EN BANC

[G.R. No. 116183. October 6, 1995.]

SEC. RICARDO T. GLORIA, in his capacity as Secretary of Education,

Culture & Sports and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the
Philippine State College of Aeronautics (PSCA); JULIAN J. LOLENG,
JR., in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge of PSCA; and BOARD OF
TRUSTEES of PSCA, petitioners, vs. HON. SALVADOR P. DE GUZMAN,
JR., Presiding Judge of Branch 113, Regional Trial Court of Pasay,
Metro Manila; VIRGILIO R. RAMOS, LEONY P. SENDIN, ROSARIO V.
CERILLO, ANDREA A. PESTANO, ARTHUR V. RODRIGUEZA, LENI V.
DIMAYUGA, JAIME ABON, RIZALDO O. VALLE, JOIE ARCEO, SHIRLEY
PESTANO, SERVANDO SACUEZA, JAIME C. PONEGAL, EDGARDO
MERCADO, CRISTINA BULADO, BENIGNO T. AQUINO, RODEL
PESTANO, JUN JAY PARMA, NILO B. ELLO, and NELSON SACUEZA,
respondents. LLjur

The Solicitor General for petitioners.

Cristino C. Abasolo, Jr. for private respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC OFFICERS; MERE

DESIGNATION DOES NOT CONFER UPON THE DESIGNEE SECURITY OF TENURE TO A
POSITION HELD IN ACTING CAPACITY ONLY. — The judgment of respondent Judge
Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr. which orders the reinstatement of Ms. Rosario V. Cerillo to
the position of "Coordinator for Extension Services" is patently improper because it
nds no support as to facts and the law. Respondent Cerillo, although temporarily
extended an appointment as Board Secretary II, was dismissed therefrom because of
loss of con dence. This dismissal was neither contested nor appealed from by Ms.
Cerillo. There is no question, therefore, that her dismissal as Board Secretary II could
not have been the subject of the petition for mandamus and reinstatement led before
respondent Judge. The fact is that private respondent's assignment as "Coordinator for
Extension Services" was a mere designation. Not being a permanent appointment, the
designation of the position cannot be the subject of a case for reinstatement.
Furthermore, even granting that Ms. Cerillo could be validly reinstated as "Coordinator
for Extension Services," her reinstatement thereto would not be possible because the
position is not provided for in the PSCA plantilla. The PSCA could not have made any
valid appointment for this inexistent position. This could very well be the reason why
she was merely designated as Coordinator. As a mere designee, she could not have
acquired any right to the position even if the position existed. At any rate, a mere
"designation" does not confer upon the designee security of tenure in the position or
office which he occupies in an acting capacity only.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REAPPOINTMENT; CANNOT BE COMPELLED AGAINST
APPOINTING AUTHORITY; CASE AT BAR. — The fact that private respondent Cerillo
passed the requisite Civil Service Examination after the termination of her temporary
appointment is no reason to compel petitioners to reappoint her. Acquisition of civil
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 service eligibility is not the sole factor for reappointment. Still to be considered by the
appointing authority are: performance, degree of education, work experience, training,
seniority, and, more importantly, as in this case, whether or not the applicant enjoys the
con dence and trust of the appointing power. As We said earlier, the position of Board
Secretary II, by its nature, is primarily con dential, requiring as it does "not only
con dence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the of ce but primarily
close intimacy which ensures freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust
or con dential matters of state." In other words, the choice of an appointee from
among those who possessed the required quali cations is a political and
administrative decision calling for considerations of wisdom, convenience, utility and
the interests of the service which can best be made by the Head of the of ce
concerned.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DISCRETIONARY; WRIT OF MANDAMUS; NOT APPLICABLE.
— We hold that reappointment to the position of Board Secretary II is an act which is
discretionary on the part of the appointing power. Consequently, it cannot be the
subject of an application for a writ of mandamus. Reinstatement is technically issuance
of a new appointment which is essentially discretionary, to be performed by the of cer
in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the
appointee should possess the quali cations required by law. Such exercise of the
discretionary power of appointment cannot be controlled, not even by the Court as long
as it is exercised properly by the appointing authority. It is Our holding that the
questioned order of reinstatement amounts to an undue interference by the Court in the
exercise of the discretionary power of appointment vested in the PSCA Board of
Trustees. Surprisingly, the Court a quo, while upholding the right of private respondent
Cerillo to a reappointment, adhered to his ponti cation by stating that: "The
appointment of the petitioners to their former positions is not a matter of right; rather,
it is a matter of discretion on the part of the respondents. Mandamus cannot be availed
of to compel anyone to exercise his discretion absent any showing of grave abuse of
discretion."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION TASKED TO PROMULGATE
POLICIES, STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR THE CIVIL SERVICE. — It cannot be
overemphasized that the PSCA Board Resolution No. 91-026 must yield to the Civil
Service Commission policies on the issuance of temporary appointments. When the
Civil Service Commission directed that temporary appointments were to be effective
only up to 1992, it did so in pursuance of the general purpose of the civil service law, as
stated under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2260, as amended, which is "to ensure and
promote the constitutional mandate regarding appointments only according to merit
and tness and to provide within the public service a progressive system of personal
administration to ensure the maintenance of an honest and ef cient progressive and
courteous civil service in the Philippines. For that matter, it is vested with the function,
among others, to promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for the civil service and
adopt plans and programs to promote economical, ef cient and effective personnel
administration in the government.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT; EXPIRATION OF TERM NOT
ILLEGAL DISMISSAL. — The termination of the services of private respondents was
proper and legal, it being the consequence of the Board of Trustees' power to appoint.
The view of respondent Judge, however, is that there was no termination ordered.
Either the employees' contracts lapsed or their temporary appointments were
abrogated by circulars from the Civil Service Commission. This, as a necessary
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 consequence of the transition from the Philippine Air Force College of Aeronautics
(PAFCA) to the Philippine State College of Aeronautic (PSCA). We agree with
respondent Judge's disquisition on this point: "To the question was the termination of
the services of the petitioners legal or not?, the only answer is there was not
termination to speak of. Termination presupposes an overt act committed by a
superior of cer. There was none whatsoever in the case at bar. At most, Col. Julian
(Loleng) gave notice to the petitioners of the expiration of their respective contracts.
Petitioners, appointment or employment simply expired either by its very own terms, or
because it may not exceed one year, but most importantly because the PAFCA was
dissolved and replaced by the PSCA. The notice given by Col. Loleng to the petitioners
seem to have been misunderstood by them as an act of dismissal which as they
correctly state, belongs to the Board of Trustees alone."
6. REMEDIAL LAW; JUDGMENT; AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES MUST BE
JUSTIFIED. — Considering Our nding that there is merit to the petition, the issue as to
whether attorney's fees and costs of litigation should be awarded to private
respondent Rosario V. Cerillo as adjudged in the questioned decision of respondent
Judge has become moot and academic. At any rate, the Court holds that the said award
could not have been imposed because, while it was directly ordered in the dispositive
portion of the decision, it was neither discussed nor justi ed in the body of the
questioned decision. Clear on this point is Our decision in Policarpio vs. Court of
Appeals, 194 SCRA 129, 742 [1991]: "The Court had occasion to state that the reason
for the award of attorney's fees must be stated in the text of the decision, otherwise, if
it is stated only in the dispositive portion of the decision, the same shall be disallowed."
This ruling We reiterated in the case of Koa vs. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 541, 549
[1993], citing Central Azucarera de Bais vs. Court of Appeals, 188 SCRA 328, 340,
where it was stated that "The award of attorney's fees must be disallowed for want of
factual and legal premise in the text of the decision rendered by the court of origin and
the appellate court as well." cdlex

DECISION

HERMOSISIMA, JR. , J : p

Intransigence of private respondents in maintaining a patently indefensible

position sparked this long drawn out controversy. Knowing fully well that, as temporary
employees whose terms of of ce, whether by contract or by the tenor of their
appointments, had expired one year after their respective temporary appointments, that
is, on December 31, 1992, they insist on a perceived, albeit mistaken, right to
reinstatement.
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari, led by Hon. Ricardo T. Gloria, in his
capacity as Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) and as Chairman of the
Board of Trustees of the Philippine State College of Aeronautics (PSCA); Col. Julian J.
Loleng, Jr., in his capacity as Of cer-in-Charge of the PSCA; and the Board of Trustees
of the PSCA 1 , under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, with the end in view of nullifying
the Decision 2 and Order 3 of respondent Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr., Presiding
Judge of Branch 113, Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, dated January 31, 1994 and
June 29, 1994, respectively. LexLibris

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 Questioned in effect by the petitioners is only the portion of the judgment
ordering the reinstatement of private respondent Rosario V. Cerillo to the position of
"Coordinator for Extension Services."
Actually, the act of effecting the termination of the appointment of Rosario V.
Cerillo was perpetrated by Col. Julian J. Loleng, Jr. while it was the Hon. Isidro Cariño
who was the DECS Secretary. The case for reinstatement which was led before
respondent Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr. of the Pasay City Regional Trial Court was
instituted during the incumbency of the succeeding DECS Secretary, the Hon. Armand
Fabella. The judgment of the lower court, as a matter of fact, involved the Hon. Armand
Fabella as defendant. In view of the resignation of Secretary Fabella, the duty and
obligation to question the decision aforesaid of Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr.
devolved on the incumbent Secretary, the Hon. Ricardo T. Gloria.
Consequently, the dramatis personae in this case include: DECS Secretary
Ricardo T. Gloria; PSCA Board of Trustees Chairman Col. Julian J. Loleng, Jr.; and the
PSCA Board of Trustees created under Republic Act No. 7605, as petitioners; and RTC
Executive Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr., as public respondent, and the named
private respondents who were the petitioners in the court below.
The facts of the case are not in dispute. The question at issue is one of law: Is
private respondent Rosario V. Cerillo entitled to reinstatement to the position of
"Coordinator for Extension Services"?
Private respondents were employees of the Philippine Air Force College of
Aeronautics (PAFCA) which was created by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1078 on
January 26, 1977. Under the said decree, the Board of Trustees is vested with authority,
among others, to appoint, as it did appoint, of cials and employees of the college,
except the members of the Board of Trustees themselves and the President of the
college. In line with this authority, the PAFCA Board of Trustees issued Resolution No.
91-026 on April 1, 1991, which declared that "All faculty/administrative employees are
also subject to the required civil service eligibilities," in accordance with pertinent civil
service law, rules and regulations. Thus, herein private respondents were issued only
temporary appointments because at the time of their appointment, they lacked
appropriate civil service eligibilities or otherwise failed to meet the necessary
qualification standards for their respective positions.
Private respondent Rosario V. Cerillo, speci cally, was issued a one-year
temporary appointment to the position of Board Secretary II of PAFCA (now PSCA),
that is, from January 1, 1992 to December 31, 1992. This appointment went along the
line enunciated by the Civil Service Commission in a letter, dated March 25, 1992. 4 The
letter emphasized that temporary appointments were good and renewable only up to
1992. cdlex

On March 24, 1992, private respondent Rosario V. Cerillo was relieved as Board
Secretary of the PAFCA in accordance with Board Resolution No. 92-017 by reason of
loss of con dence. Subsequently, however, she was designated as "Coordinator for
Extension Services."
On June 3, 1992, Republic Act No. 7605 was enacted into law. It converted
PAFCA into a state college to be known as the Philippine State College of Aeronautics
(PSCA). The Board of Trustees likewise was the governing body of the PSCA. The
power to make appointments was retained by the Board. Petitioner Col. Julian J.
Loleng, Jr. remained as Of cer-in-Charge by virtue of a designation made anew by then
DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño on June 8, 1992.
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 Only on December 7, 1992 did Col. Loleng inform private respondents that they
shall be deemed separated from the service upon the expiration of their temporary
appointments. Had private respondent Rosario V. Cerillo not been summarily
dismissed as Board Secretary on March 24, 1992, her temporary appointment as such
was supposed to have lasted until December 31, 1992.
On June 25, 1993, barely ve months after the lapse of the terms of their
temporary appointments as determined by the PSCA administration, the herein private
respondents led before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, presided over by
respondent Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr., a "Petition for Mandamus and
Reinstatement, with Back Wages and Damages," docketed as Civil Case No. 10049. The
complaint in effect prayed that then DECS Secretary Armand Fabella complete the
lling up of positions for Board of Trustees and order the Board of Trustees to
reinstate the respondents in the case at bench to their respective positions.
In their Answer, 5 the herein petitioners opposed the petition upon the ground
that mandamus will not lie to compel reinstatement because the reappointment prayed
for is discretionary on the part of the appointing power. Besides, it was the claim of
Secretary Fabella that a writ of mandamus should be unavailing to private respondents
because of their failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
We find the petition to be impressed with merit.
I
The judgment of respondent Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr. which orders the
reinstatement of Ms. Rosario V. Cerillo to the position of "Coordinator for Extension
Services" is patently improper because it nds no support as to facts and the law.
Respondent Cerillo, although temporarily extended an appointment as Board Secretary
II, was dismissed therefrom because of loss of con dence. This dismissal was neither
contested nor appealed from by Ms. Cerillo. There is no question, therefore, that her
dismissal as Board Secretary II could not have been the subject of the petition for
mandamus and reinstatement led before respondent Judge. The fact is that private
respondent's assignment as "Coordinator for Extension Services" was a mere
designation. Not being a permanent appointment, the designation to the position
cannot be the subject of a case for reinstatement.
Furthermore, even granting that Ms. Cerillo could be validly reinstated as
"Coordinator for Extension Services," her reinstatement thereto would not be possible
because the position is not provided for in the PSCA plantilla. The PSCA could not have
made any valid appointment for this inexistent position. This could very well be the
reason why she was merely designated as Coordinator. As a mere designee, she could
not have acquired any right to the position even if the position existed.
At any rate, a mere "designation" does not confer upon the designee security of
tenure in the position or office which he occupies in an acting capacity only. 6
II
Should the object of private respondent Cerillo in prosecuting the case in the
court below be her reinstatement to the position of Board Secretary II, the
reinstatement prayed for appears to be impermissible. In the rst place, Ms. Cerillo had
already been dismissed from this position for loss of con dence. She did not contest
this dismissal possibly because the position of Board Secretary II is primarily
con dential and the Board of Trustees, when nding her, the incumbent to the position,
to be wanting in faithfulness and integrity dismissed her for that reason alone. She
accepted the dismissal without any ripple and when designated as Coordinator for
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 Extension Services, she indicated acceptance by performing the acts called for by the
designation.
The quarrel between the private respondents, on the one hand, and the PSCA
administration, on the other, came about in this manner:
The Civil Service Commission, mandating a policy, wrote petitioner Col. Julian J.
Loleng, Jr. a letter 7 mandating that temporary appointments of of cers/employees of
the PSCA were to last only up to December 31, 1992. For a better perspective, We
quote a pertinent portion of the letter:
"xxx xxx xxx

Please note that temporary appointments last only for a maximum of

one (1) year and all personnel appointed in a temporary capacity can be
replaced any time by a civil service eligible. Since you have just been recently
covered by the Civil Service Law and rules, this Field Of ce approved all your
temporary appointments subject to yearly renewal up to 1992 only. Subsequent
appointments should strictly conform with civil service policies. You may,
therefore, advise all your temporary personnel to take civil service examinations
in order to be eligible for appointment."
This letter was implemented by Col. Julian J. Loleng, Jr. Objecting thereto, private
respondents pointed out to the PSCA administration that, in Resolution No. 91-026,
dated April 1, 1991, the Board of Trustees declared that all faculty/administrative
employees of the college, while required to acquire civil service eligibilities under
pertinent civil service law, rules and regulations, must exert effort to acquire civil service
eligibilities within a period of three years from their temporary appointments. This, the
private respondents believe should be taken to mean that, should they acquire civil
service eligibilities within that period of three years, they cannot be terminated from the
service.
The fact that private respondent Cerillo passed the requisite Civil Service
Examination after the termination of her temporary appointment is no reason to
compel petitioners to reappoint her. Acquisition of civil service eligibility is not the sole
factor for reappointment. Still to be considered by the appointing authority are:
performance, degree of education, work experience, training, seniority, and, more
importantly, as in this case, whether or not the applicant enjoys the con dence and
trust of the appointing power. As We said earlier, the position of Board Secretary II, by
its nature, is primarily con dential, requiring as it does "not only con dence in the
aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the of ce but primarily close intimacy which
ensures freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or con dential matters
of state." 8 In other words, the choice of an appointee from among those who
possessed the required quali cations is a political and administrative decision calling
for considerations of wisdom, convenience, utility and the interests of the service which
can best be made by the Head of the office concerned. 9
It cannot be overemphasized that the PSCA Board Resolution No. 91-026 must
yield to the Civil Service Commission policies on the issuance of temporary
appointments. When the Civil Service Commission directed that temporary
appointments were to be effective only up to 1992, it did so in pursuance of the general
purpose of the civil service law, as stated under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2260, as
amended, which is "to ensure and promote the constitutional mandate regarding
appointments only according to merit and tness and to provide within the public
service a progressive system of personnel administration to ensure the maintenance of
an honest and ef cient, progressive and courteous civil service in the Philippines. 10
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 For that matter, it is vested with the function, among others, to promulgate policies,
standards and guidelines for the civil service and adopt plans and programs to
promote economical, ef cient and effective personnel administration in the
government. 11
We hold that reappointment to the position of Board Secretary II is an act which
is discretionary on the part of the appointing power. Consequently, it cannot be the
subject of an application for a writ of mandamus.
Reinstatement is technically issuance of a new appointment which is essentially
discretionary, to be performed by the of cer in which it is vested according to his best
lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the quali cations
required by law. 12 Such exercise of the discretionary power of appointment cannot be
controlled, not even by the Court as long as it is exercised properly by the appointing
authority. 13
It is Our holding that the questioned order of reinstatement amounts to an undue
interference by the Court in the exercise of the discretionary power of appointment
vested in the PSCA Board of Trustees.
Surprisingly, the Court a quo, while upholding the right of private respondent
Cerillo to a reappointment, adhered to this pontification by stating that:
"The appointment of the petitioners to their former positions is not a
matter of right; rather, it is a matter of discretion on the part of the respondents.
Mandamus cannot be availed of to compel anyone to exercise his discretion
absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion."
III
The termination of the services of private respondents was proper and legal, it
being the consequence of the Board of Trustees' power to appoint. The view of
respondent Judge, however, is that there was no termination ordered. Either the
employees' contracts lapsed or their temporary appointments were abrogated by
circulars, from the Civil Service Commission. This, as a necessary consequence of the
transition from the Philippine Air Force College of Aeronautics (PAFCA) to the
Philippine State College of Aeronautics (PSCA).
We agree with respondent Judge's disquisition on this point:
"To the question was the termination of the services of the petitioners
legal or not?, the only answer is there was not termination to speak of.
Termination presupposes an overt act committed by a superior of cer. There
was none whatsoever in the case at bar. At most, Col. Julian (Loleng) gave
notice to the petitioners of the expiration of their perspective contracts.
Petitioners' appointment or employment simply expired either by its very own
terms, or because it may not exceed one year, but most importantly because the
PAFCA was dissolved and replaced by the PSCA. The notice given by Col.
Loleng to the petitioners seem to have been misunderstood by them as an act
of dismissal which as they correctly state, belongs to the Board of Trustees
alone."
IV
Considering Our nding that there is merit to the petition, the issue as to whether
attorney's fees and costs of litigation should be awarded to private respondent Rosario
V. Cerillo as adjudged in the questioned decision of respondent Judge has become
moot and academic. At any rate, the Court holds that the said award could not have
been imposed because, while it was directly ordered in the dispositive portion of the
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 decision, it was neither discussed nor justi ed in the body of the questioned decision.
Clear on this point is Our decision in Policarpio vs. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 129,
742, [1991]: "The Court had occasion to state that the reason for the award of
attorney's fees must be stated in the text of the decision, otherwise, if it is stated only in
the dispositive portion of the decision, the same shall be disallowed." This ruling We
reiterated in the case of Koa vs. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 541, 549, [1993], citing
Central Azucarera de Bais vs. Court of Appeals, 188 SCRA 328, 340, where it was stated
that "The award of attorney's fees must be disallowed for want of factual and legal
premise in the text of the decision rendered by the court of origin and the appellate
court as well." prLL

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision, dated January

31, 1994, insofar as it ordered the reinstatement of Ms. Rosario V. Cerillo and the
payment to the latter of back wages and attorney's fees, and the Order, dated June 29,
1994, of respondent Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr. are hereby declared null and void
and ordered set aside. The temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction
heretofore issued is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J. and Melo, J., are on official leave.
Footnotes
1. Specific names of Members not mentioned.
2. Rollo, page 91.
3. Rollo, page 105.
4. Annex "C."
5. Annex "F."
6. Sevilla vs. C.A., 209 SCRA 637, 642 (1992).
7. Letter dated March 25, 1992.

8. Delos Santos vs. Mallari, 87 Phils. 289, 298 (1950).

9. Abila vs. Civil Service Commission, 198 SCRA 102, 106 (1991).
10. Samson vs. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 654, 658-659 (1986).
11. Sec. 12 (3), Chapter 3, sub-title A, Book V, Executive Order No. 292.
12. Apurillo vs. Civil Service Commission, 227 SCRA 230; Tomali vs. Civil Service
Commission, 238 SCRA 572; Lusterio vs. IAC, 199 SCRA 125.
13. Alim vs. Civil Service Commission, 204 SCRA 510; Sevilla vs. Court of Appeals, 209
SCRA 637.

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