EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-69137. August 5, 1986.]

FELIMON LUEGO , petitioner-appellant, vs. CIVIL SERVICE

COMMISSION and FELICULA TUOZO , respondents-appellees.

Jose Batiquin for petitioner-appellant.

Fausto F. Tugade for private respondent-appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; NOT EMPOWERED

TO DETERMINE THE KIND OR NATURE OF THE APPOINTMENT EXTENDED BY THE
APPOINTING OFFICER. — The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine
the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing o cer, its authority
being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements
of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is quali ed and all the other legal
requirements are satis ed, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. As Justice Ramon C. Fernandez
declared in the case of In Re: Elvira C. Arrega, 89 SCRA 318, 322, "It is well settled that
the determination of the kind of appointment to be extended lies in the o cial vested
by law with the appointing power and not the Civil Service Commission. The
Commissioner of Civil Service is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the
appointment extended by the appointing o cer. When the appointee is quali ed, as in
this case, the Commissioner of Civil Service has no choice but to attest to the
appointment. Under the Civil Service Law, Presidential Decree No. 807, the
Commissioner is not authorized to curtail the discretion of the appointing official on the
nature or kind of the appointment to be extended."
2. ID.; ID.; APPROVAL BY THE COMMISSIONER; AN ATTESTATION OF
COMPLIANCE WITH THE CIVIL SERVICE LAW; PURPOSE. — The approval is more
appropriately called an attestation, that is, of the fact that the appointee is quali ed for
the position to which he has been named. As we have repeatedly held, such attestation
is required of the Commissioner of Civil Service merely as a check to assure
compliance with Civil Service Laws. It is understandable if one is likely to be misled by
the language of Section 9(h) of Article V of the Civil Service Decree because it says the
Commission has the power to "approve" and "disapprove" appointments. Thus, it is
provided therein that the Commission shall have inter alia the power to: "9(h) Approve
all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service,
except those presidential appointees, members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
police forces, remen, and jailguards, and disapprove those where the appointees do
not possess appropriate eligibility or required quali cations ." However, a full reading of
the provision, especially of the underscored parts, will make it clear that all the
Commission is actually allowed to do is check whether or not the appointee possesses
the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required quali cations. If he does, his
appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved. No other criterion is permitted by law
to be employed by the Commission when it acts on — or as the Decrees says,
"approves" or "disapproves" — an appointment made by the proper authorities.
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 3. ID.; CIVIL SERVICE RULES OF PERSONNEL ACTIONS AND POLICIES;
NEXT-IN-RANK, NOT ABSOLUTE. — In preferring the private respondent to the
petitioner, the Commission was probably applying its own Rule V, Section 9, of Civil
Service Rules on Personnel Actions and Policies, which provides that "whenever there
are two or more employees who are next-in-rank, preference shall be given to the
employee who is most competent and quali ed and who has the appropriate civil
service eligibility." This rule is inapplicable, however, because neither of the claimants is
next in rank. Moreover, the next-in-rank rule is not absolute as the Civil Service Decree
allows vacancies to be lled by transfer of present employees, reinstatement,
reemployment, or appointment of outsiders who have the appropriate eligibility.

DECISION

CRUZ , J : p

Stripped of irrelevant details and impertinent incidents that have cluttered the
voluminous record, the facts of this case may be briefly narrated as follows:
The petitioner was appointed Administrative O cer II, O ce of the City Mayor,
Cebu City, by Mayor Florentino Solon on February 18, 1983. 1 The appointment was
described as "permanent" but the Civil Service Commission approved it as "temporary,"
subject to the nal action taken in the protest led by the private respondent and
another employee, and provided "there (was) no pending administrative case against
the appointee, no pending protest against the appointment nor any decision by
competent authority that will adversely affect the approval of the appointment." 2 On
March 22, 1984, after protracted hearings the legality of which does not have to be
decided here, the Civil Service Commission found the private respondent better
quali ed than the petitioner for the contested position and, accordingly, directed "that
Felicula Tuozo be appointed to the position of Administrative O cer II in the
Administrative Division, Cebu City, in place of Felimon Luego whose appointment as
Administrative O cer II is hereby revoked." 3 The private respondent was so appointed
on June 28, 1984, by the new mayor, Mayor Ronald Duterte. 4 The petitioner, invoking
his earlier permanent appointment, is now before us to question that order and the
private respondent's title.
The issue is starkly simple: Is the Civil Service Commission authorized to
disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better
quali ed than the appointee and, on the basis of this nding, ordering his replacement
by the latter?
The Solicitor General, rather than face the question squarely, says the petitioner
could be validly replaced in the instant case because his appointment was temporary
and therefore could be withdrawn at will, with or without cause. Having accepted such
an appointment, it is argued, the petitioner waived his security of tenure and
consequently ran the risk of an abrupt separation from his o ce without violation of
the Constitution. 5
While the principle is correct, and we have applied it many times, 6 it is not
correctly applied in this case. The argument begs the question. The appointment of the
petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by
Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the
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 right to do so, and it was not for the respondent Civil Service Commission to reverse
him and call it temporary.
The stamping of the words "APPROVED as TEMPORARY" did not change the
character of the appointment, which was clearly described as "Permanent" in the space
provided for in Civil Service Form No. 33, dated February 18, 1983. 7 What was
temporary was the approval of the appointment, not the appointment itself. And what
made the approval temporary was the fact that it was made to depend on the condition
speci ed therein and on the veri cation of the quali cations of the appointee to the
position.
The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature
of the appointment extended by the appointing o cer, its authority being limited to
approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil
Service Law. When the appointee is quali ed and all the other legal requirements are
satis ed, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the Civil Service Laws.
As Justice Ramon C. Fernandez declared in an earlier case:
"It is well settled that the determination of the kind of appointment to be
extended lies in the o cial vested by law with the appointing power and not the
Civil Service Commission. The Commissioner of Civil Service is not empowered to
determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing
o cer. When the appointee is quali ed, as in this case, the Commissioner of Civil
Service has no choice but to attest to the appointment. Under the Civil Service
Law, Presidential Decree No. 807, the Commissioner is not authorized to curtail
the discretion of the appointing o cial on the nature or kind of the appointment
to be extended." 8

Indeed, the approval is more appropriately called an attestation, that is, of the
fact that the appointee is quali ed for the position to which he has been named. As we
have repeatedly held, such attestation is required of the Commissioner of Civil Service
merely as a check to assure compliance with Civil Service Laws. 9
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the
officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the
appointee should possess the quali cations required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better quali ed who
should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of
wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.
It is different where the Constitution or the law subjects the appointment to the
approval of another o cer or body, like the Commission on Appointments under 1935
Constitution. 1 0 Appointments made by the President of the Philippines had to be
con rmed by that body and could not be issued or were invalidated without such
con rmation. In fact, con rmation by the Commission on Appointments was then
considered part of the appointing process, which was held complete only after such
confirmation. 1 1
Moreover, the Commission on Appointments could review the wisdom of the
appointment and had the power to refuse to concur with it even if the President's
choice possessed all the quali cations prescribed by law. No similar arrangement is
provided for in the Civil Service Decree. On the contrary, the Civil Service Commission is
limited only to the non-discretionary authority of determining whether or not the person
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 appointed meets all the required conditions laid down by the law.

It is understandable if one is likely to be misled by the language of Section 9(h) of

Article V of the Civil Service Decree because it says the Commission has the power to
"approve" and "disapprove" appointments. Thus, it is provided therein that the
Commission shall have inter alia the power to:
" 9 (h ) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to
positions in the civil service, except those presidential appointees, members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces, remen, and jailguards, and
disapprove those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or
required qualifications." (emphasis supplied)
However, a full reading of the provision, especially of the underscored parts, will
make it clear that all the Commission is actually allowed to do is check whether or not
the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required
quali cations. If he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved. No
other criterion is permitted by law to be employed by the Commission when it acts on
— or as the Decree says, "approves" or "disapproves" — an appointment made by the
proper authorities.
Signi cantly, the Commission on Civil Service acknowledged that both the
petitioner and the private respondent were quali ed for the position in controversy. 1 2
That recognition alone rendered it functus o cio in the case and prevented it from
acting further thereon except to a rm the validity of the petitioner's appointment. To
be sure, it had no authority to revoke the said appointment simply because it believed
that the private respondent was better quali ed for that would have constituted an
encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.
In preferring the private respondent to the petitioner, the Commission was
probably applying its own Rule V, Section 9, of Civil Service Rules on Personnel Actions
and Policies, which provides that "whenever there are two or more employees who are
next-in-rank, preference shall be given to the employee who is most competent and
quali ed and who has the appropriate civil service eligibility." This rule is inapplicable,
however, because neither of the claimants is next in rank. Moreover, the next-in rank rule
is not absolute as the Civil Service Decree allows vacancies to be lled by transfer of
present employees, reinstatement, reemployment, or appointment of outsiders who
have the appropriate eligibility. 1 3
There are apparently no political overtones in this case, which looks to be an
honest contention between two public functionaries who each sincerely claims to be
entitled to the position in dispute. This is gratifying for politics should never be
permitted to interfere in the apolitical organization of the Civil Service, which is
supposed to serve all the people regardless of partisan considerations. This political
detachment will be impaired if the security of tenure clause in the Constitution is
emasculated and appointments in the Civil Service are revoked and changed at will to
suit the motivations and even the fancies of whatever party may be in power.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the respondent Commission on Civil Service
dated March 22, 1984, is set aside, and the petitioner is hereby declared to be entitled
to the o ce in dispute by virtue of his permanent appointment thereto dated February
18, 1983. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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 Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay,
Gutierrez, Jr., and Paras, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Rollo, p. 52.
2. Rollo, p. 52.

3. Ibid., p. 31.
4. Ibid., pp. 17, 178, 245, 336.
5. Rollo, pp. 350-351.

6. Montero vs. Castellanes, 108 Phil. 744; University of the Philippines, et al. vs. CIR, 107
Phil. 848; Azuelo vs. Arnaldo, 108 Phil. 293; Atay, et al. vs. Ty Deling, 107 Phil. 1146;
Serrano vs. NSDB, 10 SCRA 626; Hojilla vs. Mariño, 13 SCRA 293; Aguila vs. Castro, 15
SCRA 656.

7. Rollo, p. 1.
8. In Re: Elvira C. Arcega, 89 SCRA 318, 322.
9. Ibid.; Villanueva vs. Bellalo, 9 SCRA 407-411; Said Benzar Ali vs. Teehankee, 46 SCRA
728, 730-731; Santos vs. Chico, 25 SCRA 343; City of Manila vs. Subido, 17 SCRA 231.
10. Article VII, Section 10(3) and (7), 1935 Constitution.

11. Lacson vs. Romero, 84 SCRA 740, 745.

12. Rollo, pp. 30-31.

13. Section 19(5), Article VIII, P.D. No. 807.

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