Rule 66 Quo Warranto

Municipality of San Narciso vs. Mendez (1994)

Facts:

20 Aug 1959 Pres. C.P Garcia issued EO No. 353 creating the municipal
district of San Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the municipality of San
Narciso of the same province, the barrios of San Andres, Mangero, etc. along
w/ their respective sitios.
o EO 353 issued upon the request of the municipal council of San Narciso
in its Res. No. 8 of 24 May 1959.
05 Oct 1965 By virtue of EO No. 174 issued by Pres. Diosdado Macapagal,
municipal district of San Andres was later officially recognized to have gained
the status of a 5th class municipality beginning 01 July 1963 by operation of
Sec 2 of RA 1515.
05 June 1989 the Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo
warranto w/ the RTC in Gumaca, Quezon, against the officials of the Mun. of
San Andres.
o Petition sought declaration of nullity of EO No. 353 & prayed that
respondent local officials be permanently ordered to refrain from
performing the duties & functions of their respective offices.
o As per Pelaez v. Auditor General, municipality contended that EO No.
353 was a clear usurpation of the inherent powers of the legislature &
in violation of the constitutional principle of SOP.
Respondents asked for dismissal of the petition
o petitioner deemed estopped from questioning the creation of the new
municipality;
o because Municipality had existed since 1959, its corporate personality
could no longer be assailed; and
o ptr municipality was not the proper party to bring the action, that
prerogative being reserved to the State acting through the SolGen.
TC resolved to defer action on the MTD & to deny a judgment on the
pleadings.
Municipality of San Andres filed anew a MTD alleging the case had become
moot & academic w/ the enactment of RA No. 7160 (Local Government Code
of 1991).
Sec. 442.

Requisites for Creation. . . .

(d)
Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this
Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal
districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive
orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal
officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall
henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.
o

Motion opposed by petitioner: above provision inapplicable to the

Municipality of San Andres since the enactment referred to legally

existing municipalities, not to those whose mode of creation had been

void ab initio.
Order of 02 Dec 1991 LC finally dismissed petition for lack of CoA on a
matter that belonged to the State
o "whatever defects (were) present in the creation of municipal districts
by the President pursuant to presidential issuances & EOs, (were)
cured by the enactment of R.A. 7160
o Petitioner municipality's MR denied.
SC: petition for review on certiorari"

Issue: WON the lower court "acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of or in excess of jurisdiction" - NO
Ratio:
SC: Petitioners consider the instant petition to be one for "review on certiorari"
under R42 & 45 of the RoC; at the same time, however, they question the orders of
the lower court for having been issued with "GAD amounting to lack of or in excess
of jurisdiction, & that there is no other plain, speedy & adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law available to petitioners to correct said Orders, to protect their
rights & to secure a final and definitive interpretation of the legal issues involved."
Evidently, then, the petitioners intend to submit their case in this instance under
Rule 65. We shall disregard the procedural incongruence.

The special civil action of quo warranto is a "prerogative writ by which the
Government can call upon any person to show by what warrant he holds a
public office or exercises a public franchise." When the inquiry is focused on
the legal existence of a body politic, the action is reserved to the State in a
proceeding for quo warranto or any other credit proceeding. It must be
brought "in the name of the Republic of the Philippines" and commenced by
the Sol Gen or the fiscal "when directed by the President of the
Philippines . . . ." Such officers may, under certain circumstances, bring such
an action "at the request and upon the relation of another person" with the
permission of the court.

The RoC also allows an individual to commence an action for quo warranto in
his own name but this initiative can be done when he claims to be "entitled to
a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another."
While the quo warranto proceedings filed has so named only the officials of
the Municipality of San Andres as respondents, it is virtually, however, a
denunciation of the authority of the Municipality or Municipal District of San
Andres to exist and to act in that capacity.

EO No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20
Aug 1959 but it was only after 30 years that the municipality of San Narciso
finally decided to challenge the legality of the EO. In the meantime, the
Municipal District, & later the Municipality of San Andres, began & continued
to exercise the powers & authority of a duly created LGU. In the same manner
that the failure of a public officer to question his ouster or the right of another

to hold a position within a 1-year period can abrogate an action belatedly

filed, so also, if not indeed w/ greatest imperativeness, must a quo warranto
proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political subdivision be timely
raised. Public interest demands it.

All doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled.

Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 Oct 1986) apportioning the seats of the
House of Rep, the Municipality of San Andres has been considered to be 1 of
the 12 municipalities composing the 3 rd District of Quezon. Equally significant
is Sec 442(d) of the LGC to the effect that municipal districts "organized
pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders & w/c have their
respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the
effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular
municipalities." No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Sec 442(d) of
the LGC is proferred. The power to create political subdivisions is a function of
the legislature. Congress did just that when it incorporated Sec 442(d) in the
Code. Curative laws, w/c in essence are retrospective, & aimed at giving
"validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if
existing laws have been complied w/," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction,
subj to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights.

Tarrosa vs Singson
This is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner as a "taxpayer," questioning the
appointment of respondent Gabriel Singson as Governor of the Bangko Sentral Ng
Pilipinas for not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The
petition seeks to enjoin respondent Singson from the performance of his functions
as such official until his appointment is confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments and respondent Salvador M. Enriquez, Secretary of Budget and
Management, from disbursing public funds in payment of the salaries and
emoluments of respondent Singson.
Respondent Singson was appointed Governor of the Bangko Sentral by President
Fidel V. Ramos on July 2, 1993, effective on July 6, 1993 (Rollo, p. 10).
Petitioner argues that respondent Singson's appointment is null and void since it
was not submitted for confirmation to the Commission on Appointments. The
petition is anchored on the provisions of Section 6 of R.A. No. 7653, which
established the Bangko Sentral as the Central Monetary Authority of the Philippines.
Section 6, Article II of R.A. No. 7653 provides:
Sec. 6. Composition of the Monetary Board. The powers and functions
of the Bangko Sentral shall be exercised by the Bangko Sentral
Monetary Board, hereafter referred to as the Monetary Board,
composed of seven (7) members appointed by the President of the
Philippines for a term of six (6) years.

The seven (7) members are:

(a) The Governor of the Bangko Sentral, who shall be the Chairman of
the Monetary Board. The Governor of the Bangko Sentral shall be head
of a department and his appointment shall be subject to confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments. Whenever the Governor is
unable to attend a meeting of the Board, he shall designate a Deputy
Governor to act as his alternate: Provided, That in such event, the
Monetary Board shall designate one of its members as acting Chairman
. . . (Emphasis supplied).
In their comment, respondents claim that Congress exceeded its legislative powers
in requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the
appointment of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral. They contend that an
appointment to the said position is not among the appointments which have to be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, citing Section 16 of Article VII of the
Constitution which provides that:
Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by
law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of department, agencies,
commissions, or boards . . . (Emphasis supplied).
Respondents also aver that the Bangko Sentral has its own budget and accordingly,
its budgetary requirements are not subject to the provisions of the General
Appropriations Act.
We dismiss the petition.
The instant petition is in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding as it seeks the
ouster of respondent Singson and alleges that the latter is unlawfully holding or
exercising the powers of Governor of the Bangko Sentral (Cf. Castro v. Del Rosario,
19 SCRA 196 [1967]). Such a special civil action can only be commenced by the
Solicitor General or by a "person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position
unlawfully held or exercised by another" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 66, Sec. 6;
Acosta v. Flor, 5 Phil. 18 [1905]).

In Sevilla v. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 637 (1992), we held that the petitioner
therein, who did not aver that he was entitled to the office of the City Engineer of
Cabanatuan City, could not bring the action for quo warranto to oust the respondent
from said office as a mere usurper.
Likewise in Greene v. Knox, 175 N.Y. 432 (1903), 67 N.E. 910, it was held that the
question of title to an office, which must be resolved in a quo warranto proceeding,
may not be determined in a suit to restrain the payment of salary to the person
holding such office, brought by someone who does not claim to be the one entitled
to occupy the said office.
It is obvious that the instant action was improvidently brought by petitioner. To
uphold the action would encourage every disgruntled citizen to resort to the courts,
thereby causing incalculable mischief and hindrance to the efficient operation of the
governmental machinery (See Roosevelt v. Draper, 7 Abb. Pr. 108, 23 N.Y. 218).
Its capstone having been removed, the whole case of petitioner collapses. Hence,
there is no need to resolve the question of whether the disbursement of public
funds to pay the salaries and emoluments of respondent Singson can be enjoined.
Likewise, the Court refrains from passing upon the constitutionality of Section 6,
R.A. No. 7653 in deference to the principle that bars a judicial inquiry into a
constitutional question unless the resolution thereof is indispensable for the
determination of the case (Fernandez v. Torres, 215 SCRA 489 [1992]).
However for the information of all concerned, we call attention to our decision in
Calderon v. Carale, 208 SCRA 254 (1992), with Justice Isagani A. Cruz dissenting,
where we ruled that Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation powers of the
Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointment of other
government officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of
Article VII of the Constitution.