[G.R. No. 161414.

January 17, 2005] no person has been appointed, elected or qualified to

CAMID vs. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT serve any of the elective local government positions of
Andong.[14]
FACTS:
 Has its own high school, Bureau of Posts, a Department of
Pelaez v. Auditor General[2] in 1965
Education, Culture and Sports office, and at least seventeen
 President Diosdado Macapagal issued several Executive (17) barangay units with their own respective chairmen.[15]
Orders[3] creating thirty-three (33) municipalities in Mindanao.
 From 1964 until 1972, according to Camid, the public
Among them was Andong in Lanao del Sur which was officials of Andong have been serving their constituents
created by virtue of Executive Order No. 107.[4]
through the minimal means and resources and has allegedly
 These executive orders were issued after legislative bills for been getting by despite the absence of public funds
the creation of municipalities involved in that case had failed  Camid presents a Certification issued by the CENRO
to pass Congress.[5]
certifying the total land area of the Municipality of Andong,
 President Diosdado Macapagal justified the creation of these created under Executive Order No. 107 issued [last] October
municipalities citing his powers under Section 68 of the 1, 1964.[17]
Revised Administrative Code.  Certification issued by the Provincial Statistics Office of
 Then Vice-President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a special civil Marawi City concerning the population of Andong, which is
action for a writ of prohibition, alleging in main that the pegged at fourteen thousand fifty nine (14,059) strong.
Executive Orders were null and void, Section 68 having been Petition assails a Certification issued by DILG enumerating eighteen
repealed by Republic Act No. 2370,[6] and said orders (18) municipalities certified as existing, per DILG records. Notably,
constituting an undue delegation of legislative power. these eighteen (18) municipalities are among the thirty-three (33),
 The Court unanimously held that the challenged Executive along with Andong, whose creations were voided by this Court
Orders were null and void. in Pelaez.

 Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code did not meet Camid imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DILG in
the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of not classifying [Andong] as a regular existing municipality and in not
legislative power to the executive branch,[8] while three including said municipality in its records and official database as [an]
justices opined that the nullity of the issuances was the existing regular municipality.
consequence of the enactment of the 1935 Constitution, Camid insists on the continuing validity of Executive Order No. 107.
which reduced the power of the Chief Executive over local He argues that Pelaez has already been modified by supervening
governments. events consisting of subsequent laws and jurisprudence. Particularly
Petitioner Sultan Osop B. Camid (Camid) represents himself as a cited is our Decision in Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon.
current resident of Andong, Mendez,[23] wherein the Court affirmed the unique status of the
municipality of San Andres in Quezon as a de facto municipal
 He alleges that Andong has metamorphosed into a full-blown corporation.[24] Similar to Andong, the municipality of San Andres
municipality with a complete set of officials appointed to was created by way of executive order, precisely the manner which
handle essential services for the municipality and its the Court in Pelaez had declared as unconstitutional.
constituents,[13] even though he concedes that since 1968, Moreover, San Narciso cited, as Camid does, Section 442(d) of the
Local Government Code of 1991 as basis for the current Executive Order No. 107, which established Andong, was
recognition of the impugned municipality. declared null and void ab initio in 1965 by this Court in Pelaez,
along with thirty-three (33) other executive orders.
It has been opined that municipal corporations may exist by
prescription where it is shown that the community has claimed and The phrase ab initio means from the beginning,[30] at
exercised corporate functions, with the knowledge and acquiescence first,[31] from the inception.[32] Pelaez was never reversed by this
of the legislature, and without interruption or objection for period long Court but rather it was expressly affirmed in the cases
enough to afford title by prescription.[26] of Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva,[33]Municipality of
Malabang v. Benito,[34] and Municipality of Kapalong v. Moya.[35]
What is clearly essential is a factual demonstration of the continuous
exercise by the municipal corporation of its corporate powers, as well No subsequent ruling by this Court declared Pelaez as overturned or
as the acquiescence thereto by the other instrumentalities of the inoperative. No subsequent legislation has been passed since 1965
state. creating a Municipality of Andong.
 Camids plaint should have undergone the usual Pelaez Ruling
administrative gauntlet and, once that was done, should
President was then, and still is, not empowered to create
have been filed first with the Court of Appeals, which at least
municipalities through executive issuances.
would have had the power to make the necessary factual
determinations. Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva.[37]
The assailed issuance is the Certification issued by the DILG. But The Court reasoned without elaboration that the issue had already
such Certification does not pretend to bear the authority to create or been squarely taken up and settled in Pelaez which agreed with the
revalidate a municipality. Certainly, the annulment of the Certification argument posed by the challengers to Lawigans validity.[38]
will really do nothing to serve Camids ultimate cause the recognition
of Andong. Neither does the Certification even expressly refute the Municipality of Malabang v. Benito
claim that Andong still exists, as there is nothing in the document that The Court refused to acknowledge Balabagan as a de
comments on the present status of Andong. facto corporation, even though it had been organized prior to the
ISSUE: Courts decision in Pelaez. The Courts final conclusion was
unequivocal that Balabagan was not a de facto corporation.
Whether a municipality whose creation by executive fiat was
previously voided by this Court may attain recognition in the absence Municipality of Kapalong v. Moya. Now then, as ruled in the
of any curative or reimplementing statute. Pelaez case supra, the President has no power to create a
municipality. Since [Santo Tomas] has no legal personality, it can not
Apparently, the question has never been decided before, San be a party to any civil action.[48]
Narciso and its kindred cases pertaining as they did to municipalities
whose bases of creation were dubious yet were never judicially Municipality of San Narciso,
nullified.
 It noted a circumstance which is not present in the case at
The Court points out that the Municipality of Andong never barthat San Andres was in existence for nearly thirty (30)
existed.[29] years before its legality was challenged. The Court did not
declare the executive order creating San Andres null and
void.
  Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that The de facto status of such municipalities as San Andres, Alicia and
municipal districts "organized pursuant to presidential issuances or Sinacaban was recognized by this Court, and Section 442(b) of the
executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective Local Government Code deemed curative whatever legal defects to
municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of title these municipalities had labored under.
(the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular
municipalities." Is Andong similarly entitled to recognition as a de
facto municipal corporation? IT IS NOT.
 No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Section 442(d) of the
Local Government Code is preferred. It is doubtful whether such a  Differences between Andong and municipalities such as San
pretext, even if made, would succeed. The power to create Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban.
political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress
did just that when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the  EO creating Andong was expressly annulled by order of this
Code. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and Court in 1965.
aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid
under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with,"  Andong does not meet the requisites set forth by Section
are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual 442(d) of the Local Government Code.
qualification against impairment of vested rights. (Emphasis o In order that the municipality created by executive order
supplied)[55] may receive recognition, they must have their respective
set of elective municipal officials holding office at the
The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a time of the effectivity of [the Local Government] Code.
municipal corporation is the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General that the
creation of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative matter and o Camid admits that Andong has never elected its
therefore the President was without power to create by executive order the municipal officers at all.[60]
Municipality of Sinacaban. Above all, it was held that whatever doubt there  The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence
might be as to the de jure character of the municipality must be deemed to of elections in the municipality in the last four decades are
have been put to rest by the Local Government Code of 1991 (R. A. No. eloquent indicia of the non-recognition by the State of the
7160), 442(d) of which provides that "municipal districts organized existence of the town.
pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their
respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution: Andong is not listed
effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular therein as among the municipalities of Lanao del Sur, or of any other
municipalities." province for that matter.
How about the eighteen (18) municipalities similarly nullified
Pelaez and its offspring cases ruled that the President has no power in Pelaez but certified as existing in the
to create municipalities, yet limited its nullificatory effects to the DILG Certification presented by Camid? The petition fails to
particular municipalities challenged in actual cases before this Court. mention that subsequent to the ruling in Pelaez, legislation was
However, with the promulgation of the Local Government Code in enacted to reconstitute these municipalities.
1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the municipalities similarly Andong has not been similarly reestablished through statute. Clearly
created by executive order but not judicially annulled. then, the fact that there are valid organic statutes passed by
legislation recreating these eighteen (18) municipalities is sufficient
legal basis to accord a different legal treatment to Andong as against
these eighteen (18) other municipalities.
We thus assert the proper purview to Section 442(d) of the Local
Government Codethat it does not serve to affirm or reconstitute the
judicially dissolved municipalities such as Andong, which had been
previously created by presidential issuances or executive orders.
The provision affirms the legal personalities only of those
municipalities such as San Narciso, Alicia, and Sinacaban,
which may have been created using the same infirm legal basis,
yet were fortunate enough not to have been judicially annulled.
On the other hand, the municipalities judicially dissolved in cases
such as Pelaez, San Joaquin, and Malabang, remain inexistent,
unless recreated through specific legislative enactments,
The legal effect of the nullification of Andong in Pelaez was to revert
the constituent barrios of the voided town back into their
original municipalities, namely the municipalities of Lumbatan,
Butig and Tubaran.[67] These three municipalities subsist to this day
as part of Lanao del Sur,[68] and presumably continue to exercise
corporate powers over the barrios which once belonged to Andong.
If there is truly a strong impulse calling for the reconstitution of
Andong, the solution is through the legislature and not judicial
confirmation of void title.
Petition is DISMISSED.