Contents

18. La Salette v. Pilotin .................................................................................................................................. 2

19. ................................................................................................................................................................. 5
20. ................................................................................................................................................................. 6
21. Manchester v. CA .................................................................................................................................... 7
22. ................................................................................................................................................................. 9
23. Ratilla v. Tapucar ................................................................................................................................... 10
24. Sante v. Claravall ................................................................................................................................... 12
25. Caballes v. CA ........................................................................................................................................ 14
26. ............................................................................................................................................................... 17
27. Cagayan Valley v. CIR ............................................................................................................................ 18
28 ................................................................................................................................................................ 20
29. Santos v. Alcazar ................................................................................................................................... 21
30. ............................................................................................................................................................... 22
31. Habeas Corpus of Vergara .................................................................................................................... 23
 18. La Salette v. Pilotin
LA SALETTE COLLEGE, Represented by Its President, FR. ROMEO GONZALES,
MS; and JESUS T. BAYAUA, Dean of Student Services vs. VICTOR C. PILOTIN
G.R. No. 149227. December 11, 2003. FIRST DIVISION
(PANGANIBAN, J.)

DOCTRINE:

It should be noted that full payment of the appellate docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory, even jurisdictional, for the perfection of the appeal.
Otherwise, the appellate court would not be able to act on the subject matter of the
action, and the decision or final order sought to be appealed from would become final
and executory. Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment
of appellate docket fees, the Court also recognize that its strict application is qualified
by the following: first, failure to pay those fees within the reglementary period allows
only discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such power should be used by the
court in conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion in accordance with the tenets
of justice and fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in consideration
of all attendant circumstances.

FACTS:

Victor C. Pilotin (Pilotin) is a student of La Salette College (College). Enrolment

period for the second semester, Pilotin was denied re-enrollment, despite repeated pleas
by himself and by other interested parties and his lawyer. Pilotin filed his complaint and
asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to compel the
school to re-admit him. Because of the adamant refusal to re-admit him, he amended
his complaint and concentrated on damages. La Salette College alleged that it opened
its enrollment period for the second semester of school year 1993-1994 on 11 October
1993 up to 22 October, 1993 to 05 November, 1993. Since Pilotin failed to enrol on the
last day for enrolment, there is no reason why the College should relax its rules to
accommodate him. The College merely imposed its disciplining authority when it sets
dates for the period to enrol and the matter of admission of students is within the ambit
of academic freedom and beyond the province of the Courts to decide."

On November 17, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Pilotin.
College received the Decision on November 26, 1998. On the same date, they filed a
Notice of Appeal, which the RTC approved on December 2, 1998. Pilotin moved for
reconsideration thereof on the ground of College failure to pay the docket fees within
the reglementary period. The trial court, however, denied the Motion in its April 23,
1999 Order. In its November 29, 1999 Resolution, the CA dismissed the appeal of
College for their failure to pay "the required docketing fee within the period for filing an
appeal." But, upon their motion, the CA granted reconsideration of their appeal, which
it reinstated "in the interest of substantial justice and considering that College already
paid the docket fees." Respondent moved for a reconsideration on March 29, 2000. After
reexamining the records of the case, the CA, in the challenged November 16, 2000
Resolution, dismissed the appeal filed by petitioners, because "the docket fees were only
paid after one (1) year and eleven (11) months from the filing of the notice of appeal." It
deemed it imperative to reverse the March 14, 2000 Resolution "to conform with the law
and long settled jurisprudence" on the matter. Thus, in the June 22, 2001 Resolution,
it denied their Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Was the payment of appellate court docket fees timely filed?

RULING:

No. Accordingly, in order to perfect an appeal from a decision rendered by the

RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the following requirements must be
complied with. First, within 15 days, a notice of appeal must be filed with the court that
rendered the judgment or final order sought to be appealed; second, such notice must
be served on the adverse party; and third, within the same 15-day period, the full
amount of appellate court docket and other legal fees must be paid to the clerk of the
court that rendered the judgment or final order.

It should be noted that full payment of the appellate docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory, even jurisdictional, for the perfection of the appeal.
Otherwise, the appellate court would not be able to act on the subject matter of the
action, and the decision or final order sought to be appealed from would become final
and executory.

In the present case, College insist that they seasonably paid the docket fees. After
resolving thrice the timeliness of the payment of the docket fees, the CA finally found
that these had been paid one (1) year and 11 days from the filing of their notice of appeal.
To recapitulate, on November 26, 1998, College received the November 17, 1998 RTC
Decision. Consequently, they had 15 days to file their Notice of Appeal. They did so on
November 26, 1998, but failed to pay the docket fees. A review of the records shows that
they paid these only on July 8, 1999, or after almost seven (7) months from the
mandated last day for payment, which was December 11, 1998. Clearly, the November
17, 1998 RTC Decision had long become final and executory.

Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment of

appellate docket fees, the Court also recognize that its strict application is qualified by
the following: first, failure to pay those fees within the reglementary period allows only
discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such power should be used by the court
in conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of
justice and fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in consideration of
all attendant circumstances.

In Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Mangubat, the payment of the

docket fees was delayed by six (6) days, but the late payment was accepted, because the
party showed willingness to abide by the Rules by immediately paying those
fees. Yambao v. Court of Appeals saw the Court again relaxing the Rules when the Court
declared therein that "the appellate court may extend the time for the payment of the
docket fees if appellant is able to show that there is a justifiable reason for x x x the
failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees within the prescribed period, like fraud,
accident, mistake, excusable negligence, or a similar supervening casualty, without
fault on the part of the appellant."

In the present case, College have not shown any satisfactory reason to warrant
the relaxation of the Rules. In fact, the manner in which they presented their case before
the Court leaves too much to be desired.

In accordance with the requisites for the perfection of an appeal as enumerated

earlier, petitioners should have (1) filed a notice of appeal with the RTC of Santiago,
Isabela, within 15 days from the issuance of the trial court Decision being appealed; (2)
paid the docket fees within the same period; and (3) served the notice to the adverse
party.

True, College filed their Notice of Appeal within the prescribed period, but they
paid the docket fees only seven (7) months thereafter. They adamantly insisted on page
6 of their Petition that "the appeal was seasonably filed," but later said that the "the
appeal fee was paid immediately after 23 April 1999 when the court a quo denied the
respondent’s motion for reconsideration and approved the appeal. With the foregoing
therefore, the notice of appeal was seasonably filed with the payment of docket fees on
time. They admitted that because of the "excusable negligence or mistake" of their
counsel, the official receipts for the Notice of Appeal had not been attached. They
reasoned that they had failed to transmit the proof of payment of the docket fees to the
CA, because such "provision of civil procedure was relatively new at that time." At any
event, Pilotin denies being served such notice.

Assuming arguendo that the period of appeal was interrupted by respondent’s

motion for reconsideration of the RTC’s approval of petitioners’ notice of appeal, the
required docket fees for the latter were still not paid on time. From November 23, 1998,
when petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal, until April 23, 1999, when the trial court
approved it with finality, they made no effort to pay those fees. It took them more than
two (2) months to "immediately pay" the docket fees after being informed of the April 23,
1999 Order denying respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the RTC Order approving
petitioners’ Notice of Appeal. This lapse of time hardly reflected sincere willingness to
abide by the Rules, especially when respondent had raised the very issue of nonpayment
of docket fees as early as December 28, 1998.
19.
20.
 21. Manchester v. CA
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET. AL., vs. CA,
CITYLAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORARATION, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 75919, May 7, 1987, EN BANC

Doctrine:

Jurisdiction over the case is vested only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not vest jurisdiction
in the court, much less the amount of the docket fee based on the amount sought in
the amended pleading.

Facts:

Plaintiff (Petitioner-herein) filed an action which, based on the allegations in the

complaint, the designation and the prayer was considered an action for torts and
damages and for specific performance. The body of the complaint alleged the total
amount of P78 Million as damages suffered by the plaintiff but the amount of damages
was not specified in the body of the complaint nor stated in the prayer. The plaintiff
however, has filed the filing fee in the amount of only P410. 00 which the court found
to be erroneous, and consequently paved the way for the conduct of an investigation on
this case and similar cases with regard to the under re-assessment of the filing of the
docket fee.

On September 12, 1985, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint wherein the prayer
in the original complaint was maintained. On October 15, 1985, the Court ordered the
re-assessment of the docket fee paid by the plaintiff. On November 12, 1985, the trial
Court directed plaintiff to rectify the amended complaint by stating the amount which
they are asking for. It was only then that plaintiff specified the amount of damages in
the body of the complaint in the reduced amount of P10,000,000.00, but no amount of
damages was specified in the prayer. The amended complaint was admitted and the
court actions and proceedings followed consequently.

Issue:

Did the Court acquire jurisdiction on the case with the filing of the amended
complaint and upon the filing of the docket fee in the amount of only P410.00 based on
the original complaint?

RULING:

No. The instant complaint is an action for damages and for specific action which
is considered an action not capable of pecuniary estimation. In this connection, the
docketing fee should be assessed based on the damages alleged in the original
complaint. Hence, the filing of the docket fee in the amount of only P410.00 was
erroneous, and the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. It is a well-settled
rule that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee
regardless of the actual date of filing in court.

Neither can the filing of the amended complaint vest jurisdiction upon the court.
There was no such original complaint that was duly filed which could be amended.
Hence, the Order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and
actions taken by the court are null and void.
22.
 23. Ratilla v. Tapucar
ALEJANDRO V. RATILLA, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE LAURO L. TAPUCAR and
FLORESITA JAMORA, Respondents.
[G.R. No. L-45018. January 24, 1977.]
Doctrine:

1. Where there are several claims between the same parties embodied in the same
complaint, the totality of the claims supplies the jurisdictional test.

2. It is not proper for the court of first instance (now RTC) to prejudge the merits of
acclaim for damages and require its refiling in the municipal court even if it is possible
that the complainant included claims for moral and exemplary damages so that he could
evade the rule on venue in inferior courts.

Facts:

Ratilla filed a collection suit in the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte,
against Floresita Jamora. He prayed that Mrs. Jamora be ordered to pay him the sum
of P5,350 as the balance of the price of two freezers, plus interest, and the additional
sums of P2,000 as attorney’s fees, P3,000 as moral damages, P2,000 as exemplary
damages, and P1,000 as litigation expenses, or an aggregate claim of P13,350.

The Judiciary Law provides:

"SEC. 44. Original jurisdiction. — Courts of First Instance shall have

original jurisdiction:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
"(c) In all cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the
property in controversy, amounts to more than ten thousand pesos;
x x x

During the continuation of the pre-trial, the lower court dismissed the case for
lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned out that since the principal claim of Ratilla amounted
only to P5,350, it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior courts, and that the
damages were included so that the case would come within the jurisdiction of the Court
of First Instance. Ratilla’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied hence this
petition via certiorari.

Mrs. Jamora averred in her answer to the petition that Ratilla’s purpose in
inflating his claim, by adding damages thereto, was to enable him to file his collection
complaint in Butuan City instead of in Bislig, Surigao del Sur where she is a resident.

Issue:
Was the dismissal by the CFI of Agusan del Norte of the case on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the principal amount of the claim proper?

Ruling:
 No. It is possible that Ratilla, to suit his purpose, included the claims for moral
and exemplary damages to that he could evade the rule on venue in inferior courts.

But to prejudge the merits of Ratilla’s claim for damages, by dismissing his
complaint, and to require him to refile the case in the municipal court of Bislig would
not conduce to the expeditious administration of justice. The pragmatic solution, which
is sanctioned by the rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the
complaint and not by the amount ultimately proven and awarded by the trial court is to
direct the lower court to try the case on the merits if no amicable settlement is reached
by the parties.
 24. Sante v. Claravall
IRENE SANTE AND REYNALDO SANTE v HON. EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 60, Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
and VITA N. KALASHIAN
G.R. No. 173915, February 22, 2010, FIRST DIVISION

DOCTRINE:

The totality of the claim for damages, including the exemplary damages as well as the
other damages alleged and prayed in the complaint, such as attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses, should be included in determining jurisdiction.

FACTS:

In April 2004, private respondent Vita Kalashian filed before RTC Baguio a
complaint for damages against petitioners Irene Sante and Reynaldo Sante. Respondent
alleged that while she was inside the Police Station in Pangasinan, and in the presence
of other persons and police officers, Irene Sante uttered the words, “How many rounds
of sex did you have last night with your boss, Bert? You fuckin’ bitch! ” Bert refers to a
friend of the respondent and one of her hired security guards in said station, and a
suspect in the killing of petitioners’ close relative. Petitioners also allegedly went around
Pangasinan telling people that she is protecting and cuddling the suspects in the
aforesaid killing. Thus, respondent prayed for the following: a. Moral Damages
amounting to P300,000; b. Exemplary Damages amounting to P50,000; c. Attorney’s
Fees amounting to P50,000; and d. Litigation Expenses amounting to P20,000.

The Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of jurisdiction. They

claimed that the Municipal Trial Court in Cities has the jurisdiction instead of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio. They argued that the amount of the claim for moral
damages was not more than the jurisdictional amount of P300,000.00,
because the claim for exemplary damages should be excluded in computing the total
claim.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the amount of
demand P420,000 was above the jurisdictional amount for MTCC’s outside Metro
Manila.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, respondent filed an amended complaint increasing the claim for moral
damages to P1,000,000. Petitioners then filed a motion to dismiss which was denied.

Petitioners again filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals,
still raising that the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City committed grave abuse of
discretion when it allowed the amended complaint. On appeal to the Court of Appeals,
it held that the other damages sought are merely incidental.

ISSUE:

Will the claim for exemplary damages sought be included in the computation for
the determination of the jurisdictional amount?
HELD:

Yes. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the
jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to
or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for
damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such
claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.

In the case, the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 5794-R is for the recovery of
damages for the alleged malicious acts of petitioners. The complaint principally sought
an award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses, for the alleged shame and injury suffered by respondent by reason of
petitioners’ utterance while they were at a police station in Pangasinan. It is settled that
jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the
latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s
causes of action. It is clear, based on the allegations of the complaint, that respondent’s
main action is for damages. Hence, the other forms of damages being claimed by
respondent, like exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, are not
merely incidental to or consequences of the main action but constitute the primary relief
prayed for in the complaint.
 25. Caballes v. CA
GLENN CABALLES y CHUA v COURT OF APPEALS, et. al.
G.R. No. 163108, February 23, 2005, SECOND DIVISION

DOCTRINE:

Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute
for the trial court’s function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error.
The writ cannot be used to investigate and consider questions of error that might be
raised relating to procedure or on the merits. Further, when the restraint is under legal
process, mere errors and irregularities, which do not render the proceedings void, are
not grounds for relief by habeas corpus because in such cases, the restraint is not
illegal.

A petition for a writ of habeas corpus cannot be joined with the special civil action
for certiorari because the two remedies are governed by a different set of rules.

FACTS:

On November 19, 2001, petitioner Glenn Chua Caballes was charged with rape
of a minor in the RTC of Malabon City. Since, the petitioner was charged with a non-
bailable offense, he was detained.

The petitioner was then arraigned and thereafter pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged. The prosecution then presented its witnesses, however, petitioner, through
counsel, commenced his cross-examination of Pio, but failed to complete the same. The
petitioner then engaged the services of a new counsel who entered his appearance as
defense counsel.

During the duration of the trial, it was met with several delays due to the presence
of several factors, such as non-presentation of witnesses, and several motions for
extension, among others. It has been inferred in the facts of the case that it took more
than 400 days from the inception of the trial to finish the presentation of witnesses.

Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for bail. Hence, the petitioner filed a
motion seeking an earlier trial date, invoking his right to speedy trial under the Speedy
Trial Act of 1998. He also filed a motion for the urgent resolution of his petition for bail.

The trial court then reasoned that there was no violation of the petitioner’s right
to speedy trial, considering that the apparent delays could not be attributed to the fault
of the prosecution alone. The trial court noted that the petitioner also sought
Postponements of the trials.

The petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a "Petition for Habeas
Corpus and/or Certiorari and Prohibition." The CA issued a Resolution requiring the
petitioner to inform the court of his choice of remedy within five (5) days from notice
thereof. In compliance therewith, the petitioner filed a manifestation with the appellate
court that he had chosen his petition to be treated as a petition for habeas
corpus without prejudice "to the concomitant application of certiorari if the court
considered the same necessary or appropriate to give effect to the writ of habeas corpus."

The CA then dismissed the petition for being the wrong remedy.

ISSUE:

Is the petition for habeas corpus a proper remedy in the case at bar?

RULING:

No. According to the appellate court, while the petitioner manifested his
preference that his petition be treated as a petition for habeas corpus, the same was not
the proper remedy to review and examine the proceedings before the trial court and as
a relief from the petitioner’s perceived oppressive situation in the trial court. The CA
further emphasized that a writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of error; that it could not
exercise its certiorari jurisdiction over the acts or omission of the respondent judge as
a concomitant remedy; and that the remedy for habeas corpus and certiorari are
different in nature, scope and purpose. The appellate court declared that the petitioner
failed to present any evidence to prove that there was any intentional or deliberate delay
caused to prejudice him; nor was there any malice in the failure of the prosecution to
promptly serve the subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum to its witnesses. The court
also noted that the resetting of petitioner’s case may also be attributed to the
voluminous work of the RTC involved.

Following the rule, the petitioner should have appealed to this Court from the CA
decision denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as well as the denial of his
motion for reconsideration thereof; instead, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The well-settled rule is that certiorari
is not available where the aggrieved party’s remedy of appeal is plain, speedy and
adequate in the ordinary course, the reason being that certiorari cannot co-exist with
an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The existence and availability of the right to
appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action for certiorari. These
two remedies are mutually exclusive. An appeal in this case would still have been a
speedy and adequate remedy. Consequently, when the petitioner filed his petition in
this Court, the decision of the CA was already final and executory.

It bears stressing that a decision in a habeas corpus action stands in no different

position than with any other proceeding and if the appealed decision is to be reviewed
by an appellate court, the remedy is by writ of error because the error committed by the
court is an error of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction.Besides, as correctly held
by the CA, a writ of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to assail the trial court’s
denial of the petitioner’s motion to dismiss the case, the denial of the petition for bail,
as well as the voluntary inhibition of Judge Laurea.

A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding

governed by Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended. In Ex Parte Billings, it was held
that habeas corpus is that of a civil proceeding in character. It seeks the enforcement of
civil rights. Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of which the
complaint is made, but into the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act and the
immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint. The rule applies even
when instituted to arrest a criminal prosecution and secure freedom. When a prisoner
petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, he thereby commences a suit and prosecutes a
case in that court.

Our review of the petitioner’s material averments in his petition before the CA
reveals that it was a "petition for habeas corpus or, in the alternative, a petition for a
writ of certiorari" The petitioner assailed therein the orders of the trial court denying his
petition for bail and his motion to dismiss on the ground that he was deprived of his
right to a speedy disposition of the case against him, and questioned Judge Laurea’s
order of inhibition. We agree with the CA that a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus cannot be joined with the special civil action for certiorari because the two
remedies are governed by a different set of rules. Rule 2, Section 5(b) of the Rules of
Court mandates that the joinder of causes of action shall not include special actions or
actions governed by special rules, thus proscribing the joinder of a special proceeding
with a special civil action.

We also agree with the ruling of the CA that a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus is a remedy different from the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, as amended. The writ of habeas corpus is a collateral attack on the
processes, orders, or judgment of the trial court, while certiorari is a direct attack of
said processes, orders, or judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari reaches only
jurisdictional errors. It has no other use, except to bring before the court a record
material to be considered in exercising jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari reaches the
record. On the other hand, a writ of habeas corpus reaches the body but not the record;
it also reaches jurisdictional matters but does not reach the record. However, when
jurisdiction is obtained by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, to bring the body of
the person whose liberty is involved into court, and if it is necessary, to provide the
record upon which the detention is based, that may be accomplished by using a writ of
certiorari as an ancillary proceeding, i.e., it is subordinate to or in aid of the primary
action for the purpose of impeaching the record. When a writ of certiorari is issued as
the foundation of jurisdiction to bring it and direct upon the validity of a judicial
determination by anybody or officer, jurisdictional questions only are reached, and such
questions pertaining to the detention made by the officer or body particularly
complained of.
26.
 27. Cagayan Valley v. CIR
CAGAYAN VALLEY DRUG CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE
G.R. No. 151413 February 13, 2008
DOCTRINE:

The Chairperson of the Board and President of the Company can sign the verification
and certificate against non-forum shopping even without the submission of the board’s
authorization.

FACTS:

Petitioner, a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, is a duly
licensed retailer of medicine and other pharmaceutical products. In compliance with
Revenue Regulation No. (RR) 2-94, petitioner treated the 20% sales discounts granted
to qualified senior citizens in 1995 as deductions from the gross sales in order to arrive
at the net sales, instead of treating them as tax credit as provided by Section 4 of RA
7432.

On December 27, 1996, however, petitioner filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) a claim for tax refund/tax credit of the full amount of the 20% sales discount it
granted to senior citizens for the year 1995, allegedly totaling to PhP 123,083 in
accordance with Sec. 4 of RA 7432.

The CA held that the person who signed the verification and certification of absence of
forum shopping, a certain Jacinto J. Concepcion, President of petitioner, failed to
adduce proof that he was duly authorized by the board of directors to do so. It found
no sufficient proof to show that Concepcion was duly authorized by the Board of
Directors of petitioner

ISSUE:

Can the president of a corporation sign the verification and certification without the
approval of the Board of Directors?

RULING:

Yes. In sum, we have held that the following officials or employees of the company can
sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the
Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General
Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment
Specialist in a labor case. The rationale applied in the foregoing cases is to justify the
authority of corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to sign the
verification or certificate against forum shopping, being "in a position to verify the
truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition
Moreso, in the case at bar, we so hold that petitioner substantially complied with Secs.
4 and 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure. First, the requisite board
resolution has been submitted albeit belatedly by petitioner. Second, we apply our ruling
in Lepanto with the rationale that the President of petitioner is in a position to verify the
truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition. Third, the President of
petitioner has signed the complaint before the CTA at the inception of this judicial claim
for refund or tax credit.
28
 29. Santos v. Alcazar
SPOUSES FERNANDO and MA. ELENA SANTOS v LOLITA ALCAZAR
G.R. No. 183034, March 12, 2014, SECOND DIVISION

DOCTRINE:

The rule that the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be
deemed admitted, unless the adverse party specifically denies them under oath, applies
only to parties to such instrument.

FACTS:

Respondent Lolita Alcazar, proprietor of Legazpi Color Center (LCC), instituted a

Complaint for sum of money against the petitioners, spouses Fernando and Ma. Elena
Santos, to collect the value of paint and construction materials obtained by the latter
from LCC amounting to ₱1,456,000.00, which remained unpaid despite written
demand. Respondent’s cause of action is based on a document entitled
"Acknowledgment" apparently executed by petitioner Fernando.

Petitioners Spouses Santos filed a Demurrer to Evidence, which respondent

opposed. Petitioners argued that the Acknowledgment which was presented in court was
not an original copy and thus inadmissible.

The trial Court and the Court of Appeals held that the Acknowledgment which
was duly authenticated and formally offered in evidence was sufficient to establish their
liability, and no further proof in the form of receipts and statements of account was
required.

ISSUE:

Is there a requirement on the part of the respondent to present the original copy
of Acknowledgment executed by Fernando Santos?

RULING:

No.There is no need for proof of execution and authenticity with respect to

documents the genuineness and due execution of which are admitted by the adverse
party.

With the consequent admission engendered by petitioners’ failure to properly

deny the Acknowledgment in their Answer, coupled with its proper authentication,
identification and offer by the respondent, judgment may be had solely on the document,
and there is no need to present receipts and other documents to prove the claimed
indebtedness. The Acknowledgment, just as an ordinary acknowledgment receipt, is
valid and binding between the parties who executed it, as a document evidencing the
loan agreement they had entered into. The absence of rebutting evidence occasioned by
petitioners’ waiver of their right to present evidence renders the Acknowledgment as the
best evidence of the transactions between the parties and the consequential
indebtedness incurred.
30.
 31. Habeas Corpus of Vergara
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BENJAMIN
VERGARA v HON. FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR.
G. R. No. 154037, April 30, 2003, SECOND DIVISION

DOCTRINE:

As a rule, when service of notice is an issue the person alleging that the notice
was served must prove the fact of service. The burden of proving notice rests upon the
party asserting its existence. Nonetheless, even in the absence of proof of actual receipt
by the petitioners, the orders issued by the court are valid and enforceable when the
petitioners cannot deny the fact that they had actual knowledge of the said orders.

FACTS:

Petitioners were tenants of Berlito P. Taripe on a certain property located in

Parañaque City. Pending the settlement of the estate of the deceased Anselma Allers,
respondent Eleuteria P. Bolaño included the property leased by Taripe to petitioners in
the inventory of the estate. The probate court directed petitioners to pay their monthly
rentals to Bolaño, the duly appointed Special Administratrix. Copies of the order dated
October 9, 1999, were sent to petitioners via registered mail.

For failure to comply with the said order, Bolaño filed a motion to cite petitioners
in contempt. The court found petitioners guilty of indirect contempt and ordered them
to pay a fine and to undergo imprisonment until they comply with the probate court's
order for them to pay rentals. Petitioners were then arrested by virtue of a warrant of
arrest. Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus. Petitioners were temporarily released, but the CA later denied the
petition and recalled the release.

The crux of petitioners' arguments is that they were not notified of the motion
filed by respondent Special Administratrix Bolaño, submitting an inventory of the estate
of the late Anselma P. Allers, which includes the property occupied by them. Such being
the case, petitioners contend that the order granting the motion and directing them to
pay the rentals to Bolaño is unlawful; hence, their refusal to comply with it is not
contumacious.

ISSUE:

Were the subject orders issued by the probate court valid and enforceable?

RULING:

Yes, the orders were valid. When service of notice is an issue, the rule is that the
person alleging that the notice was served must prove the fact of service. The burden of
proving notice rests upon the party asserting its existence. In civil cases, service made
through registered mail is proved by the registry receipt issued by the mailing office and
an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with Section 7 of Rule 13.
 In the present case, as proof that petitioners were served with copies of the
omnibus motion submitting an inventory of the estate of deceased Allers, respondent
Bolaño presented photocopies of the motion with a certification by counsel that service
was made by registered mail, together with the registry receipts. While the affidavit and
the registry receipts proved that petitioners were served with copies of the motion, it
does not follow, however, that petitioners in fact received the motion. Bolaño failed to
present the registry return cards showing that petitioners received the motion. Receipts
for registered letters and return receipts do not prove themselves, they must be properly
authenticated in order to serve as proof of receipt of the letters. Bolaño also failed to
present a certification of the postmaster that notice was duly issued and delivered to
petitioners such that service by registered mail may be deemed completed.

Nonetheless, even in the absence of proof of actual receipt by the petitioners, the
subject orders issued by the probate court are valid and enforceable. Petitioners cannot
deny the fact that they had actual knowledge of the said orders. They have admitted in
their letter addressed to the probate court that they received the court's order "barely 2
months before," 26 or sometime in January 2001. Instead of complying with the said
order, they "froze" payment of their rentals because they are caught in the middle of the
dispute and are not sure to whom to give the rentals.

When Bolaño filed the motion to cite them in indirect contempt, records show
that they had actual knowledge of the same. In their second letter addressed to the
probate court, they acknowledged that they knew of the hearing and the reason for their
failure to attend was due to financial constraints. They likewise admitted in said letter
that they knew of the court's order dated finding them guilty of indirect contempt.

Petitioners therefore cannot cry denial of due process as they were notified of the
proceedings before the probate court. Thus, under the circumstances, it is not
imperative to require proof of a formal notice. It would be an idle ceremony where an
adverse party, as in this case, had actual knowledge of the proceedings.