AISHA’S CRITIQUE OF AUTHENTIC

HADITH CONTENT
Mar 1, 2017 | 0
Aisha’s Critique of Authentic Hadith Content
via Quranic Universals[1]
Jasser Auda

This paper approaches the relationship between the Quran and Sunnah from the
angle of using the Quranic universals to critique the content (matn) of hadith
narrations. Aisha Bint Abu Bakr, the Mother of the Believers, gave us a strong
example and a clear illustration for applying this method. This article will present a
number of illustrative examples of hadith, in which Aisha confidently rejected other
companions’ narrations, despite being ‘authentic’ according to
the sanad verification criteria that had developed later. Aisha’s rejection was based
on the contradiction of these narrations with the clear universals of the Quran that
revealed the higher principles (usul) and purposes (maqasid) of Islam. This paper
will also prove that Aisha’s method is coherent with the classic ‘verification of the
content’ (tahqeeq al-matn) method, despite the fact that, historically, this
verification was not a common practice.
Sunnah in Relation to the Quran
Sunnah (literally, tradition) is what is narrated at the authority of the companions
about the Prophet’s (pbuh) sayings, actions, or approvals. The Prophet’s (pbuh)
witnessing of certain actions without objection is considered an approval from him,
by definition. The Sunnah, in relation to the Quran (refer to Chart 1), implies a
meaning that is (1) identical to the Quran’s, (2) an explanation or elaboration on a
general meaning mentioned in the Quran, (3) a specification of certain conditions
for rulings implied in the Quran, (4) an addition of certain constraints to the general
expressions of the Quran, or finally, (5) an initiation of independent legislation.
Schools of law approve the first three of the above five relations and differ over the
last two, as follows.

Chart 1. A classification of the possible relationships between the Sunnah and

the Quranic verses.
If the Quranic expression is ‘general’ and the Sunnah expression is ‘specific’
regarding the same topic, Shafies, Hanfis, Zahiris, Zaidis and Jafaris consider the
(single-chained) Sunnah to be ‘specifying’ the general expression of the Quran and,
thus, restricting its general expression. Hanafis consider this ‘specification’ to be a
sort of invalidation of the ‘confirmed and absolute’ general expression of the Quran
and, therefore, reject the single-chained narration that place constraints on the
Quran’s general expressions.

Malik’s opinion on this issue is to look for supportive evidence to the single-chained
hadith that specifies the general meaning of the verse before rejecting it. His
additional supportive evidence should be some ˒amal(tradition) of the people of
Medina (an evidence which is invalid to all other schools), or a supporting analogy
(qiyās). Otherwise, Malik applies weighed preference (tarjīh) and invalidates the
single-chained narration.
If the hadith implies a ruling that has no relation with the Quran, all schools of law
accept it as legislation on condition that it does not fall under actions that are
specific to the Prophet (pbuh). Actions specific to the Prophet (pbuh) could be
actions exclusive to him out of prophethood considerations or actions that he did
out of custom (ādah) of a ‘man living in seventh century’s Arabia.’ Chart 2 shows
this classification.
Chart 2. Types of Prophetic actions according to their implications on
‘legislation.’
Some Malikis and Hanbalis had added two other types to the Prophet’s (pbuh)
actions that do not fall under generally abiding ‘legislation,’ namely, actions ‘out
of being a leader’ and actions ‘out of being a judge.’ Al-Qarafi, for example,
included all of the Prophetic actions during wars in his ‘leadership actions’, as well
as governance-related decisions. He said that identifying the type of the Prophet’s
(pbuh) action according to his classification has ‘implications for the law.’ For
example, he considered the Prophet’s (pbuh) actions ‘out of being a judge’ to be
valid legislations only for judges when they assume their role in courts, rather than
for every Muslim. Recently, following al-Qarafi’s example, al-Tahir Ibn Ashur
(also from the Maliki school) added other types of actions for ‘specific intents,’
which are meant to imply general and ‘abiding’ legislation, such as, advice,
conciliation, discipline, and ‘teaching high ideals’ to specific people.[2]
Ibadis include ‘acts of worship’ in actions ‘specific to the Prophet’ (pbuh). These
are actions that he (pbuh) did not practice regularly. Other schools of law consider
such actions ‘recommended.’ A few Mutazilis differentiated between the Prophet’s
(pbuh) ‘acts of worship’ (ibādāt), which they considered the only type that is
‘abiding to all Muslims,’ versus all of his other actions, which they considered
matters of ‘worldly judgements’ (mu˒āmalāt). The question of how to
differentiate ibādāt from mu˒āmalāt remains an open question, even in the Mutazili
theory.
The relation between the hadith and the Quran that this article is dealing with does
not belong to any of the categories above! It is the case when the
hadith contradicts the Quran; not in the explanation, elaboration, specification,
addition, or independent legislation sense. It is also the case where the hadith is not
addressing an action that is specific to the Prophet, peace be upon him, whether in
the legislation sense or the human customary sense. It is the case where the hadith
simply contradicts the meanings of the Quran without reservation. The next section
will discuss the definition of ‘contradiction’ in the Islamic legal theory.
‘CONTRADICTION’ VERSUS ‘OPPOSITION’
In Islamic juridical theory, there is a differentiation between opposition or
disagreement (ta˒āruḍ or ikhtilāf ) and contradiction (tanāquḍ or ta˒anud) of
evidences (verses or hadith).[3] Contradiction is defined as ‘a clear logical
conclusion of truth and falsehood in the same aspect’ (taqāsum al-ṣidqi wal-
kadhib).[4] True contradiction takes the form of a single episode narrated in truly
contradicting ways by the same or different narrators.[5] This kind of discrepancy
is obviously due to errors in narration related to the memory and/or intentions of
one or more of the narrators down the chain of narration.[6] The ‘logical’
conclusion in cases of contradiction is that one of the narrations is inaccurate and
should be rejected (perhaps both narrations, if one could prove that). This is the case
that this article is dealing with.
On the other hand, conflict or disagreement between evidences is defined as an
‘apparent contradiction between evidences in the mind of the scholar’ (ta˒āruḍun fī
dhihn al-mujtahid).[7] This means that two seemingly disagreeing (muta˒āriḍ)
evidences are not necessarily in contradiction. It is the perception of the jurist that
they are in contradiction which can occur as a result of some missing information
 regarding the evidence’s timing, place, circumstances, or other conditions.[8] Cases
of ta˒āruḍ are disagreements between narrations because of, apparently, a missing
context, not because of logically contradicting accounts of the same
episode.[9] There are three main strategies that jurists defined to deal with these
types of disagreements in traditional schools of law:
1. Conciliation (Al-Jam˒): This method is based on a fundamental rule that
states that, ‘applying the script is better than disregarding it (i˒māl al-naṣṣi
awlā min ihmālih).’[10] Therefore, a jurist facing two disagreeing narrations
should search for a missing condition or context, and attempt to interpret
both narrations based on it.[11]
2. Abrogation (Al-Naskh): This method suggests that the later evidence,
chronologically speaking, should ‘abrogate’ (juridically annul) the former.
This means that when verses disagree, the verse that is (narrated to be)
revealed last is considered to be an abrogating evidence (nāsikh) and others
to be abrogated (mansūkh). Similarly, when prophetic narrations disagree,
the narration that has a later date, if dates are known or could be concluded,
should abrogate all other narrations. The vast majority of scholars do not
accept that a hadith abrogates a verse of the Quran, even if the hadith were
to be chronologically subsequent. This is related to comparing ‘degrees of
certainty.’
3. Elimination (Al-tarjīh): This method suggests endorsing the narration that is
‘most authentic’ and dropping or eliminating other narrations. The
‘eliminating’ narration is called al-riwāyah al-rājiḥah, which literally means
the narration that is ‘heavier in the scale.’ Obviously, a hadith cannot
eliminate a verse of the Quran.[12]
And because the case this article is dealing with is not a case of ‘disagreement’, but
rather a case of ‘contradiction’, the above three methods do not apply to our
analysis.

Degrees of Fame (Shuhrah) of Hadith

Valid hadiths are classified into most famous, famous, and single-chained (Chart
3). Most famous narrations are as absolute as the Quran, according to all schools,
since they are narrated after a large number of companions (there are various
estimates of the number ‘large’), who could not possibly and logically agree to lie.
Hadith included in this category are related to Islam’s most famous acts of worship
(basic actions of prayers, pilgrimage, and fasting). The most famous narrations are
very few. Estimates range from a dozen to eighty narrations.

There comprises a category of ‘famous narrations’ narrated by a number of

narrators not numerous enough to define it as ‘logically impossible’ for them to
agree on lying. This category includes a small number of the hadith available in
traditional sources (less than one hundred hadith according to all accounts), which
makes its impact on the law limited, from a practical point of view.

Chart 3. Types of Prophetic narrations in terms of their number of narrators.

The category of hadith which this article is concerned with, and which includes the
vast majority of narrations is the āḥād (single-chained) category. All schools of
Islamic law, except for some Mutazilis, relied on this type in their derivation of
their fiqh. These are narrations conveyed via one or a few ‘chains of narrations,’
usually with slightly different wordings.
Verification procedures of āḥād narrators and narrations are detailed extensively in
the Sciences of Hadith.[13]The narration has to be valid in terms of its chain of
narrators (al-sanad) and its content (al-matn). Trusting a narration’s sanad entails
a group of conditions for bearing (haml) or learning the hadith and another group
for conveying or narrating (riwayat) the hadith, which all schools agreed upon in
principle. For being accepted as a bearer of a hadith, a narrator has to be mature and
known to have a reliable memory (al-dabt). For narrating a hadith, a narrator has to
be mature, Muslim, pious, has a reliable memory, and has a connected (muttasil)
chain of narrators between him/her and the Prophet (pbuh). The exact specifications
of each of these conditions are subject to differences of opinion amongst scholars
of hadith.
The narration has to be valid in terms of its chain of narrators (al-sanad) and its
content (al-matn). For the content of a hadith to be acceptable, the main criteria is
to be linguistically correct and not to be in ‘opposition’ with another hadith,
‘reason,’ or ‘analogy,’ in a way that cannot be reconciled.[14] However, practically
speaking, authenticity of hadith (al-ṣiḥḥah) was judged based on the chain of
narrators (al-sanad). Differences of opinion in judging the sanad had implications
on the law. Chart 4 summarises basic criteria for accepting sanad and matn.
Acceptable narrations by the Zahiris are ‘certain’ and ‘absolute,’ i.e., ‘valid for
juridical derivation’ and ‘required for correct belief,’ even if they were single-
chained. All other schools consider single-chained narrations to be juridically valid
but not part of the Islamic creed. Some Mutazilis differentiate between sayings and
actions (including approvals) narrated in hadith. They do not consider actions to be
valid evidences of legislation (that are abiding to every Muslim), except in the area
of acts of worship (˒ibādat). On the other hand, they consider ‘sayings’ to be valid
evidences of legislation in ibādāt as well as mu˒āmalāt (worldly transactions). The
question of how to differentiate ibādāt from mu˒āmalāt is another open question.
Most schools believed that ibādāt are the issues that ‘cannot be
rationalised,’[15] which also keeps the question open.
Chart 4. Conditions for validating single-chains narrations in traditional
Sciences of Hadith.
 Trusting a narration entails a group of conditions for bearing (ḥaml) or learning the
hadith and another group for conveying or narrating the hadith, which all schools
agreed upon, in principle. For being accepted as a bearer of a hadith, a narrator has
to be mature (most estimates for his/her age is seven years old) and known to have
a reliable memory (al-ḍabṭ). For narrating a hadith, a narrator has to be mature,
Muslim, pious, has a reliable memory, and has a connected (muttaṣil) chain of
narrators/teachers between him/her and the Prophet (pbuh). The exact specifications
of each of these conditions are subject to many differences of opinion amongst
scholars of hadith, even within each school. Moreover, there are clear divisions in
terms of trusted narrators between the Sunni schools (Malikis, Shafies, Hanafis,
Hanbalis, and Zahiris), and the Shia schools (Jafaris and Zaidis). Ibadis have their
own group of trusted narrators as well.
The Authentication of the Hadith Content (Al-Matn)
Regarding the narrations themselves of the degree aḥād, their content (matn) has to
follow the following conditions:[16]
 The hadith is conveyed in complete and sound sentences.

 The hadith cannot contradict with other ‘certain’ scripts.

 The hadith cannot contradict with analogy (according to Malikis, and unless the
narrator is considered a ‘faqīh,’ according to Hanafis).
 The hadith cannot contradict with the narrator’s practices.

 The hadith cannot contradict with ‘reason’, which al-Ghazali, amongst other jurists,
included in the definition of reason, ‘what is acceptable according to common sense
and experience.’[17]
 Despite the above theories, authenticity of hadith, in practice and especially in
today’s scholarship, was judged merely based on the chain of narrators (al-sanad)
and not on the matn/content. Today’s scholarship could learn from Aisha’s critique
of the matn of some narrations. The following two sections elaborate.

Aisha’s Amendments of the Companions Narrations

Aisha Bint Abu Bakr (the Mother of the Believers) was a strong, highly learned,
and independent woman. Her character showed on a number of her fatāwā and
opinions, in which she advocated women’s independence and rights, notably
against some of the other companions’ direct narrations. Badruddin al-Zarkashi
wrote a book dedicated to Aisha’s critiques to the other companions’ narrations,
which he called, ‘˒Ayn al-Iṣābah Fī Istidrāk ˒Ā˓ishah ˒alā al-Ṣaḥābah’ (The
Accurate Account on Aisha’s Amendments to the Companions’ Narrations).[18]
The following are texts that show examples of these narrations. We will quote and
discuss them in order.

 ‫في مستدرك الحاكم عن الزهري عن عروة قال بلغ عائشة أن أبا هريرة يقول إن رسول هللا صلى هللا عليه‬
‫ رحم هللا أبا هريرة أساء‬:‫ فقالت عائشة‬،‫ … ولد الزنى شر الثالثة وأن الميت يعذب ببكاء الحي‬:‫وسلم قال‬
‫سمعا فأساء إجابة … أما قوله ولد الزنى شر الثالثة فلم يكن الحديث على هذا إنما كان رجل من المنافقين‬
‫ يا رسول هللا إنه مع ما به ولد زنى‬:‫يؤذي رسول هللا صلى هللا عليه وسلم فقال من يعذرني من فالن قيل‬
‫ وأما قوله إن الميت يعذب ببكاء الحي‬،)‫ (ال تزر وازرة وزر أخرى‬:‫ وهللا تعالى يقول‬،‫ هو شر الثالثة‬:‫فقال‬
‫فلم يكن الحديث على هذا ولكن رسول هللا صلى هللا عليه وسلم مر بدار رجل من اليهود قد مات وأهله يبكون‬
‫ وفي‬.285 ‫ (ال يكلف هللا نفسا إال وسعها) – البقرة‬:‫ وهللا يقول‬،‫ إنهم ليبكون عليه وإنه ليعذب‬:‫عليه فقال‬
‫ واإلسراء‬164 ‫ حسبكم القرآن (ال تزر وازرة وزر أخرى) – المائدة‬:‫ قالت عائشة‬:‫رواية‬
 In this hadith, Aisha is resorting to the principle universal value in the Shariah,
which is justice. She referred the questioner to the Quran that, ‘no bearer of burdens
shall be made to bear another’s burden,’ (6:164, and 17:15) and rejected therefore
the ‘narrations’ that, ‘the deceased is tortured because of people’s crying after him’,
and that ‘the child of adultery is worse than his parents’, etc.

Ibn al-Qayyim gave us the following golden rule:

Sharī˒ah is based on wisdom and achieving people’s welfare in this life and the
afterlife. Sharī˒ah is all about justice, mercy, wisdom, and good. Thus, any ruling
that replaces justice with injustice, mercy with its opposite, common good with
mischief, or wisdom with nonsense, is a ruling that does not belong to the Sharī˒ah,
even if it is claimed to be so according to some interpretation.[19]
Thus, no perceived narration or interpretation should ever contradict with justice,
mercy, wisdom, or common good. These are the universals (kullīyat) of Islam that
should reign over the details (juz˓īyāt).
 ‫في مسند أحمد أن رجلين دخال على عائشة فقاال إن أبا هريرة يحدث أن نبي هللا صلى هللا عليه وسلم كان‬
‫ والذي أنزل القرآن على أبي القاسم ما هكذا كان يقول‬:‫ … قالت‬،‫ إنما الطيرة في المرأة والدابة والدار‬:‫يقول‬
‫ (ما أصاب من مصيبة في األرض وال في أنفسكم إال في‬:‫ ثم قرأت عائشة‬،‫الطيرة في المرأة والدابة والدار‬
22 ‫كتاب من قبل أن نبرأها) – الحديد‬.

So, despite Abu Hurairah’s narration that, ‘bad omens are in women, animals, and
houses,’[20] Aisha relied on the Quranic verse that, ‘No calamity can ever befall
the earth, and neither your own selves, unless it be [laid down] in Our decree before
We bring it into being’ (57:22). This verse, and there are a few similar other verses,
 set a universal principle that go against the idea of ‘bad omens’ altogether. This is
in addition to the other hadith that says, ‘no bad omens in Islam,’ and other similar
narrations.[21]
Moreover, Aisha narrated in other narrations that the Prophet (pbuh) had said,
instead: ‘People during the Days of Ignorance (jāhilīyah) used to say that bad omens
are in women, animals, and houses.’[22] There is another narration where she is
saying that Abu Huraira heard the second part of the narration but missed the first
part. All these ‘authentic’ narrations are at odds with Anu Huraira’s, which Aisha
rejected, not out of mistrust of Abu Huraira, but out of realising the error that he
made in the narration.
Yet, it is telling that most commentators rejected Aisha’s narration, rather than Abu
Huraira’s, even though other ‘authentic’ narrations supported her. Ibn al-Arabi, for
example, commented on Aisha’s rejection of the above hadith as follows: ‘What
she said is nonsense (qawluha qawlun sāqiṭ). This is rejection of a clear and
authentic narration that is narrated through trusted narrators.’[23] Ibn Al-Arabi’s
defence of his sanad-based method of authentication disabled him from showing
the appropriate respect for the Mother of Believers in this context!
 ‫ أليس هللا يقول (ال تدركه األبصار وهو يدرك‬:‫ فقالت عائشة‬،‫ رأى محمد ربه‬:‫ قال ابن عباس‬:‫أخرج الترمذي‬
‫ لقد‬:‫ قلت يا أمتاه هل رأى محمد ربه؟ فقالت‬:‫ وفي الصحيحين من حديث مسروق‬.103 ‫األبصار) – األنعام‬
‫ (ال تدركه‬:‫ ثم قرأت‬،‫ من حدثك أن محمدا صلى هللا عليه وسلم رأى ربه فقد كذب‬،‫قف شعري مما قلت‬
‫ أو لم تسمع أن هللا عز وجل‬:‫ وفي رواية قالت عائشة‬.)‫األبصار وهو يدر ك األبصار وهو اللطيف الخبير‬
‫ (وما كان لبشر أن يكلمه هللا إال وحيا أو من وراء حجاب أو يرسل رسوال فيوحي بإذنه ما يشاء إنه‬:‫يقول‬
51 ‫علي حكيم)؟ – الشورى‬

Again, Aisha is rejecting an authentic ahad narration that the Prophet, peace be
upon him, had seen his Lord, based on a Quranic principle that states that human
 sight cannot comprehend God. ‘No human vision can encompass Him, whereas He
encompasses all human vision’ (6:103). And if God is to speak to a human, it is not
face to face, according to the Quran. ‘And it is not given to mortal man that God
should speak unto him otherwise than through sudden inspiration, or [by a voice, as
it were,] from behind a veil, or by sending an apostle to reveal, by His leave,
whatever He wills [to reveal]’ (42:51). Here, the Quran has more authority in
matters of faith than ahad hadith.
 ‫ (هل وجدتم ما وعد‬:‫ وقف النبي صلى هللا عليه وسلم على قليب بدر فقال‬:‫أخرج البخاري عن ابن عمر قال‬
‫ إنما قال النبي صلى هللا عليه وسلم‬:‫ فذكرت لعائشة فقالت‬.‫ إنهم اآلن يسمعون ما أقول‬:‫ ثم قال‬،)‫ربكم حقا‬
‫إنهم ليعلمون اآلن أن ما كنت أقول لهم حق … وروي أن عائشة احتجت بقوله تعالى (وما أنت بمسمع من‬
22 ‫في القبور) – فاطر‬.

Here, Aisha is resorting to a Quranic verse in addition to ‘reason’ to reject a

narration that implies that the Prophet, peace be upon him, was talking to the
disbelievers who were buried in Badr. Aisha’s perspective was that the Quran was
clear when it stated: ‘thou canst not make hear such as are the dead in their graves’
(35:22).

Discussion
Aisha’s method outlined above is not unique in the history of the Islamic legal
theory. Imam Malik, for one example, rejected the (authentic) narration of washing
your plate seven times if a dog drinks from it based on the verse that states: ‘They
will ask thee as to what is lawful to them. Say: “Lawful to you are all the good
things of life.” And as for those hunting dogs which you train.’ (5:4). Ibn Rushd,
for another example, rejected the (authentic) narration of ‘killing black dogs’ based
on the Quranic and Prophetic principles of being kind to animals and not to
transgress against living beings. And so on.

In today’s scholarship, the criteria that Aisha utilised to critique hadith could apply
to some hadiths that have significance. In such cases, although the hadith are
authentically chained, in terms of their sanad, they do contradict some Quranic
principles in terms of their matn. Sheikh Taha Al-Alwani rejected the authenticity
and/or the common understanding of the narration, ‘Whoever changes his religion,
kill him,’ based on its contradiction to the principle verse, ‘no compulsion in matters
of faith’ (2:256). Sheikh Mohammad Abu Zahra rejected the authenticity and/or the
common understanding of the narrations of ‘stoning the adulterer’ (rajm al-zani)
based on the general principles of mercy in the Quran in addition to the verse that
prescribed ‘half of the punishment’ in some cases (and ‘stoning cannot be divided
in half’, he said). Sheikh Al-Ghazali rejected the authenticity and/or the common
understanding of the narration, ‘a people who entitle their affairs to a woman will
never be successful,’ based on its contradiction with a number of verses and other
narrations that support the juridical principle of equality of men and women. Sheikh
Al-Ghazali also rejected the authentication of Sheikh Nasser Al-Albani to such
hadiths as, ‘there is disease in cow meat’, and ‘do not travel by sea’, based on their
contradiction with Quranic verses such as, ‘And likewise they declare as unlawful
either of the two sexes of camels and of cows. Ask [them]: “Is it the two males that
He has forbidden, or the two females …’ (6:144), and ‘And His are the lofty ships
that sail like [floating] mountains through the seas. Which, then, of your Sustainer’s
powers can you disavow?’ (55:24-25).
In conclusion, the methodology that Aisha, may Allah be pleased with her, has
followed in the examination and critique of the matn of ahad hadith, even they were
claimed to be authentically transmitted, is needed for today’s projects of renewal in
the Islamic law in order to align the details of the law to its firmly based principles
of justice, mercy, wisdom, or common good.
[1] Draft submitted to IIIT 2010 Summer Scholarly Seminar.
[2] al-Tahir Ibn Ashur, Maqasid Al-Shari˒ah Al-Islamiyah, ed. al-Tahir al-Mesawi
(Kuala Lumpur: al-Fajr, 1999), Chapter 6.
[3] al-Ghazaly, Al-Mustasfa Fi Usul Al-Fiqh p279, al-Shatibi, Al-
Muwafaqat vol.4, p.129, Ibn Taymiyah, Kutub Wa Rasa˓il Wa Fatwa vol.19,
p.131.
[4] al-Ghazaly, Maqasid Al-Falasifah p.62.
[5] For examples, refer to: Auda, Fiqh Al-Maqasid p.65-68.
[6] al-Subki, Al-Ibhaj Fi Sharh Al-Minhaj vol.3, p.218.
[7] Ibn Taymiyah, Kutub Wa Rasa˓il Wa Fatwa vol.19, p.131.
[8] Abdul-Aziz al-Bukhari, Kashf Al-Asrar (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-˒ilmiyyah,
1997) vol.3, p.77.
[9] Auda, Fiqh Al-Maqasid p.64.
[10] al-Suyuti, Al-Ashbah Wal-Naza˓ir vol.1, p.192.
[11] Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Sader, Durus Fi ˒Ilm Al-Usul, 2nd ed. (Beirut:
Dar al-Kitab al-Lubnani, 1986) vol.2, p.222.
[12] Badran, Adillat Al-Tarjeeh ch.4.
[13] Abu Amr Ibn al-Salah, Al-Muqaddimah Fi Ulum Al-Hadith (Beirut: Dar al-
Fikr, 1977).
[14] al-Khoshoui A. M. al-Khoshoui, Ghayat Al-Idaah Fi Ulum Al-Istilah (Cairo:
al-Azhar University, 1992) p. 74.
[15] I had previously carried out a survey on related opinions in: Auda, Fiqh Al-
Maqasid p 64-67.
[16] Mohammad al-Basri, Al-Mu˒tamad Fi Usul Al-Fiqh, ed. Khalil al-Mees, 1st
ed. (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-˒ilmiya, 1983) vol. 2, p. 153.
[17] al-Ghazali, Al-Mustasfa vol. 1, p. 142.
[18] Badredin al-Zarkashi, Al-Ijabah Li’irad Ma Istadrakathu ˒Aisha ˒Ala Al-
Sahabah, ed. Saeed Al-Afghani, 2nd ed. (Beirut: Al-Maktab al-Islami, 1970).
[19] Shamsuddin Ibn al-Qayyim, I˒lam Al-Muwaqi˒een, ed. Taha Abdul Rauf Saad
(Beirut: Dar Al-Jeel, 1973) vol.1, p. 333.
[20] al-Bukhari, Al-Sahih p69.
[21] Auda, Fiqh Al-Maqasid p106.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Abu Bakr al-Maliki Ibn al-Arabi, ˒Aridat Al-Ahwadhi (Cairo: Dar al-Wahy al-
Mohammadi, without date) vol.10, p.264.