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Mowrer on "Sin" fore, the sinner is personally blameworthy or integrally
worthless for performing this mistaken or wrong act.
In a recent issue of the American Psychologist,
Although a may be a true observation, b is an arbi-
Hobart Mowrer (1960) argues that because "sin" is a
trary value judgment, or moralistic definition, that can
stronger word than "wrongdoing" or "irresponsibility"
never possibly be objectively validated and that, as
it is better for the "neurotic" individual to admit his
Ellis (1958), Epictetus (1899), Hartman (1959), Lewis
"sins" than accept his "wrongdoings." Says Mowrer:
(1949), Mead (1936), and other writers have shown, is
. . . the only way to resolve the paradox of self-hatred and philosophically untenable. No matter how responsible,
self-punishment is to assume, not that it represents merely in a causative sense, an individual may be for his mis-
an "introjection" of the attitudes of others, but that the taken or wrong behavior, he becomes a villain or a
self-hatred is realistically justified and will persist until the worthless lout only if members of his social group view
individual, by radically altered attitude and action, honestly or define him as such and if, more importantly, he ac-
and realistically comes to feel that he now deserves some- cepts their moralistic views.
thing better. As long as one remains, in old-fashioned The paradox, therefore, that Mowrer posits—that
religious phraseology, hard-of-heart and unrepentant, just
the "neurotic" sinner will not get better until he ac-
so long will one's conscience hold him in the vise-like grip
of "neurotic" rigidity and suffering. But if, at length, an knowledges and actively repents his sins and that he
individual confesses his past stupidities and errors and will not acknowledge his sins until he gets better—is a
makes what poor attempts he can at restitution, then the direct and "logical" result of our explicitly or implicitly
superego (like the parents of an earlier day—and society in including the concept of personal worthlessness in the
general) forgives and relaxes its stern hold; and the in- definition of "sin." Naturally, if I believe that my acts
dividual once again is free, "well" (p. 304). are sinful—meaning that I am wrong (self- or socially-
defeating) for perpetrating them and that I am blame-
In upholding the concept of individual (if not orig- worthy or worthless for being wrong—I will not dare
inal) "sin," Mowrer is contending that the "neurotic" acknowledge that I have sinned, or I will make invalid
individual must, if he is to get "well," accept the fol- excuses for so doing, or I will feel so worthless after
lowing syllogism: (a) sinning is unjustified; (b) I have my acknowledgment that I am most unlikely to be
sinned; (c) therefore, I must justify my existence by energetic or effective enough to change my wrong or
acknowledging my sins, changing my ways, and becom- mistaken behavior.
ing a nonsinner. How can the psychologist help his "neurotic" pa-
At first blush, this seems like a perfectly valid syl- tients resolve this paradox? Very simply: by taking
logism. But, as Mowrer himself suggests, it rarely the objective and "weaker" (that is, unmoralistic)
works in practice because words, such as "wrongdoing" and "irresponsibility,"
There is some evidence that human beings do not change that Mowrer abandons in place of "sin" and putting
radically unless they first acknowledge their sins; but we them into his original syllogism. The syllogism then
also know how hard it is for one to make such an acknowl- becomes: (a) wrongdoing is self- or society-defeating;
edgment unless he has already changed. In other words, (b) I have made a mistake or committed a wrong act;
the full realization of deep worthlessness is a severe ego (c) therefore, I had better stop being self-defeating by
"insult"; and one must have some new source of strength, acknowledging my wrongdoing, take considerable time
it seems, to endure it. This is a mystery (or is it only a and effort to work at not repeating it, and eventually
mistaken observation?) which traditional theology has tried become a less frequent wrongdoer.
to resolve in various ways—without complete success. Can With this more objective and realistic restatement of
we psychologists do better (p. 304) ?
Mowrer's syllogism, the problem of the "neurotic"
I think we can. Let us first see what is wrong with
individual's changing his ineffective and self-defeating
Mowrer's syllogism and why, because of the manner in
behavior is hardly automatically solved; but (by hav-
which it is stated, it virtually forces the individual fully
ing the definitional concepts of deep worthlessness and
to realize his deep worthlessness and his consequent
severe ego "insult" removed from his philosophic
inability to change his behavior. Mowrer's premise is
premises) he becomes much more likely resolutely to
that sinning is unjustified or that the sinner's "self-
tackle what Mowrer accurately describes as his moral-
hatred is realistically justified." By this statement he
psychological difficulties.
appears to mean two important things, only the first of
which can be objectively validated: (a) the sinner's, act REFERENCES
is mistaken or wrong (because it is, in some early or ELLIS, A. Rational psychotherapy. J. gen. Psychol., 1958,
final analysis, self- or society-defeating); and (b) there- 59, 35-49.
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714 THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST

EPICTETUS. The works of Epictetm. Boston: Little, makes them feel more content. Nor is it any secret
Brown, 1899. that these people go out of their way to frequently
HARTMAN, R. S. The measurement of value. Crotonville, provoke others—policemen, friends, wives, psychol-
N. Y.: General Electric Company, 1Q59. ogists—to give them a tough time. However, it seems
LEWIS, C. L. The nature of ethical disagreement. In
to me that acting out the punitive role with these
H. Feigl & W. Sellars (Eds.), Readings in philosophical
analysis. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949. people, telling them they are real sinners—while it may
MEAD, G. H. Mind, self, and society. Chicago: Univer. make them temporarily happier—brings them no closer
Chicago Press, 1936. to either understanding or changing themselves. It
MOWREE, O. H. "Sin," the lesser of two evils. Amer. merely provides them with the rationalization they
Psychologist, 1960, 15, 301-304. crave to avoid facing their problem. Yet, it seems to
ALBERT ELLIS me, Mowrer is advocating just that.
New York City After all, most clinicians are not concerned with the
philosophical ramifications of "sin" and guilt, or with
As I read Mowrer's article on "sin" in the May issue, guilt as a theological problem. Whether guilt is a nec-
I found myself downright puzzled. If I understand essary part of the human condition is a very interesting
him correctly, he is arguing that we should bring the point—perhaps related to original sin as the theologians
concept of sin into psychotherapy for three reasons. would have it, or to incest fantasies as Freud would
say—but in the clinic we are dealing with excessive
That, come to think of it, we are all sinners and the guilt. This guilt is poisonous, corrosive guilt which
sooner we admit this elementary truth, the better off we destroys the patient's soul, leads him to suicide,
will be. murder, self-destruction, and the placing of the world's
The idea of the feeling of guilt being a neurotic phenom-
sins on his more or less innocent shoulders. No better
enon is fallacious (the analysts may believe so but they are
on the way out anyway). It is not a displacement of in- term exists for this phenomenon than sickness—sick-
fantile conflicts into the present, but a realistic appraisal of ness of the mind, perhaps, but sickness none the less.
our sinful condition. GOODHUK LIVINGSTON
Bringing the idea of "sin" into the picture has a tactical Seattle, Washington
advantage. Since the psychiatrists have mislaid the term
somewhere, bringing it back puts us one up on them. This 0. Hobart Mowrer's article on " S i n " . . . is a re-
apparently is putting "sin" to good use. Since we cannot markable contribution in many respects. One could
get rid of it, let us use it. comment on many aspects of this impassioned plea for
irrationality, but it seems prudent not to. It was
For my own part, I would like to differ fairly common to misinterpret Freud's discoveries in the early
strongly with the first and second of these two points. days of psychoanalysis; it is regrettable that it occurs
The idea that man is a sinful animal has a long and in 1960 and from the pen of a distinguished psychol-
illustrious history. Judeo-Christian theology is sat- ogist. Perhaps all this follows from Mowrer's pessim-
urated with it and puts the blame on the shoulders of istic premise that "psychoanalysis, on which modern
Adam and Eve—the prototypes of all parents. 'dynamic' psychiatry is largely based, is in a state of
Clinical practice confirms this. It is no novelty to virtual collapse and imminent demise." This view un-
say that the average patient suffers from a sense of doubtedly reflects much wishful thinking, but it would
guilt. With some it is a focal point in their symptoms. be instructive to know more about Mowrer's sources of
With others it is somewhere in the background. Freud information.
would probably say that the existence of some guilt It is really quite beside the point whether Freud's
develops almost automatically from the structure of discoveries had the incidental effect of forcing the
the home. All children wish to do things they are not medical profession which had ignored his work to take
allowed to do—sexual or otherwise. So they all feel note of it. The rules of scientific evidence are also
somewhat guilty. given a somewhat novel twist in citing Katie Lee's
But granting the fact that guilt, for whatever reason, 12-inch LP recording "Songs of Couch and Consulta-
is part and parcel of the human psyche, what is the tion." What is important, among other things, is
story on excessive guilt? We are all familiar with in- Mowrer's persistent and egregious misinterpretation of
dividuals who, leading outwardly blameless lives, tor- Freud's conception of neurosis.
ture themselves constantly with accusations of sin. It should hardly be necessary to point out that one
Indeed, they cannot leave themselves alone, but con- of the central ingredients of this conception is that the
stantly flagellate themselves for sins which the rest of neurotic patient suffers from unconscious conflicts. Un-
us (lacking much character, perhaps) tolerate more or conscious means just that: important strivings, the
less and go about our business. defenses used against them, and the constellations
It is true that treating such individuals as real sinners which gave rise to them in the first place are not acces-