PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GR No.
190293, 2012-03-20
Facts:
On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family, gunned down and buried under
shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a highway in Maguindanao. In response to this carnage, on
November 24 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1946, declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao,
Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent and suppress similar lawless violence in Central Mindanao.
Believing that she needed greater authority to put order in Maguindanao and secure it from large groups of persons that
have taken up arms against the constituted authorities in the province, on December 4, 2009 President Arroyo issued
Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring... martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in that
province except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session, convened pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to
review the validity of the President's action. But, two days later or on December 12 before Congress could act, the
President issued Presidential
Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao.
Issues:
constitutionality of a presidential proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus in 2009 in a
province in Mindanao which were withdrawn after just eight days.
Ruling:
It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to
proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially,
but in a sense jointly... since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can
maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have.
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own
review powers, which is... automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the
Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the
President's proclamation of martial law or... suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands
of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.
Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which had in fact convened, could
act on the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court has nothing to review. The
lifting of martial law and... restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening event
that obliterated any justiciable controversy
Principles:
Fortun vs. Macapagal-Arroyo
Facts:
On 24 November 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre, then Pres. Arroyo issued Proclamation
1946, declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City. Believing that
she needed greater authority to put order in Maguindanao, on December 4, 2009 President Arroyo
issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in that province. On December 6, she submitted her report to Congress. On December 9,
the Congress, in joint session, convened to review the validity of the President's action. But, two days
later or on December 12 before Congress could act, the President issued Presidential Proclamation
1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao.
Petitioners brought the present action to challenge the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959.
Issue:
Is there a need for the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in this case, considering the same
were lifted within a few days after being issued and thus Congress was not able to affirm or maintain the
same based on its own evaluation?
Held:
The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is not unavoidable for two reasons:
One. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus before the joint houses of Congress could fulfill their automatic duty to review and
validate or invalidate the same. Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution state:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in- Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may,
for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty- eight hours from the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a
report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension,
which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty- four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any need of a call.
Although the above vests in the President the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, he shares such power with the Congress. Thus:
1. The Presidents proclamation or suspension is temporary, good for only 60 days;
2. He must, within 48 hours of the proclamation or suspension, report his action in person or in writing
to Congress;
3. Both houses of Congress, if not in session must jointly convene within 24 hours of the proclamation or
suspension for the purpose of reviewing its validity; and
4. The Congress, voting jointly, may revoke or affirm the Presidents proclamation or suspension, allow
their limited effectivity to lapse, or extend the same if Congress deems warranted.
It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising
the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise
the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the
proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation
of the situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have.
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the
Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated.
Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should
the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the Presidents proclamation
of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of
Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.
Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which had in
fact convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have
become moot and the Court has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and restoration of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any
justiciable controversy.
Two. Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus in just eight days, they have not been meaningfully implemented. The
military did not take over the operation and control of local government units in Maguindanao. The
President did not issue any law or decree affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be enacted by
Congress. No indiscriminate mass arrest had been reported. Those who were arrested during the period
were either released or promptly charged in court. Indeed, no petition for habeas corpus had been filed
with the Court respecting arrests made in those eight days. The point is that the President intended by
her action to address an uprising in a relatively small and sparsely populated province. In her judgment,
the rebellion was localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face of a determined and amply armed
government presence.
In a real sense, the proclamation and the suspension never took off. The Congress itself adjourned
without touching the matter, it having become moot and academic.
The Court has in exceptional cases passed upon issues that ordinarily would have been regarded as
moot. But the present cases do not present sufficient basis for the exercise of the power of judicial
review. (Fortun vs Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012)
