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DCPI 1133/2016

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[2018] HKDC 742 C

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
E HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION E
PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO 1133 OF 2016
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BETWEEN
H H
WONG YIN CHAU Plaintiff
I and I

HONG KONG ACADEMY OF MEDICINE 1st Defendant

J J
SUN HANG SHING CONSTRUCTION &
DECORATION COMPANY LIMITED 2nd Defendant
K K
MAXIM’S CATERERS LIMITED rd
3 Defendant
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M M
Before: His Honour Judge Andrew Li in Chambers (Open to Public)
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Dates of Hearing: 15 May 2018

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Date of Decision: 27 June 2018 O

P P
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DECISION Q
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INTRODUCTION

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1. This is the plaintiff’s appeals against Master SH Lee’s (“the
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Master”) Order made on 17 April 2018:

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(i) in refusing to grant leave to allow the plaintiff to file
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and serve further witness statements, inter alia,
G covering §§64-74 and §80 of the 2nd supplemental G

witness statement of the plaintiff (“P’s 2nd Supp WS)

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and witness statement of Li Yat Ching (“Li’s WS”);
I and I

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(ii) in refusing to grant leave to the plaintiff to adduce
K expert psychiatric report. K

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M 2. The plaintiff also sought leave to issue another summons on M

10 May 2018 seeking leave to file and serve a re-revised statement of

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damages (“Re-RSD”) to be heard before me on the same day as the above
O appeals (“the Re-RSD Summons”). I granted leave to the plaintiff to issue O

the summons to be heard on the same day as the appeal hearing on 15 May
P P
2018.
Q Q

BACKGROUND
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S 3. This is supposed to be a straightforward personal injury action S

arising out of a rather simple accident on 6 November 2013. The plaintiff

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was employed by the 3 defendant to work as a waitress at the restaurant
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run by the 1st defendant at the academy. She was hit by a hard object which

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fell from the ceiling when she was entering the VIP room of the restaurant. C
The object allegedly had hit her on her right hand and right arm.
D D

E 4. The plaintiff has been on legal aid since June 2014. In the E
present proceedings, the writ of summons was issued on 1 June 2016 with
F F
the statement of claim filed on 21 June 2016. The defence was filed on
G 19 July 2016 with a reply filed by the plaintiff on 4 August 2016. G

H H
5. Interlocutory judgment has been entered by consent on 15
I August 2016, leaving damages to be assessed. I

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6. The parties have made discovery as early as in October 2016.
K K

7. The plaintiff’s main witness statement (consisted of 43 pages)

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dated 13 December 2016 was served pursuant to the Order of Master Rita
M So on 7 November 2016 (“P’s Main WS”). M

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8. The revised statement of damages (“RSD”) was filed on 9
O March 2017. The plaintiff’s supplemental witness statement (consisted of O

41 pages) was filed and served on the same day (“P’s Supp WS”).
P P

Q 9. The 1st and 2nd defendant’s answer to the RSD was filed by Q

the defendants on 22 March 2017 (“the Answer”).

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S 10. The notice of assignment of counsel was issued on 23 March S

2017.
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11. A notice of re-assignment of solicitors assigning the current

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solicitor to act on behalf of the plaintiff was issued on 12 May 2017. C

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12. On 31 May 2017, by an Order of the Master, the originally

E checklist review hearing scheduled for 1 June 2017 was vacated and re- E
fixed to 28 December 2017. This included a direction for leave to set down
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for assessment of damages.
G G

13. On 18 January 2018, the plaintiff issued a summons (“the

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Witness Statement Summons”) seeking leave to adduce P’s 2nd Supp WS
I and 4 other additional witness statements. On the same day, the plaintiff I

issed another summons seeking leave to adduce expert psychiatric and/or

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anaesthesiologist evidence (“the Expert Evidence Summons”)1.
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14. The hearing of those summonses was adjourned to 16 April

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2018 for substantive arguments and was heard before the Master on 16 &
M 17 April 2018. M

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15. Due to the plaintiff’s last minute applications, the checklist
O review hearing was further adjourned to 24 July 2018 for management O

directions or leave to set down.

P P

Q 16. After hearing submissions from the parties, the Master made Q

the following Order on 17 April 2018 in relation to the Witness Statement

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Summons:
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The plaintiff had abandoned the request for the anaesthesiologist report/evidence before the Master
and hence the request before the Master and at the appeal hearing was confined to one seeking for
psychiatric evidence only.
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B “1. Leave be given to the Plaintiff to file and serve paragraph B

1-6, 38-52, 54-63, 77-79, 82(n) & (o), 85 (limited to last
C 3 entries in 2017), 89, 98(l), (m), (n) (q) & (r), 99(l), (m), C
(n), (q), & (r) of 2nd Supplemental Witness Statement of
the Plaintiff dated 2nd December 2017 annexed to
D Plaintiff’s summons out of time within 21 days from D
today;
E E
2. Leave be given to the Plaintiff to file and serve
paragraphs 1-12, 16-21 & attachment 1 of Witness
F Statement of 李一清 dated 23rd October 2017 annexed to F

the Plaintiff’s Summons out of time within 21 days from

G today; G

3. Leave be given to the Plaintiff to file and serve Witness

H Statement of Lee Siu Keung dated 25th October 2017 H
annexed to the Plaintiff’s Summons out of time within
I 21 days from today; I

4. Leave be given to the Plaintiff to file and serve Witness

J Statement of Ng Kwok Lai dated 25th October 2017 J
annexed to the Plaintiff’s Summons out of time within
21 days from today;
K K

5. Leave be given to the Plaintiff to file and serve Witness

L Statement of Ng Kwok Fai dated 25th October 2017 L
annexed to the Plaintiff’s Summons out of time within
21 days from today;
M M
6. The costs of the hearing of the Summons before Master
N S.H. Lee on 16th and 17th April 2018 be paid by the 1st N
and 2nd Defendants to the Plaintiff in any event, to be
taxed if not agreed;
O O
7. Subject to Paragraph 6 above, the costs of and incidental
P to the Plaintiff’s Summons be paid by the Plaintiff to the P
1st and 2nd Defendants in any event, to be taxed if not
agreed.
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8. The Plaintiff’s own costs to be taxed in accordance with
the Legal Aid Regulations.”
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S 17. Also on 17 April 2018, the Master made the following Order S

in relation to the Expert Evidence Summons:

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B “1. The Plaintiff’s Summons to adduce expert evidence of B

psychiatrist(s) and/or anaesthesiologist(s) be dismissed;
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2. The costs of and incidental to the Plaintiff’s Summons
be paid by the Plaintiff to the 1st and 2nd Defendants in
D any event, to be taxed if not agreed; and D

3. The Plaintiff’s own costs be taxed in accordance with the

E E
Legal Aid Regulations.”

F F
18. I shall first deal with the Re-RSD Summons and then the
G appeals of the plaintiff on the Master’s decisions on the Witness Statement G

Summons and Expert Evidence Summons.

H H

I (A) The Re-RSD Summons I

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19. In my judgment, the so-called Re-RSD was prepared with one
K thing in mind only, ie to belatedly trying to justify: (1) the contents of P’s K

2nd Supp WS and Li’s WS which the Master disallowed the plaintiff to
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adduce; and (2) the legitimacy of calling expert psychiatric evidence which
M was refused by the Master. M

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20. As can be seen from the history of the case, the original
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checklist review hearing was originally fixed for 1 June 2017. That was

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postponed by consent. The case was then supposed to be set down for P
assessment back in December 2017. However, instead of setting it down
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for assessment, the plaintiff, no doubt under the advice of her legal advisors,

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suddenly changed course and decided to file the very elaborate P’s 2nd Supp R
WS (which consists of 40 pages) and 4 other witness statements (with
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lengthy attachments) on 18 December 2017 in order to boost up her claim.

T When the defendants’ solicitors refused to accede to the request, the T

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plaintiff issued the Witness Statement Summons on 18 January 2018 which

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was subsequently heard and decided by the Master. C

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21. It is to be noted that the RSD was filed and served in this case

E pursuant to a consent summons jointly submitted by the parties which E

subsequently was made into the Order of Master Rita So dated 7 November
F F
2016. In the Order, expert evidence directions were agreed to limit to one
G orthopaedic expert to be appointed by each party only. Nothing was G

mentioned about the fact that the plaintiff might require expert psychiatric
H H
evidence and hence no direction in that regard was sought or given.
I I

22. The original RSD filed on 9 March 2017 is a lengthy piece of

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document. It consisted of 27 pages and was drafted by the assigned
K solicitor. Considering the total claim was at HK$577,201 only (that is K

before the deduction of the employees’ compensation received by the

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plaintiff at $300,000), this is a rather extravagant document which does not
M seem to me to be proportionate to the amount claimed at all. The RSD M

provides full details of the plaintiff’s injuries, treatment received, including

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the psychological and psychiatric treatments she had received at the
O Department of Clinical Psychology and Psychiatric Department at Queen O

Mary Hospital (“QMH”). It further included a claim for (i) future medical
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expenses; (ii) loss of earning capacity; and (iii) loss of future earnings,
Q although all those 3 items stated are not quantified and stated as “to be Q

assessed” only.
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S 23. In my view, the changes made in the Re-RSD are substantial S

but not clear. It is substantial because from a 27 page RSD, it has now
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changed into a 34 page Re-RSD. From a claim of $570,000, it has now
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increased to a sum of $1.73 million (which incidentally has exceeded the

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current jurisdiction of the District Court). It is not clear because the C
changes are not highlighted or underlined as one would expect to find in
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what effectively are substantial amendments to the RSD. At the hearing,

E it took the plaintiff’s counsel a long time just to explain to the court what E
changes had been made in the Re-RSD when comparing it to the RSD.
F F
Even then, not all the changes had been successfully identified by the
G plaintiff’s counsel. G

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Ruling on the Re-RSD Summons
I I

24. I would refuse the plaintiff’s application for leave to file and
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serve the Re-RSD for the following reasons.
K K

25. First, in my view, judging from the timing and contents, the
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Re-RSD Summons was issued for an ultimate motive, namely, trying to
M justify the filing of P’s 2nd Supp WS and other witness statements and the M

introduction of expert psychiatric evidence. In my judgment, the

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application for filing of the Re-RSD should be made after the disposal of
O the appeals of the 2 summonses when the plaintiff would know by then O

whether the court would allow the remaining contents of the witness
P P
statements to be included or introduction of expert psychiatric evidence. It
Q was not fair to ask both the court and the defendants to study such a lengthy Q

document in the eve of the appeal hearing. In my view, the plaintiff was
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trying to “put the cart before the horse” and have the order of filing her
S update claims and evidence reversed. If the court allows the filing of the S

Re-RSD, it will almost inevitably follow that the court should give leave
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for the plaintiff to file P’s 2 Supp WS and other witness statements and
nd

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to adduce the psychiatric expert evidence. This is not right and such

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practice should not be encouraged. C

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26. Second, the plaintiff had had plenty of opportunities to put her

E full claim in the RSD but had failed to do so. The RSD was filed in March E
2017. The plaintiff knew about the basis of her claim for future medical
F F
expenses, future loss of earning and loss of earning capacity and yet no
G particulars were provided by her at that stage. If the plaintiff’s intention G

was to merely update her claim in the Re-RSD, then in my view the proper
H H
time to seek leave is after the appeals to the 2 summonses have been heard
I and before she applies to set down the case for assessment. It certainly I

should not be sought right before the hearing of the appeals on the
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summonses.
K K

27. Third, in my judgment, the document should not be done in a

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completely “revised” format so that nobody (including the plaintiff’s
M counsel) knew exactly what changes had been made to the RSD. In my M

view, it should have been made by way of amendments with all the changes
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highlighted by underlining them in red so that any reader of the document
O could easily able to identify what are the new or additional claims or O

changes the plaintiff has made in the Re-RSD. Just like making
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amendments to any pleadings, the party who wishes to make changes
Q to them should be responsible for bearing the costs in doing that. Q

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28. Fourth, the plaintiff is now making a claim of $1.73 million
S under the Re-RSD which exceeds the jurisdiction of the District Court. S

There is no explanation from her counsel as to why he thinks the plaintiff

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is entitled to do that. Nor is there any plea to say that she will be prepared
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to waive any recoverable damages exceeding HK$1 million. If the plaintiff

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has merely put the inflated figure in the Re-RSD purely as a tactic for C
negotiations, then it is clearly against the underlying objectives of the CJR
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and should not be allowed.

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29. Based on the above reasons, I would dismiss the plaintiff’s
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Re-RSD Summons with costs to the defendant, such costs to be taxed if
G not agreed. The plaintiff’s own costs to be taxed in accordance with the G

legal aid regulations.

H H

I (B) Witness Statement Summons I

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30. I was told that the Master has refused to grant leave on those
K paragraphs of the witness statements under appeal on the ground of K

irrelevancy. I also note that the plaintiff is not appealing against some of
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the other paragraphs disallowed by the Master in his Order. Thus, I only
M need to deal with the following outstanding paragraphs in this appeal. M

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(i) §80 of P’s 2nd Supp WS & §§ 13-15 of Li’s WS
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31. §80 of P’s 2nd Supp WS and §§13-15 of Li’s WS try to

P P
compare the income of the plaintiff and her co-worker Madam Li Yat
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Ching (李一清) between 2014 and 2017. Allegedly, they were the only 2
R full-time employees employed by the 3rd defendant working at the 1st R

defendant’s restaurant at the time of the accident. What the plaintiff tries
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to do is compare the income records of the plaintiff and Li for the 3 years
T after the accident. T

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32. The plaintiff then tries to work out the loss of income between C
2014 and 2017 by comparing the “reduced” working hours between her
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and Li after the accident. The plaintiff says that this is at least relevant to

E the claim of loss of earning capacity and is of substantial probative value. E

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33. With respect, I do not agree.
G G

34. First, the contents of these paragraphs, with detailed

H H
calculations on the difference between the total working hours of the
I plaintiff and her superior Li, were made clearly with the purpose of forming I

the basis of a future claim for the loss of pre-trial earnings between 2014
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and 2017 and not for the claim of loss of earning capacity. Thus, the
K submission that it is at least relevant to the loss of earning capacity claim K

cannot be right.
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M 35. Second, in my view, it is artificial to compare the income of M

the 2 workers when there are a number of unknown factors which make
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the comparison at best speculative and at worst meaningless. This included:
O (i) we do not know what were the income difference between the plaintiff O

and Li prior to the accident, including whether their working hours were
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compatible or not; (ii) there would be obvious difference in their duties and
Q responsibilities between Li as the manager and the plaintiff as the assistant Q

supervisor at the time of the accident which would result in different

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working hours and patterns; and (iii) the difference of working hours after
S the accident could be due to the change of job and responsibilities of the S

plaintiff from that of an assistant supervisor to that of an assistant manager.

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36. Third, perhaps more importantly, at the time of seeking leave

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for filing the P’s 2nd Supp WS, this matter has not been pleaded as part of C
the plaintiff’s case under the RSD. The pre-trial loss of earnings claimed
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under the RSD was only for the total loss of income during the sick leave

E period. The claim based on the difference in the working hours between E
the plaintiff and Li could not be found anywhere in the RSD. Thus, §80
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and §§13-15 are irrelevant insofar as they purportedly try to form the basis
G of a pre-trial loss of earnings claim. This should not be allowed. Otherwise, G

it acts as an fait accompli.

H H

I 37. Fourth, Mr Lam submits that these new proposed paragraphs I

are at least relevant to the issue of earning capacity. With respect, that
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cannot be right also. §81 (1) to (19) of P’s 2nd Supp WS has already
K covered the “effects” of the injuries extensively and §§49-63 provide the K

details of why she thinks she is entitled to damages for loss of earning
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capacity. As such, §80 and §§13-15 are superfluous and cannot be said to
M be relevant to the issue of loss of earning capacity. M

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§§64-70 of P’s 2nd Supp WS
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38. §§64-67 relate to the value of the meals provided by her

P P
employer. Mr Lam claims that they are relevant to the loss of earning
Q capacity issue. Q

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39. I do not agree.
S S

40. I can see that this arguably may form part of her claims for
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loss of income or loss of future income. However, by definition, this
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cannot form part of the loss of earning capacity claim as the purpose of this

C
is “to cover the risk that, at some future date during the claimant’s working C
life, he will lose his employment and will then suffer financial loss because
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of his disadvantage in the labour market.”: See Yu Kok Wing v Lee Tim Loi

E [2011] 2 HKLRD 306 at 311I-312G. E

F F
41. §§68-70 which relate to the plaintiff’s assertions that she only
G has secondary school education and why, due to the alleged injuries to her G

hands, if she were to lose her current job, she could not even able to work
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in a ‘Cha Chann Teng’ (tea restaurant) or petrol station. And why she
I thinks she may only able to work in simple jobs as a junior clerk in an I

unhurried environment.
J J

K 42. Despite the fact that the claim of loss of earning capacity has K

only been superficially pleaded in the RSD as “the plaintiff will suffer
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disadvantage in the labour market by reason of the disabilities resulting
M from the accident” and the amount “to be assessed”, I am prepared to be M

generous and allow the inclusion of these few paragraphs as they could be
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said to be related to the loss of earning capacity claim.
O O

43. However, I do not see why this matter could not have been
P P
included earlier in the plaintiff’s Main WS and her Supp WS. Her assigned
Q lawyers had at least 2 opportunities to put their house in order but had failed Q

to do so. As such, I do not see why the defendants should be asked to bear
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the costs of the plaintiff’s “afterthought” on this issue. In my view, a party
S does not have the freedom to keep adding new things or materials to their S

claims, no matter whether they are relevant to the issues in dispute of not,
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and expect the other side to pay for the costs in preparing them. If they
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have the opportunity to do so earlier in the proceedings and failed to avail

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themselves to do that, they should be the party who bear the costs, much C
like when a party is trying to make amendments to his pleadings.
D D

E §§71-73 of P’s 2nd Supp WS E

F F
44. §§71-72 relate to a new claim for a part-time maid which the
G plaintiff says she has started to employ from February 2014 onwards. This G

claim did not feature in the RSD. Thus, these 2 paragraphs are not related
H H
to any of her claim made. As such, I think the Master has rightly rejected
I them. I

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45. For §73, the plaintiff is merely repeating the contents of the
K report of the doctor from the Psychiatric Department of Prince of Wales K

Hospital (“PWH”) dated 4 October 2017. I do not see why that is necessary.
L L

M §74 of P’s 2nd Supp WS M

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46. This is a new claim that she may be demoted from that of an
O assistant manager to a general clerk and therefore will suffer an income O

deduction from $17,000 per month to $11,000 per month. Mr Lam says
P P
that this is relevant to the loss of earning capacity claim. With respect, it
Q is not. In my view, this is purely related to the issue of a possible loss of Q

income claim which has not been pleaded in the RSD. Thus, unless and
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until the RSD is amended to include this claim, it should not be allowed.
S S

No other factor not to grant leave?

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47. The plaintiff’s counsel submits that relevancy is not the only

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factor to consider. He submits that there appears to be no other factor C
against the admission of the evidence, viz., the admission will not result in
D D
the delay of the trial of the action; it appears that it is not prejudicial to the

E interests of justice; nor is it scandalous or frivolous. In any event, the E

weight attached to the witness statement is a matter to be decided by the
F F
trial judge. Thus, the plaintiff says that if she is not able to depose all the
G relevant evidence at the trial, justice may be defeated. In this regard, the G

plaintiff relies on Order 38 rule 2A.

H H

I 48. With respect, they are not the only considerations. I

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49. It is a timely reminder of what the underlying objectives of
K the CJR under Order 1A, rule 1 of the Rules of District Court (“RDC”) are: K

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“1. Underlying objectives (O. 1A, r. 1)

M The underlying objectives of these Rules are— M

(a) to increase the cost-effectiveness of any practice

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and procedure to be followed in relation to
proceedings before the Court;
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(b) to ensure that a case is dealt with as expeditiously
as is reasonably practicable;
P P
(c) to promote a sense of reasonable proportion and
Q procedural economy in the conduct of Q
proceedings;

R (d) to ensure fairness between the parties; R

S (e) to facilitate the settlement of disputes; and S

(f) to ensure that the resources of the Court are

T distributed fairly.” T

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50. Bearing in mind that this claim was originally estimated at

C
$399,578 under the statement of damages and at $577,201 under the RSD C
only (both before deduction of employees’ compensation of $300,000) and
D D
that liability has not been a live issue since judgment was entered by

E consent in August 2016, this case could have been disposed of in a timely E
and cost-effective manner. Instead, the plaintiff chose to serve a 41-page
F F
long P’s Supp WS in March 2017 and then tried to introduce another 40-
G page long P’s 2nd Supp WS in January 2018. These are of course on top G

of the original 43 pages long P’s Main WS. In other words, the plaintiff is
H H
filing 3 witness statements under her own name totalling over 120 pages
I for a relatively simple and straightforward claim. This is on top of the 4 I

short witness statements she has recently introduced. In my opinion, not

J J
only some of the contents of these witness statements are repetitive, they
K could have been reduced to a much shorter single document. K

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51. In my judgment, P’s 2nd Supp WS, as well as the 4 other
M witness statements (which were all prepared without leave of the court), M

are not necessary and totally disproportionate to the injuries and the claims
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made in this case. By keep adding new materials and new claims to
O embellish her case, both the plaintiff and her lawyers are not helping to O

facilitate the settlement of the dispute. Moreover, by keep postponing to

P P
set down the case for assessment and creating “satellite” litigation by
Q producing lengthy witness statements and a new Re-RSD, it totally defeats Q

the whole idea of dealing with the case expeditiously as is reasonably

R R
practicable, thus defeating one of the important underlying objectives of
S the CJR. S

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52. What is more prevalent is that, in my judgment, most of what

C
the plaintiff has stated in the Supp WS and 2nd Supp WS could have been C
mentioned at an earlier stage of the proceedings, either in the main witness
D D
statement or the RSD or both. Save and except some minor updates on the

E medical and special damages claims, most of the information, including E

her psychological and psychiatric treatments, were available or could have
F F
been made available to the plaintiff at an earlier stage. In my view, just
G because there was a change of the assigned solicitor or counsel does not G

give a free rein to a party to keep adding new witness statements and RSD
H H
at any time they like. Not only this will deprive the court’s management
I powers to ensure that the case will proceed to trial in an expeditious manner I

(if the same cannot be settled out of court), such practice will only take us
J J
back to the dark age before the CJR when parties spent a great deal of time
K and money in dealing with interlocutory matters rather than focusing on K

the real issues in dispute. Litigation is there to help parties to resolve their
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disputes in accordance with their substantive rights and hence achieving
M justice, it does not exist as a platform to create more work for lawyers. M

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53. For the above reasons alone, I would have disallowed most if
O not all the contents of the 2nd Supp WS and the witness statements of all O

the additional witnesses on the grounds of lateness and disproportionality

P P
alone. However, since the Master has very generously allowed them in his
Q decision already, I shall not disturb them now. However, I certainly would Q

agree with his costs order when he disallowed a certificate for counsel as I
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consider this matter could have been easily able to be dealt with by a
S solicitor with the appropriate experience and expertise like the assigned S

solicitor.
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Conclusion on Witness Statements Summons

C C
54. In conclusion, save from §§ 68-70 of P’s 2 Supp WS, I agree
nd

D D
with the Master that all the rest of the contents of the witness statements

E under appeal are either not relevant or related to issues currently pleaded E
under the RSD. Thus, they are inadmissible and therefore should not be
F F
allowed. As for §§68-70, there is no good reason in my judgment why they
G could not have been included in the P’s Main WS or P’s Supp WS G

previously filed. If the plaintiff wishes to include them now, she should be
H H
ordered to pay for the costs of it. I will therefore dismiss the plaintiff’s
I appeal on the Witness Statement Summons with costs in favour of the I

defendants. The costs of the plaintiff should be taxed in accordance with

J J
the legal aid regulations.
K K

55. Insofar as the appeal touches on the Master’s decision of not

L L
granting a certificate for counsel for the hearing on 16 and 17 April 2018,
M as mentioned above, I see no reason to disturb the Master’s decision on this M

matter. The Master after hearing the arguments over 2 days on those 2
N N
summonses most likely had thought that the assigned solicitor could have
O argued the case himself without instructing counsel. He is a better judge O

on this matter than me as he had heard the matter himself. I have no reason
P P
to usurp his discretion on this.
Q Q

(C) Expert Evidence Summons

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S 56. The plaintiff belatedly tried to seek leave to introduce expert S

psychiatric evidence in the case under the Expert Evidence Summons. The
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A A

B B
request was rejected by the Master. She now appeals against that decision

C
before me. C

D D
Legal principles in relation to calling of experts after the CJR

E E
57. The legal principles governing the court’s discretion to grant
F F
leave to adduce expert evidence has been succinctly summarized by Mr
G Justice Bharwaney in Fung Chun Man v Hospital Authority and Another, G

unrep, HCPI 1113 of 2006 (24.6.2011; Bharwaney J):-

H H

I “9. The enactment of the CJR did not result in a change to I

O.38, r.36 of the Rules of the High Court (“RHC”). However,
after the enactment of the CJR, it is clear that the court’s
J discretion, whether or not to grant leave to a party to adduce J
expert evidence, is to be exercised within the ambit of the court’s
management powers. Those powers must be exercised in the
K K
light of the underlying objectives of the CJR, including the need
to ensure the cost effectiveness of the proceedings; to ensure that
L the case is dealt with expeditiously; to ensure reasonable L
proportionality having regard to the amount of money involved,
the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues, and the
M M
financial position of each party; to ensure procedural economy
in the conduct of the proceedings; and to ensure fairness between
N the parties. N

10. The courts recognise that the primary aim of its case
O management powers is to secure the just resolution of the dispute O
in accordance with the substantive rights of the parties.
P However, the substantive rights of the parties to a personal P
injury action do not include a legal right to call experts of their
choice.
Q Q
11. The expert evidence can only be adduced with leave of
the court and, in deciding whether or not to grant leave, the court
R R
must ensure that such evidence is admitted only if it is likely to
be of real assistance to the determination of the issues, and that
S it is adduced in the most effective and economic way consistent S
with the objectives of the CJR.
T T

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A A

B 12. In this regard, I echo the observations of Evans-Lombe J B

in Barings PLC v Coopers & Lybrand (No. 2) [2001] Lloyds
C Report Bank 85: C

“45. Expert evidence is admissible …… in any case

D where the court accepts there exists a recognised D
expertise governed by recognised standards and rules of
conduct capable of influencing the court’s decision on
E E
any of the issues which it has to decide and the witness
to be called satisfies the court that he has a sufficient
F familiarity with and knowledge of the expertise in F
question to render his opinion potentially of value in
resolving any of those issues. Evidence meeting this test
G G
can still be excluded by the court if the court takes the
view that calling it will not be helpful to the court in
H resolving any issue in the case justly. Such evidence will H
not be helpful where the issue to be decided is one of law
or is otherwise one on which the court is able to come to
I a fully informed decision without hearing such evidence.” I

J 13. The Court of Appeal in Mann v Messrs. Chetty & Patel J

(a firm) [2000] EWCA CIV 267 proposed 3 questions that ought
to be asked before deciding to allow expert evidence:-
K K
“(a) how cogent the proposed expert evidence will be;
L L
(b) how helpful it will be in resolving any of the
issues in the case; and
M M
(c) how much it will cost and the relationship of that
cost to the sums at stake.”
N N
14. Chu J, as she then was, referred to Barings PLC v
O Coopers & Lybrand and concluded, in Wong Hoi Fung v. O
American Assurance Co. (Bermuda) Ltd. [2002] 3 HKLRD 507,
that the expert evidence must be reasonably required to resolve
P the issues before the court before leave would be granted to P
adduce it.
Q Q
15. In summary, the expert evidence must be in a recognized
discipline, reasonably required to enable the court to resolve the
R issues in dispute, and proportionate. R

16. However, even if a prima facie case is made out for the
S S
admission of expert evidence, in every case, the court must also
have regard to other relevant circumstances, such as the potential
T disruption to the trial, the prejudice to the other parties, and the T
explanation offered by the applicant in cases where a late
application is made for expert evidence to be adduced. These
U U

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A A

B matters have to be considered and weighed in the light of and B

against the underlying objectives of the CJR: to ensure cost
C effectiveness and economy, expedition, proportionality, and C
fairness between the parties. Ultimately, the court strives to do
justice between the parties and, in cases where the court permits
D the parties to call expert evidence, the court strives to ensure a D
level playing field with fair access to proper experts for all
parties.”
E E

F 58. The same principles can be found in Bai Siba Kumar v F

Nishimatsu Construction Company Limited, unrep., HCPI 883 of 2012

G G
(8.10.2013; Deputy High Court Judge Marlene Ng) where the learned
H judge has summed them up as follows:- H

I I
“37. I repeat my observations in Ngai Ping Kwan v Choy Yat
Hung[5] citing the guidance by Bharwaney J in Fung Chun Man
J v Hospital Authority & anor.[6] In summary, expert medical J
evidence must be relevant, necessary and of probative value, ie
it is likely to be of real assistance to the determination of the
K K
issues or, to put it in another way, it must be reasonably required
to enable the court to resolve the issues in dispute. The court
L also has regard to other circumstances, eg potential disruption to L
the trial, the prejudice to the other parties, the explanation given
for a late application, and these matters have to be considered
M M
and weighed in light of and against the underlying objectives.
Ultimately, the court strives to do justice between the parties and
N to secure the just resolution of the dispute in accordance with the N
substantive rights of the parties.”

O O
The plaintiff’s application
P P

59. It is most unfortunate that the plaintiff only saw fit to apply
Q Q
for leave to adduce expert psychiatric evidence so late in this case as there
R R
was indisputable evidence that she has been suffering from

S
psychological/psychiatric injuries not long after the occurrence of the S
accident.
T T

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A A

B B
60. The appointment slip of the plaintiff with the PWH shows that,

C
as far back as on 10 October 2014, the plaintiff made her first appointment C
with the outpatient clinic of the Department of Psychiatry at the hospital.
D D
Perhaps due to the great demand in the public health sector, her first

E appointment with them was fixed almost 3 years later on 28 August 2017 E
only. In my view, she would not have bothered with making such an
F F
appointment in October 2014 if she did not think that she was suffering
G from some form of genuine psychiatric illness. G

H H
61. In the report of the clinical psychologist of the Department of
I Clinical Psychology at QMH dated 25 July 2016, it has been recorded that I

the plaintiff was referred by the Department of Anesthesiology at QMH for

J J
counselling for a low mood and passive pain coping as far back as on 8
K October 2015. This was less than two years after the accident. She was K

seen by the clinical psychologist for 5 sessions between January and June
L L
2016.
M M

62. During the interviews, the plaintiff reported to the clinical

N N
psychologist that she suffered onset of low mood since six months after the
O accident, which lasted for one year. She had experienced low and irritable O

mood with crying, insomnia, significant reduction of appetite and weight

P P
loss of 20 pounds, social withdrawal, and worries about the pain problems.
Q She also expressed frustration towards the loss of potential promotion Q

opportunity at work if she could not resume normal duties. She also
R R
worried that she might have to rely on analgesics to maintain her physical
S and mental functioning in the long run because her ability to concentrate S

was impaired by chronic pain.

T T

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A A

B B
63. It has also been recorded in the same report that the plaintiff’s

C
mood had improved in the 6 months prior to the date of the report due to C
her increased acceptance of pain and numbness as well as adaptive
D D
adjustment of expectation on recovery. However, from April 2016

E onwards, it has been recorded that the plaintiff started to encounter stresses E
from the compensation procedures. Her mood turned to low and she had
F F
lost motivation to move on to manage her pain. However, it was said that
G her job and daily functioning were largely maintained. G

H H
64. The clinical psychologist conclusion is that the plaintiff had
I previously suffered from adjustment disorder relating to pain and I

perceived loss of career prospects from the accident. However, her

J J
condition has been stabilized although she still continued to encounter
K stress reaction relating to her accident assessment and compensation K

procedures. She was recommended to continue to receive psychological

L L
treatment to facilitate her pain coping.
M M

65. In the report of Dr Larina Yim of the Department of

N N
Psychiatry at PWH dated 4 October 2017, it has been recorded that the
O plaintiff first attended the outpatient clinic on 28 August 2017. On that O

occasion, she presented herself with depressive symptoms since 2013.

P P
Besides the physical condition, she reported to have developed sense of
Q uselessness, insomnia and social withdrawal. Despite her pain, she still Q

went to work regularly. Antidepressants and analgesics were prescribed.

R R
She last attended the clinic on 27 September 2017. Dr Yim confirms that
S the plaintiff suffered from depression which requires drug and outpatient S

follow-up treatments. She opines that the pain and depressive symptoms
T T
may have affected her work performance.
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A A

B B

C
66. The above opinions of the clinical psychologist at QMH and C
the psychiatrist at PWH are supported by the opinion of Dr Stanley Wong,
D D
an assistant professor at the Department of Anaesthesiology at QMH. In

E his report dated 3 October 2017, Dr Wong reported that the plaintiff, E
besides suffering from chronic neck pain, cervicogenic headache and
F F
myosfacial pain, also suffers from the lack of sleep due to the pain she
G experienced. She was referred to the psychiatrist for depression and also G

to the clinical psychologist for pain management. It is interesting to note

H H
that Dr Wong recorded that the plaintiff had initially coped passively as
I demonstrated by leaning back and staying in a closed room in response to I

pain. She also showed fear avoidance behaviour and felt helpless in her
J J
situation. She also became socially withdrawal.
K K

67. In my view, all the above are classic signs of

L L
psychological/psychiatric conditions which have only manifested
M themselves after the accident in November 2013. There is no evidence to M

suggest the plaintiff had suffered from any of those symptoms prior to the
N N
occurrence of the accident. Further, as 2 of these reports have been
O obtained only recently in October 2017, it would be difficult for the O

plaintiff’s assigned lawyers to decide whether to engage psychiatric expert

P P
evidence before such reports from the government hospitals become
Q available. Q

R R
68. Besides, it is important to note that the plaintiff has pleaded
S the above psychological/psychiatric condition in the RSD back in March S

2017 based on the limited information available to her then.

T T

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A A

B B
69. Further, at least one of the orthopaedic experts who had jointly

C
examined the plaintiff recommended that she should be examined by a C
psychiatrist.
D D

E 70. As DHCJ Marlene Ng has stated in Bai Siaba Kumar, supra, E

ultimately the court strives to do justice between the parties to secure the
F F
just resolution of the dispute in accordance with the substantive rights of
G the parties. As such, in my judgment, it will be unfair in the circumstances G

of this case to deprive the plaintiff the opportunity to adduce psychiatric

H H
expert evidence to support this aspect of her claim. It is clear that she has
I displayed classic psychological/psychiatric symptoms since the early days I

of her injuries after the accident. Such condition required regular

J J
treatments at both the Department of Psychology at QMH and Department
K of Psychiatry at PWH. The plaintiff is still receiving treatment at the above K

hospitals.
L L

M 71. Ms Angela Leung, the solicitor who represented the M

defendants at the hearing, submits that the plaintiff has failed to establish
N N
any prima facie case of the causation between the plaintiff's depression
O (mood problem) and the subject accident. With respect, I cannot agree with O

such submission. The issue of causation will be a matter of opinion to be

P P
commented on the by expert psychiatrists and not for the court to decide
Q without the benefit of the assistance of such expert evidence at this stage. Q

R R
72. Ms Leung further submits that the court can still properly
S assess the plaintiff's psychiatric problems on the basis of the government S

reports from PWH and QMH. Again, with respect, I cannot agree with this
T T
also. The reports from PWH and QMH, eventhough are helpful, do not
U U

V V
 - 26 -
A A

B B
serve the functions of that of an expert report which would assist the court

C
to understand the plaintiff’s condition and the issue of causation in a more C
in-depth level.
D D

E 73. Ms Leung also submits that there is no medical evidence to E

prove the alleged worsening of depression was caused by the subject
F F
accident. In my opinion, this is a matter which should be left to be explored
G by the psychiatric experts. G

H H
74. Lastly, Ms Leung submits that the plaintiff has presented
I herself with depression symptoms since 2013 (according to the medical I

report of Dr Larina Yim of Department of Psychiatry of PWH dated 4

J J
October 2017), however, the plaintiff has failed to take out any application
K seeking leave to adduce psychiatric report until January 2018. That is true. K

However, in my judgment, the plaintiff should not be punished due to the

L L
incompetence or inefficiency, if any, of her assigned lawyers. In any event,
M Dr Yim’s report was only available in October 2017. M

N N
75. In the aforestated circumstances, I consider that the plaintiff’s
O appeal on the expert evidence summons contains some merits and that O

psychiatric expert evidence is reasonably required to assist the court to

P P
determine one of the important issues in this case. I therefore would allow
Q the appeal and set aside the order of the Master dated 17 April 2018 Q

including the costs order contained therein. I shall grant leave for the
R R
plaintiff to adduce psychiatric expert evidence in this case.
S S

76. I shall make the following management directions in regard

T T
to the adduce of psychiatric evidence:-
U U

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A A

B B

C
(a) expert psychiatric evidence be limited to one C
psychiatric expert for each party;
D D

E (b) within 14 days from today, the parties shall write to the E
PI master on the following:
F F

G (i) state the names of the parties’ respective G

psychiatric expert;
H H

I (ii) state the deadline for conducting joint I

examination of the plaintiff by the parties’

J J
respective psychiatric expert;
K K

(iii) state the deadline for compiling the joint

L L
psychiatric report by the parties’ respective
M psychiatric expert; M

N N
(iv) propose directions for obtaining joint psychiatric
O expert report; O

P P
(v) state whether it is expected that the RSD and the
Q Answer may have to be further revised or Q

amended;
R R

S (vi) if so, propose directions for leave to further S

revise or amend the RSD and the Answer;

T T

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 - 28 -
A A

B B
(vii) propose all necessary and appropriate directions

C
up to stage of setting the case down for C
assessment of damages, including preparing the
D D
trial bundle index; and

E E
(viii) prepare a draft joint proposed case management
F F
directions no less than 14 days before the
G adjourned checklist review hearing scheduled on G

24 July 2018 at 10:30 am in Court 14 for the

H H
court’s approval.
I I

77. In respect of the costs of the appeal on the Expert Evidence

J J
Summons, in my view, there is no reason why the costs should not follow
K the event. I therefore grant a costs order nisi that the 1st and 2nd defendants K

do pay the plaintiff’s costs of the appeal to be taxed if not agreed and the
L L
plaintiff’s own costs to the taxed in accordance with the legal aid
M regulations. As to the costs below, I see no reason why 1 st and 2nd M

defendants should not also bear those costs since they have failed to resist
N N
the appeal. However, I shall not disturb the Master’s discretion in not
O granting a certificate for counsel for the hearing below. The plaintiff’s own O

costs at the hearing below shall be subject to taxation under the legal aid
P P
regulations also. In the absence of any application to vary the costs order,
Q it will become absolute within 14 days after the handing down of this Q

decision. For this summons, I recognise that it involved more substantive

R R
arguments on the law and a number of authorities have been cited by the
S plaintiff’s counsel at the hearing. I shall grant a certificate for counsel for S

the appeal hearing of this particular summons only.

T T

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A A

B B
CONCLUSION

C C
78. Based on the reasons set out above, I shall:
D D

E (i) dismiss the plaintiff’s application for the introduction E

of the Re-RSD with costs in favour of the defendants;
F F

G (ii) dismiss the plaintiff’s appeal on the Witness Statement G

Summons of costs in favour of the defendants; and

H H

I (iii) allow the plaintiff’s appeal on the Expert Evidence I

Summons with costs in favour of the plaintiff with legal

J J
aid taxation and certificate for counsel.
K K

L L

M ( Andrew SY Li ) M
District Judge
N N

O
Mr Simon HW Lam, instructed by Victor Yeung & Co, assigned by the O
Director of Legal Aid, for the plaintiff
P P
st nd
Ms Angela Leung, of Deacons, for the 1 and 2 defendants
Q Q

R R

S S

T T

U U

V V