1. Francisco v.

House of Rep

Facts:
An impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide and seven
Asociate Justices was filed on 2 June 2003 but was dismissed on 22 October
2003. On 23 October 2003, Representative Gilbert Teodoro and Felix Fuentabella
filed a new impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice. Thus arose the
instant petitions against the House of Representatives et al, most of which
contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional,
“no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within the period of one year.”

Issue:
Whether or not the second impeachment is constitutional?

Held: The second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3 (5) of Article
XI of the Constitution. Applying the principles of constitutional construction, ut
magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole, the
said provision should function to the full extent of its substance and form and its
terms, in conjunction with all other provisions of the Constitution. The Court, in
determining the merits of the issues raised in a petition before it, must
necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled
principles of constitutional construction. In case of doubt, the Court resorts to
the following: (1)Verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms
are employed. (2) Where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of
the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its
framers. (3). Ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted
as a whole.

2. Gonzales v. COMELEC
Facts: In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for the proposed amendments to the Constitution.
It was provided in the said law that the plebiscite shall be held on the same day
that the general national elections shall be held (November 14, 1967). This was
questioned by Ramon Gonzales and other concerned groups as they argued that
 this was unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposals to
the people who would be more interested in the issues involved in the general
election rather than in the issues involving the plebiscite.

Issue: Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a general

election.

Held: Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only be held
on a special election. SC held that there is nothing in this provision of the [1935]
Constitution to indicate that the election therein referred to is a special, not a
general election. The circumstance that the previous amendment to the
Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections
merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances
then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments
for ratification in general elections.
3. Santiago v. COMELEC
Facts: On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a “Petition to
Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by People’s
Initiative” The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates for
signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication of
the said petition in papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed local election
registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations. On
18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition against
the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues among others that the People’s Initiative is
limited to amendments to the Constitution NOT a revision thereof. The extension
or the lifting of the term limits of those in power (particularly the President)
constitutes revision and is therefore beyond the power of people’s initiative.

Issue: Whether or not the proposed Delfin petition constitutes amendment to the
constitution or does it constitute a revision

Held: The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision
of, the Constitution because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ., it would
involve a change from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one
that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the change might appear to be an
isolated one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of
elections and on the State policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities
 for public service and prohibiting political dynasties.

4. Tolentino v. COMELEC
Facts: The Constitutional Convention of 1971 approved Organic Resolution No 1
to lower the voting age to 18 and that the plebiscite for partial amendment to
take place with the local elections on November 1971 in advance, before the rest
of the draft of the Constitution then under revision has been approved. Petitioner,
Arturo Tolentino contended that under Section 1 Article XV of the Constitution,
the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for
ratification separately from each and all of the other amendments to be drafted
and proposed by the Convention.

Issue: Whether or not the Convention may call for a plebiscite on the sole
amendment contained in Organic Resolution 1?

Held: The use of the word “election” in the singular, according to the Supreme
Court, meant that the entire Constitution must be submitted for ratification at
one plebiscite only. Furthermore, the people have to be given a “proper frame of
reference” in arriving at their decision. Thus, submission for ratification of piece-
meal amendments by the Constitutional Convention (which is tasked to revise
the Constitution) was disallowed since the people had, at that time, no idea yet of
what the rest of the revised Constitution would be.

5. In Re: Laureta v. Maravilla

Facts: Eva Maravilla-Ilustre sent letters to Justices of the First Division. Ilustre
using contemptuous language claimed that members of the court rendered
unjust decision on the case GR 68635. Ilustre claimed that the Court acted
unjustly when Justice Pedro Yap failed to inhibit himself from participating when
in fact he is a law-partner of the defense counsel Atty Sedfrey Ordonez. On 27
October 1986, the Court en banc reviewed the history of the case and found no
reason to take action, stating that Justice Yap inhibited himself from the case
and was only designated as Chairman of First Division on 14 July 1986 after the
resolution of dismissal was issued on 14 May 1986. Petitioner again addressed
letters to Justices Narvasa, Herrera and Cruz with a warning of exposing the
case to another forum of justice, to which she made true by filing an Affidavit-
Complaint to Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) on 16 Decemeber 1986.
 Issue: Whether or not Separatation of Powers was violated?
Held: Judicial power is by no means a “display of arrogance” but a restatement
of the fundamental principle of separation of powers and checks and balances
under a republican form of government, that the three co-equal branches of the
government - executive, legislative, and judicial – are each supreme and
independent within the limits of its own sphere. Neither one can interfere with the
performance of the duties of the other.

6. Demetria v. Alba
Facts: Demetrio Demetria filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction in the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44
of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the “Budget Reform Decree
of 1977.” The said PD authorizes the President to transfer any fund appropriated
for different departments to any program, project or activity of any department.
The Solicitor General filed a rejoinder with a motion to dismiss, stating that the
nullity of Section 16 (5) Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom
Constitution of March 25, 1986 has allegedly rendered the instant petition moot
and academic.
Issue: Whether or not Budget Reform Decree is constitutional?
Held: Instant petition is granted. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree
No. 1177 is declared null and void for being unconstitutional. The Supreme Court
is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the
government. There are times when although the dispute has disappeared it still
ought to be resolved. Justice demands that the Court act not only for the
vindication of the one’s right but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon
the future.

7. Angara v. Electoral Commission

Facts: Petitioner, Jose Angara won the election for National Assembly for the
first district of Tayabas Province. The National Assembly passed Resolution No 8
declaring the deadline for filing protest on 3 December 1935.On the other hand
the Electoral Commission set the deadline on 9 December 1935. Losing
candidate, Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a Motion of
Protest against the election of Angara. Angara contended in his Motion to
Dismiss the Protest that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted
in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period
 during which protests against the election of its members should be presented
and that the protest was filed out of the prescribed period.
Issue: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction to review the rulings of the
Electoral Commission organized under the National Assembly.
Held: In cases of conflict between several departments and among the agencies,
the judiciary is the only constitutional mechanism devised to resolve the conflict
and allocate constitutional boundaries. The judicial supremacy is but the power
of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the
power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority. The grant of
power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to
be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature.

8. Miranda v. Aguirre
Facts: Republic Act No. 7720 converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into
an independent component city was signed into law. The people of Santiago
ratified R.A. No. 7720 in a plebiscite. Republic Act No. 8528 was enacted. It
amended R.A. No. 7720, it changed the status of Santiago from an independent
component city to a component city. Petitioner, Jose Miranda, mayor of Santiago
assailed the constitutionality of RA 8528 due to lack of ratification through
plebiscit. Petitioners also contend the petition raises a political question over
which the Court lacks jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction on political question.
Held: Petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional and
the writ of prohibition is hereby issued commanding the respondents to desist
from implementing said law. The plea that the court back off from assuming
jurisdiction over the petition at bar on the ground that it involves a political
question has to be brushed aside. This plea has long lost its appeal especially in
light of Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which defines judicial
power as including the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.

9. La Bugal- B’laan v. Ramos

 Facts: The present petition for mandamus and prohibition assails the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942, otherwise known as the PHILIPPINE
MINING ACT OF 1995, along with the Implementing Rules and Regulations issued
pursuant thereto, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Administrative Order 96-40, and of the Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement (FTAA) entered into on March 30, 1995 by the Republic of the
Philippines and WMC (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP), a corporation organized under
Philippine laws.
Issue: May the Judiciary interfere with the due exercise by co-equal branches of
the government of their official functions
Held: No. In La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association v Ramos, G.R. No. 127882,
December 1, 2004, the Court restrained itself from intruding into policy matters
to allow the President and Congress maximum discretion in using the mineral
resources of our country and in securing the assistance of foreign groups to
eradicate the grinding poverty of our people and answer their cry for viable
employment opportunities in the country. “The Judiciary is loath to interfere with
the due exercise by co-equal branches of the government of their official
functions”. Let the development of the mining industry be the responsibility of
the political branches of government. The questioned provisions of R.A. 7942
(Philippine Mining Act of 1995) are not unconstitutional.

10. PACU v. Secretary of Education

Facts: The petitioners challenged a regulation of the respondent requiring all
private colleges and universities to first obtain a permit from the Department of
Education before they could open and operate. It appeared, however, that all the
petitioners had previously obtained the required permit and that they were
questioning the regulation only because of the possibility that such permit might
be denied them in the future
Issue: Whether or not there is justiciable controversy to be settled by the Court?
Held: The Supreme Court declared that the case was premature as there was no
showing at the time of any conflict of legal rights that would justify assumption of
jurisdiction by the judiciary. The Court said that “mere apprehension that the
Secretary of Education might, under the law, withdraw the permit of one of the
petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy.” A request for an advisory
opinion is not an actual case or controversy. But an action for declaratory relief is
proper for judicial determination.

11. Mariano v. COMELEC

 Facts: Juanito Mariano, resident of Makati filed a petition for prohibition and
declaratory relief, assailing unconstitutional sections in RA 7854 (“An Act
Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as
the City of Makati”). Petitioners contend that that the new corporate existence of
the new city will restart the term of the present municipal elective making it
favourable to incumbent Mayor Jejomar Binay.

Issue: Whether or not RA 7854 is unconstitutional.

Held: The petition to declare R.A. No. 7854 (Converting the municipality of Makati
into a Highly Urbanized City) as unconstitutional was dismissed, because it was
premised on a contingent events the happening of which was uncertain (Binay is
not yet sure if will run or will win); the petitioner, thus, posed a hypothetical issue
which had not yet ripened into an actual or controversy.

12. Montesclaros v. COMELEC

Facts: The Local Government Code of 1991 limited its membership to youths “at
least 15 but no more than 21 years of age.” On 11 March 2002 the Bicameral
Committee consolidated Senate Bill 2050 and House Bill 4456, resetting the SK
election to 15 July 2002 and lowered the membership age to at least 15 but no
more than 18 years of age. This was signed by the President on 19 March 2002.
The petitioners filed prohibition and mandamus for temporary restraining order
seeking the prevention of postponement of the SK election and reduction of age
requirement on 11 March 2002.

Issue: Whether or not Judicial Review is nescessary?

Held: Petition dismissed for utter lack of merit. A proposed bill is not subject to
judicial review because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and
imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. Having no legal effect it
violates no constitutional right or duty. At the time petitioners filed this petition,
RA No. 9164 was not yet enacted into law.

13. Atlas v. Fertilizer

 Facts: Petitioner, Atlas Fertilizer engaged in the aquaculture industry utilizing
fishponds and prawn farms. Assailed Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of
R.A. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law), as well as the implementing
guidelines and procedures contained in Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10
Series of 1988 issued by public respondent Secretary of the Department of
Agrarian Reform as unconstitutional. They contend that R.A. 6657, by including
the raising of fish and aquaculture operations including fishponds and prawn
ponds, treating them as in the same class or classification as agriculture or
farming violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution and therefore
void.

Issue: Whether or not RA 6657 is unconstitutional.

Held: Petition dismissed. R.A. No. 7881 approved by Congress on 20 February

1995 expressly state that fishponds and prawn farms are excluded from the
coverage of CARL. In view of the foregoing, the question concerning the
constitutionality of the assailed provisions has become moot and academic with
the passage of R.A. No. 7881.

14. Lacson v. Perez

Facts: On 01 May 2001, Gloria Arroyo, faced by an angry and violent mob armed
with deadly weapons assaulting and attempting to break into Malacaang, issued
Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National
Capital Region. She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the
rebellion in the National Capital Region. On 06 May 2001 she ordered the lifting
of the declaration of a state of rebellion in Metro Manila. Petitioners assail the
declaration of a state of rebellion by Gloria Arroyo and the warrantless arrests
allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact an in law.

Issue: Whether or not the Proclamation No 38 and General Order No 1 are

constitutional.

Held: Petitions are dismissed. The instant petitions have been rendered moot and
academic as Gloria Arroyo ordered the lifting of the declaration of a state of
rebellion on 06 May 2001.
15. Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary
Facts: Some 300 junior officers of AFP, stormed the Oakwood in Makati
demanding for the resignation of the President, Sec of Defence and Chief of the
PNP. State of rebellion was declared an the AFP and PNP were directed to
suppress the rebellion.The state of rebellion was lifted. Petitions were filed
challenging the validity of Proclamation of State of Rebellion and calling out of
the AFP. Sanlakas contend that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does
not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed forces.
Because of the cessation of the Oakwood occupation, there exists no sufficient
factual basis for the proclamation by the President of a state of rebellion for an
indefinite period. Solicitor General argues that the petitions have been rendered
moot by the lifting of the declaration.

Issue: Whether or not declaring state of rebellion is needed to declare General

order No 4?

Held: Petitions dismissed. The state of rebellion has ceased to exist and has
rendered the case moot. Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise
moot, if it is capable of repetition yet evading review. The case at bar is one such
case.

16. Pimentel v. Ermita

Facts: Gloria Arroyo issued appointments to various acting secretaries on 23
August 2004. The Congress commenced regular session on 26 July 2004 and
some senators filed petition for certiorari and prohibition against respondents.
The Senators contended that pursuant to Section 10 (2) Book IV of EO 292 the
undersecretary shall be designated as acting secretary in case of vacancy. Also,
petitioners assert that while Congress is in session there can be no appointments
without first obtaining consent from Commission on Appointments. When
Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004, Gloria Arroyo issued ad interim
appointments to the same respondents.

Issue: Whether or not the President may appoint in an acting secretaries without
the consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session.
 Held: Petition for certiorari and prohibition were dismissed. Due to the
appointment of Gloria Arroyo to the respondents as ad interim immediately after
the recess of the Congress, the petition has become moot. However as an
exemption to the rule of mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot
if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.

17. Joya v. PCCG

Facts: The PCGG Chairman wrote to President Corazon Aquino regarding the
scheduled sale between the Republic of the Philippines and Christie’s of 82 Old
Masers Painting housed in Metropolitan Museum of Manila and 7 boxes of
antique silverware in the custody of Central Bank. The assets subject of auction
were historical relics and had cultural significance and thereby prohibited by law.
As Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists, petitioners Dean Jose Joya et al
contended that they have legal personality to restrain respondent from acting
contrary to preserving artistic creations pursuant to Sec 14-18 Article XIV of the
Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing.

Held: Petition for prohibition and mandamus dismissed for lack of merit. Legal
standing means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that
is being challenged. When the Marcos administration was toppled and the said
objects were confiscated it did not mean that ownership has passed to the
government without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of
due process and just compensation. If these were already acquired, any defect in
the acquisition must be raised by the true owners. Petitioners failed to show that
they are the legal owners of the said objects that have become publicly owned.
18. Agan v. PIATCO
Facts: Petitioners filed instant petitions for prohibition seeking to prohibit the
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) and the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and its Secretary from
implementing the various agreement executed by the Philippine Government
through the DOTC and the MIAA and the Philippine International Air Terminals
Co., Inc. (PIATCO)
 Issue: Whether or not petitioning employees has legal standing to raise validity of
the PIATCO contracts?

Held: Petition granted and contracts declared null and void. Petitioner’s have
direct and substantial interest to protect by reason of the implementation of the
PIATCO contracts. They stand to lose their source of livelihood, a property right
which is protected by the Constitution. Subsisting agreements between MIA and
petitioners stand to be terminated by the PIATCO contracts. The financial
prejudice brought about by the PIATCO contract to petitioners is legitimate
interests sufficient to give them legal standing to file the petition.

19. CHR Employees Assoc v. CHR

Facts: Petitioner Commission on Human Rights Employee Association challenged
the CA and Civil Service Commission’s decision affirming the upgrading and
reclassification of certain personnel positions in the CHR despite the disapproval
of Department of Budget and Management. The assail that the reclassification
and upgrading only benefited select few in the upper level resulting to
demoralization on the rank and file members.

Issue: Whether or not CHREA has legal standing to file petition for review against
CHR?

Held: Petition granted. A proper party is one who has sustained or is in

immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of.
Petitioner protests that the upgrading and collapsing of positions benefited only
a select few in the upper level positions in the Commission.This sufficiently meet
the injury test.

20. Automotive Industry Workers Alliance v. Romulo

Facts: Executive Order No. 185 dated 10 March 2003 provided supervision of
NLRC reverted to the Sec. of Labor and Employment. Petitioners, composed of
ten labor unions assailed the constitutionality of EO 185 for allegedly revert the
set-up prior to RA 6715 which only Congress can do. Solicitor General contend
that petitioners have no locus standi to assail the validity of E.O. No. 185, not
even in their capacity as taxpayers, considering that labor unions are exempt
from paying taxes, citing Sec. 30 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997. Even assuming
 that their individual members are taxpayers, respondents maintain that a
taxpayer suit will not prosper as E.O. No. 185 does not require additional
appropriation for its implementation.

Issue: Whether or not the ten labour unions have legal standing to assail the
constitutionality of EO 185?

Held: Petition dismissed for lack of merit. For a citizen to have standing, he must
establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
Petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are in danger of
sustaining any personal injury attributable to the enactment of E.O. No. 185. As
labor unions it cannot be said that E.O. No. 185 will prejudice their rights and
interests considering that the scope of the authority conferred upon the
Secretary of Labor does not extend to the power to review, reverse, revise or
modify the decisions of the NLRC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.

21. Tañada v. Tuvera

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right

recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as
the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the
Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the
publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed
outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to
bring the instant petition.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing

 Held: Yes. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public
right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners
were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to
conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor
General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people,
has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.

22. Chavez v. PEA and Amari

Facts: The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority to disclose all
facts on PEA’s then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and
Development Corporation to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. PEA argues that
petitioner has no standing to institute mandamus proceedings to enforce his
constitutional right to information without a showing that PEA refused to perform
an affirmative duty imposed on PEA by the Constitution. PEA also claims that
petitioner has not shown that he will suffer any concrete injury because of the
signing or implementation of the Amended JVA. Thus, there is no actual
controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner has legal standing to compel PEA to comply with
its constitutional duties?

Held: Petition granted. The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer’s suit
because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional
duties. The right of citizens to information on matters of public concern and the
application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable
distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens are
two constitutional rights involved.

23. KMU Labor Center v. Garcia

Facts: Petition for certiorari was filed by labour group KMU to assail the
constitutionality and validity of certain memoranda, circulars and / or orders from
DOTC in relation to increase in public transportation fares. Respondent contend
that petitioner has no legal standing to sue and that it is within DOTC and
LTFRB’s authority to set a fare range scheme.

Issue: Whether or nor KMU has legal standing to maintain the suit?
 Held: Petition granted. The rule requires that a party must show a personal stake
in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a
favorable decision so as to warrant an invocation of the court’s jurisdiction and to
justify the exercise of the court’s remedial powers in his behalf. KMU members,
who avail of the use of buses, trains and jeepneys everyday, are directly affected
by the burdensome cost of arbitrary increase in passenger fares. They are part of
the millions of commuters who comprise the riding public. Certainly, their rights
must be protected, not neglected nor ignored.

24. IBP v. Zamora

Facts: President Ejercito Estrada directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief
to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless
violence. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines filed a petition seeking to declare
the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.
Solicitor General contend that petitioner has no legal standing to assail.

Issue: Whether or not IBP has legal standing to assail constitutionality of calling
the AFP to assist PNP to suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion?

Held: IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the
rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration the IBP asserts no
other basis in support of its locus standi. While undoubtedly true it is not
sufficient to merit standing. However, when the issues raised are of paramount
importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure.
The Court relaxed the rules on standing and resolved the issue now.

25. Executive Secretary v. CA

Facts: Republic Act 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995)
took effect on 15 July 1995. Prior to its effectivity, Asian Recruitment Council
Philippine CHaptr Inc (ARCO-Phil) filed petition for declaratory relief. They alleged
that Section 6, subsections (a) to (m) is unconstitutional because licensed and
authorized recruitment agencies are placed on equal footing with illegal
recruiters. It contended that while the Labor Code distinguished between
recruiters who are holders of licenses and non-holders thereof in the imposition
 of penalties, Rep. Act No. 8042 does not make any distinction. In their answer to
the petition, they contend that ARCO-Phil has no legal standing, it being a non-
stock, non-profit organization; hence, not the real party-in-interest as petitioner in
the action.

Issue: Whether or not ARCO-Phil has legal standing to assail RA 8042?

Held: The modern view is that an association has standing to complain of injuries
to its members. This view fuses the legal identity of an association with that of
its members. An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its
lack of direct interest if its members are affected by the action. An organization
has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents. However, the respondent
has no locus standi to file the petition for and in behalf of unskilled workers. We
note that it even failed to implead any unskilled workers in its petition.

26. Kilosbayan v. Guingona

Facts: Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was interested
in operating an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad (PGMC) became
interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO. KILOSBAYAN submit that
the PCSO cannot validly enter into the assailed Contract of Lease with the PGMC
because it is an arrangement wherein the PCSO would hold and conduct the on-
line lottery system in “collaboration” or “association” with the PGMC, in violation
of Section 1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42. Respondents allege
that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit.

Issue: Whether or not Kilosbayan has standing to maintain instant suit?

Held: Issue on the locus standi of the petitioners should, indeed, be resolved in
their favor. A party’s standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which
it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the
issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, 29this Court brushed
aside this technicality because “the transcendental importance to the public of
these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside,
if we must, technicalities of procedure.
27. ITF v. COMELEC
Facts: Gloria Arroyo allocated php 2.5 billion fund for the automated election
system on 24 January 2003. The bidding process commenced on the same
month and out of the 57 bidders it was awarded to MPC and TIMC. DOST’s
evaluation report states that the two obtained a number of failed marks in the
technical evaluation. ITF protested the matter to COMELEC Chairman Benjamin
Abalos Sr. Abalos rejected the protest, hence the present petition.

Issue: Whether or not ITF has standing to file the case?

Held: The case at bar is a matter of public concern and imbued with public
interest, it is of paramount public interest and transcendental importance.
Taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a claim of “illegal disbursement of
public funds” or if public money is being “deflected to any improper use,” or when
petitioner seek to restrain “wasting of public funds through the enforcement of
an unconstitutional law.”

28. Tolentino v. COMELEC

Facts: Gloria Arroyo nominated Senator Teofista Guingona as vice-president.
After confirmation as VP, Resolution 84 was passed by the Senate calling the
COMELEC to fill the vacancy with a special election tobe held simultaneously
with the 2001 May regular election. It also provided that the candidate garnering
the 13th highest vote will serve for the unexpired term of Guingona. Petitioners,
Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica sought to enjoin COMELEC from proclaiming
the winner. They contend that it is without jurisdiction because it failed to notify
the electorate of the position to be filled in (special election) due to this the
people voted without distinction in one election for 13 seats irrespective of term.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s have standing to maintain suit?

Held: In questioning the validity of special election, petitioners assert harm

classified as “generalized grievance.” They failed to establish direct injury they
suffered from the said governmental act. However, the Court relaxed the
requirement on standing and exercised its discretion to give due course to voter’s
suit involving the right of suffrage.
29. Ople v Torres
Facts:
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to
prevent the shrinking of the rightto privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis
considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the rightmost valued by civilized
men." Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308
entitled"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two
important constitutional grounds,
viz

:(1)it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and(2)it impermissibly

intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.We grant the petition for the rights
sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against
furthererosion.A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on
January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant
petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torresand the heads of
the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee,
arecharged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a
temporary restraining orderenjoining its implementation.

Issue:
WON the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O. No. 308

Held:
Yes. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is
possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of
A.O.No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power.

Rationale:
As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to
the standing to sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More
specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the
implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. These submissions do
not deserve our sympathetic ear.

As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner
can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS
funds to implement A.O. No. 308. The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is
not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O.No. 308 have yet to be
promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its
face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its
fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the implementation
of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent
Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid
for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. Respondent Executive
Secretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives from the GSIS and the
SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identification system. All signals
from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we
need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In
this light, the dissenter’s insistence that we tighten the rule on standing is not a
commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an important constitutional
principle and a fundamental right.

30. People vs Vera

GR No 45685 16 November 1937

Facts:
Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants in a criminal case where he was convicted.
Cu Unjieng appealed up to the Supreme Court but was denied. On 27 November 1936 he
filed fan application for probation under the provisions of Act 4221 of the defunct
Philippine Legislature. Cu Unjieng states in his petition that he is innocent of the crime
of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would observe
good conduct in the future. The CFI of Manila denied the petition on18 June 1937.
Thereafter, the seventh branch of CFI of Manila, set the petition for hearing on 5 April
1937. The Fiscal of the City of Manila and the private prosecution also filed an
opposition on 5 April 1937 that Act 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by
section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1,
subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws
for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because
section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said
law effective or otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their respective provinces

Issue:
Whether the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General and Fiscal of the
City of Manila, is a proper party in present case.

Held:
The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the
City of Manila, is a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is
that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case. If Act 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of
the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest
in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal
expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by
the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can
challenge the validity of its own laws.
31. Estrada vs Sandiganbayan
GR No 148560 19 November 2001

Facts:
On 4 April 2001, an Information for plunder was filed against former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be
prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as
amended by RA 7659, assailed the said law for being unconstitutional. He contends
that (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the “reasonable
doubt” standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element ofmens rea in
crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are violations of
fundamental right of due process.

Issue:
Whether or not the crime of plunder is unconstitutional for being vague?

Held:
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the
language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when
measured by common understanding and practice. The “vagueness” doctrine merely
requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld – not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a
vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible “chilling effect” upon
protected speech. The theory is that “[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and
no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the
statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally
protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with
no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct
could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity.” The possible harm to
society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived
grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.

32. Umali Vs Guingona

GR No 131124 29 March 1999
Facts:
Osmundo Umali was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
However, a confidential memorandum against him was sent to President Ramos and
thus forwarded to Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption for
investigation. Umali complied with the pleadings and hearings set by PCAGC. Umali and
his lawyer did not raise clarficatory questions during the hearing. PCAGC foud prima
facie evidence to support the charges and President Ramos issued AO 152 dismissing
Umali. He appealed to the Office of the President but was denied. He elevated it to RTC
alleging that he was not accorded due process and deprived of security of tenure.
Petition for Certiorari was denied. CA reversed the decision and was elevated to SC. One
of Umali raised the issue of the constitutionality of PCAGC as a government agency.

Issue:
Whether or not the contention of Umali was raised at the earliest opportunity?

Held:
In lieu of the supervening events AO 152 was lifted. Regarding the constitutionality of
PCAGC, it was only posed by petitioner in his motion for reconsideration before the RTC.
It was certainly too late to raise the said issue for the first time at such a late stage of
the proceedings.

33. Arceta vs Mangrobang

GR No 152895 15 June 2004

Facts:
On 16 September 1998, Ofelia Arceta issued a check to Oscar Castro payable to cash
for the amount of Php 740k even with full knowledge that the account has no sufficient
fund for the said amount. The check was subsequently dishonoured by the bank. The
City Prosecutor of Metro Manila charged Arceta of violating BP Blg 22 (Bouncing
Checks Law). She did not moved for the charge to be dismissed and pleaded not guilty.
She then petitioned for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing the
constitutionality of BP Blg 22 citing the Lozano doctrine.

Issue:
Whether or not the constitutionality of BP Blg 22 is the lis mota of the case?

Held:
Petition dismissed for utter lack of merit. Every law has in its favour the presumption of
constitutionality. To justify its nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach
of the constitution and not one that is speculative, doubtful or argumentative. Petitioner
failed to show that BP Blg 22 by itself or by implementation transgressed a provision of
the Constitution.
34. Macias vs COMELEC
GR No 18684 14 September 1961

Facts:
Petitioner Lamberto Macias requests for the prevention of implementing Act 3040 that
apportions representative districts in the country on the ground that it apportioned
districts without regard to the number of inhabitants of the several provinces.
Respondent COMELEC contend that they are merely complying with the statute and that
the census submitted on November 1960 that became the basis of the bill although
“preliminary” should be considered “official for all purposes.”

Issue:
Whether or not Act 3040 was constitutional?

Held:
Act 3040 declared void as it infringes the Constitution. The Constitution directs that the
120 members of the House of Representatives shall be apportioned among the
provinces as nearly as may be according to the member of their respective inhabitants.
Act 3040 violated this provision when it gave Cebu, Manila, Pangasinan etc more
members than Rizal, Cotabato, etc with a bigger population. Such disproportion of
representation clearly violates the Constitutional provision.

35. Tan vs COMELEC

GR No 73155 11 July 1986

Facts:
Batas Pambansa Bilang 885 was enacted creating a new province in the Island of
Negros to be known as the province of Negros del Norte, which took effect on 03
December 1985. Patricio Tan filed a case for prohibition to stop COMELEC from
conducting a plebiscite and implementing the same. Due to Christmas holiday, this was
not acted upon and the plebiscite was held and ratified only to inhabitants of Negros del
Norte excluding the rest of Negros Occidental province. Petitioner move to stop the
implementation of the said law.

Issue:
Whether or not the creation of the new province, Negros del Norte was constitutional?

Held:
No. BP Bilang 885 declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of the new province
Negros del Norte and the appointment of its officials were declared null and void.
Pursuant to Article 11 Section 3, it si imperative to obtain approval of majority of votes
in a plebiscite in the units affected whenever a province is created, divided or merged
and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. The boundary of Negros Occidental
would be altered by the division of its exiting boundaries to create the new province.
There is no way to reconcile in holding a plebiscite that eliminates the participation of
the two component political units.

36. Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC

GR No 136781 06 October 2000

Facts:
Under the party-list system, a voter elects, apart from the district representative, a
registered party, organization or coalition that will be entitled to a maximum of three
party-list representatives in the House of Representatives depending on its obtaining a
required percentage of the national vote. RA 7941 provides for the manner of selection
for the party-list representatives.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent party-lists are entitled to a arty-list seat despite their
failure to get at least 2% of the national vote in the election?

Held:
Petition partially granted. 14 sitting party-list representatives were affirmed. The
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling the 38 parties entitled to a party -list
seat as it violated RA 7941 requirements of 2% threshold and proportional
representation. The imposition of threshold ensures that only parties having sufficient
number of constituents deserving representation are actually represented in Congress.

37. Bagong Bayani OFW Labor Party vs COMELEC

GR No 147589 26 June 2001

Facts:
Petitioners challenge Omnibus Resolution No 3785 issued by COMELEC that approved
the participation of 154 organizations and parties in the 2001 party-list elections.
Petitioners contend that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized
and underrepresented. The inclusion of the political parties is objectionable. Solicitor
General argued that RA 7941 allow political parties to participate as this is open to all
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organization.

Issue:
Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections?

Held:
Petition dismissed. Pursuant to RA 7941, respondents may not be disqualified from
participating on the ground that they are political parties. The Constitution also provides
that members of the House of Representatives may “be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.”

38. Aquino vs COMELEC

GR No 120265 18 September 1995

Facts:
Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the new 2 nd district of Makati
stating that he has been residing there for ten months. When his candidacy was
opposed he filed another certificate of candidacy stating that he has been residing in
Makati for more than a year by virtue of a contract of lease. COMELEC dismissed
petition for Aquino’s disqualification and garnered majority vote on 1995 election.
Mateo Bedon filed for suspension of his proclamation. COMELEC decided in favour of
Bedon hence the petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not Aquino failed the constitutional residency requirement?

Held:
Petition dismissed, COMELEC decision affirmed. In order for Aquino to qualify he must
prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice. Clearly, the
place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home” where he
eventually intends to return and remain – his domicile – is what the Constitution speaks
of residence for purposes of election law. Property ownership is not an indicia of the
right to vote or to be voted upon.

39. Marcos vs COMELEC

GR No 119976 18 September 1995

Facts:
Imelda Marcos filed her certificate of candidacy for the 1st district of Leyte stating that
she has been residing there for seven months. Incumbent, Cirilo Montejo filed for
motion for disqualification of Marcos for failing the required residency. Marcos
amended her certificate of candidacy to residing in the district since childhood.
COMELEC decided in favour of Montejo. Marcos received the highest number of votes
and her proclamation was suspended, hence the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not Marcos failed the constitutional residency requirement?

Held:
No. COMELEC resolution was set aside and directed to proclaim Marcos as duly elected
representative of the 1st district of Leyte. The essential distinction between residence and
domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for
which the resident has taken his abode ends. If a person’s intent be to remain, it
becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave then as soon as his purpose is established
it is residence.

40. Torayno vs COMELEC

GR No 137329 09 August 2000

Facts:
Vicente Emano was provincial governor of Misamis Oriental for three terms until 1995
election and his certificate of candidacy showed that his residence was in Tagoloan,
Misamis Oriental. On 14 June 1997, while still governor he executed a voter registration
record in Cagayan de Oro City which is geographically located in Misamis Oriental,
claiming 20 years of residence. He filed candidacy for mayor in the said city and stated
that his residence for the preceding two years and five months was in the same city.
Rogelio Torayno Sr filed petition for disqualification of Emano fo failing to meet the
residency requirement. Emano won the mayoral post and proclaimed winner. Torayno
filed for annulment of election of Emano. COMELEC upheld its decision.

Issue:
Whether or not Emano failed the constitutional residency requirement?

Held:
No. Petition dismissed, COMELEC resolution affirmed. Emano was the overwhelming
choice of the people of Cagayan de Oro. The court find it apt to reiterate the principle
that the manifest will of the people as expressed through the ballot be given the fullest
effect. Emano was actually and physically residing in CDO while discharging his duties
as governor and even paid his community tax certificate in the same. The residency
requirement intends to prevent the possibility of a “stranger unacquainted with the
conditions and needs of the community from seeing an elective office to serve that
community.”

41. Santiago vs Guingona

GR No 134577 18 November 1998

Facts:
The Senate convening on 27 July 1998, Senator Marcelo Fernan and Francisco Tatad
were nominated for president. Fernan won by a vote of 20 to 2 and declared President
of Senate. Senator Ople was president pro tempore and Senator Drilon as majority
leader were likewise elected. Senator Tatad manifested that he will assume minority
leader. This was contested by Senator Flavier stating that their party being the minority
group will determine the holder of the said post. Thereafter, they voted for Senator
Guingona. Hence the petition for quo warranto by Tatad.

Issue:
Whether or not there was an actual violation of the constitution in the election of Senate
officers?

Held:
Petition dismissed. The term “majority” simple means “the number greater than half or
more than half of any total.” The plain and unambiguous words of the subject
constitutional clause mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more
than one half of all the Senators.

42. Avelino vs. Cuenco

G.R. No. L-2821, March 4, 1949

Facts:
The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to
declare him the rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco. In a
session of the Senate, Tanada’s request to deliver a speech in order to formulate charges
against then Senate President Avelino was approved. With the leadership of the Senate
President followed by his supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada
from delivering his speech. The SP with his supporters employed delaying tactics, the
tried to adjourn the session then walked out. Only 12 Senators were left in the hall. The
members of the senate left continued the session and Senator Cuenco was appointed as
the Acting President of the Senate and was recognized the next day by the President of
the Philippines.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction of the case.
2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly approved.

Held:
1. The Court has no jurisdiction of the case because the subject matter is political in
nature and in doing so, the court will be against the doctrine of separation of powers. To
the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the
political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83; Vera vs. Avelino,
77 Phil. 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) and the constitutional grant to the
Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered
with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of the Vera case
even if the rights of the electors of the suspended senators were alleged affected
without any immediate remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this case because the
selection of the presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves who are at liberty
at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition
must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his
remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.

2. It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23. In fine, all the four
justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the
twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days
immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at
most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the
latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being essentially one that
depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate
about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority.
And at any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all
controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit
of all concerned,the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved
could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.

43. Pacete vs The Secretary of Commission on Appointments

GR No 25895 23 July 1971

Facts:
Feliciano Pacete was appointed by the President as municipal judge of Pigcawayan,
Cotabato. He assumed office on 11 September 1964. His appointment was made
during recess of Congress and was only submitted to COA in 1965 session and was
unanimously confirmed on 20 May 1965. On 07 February 1966 the Secretary of Justice
advised him to vacate his post on the ground that his appointment was by-passed.
Pacete clarified the matter with Commission on Appointments.COA took no action and
the Secretary of Justice still moved to Pacete to vacate his post and withheld his salaries.

Issue:
Whether or not a motion for consideration with COA without being acted on is a new
one?

Held:
Petition granted. The constitutional requirement is clear; there must be either a rejection
by COA or nonaction on its part. Pacete’s confirmation became final and irrevocable
upon the adjournment of the Fifth Congress as no rule of the Commission as to a
motion for reconsideration could have the forece and effect of defeating the
constitutional provision that an ad interim appointment is effective until disapproved by
COA or until next adjournment of the Congress.

44. Arroyo vs De Venecia

GR No 127255 14 August 1997
Facts:
RA 8240 which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by
imposing so-called ”sin taxes” on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes were
challenged by Representative Joker Arroyo. The bicameral committee after submitting
its report to the House, the chairman of the committee proceeded to deliver his
sponsorship speech and was interpellated. Arroyo also interrupted to move to adjourn
for lack of quorum. His motion was defeated and put to a vote. The interpellation of the
sponsor proceeded and the bill was approved on its third reading.

Issue:
Whether or not Arroyo should have been heard for his call to adjourn for lack of quorum?

Held:
Petition dismissed. It is unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department
of the Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the
House has disregarded its own rules of procedure or to allow those defeated in the
political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when the petitioners can find
their remedy in their own department.

45. Alejandrino vs Quezon GR No 22041 11 September 1924

Facts:
Senator Jose Alejandrino was declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation
of the privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted Senator Vicente de
Vera. He was deprived of his prerogatives, privileges and emoluments of being a senator.
He filed mandamus and injunction against respondent Senate President Manuel Quezon
from executing the said resolution and to declare the said resolution null and void.

Issue:
Whether or not the resolution disciplining Alejandrino is null and void?

Held:
Petition dismissed. Neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be
directly controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial process. The
court lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition.

46. Osmeña Jr vs Pendatun GR No 17144 28 October 1960

Facts:
Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr during his privilege speech made charges against the
Office of the President. House Resolution 59 created a Special Committee headed by
Congressman Salipada Pendatun. The committee required him to substantiate his
allegations against President Garcia and if he failed to do so he must show cause why
the House should not punish him. Osmeña filed petition for declaratory relief, certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction. He contended that the said resolution
violated his parliamentary immunity.

Issue:
Whether or not HR 59 violated Osmeña’s parliamentary immunity?

Held:
Petition dismissed. Parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislative complete freedom
of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil action before
any court outside Congressional Hall. However, it does not protect him from
responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words or conduct are considered
by the latter disorderly or unbecoming. For unparliamentary conduct, members of
Congress can be censured, committed to prison, suspended or expelled by the votes of
their colleagues.

47. Santiago v Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 200

Power of Sandiganbayan to suspend members of Congress vis-a-vis Congress'

prerogative to discipline its own members: the former is not punitive, the latter is

Facts:
A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) filed a
complaint for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against then CID
Commissioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago. It was alleged that petitioner, with evident
bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, approved the
application for legalization of the stay of several disqualified aliens. The Sandiganbayan
then issued an order for her suspension effective for 90days.

Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has authority to decree a 90-day preventive
suspension against a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines.

Held:
Yes. The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an
incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No.
3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. xxx
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of
suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once
the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to
issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be “no ifs and
buts about it.” Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension, the Court in the case
of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan observed:

“x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In

fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension.”

In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to

the clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the
Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan’s authority to decree the suspension
of public officials and employees indicted before it.

Power of Sandiganbayan to Decree Preventive Suspension vis-à-vis Congress’ Prerogative

to Discipline its Members

The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner,
behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of
preventive suspension.

The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power
of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each-
“x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend
or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.”

The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure

that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the house of Representatives, as
the case may be, upon an erring member.

xxx
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress
and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed
preventive suspension order.

48. De Venecia v Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 130240, Feb. 05, 2002

Facts:
On 12 March 1993, an Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan against
thenCongressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., of Agusan del Sur. It was for prosecution filed
a “Motion to suspend the Accused Pendente Lite” . In its Resolution dated 6
June 1997. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion and ordered the Speaker to
suspend the accused, but the Speaker did not comply. On 12 August 1997, the
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution requiring him to appear before it, to show cause why
he should not be held in contempt of court. The Speaker filed,through counsel, a motion
for reconsideration, invo-ing the rule on separation of powers and claiming that he can
only act as may be dictated by the House as a body pursuant. On 29 August 1997, the
Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution declaring Speaker Jose C. de Venecia,Jr. in
contempt of court and ordering him to pay a fine of P10,000.00 within 10 days from
notice.

Issue:
Whether or not the Suspension provided in the Antigraft
law is a penalty or a pecuniary measure.

Held:
The suspension provided for in the Anti-graft law is mandatory and is of different nature
and purpose. It is imposed by the court, not as a penalty, but as a precautionary
measure resorted to uppon the filing of valid Information. Its purpose is to prevent the
accused public officer from frustrating his prosecution by influencing witnesses or
tampering with documentary evidenceandfromcommittingfurtheractsofmalfeasancewhilein
office. It is thus an incident to the criminal proceedings before the court. On the other hand,
the suspension or expulsion contemplated in the Constitition is a House- imposed
sanction against its members. It is,
t h e r e f o r e , a p e n a l t y for d i s o r d e r l y be h a v i o r to e n f o r c e d i s c i p l i n e , mai
n tain o rd er in i ts p r o c e e d i n g s , or v i n d i c a t e i ts h o n o r and i n t e g r i t y .

49. Casco Philippine Chemical Co vs Gimenez

GR No 17931 28 February 1963

Facts:
RA 2609 known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, fixed a uniform margin fee of
25% on foreign exchange transactions. On November and December 1959 Casco
Philippine Chemical purchased urea and formaldehyde, the main ingredients in
manufacturing glues, and paid corresponding margin fees. Casco sought a refund
pursuant to Section 2 RA 2609, “shall not be imposed… urea formaldehyde…” The Bank
Auditor of Central Bank did not honur the vouchers for refund and was affirmed by the
Auditor General. Respondent contend that “urea formaldehyde” is clearly a finished
product and distinctly different from “urea” and “formaldehyde.”

Issue:
Whether or not there was error in printing of bill?

Held:
No. Decision appealed from is affirmed. If there has been any mistake in the printing of
the bill before it was certified by Congress and approved by the Executive, the remedy is
by amendment or curative legislation not by judicial decree.

50. Casco Philippine Chemical Co vs Gimenez

GR No 17931 28 February 1963

Facts:
RA 2609 known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, fixed a uniform margin fee of
25% on foreign exchange transactions. On November and December 1959 Casco
Philippine Chemical purchased urea and formaldehyde, the main ingredients in
manufacturing glues, and paid corresponding margin fees. Casco sought a refund
pursuant to Section 2 RA 2609, “shall not be imposed… urea formaldehyde…” The Bank
Auditor of Central Bank did not honur the vouchers for refund and was affirmed by the
Auditor General. Respondent contend that “urea formaldehyde” is clearly a finished
product and distinctly different from “urea” and “formaldehyde.”

Issue:
Whether or not there was error in printing of bill?

Held:
Decision appealed from is affirmed. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the
bill before it was certified by Congress and approved by the Executive, the remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation not by judicial decree.

51. United States vs Pons

GR No 11530 12 August 1916

Facts:
Juan Pons was charged and convicted of bringing opium to Philippines on board
steamer Lopez Y Lopez. Pons contend that the last day of the special session of the
Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of February; that Act No. 2381, under
which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was not passed or approved on the 28th
of February but on March 1 of that year; and that, therefore, the same is null and void.

Issue:
Whether or not Act 2381 is valid?

Held:
Judgment affirmed. When the legislative journals show with certainty the time of
adjournment of the Legislature and are clear and unambiguous they are conclusive.
Extraneous evidence cannot be admitted to show a different date of adjournment.
52. PHILCONSA vs Enriquez
GR No 113105 19 August 1994

Facts:
The General Appropriations Act appropriated Php 86.3 billion for debt services. Congress
added a special provision which provided that the amount appropriated shall be used
for payment of the national debt only and not to be paid to the liabilities of the Central
Bank. The appropriation for DPWH also provided that the maximum amount to be
contracted for the maintenance of national roads and bridges should not exceed 30% the
appropriation for medicines by the Armed Forces of the Philippines required approval
Congress for the release of funds.
In the General Appropriations Act of 1994 the appropriation for the Armed Forces of the
Philippines contains a provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the
appropriation to augment the pension and gratuity fund of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. The President vetoed the authorization given by the Chief of Staff to use
savings to augment the pension and gratuity fund. Several Senators questioned the
validity of the veto.
Issue:
Whether or not the President’s veto is valid?

Held:
Petition dismissed. Congress cannot include in the general appropriations matters that
should be enacted in a separate legislation and if it does so, the inappropriate provision
must be treated as an item and can be vetoed by the President.
The provision in GAA authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the
pension and gratuity fund violates Section 25 (paragraph 5) and Section 29 (paragraph 1)
of Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution. Only the President is authorized to augment items
from savings in the general appropriation to the executive branch. Also pursuant to
Section 29 – no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.

53. Ligot vs Mathay

GR No 34676 30 April 1974

Facts:
Petitioner was re-elected to a third term (December 30, 1965 to December 30, 1969) but
was held not entitled to the salary increase of P32,000.00 during such third term by
virtue of this Court’s unanimous decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay. He lost his next bid
and filed for retirement claim. House of Representative issued a treasury warrant using
the unapproved amount. Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant. Petitioner’s request
for reconsideration was denied, hence the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to retirement using php 32k?
Held:
No. Petition denied. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms
expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of
P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving
during their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect
increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive
during their incumbency.

54. People vs Jalosjos

GR No 132875-76 03 February 2000

Facts:
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress
confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two
counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-
appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.

Issue:
Whether or not membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules
which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general?

Held:
Petition denied. Election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are
germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.

30. Nicanor Jimenez vs Bartolome Cabangbang

Facts
In November 1958, while congress was not in session, defendant member of the
House of Representatives who was also Chairman of its Committee on National
Defense caused the publication in several newspapers of an open letter to the
President of the Philippines stating that certain members of the armed Forces of the
Philippines have been preparing for a coup and working for the presidential
candidacy of the Secretary of national defense. The plaintiffs were named in the
open letter as being controlled by the “Planners” of the coup, thus the case was filed
to collect a sum of damages against the defendant alleging that the statement is
libelous. Defendant petitioned for the case to be dismissed claiming that as a
member of the lower house he is immune from suit, that he is covered by the
privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.

Issue: Whether or not the open letter is privileged communication and covered by the
privilege of speech and debate endowed to members of Congress

Held: No, the open letter is not covered by the speech and debate clause of the
Constitution and thus not immune from suit. Pursuant to the Constitution, no
member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or
debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof (Article VI, Section 15). This
privilege covers utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their
official functions, while congress is in session. In the case at hand the court found
that the defendant was not performing his official duty either as member of
congress or as officer thereof as Congress was not in session at the time the letter
was published. Hence the communication is not absolutely privileged.

31. Homobono Adaza vs Fernando Pacana, Jr.

Facts
Petitioner Adaza and respondent Pacana were elected governor and Vice
Governor respectively in the 1980 elections with their terms of office set to expire
in 1986. On March 27, 1984, both filed their candidacy for BP elections as
Mambabatas Pambansa with Adaza winning and taking office as MP. Having lost
the BP elections, Pacana reverted to his role in the local government and took his
oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental and started to perform the duties
of governor on July 1984. This petition is raised to exclude the respondent from
the governors office, with the claim that said petitioner is still the lawful occupant
of the said office and will serve his full term until March 1986.

Issue: Whether or not a provincial governor who was elected as a Mambabatas

Pambansa [MP] can exercise and discharge the functions of both offices
simultaneously.

Held: No, the petitioner may not exercise and discharge both functions
simultaneously. Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as
follows:
“Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall
not hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the
cabinet . . .”
The above provision prohibits a member from occupying simultaneously an
incompatible office. An incompatible office is a post that a member cannot
accept unless he waives or forfeits his seat in Congress. The purpose of said
provision is to prevent a member form owing loyalty to another branch of the
government to the detriment of the legislative. To wit, petitioner may not exercise
and discharge both functions of Legislator and Governor as the offices are
incompatible.

32. Eugenio Puyat vs Sixto De Guzman, Jr.

Facts: On May 25, 1979, a group of directors of International Pipe Industries filed
a quo warranto case before the SEC questioning the election of directors held on
May 15 stating that votes were not properly counted therein. At the SEC
conferences, Assemblyman Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for
the complainants, the elected directors protested arguing that it is
unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as counsel before any
administrative body. Fernandez then inhibited himself from appearing as counsel
for the group and instead on May 31 filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention for
him to intervene, not as a counsel, but as a legal owner of IPI shares with a legal
interest in the matter in litigation having bought 10 shares of stock from one of
the directors with the deed of sale signed on May 15 and notarized on May 30.
The SEC Commissioner subsequently granted the motion allowing Fernandez to
intervene in the proceedings.

Issue: Whether or not Fernandez as a stockholder of IPI, can appear and

intervene in the SEC case without violating the constitutional provision that an
assemblyman must not appear as counsel in such courts or bodies?

Held: The court reversed and set aside the respondent Commissioner's Order.
The court finds that because of salient facts in the case, there has been an
indirect "appearance as counsel before ... an administrative body" which in effect
is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The salient facts being that
he acquired only 10 shares (P200.00) of 262,843 outstanding shares, that the
shares were acquired after the contested election of Directors, and that the deed
was notarized after the quo warranto suit had been filed and just one day before
the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC on May 31. Furthermore,
before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel.
The court finds that the "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to
appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity and a ruling upholding
the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. That which
the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection.

33. Firdausi Abbas et al vs The Senate Electoral Tribunal

Facts: In October 1987, Firdausi Abbas et al filed before the SET an election
contest against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed
senators-elect in the May 11 (1987) congressional elections by the COMELEC.
The SET is composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6)
Senators. In consideration of public policy and the norms of fair play and due
process Abbas filed for the disqualification of the 6 senator members from
acting on the said election protest as all of them are interested parties to said
case. The Tribunal’s Rules (Section 24) requires the concurrence of five (5)
 members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature in relation to the
protest. Should the disqualification be granted, Abbas suggested amendments to
said rules with a proviso that where more than four (4) members are disqualified,
the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, and with a minimum of three
(3) including one (1) Justice, they may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no
abstentions. The suggestion is tailored to the situation hypothesized by the
petition for disqualification, which would leave the resolution of the contest to
the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose
disqualification is not sought.

Issue: Whether or not Abbas’ proposal is constitutional

Held: The Constitution provides for the Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of
the Supreme Court and Members of the Senate with the intent that both those
"judicial' and 'legislative' components commonly share the duty and authority of
deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
Senators. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would
leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or
body can perform, a duty it cannot lawfully discharge without the participation of
its entire membership of Senators.

34. Emigdio Bondoc vs Marciano Pineda

Facts: Bondoc (Nationalista Party) and Pineda (Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino)
were rivals for a Congressional seat in the 4thDistrict of Pampanga with Pineda
winning in that election. However, Bondoc contested the result in the HRET
(House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal). Bondoc won in the protest and he
was set to be declared as the winner by the HRET. Congressman Camasura, Jr. a
representative of the LDP to the HRET made a conscience vote in favor of
Bondoc for which he was expelled from the LDP. The House of Representatives
through a resolution moved to remove Camasura from the HRET for disloyalty to
the party. As the favorable decision on his electoral protest is being thwarted
because of the issue, Bondoc questioned such action before the Supreme Court
(SC) by filing a petition to, among others, annul the decision of the HOR to
withdraw and rescind the nomination of Rep. Camasura to the HRET and to issue
a writ of mandamus ordering said Rep to immediately reassume and discharge
his functions as a member of the HRET.

Issue: Whether or not the removal of Camasura from the HRET at the request of the
dominant party impairs the Tribunals prerogative to be the sole judge of protests.

Held: The court found that the resolution of the House of Representatives
removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for
disloyalty to the LDP, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of
the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between
Pineda and Bondoc. Further, the ruling states that the decision of the House of
Representatives withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of Rep.
Camasura as a member of the HRET is hereby declared null and void ab initio for
being violative of the Constitution, and is ordered reinstated to his position as a
member of the HRET.

35. Codilla vs. de Venecia

Facts: At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the disqualification case was
still pending against the petitioner Codilla and thus his name remained in the list
of candidates as Representative and obtained the highest number of votes in the
elections with Locsin coming in second. His proclamation was suspended
pending the disqualification case. Subsequently, the COMELEC Second Division
resolved in favor of disqualification and Locsin was thus pronounced as the duly
elected Representative and subsequently took her oath of office. However, this
decision was reversed by the COMELEC en banc and on Sept 12, 2001 Codilla
was declared the winner and took his oath. Locsin refused to acknowledge the
decision of the COMELEC en banc and argued that having been proclaimed and
having taken oath as representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, any
question relative to her election and eligibility should be brought before the HRET
pursuant to section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction over the validity of Locsins
proclamation
Held: No. The HRET does not have jurisdiction. The court rejected Locsins
contentions stating that a. The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division
was yet to be resolved by the COMELEC en banc at the time of her
proclamation that being so the HRET has no jurisdiction over the issue as it is
the validity of the COMELEC pronouncement that is in question which may
only be resolved by the COMELEC en banc (b) The HRET only has jurisdiction
over the election and qualification of a duly elected and proclaimed member,
Locsins proclamation does not qualify as it was a nullity and void from the
beginning.

36. Pimentel v HRET

Facts: The Party-List System Act took effect on on 3 March 1995 and for the first
time on May 11 1998, in accordance with said act, the election through popular
vote of party-list groups and organizations whose nominees would become
members of the House was held along with the national elections. Proclaimed
winners were 14 party-list representatives from 13 organizations. Subsequently,
the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its representatives
to these two constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the
nomination by the political parties of House members who are to occupy seats in
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Commission on
Appointments (CA). From available records, it does not appear that after the 11
May 1998 elections the party-list groups in the House nominated any of their
representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of the present
petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction, the House contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed solely
of district representatives belonging to the different political parties.

Issue: Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates
the constitutional requirement of proportional representation because there are
no party-list representatives in the HRET.

Held: No. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the
prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district
and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the
House in the HRET and the CA (Article VI Section 17 and 18). The discretion of
the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being
subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.
However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere
with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally mandated duty, absent a
clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Neither can the Court speculate on what action the
House may take if party-list representatives are duly nominated for membership
in the HRET and the CA. The petitions are bereft of any allegation that
respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House from participating in
the election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that
after the 11 May 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list representatives
from seeking membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the
available facts that the party-list groups in the House at that time simply refrained
from participating in the election process. As the primary recourse of the party-
list representatives lies with the House of Representatives, ‘the Court cannot
resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time.

37. Daza v Singson

FACTS: The HoR proportionally apportioned its 12 seats in the CoA among
several political parties represented in that chamber in accordance with Art. VI
Sec 18. The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a
political realignment in the HoR. 24 members of the Liberal Party joined the LDP,
reducing their former party to only 17 members. As a consequence of this
development, the chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the
original members except the petitioner and including therein Luis C. Singson as
the additional member from the LDP. Daza came to the Supreme Court to
challenge his removal from the CoA and the assumption of his seat by Singson.
Petitioner argues that he cannot be removed from the CoA because his election
thereto is permanent. Petitioner claims that the reorganization of the House
representation in the said body is not based on a permanent political realignment
because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained
political stability.

ISSUE: Whether or not the HoR was within its authority in withdrawing the seat of
Daza based on the realignment of political parties.
Held: The court resolves the issue in favor of the authority of the House of
Representatives to change its representation in the Commission on
Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the
political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must
be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions
not involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and
permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.
38. Coseteng vs mitra
Facts : On August 26, 1987, the House of Representatives, upon nomination by
the Majority Floor Leader, Cong. Francisco Sumulong, elected from the Coalesced
Majority, eleven (11) out of twelve (12) congressmen to represent the House in
the Commission on Appointments.
On February 1, 1989, Congresswoman Coseteng and her party, the KAIBA, filed
this Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs (which may be considered as a petition
for quo warranto and injunction) praying this Court to declare as null and void the
election of respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco, Mercado, Bandon,
Cabochan, Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and Singson, as members of the
Commission on Appointments, to enjoin them from acting as such and to enjoin
also the other respondents from recognizing them as members of the Commission
on Appointments on the theory that their election to that Commission violated
the constitutional mandate of proportional representation because

Issue: Whether or not the members of the House in the Commission on

Appointments were chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

Held: The courts ruled that the petition be dismissed, because the revision of the
House representation in the Commission on Appointments is based on
proportional representation of the political parties therein as provided in Section
18, Article VI of the 1987
There is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the House members in the
Commission on Appointments should have been nominated and elected by their
respective political parties. The petition itself shows that they were nominated by
their respective floor leaders in the House. They were elected by the House (not
by their party) as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution. The validity
of their election to the Commission on Appointments — eleven (11) from the
Coalesced Majority and one from the minority — is unassailable.
The petition is dismissed.

39. Guingona v Gonzales

Facts: To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12 representatives
in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a
political party) x 12 seats) ÷ Total No. of Senators elected. The senate was
composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1
LP-PDP-LABAN senator. Applying the formula would produce 7.5 members for
LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for
LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from
their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taňada from LP-PDP-LABAN
should represent the same party to the CoA. A member of LAKAS-NUCD,
opposed the nominations on the basis that the compromise is against
proportional representation.

Issue: Whether the election of Romulo and Tañada as members of the CoA is in
accordance with the provision of Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

Held: The court declared the election of Senator Alberto Romulo and Senator
Wigberto Tañada as members of the Commission on Appointments as null and
void for being in violation of the rule on proportional representation under Section
18 of Article VI of the Constitution. The court found the respondents' claim to
membership in the Commission on Appointments by nomination and election of
the LDP majority in the Senate as not in accordance with Section 18 of Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution and therefore violative of the same because it is not in
compliance with the requirements that twelve senators shall be elected on the
basis of proportional representation of the resulting fractional membership of the
political parties represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional
membership of the political parties in the Commission on Appointments by adding
together two halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional
representation because it will give the LDP an added member in the Commission
by utilizing the fractional membership of the minority political party, who is
deprived of half a representation.

40. Tio v Videogram Regulatory Board

Facts: In an effort to address the proliferation and unregulated circulation of
videograms and its economic effects to the movie industry PD No. 1987 entitled
“An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” was enacted which gave
broad powers to the VRB to regulate and supervise the videogram industry.
Sections 2 and 5 of the preamble expound on the need to properly tax the
activities of the industry in order to rationalize the before uncontrolled
distribution of videograms and also to compensate for the lost government
revenues as a result of the decline in movie house sales and consequently
income, amusement and other taxes. Petitioner questioned the constitutionality
of the law on several grounds and on Section 10 thereof, questioned the
imposition of the 30% tax on gross receipts, stating that said section is a rider
and is not germane to the subject matter of the law.

Issue: Whether or not the PD complies with the one title one subject rule.

Held: The court found that the title of the DECREE, which is the creation of the
Videogram Regulatory Board, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes
expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. The
requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof" is sufficiently complied with if the title be
comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to
achieve. It is unnecessary for the title to express every thing that the statute
wishes to accomplish so long as the parts of the statute are related, and are
germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title then the requirement
is satisfied.

41. Lidasan v Comelec

Facts: Republic Act No. 4790, entitled “An Act Creating the Municipality of
Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur,” was passed. Pursuant to this law,
COMELEC proceeded to establish precincts for voter registration in the said
territories of Dianaton. The petitioner Lidasan questioned the fact that the his
barrio in Cotabato was now included in the new Municipality of Dianaton thus
effectively transferred Lanao Del Sur. Petitioner filed a case assailing the
constitutionality of the RA on the grounds that the law did not clearly indicate in
its title that in creating Dianaton, it would be including in its territory several
barrios from Cotabato.

Issue: Whether or not the PD complies with the one title one subject rule.

Held: The court held that the title did not satisfy the one title one subject rule by
failing to inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; also, it
did not inform the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in
the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from
their towns and province to be added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it
kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected
by the bill.

42. Cruz v Paras

Facts: With the aim to exercise police power to promote general welfare, Ord. No.
84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan was
passed. The petitioners being club and Cabaret operators assailed the
constitutionality of said ordinance stating that it violates their right to engage in a
lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their business. The local
ordinance was enacted pursuant to RA 938 which reads “AN ACT GRANTING
MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF
AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS”, the
first section of which says that the municipal or city board or council of each
chartered city shall have the power to regulate, but likewise prohibit by ordinance
the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing
schools… and the like. The lower courts ruled that the prohibition is a valid
exercise of police power to promote general welfare, thus the appeal to the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the powers granted by RA 938 includes prohibition aside
 from regulation

Held: The Court ruled that the power granted remains that of regulation, not
prohibition following the rule that "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof." The court finds that there is no dispute as
the title limits the power to regulating. Ordinances by virtue of the general welfare
clause must be reasonable, in consonance with the laws and public policy of the
state.

43. Tobias vs Abalos

Facts: Prior to Republic Act No., 7675 also known as “An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City
of Mandaluyong”, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative
district. Petitioners move to declare unconstitutional R.A. No. 7675, specifically
Article VIII, Section 49 thereof. Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:
As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative
district with the firstrepresentative to be elected in the next national elections
after the passage of this Act. The remainderof the former legislative district of
San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district ofSan Juan with
its first representative to be elected at the same election.

Issue: Whether or not the creation of a separate congressional district for

Mandaluyong under RA 7675 complies with the one title one subject rule

Held: Yes, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is

not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a
highly urbanized city. The title necessarily includes and contemplates the subject
treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional
district for Mandaluyong. A liberal construction of the "one title- one subject" rule
has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.

44. Demetrio Demetria vs Manuel Alba

Facts: The petitioners as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa
sought to prohibit Manuel Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing
funds pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of
1977. Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of paragraph 1, Section 44 of the
said PD. This Section provides that:
“The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the
different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive
Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any
program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the
General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.”

Issue: Whether or not paragraph 1 Section 44 of PD No. 1177 is constitutional

Held: No, the prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was
explicit and categorical under the 1973 Constitution. The leeway granted to the
heads of the different branches of the government and those of the
constitutional commissions is limited to augmenting an item from savings in
another item in the appropriation only within the government branch or
constitutional body concerned. The extension of the powers granted to the
president by paragraph 1 Section 44 of PD No. 1177 is unconstitutional and
amounts to undue delegation of legislative powers.

45. Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague

Facts: The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with
P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under Republic Act
No. 6831, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act, or a total of
P233.5 Billion. The petitioners are questioning the constitutionality of the
automatic appropriation for debt service in said budget. Automatic appropriation
for debt service is authorized by R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D.
No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967. However, petitioners argue that being automatic, the
laws are inconsistent with Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, whereby all
appropriation bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives.
Issue: Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990
budget pursuant to R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and
P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations

Held: Yes, the automatic appropriation for debt service provides flexibility for
effective debt management without need for periodic enactment of laws. The
Court finds that in this case the questioned laws are complete in all their
essential terms and conditions and sufficient standards are indicated therein.
The purpose of these laws is to enable the government to make prompt payment
and/or advances for all loans to protect and maintain the credit standing of the
country. Although the specific amounts to be paid are not certain, there are
legislative parameters provided that is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes
and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on
the bonds, debentures or security or other evidences of indebtedness sold in
international markets incurred by virtue of the law, as and when they shall
become due.

46. PHILCONSA VS ENRIQUEZ

Facts: RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act of 1994 contains a special
provision that allows any member of Congress the authority to realign his
allocation for Operational Expenses, provided that the total of said allocation is
not exceeded. Petitioners question the validity of said provision arguing that only
the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives are
authorized under the Constitution to realign savings for the legislative branch
pursuant to Article VI Section 25 of the Constitution.
Issue
Whether or not the special provision in RA 7663 allowing members of congress
to realign his allocation is valid

Held
No. Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House have the power to
realign allocations made. The member may determine and propose the
realignment but it is subject for approval of the Speaker of the house and the
Senate President pursuant to Article VI Section 25 of the Constitution.
Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned are
actually savings, and 2) the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the items
of expenditures to which said transfer to be made.

47. Arturo Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance

Fact: Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise
known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. H. No. 11197 was filed in
the House of Representatives where it passed three readings and that afterward
it was sent to the Senate where after first reading it was referred to the Senate
Ways and Means Committee, the Senate did not pass it on second and third
readings and instead passed its own version (S. No. 1630) approved on May 24,
1994. The petitioners argued that as the enrolled bill was not the version passed
by the HoR but instead was the Senate version, therefore the bill did not
exclusively originate from the House of Representatives and violates Section 24,
Article 6 of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the Senate may propose an amendment to a House

revenue bill by enacting its own version of a revenue bill?

Held: The court finds that while Art. VI, Section 24 provides that all appropriation,
revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills must "originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives," it also provides, "but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments." The court ruled that in the exercise of this power, the Senate may
propose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure, furthermore, the court finds
that there is also no prohibition to the filing of a Senate Bill in anticipation of the
receipt of the Bill coming from the House, as long as there is no further action by
the Senate pending receipt of the House Bill. To wit, what the Constitution only
requires is that the initiative must come from the HoR on the theory that they are
more sensitive to the needs and problems of their locality.

48. LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES VS QUEZON CITY

Facts: The Lung Center of the Philippines was assessed Real Property Taxes by
the City Assessor of Quezon City. Petitioner contends that it is exempt from Real
Property Taxes as a Charitable institution pursuant to Article VI, Section 28 (3) of
the Constitution. The hospital in its operations admits patients, renders medical
services, leases portions of the land to private parties, and rents out portions of
the hospital to private medical practitioners from which it derives income to be
used for operational expenses.

Issue: Whether or not the Lung Center as a charitable institution is exempt from
Real Property Taxes on the property it occupies

Held: The exemption from Real Property Taxes is partially granted. The court
ruled that only the portions of the land occupied by the hospital and used for its
patients whether paying or nonpaying are exempt from real property taxes while
the portions of the land leased to private entities as well as those parts of the
hospital leased to private individuals are not exempt from such taxes. He who
claims the exemption must bear the burden to prove, by clear and unequivocal
proof, that (a) it is a charitable institution; and (b) its real properties are
ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY used for charitable purposes the
petitioner was found wanting thus the decision.

49. Tan v. Del Rosario

Facts: The petitioners challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7496,
commonly known as the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), which
amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. RA 7496 in
effect limited the allowable deductions from gross income of single proprietorships
and professionals in the computation of their taxable net income. Petitioner argues
that RA No. 7496 desecrates the constitutional requirement that taxation "shall
be uniform and equitable" in that the law would now attempt to tax single
proprietorships and professionals differently from the manner it imposes the tax
on corporations and partnerships.

Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 7496 complies with the rule on uniformity
of taxation and therefore constitutional.

Held: The court ruled that RA 7496 is constitutional. Uniformity of taxation merely
requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated
alike both in privileges and liabilities. Classification does not violate uniformity for
as long as: (1) the standards that are used therefor are substantial and not
arbitrary, (2) the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3)
the law applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and
(4) the classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the same class.

50. Enrique Garcia vs Executive Secretary

Facts: The President issued several Executive Orders which imposed additional
duties on importation. Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of Executive
Order Nos 475 and 478 pursant to Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills etc, shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives. Executive Order No. 475 issued on
15 August 1991 imposed an additional duty on all imported articles of five
percent (5%) ad valorem, except in the cases of crude oil and other oil products
which shall be subject to the additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad valorem.
Executive Order No. 478, dated 23 August 1991, levied (in addition to the
aforementioned additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad valorem and all other
existing ad valorem duties) a special duty of P0.95 per liter or P151.05 per barrel
of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products.

Issue: Whether or not the President is acting within his powers in the levy of
additional duties and in issuing laws in the nature of revenue generating measures

Held: The court rule that the President is acting within his powers in the issuance
of EO Nos 475 and 478. Generally, revenue laws etc shall originate from the HoR,
however there is an exception in Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution
which says that the Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose,
tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of
the Government. There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to
authorize the President "subject to such limitations and restrictions is [Congress]
may impose" to fix "within specific limits" "tariff rates . . . and other duties or
imposts . . ." The delegation of tax powers to the President must be through a
law and in this instance, the relevant congressional statute is the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines, specifically Sections 104 and 401 thereof.

51. JOHN HAY PAC V Lim

Facts: Proclamation No. 420, series of 1994, was issued by then President Fidel
Ramos “CREATING AND DESIGNATING A PORTION OF THE AREA COVERED BY
THE FORMER CAMP JOHN [HAY] AS THE JOHN HAY SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE
PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7227”. Petitioners allege that PD No. 420 is
unconstitutional in so far as it grants tax exemptions merely through the
president, when such power resides with the legislative through Article VI,
Section 28 (4) of the Constitution which provides that No law granting any tax
exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the
members of Congress.

Issue Whether or not Proclamation No. 420 is constitutional in providing for

national and local tax exemption within and granting other economic incentives
to the John Hay Special Economic Zone

Held: The court ruled that it is the legislature, unless limited by a provision of the
state constitution, that has full power to exempt any person or corporation or
class of property from taxation, its power to exempt being as broad as its power
to tax. In the case at hand, the tax exemption would circumvent the Constitutions
requirement that a law granting any tax exemption must have the concurrence of
a majority of all the members of Congress.
52. Teresita Fabian vs Aniano Desierto
Facts: The Ombudsman granted the motion for reconsideration of and absolved
private respondents from administrative charges for inter alia grave misconduct
committed as then Assistant Regional Director, of the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH). The petitioner appeals to the Supreme Court the
decision pursuant to Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of
1989)i which pertinently provides - In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders,
directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the
Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt
of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis
supplied)
Issue: Whether or not Section 27 of RA 6770 is valid thus the court has appellate
jurisdiction over administrative cases decided by the ombudsman.

Held: No, the court ruled that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman
Act of 1989), together with Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), and any other provision of law or
issuance implementing the aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for appeals in
administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the
Supreme Court, are hereby declared INVALID and of no further force and effect.
Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore,
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this
Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the
Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court.
The instant petition is referred and transferred to the Court of Appeals for final
disposition.

53. Arturo Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance

Facts: Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise
known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. H. No. 11197 was filed in
the House of Representatives where it passed three readings on the same date
and that afterward it was sent to the Senate where after first reading it was
referred to the Senate Ways and Means Committee. The President certified the
senate version S. No. 1630 as urgent and thus the Senate did not pass for
second and third readings and instead passed its own version approved on May
24, 1994. The petitioners argued against the constitutionality of the law on the
grounds that the bill did not pass the required three readings on separate days.

Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 is constitutional despite not having passed 3

readings on separate days by virtue of the presidential certification.

Held: Yes, pursuant to Article VI Sec 26 of the constitution the phrase "except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc."
dispenses with not only the requirement that "printed copies [of a bill] in its final
form [must be] distributed to the members three days before its passage" but
also the requirement that before a bill can become a law it must have passed
"three readings on separate days."

54. Philconsa v Enriquez

Facts: In passing RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act of 1994 Congress added
Special Provisions to Article XLVIII (Appropriations for Debt Service). The
President vetoed the entire paragraph one of the Special Provisions which reads:
1. Use of the Fund. The appropriation authorized herein shall be used for
payment of principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness;
PROVIDED, That any payment in excess of the amount herein appropriated shall
be subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines with the
concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in no
case shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of
Liquidators.

Issue: Whether or not the President has the power to veto "provisions" of an
Appropriations Bill?

Held: The court sustained the Presidential veto only with respect to the proviso
therein requiring that "any payment in excess of the amount herein, appropriated
shall be subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines with the
concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines . . .". The vetoed provision was
deemed an “inappropriate provision” insofar as it extended in its operation
beyond an item of appropriation also because the provision was inserted with the
intent of amending other laws which have no place in an appropriations bill. The
intent to amend the automatic appropriation for debt service is a matter of
general legislation more appropriately dealt with in separate enactments. As to
the rest of the provisions, the court finds that these provisions are germane to
and have a direct connection with the item on debt service. Inherent in the power
of appropriation is the power to specify how the money shall be spent. The said
provisos, being appropriate provisions, cannot be vetoed separately. Hence the
item veto of said provisions is void.

55. Neptali Gonzales vs Macaraig

Facts: On 29 December 1988, the President signed into law House Bill No. 19186,
or the General Appropriations Bill for the Fiscal Year 1989, and declared the same
to have become Rep. Act No. 6688. In the process, seven (7) Special Provisions
and Section 55, a "General Provision," were vetoed. On 2 February 1989, the
Senate, in issuing Resolution No. 381. expressed “that the veto by the President
of Section 55 of the GENERAL PROVISIONS of the General Appropriation Bill of
1989 (H.B. No. 19186) is unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without any
force and effect; hence, the aforesaid Section 55 remains”.
The vetoed provisions is “SEC. 55. Prohibition Against the Restoration or
Increase of Recommended Appropriations Disapproved and/or Reduced by
Congress…” The Petition for Prohibition/ Mandamus was filed by petitioners
assailing mainly the constitutionality or legality of the Presidential veto of Section
55, and seeking to enjoin respondents from implementing Rep. Act No. 6688.

Issue: Whether or not the President has the power to veto "provisions" of an
Appropriations Bill?

Held: The constitutionality of the assailed Presidential veto is UPHELD and this
Petition is hereby DISMISSED. The veto power of the President is expressed in
Article VI, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution. Explicit is the requirement that a
provision in the Appropriations Bill should relate specifically to some" particular
appropriation" therein. The challenged "provisions" fall short of this requirement.
Firstly, the vetoed "provisions" do not relate to any particular or distinctive
appropriation. They apply generally to all items disapproved or reduced by
Congress in the Appropriations Bill. Secondly, the disapproved or reduced items
are nowhere to be found on the face of the Bill. Thirdly, the vetoed Sections are
more of an expression of Congressional policy in respect of augmentation from
savings rather than a budgetary appropriation. Consequently, Sec 55 although
labelled as "provisions," are actually inappropriate provisions that should be
treated as items for the purpose of the President’s veto power.

56. Bengzon v Drilon

Facts: The issue in this petition is the constitutionality of the veto by the
President of certain provisions in the General Appropriations Act for FY 1992
relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in order to assure those serving in the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Constitutional Commissions receive
adequate old age pensions even during the time when the purchasing power of
the peso has been diminished substantially by worldwide recession or inflation.
The President vetoed underlined portions of Section 1 and the entire Section 4
the Special Provisions for the Supreme Court of the Philippines and the Lower
Courts and the underlined portions of Section 1 and the entire Section 2, of the
Special Provisions for the Court of Appeals and the underlined portions of
Section 1.3 of Article XLV of the Special Provisions of the General Fund
Adjustments.

Issue: Whether or not the veto by the President is an item veto in accordance
with the constitution

Held: The questioned veto is SET ASIDE as illegal and unconstitutional. The
President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue or tariff bill but the veto shall not affect the item or items
to which he does not object. (Section 27(2), Article VI, Constitution). However,
what were vetoed were methods or systems placed by Congress to insure that
permanent and continuing obligations to certain officials would be paid when
 they fell due. An examination of the entire sections and the underlined portions of
the law which were vetoed will readily show that portions of the item have been
chopped up into vetoed and unvetoed parts. Less than all of an item has been
vetoed. Moreover, the vetoed portions are not items. They are provisions. The
vetoed provisions of the 1992 Appropriations Act are declared valid and
subsisting.

57. Miller v Mardo

Facts: Republic Act 991 provided that the reorganization plan drafted by
Department of Labor and Employment and submitted it to the president for
approval shall deemed as approved by the Congress after its adjournment unless
in the meantime, Congress by resolution disapproved the plan and assailed its
constitutionality.

Issue: Whether or not enactment of law by legislative inaction is valid?

Decision: The contemplated procedure violates the constitutional provisions

requiring positive and separate actions of each house. It is contrary to the “settled
and well-understood parliamentary law” which requires that the “two houses are
to hold separate sessions for their deliberations, and the determination of the one
upon a proposed law is to be submitted to the separate determination of the
other.”

82. Tanada vs Tuvera

Facts:
. Petitioners filed a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish
various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letters of implementations, and administrative orders.
Issue: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law
becomes effective.
Held: Article 2 of the civil code does not do away with the requirement of publication in
the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The
objective of this provision is to inform the public and give notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions. The publication of presidential issuances of public
nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that
before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general
application which have not been published have no force and effect.

83. Executive Order No. 200

Facts:
Article 2 of the Civil Code partly provides that “laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided..”
The requirement that for laws to be effective only a publication thereof in the Official
Gazette will suffice has entailed some problems, a point recognized by the Supreme
Court in Tanada vs Tuvera when it observed that there is much to be said of the the
view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic
release and limited readership.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 2 of the Civil Code should be amended so the laws to be effective
must be published either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation
in the country.
Held:
Article 2 of the Civil Code is hereby amended.

Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.

Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the "Civil Code of the
Philippines," and all other laws inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.

Sec. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its publication in the
Official Gazette

84. Arnault vs Nazareno

Facts:
The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of land, known
as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the Senate sought to
resolve was the apparent irregularity of the government’s payment to one Ernest Burt, a
non-resident American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5 million for his alleged interest
in the two estates that only amounted to Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have
forfeited anyway long before. The Senate sought to determine who were responsible for
and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the government.

Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed to the custody
of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he answers the
questions. He thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme
Court questioning the validity of his detention.

Issues:
Whether or not the senate has the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a
term beyond its period of legislative session.

Held:

Yes, the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond
its period of legislative session. There is no sound reason to limit the power of the
legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of
the last session terminating the existence of that body. The very reason for the exercise
of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its
constitutional function without impediment or obstruction.

85. Arnault vs Balagtas

Facts:
This was a petition for habeas corpus filed by Jean Arnault against the Director of
Prisons, Balagtas. Arnault was incarcerated pursuant to a resolution by the Senate
finding Arnault in contempt for refusing to disclose the name of a person with whom he
transacted business in relation to a government purchase of of the Buenavista and
Tambobong estates. The circumstances of Arnault's incarceration are described in the
companion case Arnaultvs. Nazareno (1950) which affirmed the Legislature's power to
hold a person in contempt for defying or refusing to comply with an order in a legislative
inquiry. Arnault eventually divulged that he had transacted with one Jess D. Santos in
relation to the Buenavista and Tambobong deal. The senate was not satisfied with
Arnault’s explanations. The Court of First Instance ruled in favour of Petitioner Arnault
and ordered his release.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance has the right to review the findings of the
Senate.

Held:
NO. In the first place, the CFI did NOT have the right to review the findings of the Senate.
In the above quoted resolution, the Senate in stating that petitioner “has failed and
refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to reveal the person to whom he gave the
amount of P440,000” and that the situation of petitioner “has not materially charged
since he was committed to prison”, clearly shows that the Senate believes that Arnault
was still trying to deceive them. The CFI on the other hand arrogated unto itself to review
such finding and held that Arnault satisfactorily answered the questions of the Senate
in its investigation of the Buenavista and Tambobong deal. The only instances
when judicial intervention may lawfully be invoke are when there has been a violation of
a constitutional inhibition, or when there has been an arbitrary exercise of the legislative
discretion.

86. Bengzon vs Senate Blue Ribbon Committee

Facts:
It was alleged that Benjamin Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses
unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That
they obtained with the help of the Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo Lopa. Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took over
various government owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a motion to investigate on the matter.
The motion was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or the
Blue Ribbon Committee. Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senate’s privilege
hour upon which he insisted to have an inquiry regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected
Lopa’s and Bengzon’s plea. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the inquiry that Is sought by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee should
be granted.

Held:
No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion
of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible
violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as “The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.” In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue
Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa,
had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations
belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended
legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really “in aid of
legislation” because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress.

87. Senate vs Ermita

Facts:
This case involves the project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China
National Machinery and Equipment Group. The Senate Committees sent invitations to
various officials of the Executive Department and AFP officials for them to appear before
the Senate on September 29, 2005. On September 28, 2005, the President issued EO464,
effective immediately which, among others, mandated that “all heads of departments
of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior
to appearing before either House of Congress.” Pursuant to this Order, Executive
Secretary Ermita communicated to the Senate that the executive and AFP
officials would not be able to attend the meeting since the President has not yet given
her consent. Despite the lack of conset, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all
the AFP officials invited, attended the investigation. Both faced court marshall for such
attendance.

Issue:
Whether the Executive Order 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress.

Held:
The Legislature’s power to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation is expressly recognized
in Article 6, Section 21 of the Constitution.
The power of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent in the power to legislate but there
are exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of
“executive privilege”. This is the power of the government to withhold information from
the public, the courts, and the Congress. This is recognized only to certain types of
information of a sensitive character. When Congress exercise its power of inquiry, the
only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of
privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only
one official may be exempted from this power, the President.

88. Sabio vs Gordon

Facts:
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Resolution No. 455 “directing an
inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the POTC,
PHILCOMSAT, and PHC due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their
respective Board of Directors. Senator Richard Gordon wrote to Chairman Camilo Sabio
of the PCGG inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly
conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and
Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior
commitment. At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 “No member or
staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial,
legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.”
Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGG’s unhampered performance of its task.
Gordon’s Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he
threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 4 of EO No.1 is unconstitutional

Held:
No. It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence
and expansive construal. The Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more
evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is
broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the
doctrine in Arnault that “the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for
legislation, is a proper subject for investigation” and that “the power of inquiry is co -
extensive with the power to legislate”. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy- making
and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient
information to enable them to exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with
the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the
formulation of government policies and their effective implementation.

89. Neri vs Senate

Facts:
DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE)
for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN)
Project. The Project was to financed by the People’s Republic of China. The Senate
passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, Joe De Venecia
issued a statement that several high executive officials and power brokers were using
their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He
appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he
admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his
approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo
about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However,
when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, Neri refused to
answer, invoking the executive privilege. He refused to answer questions from the
committee. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not
President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to
prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to
attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC averring that the
communications between GMA and Neri is privileged and that the jurisprudence laid
down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for contempt.

Issue:
Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls under
executive privilege

Held:
The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to
the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.
The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential
communications privilege.
First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the
President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This
authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence
of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under
the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a
member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And
Lastly, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the
limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.

90. Pimentel vs Joint Committee of Congress

Facts:
Pimentel Jr. filed a petition for Prohibition seeking a judgement declaring null and void
the continued existence of the Joint committee. The petition is seeking for the issuance
of a writ of prohibition directing the Joint Committee to cease and desist from
conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public Session of
Congress on Canvassing.

The petitioner questions that the adjournment of the regular session terminated and
expired the Congress therefore all pending matters and proceedings terminate upon the
expiration of the Congress.

Issue:
Whether or not the Joint Committee performing election canvass even after the
termination of congress’ session is constitutional.

Held:
Sec. 15. Art VI - The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of
July for its regular session,unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to
be in session for such number of days as it may determine until thirtydays before the
opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.
The President may call aspecial session at any time.Contrary to petitioner's argument,
however, the term of the present Twelfth Congress did not terminate and expire upon
theadjournment of the regular session of both Houses on June 11, 2004.Section 15,
Article VI of the Constitution cited by petitioner does not pertain to the term of Congress,
but to its regular annual legislative sessions and the mandatory 30-day recess before the
opening of its next regular session (subject to the power of the President to call a
special session at any time).

The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close upon the
final adjournment of its regular sessions on June 11, 2004, but this does not affect its
non-legislative
functions. In fact, the joint public session of both Housesof Congress convened by express
directive of Section 4, Article VII to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly
electedPresident and VP has not, and cannot, adjourn until it has accomplished its
constitutionally mandated tasks. For onlywhen a board of canvassers has completed its
functions is it rendered functus officio. Its membership may change, but it retainsits
authority as a board until it has accomplished its purposes.

91. Republic vs Sandiganbayan

Facts:
The very first Executive Order issued by then President Corazon Aquino upon her
assumption to office was EO No. 1. It created the PCGG or the Presidential Commission
on Good Government with the task of assisting the President in the recovery of all the ill
gotten wealth accumulated by the Former President Ferdinand Marcos. In all the alleged
ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside technicalities
and formalities that merely serve to delay or impede judicious resolution. This Court
prefers to have such cases resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial
justice to the Filipino people and to all parties concerned, not mere legalisms or
perfection of form, should now be relentlessly and firmly pursued. Almost two decades
have passed since the government initiated its search for and reversion of such ill-gotten
wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is thus long overdue. If there
is proof of illegal acquisition, accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct, let
it be brought out now. Let the ownership of these funds and other assets be finally
determined and resolved with dispatch, free from all the delaying technicalities and
annoying procedural sidetracks.

Issue:
Whether or not President Marcos committed prohibited and inhibited acts as a president
during his term of office.

Held:
Yes. The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful income of
respondents since they did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as
required by law, from which their net worth could be determined. Besides, under the
1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive any other
emolument from the Government or any of its subdivisions and instrumentalities.
Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not
receive during his tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other
source. In fact, his management of businesses, like the administration of foundations to
accumulate funds, was expressly prohibited under the 1973 Constitution. Their only
known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally and fairly serve as basis for
determining the existence of a prima facie case of forfeiture of the Swiss funds.

Respondents argue that petitioner was not able to establish a prima facie case for the
forfeiture of the Swiss funds since it failed to prove the essential elements under
Section 3, paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of RA 1379. As the Act is a penal statute, its
provisions are mandatory and should thus be construed strictly against the petitioner
and liberally in favor of respondent Marcoses.

We hold that it was not for petitioner to establish the Marcoses other lawful income or
income from legitimately acquired property for the presumption to apply because, as
between petitioner and respondents, the latter were in a better position to know if there
were such other sources of lawful income. And if indeed there was such other lawful
income, respondents should have specifically stated the same in their answer. Insofar as
petitioner Republic was concerned, it was enough to specify the known lawful income of
respondents.

92. Estrada vs Arroyo

Facts:
Former President Joseph Estrada was succeeded by his Vice President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo. Due to the allegations against former president Estrada, he
eventually called for a snap election. The Supreme Court declared the seat of the
presidency vacant, saying that Estrada constructively resigned his post. On that same
day, Gloria Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA. Later
that same day, Estrada released a letter saying that he had strong and serious doubts
about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as president.

Issue:
Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or
not petitioner Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign.

Held:
The Court defines a political issue as “those questions which, under the Constitution, are
to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure.”
The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency.
The Court said that while the Aquino government was a government spawned by the
direct demand of the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old
government entirely, the Arroyo government on the other hand was a government
exercising under the 1987 constitution, wherein only the office of the president was
affected. In the former, it The question of whether the previous president (president
Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The Court held that the issue is legal
and not political.
For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign
and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is important to follow the
succession of events that struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the
quoted statements extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed Estrada’s implied
resignation On top of all these, the press release he issued regarding is
acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president despite his questioning of
its legality and his emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the sake of peace. The
Court held that petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test: prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material
relevance on the issue.

93. CLU vs Executive Secretary

Facts:
President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members of
the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government
offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein.
The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is unconstitutional.
The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal submission
that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution.
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “ unless otherwise provided in this Constitution “,
the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are
those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a
Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is
an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.

Issue:
Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional

Held:
No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from
holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in
those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to
posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law
and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members
(then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general
rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal
opinions which cannot override the constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s
understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B
of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number
of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold
in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and
government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or
employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.
94. Cruz vs COA

Facts:
The NHA Resident auditor issued a notice of disallowance on October 23, 1997
disallowing the payment to the petitioners, who are members of the Board of Directors
of the National Housing Authority (NHA), of their representation allowances and per
diems in the total amount of P276,000.00. Such disallowance was pursuant to COA
Memorandum No. 97-038 issued by the COA, directing all unit heads/auditors/team
leaders of the national government agencies and government-owned and controlled
operations which have affected payment of any form of additional compensation to
cabinet secretaries, their deputies and assistants, or representatives, in violation of the
rule on multiple positions. The petitioners appealed from the Notice of Disallowance to
the COA, claiming that the aforementioned Supreme Court decision applies only to
members of the cabinet, their deputies or assistants and does not cover other
appointive officials with equivalent rank or those lower than the position of Assistant
Secretary. They added that NHA Directors are not Secretaries, Undersecretaries or
Assistant Secretaries and that they occupy positions lower than the position of
Assistant Secretary.
The COA issued a decision denying petitioners appeal, stressing that the petitioners were
not sitting in the NHA Board in their own right but as representatives of cabinet
members and who are constitutionally prohibited from holding any other office or
employment and receive compensation therefor, during their tenure.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to their representation allowances and per
diems as members of the NHA Board of Directors.

Held:
As held in the civil liberties case, Officials are not allowed to receive additional
compensation for positions held ex oficio capacity as these positions are merely
additional imposition of duties. In this case, the petitioners are holding their positions as
member of the board are considered as alternatives, the prohibition likewise applies to
them.

95. NAC vs COA

Facts:
Petitioner National Amnesty Commision (NAC) is a government agency created on
March 25, 1994 by then President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347. The
NAC is tasked to receive, process and review amnesty applications. It is composed of
seven members: A Chairperson, three regular members appointed by the President, and
the Secretaries of Jutice, National Defense and Interior and Local Government as ex
officio members. It appears that after personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the
three ex officio members turned over said responsibility to their representatives who
were paid honorari beginning December 12, 1994. However, on October 15, 1997, NAC
resident auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit the payment of honoraria to these
representative amounting to P255, 750 for the period of December 12, 1994 to June 27,
1997, pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 97-038.

Issue:
Whether representatives can be entitled to payment intended for ex-officio members

Held:
The representatives in fact assumed their responsibilities not by virtue of a new
appointment but by mere designation from the ex officio members who were themselves
also designated as such. There is a considerable difference between an appointment
and designation. An appointment is the selection by the proper authority of an individual
who is to exercise the powers and functions of a given office; a designation merely
connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person already in
public service by virtue of an earlier appointment. Designation does not entail payment
of additional benefits or grant upon the person so designation the right to claim the
salary attached to the position. Without an appointment, a designation does not entitle
the officer to receive the salary of the position.

96. Marcos vs Manglapus

Facts:
Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in Hawaii, USA,
sought to return to the Philippines. The call is about to request of Marcos family to
order the respondents to issue travel order to them and to enjoin the petition of the
President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

Issue:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President
may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Held:
Yes
According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power shall
be vested in the President of the Philippines." The phrase, however, does not define what
is meant by executive power although the same article tackles on exercises of certain
powers by the President such as appointing power during recess of the Congress
(S.16), control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices (Section 17),
power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment (Section 19), treaty making power (Section
21), borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power (Section 22), informing power
(Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be limited
only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in
the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.

97. DENR vs DENR Region 12 Employees

Facts:
DENR Reg 12 Employees filed a petition for nullity of the memorandum order issued by
the Regional Exec. Director of DENR, directing the immediate transfer of the DENR 12
Regional Offices from Cotabato to Koronadal City. The memorandum was issued
pursuant to DENR Executive Order issued by the DENR Secretary.

Issue:
Whether or not DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR Region 12
Office.

Held:
The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive Department, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the
Chief Executive. It is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under
Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution: "The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed."

In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the
transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South
Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is
presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the
same.

98. Blaquera vs Alcala

Facts:
On Feb. 21, 1992, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 268 which granted each official and
employee of the government the productivity incentive benefits in a maximum amount
equivalent to 30% of the employee’s one month basic salary but which amount not be
less than P2, 000.00. Said AO provided that the productivity incentive benefits shall be
granted only for the year 1991. Accordingly, all heads of agencies, including government
boards of government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions, are
strictly prohibited from granting productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 and
future years pending the result of a comprehensive study being undertaken by the Office
of the Pres.

The petitioners, who are officials and employees of several government departments
and agencies, were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992. Then, on Jan. 19, 1993,
then Pres. Ramos issued AO 29 authorizing the grant of productivity incentive benefits
for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 and reiterating the prohibition
under Sec. 7 of AO 268, enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without
prior approval of the President. Sec. 4 of AO 29 directed all departments, offices and
agencies which authorized payment of productivity incentive bonus for the year 1992 in
excess of P1, 000.00 to immediately cause the refund of the excess. In compliance
therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies of the government concerned
caused the deduction from petitioners’ salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to
cover the alleged overpayments.

Issue:
Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the validexercise of presidential
control over the executive departments

Held:
The Pres. is the head of the government. Governmental power and authority are
exercised and implemented through him. His power includes the control of executive
departments as provided under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution.

Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter. The Pres. can, by virtue of his power of control, review,
modify, alter or nullify any action or decision of his subordinate in the executive
departments, bureau or offices under him.

When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits,enjoining heads
of government agencies from granting incentive benefits without approval from him and
directing the refund of the excess over the prescribed amount, the Pres. was just
exercising his power of control over executive departments.

The Pres. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of productivity incentive benefits and
to prevent discontent, dissatisfaction and demoralization among government personnel
by committing limited resources of government for the equal payment of incentives and
awards. The Pres. was only exercising his power of control by modifying the acts of the
heads of the government agencies who granted incentive benefits to their employees
without appropriate clearance from the Office of the Pres., thereby resulting in the
uneven distribution of government resources.

The President’s duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control
of executive departments.

99. Hutchison Ports vs SBMA

Facts:
In 1996, Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited (HPPL)won a public bidding made by the
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). The project was to develop and operate a
modern marine container terminal within the Subic Bay Freeport Zone. The SBMA Board
of Directors already declared HPPL as the winner but later on, the Office of the President
reversed the decision of the Board and ordered a rebidding. In the rebidding however,
HPPL was no longer among the qualified bidders. Eventually, HPPL filed a petition for
injunction to enjoin SBMA from conducting the rebidding.

Issue:
Whether or not Hutchison has the right to file an injunction case against SBMA.

Held:
No. The declaration made by the SBMA Board declaring HPPL as the winning bidder
was neither final nor unassailable. Under LOI No. 620, all projects undertaken by the
SBMA are subject to the approval of the Office of the President. Hence, the Board of
SBMA is under the control and supervision of the President of the Philippines. Therefore,
the declaration made by the Board did not vest any right in favor of HPPL.
Further, HPPL cannot sue in the Philippines. It is a foreign corporation registered under
the laws of the British Virgin Islands. It did not register here in the Philippines.
HPPL cannot invoke that it was suing only on an isolated transaction. The conduct of
bidding is not an isolated transaction. It is “doing business” here in the Philippines. The
Supreme Court emphasized that as a general rule, “doing” or “engaging in” or
“transacting” business in the Philippines is a case to case basis. It has often been held
that a single act or transaction may be considered as “doing business” when a
corporation performs acts for which it was created or exercises some of the functions
for which it was organized. The amount or volume of the business is of no moment, for
even a singular act cannot be merely incidental or casual if it indicates the foreign
corporation’s intention to do business.
Participating in the bidding process constitutes “doing business” because it shows the
foreign corporation’s intention to engage in business here. The bidding for the
concession contract is but an exercise of the corporation’s reason for creation or
existence. Therefore, HPPL has done business here without license. It cannot now sue
in the Philippines without license because its participation in the bidding is not merely
an isolated transaction.
The primary purpose of the license requirement is to compel a foreign corporation
desiring to do business within the Philippines to submit itself to the jurisdiction of the
courts of the state and to enable the government to exercise jurisdiction over them for
the regulation of their activities in this country.

100. NEA vs COA

Facts:
The President issued an executive order entitled “Implementing the Fourth and Final
Year Salary Increases Authorized by Joint Senate and House of Representatives
Resolution No. 01, Series of 1994.” It directed the payment of the fourth and final salary
increases in two tranches. However, the NEA did not implement the salary increases in
accordance with the schedule of payment and instead implemented in one lump sum
the two tranches. In other words, NEA accelerated the implementation of the salary
increase by paying the second tranche along with the first tranche. Hence, the
Commission’s resident auditor in NEA issued a notice of suspension and, consequently,
a notice of disallowance. The petitioner asked for a reconsidered but it was, however,
denied. Hence, the petition at bar.

Issue:
Did the COA commit a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disallowing the increased salaries? In other words, is NEA allowed to
accelerate the implementation of the salaries due to availability of funds?

Held:
No, the COA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. Neither is NEA allowed to
accelerate the implementation. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

101. Pimentel vs Aguirre

Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul Section 1 of
Administrative Order No. 372, issued by the President, insofar as it requires local
government units to reduce their expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular
appropriations for non-personal services and to enjoin respondents from implementing
Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion of their internal revenue allotments.

Issue:
Whether Sections 1 and 4 of AO 372 are valid exercises of President’s power of general
supervision over LGUs.

Held:
Section 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy does
not rule out any manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in
order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national
goals. AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued by the President consistent with
his powers of supervision over local governments. A directory order cannot be
characterized as an exercise of the power of control. The AO is intended only to advise
all government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures
that will help maintain economic stability in the country. It does not contain any
sanction in case of noncompliance.

The Local Government Code also allows the President to interfere in local fiscal matters,
provided that certain requisites are met: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the
national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the
House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; (3) the
corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior
and Local Government, and Budget and Management; and (4) any adjustment in the
allotment shall in no case be less than 30% of the collection of national internal revenue
taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one.

Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the
automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is
mandated by the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Section 4 which orders
the withholding of 10% of the LGU’s IRA clearly contravenes the Constitution and the
law.

102. Bermudez vs Torres

Facts:
Atty. Conrado Quiaoit was appointed by Pres. Ramos for the position of Provincial
ProsecutorPetitioner Bermudez challenged the appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the
ground that the appointment lacks the recommendation of the Sec. Of Justice
prescribed under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. Section 9, Chap. II, Title III,
Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code provides that “all provincial and city
prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed by the Pres. upon the
recommendation of the Secretary.”

Issue:
Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the
President can be held fatal to the appointment of Quiaoit

Held:
The phrase “upon recommendation of the Secretary” found in Sec. 9, Chap. II, Title III,
Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code should be interpreted to be a mere advice,
exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character and not binding
or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The recommendation is here nothing
really more than advisory in nature. The Pres., being the head of the Executive
Department, could very well disregard or do away with the action of all offices under the
Executive.

103. Sarmiento vs Mison

Facts:
Respondent Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs by then President (Corazon) Aquino. The said appointment made by the
President is being questioned by petitioner Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla,
stating that the said appointment is not valid since the appointment was not submitted
to the Commission On Appointment (COA) for approval. Under the Constitution, the
appointments made for the "Heads of Bureau" requires the confirmation from COA.

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT the appointment made by the President without the confirmation
from COA is valid.

Held:
Yes, under the 1987 Constitution, Heads of Bureau are removed from the list of officers
that needed confirmation from the Commission On Appointment. It enumerated the
four (4) groups whom the President shall appoint:

104. Concepcion-Bautista vs Salonga

Facts:
The President appointed Mary Concepcion Bautista as the Chairman of the Commission
on Human Rights pursuant to the second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, without the
confirmation of the CoA because they are among the officers of government "whom he
(the President) may be authorized by law to appoint." Section 2(c), Executive Order No.
163, authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the Commission
on Human Rights. CoA disapproved Bautista's alleged ad interim appointment as
Chairperson of the CHR in view of her refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the
Commission on Appointments.

Issues:
Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's confirmation.
2. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is an ad interim appointment.

Held:
No. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first
sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7 of the Constitution, which provides that the appointments
which are to be made with the confirmation of CoA.

Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments

solely for the President to make. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the
1987 Constitution, extend only to appointments where the review of the Commission on
Appointments is needed.
105. Calderon vs Carale

Facts:
Cory assigned Carale et al as the Chairman and the Commissioners respectively of the
NLRC, the appointment was not submitted to the CoA for its confirmation. Calderon
questioned the appointment saying that w/o the confirmation by the CoA, such an
appointment is in violation of RA 6715.

Issue:
Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the CoA of appointments
extended by the President to government officers additional to those expressly
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution whose appointments
require confirmation by the CoA.

Held:
Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he
may be authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the
Commission on Human Rights).

106. Manalo vs Sistoza

Facts:
RA 6975 was enacted by Corazon Aquino, creating DILG. Secs 26 and 31 pertain to the
Chief of PNP as well as PNP officers and members as having to be confirmed by the CA
before assuming their duties. Executive Secretary Drilon promoted the 15 respondent
officers and appointed them to the PNP in a permanent capacity. The petitioners assail
the legality of such appointment because, invoking said provisions of RA 6975,
confirmation of CA is needed.

Issue:
Whether or not PNP officers are akin to the AFP, whose positions need CA confirmation

Held:
No. The constitution expressly provides for their distinction (See Secs 24 and 6 of Art
16). Also, RA 6975 provides that “no element of the police force shall be military nor
shall any position thereof be occupied by active members of the AFP.”

107. Atty. Elpidio Soriano III vs Reuben Lista

Facts:
Eight officers of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) were promoted by the President to
Vice Admiral, Rear Admiral, Commodore, Naval Captain, and they assumed office
without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (COA). Petitioner, as a
taxpayer, filed a petition with the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of
their assumption of office, which requires confirmation of the COA.

Issue:
Is the officers ssumption of office, which requires confirmation of the COA
constitutional?

Held:
Petitioner has no locus standi. A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of
an act or statute must show not only that the law or act is invalid, but also that he has
sustained, or is in immediate or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of its enforcement and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.
The instant petition cannot even be classified as a taxpayer’s suit because petitioner has
no interest as such and this case does not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing
power.

108. Pimentel vs Ermita

Facts:
While Congress was in session, GMA appointed Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of their
respective departments. Senator Aquilino Pimentel averred that GMA cannot make such
appointment without the consent of the Commission on Appointment. Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the president is empowered by Section 16, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution to issue appointments in an acting capacity to department
secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress
is in session. Further, EO 292 itself allows the president to issue temporary designation
to an officer in the civil service provided that the temporary designation shall not exceed
one year.

Issue:
Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.

Held:
Yes. The argument raised by Ermita is correct. Further, EO 292 itself provided the
safeguard so that such power will not be abused hence the provision that the temporary
designation shall not exceed one year. In this case, in less than a year after the initial
appointments made by GMA, and when the Congress was in recess, GMA issued the ad
interim appointments – this also proves that the president was in good faith.

109. In regarding appointments of Valenzuela

Facts:
Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the President dated
March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the
RTC of Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments appear prima
facie, at least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution. The said
constitutional provision prohibits the President from making any appointments two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

Issue:
Whether or not, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Sec. 15, Art.
VII of the Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the
judiciary, in view of Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Art. VIII

Held:
During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution “two months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term” the President is
neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; The
appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made during the period
of the ban. They come within the operation of the prohibition relating to appointments.

110. De Rama v. Court of Appeals

Facts:
Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitoner
Conrado De Rama wrote a letter to the Civil Service Commission seeking the recall of
the appointments of 14 municipal employees. Petitioner justified his recall request on
the allegation that the appointments of said employees were “midnight” appointments
of the former mayor, done in violation of Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution. The CSC
denied petitioner’s request for the recall of the appointments of the 14 employees for
lack of merit. The CSC dismissed petitioner’s allegation that these were “midnight”
appointments, pointing out that the constitutional provision relied upon by petitioner
prohibits only those appointments made by an outgoing President and cannot be made
to apply to local elective officials. The CSC opined that the appointing authority can
validly issue appointments until his term has expired, as long as the appointee meets
the qualification standards for the position.

Issue:
Whether or not the appointments made by the outgoing Mayor are forbidden
under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution.
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to
the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

Held:
The CSC correctly ruled that the constitutional prohibition on so-called “midnight
appointments,” specifically those made within 2 months immediately prior to the next
presidential elections applies only to the President or Acting President. There is no law
that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of
his or her tenure.
111. Matibag v. Benipayo

Facts:
Ma. J. Angelina Ben
’s EID by then Come
Alfredo Benipayo was appointed as Comelec Chairman together with other
commissioners in an ad interim appointment. While on such ad interim appointment,
respondent Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman issued a Memorandum address
transferring petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner requested Benipayo to
reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law
Department. She cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 reminding
heads of government offices that “transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during
the election period. Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration, citing COMELEC
Resolution No. 3300 exempting COMELEC from the coverage of the said Memo
Circular. Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the
COMELEC en banc. She also filed an administrative and criminal complaint against
Benipayo alleging that her reassignment violated Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus
Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service Memorandum Circular No.
07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil service laws, rules and
regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed
the instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC,
respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the
basis of
the ad interim amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article
IX-C of the Constitution.
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C. The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by
the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office
for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years,
without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term
of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
RULING:
No. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes
effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee
has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an
ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved
by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.”
In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners
to fill the vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended permanent appointments
during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity, unlike Commissioner Haydee Yorac in Brillantes vs. Yorac and Solicitor
General Felix Bautista in Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista. The ad interim appointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes
the President, during the recess of Congress, to make appointments that take effect
immediately. While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC “shall be
independent”, this provision should be harmonized with the President’s power to extend
ad interim appointments. To hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires the
Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the
appointees can assume office will negate the President’s power to make ad interim
appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give meaning and
effect to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the
framers of the Constitution.”

112. Larin v. Executive Secetary

Facts:
Aquilino Larin was an Assistant Commissioner in the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR). He was in charge of the office of the Excise Tax Service. In 1992, the
Sandiganbayan convicted Larin for grave misconduct. His conviction was reported to the
Office of the President, at the same time, an administrative complaint was filed with the
same office. The President then, based on the Sandiganbayan conviction, created a
committee to investigate Larin. Eventually, Larin’s removal was recommended. The
President dismissed Larin.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Larin was removed from office properly.
HELD:
 No. Larin is a presidential appointee who belongs to the career service of the Civil
Service. Although it is a general rule that the power to remove is inherent in the power to
appoint such power to remove with limitations. In the case at bar, the limitation can be
found in the fact that Larin is a career service officer and under the Administrative Code
of 1987 such officers who fall under career service are characterized by the existence
of security of tenure, as contra-distinguished from non-career service whose tenure is
co-terminus with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or limited to
a period specified by law or to the duration of a particular project for which purpose the
employment was made. As a career service officer, Larin enjoys the right to security of
tenure. He can only be removed from his office on grounds enumerated in the
Administrative Code of 1987. In the case at bar, the basis for his removal was his
conviction in the Sandiganbayan. This is not one of those grounds enumerated in the
Administrative Code. Further, the Supreme Court notes that when Larin’s conviction was
appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court actually absolved Larin.
113. Barrioquinto vs Fernandez
Facts:
Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto were charged with the crime of
murder. Jimenez was sentenced to life imprisonment while Barrioquinto remained at
large. Before the period for appeal had expired, Jimenez became aware of the
Proclamation No. 8, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged
with an act penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to
the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and committed
during the period from December 8, 1941, to the date when particular area of the
Philippines where the offense was actually committed was liberated from enemy control
and occupation. Jimenez decided to apply for amnesty. Barrioquinto, who had then
been already apprehended, did the same. The Amnesty Commission returned the cases
of the petitioners to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga without deciding on the
case saying that since the Barrioquinto and Jimenez deny having committed the crime.
Petitioners cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.
Issue:
Whether or not admission of guilt is necessary in amnesty.
Ruling:
No. Amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty
of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution
and sometimes after conviction. Amnesty by Proclamation of the President with the
concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial
notice. In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, it is not
necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having
committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty
as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or the accused,
shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty
Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that “invocation of the benefits of amnesty
is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance.”
On the other, Pardon is granted by the President and as such it is a private act
which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned because the courts take no
notice thereof. Pardon is granted to one after conviction. Pardon looks forward and
relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been
convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does
“nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage,
unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,” and it “in no case
exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence” (art 36, RPC). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into
oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is
charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though
he had committed no offense.

114. Vera v. People

Facts:
Vera, Figueras, Ambas, Florido, Bayran and 92 others were charged with the
complex crime of kidnapping with murder of Amadeo Lozanes. They invoked the
benefits of the amnesty proclamation of the president and the case was referred to the
8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission. None of the petitioners admitted having committed
the crime. Vera was the only one who took the witness stand and denied having killed
Lozanes. The Commission said it could not take cognizance of the case because the
benefits of amnesty could only be invoked by defendants in a criminal case who,
admitting commission of the crime, plead that the said crime was committed in
pursuance of the resistance movement and perpetrated against persons who aided the
enemy during the Japanese occupation.
When Vera appealed, the amnesty commission denied it, reasoning that the
victim was a member of another guerilla group and that the murder seemed to have
stemmed from a rivalry between the two groups. Vera brought the case to the Court of
Appeals, asking the CA to also rule, one way or another, of the murder case. But the CA
ruled that amnesty applies only to those who had admitted the fact but said they should
not be punished for the crime done was in pursuance of resistance to the enemy. It also
said it could not take cognizance of the murder case because that came from the
amnesty commission, which had no jurisdiction over the murder case. The case was
brought to the Court on appeal, which cited People vs Llanita, which said that it was
inconsistent for an appellant to justify an act or seek forgiveness for something which
he said he has not committed.

Issue:
Whether or n
Held:
Yes. Amnesty
maintains that he has not committed a crime, he cannot have any use for amnesty.
Where an amnesty proclamation imposes certain conditions, as in this case, it is
incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of such conditions. The invocation
of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance, which means that the
pleader admits the allegations against him but disclaims liability therefore on account of
intervening facts which, if proved, would bring the crime charged within the scope of the
amnesty proclamation.

115. Cristobal vs Labrador

Facts:
Teofilo Santos was convicted of estafa and sentenced to 6 months of
imprisonment and to return the amount taken. Despite this, Santos continued to be a
registered elector in Malabon, Rizal, and between 1934 and 1937 even served as
Municipal President. On August 22 1938 the Election Code was approved, which had a
provision that disqualifies Santos from voting. Having been declared by final judgment
guilty of a crime against property, Santos applied with the President for an absolute
pardon which was given him on December 24 1939. His full civil and political rights were
restored except that his right to hold public office was limited only to positions which
involved no money or property responsibility.
Cristobal filed a petition to have Santos excluded from the voters’ list on the
basis of Section 94 of the Commonwealth Act no. 357. The court ruled that the pardon
given Santos excluded him from the disqualification created by the New Election Code.
Cristobal appealed, arguing that the pardoning power does not extend to the enjoyment
of political rights. For that would allow the President to encroach on the powers of the
legislature; in effect exempting some people from the effects of the law. Cristobal said
the pardoning power of the Executive does not apply to legislative prohibitions and
would amount to an unlawful exercise of the Executive of a legislative function.

Issue:
Whether or not the pardoning power exercised here would amount to an unlawful
exercise of the President of a legislative function.
Ruling:
No. The pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action.
It must remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the
highest authority to whom it is entrusted. An absolute pardon not only blots out the
crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. In this case,
the disability is the result of the conviction without which there would no basis for
disqualification from voting. While the pardon extended to respondent Santos is
conditional in the sense that he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which
are clerical or manual in nature involving no money or property responsibility, it is
absolute insofar as it restores the respondent to full civil and political rights.
The suggestion that the disqualification imposed in the Election Code does not
fall within the purview of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive. It would lead to
the impairment of his pardoning power not contemplated in the Constitution and would
lead furthermore to the result that there would be no way of restoring the political
privilege in a case of this nature except through legislative.

116. Pelobello vs Palatino, 72 Phil 441

Facts:
In 1912, Gregorio Palatino was convicted of a crime for which he was imprisoned
for 2 years, four months and one day, disqualified from voting and being voted upon. In
1915, he was granted a conditional pardon by the Governor General and on 1940, an
absolute pardon by the President. Pellobello instituted quo warranto proceedings
questioning his right to hold office as mayor elect of Torrijos, Marinduque. It was based
on sec 94 (a) of the Election Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the absolute pardon granted exempted him from the
disqualification incident to criminal conviction under paragraph a of sec 94 of the
Election Code.

Ruling:
Yes. Citing Cristobal v Labrador, the court held that the pardoning power is only
subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution and cannot be controlled or
restricted by legislative action. Thereafter, he had exercised the right of suffrage;
elected councilor of Torrijos, Marinduque for the period 1918 to 1921; elected municipal
president of that municipality three times in succession (1922-1931); and finally elected
mayor of the municipality in the election for local officials in December 1940. Under
these circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in granting him absolute pardon was
to enable him to assume the position in deference to the popular will. The pardon was
thus extended on the date mentioned hereinabove and before the date fixed in section 4
of the Election Code for assuming office. We see no reason for defeating this
wholesome purpose by a restrictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional grant to
the Chief Executive.

117. In Re Lontok
Marcelino Lontok was convicted of bigamy and sentenced to 8 years imprisonment. He
was pardoned by the Governor General on the condition that he shall not again be guilty
of any misconduct. A case was filed by the Attorney General to have him disbarred
because he has convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Lontok, however, argued
that pardon reaches the offense and blots it out so that he may not be looked upon as
guilty of it.

Issue:
Whether or not the effect of pardon may prevent Lontok from disbarment.
Ruling:
Yes. When proceedings to strike an attorney’s name from the rolls are founded
on, and depend alone, on a statute making the fact of a conviction for a felony ground
for disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is
a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been
granted.
Where proceedings to disbar an attorney are founded on the professional
misconduct involved in a transaction which has culminated in a conviction of felony, it
has been held that while the effect of the pardon is to relieve him of the penal
consequences of his act, it does not operate as a bar to the disbarment proceeding,
inasmuch as the criminal acts may nevertheless constitute proof that the attorney does
not possess a good moral character and is not a fit or proper person to retain his
license to practice law.
Ex parte Garland was cited, in which a lawyer pardoned by the president being a
member of the confederate congress during the secession of the South was allowed to
practice law, although lawyers were supposed to take an oath saying they have never
aided any government hostile to the US.
It was held that the exclude the petitioner from the practice of law for the offense would
be to enforce a punishment for the offense, when he has already been pardoned for it.
This the court had no right to do.

118. Torres vs Gonzales

Facts:
In 1978, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by
the president with the condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again. In 1982,
Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, then Chairman of the Board
of Paroles Neptali Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’ pardon. Hence, the
president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the Supreme Court
averring that the Executive Department erred in convicting him for violating the
conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges against him were not yet final and
executory as they were still on appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not a conviction is necessary to revoke a conditional pardon.

Ruling:
No. In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and
who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department
has two options: (1) Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, a purely
executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny, or (2) Article 159 of the Revised Penal
Code, a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional
pardon.
Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is
necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a
convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon. Under art. 159
of the RPC, parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the provisions thereof
must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to
suffer the penalty prescribed.
In the case at bar, President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the
President’s executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.

119. IBP v. Zamora

Facts:
The President ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols
for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. On Januray 17, 2000, the IBP filed
the instant petition to declare the deployment of Philippines Marines unconstitutional
thus null and void alleging that no emergency situation would justify the employment of
soldiers for law enforcement work and that the same is in derogation of Article II
Section 3 of the Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not the joint visibility patrols violate the Constitutional provisions on
civilian supremacy over the military.

HELD:
No. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military
assets for civilian enforcement and that it does not contravene Section 3, Article II of
the Constitution. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the LOI itself
which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines’ authority. The
deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of
the police force. The real authority in these operations is lodged with the head of a
civilian institution and not with the military. What is in here is mutual support and
cooperation between the military and the civilian authorities, not derogation of civilian
supremacy.

120. SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary

Facts:
During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and
enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and
unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. They complained of the
corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the government,
demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief.
These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code and by virtue
of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under
the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their
barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and
General Orders were lifted an Proclamation No. 435 declaring the cessation of the State
of Rebellion.
First, petitioners contend that Sec. 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not
require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP and that there is no
factual basis for such proclamation. Second, the proclamation is a circumvention of the
report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to
submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Third,
they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of
emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President.
Fourth, there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article
VI of the Constitution. Finally, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion
"opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the
crime of rebellion.
Issues:
Whether or not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional.
Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit.

Ruling:
Yes. Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18,
Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in
addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive
powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the
armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the
Court may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way
of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The
issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there was no indication that
military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military authorities have taken over
the functions of Civil Courts.
No. The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is of no
moment since the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed
forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander- in-Chief
powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and
18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section
23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may
be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under
the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present.

121. Aquino v. Enrile

Facts:
Juan Ponce Enrile, then Minister of National Defense, pursuant to the order of
Marcos issued and ordered the arrest of a number of individuals including Benigno
Aquino, Jr. even without any charge against them. Hence, Aquino and some others filed
for habeas corpus against Juan Ponce Enrile. Respondent’s answer contained a
common and special affirmative defense that the arrest is valid pursuant to Marcos’
declaration of Martial Law.
Issue:
Whether or not Aquino’s detention is legal in accordance to the declaration of
Martial Law.
Ruling:
Yes. The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant to the President’s order. The
Constitution provides that in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent
danger against the state, when public safety requires it, the President may suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part therein under
Martial Law. In the case at bar, the state of rebellion plaguing the country has not yet
disappeared, therefore, there is a clear and imminent danger against the state.

122. Olaquer v. Military Commission No. 4

Facts:
In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by military personnel and they
were placed in Camp Bagong Diwa. Logauer and his group are all civilians. They were
charged with (1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy
to assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate cabinet
members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to
assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roño and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine
buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and
Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and proposal to commit
rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. On August 19, 1980, the petitioners went to the SC
and filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus.
ISSUE:
Whether or no
HELD:
The petition fo
time the case reached the SC Olaguer and his companions were already released from
military confinement. “When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application
for a writ of habeas corpus was filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ
becomes moot and academic. 18 Inasmuch as the herein petitioners have been
released from their confinement in military detention centers, the instant Petitions for
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed for having become moot
and academic.” But the military court created to try the case of Olaguer (and the
decision it rendered) still continues to subsist.

123. Navales vs Gen. Abaya

Facts
On July 27, 2003, more than three hundred junior officers and enlisted men,
mostly from the elite units of Philippine Army’s Scout Rangers and the Philippine Navy’s
Special Warfare Group (SWAG). They quietly entered the premises of the Ayala Center in
Makati City. They disarmed the security guards and took over the Oakwood Premier
Apartments (Oakwood). They planted explosives around the building and in its vicinity.
Between 4:00 to 5:00 a.m., the soldiers were able to issue a public statement through
the ABS-CBN News (ANC) network and claimed that they went to Oakwood to air their
grievances against the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. They
declared their withdrawal of support from the chain of command and demanded the
resignation of key civilian and military leaders of the Arroyo administration. PGMA gave
them until 5p.m. to give up their positions and return to the barracks. At about 1:00 p.m.,
she declared the existence of a state of rebellion and issued an order to use reasonable
force in putting down the rebellion.
President Arroyo announced that the occupation of Oakwood was over. DOJ
charged 321 of those soldiers who took part in the mutiny with violation of Article 134-A
(coup d'etat) of the Revised Penal Code
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the writs of prohibition and habeas
corpus.
Ruling:
No. The writs of prohibition and habeas corpus prayed for by the petitioners must
perforce fail. As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under a process
issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do so. Further, the writ of habeas corpus
should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before
any court or quasi-judicial body. The term court necessarily includes the General Court-
Martial. These rules apply to Capt. Reaso, et al., as they are under detention
pursuant to the Commitment Order dated August 2, 2003 issued by respondent Chief of
Staff of the AFP pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War.
On the other hand, the office of the writ of prohibition is to prevent inferior courts,
corporations, boards or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with
which they have not been vested by law. As earlier discussed, the General Court-Martial
has jurisdiction over the charges filed against petitioners 1Lt. Navales, et al. under Rep.
Act No. 7055. A writ of prohibition cannot be issued to prevent it from exercising its
jurisdiction.
124. Lansang v. Garcia
FACTS:
Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in 1971
causing the death of 8 people, Marcos issued Proclamation No. 889 which suspended
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged that there is a need to curtail
the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al were invited by the PC headed
by Garcia for interrogation and investigation. Teodosio Lansang, Rodolfo del Rosario, and
Bayani Alcala questioned the validity of the suspension of the writ averring that the
suspension does not meet the constitutional requisites.
ISSUE:

HELD:

abandoned in this case where the Supreme Court declared that it had the power to
inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus by Marcos in August 1971. And to annul the same if no legal ground could be
established. Accordingly, hearings were conducted to receive evidence on this matter,
including two closed-door sessions in which relevant classified information was divulged
by the government to the members of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the petitioners.
In the end, after satisfying itself that there was actually a massive and systematic
Communist-oriented campaign to overthrow the government by force, as claimed by
Marcos, the SC unanimously decided to uphold the suspension of the privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus

125. In Re De Villa

12-year old Aileen Mendoza woke up to find Reynaldo De Villa on top of her. She
was unable to call for help because the latter covered her mouth with a pillow and
threatened to kill her. He then proceeded to rape her. Aileen became pregnant. Aileen
was examined by Dr. Cosidon, who confirmed her pregnancy (she was already 8 months
pregnant at that time), and found healed lacerations in her hymen. During the trial, De
Villa pleaded not guilty because at the time of the alleged rape, he was already 67 years
old, and was incapable of an erection. He also interposed an alibi that he was not in the
scene of the crime at the time of the rape. De Villa was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt by the trial court for the rape of Aileen Mendoza, his niece by affinity.
Three years after the decision, June (the son of Reynaldo) alleged that during the
trial of the case, he was unaware that there was a scientific test that could determine
whether Reynaldo was Leahlyn’s father. They sought for DNA testing to resolve the issue
of paternity but the same was denied. At the petitioner’s insistence, they gathered
samples from Leahlyn, from the grandchildren of Reynaldo, and from Reynaldo himself
and was submitted to the DNA Laboratory. The DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary
report showing that there was no match between the DNA samples.
Issue:
Whether or not the DNA result is a valid basis for habeas corpus, new trial, and
acquittal.
Ruling:
No to all counts.
As to Habeas Corpus
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the
individual seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed
under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual's liberty is restrained via some legal
process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing
As to new trial
A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only
if the following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b)
that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with
the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that, if
admitted, it would probably change the judgment. Lack of knowledge of the existence of
DNA testing speaks of negligence. In either instance, however, this negligence is binding
upon petitioner.
As to acquittal
Even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific evidence presented by
petitioner and his counsel, we are not convinced that Reynaldo de Villa is entitled to
outright acquittal. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, even if it is
conclusively proven that Reynaldo de Villa is not the father of Leahlyn Mendoza, his
conviction could, in theory, still stand, with Aileen Mendoza’s testimony and positive
identification as its bases. The Solicitor General reiterates, and correctly so, that the
pregnancy of the victim has never been an element of the crime of rape. Therefore, the
DNA evidence has failed to conclusively prove to this Court that Reynaldo de Villa
should be discharged.

126. David v. Arroyo

Facts:
President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency. This case covers the seven consolidated petitions for cetiorari assailing the
constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5 implementing the
former. It is alleged that in doing so, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave
abuse of discretion and that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed
efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions are actually trampling upon the
very freedom guaranteed and protected by the constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not
Whether or not

HELD:
Yes. The assailed Proclamation 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants
President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly
within the province of the Legislature, Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "the
legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines, which shall consist of
a Senate and a House of Representatives". To be sure, neither martial law nor a state of
rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo's exercise of legislative
power by issuing decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot
be enforced. With respect to "laws", she cannot call the military to enforce or implement
certain laws such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws
on obligations and contracts, and the like. She can only order the military under PP1017,
to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.
As of General Order No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by
which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.”
Considering that “acts of terrorism” have not yet been defined and made punishable
by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional.
127. Constantino v. Cuisia
During the Corazon Aquino regime, her administration came up with a scheme to
reduce the country’s external debt. The solution resorted to was to incur foreign debts.
Three restructuring programs were sought to initiate the program for foreign debts.
They are basically buyback programs and bond-conversion programs. The spouses
Renato Constantino, Jr. and Lourdes Constantino with FFDC (Freedom From Debt
Coalition) averred that the buyback and bond-conversion schemes were onerous and
they do not constitute the loan “contract” or “guarantee” contemplated in Sec. 20, Art.
VII of the Constitution. And assuming that the President has such power, unlike other
powers which may be validly delegated by the President, the power to incur foreign
debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President. Hence,
the respondents herein, Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia, cannot incur debts for the
Philippines or such power can be delegated to them. Constantino argue that the gravity
by which the exercise of the power will affect the Filipino nation requires that the
President alone must exercise this power. They argue that the requirement of prior
concurrence of an entity specifically named by the Constitution–the Monetary
Board–reinforces the submission that not respondents but the President “alone and
personally” can validly bind the country.
Issue:
Whether or not the President can validly delegate her debt power to the
respondents.
Ruling:
Yes. There is no question that the president has borrowing powers and that the
President may contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of this country with prior
concurrence of the Monetary Board. It makes no distinction whatsoever and the fact
that a debt or a loan may be onerous is irrelevant. On the other hand, the President can
delegate this power to her direct subordinates. The evident exigency of having the
Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief
contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and executing a
strategy for managing the government’s debt is deep within the realm of the expertise
of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding,
achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management
goals.
If the President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing
power, she would have to pause from running the country long enough to focus on a
welter of time-consuming detailed activities. This sort of constitutional interpretation
would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which
the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the President’s effectivity in
running the government.
128. People’s Movement for Press Freedom, et al v. Manglapus
***Paantay, Tingan ko sa library kung may available na case. Wala akong mahanap sa
internet ng full text.

129. Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading

Facts:
Eastern Sea Trading (EST) was a shipping company which imports from Japan
onion and garlic into the Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered the
seizure and forfeiture of the import goods because EST was not able to comply with
Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were pursuant to Executive Order
328. On the other hand, EO 328 was the implementing law of the Trades and Financial
Agreements, an executive agreement, entered into between the Philippines and Japan.
The said executive agreement states, among others, that all import transactions between
Japan and the Philippines should be invoiced in dollar. In this case, the said items
imported by EST from Japan were not invoiced in dollar.
EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the executive agreement
that the EO was implementing was never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was
elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The
Commissioner appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not the Executive Agreement is subject to the concurrence by the
Senate.
Ruling:
No. Executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the
concurrence of at least 2/3 of the members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by
the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive
agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more
formal instruments — treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of
exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated
‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’.
They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income
tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial
relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration of trade-marks
and copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by specific congressional
authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect
to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with
respect to the settlement of claims against foreign governments, were concluded
independently of any legislation.

130. Go Tek v. Deportation Board

Facts:
Go Tek was arrested by the National Bureau of Investigation after the search of
an office which was believed to be the headquarters of a guerilla unit of the "Emergency
Intelligence Section, Army of the United States". He was alleged to have with him at the
time of the arrest a fake dollar checks in violation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal
Code and rendered himself an undesirable alien. The prosecutor prayed that after trial
the Board should recommend to the President of the Philippines the immediate
deportation of Go Tek as an undesirable alien. Consequently, his presence in this country
having been, and will always be and a menace to the peace , welfare, and security of
the community. Go Tek filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint was
premature because there was a pending case against him in the city fiscal's office of
Manila for violation of Article 168. He contended that the board had no jurisdiction to try
the case in view of the obiter dictum in Qua Chee Gan that the board may deport aliens
only on the grounds specified in the law. The Board, in its resolution, denied Go Tek's
motion. The Board reasoned out that a conviction is not a prerequisite before the State
my exercise its rights to deport an undesirable alien. Further, the Board is only a fact
finding body whose function is to make a report and recommendation to the President
in whom is lodged the exclusive power to deport an alien.
Issue:
Whether or not the Deportation Board can entertain a deportation proceeding
based on a ground which is not specified in section 37 of the Immigration Law.
Ruling:
Yes. Section 37 of the Immigration Law provides that certain aliens may be
arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer
designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the Commissioner's warrant -
"after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien.
Under the existing law, the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected by
order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code and by the Commissioner of Immigration upon recommendation of
the Board of Commissioners under section 37 of the Immigration Law. The state has
the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens. That power may be exercise by the
Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic
tranquility of the nation Justice Johnson's is that there the Chief Executive rinds that
there are aliens whose continued in the country is injurious to the public interest he may,
even in the absence of express law, deport them.
A thorough comprehension of the President's power to deport aliens may show
the baselessness of the instant prohibition action of Go Tek The President's power to
deport aliens and the investigation of aliens subject to deportation.
SEC. 69. Deportation of subject of foreign power. A subject of a foreign power residing
in the Philippine Islands shall not be deported expelled, or excluded from said Islands or
repatriated to his own country by the Governor-General except upon prior investigator,
conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which such
action is contemplated. In such case the person concerned shall he informed of the
charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than three days for the
preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel,
to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses.

131. Beltran v. Makasiar

Facts:

President Corazon Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Luis Beltran.
The latter argues that the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit
impose a correlative disability to file suit. He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue
by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have
to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This
would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit as by testifying on
the witness stand. Beltran also contends that he could not be held liable for libel because
of the privileged character of the publication. He also says that to allow the libel case to
proceed would produce a “chilling effect” on press freedom.

Issue:

Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may
initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-
affidavit.
Ruling:

Yes. This privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the
office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the
President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is
complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case
from proceeding against such accused. Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would
prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may
shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The
choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit
is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that,
aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.

132. Gloria v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

Private respondent Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed as Schools Division

Superintendent of Quezon City in 1989. Upon recommendation of DECS Secretary
Ricardo Gloria, Icasiano was reassigned as Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of
Science and Technology (MIST) to fill up the vacuum created by the retirement of its
Superintendent in 1994. Icasiano filed a TRO and preliminary mandatory injunction
enjoining the implementation of his reassignment. The Court of Appeals granted the
petition holding that the indefinite reassignment is violative of Icasiano’s right to security
of tenure. The DECS Secretary argued that the filing of the case is improper because
the same attacks an act of the President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential
immunity from suit.

Issue:
Whether or not the filing of the case violates the “presidential immunity from suit”
doctrine.
Ruling:
No. Petitioners’ contention is untenable because the petition is directed against
petitioners and not against the President. DECS Secretary is an alter ego of the
president. He cannot invoke the President’s immunity from suit in a case filed against
him because the questioned acts are not the acts of the President but merely those of a
department secretary. Moreover, presidential decisions may be questioned before the
courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or that the President acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction. The questioned acts are those of petitioners and not of the
President. Furthermore, presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts
where there is grave abuse of discretion or that the President acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction.

133. MMDA v. JANCOM

Facts:
A Build-Operate-Transfer Contract for the waste to energy project was signed
between JANCOM and the Philippine Government. The BOT Contract was submitted to
President Ramos for approval but was then too close to the end of his term that his
term expired without him signing the contract. He, however, endorsed the same to
incoming President Estrada. With the change in administration came changes in policy
and economic environment, thus the BOT contract was not pursued and implemented.
JANCOM appealed to the President for reconsideration and despite the pendency of the
appeal, MMDA caused the publication of an invitation to pre-qualify and submit
proposals for solid waste management.

Issue:
Whether or not there is a valid and binding contract between the Republic of the
Philippines and JANCOM.

Held:
Yes. There is a valid and binding contract between JANCOM and the Republic of
the Philippines. Under Articles 1305 of the Civil Code, “A contract is a meeting of the
minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to
give something or to render some service.” Art. 1315 of the Civil Code provides that a
contract is perfected by mere consent. Consent, on the other hand, is manifested by the
meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to
constitute the contract. In the case at bar, the signing and execution of the contract by
the parties clearly show that, as between the parties, there was a concurrence of offer
and acceptance with respect to the material details of the contract, thereby giving rise
to the perfection of the absence of President’s signature is untenable. Significantly, the
contract itself provides that the signature of the President is necessary only for its
effectivity, not its perfection.
There being a perfected contract, MMDA cannot revoke or renounce the same
without the consent of the other. From the moment of perfection, the parties are bound
not only to the fulfilment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the
consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage
and law. It is a general principle of law that no one may be permitted to change his
mind and go back upon his own acts, or to proceed contrary thereto, to the prejudice of
the other party.

134. People v. Gacott

Facts:
For failure to check the citations of the prosecution, the order of respondent RTC
Judge Eustaquio Gacott, Jr. dismissing a criminal case was annulled by the SC. The
respondent judge was also sanctioned with a reprimand and a fine of P10,000.00 for
gross ignorance of the law. The judgment was made by the Second Division of the SC.

Issue:
Whether or not the Second Division of the Supreme Court has the competence to
administratively discipline respondent judge.

Held:

No. Sec. 11, Art. VIII of the Constitution clearly shows that there are actually two
situations envisaged therein. The first clause which states that “the SC en banc shall
have the power to discipline judges of lower courts,” is a declaration of the grant of that
disciplinary power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by,
the Court en banc. It was not therein intended that all administrative disciplinary cases
should be heard and decided by the whole Court since it would result in an absurdity.
The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and
is intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that
the Court en banc can “order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted therein.” In
this instance, the administrative case must be deliberated upon and decided by the full
Court itself.
Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to
the Court en banc, a decision en banc is needed only where the penalty to be imposed is
the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or
either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than 1 year or a fine exceeding
P10, 000.00 or both.
 To require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative
matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a
congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially
in administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty of reprimand would
require action by the Court en banc.

135. Meralco v. Pasay Trans Co.

Facts:
Section 11 of the Act no. 1446 provides: "Whenever any franchise or right of way
is granted to any other person or corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over
portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on which said other
person or corporation shall use such right of way, and the compensation to be paid to
the grantee herein by such other person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the
members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a
majority of whom shall be final."
Pursuant to said Act, Meralco filed a petition requesting the members of the
Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain
transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Manila
Electric Company and the compensation to be paid to the Manila Electric Company by
such transportation companies. Copies of the petition were directed to be sent to
transportation companies affected by the petition. Opposition was entered to the
petition by a number of public utility operators.

Issue:
Whether or not members of the Supreme Court can sit as arbitrators and fix the
terms and compensation.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions
of power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is
exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of
constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the
government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers
expressly or by implication conferred on it. The Supreme Court and its members should
not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume
any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions.
Section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of
a democratic government constitutionally established, and that it would be improper
and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the
decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the Manila Electric
Company.

136. Garcia v. Macaraig

Judge Catalino Macaraig, Jr. took his oath as Judge of the CFI of San Pablo City,
Laguna on June 29, 1970. The court, being one of the 112 newly created CFI branches,
had to be organized from scratch. From July 1, 1970 to February 28, 1971, Macaraig
was not able to assume the duties and functions of a judge due to the fact that his
Court Room cannot be properly established due to problems as to location and as to
appropriations to make his Court up and running. When Macaraig realized that it would
be some time before he could actually preside over his court, he applied for an extended
leave (during the 16 years he had worked in the Department of Justice, he had, due to
pressure of duties, never gone on extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting all the leave
benefits he had earned beyond the maximum ten months allowed by the law). The
Secretary of Justice, however, convinced Macaraig to forego his leave and instead to
assist the Secretary, without being extended a formal detail, whenever he was not busy
attending to the needs of his court.
Paz Garcia on the other hand filed a complaint alleging that Macaraig is
incompetent, dishonest and has acted in violation of his oath as a judge. Garcia said
that Macaraig has not submitted the progress of his Courts as required by law. And
that Macaraig has received salaries as a judge while he is fully aware that he has not
been performing the duties of a judge. Also questioned was the fact that a member of
the judiciary is helping the the DOJ, a department of the executive oi charge of
prosecution of cases.
Issue:
Whether or not Macaraig has acted with incompetence and dishonesty as Judge.
Ruling:
No. Macaraig’s inability to perform his judicial duties under the circumstances
mentioned above does not constitute incompetence. Macaraig was like every lawyer
who gets his first appointment to the bench, eager to assume his judicial duties and rid
himself of the stigma of being ‘a judge without a sala’, but forces and circumstances
beyond his control prevented him from discharging his judicial duties.
On the other hand, none of these is to be taken as meaning that the Court looks
with favor at the practice of long standing, to be sure, of judges being detailed in the
DOJ to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of exercising
administrative authority over the courts. The line between what a judge may do and
what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the
other great departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously
observed, lest the principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by
mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices
purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service.

137. Nitafan vs CIR

Facts: Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52,
19 and 53, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all
with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from
making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.

In a nutshell, they submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation
as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the
provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that "(d)uring
their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema
to the Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."

Issue: Whether or not the payment of income tax violates the constitutional protection
against decrease of their salaries pursuant to Section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution.

Held: The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are properly
subject to a general income tax law applicable to all income earners and that the
payment of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the
constitutional protection against decrease of their salaries during their continuance in
office.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for Prohibition is hereby dismissed.

138. In re Gonzales:

Facts: An anonymous letter by "Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court" addressed

to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez referring to charges for disbarment brought by Mr. Miguel
Cuenco against Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan and asking Mr. Gonzalez "to do
something about this." The second attachment is a copy of a telegram from Mr. Miguel
Cuenco addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, where Mr. Cuenco refers to pleadings he
apparently filed on 29 February 1988 with the Supreme Court in Administrative Case No.
3135, which, in the opinion of Mr. Cuenco, made improper any "intervention" by Mr. Raul
Gonzalez. Mr. Cuenco, nonetheless, encourages Mr. Gonzalez "to file responsive
pleading Supreme Court en banc to comply with Petition Concerned Employees
Supreme Court asking Tanodbayan's intervention.

Issue: won the court is correct in dismissing the Motion for reconsideration of Mr .
Cuenco.

Held: . A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the
constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987
Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by
impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by
disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against him
in appropriate proceedings.The remedy of a person with a legitimate grievance is to file
impeachment proceedings.

139. Santiago vs Bautista

Facts: As the school year 1964-1965 was then about to end, the "Committee On The
Rating Of Students For Honor" was constituted by the teachers concerned at said
school for the purpose of selecting the "honor students" of its graduating class. Tedoro
Santiago a grade six student and represented by his mother, filed a complaint alleging
that the committee committed grave abuse of discretion in choosing the honor
students as Teodoro was only given the third rank while Patricia Liñgat who was always
behind him was second in rank.

The CFI of Cotabato dismissed the case on the ground that the complaint therein states
no cause of action, and moved for reconsideration but the same proved to be futile,
hence, this appeal.

Issue: whether or not a certiorari will lie in this case

Held: The said committee of teachers does not fall within the category of the tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial functions contemplated by Rule 65.

In order that a special civil action of certiorari may be invoked in this

jurisdiction the following circumstances must exist:

(1) that there must be a specific controversy involving rights of persons or

property and said controversy is brought before a tribunal, board or officer
for hearing and determination of their respective rights and obligations.

(2) the tribunal, board or officer before whom the controversy is brought
must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a
decision on the controversy construing and applying the laws to that end.

(3) the tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that branch of the
sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary, or at least, which does not
belong to the legislative or executive department.

Hence the petition is dismissed.

140. Felipe vs Leuterio

Facts: In an oratorical contest held in Naga, Camarines Sur, first honor was given by the
board of five judges to Nestor Nosce, and second honor to Emma Imperial. Six days
later, Emma asked the court of the first instance of that province to reversed that award,
alleging that one of the judges had fallen to error in grading her performance. After a
hearing, and over the objection of the other four judges of the contest, the court declared
Emma Imperial winner of the first place. Hence this special civil action challenging the
court's power to modify the board's verdict.

Issue: whether or not the courts have the authority to reverse the award of the board of
judges of an oratorical competition.

Held: No rights to the prizes may be asserted by the contestants, because their's was
merely the privilege to compete for the prize, and that privilege did not ripen into a
demandable right unless and until they were proclaimed winners of the competition by
the appointed arbiters or referees or judges.

"Wrong" as used in the aforesaid legal principle is the deprivation or violation of a right.
As stated before, a contestant has no right to the prize unless and until he or she is
declared winner by the board of referees or judges.

Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet in law there are instances of
"damnum absque injuria". This is one of them.

The judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical
contest, literary, beauty contest and similar competitions.

141. PRUDENTIAL BANK vs JUDGE JOSE P. CASTRO and ATTY. BENJAMIN M.

GRECIA, .

Facts: Acting on the "Petition for Redress and Exoneration and for Voluntary Inhibition"
filed by respondent Benjamin M. Grecia himself, dated February 8, 1988, praying that the
decision of November 12,1987, and the resolution of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of the said decision be set aside and a new one entered by this Court
dismissing the administrative complaint and exonerating the respondent.

The decision was also questioned by the respondent due to lack of certification by the
Chief Justice that the conclusions of the Court were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion of the Court.

Issue: Whether or not the decision violated the certification requirement under the
Constitution

Held: The certification requirement refers to decisions in judicial, not administrative

cases. But even if such a certification were required, it is beyond doubt that the
conclusions of the Court in its decision were arrived at after consultation and
deliberation. The signatures of the members who actually took part in the deliberations
and voted attest to that. Besides, being a per curiam decision, or an opinion of the Court
as a whole, there is no ponente although any member of the Court may be assigned to
write the draft. In such cases, a formal certification is obviously not required.

142. Consing vs CA

Facts: A criminal complaint filed by Santos against Merlin Consing charging him with
the crime of Violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1964 of Marikina for
contracting to sell to her the two lots in question without first securing the approval of
the Municipal Council of Marikina for his subdivision plan.

On August 28, 1981, the CFI rendered judgment finding that although the Consings may
have "corrected the irregularities and/or [have] complied with the legal requirements for
the operation of their subdivision, they cannot escape their liability to [Santos] for having
sold to her portions of the roads or streets denominated as right-of-way which was
affirmed by the CA.

Issue: Whether or not the decision rendered by the respondent Court of Appeals in this
case does not comply with the requirements of Article VIII, section 13, of the New
Constitution;

Held: The absence, however, of the certification would not necessarily mean that the
case submitted for decision had not been reached in consultation before being
assigned to one member for the writing of the opinion of the Court since the regular
performance of official duty is presumed [Sec. 5 (m) of Rule 131, Rules of Court]. The
lack of certification at the end of the decision would only serve as evidence of failure to
observe the certification requirement and may be basis for holding the official
responsible for the omission to account therefor [See I Record of the Constitutional
Commission 460]. Such absence of certification would not have the effect of
invalidating the decision.

Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

143. CRUZ VS DENR

Facts: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA
and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation
of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other
natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution.
It prayed that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
Issue: WON the provisions assailed are unconstitutional
 Held: As the votes were equally divided (7 constitutional and 7 unconstitutional) and
the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However,
after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56,
Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

144. VALLADOLID, vs Inciong

Facts: Ricardo Valladolid, was employed by JRM in 1977 as a telephone switchboard

operator. He was subsequently transferred to the position of clerk-collector because he
gives out information to the competitors of the company.

Valladolid filed a written request for a vacation leave and stating therein that he
would report for work on January 5, 1979. 4 He did not report for work on January 5 but
sent a telegram from Bicol on January 8, 1979 requesting for 15 days sick leave as he
5
was confined for flu at the Dr. Estrellado Clinic. Valladolid reported for work on
February 16, 1979. The Executive Vice- President, Mr. Daniel Yu, allegedly refused to
admit him and instead asked him to resign.

On February 22, 1979, Valladolid filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with vacation
and sick leave pay. The Minister or Labor ordered his reinstatement. JRM questioned the
order and alleging that it was deprived of due process of a hearing.

Issue: WON the Minister of Labor deprived the petitioner of due process by disregarding
the procedural requirement

Held: The order was not violative of Section 9, Article X of the Constitution, which
requires a statement of the facts and the conclusions of law upon which it is based. That
prescription applies to decisions of Courts of record. The Ministry of Labor is an
administrative body with quasi-judicial functions. Section 5, Rule XIII, Book V, Ibid, states
that proceedings in the NLRC shall be non-litigious and summary in nature without
regard to legal technicalities obtaining in courts of law. Hence petition for certiorari is
denied.

145. Nunal vs COA

Facts: Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Minute Resolution of this Court of
11 May 1988 dismissing the Petition for certiorari "for failure of the petitioner to
sufficiently show that the public respondent had committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding, among others, that the compromise agreement of the parties is not
enforceable against the Municipality of Isabela, the latter not having been impleaded as
an indispensable party in the case.

Issue: WON the petitioner's contention that the Resolution of this Court under date of 11
May 1988 is not in accordance with the Constitution
Held : Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any Court without expressing

therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the

Court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis
therefor.

In the first place, our "Resolution" of 11 May 1988 was not a "Decision" within the
meaning of the Constitutional requirement. This mandate is applicable only in cases
"submitted for decision," i.e., given due course and after the filing of Briefs or
Memoranda and/or other pleadings, as the case may be. It is not applicable to an Order
or Resolution refusing due course to a Petition for Certiorari. In the second place, the
assailed Resolution does state the legal basis for the dismissal of the Petition and thus
complies with the Constitutional provision.

146. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. Bugarin

Facts: The accused appellant appealed the decision of RTC, finding him guilty of
four counts of consummated rape and one count of attempted rape and sentencing him.
He assailed he decision of the trial court as it does not state the facts and law upon
which it was based.
Held :The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing and that they
must set forth clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based
serves many functions. It is intended, among other things, to inform the parties of the
reason or reasons for the decision so that if any of them appeals, he can point out to
the appellate court the findings of facts or the rulings on points of law with which he
disagrees. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in
reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus,
a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding by ipse
dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless
vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property
of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for
sustained public confidence in the justness of his decision. The decision of the trial
court in this case disrespects the judicial function.
In Criminal Case the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED.

147. Hernandez vs CA

Facts: Petitioner was a consistent buyer of pieces of jewelry of Remedios de Leon. He

will either pay in cash or postdated checks. However on the latter part of business
transactions between the, the check issued by him bounce due to insufficiency and
closed account
The RTC rendered a decision convicting him of 9 disctinct offenses which was affirmed
by the CA except the one crime charged. According to petitioner, the Court of Appeals
did not make its own "independent judicial opinion" by such act of adopting the
statement of facts made by the advance party

Issue: WON the decision made by the CA is violative of Art. VIII, sec. 14, par. 1 and 2 of
the Constitution

Held: In its decision the Court of Appeals merely stated: "The facts of the case as
summarized in the Appellee's Brief are as follows: " and the quoted in full the statement
of facts of the Solicitor General

What the Court of Appeals, in effect, said was that it found the facts as presented by the
Solicitor General as supported by the evidence. The constitutional mandate only
requires that the decision should state the facts on which it is based. There is no
proscription made in the briefs or memoranda of the parties, instead of rewriting the
same in its own words.

The denial, therefore, was based on the ground that the Court of Appeals did not find
any "cogent reason that could justify a modification or reversal of the decision sought to
be reconsidered."

Hence the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

148. Yao vs CA

Facts: Yao was convicted of unfair competition in MeTC for issuing locally General
electric lamp starters which was affirmed by RTC without saying more. On 4 October
[12]
1994, YAO appealed to the Court of Appeals by filing a notice of appeal. However, on
25 April 1995 the Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution [14] declaring that [t]he
decision rendered on July 27, 1994 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121, has long
become final and executory and ordering the records of the case remanded to said court
for the proper execution of judgment. Hence this certiorari
Issue: WON the decision appealed is violative of the Constitution
Held: Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. [37] The
parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of
the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. More than that, the
requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so
through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity
of the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse dixit.
Thus the Court has struck down as void, decisions of lower courts and even of the
Court of Appeals whose careless disregard of the constitutional behest exposed their
sometimes cavalier attitude not only to their magisterial responsibilities but likewise to
their avowed fealty to the Constitution.

149. Dizon vs. Judge Lopez

Facts: Facts: On April 22, 1993, judgment was rendered, convicting complainant of
falsification of private document. The promulgation of the judgment consisted of reading
the dispositive portion of the decision sentencing him to imprisonment, without serving
a copy of the decision on him. When the Judge finished the decision, she just read the
dispositive portion of the decision to the accused.
Issue: Whether or not the failure of respondent judge to furnish a copy of the
decision constitutes a violation of Art. VIII, Sec. 14 of the Constitution
Held: The judgment must be read, stating the facts and the law on which such
judgment is based which is very clear in Art. VIII, Sec 14 of the Constitution.
What respondent did in this case was to render what is known as a sin perjuicio
judgment, which is a judgment without a statement of the facts in support of its
conclusion to be later supplemented by the final judgment. [1] As early as 1923, this Court
already expressed its disapproval of the practice of rendering sin perjuicio
judgments, what with all the uncertainties entailed because of the implied reservation
that it is subject to modification when the decision is finally rendered. [3] Thus, the
respondent is REPRIMANDED with WARNING that repetition of the same acts
complained of will be dealt with more severely.

150. ASIAVEST v. CA and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, .

Facts: The petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad is a corporation
organized under the laws of Malaysia while private respondent Philippine National
Construction Corporation is a corporation duly incorporated and existing under
Philippine laws.
In 1983, petitioner initiated a suit for collection against private respondent, which
was favored by the High Court of Malaysia. But due to unsuccessful attempts [6] to secure
payment from private respondent under the judgment, petitioner initiated on September
5, 1988 the complaint before Regional Trial Court of Pasig, to enforce the judgment of
the High Court of Malaya. The case was dismissed by RTC which decision was affirmed
by the CA. Hence this petition.
Issue: WON the CA erred in denying recognition and enforcement of the Malaysian
court judgment.
Held: Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is bound to give
[13]
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country;
however, the rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a
usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent
jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under
certain conditions that may vary in different countries. [14]
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be
recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are
concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a
full and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction. Having thus proven,
through the foregoing evidence, the existence and authenticity of the foreign judgment
enjoys presumptive validity.

151. Tichangco vs Enriquez

Facts: The petitioners assailed the decisions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP
No. 54648. The assailed Decision affirmed the findings of the then Land
Registration Authority (LRA) administrator, Alfredo Enriquez, that there were no
legal grounds to initiate appropriate proceedings to nullify Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) Nos. 820 and 7477 and the subsequent titles derived therefrom:
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 128240 to 128249, inclusive, and TCT No.
128270 -- all covering parcels of land in Tondo, Manila registered in the names of
private respondents.
The Petitioners attack the validity of the assailed CA Decision for its failure to
mention that a magnetic survey was completed only on November 15, 1906, a fact that
they perceived to be crucial to the determination of the case. The untenability of such
grasping at straws can easily be demonstrated. Hence this petition for review.
ISSUE :WON the CA complied with Section 14 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Held: In its assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the resolution of LRA Administrator
Enriquez. The appellate court deliberated on the law and the reasons it relied upon in its
determination of the issues presented only after giving a detailed account and
assessment of the factual antecedents found by respondent administrator.
There is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement when a collegiate
appellate court, after deliberation, decides to deny a motion; states that the questions
raised are factual or have already been passed upon; or cites some other legal
basis.[33] There is no need to explain fully the courts denial, since the facts and the law
have already been laid out in the assailed Decision.
Hence the petition is denied.

152. Fr. Martinez vs CA

Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated September 7,
1995, and resolution, dated January 31, 1996, of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed
the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branches 25 [1] and 28,[2] Cabanatuan City,
finding private respondents spouses Reynaldo and Susan Veneracion owners of the land
in dispute, subject to petitioners rights as a builder in good faith.
 Petitioner contends that the resolution of the Court of Appeals denying his motion
for reconsideration was rendered in violation of the Constitution because it does not
state the legal basis thereof.
Issue: Whether or not the resolution of the Court of Appeals denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration is contrary to the constitutional requirement that a denial of
a motion for reconsideration must state the legal reasons on which it is based.
Held. Art. VIII, Sec. 14 of the Constitution provides that No petition for review or
motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or
denied without stating the basis therefor. This requirement was fully complied with when
the Court of Appeals, in denying reconsideration of its decision, stated in its resolution
that it found no reason to change its ruling because petitioner had not raised anything
new.[47] Thus, its resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration states:

For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration of Our Decision filed by the
petitioners.Evidently, the motion poses nothing new. The points and arguments raised
by the movants have been considered and passed upon in the Decision sought to be
reconsidered. Thus, We find no reason to disturb the same. Hence the motion is denied.

153. RE: PROBLEM OF DELAYS IN CASES BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN.

Facts: On July 31, 2000, the IBP, through its National President, Arthur D. Lim,
transmitted to the Court a Resolution[1] addressing the problem of delays in cases
pending before the Sandiganbayan. It recommended an inquiry into the causes of delays
in the resolution of incidents and motions and in the decision of cases pending before
the Sandiganbayan. According to IBP, the delays result to to incompetence, inefficiency,
gross neglect of duty and misconduct in office.
Issues: WON Art. VIII Sec 15(1) and (2) of the 1987 Constitution includes the
Sandiganbayan
Held: Article VIII, Section 15 (1) and (2), of the 1987 Constitution provision refers to
regular courts of lower collegiate level that in the present hierarchy applies only to the
Court of Appeals.[23]
The Sandiganbayan is not a regular court but a special one. [26] Under Article VIII,
Section 5 (5) of the Constitution Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The law creating the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 [34] is clear on this issue. [35] It
provides “..that cases before the Sandiganbayan once commenced shall be continuous
until terminated and the judgment shall be rendered within three (3) months from the
date the case was submitted for decision”
154. In re Demetria
Facts: It was alleged that Justice Demetria intervene in the case for the accused
drug queen Yu Yuk Lai when he called and instructed the prosecutor to withdraw the
motion to inhibit of Judge Muro, the judge who handle the case and was alleged to be
partial to Yu Yuk Lai.
In 2000, the national newpapers collectively reported that Justice Demetrio G.
Demetria tried to intercede on behalf of suspected Chinese drug queen Yu Yuk Lai, alias
Sze Yuk Lai, who went in and out of prison to play in a Manila casino.[2]
Issue: WON Justice Demetria violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and is subject
to appropriate disciplinary action by the SC
Held: In sum, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses convincing and
trustworthy, as compared to those of the defense which do not only defy natural human
experience but are also riddled with major inconsistencies which create well-founded
and overriding doubts.
The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the
dispensation of justice is circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.
Unfortunately, respondent Justice Demetrio Demetria failed to live up to this
expectation. Through his indiscretions, Justice Demetria did not only make a mockery
of his high office, but also caused incalculable damage to the entire Judiciary.
Hence Justice Demetrio G. Demetria is GUILTY of violating Rule 2.04 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct. He is ordered DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all
benefits and with prejudice to his appointment or reappointment to any government
office, agency or instrumentality, including any government owned or controlled
corporation or institution.

155. People of the Philippines vs Pilotin

Facts: Vincent Crisologo through counsel filed a verified motion praying for the transfer
to the New Bilibid Prisons or, to Camps Crame, Aguinaldo or Olivas, of the place of trial
of Criminal Case No. 3949 of the municipal court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, wherein he, as
sole defendant, is charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions.

He alleged that his life would be in jeopardy if he were to be confined in the Vigan
municipal jail during the trial because there are many political enemies of the Crisologo
family in that vicinity

Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Sur signified his conformity to the transfer of the venue of the
trial to the New Bilibid Prisons.

Issue: WON the change of venue in this case is in conformity with the Constitution

Held: Section 5(4), Article X of the Constitution expressly empowers this Court to "order
a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice". Here, what is
involved is not merely a miscarriage of justice but the personal safety of movant
Crisologo, the accused. It would be absurd to compel him to undergo trial in a place
where his life would be imperilled.

We find Crisologo's motion to be meritorious. The change of venue involves not merely
the change of the place of hearing but also the transfer of the expediente of Criminal
Case No. 3949 to another court.

156. Mondiguing vs Abad

Facts: Alipio Mondiguing and Andres Dunuan are two of the ten defendants accused of
double murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder. In that incident they harmed
Governor Gualberto Lumauig of Ifugao. Hence on September 4, 1975 the petitioners
filed a petition to transfer the venue of the case to Baguio City or Quezon City.

They claimed that they could not expect a fair and impartial trial in Lagawe, Ifugao
because Judge Francisco Men Abad of the Court of First Instance of that province is a
protege' of Governor Lumauig and his brother, former Congressman Romulo Lumauig,
and because their witnesses would be afraid to testify for fear of harassment and
reprisals.

The Acting Solicitor General interposed no objection to the change of venue but Judge
Abad it is not necessary.

Issue: WON Mondiguing's plea for a change of venue is justified.

Held: This Court is invested with the prerogative of ordering "a change of venue or place
of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice" (Sec. 5[4], Art. X of the Constitution).

After a careful consideration of the circumstances recited in Mondiguing's petition to

support his request for a change of the place of trial, we have reached the conclusion
that his petition is meritorious. .

In the interest of a fair and impartial trial and to avoid a miscarriage of justice and
considering that his life would be in danger if he were to be tried in Lagawe, Ifugao, he
should be tried by the Circuit Criminal Court in the City of Baguio. .

157. People vs Sola

Facts: On September 23 and October 1, 1980, the PC provincial commander of Negros

Occidental filed seven (7) separate complaints for murder against the accused Pablo
Sola and others. While on a temporary release, the witnesses in the murder cases
informed the prosecution of their fears that if the trial is held at the Court of First
Instance branch in Himamaylan which is but 10 kilometers from Kabankalan, their
safety could be jeopardized. At least two of the accused are officials with power and
influence in Kabankalan and they have been released on bail. Hence a petition to change
the venue.

(Solicitor general: The Judge who was supposed to handle the case had a mild attack of
cerebral thrombosis and that the said Branch V is the nearest court station to
Himamaylan. The comment of respondents on the petition to cancel bail, without
prejudice to the public officials concerned taking the necessary measures to assure the
safety of the witnesses of the prosecution." 9 Thus, the issue of a change of venue has
become moot and academic) (-you may or may not put this one) 

ISSUE: WON the change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a
miscarriage of justice be considered in this case

Held: The Supreme Court could order "a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a
miscarriage of justice. The exercise by this Honorable Court of its above constitutional
power in this case will be appropriate. The witnesses in the case are fearful for their
lives. They are afraid they would be killed on their way to or from Himamaylan during
any of the days of trial. Because of fear, they may either refuse to testify or testimony
falsely to save their lives. The primordial aim and intent of the Constitution must ever
be kept in mind. In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor of a change of venue.

158. Zaldivar vs Gonzales:

Facts: The respondent prayed this court that the motion for reconsideration be reviewed
and modified relating to the per curiam Resolution of the Court dated October 7, 1988.
In the per curiam Resolution (page 50), the Court concluded that "respondent Gonzalez
is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer
of the court and member of the bar." The court sought to convey that it regarded the
contumacious acts or statements (which were made both in a pleading filed before the
Court and in statements given to the media) and the misconduct of respondent
Gonzalez as serious acts flaunted in the face of the Court and constituting a frontal
assault upon the integrity of the Court and, through the Court, the entire judicial system.

Issue: WON the court is correct in imposing an indefinite suspension of Gonzales in the
practice of law

Held: The court has no sufficient basis to modify the conclusions and rulings embodied
in that Resolution. The judge who finds himself compelled to exercise the power to
punish for contempt does so not really to avenge a wrong inflicted upon his own person;
rather he upholds and vindicates the authority, dignity and integrity of the judicial
institution and its claim to respectful behaviour on the part of all persons who appears
before it, and most especially from those who are officers of the court.

The indefiniteness of the respondent's suspension is not cruel, degrading or "inhuman.

He was given a chance to restore his rights and privileges by by acknowledging such
misconduct, exhibiting appropriate repentance and demonstrating his willingness and
capacity to live up to the exacting standards of conduct rightly demanded from every
member of the bar and officer of the courts.

159. In Re: Cunanan

Facts: Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953 was
enacted by Congress. It provides that any bar candidate who obtained a general average
of 70% (1946-1951); 71%(1952); 72%(1953); 73%(1954); 74%(1955) and without a
candidate obtaining a grade 50% in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe
the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however,
That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be
considered as one and included as part of the next whole number.

Issue: WON RA No. 972 is constitutional

Held: Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional because In the judicial system from
which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement
of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been
disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous
and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have been demonstrated
during more than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles."
Even considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter
supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the practice
of law, to our judgment and proposition that the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging to
Congress, is unacceptable. Any attempt on the part of any of these the Legislative and
Executive departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is the case with
the law in question.

160. DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, .

Facts: Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the
2000 Bar Examinations. One day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful
bar examinees, Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against respondent a Petition
for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized
practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel
for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election
Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath but not allowed him to sign the Roll
of Attorneys up to now pending the resolution of the charge against him.
Issue: WON the respondent be admitted to the practice of law
Held: The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a
privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly
ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of
integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust[4] since a lawyer
is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law
simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be
withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking
admission had practiced law without a license.[5] Hence Rana is DENIED admission to
the Philippine Bar.

161. In re Edillon:

Facts: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the
Philippines. On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short)
Board of Governors unanimously recommend to the Court the removal of the name of
the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership
dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.

The respondent stated that the Court is without power to compel him to become a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is
unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate.

Issue: WON the non- payment of dues is a ground for the removal of the name from the
Roll of Attorneys.

Held: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of
any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when
he passed the Bar examinations. The only compulsion (justified as exercise of Police
power of the state) to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The
Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality
of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in
this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the
lawyers.9 Hence, Edillon is disbarred.

162. In re: IBP elections

Facts: The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of office on July
4,1989, before the Supreme Court en banc. However, reports received that there were
intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the main
protagonists for the office of president of the association, namely, Attorneys Paculdo,
Nisce, and Drilon, the alleged use of government planes, and the officious intervention
of certain public officials to influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of
the IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities. The Supreme Court en banc, resolved to
suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect.

Issue: WON the following officers violated Art I, Sec 4 of the IBP By- Laws.
Held: It is evident that the manner in which the principal candidates for the national
positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections on
June 3, 1989, violated Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of
a "strictly non-political" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws.

The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-
Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers,
as a corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, the
duty to "promote respect for law and legal processes" and to abstain from 'activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02,
Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility).

163. DE LA LLANA vs ALBA

Facts: Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An act reorganizing the Judiciary,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes” was enacted. It includes the
reorganization of the entire Judiciary which shall embrace all lower courts, including the
Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the City and Municipal Courts, and all
Special Courts, but excluding the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior courts collides with the
security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article X, Section 7
of the Constitution.

Issue: WON the Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 collides with security of tenure of Judges and
Justices.

Held: The Court is empowered "to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at
76
least eight members, order their dismissal." Thus it possesses the competence to
remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such
power. 77 Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the
abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the
abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an
occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the
standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not
arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of
separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of
the office. (Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the
judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in
accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as
incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view
be accorded the fullest consideration.)

ADDITIONAL CASES:
Aquino/Robredo vs COMELEC

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs
afoul of the explicit constitutional requirement under Article VI Sec. 5 par. (1) and (3)
and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended thereto which requires a minimum population
of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. 5 The
petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and
second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district
will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

Issue: WON RA 9716 is constitutional

Held: Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum
population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province. The
requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an
alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.

To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of the first
and second legislative districts of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the
resulting additional district should not be considered. Our ruling is that population is not
the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the composition of the
additional district. Such settlement is in accord with both the text of the Constitution
and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form in the Constitutional debates on the
exact issue presented by this petition. Hence petition is dismissed.

55. Tecson v Comelec

G.R.No. 151434, March 3, 2004

Facts:
On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ),
filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004
national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald
Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003)
before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due
course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural- born Filipino
citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie
Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being
the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F.
Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ,
the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of
the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe
contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie
Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie
Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed
SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his
motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by the
COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC
before the Supreme Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a temporary
restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay
the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later
consolidated with GR 161824, would include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both
challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII,
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original
and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.

Issue:
Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the offcie of the
President of the Philippines.

Held:
Yes. Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be
elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter,
able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a
resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be
20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four
modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis –
had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to
being a “natural-born” citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of
Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the
reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood
relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering
the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth
certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that
could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that (1)
The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20
August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16
September, 1940; (4) The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of
his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death
certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public
officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties
during the proceedings before the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may
not establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the
evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be
held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier
has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample
opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove
whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and
willful. The petitions were dismissed.

56. Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares vs COMELEC

G.R. NO. 221697 221698-700

Facts: Grace Poe (Poe) was found abandoned in a church in Jaro Iloilo sometime 1968.
Parental care was passed to the relatives of Edgardo Militar, the person who found the
child. The relatives then reported and registered the child as a founding with the Civil
Registrar of Iloilo. The child was then named Mary Grace Militar. The child was
subsequently adopted by Fernando Poe, Jr and Susan Roces sometime in 1974.
Necessary annotations were placed in the child’s foundling certificate but it was only in
2005 that Susan Roces discovered that their lawyer failed to secure a new Certificate of
Live Birth indicating Poe’s new name as well as the name of the adoptive parents.
Roces then submitted an affidavit and in 2006, a Certificate of Live Birth in the name of
Mary Grace Poe was released by the Civil Registry of Iloilo.
At the age of 18, Poe was registered as a voter of San Juan. In 1988, she was issued a
Philippine passport. In 1991, Poe married Teodoro Llamanzares and flew to the US right
after the wedding. She then gave birth to her eldest child in the US. In 2001, Poe became
a naturalized American Citizen and she obtained a US Passport that same year.
In April 2004, Poe came back to the Philippines in order to support her father’s
candidacy. It was at this time that she gave birth to her youngest daughter. She then
returned to the US in July 2004 with her two daughters. Poe returned in December 2004
after learning of her father’s deteriorating condition. The latter died and Poe stayed until
February 2005 to take care of the funeral arrangements.
Poe stated that she wanted to be with her grieving mother hence, she and her husband
decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines sometime first quarter of
2005. They prepared for resettlement including notification of their children’s schools,
coordination with property movers and inquiry with Philippine authorities as to how they
can bring their pet dog. According to Poe, as early as 2004, she already quit her job in
the US.
Poe came home on May 24, 2005 and immediately secured a TIN while her husband
stayed in the US. She and her family stayed with her mother until she and husband was
able to purchase a condominium in San Juan sometime February 2006. On February 14,
2006, Poe returned to the US to dispose the other family belongings. She travelled back
in March 2006. In early 2006, Poe and husband acquired a property in Corinthian Hills in
Quezon City where they built their family home.
On July 7, 2006, Poe took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to R.A. 9225. On July 10, 2006, she filed a sworn petition to reacquire
Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her
three children. The Bureau of Immigration acted in favor of the petition on July 18, 2006.
She and her children were then considered dual citizens. Poe then registered as voter in
August 2006 and secured a Philippine passport thereafter.
On October 6, 2010, she was appointed as Chairperson of the MTRCB. Before assuming
her post, she executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the US before a
notary public in Pasig City on October 20, 2010. The following day, she submitted the
Affidavit to the Bureau of Immigration and took her oath as MTRCB Chairperson.
According to Poe, she stopped using her American passport from then on.
On July 12, 2011, Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of
the US before the Vice Consul of the US Embassy in Manila. On December 9, 2011, the
US Vice Consul issued a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the US effective October 21,
2010. On October 2, 2012, Poe filed with COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy for
Senator stating that she was a resident of the Philippines for a period of 6 years and 6
months before May 13, 2013. She was then proclaimed a Senator on May 16, 2013. On
October 15, 2015, Poe filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 elections. She
declared that she is a natural born and her residence in the Philippine up to the day
before election would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005. Several
petitions were filed against Poe alleging that (1) she committed material
misrepresentation in her COC when she stated that she is a resident of the Philippines
for at least 10 years 11 months up to the day before May 9, 2016 Elections, (2) she is
not natural born considering that Poe is a foundling. It was argued that international law
does not confer natural born status and Filipino citizenship to foundlings hence, she is
not qualified to apply for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A.9225 as she is
not a natural citizen to begin with. Assuming that Poe was a natural born citizen, she
lost it when she became a US Citizen. In addition, one of the petitioners, Francisco
Tatad, theorized that: 1) Philippines adhere to the principle of jus sanguinis and hence
persons of unknown parentage, particularly foundlings, are not natural born Filipino
citizens. 2) Using statutory construction, considering that foundlings were not
expressly included in the categories of citizens in the 1935 Constitution, the framers are
said to have the intention to exclude them. 3) International conventions are not self-
executory hence, local legislations are necessary to give effect to obligations assumed
by the Philippines. 4) There is no standard practice that automatically confers natural
born status to foundlings.
Petitioner Valdez alleged that Poe’s repatriation under R.A 9225 did not bestow upon
her the status of a natural born citizen as those who repatriates only acquires Philippine
citizenship and not their original status as natural born citizens.
Poe countered these petitions by alleging that:
1) The grounds invoked by the petitioners were not proper grounds for a disqualification
case as enumerated under Section 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
2) What the petitioners filed focus on establishing her ineligibility, hence, they fall within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, not the COMELEC.
3) The July 18, 2006 Order of the Bureau of Immigration declaring her as natural born,
her appointment as MTRCB Chair and the issuance of the decree of adoption reinforced
her position as a natural born citizen
4) As early as first quarter of 2005, she started to reestablish her domicile in the
Philippines and that she can reestablish her domicile of choice even before she
renounced her American citizenship.
5) The period of residency as stated in her COC for senator was a mistake in good faith.

COMELEC ruled against the petitioner resolving that she is not a natural born citizen and
that she failed to complete the 10 year residency requirement. Hence, the present
petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue:
1) Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction to disqualify POE The procedure and the
conclusions from which the Resolutions of the COMELEC emanated are tainted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
The issue before the COMELEC is whether the COC should be denied due course ‘on the
exclusive ground’ that she made in the certificate a false material representation.
COMELEC should restrain itself from going into the issue of qualifications of the
candidate. It cannot, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack
thereof of a candidate. Not one of the enumerated powers of the COMELEC as stated in
Article IX C, Sec. 2 of the Constitution grants the commission the power to determine
the qualifications of a candidate. Such powers are granted to the Electoral Tribunal as
stated in Article VI Section 17 and the Supreme Court under Article VII, Section 4 of the
Constitution.
Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 of the
COMELEC rules do not allow, are not authorization and are not vestment of jurisdiction
for the COMELEC to determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts of qualification
must first be established in a prior proceeding before an authority vested with
jurisdiction. Prior determination of qualification may be by statute, by an executive order
or by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal.
Lacking this prior determination, the certificate of candidacy cannot be cancelled or
denied due course on ground of false representations regarding a candidate’s
qualifications except if there exists self-evident facts of unquestioned or
unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. In this light the COMELEC cannot
cancel Poe’s certificate of candidacy lacking prior determination of her qualifications by
a competent body.

2) Whether it can be concluded that Poe’s parents are Filipinos. Presumption regarding
paternity is neither unknown nor unacceptable in Philippine Law. There is more than
sufficient evidence that Poe has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino.
Hence, the burden of proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner is not a
Filipino citizen.

Private respondents should show that Poe’s parents were aliens. Her admission that
she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her because such status did not exclude
the possibility that her parents were Filipinos. In fact, there is a high probability that her
parents are Filipinos. The Solicitor General offered official Statistics from the Philippine
Statistics office that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the
Philippines was 15,985. While the Filipinos born in the country were more than 10
Million. On this basis, there is a 99% chance that the child born in the Philippines would
be a Filipino which in turn, would indicate more than ample probability that Poe’s parents
are Filipinos.

Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of Poe’s parents are the fact that:

1. She was abandoned in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo

2. She has typical Filipino features

There are disputable presumptions that things have happened according to the ordinary
course of nature. On this basis, it is safer to assume that Poe’s parents are Filipinos. To
assume otherwise is to accept the absurd.

3) Whether as a foundling, Poe is a natural born Citizen Foundlings are as a class,

natural born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution is silent as to foundlings, there is no
restrictive language that would exclude them either. Because of silence and ambiguity
in the enumeration, there is a need to examine the intent of the framers.

The amendment to the Constitution proposed by constitutionalist Rafols to include

foundlings as natural born citizens was not carried out, not because there was any
objection to the notion that persons of unknown parentage are not citizens, but only
because their number was not enough to merit specific mention. There was no intent or
language that would permit discrimination against foundlings. On the contrary, all three
Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. Likewise,
domestic laws on adoption support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These
laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee, rather, the
adoptee must be Filipino in the first place to be adopted. Recent legislation all expressly
refer to “Filipino children” and include foundlings as among Filipino children who may be
adopted.
The argument that the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to the
issuance of a foundling certificate are acts to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship is
without merit. Hence, the argument that as a foundling, Poe underwent a process in
order to acquire or perfect her Philippine citizenship, is untenable.
“Having to perform an act” means that the act must be personally done by the citizen. In
this case, the determination of foundling status was done by authorities, not by Poe.
Second, the object of the process is to determine the whereabouts of the parents, not
the citizenship of the child and lastly, the process is not analogous to naturalization
proceedings.
Under international law, foundlings are citizens. Generally accepted principles of
international law which include international customs form part of the laws of the land.
The common thread of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on
the Rights of the Child and the International Convent on Civil and Political Rights
obligates the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and to ensure that no child is
stateless. The principles stated in the:
Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relation to the Conflict of Nationality laws (that
a foundling is presumed to have the nationality of the country of birth)
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (foundling is presumed born of citizens
of the country where he is found)
bind the Philippines although we are not signatory to these conventions.
Although we are not a signatory to the Hague Convention, we are a signatory to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which affirms Article 14 of the Hague
Convention. Likewise, the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness affirms Article
15 of the UDHR. By analogy, although the Philippines has not signed the International
Convention for the Protection of Persons from Enforced Disappearance, we (the
Supreme Court) ruled that the proscription against enforced disappearance was
nonetheless binding as a generally accepted principle of international law.
Poe’s evidence shows that at least 60 countries in Asia, North and South America and
Europe have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizens. 166 out of 189
countries accept that foundlings are recognized as citizens. Hence, there is a generally
accepted principle of international law to presume foundlings as having been born and a
national of the country in which it is found.
Hence, as a foundling, Poe is a natural born Filipino citizen.
4) Whether Poe’s repatriation resulted to reacquisition of natural born citizenship. The
COMELEC arrogantly disregarded jurisprudence on the matter of repatriation which
states that repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. A natural born
citizen before he lost his Philippine nationality will be restored to his former status as
natural born Filipino after repatriation (Benson v. HRET, Pareno v. Commission on Audit
etc). In passing R.A. 9225, Congress saw it fit to decree that natural born citizenship
may be reacquired even if it has been lost. It is not for the COMELEC to disagree with
the Congress’ determination.
Neither is repatriation an act to ‘acquire or perfect’ one’s citizenship. In the case of
Bengson, the Court pointed out that there are only two types of citizens under the 1987
constitution: natural born and naturalized. There is no third category for repatriated
citizens. The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. Hence, COMELEC’s
decision is wrapped with grave abuse of discretion.
5) Whether Poe is a resident of the Philippine for 10 years Poe alleged that her residency
should be counted from May 24, 2005 when she returned for good from the US. There
are three requisites to acquire a new domicile 1. Residence or bodily presence in a new
locality 2. Intention to remain (animus manendi) and 3. Intention to abandon the old
domicile (animus non-revertendi). The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice
must be for an indefinite period of time, the change of residence must be voluntary and
the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
Poe presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their
US domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence include former
US passport showing her arrival on May 24, 2005 and her return to the Philippines every
time she travelled abroad, email correspondences with freight company to arrange for
the shipment of household items as well as with the pet Bureau; school records of her
children showing enrolment in the Philippine to the Philippine schools starting on June
2005 etc.
COMELEC refused to consider the petitioner’s domicile has been timely changed as of
May 24, 2005 and maintained that although there is physical presence and animus
manendi, there is no animus revertendi. Respondents contend that the stay of an alien
former Filipino cannot be counted until he/she obtains a permanent resident visa or
reacquired Philippine citizenship since she is still an American until July 7, 2006 on the
basis of previous cases ruled upon by the Supreme Court.
SC held that the other cases previously decided by the court wherein residence was
counted only from the acquisition of permanent residence were decided as such
because there is sparse evidence on establishment of residence. These cases cannot
be applied in the present case. In the case at bar, there is overwhelming evidence that
leads to no to other conclusion that Poe decided to permanently abandon her US
residence and reside in the Philippines as early as May 24, 2005.
These evidence, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine
citizenship is clear that when she returned in May 2005, it was for good.
The stamp in her passport as a balikbayan does not make Poe an ordinary transient.
Poe was able to prove that her statement in her 2012 COC was only a mistake in good
faith. Such a mistake could be given in evidence against her but it was by no means
conclusive considering the overwhelming evidence submitted by Poe. Considering that
the COMELEC failed to take into consideration these overwhelming evidence, its
decision is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The decision of the COMELEC is
hereby annulled and set aside. Poe is thus declared qualified to be a candidate for
President in the National and Local Election on May 9, 2016.

Kilusang Mayo Uno vs NEDA Director General

Facts: President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 420
that directs a unified ID system among government agencies and
Government owned and controlled corporations in order to have a uniform ID for all
government agencies. Kilusang Mayo Uno and other respondents
assailed this executive order for being a usurpation of legislative powers by
the president and it infringes the citizens right to privacy.

Issue: Whether or not Executive Order No. 420 is valid.

Decision: Executive Order 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance

under the president’s constitutional power of control over government
entities in the executive department, as well as the president’s constitutional duty
to ensure that all laws are faithfully executed, thus said executive order
is not a usurpation of legislative power. Furthermore, it is not usurpation of
legislative power because the act of issuing ID cards and the collection of some
necessary information to imprint in them do not require a legislation.
What needs legislation is the system of appropriation to enforce the unified ID
system, when unified ID system includes the citizens and when personal data
that are beyond of what is routinely needed is collected for the ID the
result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also
a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.

Amendment vs Revision
Lambino was able to gather the signatures of 6,327,952 individuals for an initiative petition
to amend the 1987 Constitution. That said number of votes comprises at least 12 per
centum of all registered voters with each legislative district at least represented by at least
3 per centum of its registered voters. This has been verified by local COMELEC registrars as
well. The proposed amendment to the constitution seeks to modify Secs 1-7 of Art VI and
Sec 1-4 of Art VII and by adding Art XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions”. These proposed
changes will shift the president bicameral-presidential system to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary form of government. The COMELEC, on 31 Aug 2006, denied the petition of
the Lambino group due to the lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend
the Constitution – this is in pursuant to the ruling in Santiago vs COMELEC. Lambino et al
contended that the decision in the aforementioned case is only binding to the parties within
that case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for initiative met the requirements of Sec 2 ArtXVII of the
1987 Constitution.
HELD: The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents
secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are
not disinterested parties who can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the
proposed amendments to the people. The proponents present favorably their proposal to the
people and do not present the arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their
supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures. Thus, there is no presumption that the
proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The
proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements
in gathering the signatures – that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the
full text of the proposed amendments. The proponents failed to prove that all the signatories to
the proposed amendments were able to read and understand what the petition contains.
Petitioners merely handed out the sheet where people can sign but they did not attach thereto
the full text of the proposed amendments.
Lambino et al are also actually proposing a revision of the constitution and not a mere
amendment. This is also in violation of the logrolling rule wherein a proposed amendment
should only contain one issue. The proposed amendment/s by petitioners even includes a
transitory provision which would enable the would-be parliament to enact more rules.
There is no need to revisit the Santiago case since the issue at hand can be decided upon
other facts. The rule is, the Court avoids questions of constitutionality so long as there are
other means to resolve an issue at bar.
US vs NIXON
Facts. The special prosecutor in the Watergate scandal subpoenaed the tape recordings of
conversations involving the President and his advisers regarding the scandal. The President’s
counsel moved to quash the subpoena citing Article II of the United States Constitution (the
“Constitution”) and its grant of privilege to the President. The President’s counsel also argued it
was a non-justiciable question because it was a disagreement between parts of the executive
branch.

Issue. Is the President’s Article II constitutional privilege absolute?

Held: The President’s executive privilege is not absolute and must bend to Amendment
4 and Amendment 5 requirements of speedy and fair trials and of the ability of
defendants to face their accusers.

Courts are not required to proceed against the President as if the President was any
other individual.

Courts should review communications claimed to be privileged in camera (by the judge
only in chambers).

Discussion. The Supreme Court of the United States (“Supreme Court”) had to balance
the executive privilege against the rights of citizens to face their accusers and to have a
speedy and fair trial. The Court made the point that the President is not a normal citizen,
and therefore should receive great deference regarding executive claims of privilege.
However, executive privilege is not absolute and must be balanced against the right of
the accused in criminal proceedings. The Court took great care to limit its opinion
because it was delving into a political dispute between the President and Congress,
something the Supreme Court is loath to do.

Facts. Before the inauguration of President Jefferson, outgoing President Adams attempted to
secure Federalist control of the judiciary by creating new judgeships and filling them with
Federalist appointees. Included in these efforts was the nomination by President Adams, under
the Organic Act of the District of Columbia (the District), of 42 new justices of the peace for the
District, which were confirmed by the Senate the day before President Jefferson’s inauguration.
A few of the commissions, including Marbury’s, were undelivered when President Jefferson
took office. The new president instructed Secretary of State James Madison to withhold
delivery of the commissions. Marbury sought mandamus in the Supreme Court, requiring James
Madison to deliver his commission.

Issue. Is Marbury entitled to mandamus from the Supreme Court?

Held. No. Case dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
As the President signed Marbury’s commission after his confirmation, the appointment
has been made, and Marbury has a right to the commission
Given that the law imposed a duty on the office of the president to deliver Marbury’s
commission, that the Supreme Court has the power to review executive actions when
the executive acts as an officer of the law and the nature of the writ of mandamus to
direct an officer of the government “to do a particular thing therein specified,”
mandamus is the appropriate remedy, if available to the Supreme Court.
To issue mandamus to the Secretary of State really is to sustain an original action,
which is (in this case) outside the constitutional limits of jurisdiction imposed on the
Supreme Court.

Discussion. The importance of Marbury v. Madison is both political and legal. Although
the case establishes the traditions of judicial review and a litigable constitution on
which the remainder of constitutional law rests, it also transformed the Supreme Court
from an incongruous institution to an equipotent head of a branch of the federal
government.
This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT
vs COMELEC.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections
in the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified
as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying
the said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the
COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some
principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to
organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party,
whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in
party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the
party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked
to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or
lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
“marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors
that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women,
and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the
sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined
political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track
record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties
or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some
of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who
remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice,
from participating in the party-list elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional prohibition
nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now participate in the party-list system
provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will
encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission when they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The
Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all parties into the party
-list elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the
BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent
of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that
the party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the
“marginalized and underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political
constituencies”. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based
and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. The common
denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike
major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can
acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system
itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower
house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to
include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are
economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act
7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of
professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as
“marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies” as
they are ideologically marginalized.

July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a
partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the
following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the
remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987
Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners
at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%,
then it is entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula
from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of
the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-
list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT
averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision
that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes
cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule
creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the
Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory,
then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to
fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new
computation (which shall be discussed in the “HELD” portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the
3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major
political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections
limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere
ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative
districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987
Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower house.
Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from
party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number
of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative districts
as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220
district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55
seats allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats
Available to Party-List Representatives
Hence,
(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning, the number
of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of
the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow
that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those
which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a
mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court
explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast
for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes
cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50
parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55
seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself
even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the
votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of
the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats
to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the
full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives.”
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it
is guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering less than
2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall
be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the
additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because
they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the
remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats
reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are
disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first
round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters)
are given their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are
then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were
able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus
17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round,
particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in
determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in
the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining
number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number
of seats allotted for the party list – but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is
7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of
additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-
percenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3
seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats
because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there
are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and
those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the
likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from
the Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections as the word “party” was not qualified and that even the framers of the
Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate
in the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the
marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7
other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the
Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution – and
the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate
in the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list
elections, directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall
dominate the party-list system.

KILOSBAYAN vs. MANUEL L. MORATO

G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995.

FACTS:
In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC
leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of
ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term
of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon
the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition
was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's
Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is
violative of the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution.
Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become the law of the case Respondent's reply:
ELA is different from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to determine if
ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds.
Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they
were not parties to the contract

ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners have standing?

HELD:
NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a
departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were
actually involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same one
litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be
regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON
CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a
former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving
a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially
unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction
identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free
in the second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue. Since
ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's
standing. STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually
involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST.

Francisco vs House of Representatives

Impeachment; Political Question; Judicial Branch

FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. NO. 160261. November 10, 2003
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS
OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE
SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE
GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

Facts:

1. On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and
approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House
Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress.
2. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the
Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF).
3. On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and
other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred
to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article
XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October
2003 for being insufficient in substance.
4. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the
Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned
House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.
5. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court
against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of
the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5
of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year.”

Issues:

1. Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid
impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th
Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution.
3. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.

Rulings:

1. This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial power
 of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
1. Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what
constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question
which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is
clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
2. Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the
very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
2. The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.
1. Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to
promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase “to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the
Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of
Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules.
2. It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law.
If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary
implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need
of referendum.
3. It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon,
the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint
has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
2. Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court,
on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the
second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year period.

Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which
were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.
Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which
was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office
of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under
paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.