21.
Ledesma v CA The matter of the interruption of the prescriptive period by reason of a
G.R. No. 106646 written extrajudicial demand by the creditor was decided in Overseas Bank
June 30, 1993 of Manila vs. Geraldez, et al (go to last part of this Digest)
By: Danielle Casipit The case of Fulton Insurance Company is not clear either on the matter of
_____________________________________________________________________ the interruption of the prescriptive period where an action is filed in court.
Topic: Acquisitive prescription; tacking; extinctive prescription It was there held that:
Petitioner: Jaime Ledesma There are two school(s) of thought as to the legal effect of the cessation of the interruption
Respondent: CA and Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation by an intervening action upon the period of prescription. There is the view expressed and
perhaps, not without reasons, that the full period of prescription should start to run anew,
_____________________________________________________________________
reckoned from the date of the cessation of the interruption. The contrary view is, that the
cessation of the interruption merely tolls the running of the remaining period of
RECIT-READY: prescription, deducting from the full period thereof the time that has already elapsed prior
to the filing of the intervening action. Nevertheless, all discussion on this point is academic;
Doctrine: considered in the light of either view, we find that the second action is not barred
In the aforesaid case, the defendant therein moved for the dismissal of the
Facts: second case alleging that the filing of the first case neither tolled nor
interrupted the running of the prescriptive period. This Court ruled that the
Herein petition is a motion for reconsideration of the court’s March 24 1993
filing of the first action interrupted the running of the period, and then
decision to deny petitition for review on certiorari
declared that at any rate, the second action was filed within the balance of
On August 21, 1980, RCBC filed a case against petitioner to enforce term of
the period remaining. It concluded that the issue of whether the filing of the
their Trust Receipt Agreement executed by them on April 1, 1974 but
action merely tolled or it actually interrupted the running of the prescriptive
petitioner failed to comply
period was moot and academic because, in either case, the second action
As summons could not be served on the latter, case was dismissed
was still filed within the prescriptive period. Consequently, the Fulton case
On December 2, 1988, respondent bank filed another civil case on the same
cannot also sustain the thesis of petitioner.
cause of action and subject matter
On the foregoing considerations, we are convinced and so hold that the
Petitioner’s motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription was denied
correct interpretations of Article 1155 of the Civil Code are reflected in and
Petitioner’s motion for review on certiorari was denied, hence this present furnished by the doctrinal pronouncements in Overseas Bank of Manila and
motion for reconsideration Philippine National Railways Company, not only because they are later in
Contending that the second action filed by private respondent bank had point of time but because the issue is squarely resolved in a decisive and
already prescribed, petitioner invokes the rulings in Vda. de Nator, et al. vs. logical manner therein. Petitioner's submission would result in a bifurcated
Court of Industrial Relations, et al.3 and Fulton Insurance Co. vs. Manila interpretation of Article 1155, aside from the irrational conclusion that a
Railroad Co., et al.4 and invites us "to give a second look at the apparently judicial action itself cannot produce the same result on the prescriptive
conflicting or divergent jurisprudence." period as a mere extrajudicial demand or an acknowledgment of the debt.
Issue: W/N 2nd case filed by respondent has prescribed
Held: NO
Article 1155 of the Civil. Code provides that the prescription of an action,
involving in the present case the 10-year prescriptive period for filing an
action on a written contract under Article 1144(1) of the Code, is interrupted
by (a) the filing of an action, (b) a written extrajudicial demand by the
creditor, and (c) a written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor
NOTE:
Overseas Bank of Manila vs. Geraldez,
The interruption of the prescriptive period by written extrajudicial demand means
that the said period would commence anew from the receipt of the demand. That is
the correct meaning of interruption as distinguished from mere suspension or tolling
of the prescriptive period.
A written extrajudicial demand wipes out the period that has already elapsed and
starts anew the prescriptive period
That same view as to the meaning of interruption was adopted in Florendo vs.
Organo, 90 Phil 483, 488, where it was ruled that the interruption of the ten-year
prescriptive period through a judicial demand means that "the full period of
prescription commenced to run anew upon the cessation of the suspension." When
prescription is interrupted by a judicial demand, the full time for the prescription
must be reckoned from the cessation of the interruption
The interruption of the prescriptive period by reason of a written acknowledgment
of the debt by the debtor was dealt with in Philippine National Railways vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, et al.,6 thus:
Article 1155 of the Civil Code provides that the "prescription of actions is
interrupted" inter alia, "when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by
the debtor." This simply means that the period of prescription, when interrupted by
such a written acknowledgment, begins to run anew; and whatever time of
limitation might have already elapsed from the accrual of the cause of action is
thereby negated and rendered inefficacious
The effect of the interruption spoken of in Article 1155 is to renew the obligation, to
make prescription run again from the date of the interruption
