EN BANC

[G.R. No. 69866. April 15, 1988.]

ROGELIO ABERCA, RODOLFO BENOSA, NESTOR BODINO, NOEL

ETABAG, DANILO DE LA FUENTE, BELEN DIAZ-FLORES, MANUEL
MARIO GUZMAN, ALAN JAZMINEZ, EDWIN LOPEZ, ALFREDO
MANSOS, ALEX MARCELINO, ELIZABETH PROTACIO-MARCELINO,
JOSEPH OLAYER, CARLOS PALMA, MARCO PALO, ROLANDO
SALUTIN, BENJAMIN SESGUNDO, ARTURO TABARA, EDWIN
TULALIAN and REBECCA TULALIAN , petitioners, vs. MAJ. GEN.
FABIAN VER, COL. FIDEL SINGSON, COL. ROLANDO ABADILLA, COL.
GERARDO B. LANTORIA, COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, LT. COL.
PANFILO M. LACSON, MAJ. RODOLFO AGUINALDO, CAPT. DANILO
PIZARRO, 1LT. PEDRO TANGO, 1LT. ROMEO RICARDO, 1LT. RAUL
BACALSO, MSGT. BIENVENIDO BALABA, and REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XCV (95), Quezon
City , respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION; DAMAGES FOR VIOLATION OF

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS; MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES LIABLE. — Article 32 of
the Civil Code which renders any public o cer or employee or any private individual
liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as
enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges
are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do
not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS. — The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest
and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; HABEAS CORPUS; SUSPENSION OF PRIVILEGE
OF THE WRIT DOES NOT VALIDATE ILLEGAL ARREST OR DETENTION. — The
suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is
suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through
the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.
4. CIVIL LAW; INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION; DAMAGES FOR VIOLATION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS; DOCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR NOT APPLICABLE
TO SUPERIOR OFFICERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR SUBORDINATES. — The
doctrine of respondent superior is inapplicable to the case. We agree. The doctrine of
respondent superior has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent
or to master and servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such
relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PERSONS RESPONSIBLE. — Article 32 speaks of an o cer or
employee or person "directly" or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the
constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one
directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person
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 indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the
aggrieved party.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — By this provision, the principle of accountability of public
o cials under the Constitution acquires added meaning and assumes a larger
dimension. No longer may a superior o cial relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to
supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for
the transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights
and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power in February
1986 was the widely held perception that the government was callous or indifferent to,
if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights. While it would
certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred
by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no
uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as
well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.
7. REMEDIAL LAW' MOTION TO DISMISS; FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF
ACTION, A GROUND; DETERMINED BY THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT. — A
motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action must be
based on what appears on the face of the complaint. To determine the su ciency of
the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no others, should be
considered. For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth
of the facts alleged in the complaint.
8. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; AUTHORITY TO APPEAR FOR A PARTY,
ASSUMED. — The authority of an attorney to appear for and in behalf of a party can be
assumed, unless questioned or challenged by the adverse party or the party concerned,
which was never done in this case.
9. REMEDIAL LAW; COMPLAINT; DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT WITH
RESPECT TO PARTIES WHOSE LAWYERS DID NOT SIGN THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION CONSTITUTES GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — In ling the
motion to set aside the resolution of November 8, 1983, the signing attorneys did so on
behalf of all the plaintiffs. They needed no speci c authority to do that. Thus, it was
grave abuse on the part of respondent judge to take it upon himself to rule that the
motion to set aside the order of November 8, 1953 dismissing the complaint was led
only by some of the plaintiffs, when by its very language it was clearly intended to be
led by and for the bene t of all of them. It is obvious that the respondent judge took
umbrage under a contrived technicality to declare that the dismissal of the complaint
had already become nal with respect to some of the plaintiffs whose lawyers did not
sign the motion for reconsideration. Such action tainted with legal in rmity cannot be
sanctioned.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring :
1. CIVIL LAW; INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION; DAMAGES FOR VIOLATION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS; PERSONS COVERED. — All persons, be they public o cers
or employees, or members of the military or police force or private individuals who
directly or indirectly obstruct, defeat, violate or in any manner impede or impair the
constitutional rights and civil liberties of another person, stand liable and may be sued
in court for damages as provided in Art. 32 of the Civil Code.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRINCIPLE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR; NOT APPLICABLE TO
OFFICERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR SUBORDINATES. — The case at bar
rejects the automatic application of the principle of respondent superior or command
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 responsibility that would hold a superior o cer jointly and severally accountable for
damages, including moral and exemplary, with his subordinates who committed such
transgressions.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUPERIOR OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR GROSS NEGLIGENCE
IN ABDICATION OF PROPER SUPERVISION OF SUBORDINATES. — The judgment gives
the caveat that a superior o cer must not abdicate is duty to properly supervise his
subordinates for he runs the risk of being held responsible for gross negligence and of
being held under the cited provision of the Civil Code as indirectly and solidarily
accountable with the tortfeasor.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. — The rationale for this rule of law was best
expressed by Brandeis in this wise: "In a government of laws, existence of the
government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government
is the potent omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole people by
example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes the law breaker, it breeds
contempt for the law, it invites every man to become a law unto himself, it invites
anarchy. To declare that in the administration of criminal law the end justi es the
means . . . . would bring terrible retribution."

DECISION

YAP , J : p

This petition for certiorari presents vital issues not heretofore passed upon by
this Court. It poses the question whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by
military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution. If such action for damages may be maintained, who can be held liable for
such violations: only the military personnel directly involved and/or their superiors as
well.
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations
of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM), ordered by General Fabian
Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT)
underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances
in Metro Manila." Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order,
elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued
judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party
con scated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs
were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after
their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were
interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who
interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in
order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them;
that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and
deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from
plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously known to
and sanctioned by defendants.
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 Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages amounting to P39,030.00;
moral damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00;
exemplary damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of
P3,000,000.00; and attorney's fees amounting to not less than P200,000.00.
A motion to dismiss was led by defendants, through their counsel, then
Solicitor-General Estelito Mendoza, alleging that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial
inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because,
as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) assuming that
the courts can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for
acts done in the performance of their o cial duties; and (3) the complaint states no
cause of action against the defendants. Opposition to said motion to dismiss was led
by plaintiffs Marco Palo, Danilo de la Fuente, Benjamin Sesgundo, Nel Etabag, Alfredo
Mansos and Rolando Salutin on July 8, 1983, and by plaintiffs Edwin Lopez, Manuel
Mario Guzman, Alan Jasminez, Nestor Bodino, Carlos Palma, Arturo Tabara, Joseph
Olayer, Rodolfo Benosa, Belen Diaz Flores, Rogelio Aberca, Alex Marcelino and Elizabeth
Marcelino on July 21, 1983. On November 7, 1983, a Consolidated Reply was led by
defendants' counsel. cdrep

Then, on November 8, 1983, the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region,
Branch 95, Judge Willelmo C. Fortun, Presiding, 1 issued a resolution granting the
motion to dismiss. It sustained, lock, stock and barrel, the defendants' contention (1)
the plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention
in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended; (2) that assuming that the court can entertain the present action,
defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their o cial
duties; and (3) that the complaint states no cause of action against defendants, since
there is no allegation that the defendants named in the complaint con scated plaintiffs'
purely personal properties in violation of their constitutional rights, and with the
possible exception of Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Sergeant Bienvenido Balabo,
committed acts of torture and maltreatment, or that the defendants had the duty to
exercise direct supervision and control of their subordinates or that they had vicarious
liability as employers under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court stated, "After
a careful study of defendants' arguments, the court nds the same to be meritorious
and must, therefore, be granted. On the other hand, plaintiffs' arguments in their
opposition are lacking in merit."
A motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint and a supplemental
motion for reconsideration was led by the plaintiffs on November 18, 1983, and
November 24, 1983, respectively. On December 9, 1983, the defendants led a
comment on the aforesaid motion of plaintiffs, furnishing a copy thereof to the
attorneys of all the plaintiffs, namely, Attys. Jose W. Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene
Sarmiento, Efren Mercado, Augusto Sanchez, Antonio L. Rosales, Pedro B. Ella, Jr., Arno
V. Sanidad, Alexander Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene Saguisag, Ramon Esguerra and
Felicitas Aquino.
On December 15, 1983, Judge Fortun issued an order voluntarily inhibiting
himself from further proceeding in the case and leaving the resolution of the motion to
set aside the order of dismissal to Judge Lising, "to preclude any suspicion that he
(Judge Fortun) cannot resolve [the] aforesaid pending motion with the cold neutrality of
an impartial judge and to put an end to plaintiffs' assertion that the undersigned has no
authority or jurisdiction to resolve said pending motion." This order prompted plaintiffs
to le an ampli catory motion for reconsideration signed in the name of the Free Legal
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 Assistance Group (FLAG] of Mabini Legal Aid Committee, by Attys. Joker P. Arroyo,
Felicitas Aquino and Arno Sanidad on April 12, 1984. On May 2, 1984, the defendants
filed a comment on said amplificatory motion for reconsideration.
In an order dated May 11, 1984, the trial court, Judge Esteban Lising, Presiding,
without acting on the motion to set aside order of November 8, 1983, issued an order,
as follows:
"It appearing from the records that, indeed, the following plaintiffs, Rogelio
Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente and Marco Palo, represented by counsel, Atty. Jose W.
Diokno, Alan Jasminez, represented by counsel, Atty. Augusto Sanchez, Spouses
Alex Marcelino and Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, represented by counsel, Atty.
Procopio Beltran, Alfredo Mansos, represented by counsel, Atty. Rene Sarmiento,
and Rolando Salutin, represented by counsel, Atty. Efren Mercado, failed to le a
motion to reconsider the Order of November 8, 1983, dismissing the complaint,
nor interposed an appeal therefrom within the reglementary period, as prayed for
by the defendants, said Order is now final against said plaintiffs."

Assailing the said order of May 11, 1984, the plaintiffs led a motion for
reconsideration on May 28, 1984, alleging that it was not true that plaintiffs Rogelio
Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan Jasminez, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth
Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin failed to le a motion to
reconsider the order of November 8, 1983 dismissing the complaint, within the
reglementary period. Plaintiffs claimed that the motion to set aside the order of
November 8, 1983 and the ampli catory motion for reconsideration was led for all the
plaintiffs, although signed by only some of the lawyers. llcd

In its resolution of September 21, 1984, the respondent court dealt with both
motions (1) to reconsider its order of May 11, 1984 declaring that with respect to
certain plaintiffs, the resolution of November 8, 1983 had already become nal, and (2)
to set aside its resolution of November 8, 1983 granting the defendants' motion to
dismiss. In the dispositive portion of the order of September 21, 1984, the respondent
court resolved:
(1) That the motion to set aside the order of nality, dated May 11, 1984, of
the Resolution of dismissal of the complaint of plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo
de la Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan Jasminez, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-
Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin is denied for lack of merit;

(2) For lack of cause of action as against the following defendants, to wit:
1. Gen Fabian Ver

2. Col. Fidel Singson

3. Col. Rolando Abadilla

4. Lt. Col. Conrado Lantoria, Jr.

5. Col. Galileo Kintanar
6. Col. Panfilo Lacson

7. Capt. Danilo Pizaro

8. 1Lt Pedro Tango

9. Lt. Romeo Ricardo

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 10. Lt. Raul Bacalso

the motion to set aside and reconsider the Resolution of dismissal of the present
action or complaint, dated November 8, 1983, is also denied; but in so far as it
affects and refers to defendants, to wit:

1. Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo, and

2. Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba,

the motion to reconsider and set aside the Resolution of dismissal dated
November 3, 1983 is granted and the Resolution of dismissal is, in this respect,
reconsidered and modified."

Hence, petitioners led the instant petition for certiorari on March 15, 1985
seeking to annul and set aside the respondent court's resolution of November 8, 1983,
its order of May 11, 1984, and its resolution dated September 21, 1984. Respondents
were required to comment on the petition, which it did on November 9, 1985. A reply
was filed by petitioners on August 26, 1986.
We find the petition meritorious and decide to give it due course.
At the heart of petitioners' complaint is Article 32 of the Civil Code which
provides:
ARTICLE 32. Any public o cer or employee, or any private individual who
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or
impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable
to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;

(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;

(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public
use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;

(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;

(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;

(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes
not contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the
Government for redress of grievances;

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 (14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;

(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;

(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy
and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or
from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of
immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing
becomes a State witness;

(18) Freedom from excessive nes, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless
the same is imposed or in icted in accordance with a statute which has not been
judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts. LLjur

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or
omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to
commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for
other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal
prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of
evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be
adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act
or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a

sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its
message is clear: no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. In
times of great upheaval or of social and political stress, when the temptation is
strongest to yield — borrowing the words of Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee — to the
law of force rather than the force of law, it is necessary to remind ourselves that certain
basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be sacri ced to the transient needs
or imperious demands of the ruling power. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty
will perish. Our commitment to democratic principles and to the rule of law compels us
to reject the view which reduces law to nothing but the expression of the will of the
predominant power in the community. "Democracy cannot be a reign of progress, of
liberty, of justice, unless the law is respected by him who makes it and by him for whom
it is made. Now this respect implies a maximum of faith, a minimum of idealism. On
going to the bottom of the matter, we discover that life demands of us a certain
residuum of sentiment which is not derived from reason, but which reason nevertheless
controls." 2
Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the respondents
postulate the view that as public o cers they are covered by the mantle of state
immunity from suit for acts done in the performance of o cial duties or functions. In
support of said contention, respondents maintain that —
"Respondents are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Their primary
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 duty is to safeguard public safety and order. The Constitution no less provides
that the President may call them "to prevent or supress lawless violence, invasion,
insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof." (Constitution, Article VII,
Section 9).

On January 17, 1981, the President issued Proclamation No. 2045 lifting martial
law but providing for the continued suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in view of the remaining dangers to the security of the nation. The
proclamation also provided "that the call to the Armed Forces of the Philippines to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion shall
continue to be in force and effect."
Petitioners allege in their complaint that their causes of action proceed from
respondent General Ver's order to Task Force Makabansa to launch preemptive
strikes against communist terrorist underground houses in Metro Manila.
Petitioners claim that this order and its subsequent implementation by elements
of the task force resulted in the violation of their constitutional rights against
unlawful searches, seizures and arrest, rights to counsel and to silence, and the
right to property and that, therefore, respondents Ver and the named members of
the task force should be held liable for damages.

But, by launching a preemptive strike against communist terrorists, respondent

members of the armed forces merely performed their o cial and constitutional
duties. To allow petitioners to recover from respondents by way of damages for
acts performed in the exercise of such duties run contrary to the policy
considerations to shield respondents as public o cers from undue interference
with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability (Aarlon v.
Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2731; Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 534), and upon the
necessity of protecting the performance of governmental and public functions
from being harassed unduly or constantly interrupted by private suits (McCallan
v. State, 35 Cal. App. 605; Metran v. Paredes, 79 Phil. 819).
cdphil

xxx xxx xxx

The immunity of public o cers from liability arising from the performance of
their duties is now a settled jurisprudence (Alzua v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308; Zulueta
v. Nicolas, 102 Phil. 944; Spalding v. Vilas, 161 US 483; 40 L. Ed. 738, 16 S. Ct.
631; Barr v. Mateo, 360; Butz v. Economon, 438 US 478; 57 L. Ed. 2d 895, 98 S. Ct.
2894; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 US 232; Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, supra; Miller v. de
Leune, 602 F. 2d 198; Sami v. US, 617 F. 2d 755).
Respondents-defendants who merely obeyed the lawful orders of the President
and his call for the suppression of the rebellion involving petitioners enjoy such
immunity from suit." 3

We nd respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit

totally misplaced. The cases invoked by respondents actually involved acts done by
o cers in the performance of o cial duties within the ambit of their powers. As held in
Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield: 4
"No one can be held legally responsible in damages or otherwise for doing in a
legal manner what he had authority, under the law, to do. Therefore, if the
Governor-General had authority, under the law to deport or expel the defendants,
and circumstances justifying the deportation and the method of carrying it out are
left to him, then he cannot be held liable in damages for the exercise of this
power. Moreover, if the courts are without authority to interfere in any manner, for
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 the purpose of controlling or interfering with the exercise of the political powers
vested in the chief executive authority of the Government, then it must follow that
the courts cannot intervene for the purpose of declaring that he is liable in
damages for the exercise of this authority."

It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the

Philippines, were merely responding to their duty, as they claim, "to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in accordance with
Proclamation No. 2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on
January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre-emptive strikes
against alleged communist terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be construed
as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint,
to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen
enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme
law of the land to which all o cials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and
allegiance at all times.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public o cer or employee or any
private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of
another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility.
Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or
omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their
assigned task or carrying out their mission with vigor. We have no quarrel with their
duty to protect the Republic from its enemies, whether of the left or of the right, or from
within or without, seeking to destroy or subvert our democratic institutions and imperil
their very existence. What we are merely trying to say is that in carrying out this task
and mission, constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed, otherwise, the very
fabric of our faith will start to unravel. In the battle of competing ideologies, the
struggle for the mind is just as vital as the struggle of arms. The linchpin in that
psychological struggle is faith in the rule of law. Once that faith is lost or compromised,
the struggle may well be abandoned.
We do not nd merit in respondents' suggestion that plaintiffs' cause of action is
barred by the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Respondents
contend that "Petitioners cannot circumvent the suspension of the privilege of the writ
by resorting to a damage suit aimed at the same purpose - a judicial inquiry into the
alleged illegality of their detention. While the main relief they ask by the present action
is indemni cation for alleged damages they suffered, their causes of action are
inextricably based on the same claim of violations of their constitutional rights that they
invoked in the habeas corpus case as grounds for release from detention. Were the
petitioners allowed the present suit, the judicial inquiry barred by the suspension of the
privilege of the writ will take place. The net result is that what the courts cannot do, i.e.
override the suspension ordered by the President, petitioners will be able to do by the
mere expedient of altering the title of their action."
We do not agree. We nd merit in petitioners' contention that the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause
of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their
constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or
detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from
detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.
LibLex

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 Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of action for
damages are explicitly recognized in P.D. No. 1755 which amended Article 1146 of the
Civil Code by adding the following to its text:
"However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasi-
delict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public o cer
involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including
the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within
one (1) year."

Petitioners have a point in contending that even assuming that the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends petitioners' right of action for
damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and cannot suspend their rights
and causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents' con scation of their
private belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their
right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and
other cruel and inhuman treatment.
However, we nd it unnecessary to address the constitutional issue pressed
upon us. On March 25, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 2,
revoking Proclamation Nos. 2045 and 2045-A and lifting the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. The question therefore has become moot and academic.
This brings us to the crucial issue raised in this petition. May a superior o cer
under the notion of respondeat superior be answerable for damages, jointly and
severally with his subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties
have been violated?
Respondents contend that the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable to
the case. We agree. The doctrine of respondeat superior has been generally limited in
its application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and
employee) relationship. No such relationship exists between superior o cers of the
military and their subordinates.
Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the
language of Article 32. The law speaks of an o cer or employee or person "directly" or
"indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of
another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must
answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to
answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.
By this provision, the principle of accountability of public o cials under the
Constitution 5 acquires added meaning and assumes a larger dimension. No longer
may a superior o cial relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his
subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the
transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights
and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power in February
1986 was the widely held perception that the government was callous or indifferent to,
if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights. While it would
certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred
by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no
uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as
well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.
In the case at bar, the trial court dropped defendants General Fabian Ver, Col.
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 Fidel Singson, Col. Rolando Abadilla, Col. Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Col. Galileo Kintanar, Col.
Pan lo Lacson, Capt. Danilo Pizarro, 1st Lt. Pedro Tango, Lt. Romeo Ricardo and Lt.
Ricardo Bacalso from the complaint on the assumption that under the law, they cannot
be held responsible for the wrongful acts of their subordinates. Only Major Rodolfo
Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba were kept as defendants on the ground
that they alone "have been speci cally mentioned and identi ed to have allegedly
caused injuries on the persons of some of the plaintiffs, which acts of alleged physical
violence constitute a delict or wrong that gave rise to a cause of action." But such
finding is not supported by the record, nor is it in accord with law and jurisprudence.
Firstly, it is wrong to limit the plaintiffs' action for damages to "acts of alleged
physical violence" which constituted delict or wrong. Article 32 clearly speci es as
actionable the act of violating or in any manner impeding or impairing any of the
constitutional rights and liberties enumerated therein, among others —
1. Freedom from arbitrary arrest or illegal detention;
2. The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

3. The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;

4. The privacy of communication and correspondence;

5. Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from
being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or
reward to make a confession, except when the person confessing becomes a
state witness. LLphil

The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity and
details, how plaintiffs' constitutional rights and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the
Civil Code were violated and impaired by defendants. The complaint speaks of, among
others, searches made without search warrants or based on irregularly issued or
substantially defective warrants; seizures and con scation, without proper receipts, of
cash and personal effects belonging to plaintiffs and other items of property which
were not subversive and illegal nor covered by the search warrants; arrest and
detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under irregular, improper and illegal
circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed places of "safehouses"
where they were kept incommunicado and subjected to physical and psychological
torture and other inhuman, degrading and brutal treatment for the purpose of extracting
incriminatory statements. The complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses
perpetrated upon the plaintiffs violative of their constitutional rights.
Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated
"directly" should be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the
ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violation.
The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth
in the complaint. It is well established in our law and jurisprudence that a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action must be based on
what appears on the face of the complaint. 6 To determine the su ciency of the cause
of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no others, should be considered. 7
For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts
alleged in the complaint. 8
Applying this test, it is difficult to justify the trial court's ruling, dismissing for lack
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 of cause of action the complaint against all defendants, except Major Rodolfo
Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba. The complaint contained allegations
against all the defendants which, if admitted hypothetically, would be su cient to
establish a cause or causes of action against all of them under Article 32 of the Civil
Code.
This brings us to the last issue. Was the trial court correct in dismissing the
complaint with respect to plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente, Marco Palo,
Alan Jazminez, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and
Rolando Salutin, on the basis of the alleged failure of said plaintiffs to le a motion for
reconsideration of the court's resolution of November 8, 1983, granting the
respondent's motion to dismiss?
It is undisputed that a timely motion to set aside said order of November 8, 1983
was led by "plaintiffs, through counsel." True, the motion was signed only by Atty.
Joker P. Arroyo, counsel for Benjamin Sesgundo; Atty. Antonio Rosales, counsel for
Edwin Lopez and Manuel Martin Guzman; Atty. Pedro B. Ella, Jr., counsel for Nestor
Bodino and Carlos Palma; Atty. Arno V. Sanidad, counsel for Arturo Tabara; Atty.
Felicitas S. Aquino, counsel for Joseph Olayer; and Atty. Alexander Padilla, counsel for
Rodolfo Benosa.
But the body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the motion was led on
behalf of all the plaintiffs. And this must have been also the understanding of
defendants' counsel himself for when he led his comment on the motion, he furnished
copies thereof, not just to the lawyers who signed the motion, but to all the lawyers of
plaintiffs, to wit: Attys. Jose W. Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren
Mercado, Augusto Sanchez, Antonio Rosales, Pedro Ella, Jr., Arno Sanidad, Alexander
Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene Saguisag, Ramon Esguerra and Felicitas S. Aquino.
In ling the motion to set aside the resolution of November 8, 1983, the signing
attorneys did so on behalf of all the plaintiffs. They needed no speci c authority to do
that. The authority of an attorney to appear for and in behalf of a party can be assumed,
unless questioned or challenged by the adverse party or the party concerned, which
was never done in this case. Thus, it was grave abuse on the part of respondent judge
to take it upon himself to rule that the motion to set aside the order of November 8,
1953 dismissing the complaint was led only by some of the plaintiffs, when by its very
language it was clearly intended to be led by and for the bene t of all of them. It is
obvious that the respondent judge took umbrage under a contrived technicality to
declare that the dismissal of the complaint had already become nal with respect to
some of the plaintiffs whose lawyers did not sign the motion for reconsideration. Such
action tainted with legal infirmity cannot be sanctioned. cdphil

Accordingly, we grant the petition and annul and set aside the resolution of the
respondent court, dated November 8, 1983, its order dated May 11, 1984 and its
resolution dated September 21, 1984. Let the case be remanded to the respondent
court for further proceedings. With Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, C.J., concurs with a separate opinion.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., in the result.
Padilla, J., took no part; related to counsel for Rodolfo Benosa.
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 Separate Opinion
TEEHANKEE, C .J ., concurring :

The Court's judgment at bar makes clear that all persons, be they public o cers
or employees, or members of the military or police force or private individuals who
directly or indirectly obstruct, defeat, violate or in any manner impede or impair the
constitutional rights and civil liberties of another person, stand liable and may be sued
in court for damages as provided in Art. 32 of the Civil Code.
The case at bar speci cally upholds and reinstates the civil action for damages
led in the court below by petitioners-plaintiffs for illegal searches conducted by
military personnel and other violations of their constitutional rights and liberties. At the
same time it rejects the automatic application of the principle of respondeat superior
or command responsibility that would hold a superior o cer jointly and severally
accountable for damages, including moral and exemplary, with his subordinates who
committed such transgressions. However, the judgment gives the caveat that a
superior o cer must not abdicate his duty to properly supervise his subordinates for
he runs the risk of being held responsible for gross negligence and of being held under
the cited provision of the Civil Code as indirectly and solidarily accountable with the
tortfeasor. prcd

The rationale for this rule of law was best expressed by Brandeis in this wise: "In
a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to
observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent omnipresent teacher. For
good or ill, it teaches the whole people by example. Crime is contagious. If the
government becomes the law breaker, it breeds contempt for the law, it invites every
man to become a law unto himself, it invites anarchy. To declare that in the
administration of criminal law the end justi es the means . . . . would bring terrible
retribution." 1
As the writer stressed in Hildawa vs. Enrile 2 which was an action to enjoin the
operations of the dreaded secret marshals during the past regime, "In a democratic
state, you don't stop to the level of criminals. If we stoop to what they do, then we're no
better than they . . . there would be no difference." . . . The Supreme Court stands as the
guarantor of the Constitutional and human rights of all persons within its jurisdiction
and cannot abdicate its basic role under the Constitution that these rights be respected
and enforced. The spirit and letter of the Constitution negates as contrary to the basic
precepts of human rights and freedom that a person's life be snuffed out without due
process in a split second even if he is caught in agrante delicto — unless it was called
for as an act of self-defense by the law agents using reasonable means to prevent or
repel an unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased."
Needless to say, the criminal acts of the "Sparrow Units" or death squads of the
NPA which have in ltrated the cities and suburbs and performed their despicable
killings of innocent civilians and military and police o cers constitute an equally
perverse violation of the sanctity of human life and must be severely condemned by all
who adhere to the Rule of Law.
It need only be pointed out that one of the rst acts of the present government
under President Corazon C. Aquino after her assumption of o ce in February, 1986
was to le our government's rati cation and access to all human rights instruments
adopted under the auspices of the United Nations, declaring thereby the government's
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 commitment to observe the precepts of the United Nations Charter and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. More than this, pursuant to our Constitution which the
people decisively rati ed on February 2, 1987, the independent o ce of the
Commission on Human Rights has been created and organized with ample powers to
investigate human rights violations and take remedial measures against all such
violations by the military as well as by the civilian groups. LibLex

Footnotes

1. The Presiding Judge of Branch 95, Judge Esteban M. Lising, was allowed to go on leave,
per resolution of the Supreme Court on October 18, 1983, and Judge Willelmo C. Fortun
was authorized to take cognizance of all kinds of cases of Branch 95 during the former's
absence.
2. Joseph Charmont, French Legal Philosophy, Mcmillan Co., New York, 1921, pp. 72-73.

3. Rollo, pp. 240-241; 244.

4. 16 Phil. 534, 578.

5. Section 1, Article XI.

6. Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50, 57; Garcon v. Redemptorist Fathers, 17 SCRA 341.
7. Adamos v. J. M. Tuazon , 25 SCRA 529; Socorro v. Vargag , 25 SCRA 592, 596; La Suerte
Cigar & Cigarette Factory vs. Central Azucarera de Davao, 23 SCRA 686, 690.
8. Garcon vs. Redemptorist Fathers, supra; PNB vs. Hipolito, 13 SCRA 20.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

1. Olmstead vs. U.S. 277 U.S. 438; dissenting opinion.

2. 138 SCRA 146, 161.

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