G.R. No. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424. May 3, 2006.
RANDOLF DAVID, ET AL., petitioner VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET AL., respondents.
Digest by: John T. Lansangan Commented [1]: The case was quite lengthy as it
contained multiple petitions so please excuse me if this
exceeded the 1 page limit.
PONENTE: Sandoval-Gutierrez Jr.
FACTS:
1. February 24, 2006, as the nation was celebrating the 20th anniversary of the Edsa People Power I,
President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency in response to conspiracies that
political opposition has banded together with authoritarians from both extreme left (NDF-CPP-NPA) and
extreme right (military adventurists) in order to bring down the duly constituted Government in May 2004
and to assassinate the president (see Appendix A). That same day, she also issued G.O. No. 5
implementing PP 1017 (see Appendix B).
2. On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and after all
these petitions had been filed, the President lifted PP 1017 via Proclamation No. 1021.
3. On March 7, 2006, oral arguments were held wherein the Solicitor General specified the facts which led to
the proclamation of PP1017 and G.O. No. 5. [Escape of those involved in the Oakwood mutiny, uncovering
bombing plans directed at the PMA, uncovered a live bomb at PMA parade grounds, capture of Lt. San
Juan in a communist safehouse with 2 flash disks containing minutes of meetings between members of the
Magdalo group and NPA, etc.]
4. Petitioners, for their part, cited events that followed after the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 such
as the revocation of rallying permits and dispersal of rallyists by anti-riot police after they did not vacate the
premises following the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration
of Edsa People Power I; Arrest (without warrant) of petitioner, columnist, and UP professor Randolf S. David
and his companion Ronald Llamas, president of the party-list Akbayan; raid of the Daily Tribune in Manila by
the CIDG which confiscated documents and material pertaining to the Saturday issue along with raids of
other similar publications, etc. Following such, 7 petitions (see Appendix C) challenging the constitutionality
of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, 3 of which impleaded President Arroyo as respondent, were filed against the
respondents to which the Solicitor General responded.
ISSUES:
1. W/N PP 1017 is unconstitutional?
2. W/N the warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas and the dispersal of KMU and NAFLU-
KMU members during rallies were valid?
3. W/N the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic?
4. W/N petitioners in G.R. Nos. 171400(ALGI), 171424 (Legarda), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171485 (Escudero et
al.) and 171489 (Cadiz et al.) have legal standing?
5. W/N it is necessary for petitioners to implead President Arroyo as respondent?
RULINGS:
1. The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the
President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. However, provisions found in PP 1017 which gives the
President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all
laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President; and (3) to
impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and
unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President,
in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business
affected with public interest. Likewise, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 constitutional. It is an Order issued by
the President who, acting as Commander-in-Chief, addressed to officers in the AFP to carry out the
provisions of PP 1017. Significantly, it also provides a valid standard — that the military and the police
should take only the "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of
lawless violence." However, "acts of terrorism" found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined and
made punishable by Congress. While "terrorism" has been denounced generally in media, no law has
been enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts, to determine the limits of the AFP's authority
in carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5. Hence, this section of the G.O. has been declared
unconstitutional.
2. Following the discussion in #1, it is evident that the (1) the warrantless arrest of petitioners Randolf S. David
and Ronald Llamas; (2) the dispersal of the rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU
members; (3) the imposition of standards on media or any prior restraint on the press; and (4) the
warrantless search of the Tribune offices and the seizures of some articles for publication and other
materials, are not authorized by the Constitution, the law, and jurisprudence. Not even by the valid
provisions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
3. The Court holds that President Arroyo's issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot
and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to
petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it. As such, the issue at hand is of transcendental
importance and must be resolved to prevent similar events from taking place (see also Fortun v. Macapagal
Arroyo).
4. The Court, using the liberal policy of transcendental importance as a basis, meaning to say that even if
the petitioners have failed to show direct injury the law may relax the standing rules and allow,
taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators to be accorded standing to sue as long as (1)
the cases involve constitutional issues; (2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of
public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious
interest in the validity of the election law in questions; (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing
that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and (5) for legislators,
there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
5. As held by the Court, “it is a doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the
Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can
be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any
form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official
duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch
and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed
upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does not
mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the
people but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment.”
Appendix A:
“NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the
Philippine Constitution which states that: "The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary,...may call out (the)
armed forces to prevent or suppress...rebellion...," and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or
suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all
the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as
provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.”
Appendix B:
“NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO , by virtue of the powers vested in me under the
Constitution as President of the Republic of the Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of the
Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and
lawless violence in the country;”
Appendix C:
1. In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches
on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the
imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of
assembly.
2. In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. challenged the CIDG's
act of raiding the Daily Tribune oces as a clear case of "censorship" or "prior restraint." They also claimed that the
term "emergency" refers only to tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and similar occurrences, hence, there is "absolutely no
emergency" that warrants the issuance of PP 1017.
3. In G.R. No. 171485, petitioners herein are Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, and twenty one (21)
other members of the House of Representatives, including Representatives Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro
Casiño, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador. They asserted that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitute "usurpation of
legislative powers"; "violation of freedom of expression" and "a declaration of martial law." They alleged that
President Arroyo "gravely abused her discretion in calling out the armed forces without clear and verifiable factual
basis of the possibility of lawless violence and a showing that there is necessity to do so."
4. In G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU, NAFLU-KMU, and their members averred that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
are unconstitutional because (1) they arrogate unto President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees; (2) their
issuance was without factual basis; and (3) they violate freedom of expression and the right of the people to
peaceably assemble to redress their grievances.
5. In G.R. No. 171400, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc. (ALGI) alleged that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
unconstitutional because they violate (a) Section 4 15 of Article II, (b) Sections 1, 16 2, 17 and 4 18 of Article III, (c)
Section 23 19 of Article VI, and (d) Section 17 20 of Article XII of the Constitution.
6. In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz et al., alleged that PP 1017 is an "arbitrary and unlawful
exercise by the President of her Martial Law powers." And assuming that PP 1017 is not really a declaration of
Martial Law, petitioners argued that "it amounts to an exercise by the President of emergency powers without
congressional approval." In addition, petitioners asserted that PP 1017 "goes beyond the nature and function of a
proclamation as defined under the Revised Administrative Code."
7. And lastly, in G.R. No. 171424, petitioner Loren B. Legarda maintained that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
"unconstitutional for being violative of the freedom of expression, including its cognate rights such as freedom of the
press and the right to access to information on matters of public concern, all guaranteed under Article III, Section 4 of
the 1987 Constitution." In this regard, she stated that these issuances prevented her from fully prosecuting her
election protest pending before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
