Division (GR No. 156132, Oct 16, 2006) Citibank V. Modesta R. Sabeniano

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DIVISION
[ GR No. 156132, Oct 16, 2006 ]
CITIBANK v. MODESTA R. SABENIANO
DECISION
535 Phil. 384
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari,[1] under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court, of the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 51930, dated 26 March 2002, and the Resolution,[3] dated 20
November 2002, of the same court which, although modifying its earlier
Decision, still denied for the most part the Motion for Reconsideration of herein
petitioners.
Petitioner Citibank, N.A. (formerly known as the First National City Bank) is a
banking corporation duly authorized and existing under the laws of the United
States of America and licensed to do commercial banking activities and perform
trust functions in the Philippines.
Petitioner Investor's Finance Corporation, which did business under the name
and style of FNCB Finance, was an affiliate company of petitioner Citibank,
specifically handling money market placements for its clients. It is now, by
virtue of a merger, doing business as part of its successor-in-interest, BPI Card
Finance Corporation. However, so as to consistently establish its identity in the
Petition at bar, the said petitioner shall still be referred to herein as FNCB
Finance.[4]
Respondent Modesta R. Sabeniano was a client of both petitioners Citibank and

FNCB Finance. Regrettably, the business relations among the parties
subsequently went awry.
On 8 August 1985, respondent filed a Complaint[5] against petitioners,

docketed as Civil Case No. 11336, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City. Respondent claimed to have substantial deposits and money
market placements with the petitioners, as well as money market placements
with the Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC), the proceeds
of which were supposedly deposited automatically and directly to respondent's
accounts with petitioner Citibank. Respondent alleged that petitioners refused
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to return her deposits and the proceeds of her money market placements
despite her repeated demands, thus, compelling respondent to file Civil Case
No. 11336 against petitioners for "Accounting, Sum of Money and Damages."
Respondent eventually filed an Amended Complaint[6] on 9 October 1985 to
include additional claims to deposits and money market placements
inadvertently left out from her original Complaint.
In their joint Answer[7] and Answer to Amended Complaint,[8] filed on 12

September 1985 and 6 November 1985, respectively, petitioners admitted that
respondent had deposits and money market placements with them, incluing
dollar accounts in the Citibank branch in Geneva, Switzerland (Citibank-
Geneva). Petitioners further alleged that the respondent later obtained several
loans from petitioner Citibank, for which she executed Promissory Notes (PNs),
and secured by (a) a Declaration of Pledge of her dollar accounts in Citibank-
Geneva, and (b) Deeds of Assignment of her money market placements with
petitioner FNCB Finance. When respondent failed to pay her loans despite
repeated demands by petitioner Citibank, the latter exercised its right to off-set
or compensate respondent's outstanding loans with her deposits and money
market placements, pursuant to the Declaration of Pledge and the Deeds of
Assignment executed by respondent in its favor. Petitioner Citibank supposedly
informed respondent Sabeniano of the foregoing compensation through letters,
dated 28 September 1979 and 31 October 1979. Petitioners were therefore
surprised when six years later, in 1985, respondent and her counsel made
repeated requests for the withdrawal of respondent's deposits and money
market placements with petitioner Citibank, including her dollar accounts with
Citibank-Geneva and her money market placements with petitioner FNCB
Finance. Thus, petitioners prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint and for the
award of actual, moral, and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
When the parties failed to reach a compromise during the pre-trial hearing,[9]
trial proper ensued and the parties proceeded with the presentation of their
respective evidence. Ten years after the filing of the Complaint on 8 August
1985, a Decision[10] was finally rendered in Civil Case No. 11336 on 24 August
1995 by the fourth Judge[11] who handled the said case, Judge Manuel D.
Victorio, the dispositive portion of which reads -
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, decision is hereby

rendered as follows:
(1) Declaring as illegal, null and void the setoff effected by the
defendant Bank [petitioner Citibank] of plaintiff's [respondent
Sabeniano] dollar deposit with Citibank, Switzerland, in the amount
of US$149,632.99, and ordering the said defendant [petitioner
Citibank] to refund the said amount to the plaintiff with legal interest
at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum, compounded yearly,
from 31 October 1979 until fully paid, or its peso equivalent at the time
of payment;
(2) Declaring the plaintiff [respondent Sabeniano] indebted to the

defendant Bank [petitioner Citibank] in the amount of P1,069,847.40
as of 5 September 1979 and ordering the plaintiff [respondent
Sabeniano] to pay said amount, however, there shall be no interest
and penalty charges from the time the illegal setoff was effected on 31
October 1979;
(3) Dismissing all other claims and counterclaims interposed by the

parties against each other.
Costs against the defendant Bank.
All the parties appealed the foregoing Decision of the RTC to the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 51930. Respondent questioned the
findings of the RTC that she was still indebted to petitioner Citibank, as well as
the failure of the RTC to order petitioners to render an accounting of
respondent's deposits and money market placements with them. On the other
hand, petitioners argued that petitioner Citibank validly compensated
respondent's outstanding loans with her dollar accounts with Citibank-Geneva,
in accordance with the Declaration of Pledge she executed in its favor.
Petitioners also alleged that the RTC erred in not declaring respondent liable for
damages and interest.
On 26 March 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision[12] affirming

with modification the RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 11336, dated 24 August
1995, and ruling entirely in favor of respondent in this wise -
Wherefore, premises considered, the assailed 24 August 1995

Decision of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION, as follows:
1. Declaring as illegal, null and void the set-off effected by the

defendant-appellant Bank of the plaintiff-appellant's dollar
deposit with Citibank, Switzerland, in the amount of
US$149,632.99, and ordering defendant-appellant Citibank to
refund the said amount to the plaintiff-appellant with legal
interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum,
compounded yearly, from 31 October 1979 until fully paid, or its
peso equivalent at the time of payment;
2. As defendant-appellant Citibank failed to establish by competent

evidence the alleged indebtedness of plaintiff-appellant, the set-
off of P1,069,847.40 in the account of Ms. Sabeniano is hereby
declared as without legal and factual basis;
3. As defendants-appellants failed to account the following plaintiff-

appellant's money market placements, savings account and
current accounts, the former is hereby ordered to return the
same, in accordance with the terms and conditions agreed upon
by the contending parties as evidenced by the certificates of
investments, to wit:
(i) Citibank NNPN Serial No. 023356 (Cancels and

Supersedes NNPN No. 22526) issued on 17 March 1977,
P318,897.34 with 14.50% interest p.a.;
(ii) Citibank NNPN Serial No. 23357 (Cancels and

Supersedes NNPN No. 22528) issued on 17 March 1977,
P203,150.00 with 14.50 interest p.a.;
(iii) FNCB NNPN Serial No. 05757 (Cancels and

Supersedes NNPN No. 04952), issued on 02 June 1977,
P500,000.00 with 17% interest p.a.;
(iv) FNCB NNPN Serial No. 05758 (Cancels and

Supersedes NNPN No. 04962), issued on 02 June 1977,
P500,000.00 with 17% interest per annum;
(v) The Two Million (P2,000,000.00) money market

placements of Ms. Sabeniano with the Ayala
Investment & Development Corporation (AIDC) with
legal interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per
annum compounded yearly, from 30 September 1976
until fully paid;
4. Ordering defendants-appellants to jointly and severally pay the

plaintiff-appellant the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P500,000.00) by way of moral damages, FIVE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) as exemplary
damages, and ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P100,000.00) as attorney's fees.
Apparently, the parties to the case, namely, the respondent, on one hand, and
the petitioners, on the other, made separate attempts to bring the
aforementioned Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 26 March 2002, before
this Court for review.
G.R. No. 152985
Respondent no longer sought a reconsideration of the Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930, dated 26 March 2002, and instead, filed
immediately with this Court on 3 May 2002 a Motion for Extension of Time to
File a Petition for Review,[13] which, after payment of the docket and other
lawful fees, was assigned the docket number G.R. No. 152985. In the said
Motion, respondent alleged that she received a copy of the assailed Court of
Appeals Decision on 18 April 2002 and, thus, had 15 days therefrom or until 3
May 2002 within which to file her Petition for Review. Since she informed her
counsel of her desire to pursue an appeal of the Court of Appeals Decision only
on 29 April 2002, her counsel neither had enough time to file a motion for
reconsideration of the said Decision with the Court of Appeals, nor a Petition for
Certiorari with this Court. Yet, the Motion failed to state the exact extension
period respondent was requesting for.
Since this Court did not act upon respondent's Motion for Extension of Time to
file her Petition for Review, then the period for appeal continued to run and still
expired on 3 May 2002.[14] Respondent failed to file any Petition for Review
within the prescribed period for appeal and, hence, this Court issued a
Resolution,[15] dated 13 November 2002, in which it pronounced that -
G.R. No. 152985 (Modesta R. Sabeniano vs. Court of

Appeals, et al.). - It appearing that petitioner failed to file the
intended petition for review on certiorari within the period which
expired on May 3, 2002, the Court Resolves to DECLARE THIS
CASE TERMINATED and DIRECT the Division Clerk of Court to
INFORM the parties that the judgment sought to be reviewed has
become final and executory.
The said Resolution was duly recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments on 3
January 2003.
G.R. No. 156132
Meanwhile, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for

Reconsideration of its Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930, dated 26 March
2002. Acting upon the said Motion, the Court of Appeals issued the Resolution,
[16] dated 20 November 2002, modifying its Decision of 26 March 2002, as
follows -
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion for

Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED as Sub-paragraph (V)
paragraph 3 of the assailed Decision's dispositive portion is hereby
ordered DELETED.
The challenged 26 March 2002 Decision of the Court is AFFIRMED

with MODIFICATION.
Assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV

No. 51930, dated 26 March 2002 and 20 November 2002, respectively,
petitioners filed the present Petition, docketed as G.R. No. 156132. The Petition
was initially denied[17] by this Court for failure of the petitioners to attach
thereto a Certification against Forum Shopping. However, upon petitioners'
Motion and compliance with the requirements, this Court resolved[18] to
reinstate the Petition.
The Petition presented fourteen (14) assignments of errors allegedly committed

by the Court of Appeals in its Decision, dated 26 March 2002, involving both
questions of fact and questions of law which this Court, for the sake of
expediency, discusses jointly, whenever possible, in the succeeding paragraphs.
The Resolution of this Court, dated

13 November 2002, in G.R. No.
152985, declaring the Decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated 26 March
2002, final and executory, pertains to
respondent Sabeniano alone.
Before proceeding to a discussion of the merits of the instant Petition, this Court
wishes to address first the argument, persistently advanced by respondent in
her pleadings on record, as well as her numerous personal and unofficial letters
to this Court which were no longer made part of the record, that the Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930, dated 26 March 2002, had
already become final and executory by virtue of the Resolution of this Court in
G.R. No. 152985, dated 13 November 2002.
G.R. No. 152985 was the docket number assigned by this Court to respondent's
Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Review. Respondent,
though, did not file her supposed Petition. Thus, after the lapse of the
prescribed period for the filing of the Petition, this Court issued the Resolution,
dated 13 November 2002, declaring the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
26 March 2002, final and executory. It should be pointed out, however, that the
Resolution, dated 13 November 2002, referred only to G.R. No. 152985,
respondent's appeal, which she failed to perfect through the filing of a Petition
for Review within the prescribed period. The declaration of this Court in the
same Resolution would bind respondent solely, and not petitioners which filed
their own separate appeal before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 156132, the
Petition at bar. This would mean that respondent, on her part, should be bound
by the findings of fact and law of the Court of Appeals, including the monetary
amounts consequently awarded to her by the appellate court in its Decision,
dated 26 March 2002; and she can no longer refute or assail any part thereof.
[19]
This Court already explained the matter to respondent when it issued a

Resolution[20] in G.R. No. 156132, dated 2 February 2004, which addressed
her Urgent Motion for the Release of the Decision with the Implementation of
the Entry of Judgment in the following manner -
[A]cting on Citibank's and FNCB Finance's Motion for

Reconsideration, we resolved to grant the motion, reinstate the
petition and require Sabeniano to file a comment thereto in our
Resolution of June 23, 2003. Sabeniano filed a Comment dated July
17, 2003 to which Citibank and FNCB Finance filed a Reply dated
August 20, 2003.
From the foregoing, it is clear that Sabeniano had knowledge of, and
in fact participated in, the proceedings in G.R. No. 156132. She cannot
feign ignorance of the proceedings therein and claim that the Decision
of the Court of Appeals has become final and executory. More
precisely, the Decision became final and executory only with
regard to Sabeniano in view of her failure to file a petition for
review within the extended period granted by the Court, and not to
Citibank and FNCB Finance whose Petition for Review was duly
reinstated and is now submitted for decision.
Accordingly, the instant Urgent Motion is hereby DENIED.

(Emphasis supplied.)
To sustain the argument of respondent would result in an unjust and

incongruous situation wherein one party may frustrate the efforts of the
opposing party to appeal the case by merely filing with this Court a Motion for
Extension of Time to File a Petition for Review, ahead of the opposing party,
then not actually filing the intended Petition.[21] The party who fails to file its
intended Petition within the reglementary or extended period should solely bear
the consequences of such failure.
Respondent Sabeniano did not

commit forum shopping.
Another issue that does not directly involve the merits of the present Petition,
but raised by petitioners, is whether respondent should be held liable for forum
shopping.
Petitioners contend that respondent committed forum shopping on the basis of

the following facts:
While petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision in CA-G.R. CV

No. 51930, dated 26 March 2002, was still pending before the Court of Appeals,
respondent already filed with this Court on 3 May 2002 her Motion for
Extension of Time to File a Petition for Review of the same Court of Appeals
Decision, docketed as G.R. No. 152985. Thereafter, respondent continued to
participate in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
51930 by filing her Comment, dated 17 July 2002, to petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration; and a Rejoinder, dated 23 September 2002, to petitioners'
Reply. Thus, petitioners argue that by seeking relief concurrently from this
Court and the Court of Appeals, respondent is undeniably guilty of forum
shopping, if not indirect contempt.
This Court, however, finds no sufficient basis to hold respondent liable for
forum shopping.
Forum shopping has been defined as the filing of two or more suits involving
the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.[22] The test
for determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending,
there is an identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and relief sought.[23]
To guard against this deplorable practice, Rule 7, Section 5 of the revised Rules
of Court imposes the following requirement -
SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. - The plaintiff or

principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a)
that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim
involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim
is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a
complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should
thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed
or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to
the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has
been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable

by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but
shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless
otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission
of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings
therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice
to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts
of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate
forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with
prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as cause for

administrative sanctions.
Although it may seem at first glance that respondent was simultaneously

seeking recourse from the Court of Appeals and this Court, a careful and closer
scrutiny of the details of the case at bar would reveal otherwise.
It should be recalled that respondent did nothing more in G.R. No. 152985 than
to file with this Court a Motion for Extension of Time within which to file her
Petition for Review. For unexplained reasons, respondent failed to submit to
this Court her intended Petition within the reglementary period. Consequently,
this Court was prompted to issue a Resolution, dated 13 November 2002,
declaring G.R. No. 152985 terminated, and the therein assailed Court of Appeals
Decision final and executory. G.R. No. 152985, therefore, did not progress and
respondent's appeal was unperfected.
The Petition for Review would constitute the initiatory pleading before this
Court, upon the timely filing of which, the case before this Court commences;
much in the same way a case is initiated by the filing of a Complaint before the
trial court. The Petition for Review establishes the identity of parties, rights or
causes of action, and relief sought from this Court, and without such a Petition,
there is technically no case before this Court. The Motion filed by respondent
seeking extension of time within which to file her Petition for Review does not
serve the same purpose as the Petition for Review itself. Such a Motion merely
presents the important dates and the justification for the additional time
requested for, but it does not go into the details of the appealed case.
Without any particular idea as to the assignments of error or the relief

respondent intended to seek from this Court, in light of her failure to file her
Petition for Review, there is actually no second case involving the same parties,
rights or causes of action, and relief sought, as that in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930.
It should also be noted that the Certification against Forum Shopping is

required to be attached to the initiatory pleading, which, in G.R. No. 152985,
should have been respondent's Petition for Review. It is in that Certification
wherein respondent certifies, under oath, that: (a) she has not commenced any
action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of her knowledge, no such other action or
claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, that
she is presenting a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if
she should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been
filed or is pending, she shall report that fact within five days therefrom to this
Court. Without her Petition for Review, respondent had no obligation to
execute and submit the foregoing Certification against Forum Shopping. Thus,
respondent did not violate Rule 7, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court;
neither did she mislead this Court as to the pendency of another similar case.
Lastly, the fact alone that the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 26 March
2002, essentially ruled in favor of respondent, does not necessarily preclude her
from appealing the same. Granted that such a move is ostensibly irrational,
nonetheless, it does not amount to malice, bad faith or abuse of the court
processes in the absence of further proof. Again, it should be noted that the
respondent did not file her intended Petition for Review. The Petition for
Review would have presented before this Court the grounds for respondent's
appeal and her arguments in support thereof. Without said Petition, any reason
attributed to the respondent for appealing the 26 March 2002 Decision would
be grounded on mere speculations, to which this Court cannot give credence.
II
As an exception to the general rule,

this Court takes cognizance of questions of
fact raised in the Petition at bar.
It is already a well-settled rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases

brought before it from the Court of Appeals by virtue of Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law. Findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals are conclusive upon this Court. There are, however, recognized
exceptions to the foregoing rule, namely: (1) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the interference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its
findings, the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings
are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when
the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9)
when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of
fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record.[24]
Several of the enumerated exceptions pertain to the Petition at bar.
It is indubitable that the Court of Appeals made factual findings that are
contrary to those of the RTC,[25] thus, resulting in its substantial modification
of the trial court's Decision, and a ruling entirely in favor of the respondent. In
addition, petitioners invoked in the instant Petition for Review several
exceptions that would justify this Court's review of the factual findings of the
Court of Appeals, i.e., the Court of Appeals made conflicting findings of fact;
findings of fact which went beyond the issues raised on appeal before it; as well
as findings of fact premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.
On the basis of the foregoing, this Court shall proceed to reviewing and re-
evaluating the evidence on record in order to settle questions of fact raised in
the Petition at bar.
The fact that the trial judge who

rendered the RTC Decision in Civil
Case No. 11336, dated 24 August
1995, was not the same judge who
heard and tried the case, does not, by
itself, render the said Decision
erroneous.
The Decision in Civil Case No. 11336 was rendered more than 10 years from the
institution of the said case. In the course of its trial, the case was presided over
by four (4) different RTC judges.[26] It was Judge Victorio, the fourth judge
assigned to the case, who wrote the RTC Decision, dated 24 August 1995. In his
Decision,[27] Judge Victorio made the following findings -
After carefully evaluating the mass of evidence adduced by the parties,

this Court is not inclined to believe the plaintiff's assertion that the
promissory notes as well as the deeds of assignments of her FNCB
Finance money market placements were simulated. The evidence is
overwhelming that the plaintiff received the proceeds of the loans
evidenced by the various promissory notes she had signed. What is
more, there was not an iota of proof save the plaintiff's bare testimony
that she had indeed applied for loan with the Development Bank of
the Philippines.
More importantly, the two deeds of assignment were notarized, hence

they partake the nature of a public document. It makes more than
preponderant proof to overturn the effect of a notarial attestation.
Copies of the deeds of assignments were actually filed with the
Records Management and Archives Office.
Finally, there were sufficient evidence wherein the plaintiff had

admitted the existence of her loans with the defendant Bank in the
total amount of P1,920,000.00 exclusive of interests and penalty
charges (Exhibits "28", "31", "32", and "33").
In fine, this Court hereby finds that the defendants had established
the genuineness and due execution of the various promissory notes
heretofore identified as well as the two deeds of assignments of the
plaintiff's money market placements with defendant FNCB Finance,
on the strength of which the said money market placements were
applied to partially pay the plaintiff's past due obligation with the
defendant Bank. Thus, the total sum of P1,053,995.80 of the
plaintiff's past due obligation was partially offset by the said money
market placement leaving a balance of P1,069,847.40 as of 5
September 1979 (Exhibit "34").
Disagreeing in the foregoing findings, the Court of Appeals stressed, in its

Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930, dated 26 March 2002, "that the ponente of
the herein assailed Decision is not the Presiding Judge who heard and tried the
case."[28] This brings us to the question of whether the fact alone that the RTC
Decision was rendered by a judge other than the judge who actually heard and
tried the case is sufficient justification for the appellate court to disregard or set
aside the findings in the Decision of the court a quo?
This Court rules in the negative.
What deserves stressing is that, in this jurisdiction, there exists a disputable

presumption that the RTC Decision was rendered by the judge in the regular
performance of his official duties. While the said presumption is only
disputable, it is satisfactory unless contradicted or overcame by other evidence.
[29] Encompassed in this presumption of regularity is the presumption that the
RTC judge, in resolving the case and drafting his Decision, reviewed, evaluated,
and weighed all the evidence on record. That the said RTC judge is not the
same judge who heard the case and received the evidence is of little
consequence when the records and transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) are
complete and available for consideration by the former.
In People v. Gazmen,[30] this Court already elucidated its position on such an

issue -
Accused-appellant makes an issue of the fact that the judge who

penned the decision was not the judge who heard and tried the case
and concludes therefrom that the findings of the former are
erroneous. Accused-appellant's argument does not merit a lengthy
discussion. It is well-settled that the decision of a judge who did not
try the case is not by that reason alone erroneous.
It is true that the judge who ultimately decided the case had not heard
the controversy at all, the trial having been conducted by then Judge
Emilio L. Polig, who was indefinitely suspended by this Court.
Nonetheless, the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the
trial were complete and were presumably examined and studied by
Judge Baguilat before he rendered his decision. It is not unusual for a
judge who did not try a case to decide it on the basis of the record. The
fact that he did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of
the witnesses during the trial but merely relied on the transcript of
their testimonies does not for that reason alone render the judgment
erroneous.
(People vs. Jaymalin, 214 SCRA 685, 692 [1992])
Although it is true that the judge who heard the witnesses testify is in
a better position to observe the witnesses on the stand and determine
by their demeanor whether they are telling the truth or mouthing
falsehood, it does not necessarily follow that a judge who was not
present during the trial cannot render a valid decision since he can
rely on the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the trial as
basis of his decision.
Accused-appellant's contention that the trial judge did not have the
opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses
since he was not the same judge who conducted the hearing is also
untenable. While it is true that the trial judge who conducted the
hearing would be in a better position to ascertain the truth and falsity
of the testimonies of the witnesses, it does not necessarily follow that a
judge who was not present during the trial cannot render a valid and
just decision since the latter can also rely on the transcribed
stenographic notes taken during the trial as the basis of his decision.
(People vs. De Paz, 212 SCRA 56, 63 [1992])
At any rate, the test to determine the value of the testimony of the
witness is whether or not such is in conformity with knowledge and
consistent with the experience of mankind (People vs. Morre, 217
SCRA 219 [1993]). Further, the credibility of witnesses can also be
assessed on the basis of the substance of their testimony and the
surrounding circumstances (People v. Gonzales, 210 SCRA 44
[1992]). A critical evaluation of the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses reveals that their testimony accords with the
aforementioned tests, and carries with it the ring of truth end
perforce, must be given full weight and credit.
Irrefragably, by reason alone that the judge who penned the RTC Decision was
not the same judge who heard the case and received the evidence therein would
not render the findings in the said Decision erroneous and unreliable. While
the conduct and demeanor of witnesses may sway a trial court judge in deciding
a case, it is not, and should not be, his only consideration. Even more vital for
the trial court judge's decision are the contents and substance of the witnesses'
testimonies, as borne out by the TSNs, as well as the object and documentary
evidence submitted and made part of the records of the case.
This Court proceeds to making its

own findings of fact.
Since the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930, dated 26
March 2002, has become final and executory as to the respondent, due to her
failure to interpose an appeal therefrom within the reglementary period, she is
already bound by the factual findings in the said Decision. Likewise,
respondent's failure to file, within the reglementary period, a Motion for
Reconsideration or an appeal of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in the
same case, dated 20 November 2002, which modified its earlier Decision by
deleting paragraph 3(v) of its dispositive portion, ordering petitioners to return
to respondent the proceeds of her money market placement with AIDC, shall
already bar her from questioning such modification before this Court. Thus,
what is for review before this Court is the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated 26 March 2002, as modified by the Resolution of the same court, dated
20 November 2002.
Respondent alleged that she had several deposits and money market
placements with petitioners. These deposits and money market placements, as
determined by the Court of Appeals in its Decision, dated 26 March 2002, and
as modified by its Resolution, dated 20 November 2002, are as follows -
Deposit/Placement Amount
$
Dollar deposit with Citibank-Geneva
149,632.99
Money market placement with Citibank, evidenced by
Promissory Note (PN) No. 23356 (which cancels and P
supersedes PN No. 22526), earning 14.5% interest per 318,897.34
annum (p.a.)
Money market placement with Citibank, evidenced by PN
P
No. 23357 (which cancels and supersedes PN No. 22528),
203,150.00
earning 14.5% interest p.a.
Money market placement with FNCB Finance, evidenced
P
by PN No. 5757 (which cancels and supersedes PN No.
500,000.00
4952), earning 17% interest p.a.
Money market placement with FNCB Finance, evidenced
P
by PN No. 5758 (which cancels and supersedes PN No.
500,000.00
2962), earning 17% interest p.a.
This Court is tasked to determine whether petitioners are indeed liable to return
the foregoing amounts, together with the appropriate interests and penalties, to
respondent. It shall trace respondent's transactions with petitioners, from her
money market placements with petitioner Citibank and petitioner FNCB
Finance, to her savings and current accounts with petitioner Citibank, and to
her dollar accounts with Citibank-Geneva.
Money market placements with petitioner Citibank
The history of respondent's money market placements with petitioner Citibank

began on 6 December 1976, when she made a placement of P500,000.00 as
principal amount, which was supposed to earn an interest of 16% p.a. and for
which PN No. 20773 was issued. Respondent did not yet claim the proceeds of
her placement and, instead, rolled-over or re-invested the principal and
proceeds several times in the succeeding years for which new PNs were issued
by petitioner Citibank to replace the ones which matured. Petitioner Citibank
accounted for respondent's original placement and the subsequent roll-overs
thereof, as follows -
Date PN Cancels Maturity Date Amount

Interest
(mm/dd/yyyy) No. PN No. (mm/dd/yyyy) (P)
(p.a.)
12/06/1976 20773 None 01/13/1977 500,000.00 16%
01/14/1977 21686 20773 02/08/1977 508,444.44 15%
22526 21686 03/16/1977 313,952.59 15-3/4%
02/09/1977
22528 21686 03/16/1977 200,000.00 15-3/4%
23356 22526 04/20/1977 318,897.34 14-1/2%
03/17/1977
23357 22528 04/20/1977 203,150.00 14-1/2%
Petitioner Citibank alleged that it had already paid to respondent the principal
amounts and proceeds of PNs No. 23356 and 23357, upon their maturity.
Petitioner Citibank further averred that respondent used the P500,000.00 from
the payment of PNs No. 23356 and 23357, plus P600,000.00 sourced from her
other funds, to open two time deposit (TD) accounts with petitioner Citibank,
namely, TD Accounts No. 17783 and 17784.
Petitioner Citibank did not deny the existence nor questioned the authenticity of
PNs No. 23356 and 23357 it issued in favor of respondent for her money market
placements. In fact, it admitted the genuineness and due execution of the said
PNs, but qualified that they were no longer outstanding.[31] In Hibberd v.
Rohde and McMillian,[32] this Court delineated the consequences of such an
admission -
By the admission of the genuineness and due execution of an

instrument, as provided in this section, is meant that the party whose
signature it bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by
another for him with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was
in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party
relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any formal
requisites required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or
revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him. Hence, such
defenses as that the signature is a forgery (Puritan Mfg. Co. vs. Toti &
Gradi, 14 N. M., 425; Cox vs. Northwestern Stage Co., 1 Idaho, 376;
Woollen vs. Whitacre, 73 Ind., 198; Smith vs. Ehnert, 47 Wis., 479;
Faelnar vs. Escaño, 11 Phil. Rep., 92); or that it was unauthorized, as
in the case of an agent signing for his principal, or one signing in
behalf of a partnership (Country Bank vs. Greenberg, 127 Cal., 26;
Henshaw vs. Root, 60 Inc., 220; Naftzker vs. Lantz, 137 Mich., 441) or
of a corporation (Merchant vs. International Banking Corporation, 6
Phil Rep., 314; Wanita vs. Rollins, 75 Miss., 253; Barnes vs. Spencer &
Barnes Co., 162 Mich., 509); or that, in the case of the latter, that the
corporation was authorized under its charter to sign the instrument
(Merchant vs. International Banking Corporation, supra); or that the
party charged signed the instrument in some other capacity than that
alleged in the pleading setting it out (Payne vs. National Bank, 16
Kan., 147); or that it was never delivered (Hunt vs. Weir, 29 Ill., 83;
Elbring vs. Mullen, 4 Idaho, 199; Thorp vs. Keokuk Coal Co., 48 N.Y.,
253; Fire Association of Philadelphia vs. Ruby, 60 Neb., 216) are cut
off by the admission of its genuineness and due execution.
The effect of the admission is such that in the case of a promissory

note a prima facie case is made for the plaintiff which dispenses with
the necessity of evidence on his part and entitles him to a judgment on
the pleadings unless a special defense of new matter, such as payment,
is interposed by the defendant (Papa vs. Martinez, 12 Phil. Rep., 613;
Chinese Chamber of Commerce vs. Pua To Ching, 14 Phil. Rep., 222;
Banco Español-Filipino vs. McKay & Zoeller, 27 Phil. Rep., 183). x x x
Since the genuineness and due execution of PNs No. 23356 and 23357 are
uncontested, respondent was able to establish prima facie that petitioner
Citibank is liable to her for the amounts stated therein. The assertion of
petitioner Citibank of payment of the said PNs is an affirmative allegation of a
new matter, the burden of proof as to such resting on petitioner Citibank.
Respondent having proved the existence of the obligation, the burden of proof
was upon petitioner Citibank to show that it had been discharged.[33] It has
already been established by this Court that -
As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving
it. Even where the plaintiff must allege non-payment, the general rule
is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather
than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. The debtor has the
burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been
discharged by payment.
When the existence of a debt is fully established by the evidence

contained in the record, the burden of proving that it has been
extinguished by payment devolves upon the debtor who offers such
defense to the claim of the creditor. Where the debtor introduces
some evidence of payment, the burden of going forward with the
evidence - as distinct from the general burden of proof - shifts to the

creditor, who is then under the duty of producing some evidence of
non-payment.[34]
Reviewing the evidence on record, this Court finds that petitioner Citibank
failed to satisfactorily prove that PNs No. 23356 and 23357 had already been
paid, and that the amount so paid was actually used to open one of respondent's
TD accounts with petitioner Citibank.
Petitioner Citibank presented the testimonies of two witnesses to support its

contention of payment: (1) That of Mr. Herminio Pujeda,[35] the officer-in-
charge of loans and placements at the time when the questioned transactions
took place; and (2) that of Mr. Francisco Tan,[36] the former Assistant Vice-
President of Citibank, who directly dealt with respondent with regard to her
deposits and loans.
The relevant portion[37] of Mr. Pujeda's testimony as to PNs No. 23356 and
23357 (referred to therein as Exhibits No. "47" and "48," respectively) is
reproduced below -
Atty. Mabasa:
Okey [sic]. Now Mr. Witness, you were asked to testify in this
case and this case is [sic] consist [sic] of several documents
involving transactions between the plaintiff and the defendant.
Now, were you able to make your own memorandum regarding
all these transactions?
Yes, based on my recollection of these facts, I did come up of

A
[sic] the outline of the chronological sequence of events.
Court:
Are you trying to say that you have personal knowledge or

participation to these transactions?
Yes, your Honor, I was the officer-in charge of the unit that was
A processing these transactions. Some of the documents bear my
signature.
Court:
And this resume or summary that you have prepared is based

on purely your recollection or documents?
A Based on documents, your Honor.
Court:
Are these documents still available now?
A Yes, your honor.
Court:
Better present the documents.
Atty. Mabasa:
Yes, your Honor, that is why your Honor.
Atty. Mabasa:
Now, basing on the notes that you prepared, Mr. Witness, and
according to you basing also on your personal recollection
about all the transactions involved between Modesta
Q Sabeniano and defendant City Bank [sic] in this case. Now,
would you tell us what happened to the money market
placements of Modesta Sabeniano that you have earlier
identified in Exhs. "47" and "48"?
The transactions which I said earlier were terminated and

A
booked to time deposits.
Q And you are saying time deposits with what bank?
A With First National Citibank.
Q Is it the same bank as Citibank, N.A.?
A Yes, sir.
And how much was the amount booked as time deposit with
Q
defendant Citibank?
A In the amount of P500,000.00.
And outside this P500,000.00 which you said was booked out
Q of the proceeds of Exhs. "47" and "48", were there other time
deposits opened by Mrs. Modesta Sabeniano at that time.
A Yes, she also opened another time deposit for P600,000.00.
So all in all Mr. Witness, sometime in April of 1978 Mrs.

Modesta Sabeneano [sic] had time deposit placements with
Q
Citibank in the amount of P500,000.00 which is the proceeds
of Exh. "47" and "48" and another P600,000.00, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
And would you know where did the other P600,000 placed by
Q Mrs. Sabeneano [sic] in a time deposit with Citibank, N.A.
came [sic] from?
A She funded it directly.
What are you saying Mr. Witness is that the P600,000 is a [sic]
Q
fresh money coming from Mrs. Modesta Sabeneano [sic]?
A That is right.
In his deposition in Hong Kong, Mr. Tan recounted what happened to PNs No.
23356 and 23357 (referred to therein as Exhibits "E" and "F," respectively), as
follows -
Now from the Exhibits that you have identified Mr. Tan
from Exhibits "A" to "F", which are Exhibits of the plaintiff.
Atty.
Now, do I understand from you that the original amount is
Mabasa :
Five Hundred Thousand and thereafter renewed in the
succeeding exhibits?
Mr. Tan : Yes, Sir.
Atty. Alright, after these Exhibits "E" and "F" matured, what
Mabasa : happened thereafter?
Mr. Tan : Split into two time deposits.
Atty.
Exhibits "E" and "F"?
Mabasa :
Before anything else, it should be noted that when Mr. Pujeda's testimony
before the RTC was made on 12 March 1990 and Mr. Tan's deposition in Hong
Kong was conducted on 3 September 1990, more than a decade had passed from
the time the transactions they were testifying on took place. This Court had
previously recognized the frailty and unreliability of human memory with
regards to figures after the lapse of five years.[38] Taking into consideration the
substantial length of time between the transactions and the witnesses'

testimonies, as well as the undeniable fact that bank officers deal with multiple
clients and process numerous transactions during their tenure, this Court is
reluctant to give much weight to the testimonies of Mr. Pujeda and Mr. Tan
regarding the payment of PNs No. 23356 and 23357 and the use by respondent
of the proceeds thereof for opening TD accounts. This Court finds it implausible
that they should remember, after all these years, this particular transaction with
respondent involving her PNs No. 23356 and 23357 and TD accounts. Both
witnesses did not give any reason as to why, from among all the clients they had
dealt with and all the transactions they had processed as officers of petitioner
Citibank, they specially remembered respondent and her PNs No. 23356 and
23357. Their testimonies likewise lacked details on the circumstances
surrounding the payment of the two PNs and the opening of the time deposit
accounts by respondent, such as the date of payment of the two PNs, mode of
payment, and the manner and context by which respondent relayed her
instructions to the officers of petitioner Citibank to use the proceeds of her two
PNs in opening the TD accounts.
Moreover, while there are documentary evidences to support and trace

respondent's money market placements with petitioner Citibank, from the
original PN No. 20773, rolled-over several times to, finally, PNs No. 23356 and
23357, there is an evident absence of any documentary evidence on the payment
of these last two PNs and the use of the proceeds thereof by respondent for
opening TD accounts. The paper trail seems to have ended with the copies of
PNs No. 23356 and 23357. Although both Mr. Pujeda and Mr. Tan said that
they based their testimonies, not just on their memories but also on the
documents on file, the supposed documents on which they based those portions
of their testimony on the payment of PNs No. 23356 and 23357 and the opening
of the TD accounts from the proceeds thereof, were never presented before
the courts nor made part of the records of the case. Respondent's
money market placements were of substantial amounts - consisting of the
principal amount of P500,000.00, plus the interest it should have earned
during the years of placement - and it is difficult for this Court to believe that
petitioner Citibank would not have had documented the payment thereof.
When Mr. Pujeda testified before the RTC on 6 February 1990,[39] petitioners'
counsel attempted to present in evidence a document that would supposedly
support the claim of petitioner Citibank that the proceeds of PNs No. 23356 and
23357 were used by respondent to open one of her two TD accounts in the
amount of P500,000.00. Respondent's counsel objected to the presentation of
the document since it was a mere "xerox" copy, and was blurred and hardly
readable. Petitioners' counsel then asked for a continuance of the hearing so
that they can have time to produce a better document, which was granted by the
court. However, during the next hearing and continuance of Mr. Pujeda's
testimony on 12 March 1990, petitioners' counsel no longer referred to the said
document.
As respondent had established a prima facie case that petitioner Citibank is

obligated to her for the amounts stated in PNs No. 23356 and 23357, and as
petitioner Citibank failed to present sufficient proof of payment of the said PNs
and the use by the respondent of the proceeds thereof to open her TD accounts,
this Court finds that PNs No. 23356 and 23357 are still outstanding and
petitioner Citibank is still liable to respondent for the amounts
stated therein.
The significance of this Court's declaration that PNs No. 23356 and 23357 are
still outstanding becomes apparent in the light of petitioners' next contentions -
that respondent used the proceeds of PNs No. 23356 and 23357, together with
additional money, to open TD Accounts No. 17783 and 17784 with petitioner
Citibank; and, subsequently, respondent pre-terminated these TD accounts and
transferred the proceeds thereof, amounting to P1,100,000.00, to petitioner
FNCB Finance for money market placements. While respondent's money
market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance may be traced back with
definiteness to TD Accounts No. 17783 and 17784, there is only flimsy and
unsubstantiated connection between the said TD accounts and the supposed
proceeds paid from PNs No. 23356 and 23357. With PNs No. 23356 and 23357
still unpaid, then they represent an obligation of petitioner Citibank separate
and distinct from the obligation of petitioner FNCB Finance arising from
respondent's money market placements with the latter.
Money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance
According to petitioners, respondent's TD Accounts No. 17783 and 17784, in the

total amount of P1,100,000.00, were supposed to mature on 15 March 1978.
However, respondent, through a letter dated 28 April 1977,[40] pre-terminated
the said TD accounts and transferred all the proceeds thereof to petitioner
FNCB Finance for money market placement. Pursuant to her instructions, TD
Accounts No. 17783 and 17784 were pre-terminated and petitioner Citibank
(then still named First National City Bank) issued Manager's Checks (MC) No.
199253[41] and 199251[42] for the amounts of P500,000.00 and P600,00.00,
respectively. Both MCs were payable to Citifinance (which, according to Mr.
Pujeda,[43] was one with and the same as petitioner FNCB Finance), with the
additional notation that "A/C MODESTA R. SABENIANO." Typewritten on MC
No. 199253 is the phrase "Ref. Proceeds of TD 17783," and on MC No. 199251 is
a similar phrase, "Ref. Proceeds of TD 17784." These phrases purportedly
established that the MCs were paid from the proceeds of respondent's pre-
terminated TD accounts with petitioner Citibank. Upon receipt of the MCs,
petitioner FNCB Finance deposited the same to its account with Feati Bank and
Trust Co., as evidenced by the rubber stamp mark of the latter found at the back
of both MCs. In exchange, petitioner FNCB Finance booked the amounts
received as money market placements, and accordingly issued PNs No. 4952
and 4962, for the amounts of P500,000.00 and P600,000.00, respectively,

payable to respondent's savings account with petitioner Citibank, S/A No. 25-
13703-4, upon their maturity on 1 June 1977. Once again, respondent rolled-
over several times the principal amounts of her money market placements with
petitioner FNCB Finance, as follows -
Maturity
PN
Date Cancels Date Amount Interest
No.
(mm/dd/yyyy) PN No. (mm/dd/yyyy) (P) (p.a.)
4952 None 06/01/1977 500,000.00 17%
04/29/1977
4962 None 06/01/1977 600,000.00 17%
5757 4952 08/31/1977 500,000.00 17%
06/02/1977
5758 4962 08/31/1977 500,000.00 17%
8167 5757 08/25/1978 500,000.00 14%
08/31/1977
8169 5752 08/25/1978 500,000.00 14%
As presented by the petitioner FNCB Finance, respondent rolled-over only the

principal amounts of her money market placements as she chose to receive the
interest income therefrom. Petitioner FNCB Finance also pointed out that when
PN No. 4962, with principal amount of P600,000.00, matured on 1 June 1977,
respondent received a partial payment of the principal which, together with the
interest, amounted to P102,633.33;[44] thus, only the amount of P500,000.00
from PN No. 4962 was rolled-over to PN No. 5758.
Based on the foregoing records, the principal amounts of PNs No. 5757 and
5758, upon their maturity, were rolled over to PNs No. 8167 and 8169,
respectively. PN No. 8167[45] expressly canceled and superseded PN No. 5757,
while PN No. 8169[46] also explicitly canceled and superseded PN No. 5758.
Thus, it is patently erroneous for the Court of Appeals to still award to
respondent the principal amounts and interests covered by PNs No. 5757 and
5758 when these were already canceled and superseded. It is now incumbent
upon this Court to determine what subsequently happened to PNs No. 8167 and
8169.
Petitioner FNCB Finance presented four checks as proof of payment of the

principal amounts and interests of PNs No. 8167 and 8169 upon their maturity.
All the checks were payable to respondent's savings account with petitioner
Citibank, with the following details -
Date of
Amount
Issuance Check Notation
(P)
(mm/dd/yyyy) No.
09/01/1978
76962 12,833.34 Interest payment on PN#08167
09/01/1978 76961 12,833.34 Interest payment on PN#08169
09/05/1978 77035 500,000.00Full payment of principal on

PN#08167 which is hereby
cancelled
Full payment of principal on
09/05/ 1978 77034 500,000.00PN#08169 which is hereby
cancelled
Then again, Checks No. 77035 and 77034 were later returned to petitioner
FNCB Finance together with a memo,[47] dated 6 September 1978, from Mr.
Tan of petitioner Citibank, to a Mr. Bobby Mendoza of petitioner FNCB
Finance. According to the memo, the two checks, in the total amount of
P1,000,000.00, were to be returned to respondent's account with instructions
to book the said amount in money market placements for one more year.
Pursuant to the said memo, Checks No. 77035 and 77034 were invested by
petitioner FNCB Finance, on behalf of respondent, in money market placements
for which it issued PNs No. 20138 and 20139. The PNs each covered
P500,000.00, to earn 11% interest per annum, and to mature on 3 September
1979.
On 3 September 1979, petitioner FNCB Finance issued Check No. 100168, pay
to the order of "Citibank N.A. A/C Modesta Sabeniano," in the amount of
P1,022,916.66, as full payment of the principal amounts and interests of both
PNs No. 20138 and 20139 and, resultantly, canceling the said PNs.[48]
Respondent actually admitted the issuance and existence of Check No. 100168,
but with the qualification that the proceeds thereof were turned over to
petitioner Citibank.[49] Respondent did not clarify the circumstances
attending the supposed turn over, but on the basis of the allegations of
petitioner Citibank itself, the proceeds of PNs No. 20138 and 20139, amounting
to P1,022,916.66, was used by it to liquidate respondent's outstanding loans.
Therefore, the determination of whether or not respondent is still entitled to the
return of the proceeds of PNs No. 20138 and 20139 shall be dependent on the
resolution of the issues raised as to the existence of the loans and the authority
of petitioner Citibank to use the proceeds of the said PNs, together with
respondent's other deposits and money market placements, to pay for the same.
Savings and current accounts with petitioner Citibank
Respondent presented and submitted before the RTC deposit slips and bank
statements to prove deposits made to several of her accounts with petitioner
Citibank, particularly, Accounts No. 00484202, 59091, and 472-751, which
would have amounted to a total of P3,812,712.32, had there been no
withdrawals or debits from the said accounts from the time the said deposits
were made.
Although the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not make any definitive findings
as to the status of respondent's savings and current accounts with petitioner

Citibank, the Decisions of both the trial and appellate courts effectively
recognized only the P31,079.14 coming from respondent's savings account
which was used to off-set her alleged outstanding loans with petitioner Citibank.
[50]
Since both the RTC and the Court of Appeals had consistently recognized only
the P31,079.14 of respondent's savings account with petitioner Citibank, and
that respondent failed to move for reconsideration or to appeal this particular
finding of fact by the trial and appellate courts, it is already binding upon this
Court. Respondent is already precluded from claiming any greater amount in
her savings and current accounts with petitioner Citibank. Thus, this Court
shall limit itself to determining whether or not respondent is entitled to the
return of the amount of P31,079.14 should the off-set thereof by petitioner
Citibank against her supposed loans be found invalid.
Dollar accounts with Citibank-Geneva
Respondent made an effort of preparing and presenting before the RTC her own
computations of her money market placements and dollar accounts with
Citibank-Geneva, purportedly amounting to a total of United States (US)
$343,220.98, as of 23 June 1985.[51] In her Memorandum filed with the RTC,
she claimed a much bigger amount of deposits and money market placements
with Citibank-Geneva, totaling US$1,336,638.65.[52] However, respondent
herself also submitted as part of her formal offer of evidence the computation of
her money market placements and dollar accounts with Citibank-Geneva as
determined by the latter.[53] Citibank-Geneva accounted for respondent's
money market placements and dollar accounts as follows -
MODESTA SABENIANO &/OR

==================
US$ 30'000.-- Principal Fid. Placement

Interest at 3,875% p.a. from 12.07. -
+ US$ 339.06
25.10.79
- US$ 95.-- Commission (minimum)
US$ 30'244.06 Total proceeds on 25.10.1979
US$ 114'000.-- Principal Fid. Placement

Interest at 4,125% p.a. from 12.07. -
+ US$ 1'358.50
25.10.79
- US$ 41.17 Commission
US$ 115'317.33 Total proceeds on 25.10.1979
Total proceeds of both placements on

US$ 145'561.39
25.10.1979
+ US$ 11'381.31 total of both current accounts
US$156'942.70 Total funds available
- US$149'632.99 Transfer to Citibank Manila on 26.10.1979

(counter value of Pesos 1'102'944.78)
US$ 7'309.71 Balance in current accounts
Transfer to Citibank Zuerich - ac no.
- US$ 6'998.84
121359 on March 13, 1980
US$ 310.87 various charges including closing charges
According to the foregoing computation, by 25 October 1979, respondent had a

total of US$156,942.70, from which, US$149,632.99 was transferred by
Citibank-Geneva to petitioner Citibank in Manila, and was used by the latter to
off-set respondent's outstanding loans. The balance of respondent's accounts
with Citibank-Geneva, after the remittance to petitioner Citibank in Manila,
amounted to US$7,309.71, which was subsequently expended by a transfer to
another account with Citibank-Zuerich, in the amount of US$6,998.84, and by
payment of various bank charges, including closing charges, in the amount of
US$310.87. Rightly so, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals gave more
credence to the computation of Citibank-Geneva as to the status of respondent's
accounts with the said bank, rather than the one prepared by respondent
herself, which was evidently self-serving. Once again, this Court shall limit
itself to determining whether or not respondent is entitled to the return of the
amount of US$149,632.99 should the off-set thereof by petitioner Citibank
against her alleged outstanding loans be found invalid. Respondent cannot
claim any greater amount since she did not perfect an appeal of the Decision of
the Court of Appeals, dated 26 March 2002, which found that she is entitled
only to the return of the said amount, as far as her accounts with Citibank-
Geneva is concerned.
III
Petitioner Citibank was able to

establish by preponderance of
evidence the existence of
respondent's loans.
Petitioners' version of events

In sum, the following amounts were used by petitioner Citibank to liquidate

respondent's purported outstanding loans -
Description Amount
Principal and interests of PNs No. 20138 and 20139
(money market placements with petitioner FNCB P
Finance) 1,022,916.66
Savings account with petitioner Citibank 31,079.14
Dollar remittance from Citibank-Geneva (peso
equivalent
Of US$149,632.99) 1,102,944.78
P
Total
2,156,940.58
According to petitioner Citibank, respondent incurred her loans under the

circumstances narrated below.
As early as 9 February 1978, respondent obtained her first loan from petitioner
Citibank in the principal amount of P200,000.00, for which she executed PN
No. 31504.[54] Petitioner Citibank extended to her several other loans in the
succeeding months. Some of these loans were paid, while others were rolled-
over or renewed. Significant to the Petition at bar are the loans which
respondent obtained from July 1978 to January 1979, appropriately covered by
PNs (first set).[55] The aggregate principal amount of these loans was
P1,920,000.00, which could be broken down as follows -
Date of Date of Date of

PN Principal MC
Issuance Maturity Release
No. Amount No.
(mm/dd/yyyy)(mm/dd/yyyy) (mm/dd/yyyy)
P
32935 07/20/1978 09/18/1978 07/20/1978 220701
400,000.00
33751 10/13/1978 12/12/1978 100,000.00 Unrecovered
33798 10/19/1978 11/03/1978 100,000.00 10/19/1978 226285
34025 11/15/1978 01/15/1979 150,000.00 11/16/1978 226439
34079 11/21/1978 01/19/1979 250,000.00 11/21/1978 226467
34192 12/04/1978 01/18/1979 100,000.00 12/05/1978 228057
34402 12/26/1978 02/23/1979 300,000.00 12/26/1978 228203
34534 01/09/1979 03/09/1979 150,000.00 01/09/1979 228270
34609 01/17/1979 03/19/1979 150,000.00 01/17/1979 228357
34740 01/30/1979 03/30/1979 220,000.00 01/30/1979 228400
Total P 1,920,000.00
When respondent was unable to pay the first set of PNs upon their maturity,
these were rolled-over or renewed several times, necessitating the execution by
respondent of new PNs in favor of petitioner Citibank. As of 5 April 1979,

respondent had the following outstanding PNs (second set),[56] the principal
amount of which remained at P1,920,000.00 -
Date of Issuance Date of Maturity

PN No. Principal Amount
(mm/dd/yyyy) (mm/dd/yyyy)
34510 01/01/1979 03/02/1979 P 400,000.00
34509 01/02/1979 03/02/1979 100,000.00
34534 01/09/1979 03/09/1979 150,000.00
34612 01/19/1979 03/16/1979 150,000.00
34741 01/26/1979 03/12/1979 100,000.00
35689 02/23/1979 05/29/1979 300,000.00
35694 03/19/1979 05/29/1979 150,000.00
35695 03/19/1979 05/29/1979 100,000.00
356946 03/20/1979 05/29/1979 250,000.00
35697 03/30/1979 05/29/1979 220,000.00
Total
P1,920,000.00
All the PNs stated that the purpose of the loans covered thereby is "To liquidate
existing obligation," except for PN No. 34534, which stated for its purpose
"personal investment."
Respondent secured her foregoing loans with petitioner Citibank by executing

Deeds of Assignment of her money market placements with petitioner FNCB
Finance. On 2 March 1978, respondent executed in favor of petitioner Citibank
a Deed of Assignment[57] of PN No. 8169, which was issued by petitioner FNCB
Finance, to secure payment of the credit and banking facilities extended to her
by petitioner Citibank, in the aggregate principal amount of P500,000.00. On 9
March 1978, respondent executed in favor of petitioner Citibank another Deed
of Assignment,[58] this time, of PN No. 8167, also issued by petitioner FNCB
Finance, to secure payment of the credit and banking facilities extended to her
by petitioner Citibank, in the aggregate amount of P500,000.00. When PNs
No. 8167 and 8169, representing respondent's money market placements with
petitioner FNCB Finance, matured and were rolled-over to PNs No. 20138 and
20139, respondent executed new Deeds of Assignment,[59] in favor of
petitioner Citibank, on 25 August 1978. According to the more recent Deeds,
respondent assigned PNs No. 20138 and 20139, representing her rolled-over
money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance, to petitioner Citibank
as security for the banking and credit facilities it extended to her, in the
aggregate principal amount of P500,000.00 per Deed.
In addition to the Deeds of Assignment of her money market placements with

petitioner FNCB Finance, respondent also executed a Declaration of Pledge,[60]
in which she supposedly pledged "[a]ll present and future fiduciary placements
held in my personal and/or joint name with Citibank, Switzerland," to secure
all claims the petitioner Citibank may have or, in the future, acquire against
respondent. The petitioners' copy of the Declaration of Pledge is undated, while
that of the respondent, a copy certified by a Citibank-Geneva officer, bore the
date 24 September 1979.[61]
When respondent failed to pay the second set of PNs upon their maturity, an
exchange of letters ensued between respondent and/or her representatives, on
one hand, and the representatives of petitioners, on the other.
The first letter[62] was dated 5 April 1979, addressed to respondent and signed
by Mr. Tan, as the manager of petitioner Citibank, which stated, in part, that -
Despite our repeated requests and follow-up, we regret you have not
granted us with any response or payment.
We, therefore, have no alternative but to call your loan of

P1,920,000.00 plus interests and other charges due and demandable.
If you still fail to settle this obligation by 4/27/79, we shall have no
other alternative but to refer your account to our lawyers for legal
action to protect the interest of the bank.
Respondent sent a reply letter[63] dated 26 April 1979, printed on paper

bearing the letterhead of respondent's company, MC Adore International
Palace, the body of which reads -
This is in reply to your letter dated April 5, 1979 inviting my attention

to my loan which has become due. Pursuant to our representation
with you over the telephone through Mr. F. A. Tan, you allow us to pay
the interests due for the meantime.
Please accept our Comtrust Check in the amount of P62,683.33.
Please bear with us for a little while, at most ninety days. As you
know, we have a pending loan with the Development Bank of the
Philippines in the amount of P11-M. This loan has already been
recommended for approval and would be submitted to the Board of
Governors. In fact, to further facilitate the early release of this loan,
we have presented and furnished Gov. J. Tengco a xerox copy of your
letter.
You will be doing our corporation a very viable service, should you
grant us our request for a little more time.
A week later or on 3 May 1979, a certain C. N. Pugeda, designated as "Executive

Secretary," sent a letter[64] to petitioner Citibank, on behalf of respondent. The
letter was again printed on paper bearing the letterhead of MC Adore
International Palace. The pertinent paragraphs of the said letter are reproduced
below -
Per instructions of Mrs. Modesta R. Sabeniano, we would like to

request for a re-computation of the interest and penalty charges on
her loan in the aggregate amount of P1,920,000.00 with maturity date
of all promissory notes at June 30, 1979. As she has personally
discussed with you yesterday, this date will more or less assure you of
early settlement.
In this regard, please entrust to bearer, our Comtrust check for

P62,683.33 to be replaced by another check with amount resulting
from the new computation. Also, to facilitate the processing of the
same, may we request for another set of promissory notes for the
signature of Mrs. Sabeniano and to cancel the previous ones she has
signed and forwarded to you.
This was followed by a telegram,[65] dated 5 June 1979, and received by

petitioner Citibank the following day. The telegram was sent by a Dewey G.
Soriano, Legal Counsel. The telegram acknowledged receipt of the telegram
sent by petitioner Citibank regarding the "re-past due obligation" of McAdore
International Palace. However, it reported that respondent, the President and
Chairman of MC Adore International Palace, was presently abroad negotiating
for a big loan. Thus, he was requesting for an extension of the due date of the
obligation until respondent's arrival on or before 31 July 1979.
The next letter,[66] dated 21 June 1979, was signed by respondent herself and
addressed to Mr. Bobby Mendoza, a Manager of petitioner FNCB Finance.
Respondent wrote therein -
Re: PN No. 20138 for P500,000.00 & PN No.

20139 for P500,000.00 totalling P1 Million,
both PNs will mature on 9/3/1979.
This is to authorize you to release the accrued quarterly interests

payment from my captioned placements and forward directly to
Citibank, Manila Attention: Mr. F. A. Tan, Manager, to apply to my
interest payable on my outstanding loan with Citibank.
Please note that the captioned two placements are continuously

pledged/hypothecated to Citibank, Manila to support my personal
outstanding loan. Therefore, please do not release the captioned
placements upon maturity until you have received the instruction

from Citibank, Manila.
On even date, respondent sent another letter[67] to Mr. Tan of petitioner

Citibank, stating that -
Re: S/A No. 25-225928

and C/A No. 484-946
This letter serves as an authority to debit whatever the outstanding

balance from my captioned accounts and credit the amount to my loan
outstanding account with you.
Unlike respondent's earlier letters, both letters, dated 21 June 1979, are printed
on plain paper, without the letterhead of her company, MC Adore International
Palace.
By 5 September 1979, respondent's outstanding and past due obligations to

petitioner Citibank totaled P2,123,843.20, representing the principal amounts
plus interests. Relying on respondent's Deeds of Assignment, petitioner
Citibank applied the proceeds of respondent's money market placements with
petitioner FNCB Finance, as well as her deposit account with petitioner
Citibank, to partly liquidate respondent's outstanding loan balance,[68] as
follows -
Respondent's outstanding obligation (principal and P

interest) 2,123,843.20
Proceeds from respondent's money market
Less:
placements
with petitioner FNCB Finance (principal and
(1,022,916.66)
interest)
Deposits in respondent's bank accounts with
petitioner
Citibank (31,079.14)
P
Balance of respondent's obligation
1,069,847.40
Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank subsequently sent a letter,[69] dated 28

September 1979, notifying respondent of the status of her loans and the
foregoing compensation which petitioner Citibank effected. In the letter, Mr.
Tan informed respondent that she still had a remaining past-due obligation in
the amount of P1,069,847.40, as of 5 September 1979, and should respondent
fail to pay the amount by 15 October 1979, then petitioner Citibank shall
proceed to off-set the unpaid amount with respondent's other collateral,
particularly, a money market placement in Citibank-Hongkong.
On 5 October 1979, respondent wrote Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank, on paper

bearing the letterhead of MC Adore International Palace, as regards the
P1,920,000.00 loan account supposedly of MC Adore Finance & Investment,
Inc., and requested for a statement of account covering the principal and
interest of the loan as of 31 October 1979. She stated therein that the loan
obligation shall be paid within 60 days from receipt of the statement of account.
Almost three weeks later, or on 25 October 1979, a certain Atty. Moises

Tolentino dropped by the office of petitioner Citibank, with a letter, dated 9
October 1979, and printed on paper with the letterhead of MC Adore
International Palace, which authorized the bearer thereof to represent the
respondent in settling the overdue account, this time, purportedly, of MC Adore
International Palace Hotel. The letter was signed by respondent as the
President and Chairman of the Board.
Eventually, Atty. Antonio Agcaoili of Agcaoili & Associates, as counsel of

petitioner Citibank, sent a letter to respondent, dated 31 October 1979,
informing her that petitioner Citibank had effected an off-set using her account
with Citibank-Geneva, in the amount of US$149,632.99, against her
"outstanding, overdue, demandable and unpaid obligation" to petitioner
Citibank. Atty. Agcaoili claimed therein that the compensation or off-set was
made pursuant to and in accordance with the provisions of Articles 1278
through 1290 of the Civil Code. He further declared that respondent's
obligation to petitioner Citibank was now fully paid and liquidated.
Unfortunately, on 7 October 1987, a fire gutted the 7th floor of petitioner

Citibank's building at Paseo de Roxas St., Makati, Metro Manila. Petitioners
submitted a Certification[70] to this effect, dated 17 January 1991, issued by the
Chief of the Arson Investigation Section, Fire District III, Makati Fire Station,
Metropolitan Police Force. The 7th floor of petitioner Citibank's building
housed its Control Division, which was in charge of keeping the necessary
documents for cases in which it was involved. After compiling the documentary
evidence for the present case, Atty. Renato J. Fernandez, internal legal counsel
of petitioner Citibank, forwarded them to the Control Division. The original
copies of the MCs, which supposedly represent the proceeds of the first set of
PNs, as well as that of other documentary evidence related to the case, were
among those burned in the said fire.[71]
Respondent's version of events
Respondent disputed petitioners' narration of the circumstances surrounding

her loans with petitioner Citibank and the alleged authority she gave for the off-
set or compensation of her money market placements and deposit accounts with
petitioners against her loan obligation.
Respondent denied outright executing the first set of PNs, except for one (PN
No. 34534 in particular). Although she admitted that she obtained several loans
from petitioner Citibank, these only amounted to P1,150,000.00, and she had
already paid them. She secured from petitioner Citibank two loans of
P500,000.00 each. She executed in favor of petitioner Citibank the
corresponding PNs for the loans and the Deeds of Assignment of her money
market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance as security.[72] To prove
payment of these loans, respondent presented two provisional receipts of
petitioner Citibank - No. 19471,[73] dated 11 August 1978, and No. 12723,[74]
dated 10 November 1978 - both signed by Mr. Tan, and acknowledging receipt
from respondent of several checks in the total amount of P500,744.00 and
P500,000.00, respectively, for "liquidation of loan."
She borrowed another P150,000.00 from petitioner Citibank for personal

investment, and for which she executed PN No. 34534, on 9 January 1979.
Thus, she admitted to receiving the proceeds of this loan via MC No. 228270.
She invested the loan amount in another money market placement with
petitioner FNCB Finance. In turn, she used the very same money market
placement with petitioner FNCB Finance as security for her P150,000.00 loan
from petitioner Citibank. When she failed to pay the loan when it became due,
petitioner Citibank allegedly forfeited her money market placement with
petitioner FNCB Finance and, thus, the loan was already paid.[75]
Respondent likewise questioned the MCs presented by petitioners, except for

one (MC No. 228270 in particular), as proof that she received the proceeds of
the loans covered by the first set of PNs. As recounted in the preceding
paragraph, respondent admitted to obtaining a loan of P150,000.00, covered by
PN No. 34534, and receiving MC No. 228270 representing the proceeds thereof,
but claimed that she already paid the same. She denied ever receiving MCs No.
220701 (for the loan of P400,000.00, covered by PN No. 33935) and No.
226467 (for the loan of P250,000.00, covered by PN No. 34079), and pointed
out that the checks did not bear her indorsements. She did not deny receiving
all other checks but she interposed that she received these checks, not as
proceeds of loans, but as payment of the principal amounts and/or interests
from her money market placements with petitioner Citibank. She also raised
doubts as to the notation on each of the checks that reads "RE: Proceeds of PN#
[corresponding PN No.]," saying that such notation did not appear on the MCs
when she originally received them and that the notation appears to have been
written by a typewriter different from that used in writing all other information
on the checks (i.e., date, payee, and amount).[76] She even testified that MCs
were not supposed to bear notations indicating the purpose for which they were
issued.
As to the second set of PNs, respondent acknowledged having signed them all.
However, she asserted that she only executed these PNs as part of the simulated
loans she and Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank concocted. Respondent explained
that she had a pending loan application for a big amount with the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP), and when Mr. Tan found out about this, he
suggested that they could make it appear that the respondent had outstanding
loans with petitioner Citibank and the latter was already demanding payment
thereof; this might persuade DBP to approve respondent's loan application. Mr.
Tan made the respondent sign the second set of PNs, so that he may have
something to show the DBP investigator who might inquire with petitioner
Citibank as to respondent's loans with the latter. On her own copies of the said
PNs, respondent wrote by hand the notation, "This isa (sic) simulated non-
negotiable note, signed copy given to Mr. Tan., (sic) per agreement to be shown
to DBP representative. itwill (sic) be returned to me if the P11=M (sic) loan for
MC Adore Palace Hotel is approved by DBP."[77]
Findings of this Court as to the existence of the loans
After going through the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by

both sides to this case, it is this Court's assessment that respondent did indeed
have outstanding loans with petitioner Citibank at the time it effected the off-set
or compensation on 25 July 1979 (using respondent's savings deposit with
petitioner Citibank), 5 September 1979 (using the proceeds of respondent's
money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance) and 26 October 1979
(using respondent's dollar accounts remitted from Citibank-Geneva). The
totality of petitioners' evidence as to the existence of the said loans
preponderates over respondent's. Preponderant evidence means that, as a
whole, the evidence adduced by one side outweighs that of the adverse party.
[78]
Respondent's outstanding obligation for P1,920,000.00 had been sufficiently

documented by petitioner Citibank.
The second set of PNs is a mere renewal of the prior loans originally covered by
the first set of PNs, except for PN No. 34534. The first set of PNs is supported,
in turn, by the existence of the MCs that represent the proceeds thereof received
by the respondent.
It bears to emphasize that the proceeds of the loans were paid to respondent in
MCs, with the respondent specifically named as payee. MCs checks are drawn
by the bank's manager upon the bank itself and regarded to be as good as the
money it represents.[79] Moreover, the MCs were crossed checks, with the
words "Payee's Account Only."
In general, a crossed check cannot be presented to the drawee bank for payment
in cash. Instead, the check can only be deposited with the payee's bank which,
in turn, must present it for payment against the drawee bank in the course of
normal banking hours. The crossed check cannot be presented for payment, but
it can only be deposited and the drawee bank may only pay to another bank in
the payee's or indorser's account.[80] The effect of crossing a check was
described by this Court in Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Court
of Appeals[81] -
[T]he crossing of a check with the phrase "Payee's Account Only" is a

warning that the check should be deposited in the account of the
payee. Thus, it is the duty of the collecting bank PCI Bank to ascertain
that the check be deposited in payee's account only. It is bound to
scrutinize the check and to know its depositors before it can make the
clearing indorsement "all prior indorsements and/or lack of
indorsement guaranteed."
The crossed MCs presented by petitioner Bank were indeed deposited in several
different bank accounts and cleared by the Clearing Office of the Central Bank
of the Philippines, as evidenced by the stamp marks and notations on the said
checks. The crossed MCs are already in the possession of petitioner Citibank,
the drawee bank, which was ultimately responsible for the payment of the
amount stated in the checks. Given that a check is more than just an instrument
of credit used in commercial transactions for it also serves as a receipt or
evidence for the drawee bank of the cancellation of the said check due to
payment,[82] then, the possession by petitioner Citibank of the said MCs, duly
stamped "Paid" gives rise to the presumption that the said MCs were already
paid out to the intended payee, who was in this case, the respondent.
This Court finds applicable herein the presumptions that private transactions
have been fair and regular,[83] and that the ordinary course of business has
been followed.[84] There is no question that the loan transaction between
petitioner Citibank and the respondent is a private transaction. The
transactions revolving around the crossed MCs - from their issuance by
petitioner Citibank to respondent as payment of the proceeds of her loans; to its
deposit in respondent's accounts with several different banks; to the clearing of
the MCs by an independent clearing house; and finally, to the payment of the
MCs by petitioner Citibank as the drawee bank of the said checks - are all
private transactions which shall be presumed to have been fair and regular to all
the parties concerned. In addition, the banks involved in the foregoing
transactions are also presumed to have followed the ordinary course of business
in the acceptance of the crossed MCs for deposit in respondent's accounts,
submitting them for clearing, and their eventual payment and cancellation.
The afore-stated presumptions are disputable, meaning, they are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence.[85]

Respondent, however, was unable to present sufficient and credible evidence to
dispute these presumptions.
It should be recalled that out of the nine MCs presented by petitioner Citibank,
respondent admitted to receiving one as proceeds of a loan (MC No. 228270),
denied receiving two (MCs No. 220701 and 226467), and admitted to receiving
all the rest, but not as proceeds of her loans, but as return on the principal
amounts and interests from her money market placements.
Respondent admitted receiving MC No. 228270 representing the proceeds of

her loan covered by PN No. 34534. Although the principal amount of the loan is
P150,000.00, respondent only received P146,312.50, because the interest and
handling fee on the loan transaction were already deducted therefrom.[86]
Stamps and notations at the back of MC No. 228270 reveal that it was deposited
at the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), Cubao Branch, in Account No. 0123-
0572-28.[87] The check also bore the signature of respondent at the back.[88]
And, although respondent would later admit that she did sign PN No. 34534
and received MC No. 228270 as proceeds of the loan extended to her by
petitioner Citibank, she contradicted herself when, in an earlier testimony, she
claimed that PN No. 34534 was among the PNs she executed as simulated loans
with petitioner Citibank.[89]
Respondent denied ever receiving MCs No. 220701 and 226467. However,
considering that the said checks were crossed for payee's account only, and that
they were actually deposited, cleared, and paid, then the presumption would be
that the said checks were properly deposited to the account of respondent, who
was clearly named the payee in the checks. Respondent's bare allegations that
she did not receive the two checks fail to convince this Court, for to sustain her,
would be for this Court to conclude that an irregularity had occurred
somewhere from the time of the issuance of the said checks, to their deposit,
clearance, and payment, and which would have involved not only petitioner
Citibank, but also BPI, which accepted the checks for deposit, and the Central
Bank of the Philippines, which cleared the checks. It falls upon the respondent
to overcome or dispute the presumption that the crossed checks were issued,
accepted for deposit, cleared, and paid for by the banks involved following the
ordinary course of their business.
The mere fact that MCs No. 220701 and 226467 do not bear respondent's
signature at the back does not negate deposit thereof in her account. The
liability for the lack of indorsement on the MCs no longer fall on petitioner
Citibank, but on the bank who received the same for deposit, in this case, BPI
Cubao Branch. Once again, it must be noted that the MCs were crossed, for
payee's account only, and the payee named in both checks was none other than
respondent. The crossing of the MCs was already a warning to BPI to receive
said checks for deposit only in respondent's account. It was up to BPI to verify
whether it was receiving the crossed MCs in accordance with the instructions on
the face thereof. If, indeed, the MCs were deposited in accounts other than
respondent's, then the respondent would have a cause of action against BPI.
[90]
BPI further stamped its guarantee on the back of the checks to the effect that,
"All prior endorsement and/or Lack of endorsement guaranteed." Thus, BPI
became the indorser of the MCs, and assumed all the warranties of an indorser,
[91] specifically, that the checks were genuine and in all respects what they
purported to be; that it had a good title to the checks; that all prior parties had
capacity to contract; and that the checks were, at the time of their indorsement,
valid and subsisting.[92] So even if the MCs deposited by BPI's client, whether
it be by respondent herself or some other person, lacked the necessary
indorsement, BPI, as the collecting bank, is bound by its warranties as an
indorser and cannot set up the defense of lack of indorsement as against
petitioner Citibank, the drawee bank.[93]
Furthermore, respondent's bare and unsubstantiated denial of receipt of the

MCs in question and their deposit in her account is rendered suspect when MC
No. 220701 was actually deposited in Account No. 0123-0572-28 of BPI Cubao
Branch, the very same account in which MC No. 228270 (which respondent
admitted to receiving as proceeds of her loan from petitioner Citibank), and
MCs No. 228203, 228357, and 228400 (which respondent admitted to
receiving as proceeds from her money market placements) were deposited.
Likewise, MC No. 226467 was deposited in Account No. 0121-002-43 of BPI
Cubao Branch, to which MCs No. 226285 and 226439 (which respondent
admitted to receiving as proceeds from her money market placements) were
deposited. It is an apparent contradiction for respondent to claim having
received the proceeds of checks deposited in an account, and then deny
receiving the proceeds of another check deposited in the very same account.
Another inconsistency in respondent's denial of receipt of MC No. 226467 and

her deposit of the same in her account, is her presentation of Exhibit "HHH," a
provisional receipt which was supposed to prove that respondent turned over
P500,000.00 to Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank, that the said amount was split
into three money market placements, and that MC No. 226467 represented the
return on her investment from one of these placements.[94] Because of her
Exhibit "HHH," respondent effectively admitted receipt of MC No. 226467,
although for reasons other than as proceeds of a loan.
Neither can this Court give credence to respondent's contention that the
notations on the MCs, stating that they were the proceeds of particular PNs,
were not there when she received the checks and that the notations appeared to
be written by a typewriter different from that used to write the other
information on the checks. Once more, respondent's allegations were

uncorroborated by any other evidence. Her and her counsel's observation that
the notations on the MCs appear to be written by a typewriter different from
that used to write the other information on the checks hardly convinces this
Court considering that it constitutes a mere opinion on the appearance of the
notation by a witness who does not possess the necessary expertise on the
matter. In addition, the notations on the MCs were written using both capital
and small letters, while the other information on the checks were written using
capital letters only, such difference could easily confuse an untrained eye and
lead to a hasty conclusion that they were written by different typewriters.
Respondent's testimony, that based on her experience transacting with banks,

the MCs were not supposed to include notations on the purpose for which the
checks were issued, also deserves scant consideration. While respondent may
have extensive experience dealing with banks, it still does not qualify her as a
competent witness on banking procedures and practices. Her testimony on this
matter is even belied by the fact that the other MCs issued by petitioner
Citibank (when it was still named First National City Bank) and by petitioner
FNCB Finance, the existence and validity of which were not disputed by
respondent, also bear similar notations that state the reason for which they
were issued.
Respondent presented several more pieces of evidence to substantiate her claim

that she received MCs No. 226285, 226439, 226467, 226057, 228357, and
228400, not as proceeds of her loans from petitioner Citibank, but as the return
of the principal amounts and payment of interests from her money market
placements with petitioners. Part of respondent's exhibits were personal
checks[95] drawn by respondent on her account with Feati Bank & Trust Co.,
which she allegedly invested in separate money market placements with both
petitioners, the returns from which were paid to her via MCs No. 226285 and
228400. Yet, to this Court, the personal checks only managed to establish
respondent's issuance thereof, but there was nothing on the face of the checks
that would reveal the purpose for which they were issued and that they were
actually invested in money market placements as respondent claimed.
Respondent further submitted handwritten notes that purportedly computed

and presented the returns on her money market placements, corresponding to
the amount stated in the MCs she received from petitioner Citibank. Exhibit
"HHH-1"[96] was a handwritten note, which respondent attributed to Mr. Tan
of petitioner Citibank, showing the breakdown of her BPI Check for
P500,000.00 into three different money market placements with petitioner
Citibank. This Court, however, noticed several factors which render the note
highly suspect. One, it was written on the reversed side of Provisional Receipt
No. 12724 of petitioner Citibank which bore the initials of Mr. Tan
acknowledging receipt of respondent's BPI Check No. 120989 for P500,000.00;
but the initials on the handwritten note appeared to be that of Mr. Bobby
Mendoza of petitioner FNCB Finance.[97] Second, according to Provisional

Receipt No. 12724, BPI Check No. 120989 for P500,000.00 was supposed to be
invested in three money market placements with petitioner Citibank for the
period of 60 days. Since all these money market placements were made
through one check deposited on the same day, 10 November 1978, it made no
sense that the handwritten note at the back of Provisional Receipt No. 12724
provided for different dates of maturity for each of the money market
placements (i.e., 16 November 1978, 17 January 1979, and 21 November 1978),
and such dates did not correspond to the 60 day placement period stated on the
face of the provisional receipt. And third, the principal amounts of the money
market placements as stated in the handwritten note - P145,000.00,
P145,000.00 and P242,000.00 - totaled P532,000.00, and was obviously in
excess of the P500,000.00 acknowledged on the face of Provisional Receipt No.
12724.
Exhibits "III" and "III-1," the front and bank pages of a handwritten note of Mr.
Bobby Mendoza of petitioner FNCB Finance,[98] also did not deserve much
evidentiary weight, and this Court cannot rely on the truth and accuracy of the
computations presented therein. Mr. Mendoza was not presented as a witness
during the trial before the RTC, so that the document was not properly
authenticated nor its contents sufficiently explained. No one was able to
competently identify whether the initials as appearing on the note were actually
Mr. Mendoza's.
Also, going by the information on the front page of the note, this Court observes
that payment of respondent's alleged money market placements with petitioner
FNCB Finance were made using Citytrust Checks; the MCs in question,
including MC No. 228057, were issued by petitioner Citibank. Although
Citytrust (formerly Feati Bank & Trust Co.), petitioner FNCB Finance, and
petitioner Citibank may be affiliates of one another, they each remained
separate and distinct corporations, each having its own financial system and
records. Thus, this Court cannot simply assume that one corporation, such as
petitioner Citibank or Citytrust, can issue a check to discharge an obligation of
petitioner FNCB Finance. It should be recalled that when petitioner FNCB
Finance paid for respondent's money market placements, covered by its PNs
No. 8167 and 8169, as well as PNs No. 20138 and 20139, petitioner FNCB
Finance issued its own checks.
As a last point on this matter, if respondent truly had money market placements
with petitioners, then these would have been evidenced by PNs issued by either
petitioner Citibank or petitioner FNCB Finance, acknowledging the principal
amounts of the investments, and stating the applicable interest rates, as well as
the dates of their of issuance and maturity. After respondent had so
meticulously reconstructed her other money market placements with
petitioners and consolidated the documentary evidence thereon, she came
surprisingly short of offering similar details and substantiation for these
particular money market placements.
Since this Court is satisfied that respondent indeed received the proceeds of the
first set of PNs, then it proceeds to analyze her evidence of payment thereof.
In support of respondent's assertion that she had already paid whatever loans
she may have had with petitioner Citibank, she presented as evidence
Provisional Receipts No. 19471, dated 11 August 1978, and No. 12723, dated 10
November 1978, both of petitioner Citibank and signed by Mr. Tan, for the
amounts of P500,744.00 and P500,000.00, respectively. While these
provisional receipts did state that Mr. Tan, on behalf of petitioner Citibank,
received respondent's checks as payment for her loans, they failed to specifically
identify which loans were actually paid. Petitioner Citibank was able to present
evidence that respondent had executed several PNs in the years 1978 and 1979
to cover the loans she secured from the said bank. Petitioner Citibank did admit
that respondent was able to pay for some of these PNs, and what it identified as
the first and second sets of PNs were only those which remained unpaid. It thus
became incumbent upon respondent to prove that the checks received by Mr.
Tan were actually applied to the PNs in either the first or second set; a fact that,
unfortunately, cannot be determined from the provisional receipts submitted by
respondent since they only generally stated that the checks received by Mr. Tan
were payment for respondent's loans.
Mr. Tan, in his deposition, further explained that provisional receipts were
issued when payment to the bank was made using checks, since the checks
would still be subject to clearing. The purpose for the provisional receipts was
merely to acknowledge the delivery of the checks to the possession of the bank,
but not yet of payment.[99] This bank practice finds legitimacy in the
pronouncement of this Court that a check, whether an MC or an ordinary check,
is not legal tender and, therefore, cannot constitute valid tender of payment. In
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, [100] this Court elucidated that:
Since a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money and not

money, the delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself, operate
as payment (Sec. 189, Act 2031 on Negs. Insts.; Art. 1249, Civil Code;
Bryan Landon Co. v. American Bank, 7 Phil. 255; Tan Sunco, v.
Santos, 9 Phil. 44; 21 R.C.L. 60, 61). A check, whether a manager's
check or ordinary check, is not legal tender, and an offer of a check in
payment of a debt is not a valid tender of payment and may be refused
receipt by the obligee or creditor. Mere delivery of checks does not
discharge the obligation under a judgment. The obligation is not
extinguished and remains suspended until the payment by
commercial document is actually realized (Art. 1249, Civil Code, par.
3).
In the case at bar, the issuance of an official receipt by petitioner Citibank would
have been dependent on whether the checks delivered by respondent were
actually cleared and paid for by the drawee banks.
As for PN No. 34534, respondent asserted payment thereof at two separate

instances by two different means. In her formal offer of exhibits, respondent
submitted a deposit slip of petitioner Citibank, dated 11 August 1978, evidencing
the deposit of BPI Check No. 5785 for P150,000.00.[101] In her Formal Offer of
Documentary Exhibits, dated 7 July 1989, respondent stated that the purpose
for the presentation of the said deposit slip was to prove that she already paid
her loan covered by PN No. 34534.[102] In her testimony before the RTC three
years later, on 28 November 1991, she changed her story. This time she
narrated that the loan covered by PN No. 34534 was secured by her money
market placement with petitioner FNCB Finance, and when she failed to pay the
said PN when it became due, the security was applied to the loan, therefore, the
loan was considered paid.[103] Given the foregoing, respondent's assertion of
payment of PN No. 34534 is extremely dubious.
According to petitioner Citibank, the PNs in the second set, except for PN No.
34534, were mere renewals of the unpaid PNs in the first set, which was why the
PNs stated that they were for the purpose of liquidating existing obligations. PN
No. 34534, however, which was part of the first set, was still valid and subsisting
and so it was included in the second set without need for its renewal, and it still
being the original PN for that particular loan, its stated purpose was for
personal investment.[104] Respondent essentially admitted executing the
second set of PNs, but they were only meant to cover simulated loans. Mr. Tan
supposedly convinced her that her pending loan application with DBP would
have a greater chance of being approved if they made it appear that respondent
urgently needed the money because petitioner Citibank was already demanding
payment for her simulated loans.
Respondent's defense of simulated loans to escape liability for the second set of
PNs is truly a novel one. It is regrettable, however, that she was unable to
substantiate the same. Yet again, respondent's version of events is totally based
on her own uncorroborated testimony. The notations on the second set of PNs,
that they were non-negotiable simulated notes, were admittedly made by
respondent herself and were, thus, self-serving. Equally self-serving was
respondent's letter, written on 7 October 1985, or more than six years after the
execution of the second set of PNs, in which she demanded return of the
simulated or fictitious PNs, together with the letters relating thereto, which Mr.
Tan purportedly asked her to execute. Respondent further failed to present any
proof of her alleged loan application with the DBP, and of any circumstance or
correspondence wherein the simulated or fictitious PNs were indeed used for
their supposed purpose.
In contrast, petitioner Citibank, as supported by the testimonies of its officers

and available documentation, consistently treated the said PNs as regular loans
- accepted, approved, and paid in the ordinary course of its business.
The PNs executed by the respondent in favor of petitioner Citibank to cover her
loans were duly-filled out and signed, including the disclosure statement found
at the back of the said PNs, in adherence to the Central Bank requirement to
disclose the full finance charges to a loan granted to borrowers.
Mr. Tan, then an account officer with the Marketing Department of petitioner
Citibank, testified that he dealt directly with respondent; he facilitated the
loans; and the PNs, at least in the second set, were signed by respondent in his
presence.[105]
Mr. Pujeda, the officer who was previously in charge of loans and placements,
confirmed that the signatures on the PNs were verified against respondent's
specimen signature with the bank.[106]
Ms. Cristina Dondoyano, who worked at petitioner Citibank as a loan processor,

was responsible for booking respondent's loans. Booking the loans means
recording it in the General Ledger. She explained the procedure for booking
loans, as follows: The account officer, in the Marketing Department, deals
directly with the clients who wish to borrow money from petitioner Citibank.
The Marketing Department will forward a loan booking checklist, together with
the borrowing client's PNs and other supporting documents, to the loan pre-
processor, who will check whether the details in the loan booking checklist are
the same as those in the PNs. The documents are then sent to Signature Control
for verification of the client's signature in the PNs, after which, they are
returned to the loan pre-processor, to be forwarded finally to the loan
processor. The loan processor shall book the loan in the General Ledger,
indicating therein the client name, loan amount, interest rate, maturity date,
and the corresponding PN number. Since she booked respondent's loans
personally, Ms. Dondoyano testified that she saw the original PNs. In 1986,
Atty. Fernandez of petitioner Citibank requested her to prepare an accounting
of respondent's loans, which she did, and which was presented as Exhibit "120"
for the petitioners. The figures from the said exhibit were culled from the
bookings in the General Ledger, a fact which respondent's counsel was even
willing to stipulate.[107]
Ms. Teresita Glorioso was an Investigation and Reconcilement Clerk at the

Control Department of petitioner Citibank. She was presented by petitioner
Citibank to expound on the microfilming procedure at the bank, since most of
the copies of the PNs were retrieved from microfilm. Microfilming of the
documents are actually done by people at the Operations Department. At the
end of the day or during the day, the original copies of all bank documents, not
just those pertaining to loans, are microfilmed. She refuted the possibility that
insertions could be made in the microfilm because the microfilm is inserted in a
cassette; the cassette is placed in the microfilm machine for use; at the end of
the day, the cassette is taken out of the microfilm machine and put in a safe
vault; and the cassette is returned to the machine only the following day for use,
until the spool is full. This is the microfilming procedure followed everyday.
When the microfilm spool is already full, the microfilm is developed, then sent
to the Control Department, which double checks the contents of the microfilms
against the entries in the General Ledger. The Control Department also
conducts a random comparison of the contents of the microfilms with the
original documents; a random review of the contents is done on every role of
microfilm.[108]
Ms. Renee Rubio worked for petitioner Citibank for 20 years. She rose from the
ranks, initially working as a secretary in the Personnel Group; then as a
secretary to the Personnel Group Head; a Service Assistant with the Marketing
Group, in 1972 to 1974, dealing directly with corporate and individual clients
who, among other things, secured loans from petitioner Citibank; the Head of
the Collection Group of the Foreign Department in 1974 to 1976; the Head of
the Money Transfer Unit in 1976 to 1978; the Head of the Loans and Placements
Unit up to the early 1980s; and, thereafter, she established operations training
for petitioner Citibank in the Asia-Pacific Region responsible for the training of
the officers of the bank. She testified on the standard loan application process
at petitioner Citibank. According to Ms. Rubio, the account officer or marketing
person submits a proposal to grant a loan to an individual or corporation.
Petitioner Citibank has a worldwide policy that requires a credit committee,
composed of a minimum of three people, which would approve the loan and
amount thereof. There can be no instance when only one officer has the power
to approve the loan application. When the loan is approved, the account officer
in charge will obtain the corresponding PNs from the client. The PNs are sent
to the signature verifier who would validate the signatures therein against those
appearing in the signature cards previously submitted by the client to the bank.
The Operations Unit will check and review the documents, including the PNs, if
it is a clean loan, and securities and deposits, if it is collateralized. The loan is
then recorded in the General Ledger. The Loans and Placements Department
will not book the loans without the PNs. When the PNs are liquidated, whether
they are paid or rolled-over, they are returned to the client.[109] Ms. Rubio
further explained that she was familiar with respondent's accounts since, while
she was still the Head of the Loan and Placements Unit, she was asked by Mr.
Tan to prepare a list of respondent's outstanding obligations.[110] She thus
calculated respondent's outstanding loans, which was sent as an attachment to
Mr. Tan's letter to respondent, dated 28 September 1979, and presented before
the RTC as Exhibits "34-B" and "34-C."[111]
Lastly, the exchange of letters between petitioner Citibank and respondent, as

well as the letters sent by other people working for respondent, had consistently
recognized that respondent owed petitioner Citibank money.
In consideration of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that the

preponderance of evidence supports the existence of the respondent's loans, in
the principal sum of P1,920,000.00, as of 5 September 1979. While it is well-
settled that the term "preponderance of evidence" should not be wholly
dependent on the number of witnesses, there are certain instances when the
number of witnesses become the determining factor -
The preponderance of evidence may be determined, under certain

conditions, by the number of witnesses testifying to a particular fact or
state of facts. For instance, one or two witnesses may testify to a given
state of facts, and six or seven witnesses of equal candor, fairness,
intelligence, and truthfulness, and equally well corroborated by all the
remaining evidence, who have no greater interest in the result of the
suit, testify against such state of facts. Then the preponderance of
evidence is determined by the number of witnesses. (Wilcox vs. Hines,
100 Tenn. 524, 66 Am. St. Rep., 761.)[112]
Best evidence rule
This Court disagrees in the pronouncement made by the Court of Appeals

summarily dismissing the documentary evidence submitted by petitioners
based on its broad and indiscriminate application of the best evidence rule.
In general, the best evidence rule requires that the highest available degree of
proof must be produced. Accordingly, for documentary evidence, the contents
of a document are best proved by the production of the document itself,[113] to
the exclusion of any secondary or substitutionary evidence.[114]
The best evidence rule has been made part of the revised Rules of Court, Rule
130, Section 3, which reads -
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the

subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be

produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the
party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other

documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of
time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the
general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public

officer or is recorded in a public office.
As the afore-quoted provision states, the best evidence rule applies only when
the subject of the inquiry is the contents of the document. The scope of the rule
is more extensively explained thus -
But even with respect to documentary evidence, the best evidence rule
applies only when the content of such document is the subject of the
inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was
actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or
surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and
testimonial evidence is admissible (5 Moran, op. cit., pp. 76-66; 4
Martin, op. cit., p. 78). Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise
admissible without need for accounting for the original.
Thus, when a document is presented to prove its existence or

condition it is offered not as documentary, but as real, evidence. Parol
evidence of the fact of execution of the documents is allowed
(Hernaez, et al. vs. McGrath, etc., et al., 91 Phil 565). x x x [115]
In Estrada v. Desierto,[116] this Court had occasion to rule that -
It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only copy of
the Angara Diary as published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on
February 4-6, 2001. In doing so, the Court, did not, however, violate
the best evidence rule. Wigmore, in his book on evidence, states that:
"Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court's

discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not bona
fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose
will be served by requiring production.24
"x x x x
"In several Canadian provinces, the principle of unavailability has

been abandoned, for certain documents in which ordinarily no real
dispute arised. This measure is a sensible and progressive one and
deserves universal adoption (post, sec. 1233). Its essential feature is
that a copy may be used unconditionally, if the opponent has been
given an opportunity to inspect it." (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court did not violate the best evidence rule when it considered and
weighed in evidence the photocopies and microfilm copies of the PNs, MCs, and
letters submitted by the petitioners to establish the existence of respondent's
loans. The terms or contents of these documents were never the point of
contention in the Petition at bar. It was respondent's position that the PNs in
the first set (with the exception of PN No. 34534) never existed, while the PNs
in the second set (again, excluding PN No. 34534) were merely executed to
cover simulated loan transactions. As for the MCs representing the proceeds of
the loans, the respondent either denied receipt of certain MCs or admitted
receipt of the other MCs but for another purpose. Respondent further admitted
the letters she wrote personally or through her representatives to Mr. Tan of
petitioner Citibank acknowledging the loans, except that she claimed that these
letters were just meant to keep up the ruse of the simulated loans. Thus,
respondent questioned the documents as to their existence or execution, or
when the former is admitted, as to the purpose for which the documents were
executed, matters which are, undoubtedly, external to the documents, and
which had nothing to do with the contents thereof.
Alternatively, even if it is granted that the best evidence rule should apply to the
evidence presented by petitioners regarding the existence of respondent's loans,
it should be borne in mind that the rule admits of the following exceptions
under Rule 130, Section 5 of the revised Rules of Court -
SEC. 5. When the original document is unavailable. - When the

original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced
in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the
cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its
contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
The execution or existence of the original copies of the documents was

established through the testimonies of witnesses, such as Mr. Tan, before whom
most of the documents were personally executed by respondent. The original
PNs also went through the whole loan booking system of petitioner Citibank -
from the account officer in its Marketing Department, to the pre-processor, to
the signature verifier, back to the pre-processor, then to the processor for
booking.[117] The original PNs were seen by Ms. Dondoyano, the processor,
who recorded them in the General Ledger. Mr. Pujeda personally saw the
original MCs, proving respondent's receipt of the proceeds of her loans from
petitioner Citibank, when he helped Attys. Cleofe and Fernandez, the bank's
legal counsels, to reconstruct the records of respondent's loans. The original
MCs were presented to Atty. Cleofe who used the same during the preliminary
investigation of the case, sometime in years 1986-1987. The original MCs were
subsequently turned over to the Control and Investigation Division of petitioner
Citibank.[118]
It was only petitioner FNCB Finance who claimed that they lost the original
copies of the PNs when it moved to a new office. Citibank did not make a similar
contention; instead, it explained that the original copies of the PNs were
returned to the borrower upon liquidation of the loan, either through payment
or roll-over. Petitioner Citibank proffered the excuse that they were still looking
for the documents in their storage or warehouse to explain the delay and
difficulty in the retrieval thereof, but not their absence or loss. The original
documents in this case, such as the MCs and letters, were destroyed and, thus,
unavailable for presentation before the RTC only on 7 October 1987, when a fire
broke out on the 7th floor of the office building of petitioner Citibank. There is
no showing that the fire was intentionally set. The fire destroyed relevant
documents, not just of the present case, but also of other cases, since the 7th
floor housed the Control and Investigation Division, in charge of keeping the
necessary documents for cases in which petitioner Citibank was involved.
The foregoing would have been sufficient to allow the presentation of

photocopies or microfilm copies of the PNs, MCs, and letters by the petitioners
as secondary evidence to establish the existence of respondent's loans, as an
exception to the best evidence rule.
The impact of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in the Dy case
In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals made the following

pronouncement -
Besides, We find the declaration and conclusions of this Court in CA-

G.R. CV No. 15934 entitled Sps. Dr. Ricardo L. Dy and Rosalind O.
Dy vs. City Bank, N.A., et al, promulgated on 15 January 1990, as
disturbing taking into consideration the similarities of the fraud,
machinations, and deceits employed by the defendant-appellant
Citibank and its Account Manager Francisco Tan.
Worthy of note is the fact that Our declarations and conclusions

against Citibank and the person of Francisco Tan in CA-G.R. CV No.
15934 were affirmed in toto by the Highest Magistrate in a Minute
Resolution dated 22 August 1990 entitled Citibank, N.A., vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. 93350.
As the factual milieu of the present appeal created reasonable doubts

as to whether the nine (9) Promissory Notes were indeed executed
with considerations, the doubts, coupled by the findings and
conclusions of this Court in CA-G.R. CV No. 15934 and the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 93350. should be construed against
herein defendants-appellants Citibank and FNCB Finance.
What this Court truly finds disturbing is the significance given by the Court of
Appeals in its assailed Decision to the Decision[119] of its Third Division in CA-
G.R. CV No. 15934 (or the Dy case), when there is an absolute lack of legal basis
for doing such.
Although petitioner Citibank and its officer, Mr. Tan, were also involved in the
Dy case, that is about the only connection between the Dy case and the one at
bar. Not only did the Dy case tackle transactions between parties other than the
parties presently before this Court, but the transactions are absolutely
independent and unrelated to those in the instant Petition.
In the Dy case, Severino Chua Caedo managed to obtain loans from herein
petitioner Citibank amounting to P7,000,000.00, secured to the extent of
P5,000,000.00 by a Third Party Real Estate Mortgage of the properties of
Caedo's aunt, Rosalind Dy. It turned out that Rosalind Dy and her husband
were unaware of the said loans and the mortgage of their properties. The
transactions were carried out exclusively between Caedo and Mr. Tan of
petitioner Citibank. The RTC found Mr. Tan guilty of fraud for his participation
in the questionable transactions, essentially because he allowed Caedo to take
out the signature cards, when these should have been signed by the Dy spouses
personally before him. Although the Dy spouses' signatures in the PNs and
Third Party Real Estate Mortgage were forged, they were approved by the
signature verifier since the signature cards against which they were compared to
were also forged. Neither the RTC nor the Court of Appeals, however,
categorically declared Mr. Tan personally responsible for the forgeries, which,
in the narration of the facts, were more likely committed by Caedo.
In the Petition at bar, respondent dealt with Mr. Tan directly, there was no third
party involved who could have perpetrated any fraud or forgery in her loan
transactions. Although respondent attempted to raise suspicion as to the
authenticity of her signatures on certain documents, these were nothing more
than naked allegations with no corroborating evidence; worse, even her own
allegations were replete with inconsistencies. She could not even establish in
what manner or under what circumstances the fraud or forgery was committed,
or how Mr. Tan could have been directly responsible for the same.
While the Court of Appeals can take judicial notice of the Decision of its Third
Division in the Dy case, it should not have given the said case much weight
when it rendered the assailed Decision, since the former does not constitute a
precedent. The Court of Appeals, in the challenged Decision, did not apply any
legal argument or principle established in the Dy case but, rather, adopted the
findings therein of wrongdoing or misconduct on the part of herein petitioner
Citibank and Mr. Tan. Any finding of wrongdoing or misconduct as against
herein petitioners should be made based on the factual background and pieces
of evidence submitted in this case, not those in another case.
It is apparent that the Court of Appeals took judicial notice of the Dy case not as
a legal precedent for the present case, but rather as evidence of similar acts
committed by petitioner Citibank and Mr. Tan. A basic rule of evidence,
however, states that, "Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one
time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar
thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or
knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like."
[120] The rationale for the rule is explained thus -
The rule is founded upon reason, public policy, justice and judicial
convenience. The fact that a person has committed the same or
similar acts at some prior time affords, as a general rule, no logical
guaranty that he committed the act in question. This is so because,
subjectively, a man's mind and even his modes of life may change;
and, objectively, the conditions under which he may find himself at a
given time may likewise change and thus induce him to act in a
different way. Besides, if evidence of similar acts are to be invariably
admitted, they will give rise to a multiplicity of collateral issues and
will subject the defendant to surprise as well as confuse the court and
prolong the trial.[121]
The factual backgrounds of the two cases are so different and unrelated that the
Dy case cannot be used to prove specific intent, knowledge, identity, plan,
system, scheme, habit, custom or usage on the part of petitioner Citibank or its
officer, Mr. Tan, to defraud respondent in the present case.
IV
The liquidation of respondent's

outstanding loans were valid in so
far as petitioner Citibank used
respondent's savings account with
the bank and her money market
placements with petitioner FNCB
Finance; but illegal and void in so
far as petitioner Citibank used
respondent's dollar accounts with
Citibank-Geneva.
Savings Account with petitioner Citibank
Compensation is a recognized mode of extinguishing obligations. Relevant

provisions of the Civil Code provides -
Art. 1278. Compensation shall take place when two persons, in their
own right, are creditors and debtors of each other.
Art. 1279. In order that compensation may be proper, it is necessary;
(1) That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be
at the same time a principal creditor of the other;
(2) That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are
consumable, they be of the same kind, and also of the same quality if
the latter has been stated;
(3) That the two debts be due;
(4) That they be liquidated and demandable;
(5) That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy,

commenced by third persons and communicated in due time to the
debtor.
There is little controversy when it comes to the right of petitioner Citibank to

compensate respondent's outstanding loans with her deposit account. As
already found by this Court, petitioner Citibank was the creditor of respondent
for her outstanding loans. At the same time, respondent was the creditor of
petitioner Citibank, as far as her deposit account was concerned, since bank
deposits, whether fixed, savings, or current, should be considered as simple loan
or mutuum by the depositor to the banking institution.[122] Both debts consist
in sums of money. By June 1979, all of respondent's PNs in the second set had
matured and became demandable, while respondent's savings account was
demandable anytime. Neither was there any retention or controversy over the
PNs and the deposit account commenced by a third person and communicated
in due time to the debtor concerned. Compensation takes place by operation of
law,[123] therefore, even in the absence of an expressed authority from
respondent, petitioner Citibank had the right to effect, on 25 June 1979, the
partial compensation or off-set of respondent's outstanding loans with her
deposit account, amounting to P31,079.14.
Money market placements with FNCB Finance
Things though are not as simple and as straightforward as regards to the money
market placements and bank account used by petitioner Citibank to complete
the compensation or off-set of respondent's outstanding loans, which came
from persons other than petitioner Citibank.
Respondent's money market placements were with petitioner FNCB Finance,

and after several roll-overs, they were ultimately covered by PNs No. 20138 and
20139, which, by 3 September 1979, the date the check for the proceeds of the
said PNs were issued, amounted to P1,022,916.66, inclusive of the principal
amounts and interests. As to these money market placements, respondent was

the creditor and petitioner FNCB Finance the debtor; while, as to the
outstanding loans, petitioner Citibank was the creditor and respondent the
debtor. Consequently, legal compensation, under Article 1278 of the Civil Code,
would not apply since the first requirement for a valid compensation, that each
one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at the same time a
principal creditor of the other, was not met.
What petitioner Citibank actually did was to exercise its rights to the proceeds
of respondent's money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance by
virtue of the Deeds of Assignment executed by respondent in its favor.
The Court of Appeals did not consider these Deeds of Assignment because of
petitioners' failure to produce the original copies thereof in violation of the best
evidence rule. This Court again finds itself in disagreement in the application of
the best evidence rule by the appellate court.
To recall, the best evidence rule, in so far as documentary evidence is

concerned, requires the presentation of the original copy of the document only
when the context thereof is the subject of inquiry in the case. Respondent does
not question the contents of the Deeds of Assignment. While she admitted the
existence and execution of the Deeds of Assignment, dated 2 March 1978 and 9
March 1978, covering PNs No. 8169 and 8167 issued by petitioner FNCB
Finance, she claimed, as defense, that the loans for which the said Deeds were
executed as security, were already paid. She denied ever executing both Deeds
of Assignment, dated 25 August 1978, covering PNs No. 20138 and 20139.
These are again issues collateral to the contents of the documents involved,
which could be proven by evidence other than the original copies of the said
documents.
Moreover, the Deeds of Assignment of the money market placements with

petitioner FNCB Finance were notarized documents, thus, admissible in
evidence. Rule 132, Section 30 of the Rules of Court provides that -
SEC. 30. Proof of notarial documents. - Every instrument duly

acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law, may be
presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of
acknowledgement being prima facie evidence of the execution of the
instrument or document involved.
Significant herein is this Court's elucidation in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals,

[124] which reads -
On the evidentiary value of these documents, it should be recalled that

the notarization of a private document converts it into a public one
and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its
authenticity (Joson vs. Baltazar, 194 SCRA 114 [1991]). This is so

because a public document duly executed and entered in the proper
registry is presumed to be valid and genuine until the contrary is
shown by clear and convincing proof (Asido vs. Guzman, 57 Phil. 652
[1918]; U.S. vs. Enriquez, 1 Phil 241 [1902]; Favor vs. Court of
Appeals, 194 SCRA 308 [1991]). As such, the party challenging the
recital of the document must prove his claim with clear and
convincing evidence (Diaz vs. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 346
[1986]).
The rule on the evidentiary weight that must be accorded a notarized document
is clear and unambiguous. The certificate of acknowledgement in the notarized
Deeds of Assignment constituted prima facie evidence of the execution thereof.
Thus, the burden of refuting this presumption fell on respondent. She could
have presented evidence of any defect or irregularity in the execution of the said
documents[125] or raised questions as to the verity of the notary public's
acknowledgment and certificate in the Deeds.[126] But again, respondent
admitted executing the Deeds of Assignment, dated 2 March 1978 and 9 March
1978, although claiming that the loans for which they were executed as security
were already paid. And, she assailed the Deeds of Assignment, dated 25 August
1978, with nothing more than her bare denial of execution thereof, hardly the
clear and convincing evidence required to trounce the presumption of due
execution of a notarized document.
Petitioners not only presented the notarized Deeds of Assignment, but even
secured certified literal copies thereof from the National Archives.[127] Mr.
Renato Medua, an archivist, working at the Records Management and Archives
Office of the National Library, testified that the copies of the Deeds presented
before the RTC were certified literal copies of those contained in the Notarial
Registries of the notary publics concerned, which were already in the possession
of the National Archives. He also explained that he could not bring to the RTC
the Notarial Registries containing the original copies of the Deeds of
Assignment, because the Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 97, dated 8
November 1968, prohibits the bringing of original documents to the courts to
prevent the loss of irreplaceable and priceless documents.[128]
Accordingly, this Court gives the Deeds of Assignment grave importance in

establishing the authority given by the respondent to petitioner Citibank to use
as security for her loans her money her market placements with petitioner
FNCB Finance, represented by PNs No. 8167 and 8169, later to be rolled-over as
PNs No. 20138 and 20139. These Deeds of Assignment constitute the law
between the parties, and the obligations arising therefrom shall have the force
of law between the parties and should be complied with in good faith.[129]
Standard clauses in all of the Deeds provide that -
The ASSIGNOR and the ASSIGNEE hereby further agree as follows:
xxxx
2. In the event the OBLIGATIONS are not paid at maturity or upon

demand, as the case may be, the ASSIGNEE is fully authorized
and empowered to collect and receive the PLACEMENT (or so
much thereof as may be necessary) and apply the same in
payment of the OBLIGATIONS. Furthermore, the ASSIGNOR
agrees that at any time, and from time to time, upon request by
the ASSIGNEE, the ASSIGNOR will promptly execute and deliver
any and all such further instruments and documents as may be
necessary to effectuate this Assignment.
xxxx
5. This Assignment shall be considered as sufficient authority to

FNCB Finance to pay and deliver the PLACEMENT or so much
thereof as may be necessary to liquidate the OBLIGATIONS, to
the ASSIGNEE in accordance with terms and provisions hereof.
[130]
Petitioner Citibank was only acting upon the authority granted to it under the
foregoing Deeds when it finally used the proceeds of PNs No. 20138 and 20139,
paid by petitioner FNCB Finance, to partly pay for respondent's outstanding
loans. Strictly speaking, it did not effect a legal compensation or off-set under
Article 1278 of the Civil Code, but rather, it partly extinguished respondent's
obligations through the application of the security given by the respondent for
her loans. Although the pertinent documents were entitled Deeds of
Assignment, they were, in reality, more of a pledge by respondent to petitioner
Citibank of her credit due from petitioner FNCB Finance by virtue of her money
market placements with the latter. According to Article 2118 of the Civil Code -
ART. 2118. If a credit has been pledged becomes due before it is

redeemed, the pledgee may collect and receive the amount due. He
shall apply the same to the payment of his claim, and deliver the
surplus, should there be any, to the pledgor.
PNs No. 20138 and 20139 matured on 3 September 1979, without them being
redeemed by respondent, so that petitioner Citibank collected from petitioner
FNCB Finance the proceeds thereof, which included the principal amounts and
interests earned by the money market placements, amounting to P1,022,916.66,
and applied the same against respondent's outstanding loans, leaving no
surplus to be delivered to respondent.
Dollar accounts with Citibank-Geneva

Despite the legal compensation of respondent's savings account and the total
application of the proceeds of PNs No. 20138 and 20139 to respondent's
outstanding loans, there still remained a balance of P1,069,847.40. Petitioner
Citibank then proceeded to applying respondent's dollar accounts with
Citibank-Geneva against her remaining loan balance, pursuant to a Declaration
of Pledge supposedly executed by respondent in its favor.
Certain principles of private international law should be considered herein

because the property pledged was in the possession of an entity in a foreign
country, namely, Citibank-Geneva. In the absence of any allegation and
evidence presented by petitioners of the specific rules and laws governing the
constitution of a pledge in Geneva, Switzerland, they will be presumed to be the
same as Philippine local or domestic laws; this is known as processual
presumption.[131]
Upon closer scrutiny of the Declaration of Pledge, this Court finds the same
exceedingly suspicious and irregular.
First of all, it escapes this Court why petitioner Citibank took care to have the
Deeds of Assignment of the PNs notarized, yet left the Declaration of Pledge
unnotarized. This Court would think that petitioner Citibank would take
greater cautionary measures with the preparation and execution of the
Declaration of Pledge because it involved respondent's "all present and future
fiduciary placements" with a Citibank branch in another country, specifically, in
Geneva, Switzerland. While there is no express legal requirement that the
Declaration of Pledge had to be notarized to be effective, even so, it could not
enjoy the same prima facie presumption of due execution that is extended to
notarized documents, and petitioner Citibank must discharge the burden of
proving due execution and authenticity of the Declaration of Pledge.
Second, petitioner Citibank was unable to establish the date when the
Declaration of Pledge was actually executed. The photocopy of the Declaration
of Pledge submitted by petitioner Citibank before the RTC was undated.[132] It
presented only a photocopy of the pledge because it already forwarded the
original copy thereof to Citibank-Geneva when it requested for the remittance of
respondent's dollar accounts pursuant thereto. Respondent, on the other hand,
was able to secure a copy of the Declaration of Pledge, certified by an officer of
Citibank-Geneva, which bore the date 24 September 1979.[133] Respondent,
however, presented her passport and plane tickets to prove that she was out of
the country on the said date and could not have signed the pledge. Petitioner
Citibank insisted that the pledge was signed before 24 September 1979, but
could not provide an explanation as to how and why the said date was written
on the pledge. Although Mr. Tan testified that the Declaration of Pledge was
signed by respondent personally before him, he could not give the exact date
when the said signing took place. It is important to note that the copy of the
Declaration of Pledge submitted by the respondent to the RTC was certified by
an officer of Citibank-Geneva, which had possession of the original copy of the
pledge. It is dated 24 September 1979, and this Court shall abide by the
presumption that the written document is truly dated.[134] Since it is
undeniable that respondent was out of the country on 24 September 1979, then
she could not have executed the pledge on the said date.
Third, the Declaration of Pledge was irregularly filled-out. The pledge was in a
standard printed form. It was constituted in favor of Citibank, N.A., otherwise
referred to therein as the Bank. It should be noted, however, that in the space
which should have named the pledgor, the name of petitioner Citibank was
typewritten, to wit -
The pledge right herewith constituted shall secure all claims which the
Bank now has or in the future acquires against Citibank, N.A., Manila
(full name and address of the Debtor), regardless of the legal cause or
the transaction (for example current account, securities transactions,
collections, credits, payments, documentary credits and collections)
which gives rise thereto, and including principal, all contractual and
penalty interest, commissions, charges, and costs.
The pledge, therefore, made no sense, the pledgor and pledgee being the same
entity. Was a mistake made by whoever filled-out the form? Yes, it could be a
possibility. Nonetheless, considering the value of such a document, the mistake
as to a significant detail in the pledge could only be committed with gross
carelessness on the part of petitioner Citibank, and raised serious doubts as to
the authenticity and due execution of the same. The Declaration of Pledge had
passed through the hands of several bank officers in the country and abroad,
yet, surprisingly and implausibly, no one noticed such a glaring mistake.
Lastly, respondent denied that it was her signature on the Declaration of

Pledge. She claimed that the signature was a forgery. When a document is
assailed on the basis of forgery, the best evidence rule applies -
Basic is the rule of evidence that when the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence is admissible other than the
original document itself except in the instances mentioned in Section
3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. Mere photocopies of
documents are inadmissible pursuant to the best evidence rule. This
is especially true when the issue is that of forgery.
As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear,

positive and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the
party alleging forgery. The best evidence of a forged signature in an
instrument is the instrument itself reflecting the alleged forged
signature. The fact of forgery can only be established by a comparison

between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine
signature of the person whose signature is theorized upon to have
been forged. Without the original document containing the alleged
forged signature, one cannot make a definitive comparison which
would establish forgery. A comparison based on a mere xerox copy or
reproduction of the document under controversy cannot produce
reliable results.[135]
Respondent made several attempts to have the original copy of the pledge
produced before the RTC so as to have it examined by experts. Yet, despite
several Orders by the RTC,[136] petitioner Citibank failed to comply with the
production of the original Declaration of Pledge. It is admitted that Citibank-
Geneva had possession of the original copy of the pledge. While petitioner
Citibank in Manila and its branch in Geneva may be separate and distinct
entities, they are still incontestably related, and between petitioner Citibank and
respondent, the former had more influence and resources to convince Citibank-
Geneva to return, albeit temporarily, the original Declaration of Pledge.
Petitioner Citibank did not present any evidence to convince this Court that it
had exerted diligent efforts to secure the original copy of the pledge, nor did it
proffer the reason why Citibank-Geneva obstinately refused to give it back,
when such document would have been very vital to the case of petitioner
Citibank. There is thus no justification to allow the presentation of a mere
photocopy of the Declaration of Pledge in lieu of the original, and the photocopy
of the pledge presented by petitioner Citibank has nil probative value.[137] In
addition, even if this Court cannot make a categorical finding that respondent's
signature on the original copy of the pledge was forged, it is persuaded that
petitioner Citibank willfully suppressed the presentation of the original
document, and takes into consideration the presumption that the evidence
willfully suppressed would be adverse to petitioner Citibank if produced.[138]
Without the Declaration of Pledge, petitioner Citibank had no authority to

demand the remittance of respondent's dollar accounts with Citibank-Geneva
and to apply them to her outstanding loans. It cannot effect legal compensation
under Article 1278 of the Civil Code since, petitioner Citibank itself admitted
that Citibank-Geneva is a distinct and separate entity. As for the dollar
accounts, respondent was the creditor and Citibank-Geneva is the debtor; and
as for the outstanding loans, petitioner Citibank was the creditor and
respondent was the debtor. The parties in these transactions were evidently not
the principal creditor of each other.
Therefore, this Court declares that the remittance of respondent's dollar

accounts from Citibank-Geneva and the application thereof to her outstanding
loans with petitioner Citibank was illegal, and null and void. Resultantly,
petitioner Citibank is obligated to return to respondent the amount of
US$149,632,99 from her Citibank-Geneva accounts, or its present equivalent

value in Philippine currency; and, at the same time, respondent continues to be
obligated to petitioner Citibank for the balance of her outstanding loans which,
as of 5 September 1979, amounted to P1,069,847.40.
The parties shall be liable for

interests on their monetary
obligations to each other, as
determined herein.
In summary, petitioner Citibank is ordered by this Court to pay respondent the

proceeds of her money market placements, represented by PNs No. 23356 and
23357, amounting to P318,897.34 and P203,150.00, respectively, earning an
interest of 14.5% per annum as stipulated in the PNs,[139] beginning 17 March
1977, the date of the placements.
Petitioner Citibank is also ordered to refund to respondent the amount of

US$149,632.99, or its equivalent in Philippine currency, which had been
remitted from her Citibank-Geneva accounts. These dollar accounts, consisting
of two fiduciary placements and current accounts with Citibank-Geneva shall
continue earning their respective stipulated interests from 26 October 1979, the
date of their remittance by Citibank-Geneva to petitioner Citibank in Manila
and applied against respondent's outstanding loans.
As for respondent, she is ordered to pay petitioner Citibank the balance of her
outstanding loans, which amounted to P1,069,847.40 as of 5 September 1979.
These loans continue to earn interest, as stipulated in the corresponding PNs,
from the time of their respective maturity dates, since the supposed payment
thereof using respondent's dollar accounts from Citibank-Geneva is deemed
illegal, null and void, and, thus, ineffective.
VI
Petitioner Citibank shall be liable for

damages to respondent.
Petitioners protest the award by the Court of Appeals of moral damages,

exemplary damages, and attorney's fees in favor of respondent. They argued
that the RTC did not award any damages, and respondent, in her appeal before
the Court of Appeals, did not raise in issue the absence of such.
While it is true that the general rule is that only errors which have been stated in
the assignment of errors and properly argued in the brief shall be considered,
this Court has also recognized exceptions to the general rule, wherein it
authorized the review of matters, even those not assigned as errors in the
appeal, if the consideration thereof is necessary in arriving at a just decision of
the case, and there is a close inter-relation between the omitted assignment of
error and those actually assigned and discussed by the appellant.[140] Thus,
the Court of Appeals did not err in awarding the damages when it already made
findings that would justify and support the said award.
Although this Court appreciates the right of petitioner Citibank to effect legal
compensation of respondent's local deposits, as well as its right to the proceeds
of PNs No. 20138 and 20139 by virtue of the notarized Deeds of Assignment, to
partly extinguish respondent's outstanding loans, it finds that petitioner
Citibank did commit wrong when it failed to pay and properly account for the
proceeds of respondent's money market placements, evidenced by PNs No.
23356 and 23357, and when it sought the remittance of respondent's dollar
accounts from Citibank-Geneva by virtue of a highly-suspect Declaration of
Pledge to be applied to the remaining balance of respondent's outstanding
loans. It bears to emphasize that banking is impressed with public interest and
its fiduciary character requires high standards of integrity and performance.
[141] A bank is under the obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with
meticulous care whether such accounts consist only of a few hundred pesos or
of millions of pesos.[142] The bank must record every single transaction
accurately, down to the last centavo, and as promptly as possible.[143]
Petitioner Citibank evidently failed to exercise the required degree of care and
transparency in its transactions with respondent, thus, resulting in the wrongful
deprivation of her property.
Respondent had been deprived of substantial amounts of her investments and

deposits for more than two decades. During this span of years, respondent had
found herself in desperate need of the amounts wrongfully withheld from her.
In her testimony[144] before the RTC, respondent narrated -
By the way Mrs. Witness will you kindly tell us again, you said
Q before that you are a businesswoman, will you tell us again
what are the businesses you are engaged into [sic]?
A I am engaged in real estate. I am the owner of the Modesta

Village 1 and 2 in San Mateo, Rizal. I am also the President and
Chairman of the Board of Macador [sic] Co. and Business Inc.
which operates the Macador [sic] International Palace Hotel. I
am also the President of the Macador [sic] International Palace
Hotel, and also the Treasures Home Industries, Inc. which I
am the Chairman and president of the Board and also
operating affiliated company in the name of Treasures Motor
Sales engaged in car dealers [sic] like Delta Motors, we are the
dealers of the whole Northern Luzon and I am the president of
the Disto Company, Ltd., based in Hongkong licensed in

Honkong [sic] and now operating in Los Angeles, California.
Q What is the business of that Disto Company Ltd.?
Disto Company, Ltd., is engaged in real estate and

A
construction.
Aside from those businesses are you a member of any national

Q
or community organization for social and civil activities?
A Yes sir.
Q What are those?
I am the Vice-President of thes [sic] Subdivision Association of

the Philippines in 1976, I am also an officer of the ... Chamber
A of Real Estate Business Association; I am also an officer of the
Chatholic [sic] Women's League and I am also a member of the
CMLI, I forgot the definition.
How about any political affiliation or government position held

Q
if any?
A I was also a candidate for Mayo last January 30, 1980.
Q Where?
A In Dagupan City, Pangasinan.
Q What else?
I also ran as an Assemblywoman last May, 1984, Independent

A
party in Regional I, Pangasinan.
What happened to your businesses you mentioned as a result

Q of your failure to recover you [sic] investments and bank
deposits from the defendants?
They are not all operating, in short, I was hampered to push

A
through the businesses that I have.
Of all the businesses and enterprises that you mentioned what

A [sic]
are those that are paralyzed and what remain inactive?
A Of all the company [sic] that I have, only the Disto Company
that is now operating in California.
How about your candidacy as Mayor of Dagupan, [sic] City,

Q and later as Assemblywoman of Region I, what happened to
this?
I won by voting but when election comes on [sic] the counting I

lost and I protested this, it is still pending and because I don't
A
have financial resources I was not able to push through the
case. I just have it pending in the Comelec.
Q Now, do these things also affect your social and civic activities?
A Yes sir, definitely.
Q How?
I was embarrassed because being a businesswoman I would

like to inform the Honorable Court that I was awarded as the
most outstanding businesswoman of the year in 1976 but when
A
this money was not given back to me I was not able to comply
with the commitments that I have promised to these
associations that I am engaged into [sic], sir.
For the mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, moral shock
and social humiliation suffered by the respondent, the award of moral damages
is but proper. However, this Court reduces the amount thereof to P300,000.00,
for the award of moral damages is meant to compensate for the actual injury
suffered by the respondent, not to enrich her.[145]
Having failed to exercise more care and prudence than a private individual in its
dealings with respondent, petitioner Citibank should be liable for exemplary
damages, in the amount of P250,000.00, in accordance with Article 2229[146]
and 2234[147] of the Civil Code.
With the award of exemplary damages, then respondent shall also be entitled to
an award of attorney's fees.[148] Additionally, attorney's fees may be awarded
when a party is compelled to litigate or to incur expenses to protect his interest
by reason of an unjustified act of the other party.[149] In this case, an award of
P200,000.00 attorney's fees shall be satisfactory.
In contrast, this Court finds no sufficient basis to award damages to petitioners.

Respondent was compelled to institute the present case in the exercise of her
rights and in the protection of her interests. In fact, although her Complaint
before the RTC was not sustained in its entirety, it did raise meritorious points
and on which this Court rules in her favor. Any injury resulting from the
exercise of one's rights is damnum absque injuria.[150]
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is PARTLY

GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
51930, dated 26 March 2002, as already modified by its Resolution, dated 20
November 2002, is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION, as follows
-
1. PNs No. 23356 and 23357 are DECLARED subsisting and outstanding.
Petitioner Citibank is ORDERED to return to respondent the principal
amounts of the said PNs, amounting to Three Hundred Eighteen Thousand
Eight Hundred Ninety-Seven Pesos and Thirty-Four Centavos
(P318,897.34) and Two Hundred Three Thousand One Hundred Fifty
Pesos (P203,150.00), respectively, plus the stipulated interest of Fourteen
and a half percent (14.5%) per annum, beginning 17 March 1977;
2. The remittance of One Hundred Forty-Nine Thousand Six Hundred Thirty

Two US Dollars and Ninety-Nine Cents (US$149,632.99) from
respondent's Citibank-Geneva accounts to petitioner Citibank in Manila,
and the application of the same against respondent's outstanding loans
with the latter, is DECLARED illegal, null and void. Petitioner Citibank is
ORDERED to refund to respondent the said amount, or its equivalent in
Philippine currency using the exchange rate at the time of payment, plus
the stipulated interest for each of the fiduciary placements and current
accounts involved, beginning 26 October 1979;
3. Petitioner Citibank is ORDERED to pay respondent moral damages in the

amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00); exemplary
damages in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P250,000.00); and attorney's fees in the amount of Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00); and
4. Respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner Citibank the balance of her

outstanding loans, which, from the respective dates of their maturity to 5
September 1979, was computed to be in the sum of One Million Sixty-Nine
Thousand Eight Hundred Forty-Seven Pesos and Forty Centavos
(P1,069,847.40), inclusive of interest. These outstanding loans shall
continue to earn interest, at the rates stipulated in the corresponding PNs,
from 5 September 1979 until payment thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., (Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, and

Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 165-325.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. with Associate Justices
Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; id. at 327-366.
[3] Id. at 368-374.
[4] TSN, Deposition of Mr. Francisco Tan, 3 September 1990, pp. 9-10.
[5] Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-8.
[6] Id. at 148-157.
[7] Id. at 40-51.
[8] Id. at 208-227.
[9] Order, dated 11 December 1985, penned by Judge Ansberto P. Paredes,

Records, Vol. I, p. 346.
[10] Penned by Judge Manuel D. Victorio, Records, Vol. III, pp. 1607-1621.
[11] Civil Case No. 11336 was raffled and re-reffled to four different Judges of
the Makati RTC before it was finally resolved. It was originally raffled to Makati
RTC, Branch 140, presided by Judge Ansberto P. Paredes. On 4 February 1987,
before the termination of the re-direct examination of herein respondent
(plaintiff before the RTC), the case was transferred to Makati RTC, Branch 57,
presided by Judge Francisco X. Velez, for reasons not disclosed in the Records.
Judge Velez was able to try and hear the case until the presentation of the
evidence by herein petitioners (defendants before the RTC). Respondent again
took the stand to present rebuttal evidence, but even before she could finish her
testimony, Judge Velez inhibited himself upon petitioners' motion (Order,
dated 10 April 1992, penned by Judge Francisco X. Velez, Records, Vol. 11, p.
1085). The case was transferred to Makati RTC, Branch 141, presided by Judge
Marcelino F. Bautista, Jr. For reasons not disclosed in the Records, Judge
Manuel D. Victorio took over Makati RTC, Branch 141. After the parties
submitted their respective Memoranda, Judge Victorio declared the case
submitted for decision (Order, dated 9 December 1994, penned by Judge
Manuel D. Victorio, Records, Vol. III, p. 1602). Judge Victorio rendered his
Decision in Civil Case No. 11336 on 24 August 1995 (Records, Vol. III, pp. 1607-
1621).
[12] Rollo, pp. 365-366.
[13] Rollo of G.R. No. 152985, pp. 3-4.
[14] The filing of a motion for extension does not automatically suspend the
running of the period for appeal, since the purpose of such motion is to merely
ask the court to grant an enlargement of the time fixed by law. The movant,
therefore, has no right to assume that his motion would be granted, and should
check with the court as to the outcome of his motion, so that if the same is
denied, he can still perfect his appeal. (Hon. Bello and Ferrer v. Fernando, 114
Phil. 101, 104 [1962].)
[15] Rollo of G.R. No. 156132, p. 1227.
[16] Rollo, p. 374.
[17] Resolution, dated 29 January 2003; rollo, pp. 980-A-B.
[18] Resolution, dated 23 June 2003; id. at 1311-1312.
[19] Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines v. Tempongko, 137
Phil. 239, 244 (1969); Singh v. Liberty Insurance Corp., 118 Phil. 532, 535
(1963).
[20] Rollo, pp. 1443-1445.
[21] See the case of Borromeo v. Court of Appeals (162 Phil. 430, 438 [1976])
wherein this Court pronounced that a party's right to appeal shall not be
affected by the perfection of another appeal from the same decision;
otherwise, it would lead to the absurd proposition that one party may be
deprived of the right to appeal from the portion of a decision against him just
because the other party who had been notified of the decision ahead had already
perfected his appeal in so far as the said decision adversely affects him. If the
perfection of an appeal by one party would not bar the right of the other party to
appeal from the same decision, then an unperfected appeal, as in the case at bar,
would have far less effect.
[22] The Executive Secretary v. Gordon, 359 Phil. 266, 271 (1998).
[23] Young v. John Keng Seng, 446 Phil. 823, 833 (2003).
[24] Sps. Sta. Maria v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 275, 282-283 (1998).
[25] The Court of Appeals modified the trial court's findings and conclusions, as
follows: (1) By declaring the P1,069,847.40 alleged indebtedness of Ms.
Sabeniano as non-existing for failure of Citibank to substantiate its allegations;
(2) By declaring that there are unpaid money market placements, current
accounts and savings account of Ms. Sabeniano; and (3) The awarding of
damages in favor of Ms. Sabeniano and against Citibank.
[26] Supra note 11.
[27] Records, Vol. III, pp. 1612-1613.
[28] Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes with Associate Justices

Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; rollo, p. 344.
[29] Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the REVISED RULES OF COURT reads -
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. - The following presumptions are

satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence:
xxxx
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed.
[30] 317 Phil. 495, 501-503 (1995).
[31] Records, Vol. I, p. 515.
[32] 32 Phil. 476, 478-479.
[33] Behn, Meyer & Co. v. Rosatzin, 5 Phil. 660, 662 (1906).
[34] Jimenez v. National Labor Relations Commission, 326 Phil. 89, 95 (1996).
[35] Mr. Herminio Pujeda, at the time he testified before the RTC in 1990, was
already the Vice President of petitioner Citibank.
[36] Mr. Francisco Tan, at the time of his deposition in 1990, was already
working as Assistant General Manager for Dai-Chi Kangyo Bank in Hong Kong.
[37] TSN, 12 March 1990, pp. 6-10.
[38] Lichauco v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co., 84 Phil. 330, 346 (1949).
[39] TSN, 6 February 1990, Vol. V, pp. 16-24.
[40] Exhibit "37," defendants' folder of exhibits, p. 106.
[41] Exhibit "37-C," id. at 107.
[42] Exhibit "37-F," id. at 108.
[43] TSN, 12 March 1990, p. 13.
[44] Exhibit "104-C," defendants' folder of exhibits, p. 111.
[45] Exhibit "105," id. at 112.
[46] Exhibit "106," id. at 114.
[47] Exhibit "108," id. at 118.
[48] Exhibits "112" and "119," id. at 121-A, 124.
[49] Records, Vol. III, p. 1367.
[50] Exhibit "34-B," petitioners' folder of exhibits, p. 102.
[51] Exhibit "G," plaintiff's folder of exhibits, pp. 4-15.
[52] Records, Vol. III, p. 1,562.
[53] Exhibit "J," plaintiff's folder of exhibits, p. 49.
[54] Exhibit "120-H," defendants' folder of exhibits, pp. 131.
[55] Exhibits "1" to "9," id. at 44-52.
[56] Exhibits "18" to "26," id. at 83-92.

[57] Exhibit "13-E," id. at 65-67.
[58] Exhibit "14-G," id. at 72-74.
[59] Exhibit "15" and "Exhibit 17-D," id. at 77-78, 81-82.
[60] Exhibit "38," id. at 109-110.
[61] Exhibit "K-1," plaintiff's folder of exhibits, pp. 54-55
[63] Exhibit "28," id. at 94.
[64] Exhibit "29," id. at 95.
[65] Exhibit "30," id. at 96.
[66] Exhibit "31," id. at 97.
[67] Exhibit "32," id. at 98.
[68] Exhibits "34-B" and "34-C," id. at 102-103.
[69] Exhibit "34," id. at 100.
[70] Exhibit "121," id. at 207.
[71] TSN, 14 May 1991, Vol. XI , pp. 12-14.
[72] TSN, 28 November 1991, Vol. XIII, pp. 5, 15, 23, 28-29.
[73] Exhibit "QQQ," plaintiff's folder of exhibits, p. 117.
[74] Exhibit "AAAA," id. at 124.
[75] TSN, 28 November 1991, Vol. XIII, pp. 7-8, 23.
[76] Id. at 16-23.

[77] TSN, 7 May 1986, Vol. II, pp. 42-52; TSN, 19 May 1986, Vol. II, pp. 3-28.
[78] Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, 364 Phil. 613, 621 (1999).
[79] Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, 383 Phil. 538, 553
(2000), with reference to Tan v. Court of Appeals, 239 Phil. 310, 322 (1994).
[80] Gempesaw v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 92244, 9 February 1993, 218
SCRA 682, 695.
[81] 403 Phil. 361, 383 (2001).
[82] Moran v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105836, 7 March 1994, 230 SCRA
799, 311-312.
[83] REVISED RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Section 3(p).
[84] Id., Rule 131, Section 3(q).
[85] Id., Section 3.
[87] Exhibits "9-D" and "9-G," id. at 52.
[88] Exhibit "9-F," id. at 52.
[89] TSN, 19 May 1986, Vol. II, p. 10.
[90] Associated Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89802, 7 May 1992, 208
SCRA 465, 469-471.
[91] Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank v Equitable Banking

Corporation, G.R. No. 74917, 20 January 1988, 157 SCRA 188, 199.
[92] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, Section 66, in connection with

Section 65.
[93] Associated Bank v. Court of Appeals, 322 Phil. 677, 697 (1996); Associated
Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89802, 7 May 1992, 208 SCRA 465, 472.
[94] Plaintiff's Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits, records, Vol. I, pp. 504-
505; plaintiff's folder of exhibits, p. 110.
[95] Exhibits "GGG" and "JJJ," plaintiff's folder of exhibits, pp. 109, 113.
[96] Plaintiff's folder of exhibits, p. 110.
[97] See the initials on Exhibit "III-1," plaintiff's folder of exhibits, p. 112.
[98] Plaintiff's folder of exhibits, p. 112.
[99] TSN, deposition of Mr. Francisco Tan, 3 September 1990, p. 118.
[100] G.R. No. 49188, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 557, 568.
[101] Exhibit "MMM," plaintiff's folder of exhibits, p. 115.
[102] Records, Vol. I, p. 507.
[103] TSN, 28 November 1991, Vol. XIII, pp. 7-8.
[104] TSN, deposition of Mr. Francisco Tan, 3 September 1990, p. 96.
[105] TSN, deposition of Mr. Francisco A. Tan, 3 September 1990, pp. 13-16.
[106] TSN, 22 May 1990, Vol. V, pp. 31-61.
[107] TSN, 7 March 1991, Vol. IX, pp. 15-19; TSN, 13 March 1991, Vol X, pp. 7-9.
[108] TSN, 19 March 1991, Vol. X, pp. 17-21; TSN, 8 April 1991, Vol. X, pp. 31-
34.
[109] TSN, 18 April 1991, Vol. X, pp. 3-13.
[110] Id. at 15-23.
[111] Folder of defendants' exhibits, pp. 102-103.
[112] Municipality of Moncada v. Cajuigan, 21 Phil 184, 190 (1912).

[113] J.A.R. Sibal and J.N. Salazar, Jr., COMPENDIUM ON EVIDENCE 31 (4th
ed., 1995).
[114] F.D. Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, Vol. II, p. 571 (8th ed.,
2000).
[115] F.D. Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, Vol. II, 571 (8th ed.,
2000).
[116] G.R. Nos. 146710-15, 3 April 2001, 356 SCRA 108, 137-138.
[117] TSN, 13 March 1991, Vol X, pp. 7-9.
[118] TSN, 22 May 1990, Vol. V, pp. 14-17.
[119] Dr. Ricardo L. Dy and Rosalind O. Dy vs. Citibank, N.A.,CA-G.R. CV No.

15934, 15 January 1990, penned by Associate Justice Nicolas P. Lapeña, Jr. with
Associate Justices Santiago M. Kapunan and Emeterio C. Cui, concurring.
[120] REVISED RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, Section 34.
[121] J.A.R. Sibal and J.N. Salazar, Jr., COMPENDIUM ON EVIDENCE 199-
200 (4th ed., 1995).
[122] CIVIL CODE, Article 1980; Guingona, Jr. v. City Fiscal of Manila, 213
Phil. 516,523-524 (1984).
[123] CIVIL CODE, Article 1286.
[124] G.R. No. 57092, 21 January 1993, 217 SCRA 307, 313-314.
[125] Anachuelo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-71391, 29 January

1987, 147 SCRA 434, 441-442.
[126] Antillon v. Barcelon, 37 Phil. 148, 150-151 (1917).
[127] See Exhibits "13-E, "14-G," "15-D,"and "17-D," defendants' folder of

exhibits, pp. 65-67, 72-74, 77-78, 81-82.
[128] TSN, 7 March 1991, Vol. IX, pp. 3-6.

[129] Cuizon v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 456, 482 (1996).
[130] Exhibits "13-E, "14-G," "15-D," and "17-D," defendants' folder of exhibits,
pp. 65-66, 72-73, 77-78, 81-82.
[131] Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 396 Phil. 383, 396
(2000).
[132] Exhibit "38," defendants' folder of exhibits, pp. 109-110.
[133] Exhibit "K-1," plaintiff's folder of exhibits, 54-55.
[134] REVISED RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Section 3(u).
[135] Heirs of Severa P. Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 360 Phil. 753, 763
(1998).
[136] Order, dated 12 November 1985, penned by Judge Ansberto P. Paredes,

records, Vol. I, p. 310; Order, dated 2 September 1988, id. at penned by Judge
Francisco X. Velez, records, Vol. I, p. 449; Order, dated 24 November 1988,
penned by Judge Francisco X. Velez, records, Vol. I, p. 458; Order, dated 25
April 1989, penned by Judge Francisco X. Velez, records, Vol. I, pp. 476-477
[137] Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Triumph Lumber and Construction
Corporation, 361 Phil. 463, 477 (1999).
[138] REVISED RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Section 3(e).
[139] The stipulated interest shall apply as indemnity for the damages incurred
in the delay of payment as provided in Article 2209 of the Civil Code which
reads -
ART. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of

money, and the debtor incurs delay, the indemnity for damages, there
being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the
interest agreed upon, and in the absence of a stipulation, the legal
interest, which is six percent per annum. [Emphasis supplied.]
Note, however, that the legal interest has been increased from six percent to
twelve percent per annum by virtue of Central Bank Circulars No. 416, dated 29
July 1974, and No. 905, dated 10 December 1982.
[140] Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. National Labor

Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 101181-84, 22 June 1992, 210 SCRA 222, 226-
227; Ortigas, Jr. v. Lufthansa German Airlines, G.R. No. L-28773, 30 June
1975, 64 SCRA 610, 633-634; Hernandez v. Andal, 78 Phil. 196, 209-210 (1947).
[141] THE GENERAL BANKING LAW OF 2000, Section 2.
[142] Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 942, 948 (1999).
[143] Simex International (Manila), Inc, vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88013,
19 March 1990, 183 SCRA 360, 367; Bank of Philippine Islands vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 69162, 21 February 1992, 206 SCRA
408, 412-413.
[144] TSN, 28 January 1986, Vol. I, pp. 5-7.
[145] Tiongco v. Atty. Deguma, 375 Phil. 978, 994-995 (1999); Zenith
Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85296, 14 May 1990, 185
SCRA 398, 402-403.
[146] Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or

correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages.
[147] While the amount of exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff
must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages
before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary
damages should be awarded. x x x
[148] CIVIL CODE, Article 2208(1).
[149] Ching Sen Ben vs. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 544, 555 (1999).
[150] ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 498,

531-532 (1999); Tierra International Construction Corp. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 88912, 3 July 1992, 211 SCRA 73, 81; Saba v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77950, 24 August 1990, 189 SCRA 50, 55.

Division (GR No. 156132, Oct 16, 2006) Citibank V. Modesta R. Sabeniano

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Division (GR No. 156132, Oct 16, 2006) Citibank V. Modesta R. Sabeniano

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Respondent Modesta R. Sabeniano was a client of both petitioners Citibank and

On 8 August 1985, respondent filed a Complaint[5] against petitioners,

In their joint Answer[7] and Answer to Amended Complaint,[8] filed on 12

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, decision is hereby

(2) Declaring the plaintiff [respondent Sabeniano] indebted to the

(3) Dismissing all other claims and counterclaims interposed by the

Costs against the defendant Bank.

On 26 March 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision[12] affirming

Wherefore, premises considered, the assailed 24 August 1995

1. Declaring as illegal, null and void the set-off effected by the

2. As defendant-appellant Citibank failed to establish by competent

declared as without legal and factual basis;

3. As defendants-appellants failed to account the following plaintiff-

(i) Citibank NNPN Serial No. 023356 (Cancels and

(ii) Citibank NNPN Serial No. 23357 (Cancels and

(iii) FNCB NNPN Serial No. 05757 (Cancels and

(iv) FNCB NNPN Serial No. 05758 (Cancels and

(v) The Two Million (P2,000,000.00) money market

4. Ordering defendants-appellants to jointly and severally pay the

G.R. No. 152985

Respondent no longer sought a reconsideration of the Decision of the Court of

G.R. No. 152985 (Modesta R. Sabeniano vs. Court of

G.R. No. 156132

Meanwhile, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion for

The challenged 26 March 2002 Decision of the Court is AFFIRMED

Assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV

The Petition presented fourteen (14) assignments of errors allegedly committed

The Resolution of this Court, dated

This Court already explained the matter to respondent when it issued a

[A]cting on Citibank's and FNCB Finance's Motion for

Accordingly, the instant Urgent Motion is hereby DENIED.

To sustain the argument of respondent would result in an unjust and

Respondent Sabeniano did not

Petitioners contend that respondent committed forum shopping on the basis of

While petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision in CA-G.R. CV

SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. - The plaintiff or

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable

prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as cause for

Although it may seem at first glance that respondent was simultaneously

Without any particular idea as to the assignments of error or the relief

It should also be noted that the Certification against Forum Shopping is

As an exception to the general rule,

It is already a well-settled rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases

Several of the enumerated exceptions pertain to the Petition at bar.

contradicted by the evidence on record.

The fact that the trial judge who

After carefully evaluating the mass of evidence adduced by the parties,

More importantly, the two deeds of assignment were notarized, hence

Finally, there were sufficient evidence wherein the plaintiff had

Disagreeing in the foregoing findings, the Court of Appeals stressed, in its

This Court rules in the negative.

What deserves stressing is that, in this jurisdiction, there exists a disputable

In People v. Gazmen,[30] this Court already elucidated its position on such an

Accused-appellant makes an issue of the fact that the judge who

(People vs. Jaymalin, 214 SCRA 685, 692 [1992])