Vision and Value in Health Information
Vision and Value in Health Information
in Health Information
Edited by
Michael Rigby
Reader in Health Planning and Management
Keele University
CRC Press
Taylor & Francis Group
6000 Broken Sound Parkway NW, Suite 300
Boca Raton, FL 33487-2742
© 2004 Michael Rigby
This book contains information obtained from authentic and highly regarded sources. While all reasonable
efforts have been made to publish reliable data and information, neither the author[s] nor the publisher can
accept any legal respon-sibility or liability for any errors or omissions that may be made. The publishers
wish to make clear that any views or opinions expressed in this book by individual editors, authors or
contributors are personal to them and do not neces-sarily reflect the views/opinions of the publishers. The
information or guidance contained in this book is intended for use by medical, scientific or health-care
professionals and is provided strictly as a supplement to the medical or other professional’s own
judgement, their knowledge of the patient’s medical history, relevant manufacturer’s instructions and the
appropriate best practice guidelines. Because of the rapid advances in medical science, any information or
advice on dosages, procedures or diagnoses should be independently verified. The reader is strongly urged
to consult the relevant national drug formulary and the drug companies’ and device or material
manufacturers’ printed instructions, and their websites, before administering or utilizing any of the
drugs, devices or materials mentioned in this book. This book does not indicate whether a particular
treatment is appropriate or suitable for a particular individual. Ultimately it is the sole responsibility of
the medical professional to make his or her own professional judgements, so as to advise and treat
patients appropriately. The authors and publishers have also attempted to trace the copyright holders of all
mate-rial reproduced in this publication and apologize to copyright holders if permission to publish in this
form has not been obtained. If any copyright material has not been acknowledged please write and let us
know so we may rectify in any future reprint.
Except as permitted under U.S. Copyright Law, no part of this book may be reprinted, reproduced,
transmitted, or uti-lized in any form by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter
invented, including photocopy-ing, microfilming, and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval
system, without written permission from the publishers.
For permission to photocopy or use material electronically from this work, please access
www.copyright.com (http://www.copyright.com/) or contact the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. (CCC),
222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, 978-750-8400. CCC is a not-for-profit organization that
provides licenses and registration for a variety of users. For organizations that have been granted a
photocopy license by the CCC, a separate system of payment has been arranged.
Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are
used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.
Visit the Taylor & Francis Web site at
http://www.taylorandfrancis.com
and the CRC Press Web site at
http://www.crcpress.com
Dedication iii
Foreword vi
Preface x
About the editor xiv
About the contributors xvi
Introduction xxi
CHAPTER 1
Edith K˛rner: visionary, NHS reformer and friend 1
Alastair Mason
CHAPTER 2
Learning from history 11
Jeanette Murphy
CHAPTER 3
Improving the United Kingdom’s health system: an adaptive model 31
to harness information and evidence
Don E Detmer
CHAPTER 4
The need for a new healthcare paradigm: patient-centred and 47
knowledge-driven
JA Muir Gray and Harry Rutter
CHAPTER 5
Information as the patient’s advocate 57
Michael Rigby
CHAPTER 6
Information for practice improvement 69
John G Williams
Contents v
CHAPTER 7
Information for good governance 79
Ellie Scrivens
CHAPTER 8
Information for the assessment of health outcomes 91
Azim Lakhani
CHAPTER 9
Principles and purpose for child health informatics 107
Mitch Blair and Michael Rigby
CHAPTER 10
New methods of documenting health visiting practice 121
June Clark
CHAPTER 11
Using information for public bene¢t 143
Peter Tiplady
CHAPTER 12
Globalisation or localisation: common truths or local knowledge? 149
Michael Rigby
Index 159
Foreword
It gives me great pleasure to write the foreword to this series of essays on inno-
vation in the presentation and use of information in healthcare. Throughout
my career, and not least in my current position as Chair of the Commission for
Health Improvement (CHI), I have found that recognising the importance of
information, innovation and investment in its use, is key to determining success
or failure.
As an undergraduate and postgraduate student of medicine in Wales I had
the privilege of being taught by one of the most innovative thinkers in the infor-
mation ¢eld, Archie Cochrane, who as Director of the MRC Epidemiology Unit in
Cardi¡, became a legend in his own right in pioneering a rigorous scienti¢c
approach to information and evidence. That legacy lives on, quite rightly, in
the Cochrane collaboration that was inspired by his approach and named not
so much in his honour as because the very citation of his name encapsulates
the vision and the standards. And in a di¡erent but not unrelated way, Julian
Tudor Hart was bringing a rigorous approach to record-keeping and data cap-
ture to general practice in Glyncorrwg, in a way which inspired a very indus-
trial practice population, as well as demonstrating how to address the Inverse
Care Law that he identi¢ed. So as a result, healthcare delivery in South Wales
was very much in£uenced by this recognition of information and establishment
of innovation in its application.
In my own early practice in community medicine, aspects of information were
key both in terms of providing best evidence, but ^ in a sense more impor-
tantly ^ in terms of recording local service availability and individual patient
need. And so with my progression to Chief Medical O⁄cer for Wales, it was only
natural that information should be a key resource which I valued and nour-
ished. We were able to watch what was happening not only in England but else-
where, and to interpret and adapt those initiatives to apply them to the speci¢c
challenges of the Principality. At the same time, though, we sought to put great
emphasis upon innovative and successful completion of information invest-
ment, rather than merely the initial pioneering idea. These were exciting times,
with the Strategies for Health Gain just one signi¢cant example. These were
¢rmly grounded in information ^ information as to need, information as to
performance, but above all setting measurable indices of progress counted in
terms of measured bene¢t to the population.
Foreword vii
The technical infrastructure to obtain and use good-quality data was not
overlooked either. One particular achievement was the Digital All Wales Net-
work (DAWN), which rolled out to the whole of the NHS family throughout
Wales, including primary care, the bene¢ts of a dedicated health infrastructure.
This was later followed by developments such as the private intranet, Cymru-
Web. We also placed importance in investing in an information-handling
resource, best known as the Health Intelligence Unit, which later developed
into Health Solutions Wales.
One of the other major initiatives I had the challenge of working on, together
with Sir Kenneth Calman in England, was the total review of cancer services in
England and Wales. This was a challenging brief, and our recommendations
were equally challenging to those practising in this important ¢eld throughout
England and Wales. That we called for a radical reshaping of service provision is
now well known, and the rationale for this was entirely evidence-based. It was
upon review of information about activity and results that we were able to
reach the conclusions we did, motivate so many organisations and individuals
to undertake di⁄cult change with comparative smoothness, and as a result,
bring about lasting bene¢ts to the population and patients.
From within Wales we were not directly involved in the work of the Steering
Group on Health Services Information, and the drive of Mrs K˛rner. However,
as with many other innovations in England, we watched with a mixture of envy
and relief, but above all with the great opportunity of learning from observa-
tion. Indeed, on a ¢ne day Mrs K˛rner’s home region could be viewed across
the water from my own constituency! The challenges that the Steering Group
faced were clearly major, both in terms of the size of the task and in terms of the
natural institution of organisational inertia through the long tradition of the
pre-existing statistical systems. But what was clear was that Edith K˛rner
bought a combination of vision, inspiration and sheer determination which
motivated her Steering Group, charmed and persuaded the wider constituency,
and drove her immediate support team. From her work came a vision, and then
a demonstration, of how to harness modern management approaches to infor-
mation as a resource and apply them to the huge and technically precise
domain of health information.
Now, in my current position as Chair of the CHI, I continue to be very con-
vinced of the importance of information in healthcare management and clinical
practice. In our work in the CHI we see innovation and good practice; inevitably,
we also have to focus on the more disappointing areas of poor practice and other
problems. And if I were asked to identify any particular factors which seem to
di¡erentiate between success and failure, I have to say that nearly all the loca-
tions where we have to deal with problems can be identi¢ed as those with either
poor information systems, or scant understanding of how to use that informa-
tion in a diagnostic and material way. And similarly, with nearly every example
of good practice can be seen investment in information, which is a key factor.
viii Foreword
had a mental master plan for her work, but she was active in small group
discussions of every detail. With her at the table the debate was always friendly,
and tolerant of exploratory ideas, yet any unfounded assumption or unjusti¢ed
conclusion was pounced on for what it was ^ unsustainable. The precise tones
of the accent with its surviving hint of east-European origins would pose
the question that, though not strictly rhetorical, by its very asking provided the
answer. The careful phraseology, the momentary pause to produce every time
the absolutely apt word or phrase, taught many of us a new level of analytic and
re£ective discussion. Yet this was always amicable, and business meetings were
like (indeed were) meetings of friends to which one always looked forward.
And to the work itself, Mrs K˛rner brought the background experience of
being the vice chair of a regional health authority, and therefore strong aware-
ness of the issues and challenges of obtaining adequate information for strategic
management. Yet, in modern parlance, she was a ‘bottom up’ as much as a ‘top
down’ person. Running throughout her reports was the express principle that it
was di⁄cult to think of any information item or analysis that was relevant at a
higher level if it was not relevant at the level below it. This was true respect for
those undertaking the operational work of the NHS, whilst also recognising the
need for modern management of an informed nature, in rather the way which
was articulated a decade later by Sir Roy Gri⁄ths.
The freshness of Edith K˛rner’s approach ^ the legacy upon which this
volume seeks to build ^ was not framed in speci¢c recommendations and
reports, important though they were at the time and in many ways still con-
tinue to have in£uence. Rather, it was the important recognition of information
as a key management tool, with its concomitant need to apply consistent objec-
tive principles and methods in the NHS to its recording, gathering and use that
was the beacon. The reports of her steering group start with an analysis of the
requirements for information, and many of the concepts she described were
articulated in ways well ahead of their time. The terms ‘health gain’ or ‘cost-
e¡ectiveness’ may not have been current at the time, but those underlying
concepts can clearly be seen in the arguments expressed. Alistair Mason, who
provides our ¢rst contribution, was the secretary to the Steering Group, and
therefore worked with Edith K˛rner closely on a daily basis. My own role at the
time was much more humble, as a mere co-optee to one working group, but
the fact that we were both treated in the same way, and both have the same
warm yet respectful recalls, is itself an example of Edith K˛rner’s inspiring open-
ness and inclusiveness in every sense of the word.
The great disappointment of Edith K˛rner’s work was that it never reached
true fruition. Very seldom does the public service, not least the NHS organ-
isation, have capacity for a visionary. Mrs K˛rner started o¡ along an important
road towards the development of e¡ective purposeful information systems;
the powers that be decided that her ¢rst, interim, reports were perfectly ade-
quate as the ¢nal answer. For them the future was for others, and so not their
xii Preface
responsibility. Edith K˛rner and her immediate colleagues were bitterly disap-
pointed; the NHS and healthcare have su¡ered seriously as a result. I hope this
volume provides a modest opportunity to give visionary thinking an appropri-
ate outlet.
However, Edith K˛rner’s work, although refreshingly clear and objective,
was neither cold nor divorced from real life. That, indeed, is part of the endear-
ing richness of the example she left. It is important not to let leading-edge think-
ing, nor top-level national responsibilities, become either remote or cold. Those
who worked with Edith K˛rner will each have a favourite personal anecdote.
One legend concerns a time when Mrs K˛rner was invited to speak to the
young members’ branch of a national professional organisation. After the for-
mal proceedings, Mrs K˛rner made it clear that she preferred to socialise with
the young members rather than the platform party. Someone di⁄dently invited
her to join the table tennis party, which she willing accepted, and play com-
menced in a gentle style with due respect for the dignity of their older guest.
Sometime later, when the visiting speaker had thoroughly trounced all the
young members, she gently asked whether they were unaware that she had
been a youth champion in the country of her birth. Like her cognitive skills,
this physical performance was little diminished with age.
A quite separate anecdote relates to the time, in the midst of the full £urry of
the work of the steering group, when, after a strenuous week, a relaxing week-
end was clearly deserved and needed. However, on subsequently enquiring
whether rest and recreation had indeed been the order of the weekend, the
reply was that she had completed some home plumbing. When those present
argued that this was not what was planned or appropriate, her comment was
archetypical of the lady, ‘The job had to be done and no plumber was available. So I
thought of the IQ of a plumber, I thought of my IQ, and wondered why I was waiting and
then going to pay a large sum of money, so I went out and bought a book and did the job
myself.’ This was not in any way an anti-tradesman statement, but rather a phi-
losophy that if something needed doing the central duty was to acquire the skills
and do the job, and not to consider any essential task demeaning.
Those two anecdotes encapsulate the humanitarian inspiration which Edith
K˛rner provided. She was able to mix and enjoy the company of anyone, and to
tackle any necessary task, but in both cases to do them with good grace, to a
high standard, and above all, with enjoyment.
Edith K˛rner may have been ahead of her time, or conversely the times may
not have been ready for her. She brought a blend of experience, common sense,
rigorous analysis and vision to an important task, and that is a powerful mix-
ture that serves as a model framework. She may not have ¢nished her task as
she saw it, or indeed as others hoped it would be undertaken, but there is no
doubt that she left a legacy ^ both of practice and of principle ^ that has
endured. These are important lessons for the future of health information ^ to
have objectivity, clarity and vision; to recognise the skills and the humanity of
Preface xiii
those delivering care at the operational level; and at the same time to recognise
the importance of accurate and timely management information derived from
operational data. Those principles may have been overshadowed by political
expediency in aspects of recent policy, which has itself proved far less enduring,
but their appropriateness is shown by the fact that they can be recognised as
themes in each of the papers in this collection.
Michael Rigby
Reader in Health Planning and Management
Keele University
July 2003
About the editor
This publication, Vision and Value in Health Information, not only celebrates the
contribution of Edith K˛rner over the years but also o¡ers a signi¢cant chal-
lenge for a proper place for health information in the modernisation of health
services in the UK.
The Nu⁄eld Trust, in its Policy Futures for UK Health1 project, was attempting
to analyse the broad environment for health in this country in the year 2015,
and the implications of that for current UK health policy. The trust indicated
some areas where the government could take action now in order to anticipate
the likely circumstances of 2015. This time frame was chosen carefully with a
view to making a constructive contribution to policy development and not
creating a piece of abstract futurology. The period under review extended
beyond the usual constraint of the electoral cycle but was short enough to
allow a realistic assessment of future developments.
The report was in the Nu⁄eld Trust tradition of stimulating change in the
culture of the health policy-making process, and of encouraging thinking and
analysis based on evidence. There were three messages to the prime minister:
The study foresaw very radical new developments in, among other things,
information and communication technology, that would move conventional
professional boundaries within the workforce and change the locations of
care. All three areas highlighted that an e¡ective policy for information and
information technology (IT) was essential. No business runs on as little infor-
mation or IT expertise and capability as does the NHS, or has invested so little
in general sta¡ training or in raising awareness of the importance of data, infor-
mation and intelligence. Unless information is properly gathered, organised,
analysed and used, the NHS will continue to lack some of the most basic tools
of policy-making and may be unable to cope with the changes that lie ahead,
still less with moderate public expectations in relation to them.
Central to stimulating debate on the problems that we now face and will
face in the future, the Nu⁄eld Trust is pursuing its interest in benchmarking.
xxii Introduction
A great deal of interesting work is being done on this, for example by the Orga-
nization for Economic and Commercial Development (OECD) and the World
Health Organization (WHO). One central question will be: how can we tell
how well what we are doing in the UK works? It is essential that indicators are
developed to permit accurate assessment of where we are now, so that sensible
benchmarks can be set on where we want to be by the year 2015. This emphasis
is about perpetuating the K˛rner cause.
We are at an in£exion point in healthcare, with advances in biomedical
science, and looming developments in genetics, pharmacology, computing and
nanotechnology all acting as agents for change. But our health systems are still
unable to deliver a consistently high level of error-free healthcare. Data that
support the development of evidence should be of proven value to individuals,
the population and patients. Sound policy and IT should assist everyone con-
cerned with the healthcare system, but above all should help clinicians to
improve their operational decisions. We also need to provide consumers and
patients with accurate information that stimulates them to demand action to
improve the service they receive. Measurement and reporting lie at the heart of
the ability to identify where errors are occurring, and the need to deal with
them, as well as giving those funding the health system the ability to control
and direct their resources more accurately. Empowering the public is one of
the potentially largest drivers for improvement in our healthcare system.
There is a degree of dissatisfaction among patients with the outcomes in the
present NHS and this may be a potent means of building pressure for change.
Information initiatives are important.
The role of information and IT should also be central to improving the quality
of healthcare. It is already almost impossible for clinicians to keep abreast of
advances in their ¢elds, and even the present rate of advance in knowledge
might soon overwhelm doctors, so it is clear that it is impossible for individual
doctors to cope with the impending genetics revolution. There is a need for
information and IT systems that assist doctors and patients at the point of
decision. We need visionary information, information systems and communica-
tions technology projects almost akin to putting a man on the moon to achieve a
goal which would not only be of immense bene¢t to societies in industrialised
countries, but could also be of relevance in developing countries.
Lastly, I would like to focus on public interest in information. We now live in a
period where public disclosure of information about quality at the level of
named hospitals, doctors and primary care organisations, is becoming the
norm. In the USA this movement is being driven by a variety of stakeholders ^
government, business and the public. In the UK, the government (with some
public support) is the primary force behind the movement. At the core of this
movement is the concept that producing public information about the quality
of care actually provided will complement all those who are putting systems in
place to improve quality. The public disclosure of information should help the
Introduction xxiii
quality of care improve rapidly in the ¢rst three decades in the 21st cen-
tury, faster than it did in the last three decades of the 20th century. The hope is
that the provision of appropriate data, information and intelligence will contri-
bute to more rapid improvement in the delivery of quality healthcare ^ no over-
use, underuse or misuse of medical interventions. This is the continuing K˛rner
challenge.
Reference
1 Dargie C, Dawson S and Garside P (2000) Policy Futures for UK Health. 2000 report. Nuf-
¢eld Trust, London.
CHAPTER 1
The background
In 1975, Prime Minister Harold Wilson set up a Royal Commission to consider
the best use and management of the ¢nancial and sta¡ resources of the National
Health Service (NHS). It reported in July 1979 to a Conservative government
that accepted the larger part of the 117 recommendations.
As usual, implementation was dominated by structural change. The restruc-
turing of 1982 adopted the key recommendation to abolish area health author-
ities (AHAs). The new structure was to comprise 14 regional health authorities
(RHAs), 192 district health authorities (DHAs) and 90 separate family practi-
tioner committees (FPCs).
Royal Commission comments about the need to strengthen local manage-
ment were also instrumental in the genesis of the management review, led by
Roy Gri⁄ths, and the consequent implementation of the general management
function in 1984.
The royal commissioners severely criticised the state of the national infor-
mation systems, which were broadly unchanged from those existing before the
previous NHS re-organisation of 1974. In particular, they were concerned
about the lack of information available for monitoring and controlling resource
utilisation.
The regionally organised computerised hospital activity analysis statistical
system contained data about all inpatients discharged from general hospitals.
From this regional database a 10% sample was submitted to the Department of
Health to form the national hospital inpatient enquiry database. There was a
separate mental health enquiry containing information about discharges from
psychiatric hospitals and units. A variety of systems collected data about mater-
nity events. The major managerial data sources were Form SH 3, the annual
2 Vision and value in health information
facilities return from each hospital, and Form SBH 203, containing waiting list
data. These systems formed a body of statistical data for policy use by the
Department of Health, from which standard summary tables were published in
report form, inevitably with a time delay. There were major concerns about
data accuracy and timeliness, and the relevance to contemporary clinical prac-
tice, of the de¢nitions and classi¢cations of all these systems.
However, the royal commissioners also identi¢ed some promising informa-
tion research projects. As part of the ‘clinicians in management’ initiative in
the late 1970s, two former district administrators, John Yates and Iden Wick-
ings, were successfully developing new techniques for performance indicators
and clinical budgeting. In 1982, concerns about deaths after operations led to
the con¢dential enquiry into peri-operative deaths being set up. Some comput-
ing projects were beginning to show the bene¢ts that electronic data capture
and storage might bring.
It was against this background that the NHS/DHSS Steering Group on Health
Services Information carried out its work from 1980 to 1985.
The steering group was to be permanent (to ‘keep under review’), to have
primacy in information matters (to ‘resolve issues requiring a co-ordinated
approach’) and to be responsible for implementing its proposals. Mrs Edith
K˛rner, vice-chair of the South Western Regional Health Authority, was
appointed as chair.
At the time civil servants were very uncomfortable with the concept that an
independent, and thus di⁄cult to control, group should be given responsibility
to implement its own recommendations. Mrs K˛rner took her case direct to
Secretary of State, Patrick Jenkin, and obtained the implementation commit-
ment that she wanted. The political timing was opportune because in 1980
there was emphasis on greater decentralisation of the NHS, and recognition by
ministers that those in the periphery should have more in£uence on the centre.
Edith Körner: visionary, NHS reformer and friend 3
The chair
By choosing the hitherto little-known vice-chair of the South Western RHA to
become chair of the steering group, ministers cannot have imagined the force
they were unleashing. Mrs K˛rner may not have had a reputation outside her
4 Vision and value in health information
region, but within it her ability to tackle and solve the really di⁄cult problems
without fear or favour was legendary.
I ¢nd it very di⁄cult to write objectively about this extraordinary woman.
As so many adverse things have happened to the NHS it is impossible not to look
back at the early 1980s as a golden age. Memories thus tend to be rose-coloured.
However, David King, one of Mrs K˛rner’s closest NHS friends, summed up
her qualities admirably in Walk Don’t Run, the original set of essays to honour
Mrs Körner, published in 1985:
She established her authority by brute ability, being better informed and
working harder than anyone else. Everyone accepts that she knows more
about the subject and has read more (in several languages) about it than
any two other people. Hers is not merely a detailed knowledge of a limited
technical subject, for her grasp of health services internationally and the
changes they are undergoing provide a general context into which the
invaluable auxiliary information ¢ts.
Mrs K˛rner’s commitment to the task and her capacity for hard work never
£agged, even when, in addition to everything else, she was found to be
rattling over every inch of British Rail’s track to attend or address meet-
ings. Happily, these formidable qualities are leavened with a keen sense of
humour, and when K˛rner activity was in full £ood, it was rare to meet
anyone engaged in it who did not start the conversation with the latest
anecdote or bon mot.
Powerful intellect and incisive humour are not always an endearing com-
bination unless, as in her case, they go with a genuine regard for others,
whatever their station and ability. This respect and a¡ection for the NHS
and its sta¡ were apparent to all, and people sensed that here was a refor-
mer with her heart in the right place.
The friend
Colleagues who have su¡ered over the last 15 years with chairs, bent solely on
supporting the political fancies of the day, will envy the relationships we had
within the steering group. Mrs K˛rner was a Jewess, born originally in Czecho-
slovakia, and blessed with many of the talents of this culturally rich group of
immigrants who arrived during the 1930s.
Like the archetype Jewish grandmother she worried. She worried about the
progress of the work; she worried about us in the secretariat, and she worried,
above all, from day one, about how recommendations were to be implemented.
Indeed, Mrs K˛rner was only happy when she was worrying. Many a Friday
evening I received a telephone call about a new danger facing us, allowing
Edith Körner: visionary, NHS reformer and friend 5
me to share it with her over the weekend. This constant concern about what
was, and what might happen, underpinned an attention to detail and the rapid
resolution of potential con£icts that were essential to the successful completion
of the work
Mrs K˛rner’s command of the English language was unsurpassed. Tom Stop-
pard, a fellow countryman, sent her his plays in draft for comment. She wrote
brilliant satirical pieces for the health and social services journal, including the
cult-status column ‘Dear Charles’. Although we in the secretariat did the tech-
nical writing, Mrs K˛rner meticulously corrected the punctuation, added a ¢nal
literary gloss and chose the frequently obscure but always apt quotation asso-
ciated with each publication. The clarity of the writing was a major reason for
the ready acceptance of the recommendations by NHS sta¡.
We travelled endlessly to market our proposals and to hear the views of the
NHS face-to-face. However inept the comment or malicious the intent, she trea-
ted all questioners as intellectual equals and never put down or embarrassed
them in public. This active engagement with NHS rank and ¢le engendered a
respect and a¡ection still held today by all who were involved. There was feeling
amongst many that although they may not have understood the technical
merits of the recommendations they must be good because she was.
Mrs K˛rner took a genuine interest in our families, sharing concern about
childhood ailments and o¡ering excellent advice about educational and beha-
vioural problems. One of my children in his teens needed some time and space
to himself, and she and her husband, typically generous, entertained him for a
week with very successful results.
Indeed, the most memorable experience of that period was a personal moment
not a work one. Three years into the project we were invited to a World Health
Organization (WHO) conference in Dˇsseldorf. This was the ¢rst time she had
returned to Germany since travelling through it alone in 1938 in a sealed rail-
way carriage as a 17-year-old girl on the way to freedom in England. Though
very apprehensive she behaved with dignity and supreme professionalism. The
only clue to the inner turmoil of emotions was the doubling of an already signif-
icant nicotine habit. It was a privilege to have been with her.
The vision
The work done by the steering group was informed by the clear vision developed
by its chair. The activity focused on information for health service manage-
ment. The guiding principle governing the approach was that data should be
collected because they are essential for operational purposes. User-orientated
information yields bene¢ts to those who collect it, and thus provides an incen-
tive for accuracy and expedition. From this simple central vision there emerged
a number of logical consequences.
6 Vision and value in health information
. The central DHSS returns, which at that time totally dominated the develop-
ment of information systems, must be determined by the data required locally.
The information needs of district management should be paramount and the
data submitted to the DHSS con¢ned to a small subset of the district data set.
. Every DHA and its o⁄cers need a minimum amount of data available to
them, collected as a by-product of operational processes, to carry out their
management function. An authority not regularly using such data is handi-
capped by being inadequately informed when ful¢lling its responsibilities.
. The recommendations about data items to be included in the district mini-
mum data set should be a compromise between the desirable, the feasible
and the a¡ordable. It was felt that this pragmatic approach would lead to
proposals adopted in a reasonable timescale, with feasibility being de¢ned
as implementable within three years
. In order to make informed judgements about their own performance, mem-
bers and o⁄cers require information not only about their own district but
also comparable information about others. To enhance the validity of such
comparisons, standard de¢nitions and classi¢cations should be developed for
each requisite data item.
. Although the district minimum data set is relevant to operational managers,
most units and departments will wish to collect more data for their own
purposes. However, the variety of local arrangements militates against the
national prescription of standard data sets for every managerial entity.
. To meet the increasing need for IT within districts, considerable design
work is essential to ensure compatibility between di¡erent computer sys-
tems. Investment in computer systems was considered by the steering group
to be only justi¢ed when the bene¢ts of better information were added to the
improvements in operational processes.
. As clinical and management practices change, data collected about hospital
patients and resources have to be altered to accord with current reality. The
minimum data set is therefore not set for all time. Its relevance must be reg-
ularly reviewed and its content appropriately updated.
Rarely can a national group reforming the NHS have had such a simple sustain-
able vision; one that is as relevant to today’s health economies as it was to the
DHAs of the 1980s.
The work
The work for which the steering group became best known was the develop-
ment of the district minimum data sets. Seven working groups were set up to
review the information needed to cover all aspects of heath authority activity,
Edith Körner: visionary, NHS reformer and friend 7
manpower and management accounting. To re£ect the vision, the work in each
area was done in two stages. Groups of NHS experts were brought together to
develop the minimum data set. No civil servants, no representatives of special
interest groups or external management consultants were involved. The talent
was all from within the NHS.
Once the district needs had been identi¢ed, a second group (with civil servants
as well as NHS sta¡) agreed the subset of the minimum data set that would
be made available to the DHSS. All the recommended data items were de¢ned
and classi¢ed. Any new data items, de¢nitions or classi¢cations were piloted
for feasibility of collection in four participating health districts.
Extensive consultation took place on each report. In addition to the usual
formal written exercise, numerous meetings were held with specialist groups
nationally and regional gatherings all over the country. An innovative feature
was the setting up of K˛rner Klubs at four regional centres which met quarterly
to be kept abreast of developments and to feed back their views and comments.
In view of subsequent events it is interesting that the only signi¢cant criti-
cism came from computer professionals who objected not to the products but
to the lack of one of their systems-based methodologies to support them. Great
care was taken to ensure that the ¢nal reports showed signs of having been
changed as a result of the consultation process.
Given this open process in which the NHS was totally involved, when pub-
lished, the reports contained no surprises and were in tune with the needs of
health authorities and their management teams. Indeed, everything was done
to make implementation feel a natural extension of the development work.
It became clear at the outset that recommendations about new data would
not of themselves ensure the e¡ective provision of information for health service
management. The steering group therefore embarked on a parallel programme
to improve the environment in which data were collected and information pro-
duced. A working group was set up to develop standards for maintaining the
con¢dentiality of patient and employee data. Numerous workshops of NHS
experts were held to develop best practice for medical records, district informa-
tion services, data standards and library services. Training materials were
developed using, for the ¢rst time in the NHS, videos and computer-based inter-
active techniques.
Despite not having formal responsibility for computing issues, the steering
group supported two important IT clinical developments. The computer-based
accident and emergency records project was based in Leeds and piloted at three
sites. The maternity project involved funding seven sites to develop software, all
using the minimum data set.
One area that the steering group decided not to address directly was the
development and speci¢cation of the information that should be presented to
health authorities. It was felt very strongly that initiatives of this kind would
depress the creativity of NHS managers. However, the group did commission
8 Vision and value in health information
The publications
The steering group’s publications are shown below (see opposite). There were
seven reports to the Secretary of State. Two working group reports were
published directly by the steering group. Seven occasional papers on information
issues were published by the King’s Fund. As a tribute to Mrs Körner, a
collection of essays by key participants in the work was published in 1985.
The outcome
As the minimum data set reports came out from 1982 onwards and the moment
for pressing the implementation button arrived, there was a crucial change in
ministers. Out went devolver Patrick Jenkin and in came centraliser Norman
Fowler.
Although ministers praised the work, there was no way they felt they could
entrust the crucial task of implementation to the steering group. Mrs K˛rner,
knowing that key civil servants did not share her vision and that they were very
concerned about their loss of central control and power, insisted that the new
ministers honoured the commitments of their predecessors. With an impasse
of this nature there is only one outcome. Mrs K˛rner resigned from the steer-
ing group and the computer technocrats in the DHSS became responsible for
implementation.
Without Mrs K˛rner the steering group limped on for another six months,
completing the development work before being put out of its misery in 1985.
Despite taking every conceivable precaution to ensure that the vision could be
sustained she was beaten by the political process. Within a couple of years the
NHS information culture had reverted. The needs of the DHSS were again para-
mount. The central returns, now ironically called K˛rner returns, multiplied
and assumed ever-increasing importance.
The legacy
In the introduction to Walk Don’t Run, Robert Maxwell, Director of the King’s
Fund, encapsulated the hopes of many senior NHS personnel when he wrote:
Edith Körner: visionary, NHS reformer and friend 9
Perhaps I may make two ¢nal comments that are not directly connected
with the task of implementing the Steering Group’s ¢ndings. The ¢rst is
a plea that the energy released by the device of a genuine partnership
between the NHS and the DHSS will be remembered. It points to the advan-
tage of challenging people at all levels in the service to take an active rather
than a passive role in problem resolution. It also underlines that NHS
people and DHSS people can be far more e¡ective working closely together
rather than at arm’s length.
10 Vision and value in health information
The second comment concerns the need to see the K˛rner reports as an
important stage in the continuing evolution of health services information,
not as an end point. It would show a sad unawareness of Mrs K˛rner’s
quickness and breadth of mind to allow NHS information systems to set in
concrete, rather than continue to develop.
Sadly, the challenge was not forthcoming again and the concrete set. If any
contemporary NHS manager thinks of K˛rner it is in the context of the ever
more burdensome central returns and the use of the ¢nished consultant epi-
sode as the currency of the internal market. Both perceptions are nothing to do
with the work of the steering group but re£ect the way that civil servants have
used the K˛rner name to maintain their centrally determined approach to
national information systems.
Mrs K˛rner had a powerful but simple vision that was ably communicated to,
and accepted by, the NHS but was not palatable to the DHSS. A series of techni-
cally competent products about data content and the information environment
spelt out the necessary detail to ensure the vision could be implemented.
All this was for naught when, in one of the periodic political swings from
decentralisation to centralisation, ministers and their advisers decided that she
could not be trusted to implement her proposals in a way that would be accep-
table to the DHSS. Instead, they handed over this crucial task to her greatest
critics. The primacy of the user was replaced by dominance of the computer
technocrat, and devolved management again dominated by central demands.
Unfortunately, in that process the name of the visionary driving force has
been tarnished through association with an approach which breached her own
clear principles.
NHS information services, and consequently all attempts at NHS reform,
have su¡ered ever since. Moreover, the enduring lessons on e¡ective manage-
ment of innovation in information systems have continued to go unheeded.
CHAPTER 2
Introduction
It is now more than 20 years since the Department of Health and Social Security
(DHSS) set up the NHS/DHSS Steering Group on Health Services Informa-
tion, chaired by Edith K˛rner. This initiative was the ¢rst comprehensive and
detailed review of the statistics available for health service management since
the health service was founded in 1948.
Is there any justi¢cation now for revisiting and reassessing the achievements
of Mrs K˛rner and her colleagues? A quick glance through the indexes of several
contemporary textbooks of health informatics suggests that the current genera-
tion of health information students and practitioners is very unlikely to be
exposed to the goals and methods of the steering group. At the same time, an
older generation of clinicians and managers may feel that K˛rner’s work is quite
irrelevant to the challenges they face in the wake of Information for Health.1 For
some, the steering group may seem an anachronism, a throwback to the days
before the internet, clinical codes, electronic patient records and trust intranets.
If we subscribe to the view that the solution to current information problems
in the NHS lies with advances in communication and information technologies
then Edith K˛rner seems to have little relevance to the challenges facing the
health service today.
The goal of this chapter is to challenge this perception by demonstrating that
Mrs K˛rner’s insight and initiative still have relevance for the NHS and to all
those involved with the modernisation agenda. The reason for her continuing
relevance lies in the fact that she identi¢ed a set of methodological and episte-
mological problems which are as relevant today as they were 20 years ago.
More to the point, some of her recommendations that were not implemented
are worth revisiting.
K˛rner’s vision
I remember how astonished I was when I ¢rst encountered the six reports pro-
duced by the steering group chaired by Edith K˛rner from 1980 to 1984. It was
12 Vision and value in health information
in the early 1990s ( just before the launch of the ¢rst national health informa-
tion strategy) and I was designing a health informatics course for health science
students. When I started to read about Mrs K˛rner’s work, the ¢rst thing that
struck me was the scope of her project and how much she and her team had
achieved in such a brief time. In the space of four years, the steering group
looked at the collection and use of information about:
I was intrigued to know more about the chair ^ who was she; how did she come
to take on the task of reforming the way in which information was captured and
used; and what methods did she use to carry out this herculean task? But above
all, I wanted to know what motivated her to devote ¢ve years of her life to this
project. What was her vision? The ¢rst surprise when I started to investigate
was the fact that she did not come from either a ‘techie’ or an information
science background. Nor was she a clinician. Uniquely, Mrs K˛rner brought to
the job her managerial experience, a capacity for hard work and a commitment
to an open, participatory approach to the task of rethinking the information
needs of the NHS. As I read about her and the work of the steering group, I was
struck by the clarity of their vision and the revolutionary implications of what
they were seeking to achieve.
the majority have preferred to denigrate the statistics rather than improve
them and face the music2
Edith K˛rner was out of step with the majority; she was committed to ¢nding a
way to improve the way that data were collected and statistics generated. But
the improvements she was seeking extended far beyond better data quality and
information systems. On the surface, it may seem that the focus of the steering
group was on number-crunching: statistics, data de¢nitions and minimum data
sets. But in fact, from reading the reports and other documents produced by the
steering group and the working groups, it is clear that the protocols for data
Learning from history 13
collection and the statistics were just a means to an end. The real goal was
to improve the quality of healthcare. Speaking at a conference in 1983, Mrs
K˛rner said that she saw the working party as the means of reaching the true
objectives of the NHS, namely better health for more people.3
My reading of Edith K˛rner’s approach to reforming the system of data collec-
tion suggests that she was aware of trends in the commercial sector where
chief executives were waking up to the value of information and the need to
have a corporate approach to information. Under her chairmanship, the steer-
ing group adopted this concept:
The steering group saw its project as being at the very heart of the changes that
were taking place in the health service. It could see that political and economic
pressures would bring new demands for accountability, and at the same time
the introduction of new models of management was imminent. What needed
to be done was ‘to align the collection, processing and dissemination of informa-
tion in the NHS to clinical and economic realities of the present and the future’.5
In this emerging climate, managers and clinicians needed better-quality data
to allow them to determine:
What strikes me as signi¢cant about Mrs K˛rner’s vision of the role of health
information is that it was grounded in a shrewd reading of where the world
was moving and how this would impinge on public services in general and
the health services in particular. But her vision was wedded to an unshake-
able commitment to the core values of the NHS. Although the K˛rner reports are
often characterised as being pragmatic, this does not mean they were devoid
of ideals.
The challenge facing Mrs K˛rner was to convince a wide range of stake-
holders that changes were needed, and to give clear guidance on how things
needed to change. To appreciate the scale of this challenge we need to consider
what the world was like in 1980 when the Secretary of State for Social Services
set up the NHS/DHSS Steering Group on Health Services Information.
14 Vision and value in health information
To summarise, the charges were: that there was a lack of clarity about what
information was needed; that data quality was suspect; that there were gaps in
provision; and that there were problems with accessibility, timeliness and pre-
sentation. Clearly, there was urgent need for reform.
The terms of reference for the steering group were very broad:
. to agree, implement and keep under review principles and procedures to
guide future development of health service information systems
. to identify and resolve health service information issues requiring a co-
ordinated approach
. to review existing health service information systems
. to consider proposals for changes to, or development in, health service infor-
mation systems arising elsewhere and, if acceptable, to assess priorities for
their development and implementation.
To appreciate what Edith K˛rner achieved, given this broad brief and the tight
timescale for delivering the reports, it is useful to look at the process by which the
steering group collected its evidence, as well as some of its recommendations.
adopted to their work was very pragmatic. Reading the reports and the sup-
plementary material, it is very apparent that members of this group were not
theoreticians or academics, but people who were very connected to the realities
of the NHS. Furthermore, they were aware of the need to test their assumptions,
to ¢nd out if their proposed reforms were feasible (what we would nowadays
think of as ‘rapid prototyping’).
Their working method was to build a model (such as their interim reports)
and then test in the reality of the workplace whether the ideas were feasible.
Four NHS health districts volunteered to act as test-beds for this work. From
the report of their experiences,12 the working methods of the steering group
can be summarised (see box).
Whatever one might think of what the steering group achieved, it is very hard to
fault its method. If you are trying to make sense of chaos, and to engage all the
stakeholders, the K˛rner approach seems an eminently sensible way forward.
Has this vision stood the test of time? I think that Mrs K˛rner’s vision has proved
to be remarkably robust. Apart from queries about the scope of the minimum
data set, most of us today could still sign up to her conception of what a
well-organised information system would be like. The principles she enunciated
20 years ago mirror the rules and exhortations found in most contempor-
ary books on the design of information systems. Her vision encompasses good
Learning from history 17
practice with respect to data quality and information capture, and also demon-
strates a ¢rm grasp of socio-organisational issues. The one element which you
might say is absent from this sketch of Mrs K˛rner’s vision is a reference to tech-
nology. This omission is quite deliberate because my reading of her suggests
that she ¢rmly believed that technology could not deliver bene¢ts unless there
is an integrated concept of the objectives of the organisation. So technology is a
way of delivering the vision but it is not part of the vision.
To achieve the vision, the steering group argued that the following actions
needed to be taken:
. Create an information environment in which all who work in the NHS care
about data and have the education, training and support needed to work
with data.
. Establish the credibility of data ^ ensure it is trusted, easy to access, easy to
understand, and, most importantly, easy to turn into information.
. Foster a culture in the NHS in which clinicians and managers use informa-
tion to inform decision, to plan for the future, to monitor performance and
outcomes.
In a sense these are all actions that had to be part and parcel of the implementa-
tion phase. The thinking behind all this is that if these conditions are ful¢lled,
patients will bene¢t. Edith K˛rner’s vision anticipated a rational NHS, where
decisions were based on information, intelligence and evidence.
. Did the steering group ¢nish the task it set out to do in the designated time? Here,
the answer is ‘yes’. The steering group wound up its work in 1984 with pub-
lication of its sixth report.
. Did the steering group use an explicit method and did it consult widely? Full
marks here. Its method is clearly spelled out and the consultative process was
extensive.
. Were the recommendations of the steering group accepted? Yes ^ in April 1984
the government decided to back the national implementation of the K˛rner
18 Vision and value in health information
Leaving Windsor’s caveats to one side, by and large on the basis of the four
questions asked earlier, the K˛rner project should be judged to have been a suc-
cess. But, as the steering group clearly recognised, this would be misleading:
the success or failure of our work will be judged not by the quality of our
reports or by the successful implementation of our recommendations about
data and systems. The key criterion by which our performance must be assessed
is the extent to which the information derived from the new data sets is used
to make decisions about the allocation, planning and review of resources [author’s
italics].14
In other words, Edith K˛rner set very stringent criteria by which to judge the
success of her work. Did the K˛rner reports break the vicious cycle of underuse
of information and poor quality of data collected? Here I think the answer is
‘no’. To back up this assertion, there is evidence to suggest that in the post-
K˛rner environment, the availability and use of health information did not
show marked improvement.
In 1988, the Social Services Committee had this to say about the quality and
usefulness of health information:
The last major weakness of the National Health Service is that it is not pos-
sible to tell whether or not it works. There are no outcome measures to
speak of other than that of crude numbers of patients treated. There is
little monitoring on behalf of the public. As a result, the correct level of
funding for the NHS cannot be determined.15
Commenting about NHS information in 1992 (¢ve years after the K˛rner
reports were meant to have been implemented), Cyril Chantler noted that
Learning from history 19
‘To outside observers the lack of relevant information for management in the
NHS is surprising.’16
Barbara Young, writing as President of the Institute of Health Services
Management, in the Foreword to Information for Action, also suggested that,
despite the K˛rner reforms, managers remained disengaged from the informa-
tion agenda:
Further evidence that Mrs K˛rner failed to bring about changes in information
practices can be inferred from the list of questions (see box) the British Medical
Association (BMA), in the early 1990s, said needed to be asked about informa-
tion. These questions show considerable overlap with those she posed, suggest-
ing again that the reports had not had the desired impact.
Managers give numerous excuses to justify their failure to be informed, one of the
most common being that data cannot be trusted. Although Mrs K˛rner recog-
nised that there was some truth to this claim, she felt it also provided an excuse
for inaction. To change this situation, a whole range of measures needed to be
put in place to develop an information culture, for example education and train-
ing, skills audit, development of data standards, development of best admin-
istrative practice for safeguarding patient data and promotion of the use of IT:
Looking back now more than 20 years since the steering group began its work,
we must admit that the necessary cultural and organisational changes have
still not occurred. But do we place this failure at Edith K˛rner’s doorstep?
I think it would be most unfair to blame the steering group for having failed to
promote better use of information in the NHS. Nor does the fact that Edith K˛rner
did not succeed in achieving what she had set out to do mean the vision was
£awed. To understand the fact that we are still struggling to cultivate a culture
which values and uses information we need to look at what happened between
the time the reports were commissioned and the time they were delivered. With
hindsight, we can identify six interconnected developments which undermined
Mrs K˛rner’s agenda.
First, there were major political and economic changes; the whole landscape
of the public sector changed signi¢cantly from the time Mrs K˛rner began her
work. The phrase that is sometimes used to characterise this change is ‘the end
of the era of optimism’. The medical sociologist, Mary Ann Elston, describes the
emergence of a new climate in which questioning the e⁄ciency and e¡ectiveness
of medicine’s use of resources became a more legitimate activity for politicians.
‘The swift introduction, following the Gri⁄ths Report in 1983, of general man-
agers charged with responsibility for the e⁄cient use of resources,’ Elston
suggests, ‘apparently cut a swathe across established lines of professional
responsibility and clinical freedom.’19 ‘By 1985, it was possible to identify a
series of (government) moves which arguably at least are beginning to amount
to a confrontation with the medical profession.’19
The reaction of the professions is encapsulated in Trevor Clay’s pronounce-
ment, ‘The Gri⁄ths Inquiry . . . signalled the demise of professional power in
the NHS. The doctors were deemed important only in so far as they could be
nudged into management’ (as quoted by Elston pp. 68^69).19
Learning from history 21
the NHS has been pushed from information into Information Technology
to the extent the two have become synonymous, especially in general man-
agement’s eyes.22
Edith K˛rner never thought the computer would be the panacea to the in-
formation problems of the NHS information. In her preface to the workshop
proceedings, Developing a District IT Policy, she put her ¢nger on the key
problem ^ technology is seen as the holy grail, but for technology to deliver ben-
e¢ts, managers need to be understand what information systems can and
cannot do. She perceived that we are in a Heraclidean landscape, with the river
of technology changing from moment to moment. To survive in this situation,
we need to be nimble and adaptable, ‘only a process in which teaching learning
22 Vision and value in health information
and doing interact constantly with each other, will allow us to acquire and
maintain the skills which we shall need in the years to come’.23
Mrs K˛rner was also percipient in her observation that the problems of apply-
ing IT solutions in a healthcare environment are not just technical, ‘they
extend to structural concerns of centralisation and decentralisation and to the
respective roles of technical experts vis-a'-vis lay computer users’. To rephrase
this in modern jargon, Edith K˛rner was aware that when developing a coher-
ent information policy and an IT system, some process re-engineering may well
need to take place.
Sixth, the process of culture change was much more di⁄cult to achieve than
anticipated. Despite K˛rner’s repeated messages about the need to invest in
people, a coherent education, training and professional development strategy
was not set in place. Even today we are still wrestling with the problem of how
best to prepare clinicians, managers and administrative and clerical sta¡ to
value and use information. To paraphrase the American sociologist Daniel Bell,
we all live in an information society; we are all information workers, but few of us
are prepared to play this role.
In the ¢nal chapter of Walk Don’t Run Yates re£ects on the costs of using infor-
mation.21 His appraisal goes beyond the obvious ¢nancial costs. One of the costs
Yates identi¢es is a willingness to change working practices on the basis of
information. This, in turn, means being able to take on the vested interests
that prefer to maintain the status quo. Yates hints that Edith herself paid the
price of ¢ghting to establish an ‘evidence-based health care system’. He suggests
that Mrs K˛rner was not surprised by some of the reactions to her work, ‘she
recognised from the outset that spring cleaning the NHS information system
would be a mammoth task, and probably completely thankless.’
Throughout my research into Edith K˛rner’s work, and her legacy, I have con-
tinued to puzzle over what sort of person she was. My abiding impression is that
she was often misunderstood and criticised for what she did not do. Her critics
seemed reluctant to give her credit for what she had attempted. I empathise
with her long struggle to combat the view that a commitment to rigorous
methods is somehow incompatible with humanistic values. As a teacher, I have
very vivid memories of my struggle to convince nurses and social workers of the
need to be numerate and computer-literate. They justi¢ed their resistance on the
grounds they were ‘people-focused’ and they did not see why I wanted them to
deal with numbers and computers. When addressing the Annual Study Confer-
ence of Health Visitors in 1983, Mrs K˛rner was taken to task by her audience
for thinking it was possible to quantify their work. Health visitors expressed
doubts as to whether the breadth and depth of what they do on a home visit
could be portrayed by a statistic. Her reply was both poignant and revealing,
‘Statistics’, she said, ‘are people with the tears wiped o¡.’3
Edith K˛rner was well aware that her work was far from neutral. A study of
information-gathering in the NHS was potentially subversive for two reasons.
Learning from history 23
First, because it exposed poor organisational design and a lack of rigorous think-
ing about the way clinical work was scheduled and delivered. Second, the crea-
tion of credible data would make it more di⁄cult for clinicians and managers to
conceal poor practice. Her awareness of the political implications of her work is
nicely demonstrated in the choice of quotes used at the start of the six pamphlets
illuminating di¡erent phases of the work of the steering group. The quotations
range from Machiavelli: The Prince, to John Galbraith: The Age of Uncertainty and
John Stewart Mill: On Liberty.
There is little doubt that even today, after two national information strategies,
there is still a gap between data collection and the intelligent use of information.
Does this means that Edith K˛rner failed? I feel this judgement would be too
harsh. The fact that she did not create an environment where all participants
were able to understand their role in the information agenda can be interpreted
in various ways. As suggested previously, the challenges of organisational
development and providing adequate education and training for all who collect
and use information were greater than anticipated. To achieve this demanded a
level of investment and sustained leadership that was not forthcoming. Further-
more, although there were various drivers for change, the really big seismic
forces had not yet hit the NHS in the mid-1980s. Audit, risk management and
clinical governance were still on the distant horizon.
At the stage she was writing (October 1987), the steering group reports had
been accepted and were in the process of being implemented. But far from feel-
ing that the battle had been won, Mrs K˛rner was all too aware of the fragility of
what had been achieved ‘because too many people mistake the milestone for the
¢nishing post’.
24 Vision and value in health information
The danger stemmed from the fact that people might not appreciate that what
was needed was not a once and forever reform of information systems but a
state of permanent revolution. In her words, ‘It is essential that everyone con-
cerned be made to realise and accept that we are moving towards not an event
but a process’. Information management is not ‘a task that can be put to bed
when completed, or a routine which, once established, can be left to run by its
own momentum. It is a demanding and iterative task’.24 (Those involved in
implementing Information for Health1 and Building the Information Core25 might
consider having these words emblazoned on their doors.)
Edith K˛rner was particularly concerned to warn the NHS that in relation to
information there were no simple cures, and that it would be a terrible mistake
for her work to be rei¢ed ^ for the minimum data set to come to be seen as
immutable and for thinking to be frozen as a result of her reports. As far as
Mrs Ko«rner was concerned the NHS information edi¢ce was not complete and
she was utterly opposed to the prospect that information strategies might be
delegated to experts.
K˛rner saw information as a way of mapping the real world. As the world
changes, so the information needed to describe it changes. Edith echoed the
Greek philosopher Heraclides when she said, ‘Thus, while the information task
is iterative, it is not like painting the Forth Bridge: both the bridge and the
method of painting change even as we are painting it.’24
In 1987 Mrs K˛rner recognised that already the data items proposed by the
steering group were ‘feeling the tooth of time’. ‘In the ¢ve years which have
elapsed since publication of the ¢rst report, the NHS world has changed su⁄-
ciently for some of our data de¢nitions and data sets to need revision.’24
The health service after K˛rner . . . is at least a more rational system. The
management and use of information within the system is better under-
stood, de¢ned and standardised, which must lead, particularly with the
national introduction of health care computers, to better patient care.26
The Steering Group . . . provided the basic building blocks of information for
managing the health services.27
The K˛rner reports may also be seen as a natural ¢rst step in preparing for
future managerial and organisational changes in the NHS. . . . both the
government and K˛rner had such policy directions in mind when develop-
ing NHS information requirements in the early 1980s.22
K˛rner’s system is still with us, and forms the basis of the national perfor-
mance indicators. These have been widely criticised ^ perhaps condemned
is a better word ^ principally in the basis that they re£ect input and process
measures, and largely omit outputs and outcomes. Moreover, though in-
tended for local use they re£ected a centralised view of the world, and so
were of limited use to those who collected them. The practical consequence
for local sites was that most of their data collection e¡orts went on data of
little local relevance and most felt they could not commit substantial extra
resources to the collection of other, more relevant data.29
With hindsight the work by Edith K˛rner and her colleagues can be seen
to have underpinned subsequent moves to the general management con-
cept and then the internal market. It is unfortunate that much of their
initial logic and work was seen by the DHSS as making a stick to beat
the NHS with: the resultant stick was called the ‘Department of Health Cen-
tral Returns’.30
Knox and colleagues spelled out the de¢ciencies of the K˛rner reports from the
perspective of community medicine. These authors took issue with the terms of
reference to which the steering group worked:
The data sets delineated by the Steering Group were directed more towards
managing the institutions, the ¢nances and the resources of the NHS and less
26 Vision and value in health information
These aims were admirable and, if achieved, were to support the develop-
ment of general management in the NHS. However, the real outcome was
that ‘implementing K˛rner’ became an end point in itself. Whilst K˛rner
returns may have been helpful to the Department of Health, their useful-
ness within health authorities, in hospitals and for doctors has been extre-
mely questionable.32
K˛rner did, however, ensure that information and IT were put on the man-
agement agenda . . . The need for systems in turn led to resources being
assigned to this area and particularly to the establishment of information
and IT departments.32
Similarly, Windsor, at the start of his critique of K˛rner, pays tribute to her
breadth of vision:
There is no doubt that K˛rner is the most important event ever to hit man-
agement information in the NHS. Nor is there any doubt that it is, in scale,
breadth and quality, a remarkable achievement. . . . K˛rner broke with the
pattern of nearly forty years of apathy about information systems in
the NHS. For the ¢rst time the corporate and not the piecemeal needs of the
service have been structured: one of the reports’ main achievements must
be the end of the nonsense of separate data for local and central require-
ments. . . . Its breath of coverage is unrivalled.13
Un¢nished business
It would be beyond the scope of the current chapter to respond to each of these
criticisms. My general view is that many of the critics focus on what Edith
Learning from history 27
K˛rner did not do and ignore the cogent reasons she gives for limiting her inves-
tigation to the needs of NHS managers and her rationale for not addressing
epidemiological concerns:
The Steering Group’s main concern is with information for health services
management. Thus we have not tackled speci¢cally the information
needed by health professionals to evaluate the results of their care; nor
that needed by individual professional bodies to review the resources to
and the professional work of their members.14
But, as the preamble went on to say, clinicians would ¢nd much in the report to
assist them when reviewing their performance and the amount of resources
devoted to their activities. As for what we now call ‘health needs assessment’,
the steering group had this to say:
In our work we have not directly considered information about the occur-
rence of disease or about the health needs of populations except in so far as
these can be inferred from data about hospital episodes and certain com-
munity health programmes; nor have we made recommendations about
data describing health status or the clinical and social outcomes of the use
of health services.14
Mrs K˛rner’s justi¢cation for excluding epidemiological data was that it lay out-
side the scope of her work. And, regarding health status and social outcomes,
ever the realist, K˛rner observed that:
Final re£ections
In any consideration of a vision for health information, the last word must be
Edith K˛rner’s. In 1984, after all the recommendations of the steering group
had been accepted by the Secretary of State, Mrs K˛rner wrote a article for
the British Medical Journal in which she issued a wake-up call to clinicians. She
warned doctors of the big battles that were raging over resources and made it
clear that they could not expect to be shielded from these. Whilst in the past
such debates took place behind closed doors between the Cabinet and the
28 Vision and value in health information
DHSS, in the years ahead this struggle for funds, she predicted, would become a
familiar problem to all who work in the NHS. Edith K˛rner’s advice was blunt:
to survive you will need evidence. Guesses, unsupported opinions and anecdo-
tal evidence will not prove e¡ective weapons in the battle for resources. This
message needs to be placed alongside Mrs K˛rner’s earlier exhortation to doc-
tors to improve the quality of data on diagnoses and operative procedures. She
pointed out that as this data is recorded by doctors in their clinical notes, it is
they who are solely responsible for the quality of this data. She was well aware
of the implications of this advice and why it might be ignored. ‘The procedures
to maintain high levels of accuracy and completeness of these data items may
impose an unwelcome discipline on doctors who record them.’18
In 1984 Edith K˛rner stood down as the chair of the steering group. She
re£ected on what she had achieved and the challenges that lay ahead. This
was her parting message to the health service:
The Steering Group has led the NHS to the water and cleansed it of sedi-
ment and impurities. Given the country’s economic and political condition,
the service will refuse to drink at its peril.5
References
1 NHS Executive (1998) Information for Health. NHS Executive, Leeds.
2 King D (1985) Mrs K˛rner and her Steering Group. In: A Mason and V Morrison (eds)
Walk Don’t Run: a collection of essays on information issues published to honour Mrs Edith
K˛rner CBE. King Edward’s Hospital Fund for London, London.
3 K˛rner E (1983) Statistics are people with the tears wiped o¡. Health Visitor. 56: 441^2.
4 Kempner V (2000) Statistical returns: past, present and future. In: D Leadbeter (ed)
Harnessing O⁄cial Statistics. Radcli¡e Medical Press, Oxford.
5 K˛rner E (1984) Improving information for the NHS. BMJ. 289: 1635^6.
6 Day C (1985) From Figures to Facts. King’s Fund (on behalf of NHS/DHSS Health Services
Information Steering Group), London.
7 Mason A and Morrison V (eds) (1985). Walk Don’t Run: a collection of essays on informa-
tion issues published to honour Mrs Edith K˛rner CBE. King Edward’s Hospital Fund for
London, London.
8 Department of Health and Social Security (1972). Management Arrangements for the
Reorganised National Health Service (‘The Grey Book’). HMSO, London.
9 Department of Health and Social Security (1976). The Regional Chairmen’s Enquiry
into the Working of the DHSS in Relation to Regional Health Authorities. Report (the three
chairmen’s report). Department of Health and Social Security, London.
Learning from history 29
10 Resource Allocation Working Party (1976) Sharing Resources for Health in England
(RAWP Report). HMSO, London.
11 Royal Commission on the National Health Service (Chairman Sir Alec Merrison) (1979)
Report. Cmnd 7615. HMSO, London.
12 NHS/DHSS Health Services Information Steering Group (1983) Piloting K˛rner: the views
of senior administrators from the four districts who piloted the interim reports of working
groups A to E from 1981 to 1983. King’s Fund, London.
13 Windsor P (1986) Introducing K˛rner: a critical guide to the work and recommendations of the
Steering Group on Health Services Information. British Journal of Healthcare Computing
Publications, Weybridge.
14 Steering Group on Health Services Information (1982) First Report to the Secretary of
State: a report on the collection and use of information about hospital clinical activity in the
National Health Service. HMSO, London.
15 Coulter A (1991) Evaluating the outcomes of health care. In: J Gabe, M Calnan and
M Bury (eds) The Sociology of the Health Service. Routledge, London.
16 Chantler C (1992) Management and information, in the future of health care: articles
published in the British Medical Journal, BMJ, London. 304: 632^5.
17 Lattimer B and Mason A (no date) Information for Action. Institute of Health Services
Management, London.
18 NHS/DHSS Health Services Information Steering Group (1984) Making Data Credible.
King’s Fund, London.
19 Elston MA (1991) The politics of professional power. In: J Gabe, M Calnan and M Bury
(eds) The Sociology of the Health Service. Routledge, London.
20 NHS/DHSS Health Services Information Steering Group (1982) Converting Data into
Information. King’s Fund, London.
21 Yates J (1985) Using Information. In: A Mason and V Morrison (eds) Walk Don’t Run:
a collection of essays on information issues published to honour Mrs Edith K˛rner CBE. King
Edward’s Hospital Fund for London, London.
22 Willcock LP and Mark AL (1988) Information for Management? A review of progress on
information technology and general management in the UK National Health Service. Working
Paper No 92, City University Business School, London.
23 NHS/DHSS Health Services Information Steering Group (1983) Developing a District IT
Policy. King’s Fund, London.
24 K˛rner E (1987) Too important for the experts. Health Service Journal. 29 Oct: 1258^60.
25 Department of Health. Building the Information Core . Department of Health, London.
26 Strickland-Hodge B, Allan B and Livesey B (1988) Information Technology and Health
Care. Gower, Aldershot.
27 Scrivens E (1985) Policy, Power and Information Technology in the National Health Service.
(Bath Social Policy Paper No. 3) University of Bath, Bath.
30 Vision and value in health information
28 Peel V (1995) Information management and technology strategy for healthcare organi-
sations. In: R Shea¡ and V Peel (eds) Managing Health Service Information Systems:
an introduction. Open University Press, Buckingham.
29 Keen J (1994) Information policy in the National Health Service. In: J Keen (ed.) Informa-
tion Management in Health Services. Open University Press, Buckingham.
30 Nicholson L and Peel V (1995) Manpower development for NHS information systems.
In: R Shea¡ and V Peel (eds) Managing Health Service Information Systems: an introduction.
Open University Press, Buckingham.
Introduction
These are stressful times for the healthcare sectors of all nations, and the United
Kingdom is no exception.1^6 Health system shortcomings are widely publicised,
funding remains tight, public expectations for improved performance are grow-
ing, and many people want more direct involvement in their own care. New
knowledge and technologies create an abundance of opportunities to improve
health, but inadequate di¡usion mechanisms or limited resources often hinder
their impact. Healthcare in the near future must continue to deliver acute,
episodic care to individuals (the old business) and simultaneously provide
much better chronic illness management for both individuals and populations
(a newer business). The challenge for all nations is to redesign their complex
care systems.7,8 Neither a straight top-down nor a bottom-up approach will
work; rather, change must occur throughout systems over time.
Despite a strong commitment from health professionals to improve health,
their e¡ectiveness is determined largely by the system in which they operate.
A healthcare system is only as good as the skills and ideas of its people, the pro-
cesses and infrastructure they use to accomplish their work, and the culture
that supports their e¡orts. Today each of these critical components is distressed
and only the adoption of a clear longer-range strategy will truly integrate e¡orts
and lead to a modernised service. Considerable e¡ort is already being devoted to
identifying the kinds of changes needed and how best to implement them. It is
32 Vision and value in health information
timely and appropriate to identify the critical leverage points for transformation
of the health system.
The times call for vision and leadership ^ a vision simple enough to carry in
one’s head and leadership that both motivates reluctant souls to respond to
relevant messages and allows the experimentation needed for changes to occur.
A strong vision that is e¡ectively communicated by leaders and eventually
embraced by the broader health community is not, however, su⁄cient to reach
the objective of a transformed health system for the 21st century. Leaders must
assure that organisational systems are both £exible and su⁄ciently aligned with
stated goals. They must support a culture whose values drive them toward
needed actions. Further, the vision that will shape the evolution of the health
system must be constantly re¢ned to accommodate the ever-growing base of
knowledge on what constitutes e¡ective health services. There needs to be a
permanent means of ensuring that the vision stays ahead of the system and that
the system’s development is generally consistent with the vision and available
evidence. And, a proper knowledge and information technology infrastructure
(what Canadians call an ‘infostructure’) must underpin it all.9
The four recommendations presented here create an integrated regimen for
improving performance of the United Kingdom’s health systems. The ¢rst recom-
mendation calls for a national academy of health to provide continuous visible-
thought leadership for the health system that can withstand and channel the
winds of open political discourse and media hype. The second recommendation
calls for a set of principles to guide reform e¡orts. The third recommenda-
tion develops informed leadership through a clinical scholars’ programme and
a corresponding redesign of the work setting to provide prepared clinician-
executives with the time, authority and resources needed to perform their lea-
dership roles. The fourth recommendation establishes an information and
knowledge platform as essential to improving the organisation and delivery of
care. These recommendations will complement the recent set of policy initia-
tives by the Department of Health and the other home countries’ health depart-
ments, and enhance performance of whatever system emerges from the current
reform debate in the United Kingdom.
One of the major impediments to true transformation for the NHS is the degree to
which the NHS is exposed to political winds and expected to respond to the latest
public concern. The UK lacks a representative group of health experts to bring
su⁄ciently broad and seasoned input to the table to contemplate and create new
and more acceptably framed programmes for change that are not linked to any
particular political party. The current situation needs to be replaced by a steady,
evidence-based course of action that builds on past experiences and policies
so that there is a long-term sense of policy direction and better continuity for
policy that in£uences individuals working within the NHS.
A Royal (National) Academy of Health (R/NAH) would provide needed
authority, independence and credibility for UK health policy and NHS strategy
development. The R/NAH would be a membership organisation modelled on the
Institute of Medicine (IOM) in the USA (as described below). It would be broadly
representative of the health professions and include distinguished individuals
of related disciplines who are willing to volunteer their relevant expertise to
critical health issues facing the nation, much like the Foresight Programme or
the Academy of Medical Sciences, but with all relevant disciplines represented.
The new organisation would provide guidance to the governments on critical
health policy questions while remaining independent of immediate political
demands. The primary role of the R/NAH would be to provide unequivocal evi-
dence derived from analysis, synthesis and constructive deliberation. Reliance
on scienti¢c rigor and consensus development would provide crucial ballast
against shifting political winds and a bu¡er against an incessant media that is
interested in ‘human interest’ for hype and sales as much as constructive social
change. In addition to producing useful, evidence-based reports, the R/NAH
would also provide a mechanism for creating more mature informed leaders.
The R/NAH would respond to speci¢c policy questions (for example, what are
the implications of wait times on health status; when are wait times acceptable
and when are they detrimental; is this policy generally functional or dysfunc-
tional?), would help to de¢ne the health agenda for the UK (such as, which
of the myriad white papers and reports should form the basis for action; what
are the most important tasks for health system reform; what should the trans-
formation platform look like?) and articulate policy in terms of action steps for a
variety of stakeholders. Further, the R/NAH would play an important role in
educating the public on the complexity of health policy issues.
The IOM was established in 1970 as a non-pro¢t organisation that is a
branch of the National Academy of Sciences. Its mission is to ‘advance and dis-
seminate scienti¢c knowledge to improve human health’.10 The IOM strives to
‘obtain the most authoritative, objective, and scienti¢cally balanced answers
to di⁄cult questions of national importance’. It provides information and advice
concerning health and science policy to government, the corporate sector, the
professions and the public through its studies and reports. The federal govern-
ment requests and funds the majority of IOM studies but committees of volunteer
34 Vision and value in health information
scientists selected totally by the IOM processes conduct the actual studies. The
IOM carefully composes these committees to assure the necessary expertise,
and to mitigate complicating bias or con£ict of interest. The committee reports
undergo extensive review and evaluation for scienti¢c merit and rigorous evi-
dence by a group of relevant experts who remain anonymous until the study is
published.
The IOM also organises round tables, workshops and symposia to provide an
opportunity for public and private sector experts to ‘openly discuss contentious
issues in an environment that promotes evidence-based dialogue’. The IOM also
manages the Robert Wood Johnson Health Policy Fellowship Program,
designed to develop the capacity of outstanding mid-career health professionals
in academic and community-based settings to assume leadership roles in health
policy and management. (In time, such a programme would be a useful adjunct
to the clinical scholars’ initiatives discussed below.)
In addition, the IOM is an honori¢c membership organisation. Members are
elected on the basis of their professional achievements and serve without com-
pensation in studies and other activities on health policy issues. One-quarter
of members must be selected from professions other than those primarily con-
cerned with medicine and health; members are represented from natural, social
and behavioural sciences, law, administration and engineering. This mixture
is crucial since it creates a rich pool of experts to allow panels to be created on
a wide variety of studies. Foreign members add greatly to the quality of delib-
erations. Non-members are also invited to participate in study committees to
ensure balanced representation of views and the highest calibre of technical
expertise. The IOM works through a set of boards composed of members and
sta¡ed by the IOM. The board structure assures that work is done across a num-
ber of relevant topic domains that include children, youth and families, food and
nutrition, global health, healthcare services, health promotion and disease pre-
vention, health sciences policy, cancer policy, neuroscience and behavioural
health, and health policy programmes and fellowships.
Over its 30-year history, IOM studies have addressed a wide variety of issues
ranging from disparities in healthcare among races and ethnic groups to bio-
logical threats and terrorism, from improving palliative care for cancer to family
violence.11^14 The IOM special initiative on healthcare quality resulted in two
pivotal reports on patient safety and healthcare quality that provided a call to
action and a framework for achieving threshold improvements in safety and
quality.2,3 These reports, To Err is Human and Crossing the Quality Chasm, have
received some attention in the UK. The quality initiative is ongoing and now
has a major IT component as well to address speci¢c policy issues raised in
those reports, such as identi¢cation of priority areas for quality improvement,
outlining a national healthcare quality report, guiding development of patient
safety data standards and creating a robust national information infrastructure.
These reports and national events led the US Secretary of Health and Human
Improving the United Kingdom’s health system 35
Services to request a study to o¡er the government advice on next steps. This
report, Fostering Rapid Advances in Health Care: learning from system demonstra-
tions, outlines a set of major statewide initiatives to create the seeds for the
future US healthcare system.15 It has received a strongly positive response
from the media in the USA.
In the area of IT and information policy alone, the IOM and the National
Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences have produced a series
of reports that have brought important health information technology issues to
the attention of the federal government. Indeed, they helped put these issues on
the national agenda. These reports include:
drew heavily from the conclusions and recommendations of the IOM and NRC
reports and the individuals who had been part of the studies.
Aims: ‘. . . [C]are must be delivered by systems that are carefully and con-
sciously designed to provide care that is safe, e¡ective, patient-centered,
timely, e⁄cient, and equitable’ (p. 7).3
Health professionals and decision-makers can easily remember the purpose and
aims since they are clear and basic and they share tacit validity. Despite their
simplicity, they are comprehensive and relevant for all health systems.
Certainly, one wishes to have care that is safe. The precept of doing no harm
while seeking to help the patient is an ancient one. An ethical system of care
should not waste resources on care whose bene¢ts are unproven, hence e¡ec-
tiveness is important. Further, if one pursues e¡ectiveness wherever it may
Improving the United Kingdom’s health system 37
lead, signi¢cant changes in care systems may well develop over time. Care,
de¢ned as health services, may possibly change one day into more e¡ective
community education policies. Patient-centred care is subtle and can be a chal-
lenge to focus upon since one can rather easily say that virtually everything is
there to some extent to focus on the patient. What is intended is to have, to the
maximal extent possible, patients at the centre of their care with respect to deci-
sions, responsibility, and style and manner of delivery. This has not been a
design feature of many of our care processes. This becomes even more impor-
tant as chronic illness becomes a more dominant component of illness patterns
(World Health Organization, 2001).26
Care should be timely. Some problems can be safely put aside, whereas good
care in other instances must be prompt care to be any care at all. As the old
adage goes, ‘a stitch in time saves nine’. A care system must have a way to
determine what can wait and what cannot wait and triage patients accord-
ingly. E⁄cient care is important since there are always insu⁄cient resources
and wastefulness is essentially care that is not given to someone else who
might bene¢t from it. Lastly, care should be equitable. Obviously, there may be
times when these criteria come into con£ict but much of the time they do not.
To achieve the six aims, healthcare organisations need to redesign their sys-
tems. According to the IOM, healthcare process redesign should be based as well
on 10 principles (see box). Health professionals need to be supported in their
e¡orts to implement these redesign rules. The health system must o¡er appro-
priate training opportunities and incentives that encourage behaviour consis-
tent with the rules. Information systems will play a critical role in putting these
rules into routine practice (see rule 4 below).
in their clinical disciplines but those who are tagged to become leaders or who
have the instincts and capabilities for being ¢rst-rate medical or nursing direc-
tors or leads on a variety of new programmes move into these posts with a mini-
mum of appropriate academic preparation. It is no surprise that many people in
such positions do not give the job adequate attention and think it is less impor-
tant than the clinical backlogs they also face. Yet it is the innovative thinking of
these individuals that is needed to lead the system redesign that will help to
reduce these backlogs.
Developing leadership skills is not a quick process and two-day workshops are
not adequate to prepare rising leaders of the NHS. The Leadership Centre within
the NHS Modernisation Agency is an important step towards addressing cur-
rent shortcomings.29 Its o¡erings need to be strengthened, however, through
the creation of a clinical scholars’ degree programme that is aimed at fostering
a broad perspective and strengthening analytical skills of its participants. Only
one or two ¢rst rank programmes would be required to meet the needs for the
entire UK and Europe. Moreover, the resources needed to do the job properly are
such that only one site in the UK will be likely to generate su⁄cient funding to
do the job right.
The model programme would include learners pursuing master’s degrees,
some studying at the doctoral level, and some studying simply to gain skills
and knowledge in one particular area. Those learners enrolled for the master’s
level courses could take them either as modular courses to meet the degree
requirements or simply as continuing education courses. However, by being
part of an organised curriculum, their courses would comprise a rigorous, com-
prehensive set of knowledge and skills needed to excel at the role of clinical
leader. Approximately one-half of the curriculum would be from the core curri-
culum for a Master of Business Administration (MBA) degree; one-¢fth would be
on healthcare systems and clinical informatics; one-¢fth would be focused on
quality and safety; one-¢fth would contain elements from a Doctor of Public
Health curriculum; and the balance would be electives particularly suited to
helping learners to improve their current work environment and the problems
it faces. Academic faculty and an appropriate worksite ‘faculty member’ would
collaborate in shaping simultaneously a scholarly and practical e¡ort to address
a current problem facing the organisation and then solve it. This will assure that
the programme actually delivers relevant knowledge and theory while also
developing the learners’ practice skills. The learning goal is not knowledge
per se but useful knowledge, including the skills to create and manage change.
A high priority of the programme is a multidisciplinary character, with both
the teachers and learners being from various backgrounds and disciplines.
Much of the current discontinuity in the present system exists because partici-
pants do not see themselves as members of teams where the role of each is
known and is highly valued. Those who leave the programme will have chan-
ged their perspectives and sense of values. They will be more prepared to face
40 Vision and value in health information
tough issues and help those with more focused responsibilities and skills to
create e¡ective solutions combining both human resources development and
relevant communication and information systems. The practicum ^ the practi-
cal component ^ will also tend to keep learners committed to their current
practice setting while it builds a tradition of supporting the growth and devel-
opment of talented younger people within a variety of settings (for example,
primary care, community resources, hospitals). It scarcely serves the system to
have people constantly shifting from one locale to another with the lost produc-
tivity such moves entail.
Those few individuals who pursue doctoral-level training will become the
generation of health services researchers and leaders who help to ensure that
top-quality research is pursued and that top-level health policy meets the qual-
ity standards needed for progress in healthcare systems. These people will serve
as mentors and colleagues to rising generations of health professionals. Their
training will have made them international in their outlook so that the advances
from elsewhere are fed into the system.
In addition to a robust educational programme to develop clinical scholarship
and leadership, clinical leadership roles within the NHS must be redesigned to
allow those with the knowledge and skills to reinvent their environments and
its systems. Achieving dramatic progress with respect to IT in the UK will involve
the skills of strategic assessment and implementation as much as knowledge of
information hardware and software. The chief information o⁄cer needs to be
seated at the board level but only if he or she has the knowledge and skills
needed to o¡er strategic and tactical direction.
Consider the model of how our cells work. There is important information
sent from the nucleus in the form of messenger RNA to ribosomes. The ribosome
is one-half nucleus and one-half cytoplasmic in its orientation. Having an inti-
mate knowledge of both the centre and the periphery, it can create proteins
(that is, policies and procedures) that are speci¢c to cellular needs so that the
cell can adapt to changing circumstances and still remain healthy. After a set
of clinical scholars begin to populate the work settings as capable ‘ribosomes’,
they must be given the materials (substrates) they need to revise, reform and
create more appropriate structures, systems and modes of communication so
that meaningful acceptable change can be accomplished without intense angst
or strain. Indeed, much of this will eventually become ‘second nature’ since it
basically is an organic approach used by complex adaptive systems as a way
of sense-making.
The poor opinion of management and leadership within the ranks of many
health professionals would suggest that an explicit programme be developed to
raise the visibility and acceptability of these crucial functions. This can involve
little more than acknowledging to the inside and regional community when the
e¡orts of a team and its leader have led to clear improvements in care. Publicly
Improving the United Kingdom’s health system 41
a computerised physician order entry system with drug allergy and drug^drug
interaction warnings reduced non-missed dose medication errors by 80%.32
Electronic mail o¡ers a convenient means of maintaining contact with patients
and strengthening the relationship between patients and professionals.
IT is also the means by which health organisations and professionals can
improve the quality of health services for the population as a whole by strength-
ening the body of evidence on which health decisions are based. A system
worth its salt will actively seek evidence of clinical impact in a manner that
allows conclusions to be drawn based upon experience. In a managed informa-
tion environment, when problems are identi¢ed that meet criteria for care, and
there is sound evidence on how to obtain excellent results, one follows decision
support rules so that performance does not slip and slide along in an uncertain
manner. Clinicians can choose to override the decision support system when
selecting among care options. However, the data on all patients is tracked
over time so health professionals and system managers can review both the
quality of the protocol and the impact of their decisions to override it. They
can either revise the protocol to become more robust or revise their thinking
and behaviour.
The decision support system is ‘adapted’ over time based upon the relevant
evidence, both distant and local, to assure better processes of care and better
outcomes. The emerging term for such decision support systems for clinical
environments is ‘evidence adaptive clinical decision-support systems’.33 The
hallmark of these systems will be their ability to provide the most current litera-
ture-based evidence and local practice-based evidence to clinicians. Getting
‘just-in-time’ knowledge that is needed at the ‘point-of-decision’ to make sound
decisions is a role for the ‘infostructure’. The architecture for the information
infrastructure must be able to draw upon personal health records, patient
health records and population health records as needed.24 Only with proper
design will the system allow such data to be assembled and studied so that
leaders at di¡erent levels of the system can ask relevant questions and receive
timely answers.
The cycle described above presumes the existence of robust and formal knowl-
edge management capabilities within organisations and across the health sector
as a whole. Information and knowledge management system developers and
users need to understand that information systems are in reality echoes of face-
to-face conversations or other relevant communications. The goal is to both
enhance communications in the ¢rst instance and also bring to later decisions
the value that was derived from earlier investigations and conversations.
Further, the bene¢ts of IT can only accrue if the information that is being trans-
mitted or used for analysis is of high quality, if the people using the information
are skilled in its application, and organisational processes are modi¢ed to take
advantage of improved access to information and incorporate lessons learned
from analysis of the information.
Improving the United Kingdom’s health system 43
Conclusion
Well done is better than well said.
Benjamin Franklin
The UK and the USA are both grappling with how to overcome the short-
comings of their current healthcare systems. They are striving to improve their
approaches to rationing while dramatically improving the quality of their health
services and, in so doing, ultimately improve the health status of their popula-
tions. The complexity of the endeavour should not be underestimated. Clear
vision, su⁄cient resources and countless hours of e¡ort must be combined with
patience and creativity to transform the respective health systems. The impor-
tance of these e¡orts cannot be overstated, improving the health of individuals
and populations always has been and always will be one of the noblest tasks
for professionals and one of the most important functions of government.
Responsibility for building the 21st century health system does not lie with
‘them’. It falls to each citizen, each patient, each health professional, each
health system executive, each policy analyst and each legislator to do a bit more
than their fair share. Citizens and patients have a responsibility to pursue healthy
lifestyles and to participate actively in decisions about their healthcare. Health
professionals have a responsibility to collaborate with their peers and with
patients, to grow as professionals, and to embrace the forthcoming changes.
Policy-makers and legislators have the responsibility for providing needed tools
and adequate resources. System executives have the responsibility for helping
their sta¡ see the possibilities of a 21st century health system and encouraging
experimentation that will yield new practices.
To achieve the greatest bene¢t from available resources, we must all be evi-
dence-based in our decision-making and align our actions with the rules of the
new health system. IT is the means by which evidence can be systematically
44 Vision and value in health information
References
1 Feachem RGA (2000) The future of the NHS: confronting the big questions. Health
A¡airs 19: 128^9.
2 Institute of Medicine (2000) To Err is Human: building a safer health system. National
Academy Press, Washington DC.
3 Institute of Medicine (2001) Crossing the Quality Chasm: a new health system for the 21st
century. National Academy Press, Washington DC.
4 Klein R (1999) Why Britain is reorganizing its National Health Service ^ yet again.
Health A¡airs 17: 111^25.
5 Smith PC (2002) Performance management in British health care: will it deliver?. Health
A¡airs 21: 103^15.
6 Smith R (2002) Oh, NHS, thou art sick. BMJ 324: 127^8.
7 King’s Fund (2002) The Future of the NHS. A Framework for Debate. King’s Fund, London.
8 Wanless D (2002) Securing Our Future Health: taking a long-term view. April. HM Treas-
ury, London.
9 O⁄ce of Health and the Information Highway (2002) Canadian Health Infostructure
(CHI): introduction. (www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ohih-bsi/chi ics/index e.html)
10 Institute of Medicine (2001) Informing the Future: critical issues in health. (www.iom.edu)
11 Institute of Medicine (2001) Improving Palliative Care for Cancer. National Academy
Press, Washington DC.
12 Institute of Medicine (2002) Unequal Treatment: confronting racial and ethnic disparities in
health care. National Academy Press, Washington DC.
13 Institute of Medicine (2002) Biological Threats and Terrorism: assessing the science and
response capabilities. National Academy Press, Washington DC.
14 Institute of Medicine (2002) Confronting Chronic Neglect: the education and training of
health professionals on family violence. National Academy Press, Washington DC.
15 Institute of Medicine (2002) Fostering Rapid Advances in Health Care: learning from system
demonstrations. National Academy Press, Washington DC.
16 Institute of Medicine (1991) The Computer-based Patient Record: an essential technology for
health care. RS Dick and EB Steen (eds). National Academy Press, Washington DC.
17 Institute of Medicine (1997) The Computer-based Patient Record: an essential technology for
health care. (rev. edn.) RS Dick, EB Steen and DE Detmer (eds). National Academy Press,
Washington DC.
Improving the United Kingdom’s health system 45
18 Institute of Medicine (1994) Health Data in the Information Age: use, disclosure, and
privacy. MS Donaldson and KN Lohr (eds). National Academy Press, Washington DC.
19 Institute of Medicine (1996) Telemedicine: a guide to assessing telecommunications in health
care. MJ Field (ed). National Academy Press, Washington DC.
20 National Research Council (NRC) (1997) For the Record: protecting electronic health infor-
mation. National Academy Press, Washington DC.
21 National Research Council (1999) Trust in Cyberspace. FB Schneider (ed). National
Academy Press, Washington DC.
22 National Research Council (2000) Networking Health: prescriptions for the internet.
National Academy Press, Washington DC.
23 President’s Information Technology Advisory Committee (PITAC) (2001) Transforming
Health Care through Information Technology. (www.ccic.gov/pubs/pitac.index.html)
24 National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics (2001) Information for Health: a strat-
egy for building the national health information infrastructure. United States Department of
Health and Human Services, Washington DC.
25 Plesk P (2001) Redesigning health care with insights from the science of complex adap-
tive systems. In: Institute of Medicine Crossing the Quality Chasm: a new health system for
the 21st century. National Academy Press, Washington DC.
26 World Health Organization (2001) Informal Meeting on Innovative Care for Chronic Condi-
tion. (ICCC) 30^31 May. Geneva, World Health Organization.
27 Couto RA (2002) To Give Their Gifts: community, health, and democracy. Vanderbilt Uni-
versity Press, Nashville, Tennessee.
28 Goleman D (1998) Working with Emotional Intelligence. Bantam Books, New York.
29 NHS Modernisation Agency (2002) Leadership Development. (www.modernnhs.uk)
30 Blue Ridge Academic Health Group (1998) Promoting Value and Expanded Coverage: good
health is good business. Cap Gemini Ernst & Young, Washington DC.
31 Shea S, Starren J, Weinstock RW et al. (2002) Columbia University’s Informatics for Dia-
betes and Telemedicine (IDEATel) Project. Journal of the American Medical Informatics
Association 9: 49^55.
32 Bates DW, Teich JM, Lee J et al. (1999) The impact of computerized physician order entry
on medication error prevention. Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association
6: 313^21.
33 Sim I, Gorman P, Greenes RA et al. (2001) Clinical decision support systems for the prac-
tice of evidence-based medicine. Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association
8: 299^308.
CHAPTER 4
Introduction
Never has healthcare been so e¡ective, or so criticised. About three of the ¢ve
extra years of life that people have gained in the last half-century are due to the
e¡ects of progress in healthcare.1 The developments, many of which we now
take for granted, have been astonishing, ranging from renal transplantation to
the treatment of migraine. However, those who provide and pay for healthcare
face continuing problems as the need and demand for healthcare increases
inexorably owing to population ageing, technological development and rising
expectations. In almost every country the rate of increase of need and demand
is greater than the rate at which additional resources can be made available by
the state.
For these reasons healthcare systems always fail to meet both need and
demand, leading to increased pressure for more resources. This is resisted in
many countries because of the high proportion of the wealth of societies already
invested in healthcare. The gap between public expectations and the reality of
service delivery also leads to demands for ever higher standards of management
of those resources that are available, and managerial ingenuity has been in-
vested in the development of better systems for managing human resources, for
funding healthcare, for motivating clinicians, and in new methods of organis-
ing and delivering healthcare.
One reason for our continuing problems is that we are not moving quickly
enough to the new paradigm described in The NHS Plan and related documents,
such as An Organisation with a Memory2 and The Expert Patient,3 described by the
Chief Executive of the NHS at the South East Region conference on Information
48 Vision and value in health information
for Health in June 2001. The di¡erence in emphasis between the old and the new
paradigms is set out in Table 4.1.
it is thus tacit knowledge. Patients also have a large amount of tacit knowledge
that can be made explicit and useful. However, the potential usefulness of
this knowledge is not fully realised because it is not managed well enough.
Healthcare organisations manage money, human resources and their buildings
with care and responsibility, but knowledge is not managed to this standard.
Librarians manage the knowledge that is sent to libraries, but much important
knowledge is not sent to libraries ^ knowledge about health service use and
outcomes, for example. Furthermore, few libraries are properly used in support-
ing board decisions because board members often do not see the need to use the
knowledge and skills contained in libraries for management decision-making.
The internet changes all aspects of knowledge management from research to
publishing and from distribution to implementation, but few health services
are realising the potential that the new paradigm o¡ers.
The magnitude of these problems is immense; for example, half of all medication
errors are knowledge-based, and poor document management is overloading
practitioners with information: almost 23 kg of paper guidelines had been sent
to all 30 000 general practitioners in the eight years to 1998.5
All of these problems can be tackled by more e¡ective knowledge management.
50 Vision and value in health information
Organisational Document
development management
Personal development
Although healthcare is based on knowledge and uses large amounts of resources,
it is an activity delivered by people for people, and personal development is of
central importance in improving knowledge management.
The level of performance of individuals within an organisation is a function of
three variables: it is directly related to their competence and motivation, and
The need for a new healthcare paradigm 51
inversely related to the barriers that they have to overcome. A personal devel-
opment strategy therefore has to address all three of these issues (Figure 4.2).
Competence
Motivation Barriers
Organisational development
Three aspects of an organisation impinge upon the ability of organisations to
manage knowledge culture, systems and structure (Figure 4.3).
Culture
Systems Structure
Figure 4.3 Three aspects of organisations that impinge upon their ability to manage
knowledge.
52 Vision and value in health information
. Clinical errors
. Unknowing variations in policy and practice
. Failure to get knowledge into practice
. Overenthusiastic adoption of new technology of low value
. Poor clinical quality
. Poor patient experience
. Waste
Document management
The term ‘knowledge’ is sometimes interpreted as meaning evidence derived
from research, but this is only one meaning and it is too narrow. A second
. accessibility ^ the ease with which a document can be found, moved or stored
. usability ^ the ease with which it can be used for the purpose intended
. functionality ^ the ease with which the documents and their systems inter-
act with all other information systems, such as the electronic patient record.
. the opportunity to interest and motivate many clinicians who are interested
in reducing clinical errors, but who would be uninterested in, or cynical
about, concepts such as knowledge management
. improvements in quality management
. support for national programmes of disease control by providing a knowl-
edge framework on which better control of epilepsy or asthma could be built.
Change can be facilitated and promoted through the use of concepts, but it
is essential to complement these with structural and systems measures to
54 Vision and value in health information
Knowledge
about disease
and its control
Prepare
Knowledge
Knowledge
about the
about the NHS Change Do
individual
as a whole
patient
Reflect
Knowledge
about all the
processes and
outcomes of all the
patients treated
by a service
References
1 Bunker J (2001) Medicine Matters after All. The Nu⁄eld Trust, London.
2 Department of Health (2000) An Organisation with a Memory. The Stationery O⁄ce,
London.
3 Department of Health (2001) The Expert Patient: a new approach to chronic disease manage-
ment for the 21st Century. The Stationery O⁄ce, London.
4 Department of Health (2002) Learning from Bristol: the Department of Health’s response to
the report of the public inquiry into children’s heart surgery at the Bristol Royal In¢rmary
1984^1995. The Stationery O⁄ce, London.
5 Hibble A, Kanka D, Pencheon D et al. (1998) Guidelines in general practice: the new
tower of Babel? BMJ 317: 862^3.
6 National Electronic Library for Health Rapid Access Chest Pain Clinic project. (www.
nelh.nhs.uk/heart/racpcs/dataset/racpc intro.htm )
CHAPTER 5
Information as the
patient’s advocate
Michael Rigby
Introduction
Traditionally, the medical record has been an essential information store captur-
ing the patient’s history of diagnosis and treatment with a healthcare provider.
By reference to this record subsequent clinicians can scan the patient’s previous
health experiences, but more importantly can assess the possible causes of new
morbidity, and previous patterns of response to treatments, as the record speaks
for the patient in a way more technically eloquent than patients themselves
could achieve. Medical and nursing practice has considered the record as some-
thing which belonged to the organisation and was there for the bene¢t of
clinicians, whereas modern thinking is that it should be considered far more as
being a representation of the patient’s interest.
Now, modern technology and the opportunity to interlink records give this
advocacy function much greater power and wider recognition. There are also
sub-groups of patients who are not able to represent themselves easily in health-
care encounters ^ these include: infants; patients who are comatose confused
or distressed; and under some circumstances, those with a mental illness or
intellectual disability. Thus as organisational concepts such as care planning
become more focal to the healthcare process, so the patient’s case for bene¢ting
from a share of available healthcare resources becomes dependent upon the
strength of the representation of their need as encapsulated in the record. This
is additional to the traditional indirect but important function of epidemiology
and public health in taking a statistical representation of a de¢ned group of
people and promoting their interests through public health measures, including
identi¢cation of resource needs.
Whilst some aspects of this representation approach are rooted in history, the
work of the Steering Group on Health Services Information, led by Edith K˛rner,
58 Vision and value in health information
represented a major step forward. In particular, the minimum data set (speci¢ed
according to local functional need) is a concept that ensures comparability of
representation. Some subsequent initiatives have sought to facilitate this repre-
sentational role. However, as with so many initiatives that Mrs K˛rner’s work
instigated, the follow-through has been poorly focused and has not captured
the imagination or striven for the goals that are desirable.
Development of record-keeping
Over the years record-keeping has been seen as a fundamental and essential part
of clinical practice ^ for doctors, for midwives, for nurses and for other profes-
sionals. As a result, in recognition of the vital importance of the contribution of
an accurate historic record to the care of the individual, professional bodies have
established principles and professional standards for this task. For the individual
clinician failure to study the record before treatment is perceived as reckless risk-
taking (except in emergencies when the record is not available and life is at
immediate risk), and concomitantly the keeping of accurate records is seen as
an essential professional requirement, failure to comply with which is a disci-
plinary matter. In the more complex world of hospitals, with a large range of
diagnostic and other information, and tremendous demands upon the records
library function, a distinct medical records profession has become established,
together with principles and techniques.
However, these principles and practices have emerged from centuries of
keeping of paper records, largely completed by hand or more recently machine
printout, and perforce restricted to the individual healthcare organisation. The
record for individual patients could be held within the controlled environment of
the treatment location, and thereby also linked to the particular health prob-
lems being treated there.
Given these physical constructs, communication between di¡erent treatment
locations was by means of letter. Although the message would be about an indi-
vidual patient ^ a request for a diagnostic procedure, a request for treatment for
a purported condition or a discharge noti¢cation with summation of the action
taken and recommendations for onward care ^ the views expressed were clini-
cal interpretations. They were messages from one health professional or team
to another, expressing views about the patient, and asking another clinician to
undertake speci¢c action. Although these messages concern a patient, the views
are those of health professionals, and the speci¢c wishes of the patient may or
may not be strongly articulated within them.
This is a ‘message in a cleft stick’ approach to clinical communications, and
the health records for patients begin to acquire a collection of the messages
received. A particular provider’s record for a patient thus extends to being a
representation of the diagnosis and treatment of that patient by that health
Information as the patient’s advocate 59
Resource advocacy
Healthcare resources are always overstretched, and even in the best-planned
circles illness of sta¡ or other adverse events will always disturb the pre-planned
schedule and require immediate decisions. Care may be delayed, rescheduled,
reduced or cancelled. In these circumstances patients are only represented by
their records or their scheduled requirements.
Protection advocacy
Possibly the least-appreciated of all, the record can act to protect patients.
A strong yet under-realised example is in child protection, where abused chil-
dren are usually presented to di¡erent health facilities in di¡erent locations so
as to disguise the pattern of induced illness or injury. Subsequent studies have
shown all too frequently that all the relevant information is available, but is
locked into separate unlinked record systems.11 A means of pooling, within an
ethical framework, of this otherwise comparatively insigni¢cant information in
order to build up a big picture would have a protective e¡ect. By presenting the
pattern of previous presentations and problems to a health or social care profes-
sional, the record would speak on behalf of the child.
Prevention advocacy
This is more widely understood, and is based on the emergence of public health
and epidemiological principles. Illness in individuals will be treated on an
individual basis, but if summaries of that information are pooled then epidemio-
logical pictures build up. Action can then be taken to address the course of a
problem and to prevent further recurrence. The bene¢ciary of this form of popu-
lation advocacy is not the group of patients who have already su¡ered, but their
peers in the social group who are protected from also joining them. The social
group itself may not have any visible cohesion. The traditional example is the
64 Vision and value in health information
Conclusion
As with so many developments in healthcare, there is a risk that the develop-
ment of electronic patient record systems will be driven by issues of provider
organisation e⁄ciency, and modelled largely on the apparently more expensive
Information as the patient’s advocate 65
areas of acute care. However, as is also often the case, this will fail to look at the
yield of human bene¢ts that could and should be available by a more re£ec-
tive and consumer-orientated approach. Streamlining post-operative care, for
example, should be bene¢cial to patients and organisations. However, avoiding
missed appointments in mental health or long-term support of the frail and
elderly, or rapid adjustment of planned support because of a change in the
patient’s circumstances, will reduce the risk of adverse incidents whose human
and economic costs can be even more severe. Quantifying the bene¢ts of redu-
cing the number of children at risk of inadequate care may be di⁄cult, but there
are clearly gains on all fronts if these problems are reduced. But even beyond
these more emotional bene¢ts, there are clearly signi¢cant gains to patients
and services if the ongoing delivery of care and provision of support is more
¢nely tuned to human facets, and if necessary short-term changes to deploy-
ment caused by sta¡ sickness or other factors can minimise disadvantages
to patients.
Moreover, the issues are not restricted merely to the immediate ones. The
NHS is concerned about comparatively poor patient compliance both with
delivery mechanisms, such as keeping to appointment times, and with compli-
ance with treatment regimes. It is often not appreciated that this is exacerbated
by the apparently impersonal and somewhat mechanistic structure of the ser-
vice delivery system. If healthcare delivery based on modern record systems is
seen to be much more people-speci¢c and sensitive, it is more likely to increase
respect for the service and thus compliance with it.
In addition, management should increasingly be evidence-based, and the
necessary evidence derives in a large part from local information.16 Wherever
possible, management information should be drawn from operational systems,
to minimise cost whilst valuing accuracy and timeliness. Electronic patient
records are an ideal source of such data. But if operational and strategic deci-
sions are going to be made based on the information in patients’ records, it is
also essential to ensure that they act e¡ectively as patients’ advocates.
In order to achieve this the focus of the record needs to move from solely that
of a treatment history and a treatment booking system to one that, in all
respects, speaks for and on behalf of patients in a much more personal way as
an advocate. In a signi¢cant way Mrs K˛rner’s work laid a simple foundation,
by indicating the importance of the minimum data set to ensure that adequate
information was recorded and shared for each patient. This was a very simple,
and in the more modern technological context simplistic, approach. Never-
theless, when building upon the concept of a core set of essential data represent-
ing patients, and building into that ideas of representing patients’ interests in a
wider humanitarian sense, can be seen the foundations of a new paradigm of
representation of patient interest in the record. Now that there is a policy drive
to further speed up the implementation of electronic patient records, there is
the danger that history will repeat itself and the NHS will opt for the simplest
66 Vision and value in health information
solution simply because it will be the quickest. But as we learnt from that era of
short-term expediency, the core purpose will be signi¢cantly undermined. The
challenge in the modern implementation of electronic information and records
systems in health must be to build in the wider interests of patients, using appro-
priate representations through modern information concepts, so that the new
record structures truly represent patients as people, and promote their interests
and advocate their positions in articulate, sensitive and caring ways.
References
1 Roberts R, Rigby M and Birch K (2000) Telematics in healthcare: new paradigm, new
issues. In: M Rigby, R Roberts and M Thick (eds) Taking Health Telematics into the 21st
Century. Radcli¡e Medical Press, Oxford.
2 Institute of Medicine (1991) The Computer-Based Patient Record ^ an essential technology
for health care. RS Dick and EB Steen (eds) National Academy Press, Washington DC.
3 Swayne J (1993) A common language of healthcare? Journal of Interprofessional Care
7: 29^35.
4 Weed L (1968) Medical records that guide and teach. NEJM 278: 593^600, 652^7.
5 Weed LL (1969) Medical Records, Medical Education, and Patient Care: the problem orien-
tated record as a basic tool. Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland OH.
6 Savage P (2001) Problem Orientated Medical Records. BMJ 322: 275^6.
7 Binnie A et al. (1984) A Systematic Approach to Nursing Care ^ An Introduction. Open Uni-
versity Press, Milton Keynes.
8 Robins SC and Rigby MJ (1995) Electronic health records as a key to objective health
care needs assessment beyond the hospital boundary. In: RA Greenes, HE Peterson and
DJ Protti. Medinfo ’95 ^ Proceedings of the Eighth World Congress on Medical Informatics,
Vancouver, 23^27 July 1995. Healthcare Computing & Communications Canada Inc.,
Alberta.
9 Rigby MJ and Robins SC (1996) Building healthcare delivery systems, management and
information around the human facets. In: J Brender, JP Christensen and J-P Scherrer
et al. (eds) Medical Informatics Europe ’96 ^ human facets in information technologies.
IOS Press, Amsterdam.
10 Rigby M (1994) Patient-focused hospitals or person-focused healthcare? Health Services
Review, X: 8^10.
11 Noyes P (1991) Child Abuse ^ a study of inquiry reports 1980^1989. HMSO, London.
12 Rigby MJ and Nolder D (1994) Lessons from a child health system on opportunities and
threats to quality from networked record systems. In: F Roger-France, J Noothoven van
Goor and K Staehr-Johansen (eds) Case-based Telematic Systems Towards Equity in Health
Care (studies in Health Technology and Informatics Vol. 14). IOS Press, Amsterdam.
Information as the patient’s advocate 67
Introduction
In an ideal world, clinicians delivering care to the highest possible standards will
be fully informed about the patients who are the subjects of their care. They
will have immediate access to current evidence-based wisdom as to what is the
best route to diagnosis and cure or alleviation of the condition presented. They
will also know details of all the resources, facilities and expertise available to
support them in achieving this, and how to access these quickly and appropri-
ately. Clinicians will have knowledge and insight into the extent and limitations
of their own expertise, and will be able to monitor their own performance regu-
larly. Lastly, they will be able to plan and implement sensible changes to their
own and their teams’ practice, based on knowledge of demand, and the success
and weaknesses of the service.
Patients are the prime source of information about themselves, but recall
and accuracy deteriorate rapidly with time, and probably the only truly reliable
information from the rational patient will describe current problems and com-
plaints. The primary purpose of the patient record is to document details of
history and care that will be of use in the immediate or long-term future.
Present record systems fail to meet this primary purpose,1 for many reasons.
Most records are paper-based, and are thus often not available, particularly if
needed in more than one place at a time. Paper records grow larger, and they
deteriorate. Each provider organisation and professional group has its own
system. Surprisingly, in hospitals there is no statutory requirement governing
the structure or content of medical records, and diversity and lack of structure
or organisation are commonplace. The current concept of the patient record, as
a provider, speciality- and episode-based journal, is also £awed, preventing the
easy generation of a clear longitudinal picture of patients’ illness or health.
70 Vision and value in health information
The ideal world envisages a simple means of capturing and storing data about
patients, yielding information that is immediately available when needed, and
presentable in a variety of forms, appropriate to the context of care. It is believed
that electronic capture of data in both structured and free text form will enable
this,2 but the technical, cultural and organisational problems of achieving this
are formidable. From the technical point of view, a generic approach to elec-
tronic clinical system development has long been advocated,3 but progress is
inhibited by short-term, speciality-speci¢c requirements. It is being further
slowed by the need to monitor the implementation of condition-focused national
service frameworks that are generating their own, condition-speci¢c data sets
and data collection processes.4,5
evidence on best practice must be made available at the point of care. Thus, col-
lation of the knowledge base is required, with its delivery to clinicians where
and when needed. The National electronic Library for Health14 is a visionary
initiative that aims to pull together reliable knowledge in a form that is easily
accessible to both clinicians and patients. Ensuring that it is accessible at the
point of care: in the surgery, on the wards, in outpatients, even in the home,
remains a challenge for those who are developing the communications infra-
structure for the NHS and it is hoped that progress will now be rapid. Achieving
this vision demands more than the development of a sophisticated technical
infrastructure. Sifting, appraising and reviewing the vast knowledge base of
healthcare has been catalysed by the Cochrane collaboration15 and a cultural
shift towards evidence-based medicine,16 but its presentation to busy clinicians
who have inadequate time to talk to patients, let alone keep up to date, remains
a problem. The solution is believed to lie in producing trustworthy advice in the
form of evidence-based guidelines,17 but there remains a need to ensure their
uptake by those who deliver care. This depends on clinicians being involved
in the production of local guidelines and requires active local dissemination,
education and support,18 whether guidelines are made available in paper or
electronic form.19 Thus, organisational development, culture change, educa-
tion and training all need to move forward, hand in hand with technology.
Evidence-based medicine
Evidence-based medicine has been de¢ned as a requirement for individual
clinicians to ‘engage in life-long, self-directed learning, so that they remain
continually up-to-date with research evidence and o¡er their patients the
best available practice according to that evidence’,16 but challenged by those
who champion more medicine-based evidence, which re£ects more appropri-
ately the diversity and challenges of care at the ‘coal face’.20 This concept of
evidence-based medicine also fails to cope with the complexity of some interven-
tions, where accumulation of evidence is di⁄cult and where managing change
requires discussion of options and consensus-building among various stake-
holders.21 These di⁄culties are highlighted by the complexities of national
service frameworks for heterogenous diseases, such as cancer,22 and situations,
such as the management of elderly people.23 The explosion of information avail-
able in electronic form adds further concerns about its validity, and measures of
quality are needed.
Information about resources, expertise and access to healthcare is surpris-
ingly sparse at both local and national levels. This information is needed by
managers, clinicians and patients, and it must be accurate, updated regularly
and available at the point of care. The scarcity of such information implies that
72 Vision and value in health information
This patient focus implies greater patient involvement in data collection,28 and
greater access by patients to computer terminals, both in waiting areas and on
wards, in primary and secondary care, where they could review data about
their illness and its treatment, and could complete patient-focused question-
naires that would enable monitoring of outcome.
Well-informed clinicians will rapidly be able to detect areas of practice that
need attention. They will be able to map referral rates to activity, so that they
can predict a rising waiting list and deal with it by recon¢guring their services.
They will monitor complications and adverse events, to pick up trends at an
early stage. They will be able to see whether their practice is deviating from
the wisdom held in guidelines, and if they are justi¢ed in doing so by the details
of the individual case. Clinicians will be able to identify their own educational
needs, and monitor the experience and results of those they train. They will be
able to search for new knowledge by analysing the details of their own practice,
and could participate in rigorously designed randomised controlled trials by
providing routinely collected data without the need for additional purpose-
designed data collection.29 They will be able to use information about their
practice to plan new services and justify investment in them.30 Clinicians will
also be able to involve individual patients in decisions about their care, enabling
them to base decisions on detailed knowledge of the clinician’s experience, and
likely outcomes or side e¡ects of treatment.11
This vision for better information, to underpin the management of both
patients and the service, applies equally to primary, secondary and community
care. In primary care disparate organisations and accountability of teams pre-
sent their own challenges,31 and the need to blur the interface between these
sectors is already clear.32
How close are we to achieving this vision? Individual patient records remain a
shambles in secondary and community care: largely paper-based, disorganised
and useless as a ready source of secondary data.1,26 Progress has been made
towards computerised records in primary care, but these remain largely unipro-
fessional, unstandardised and of limited value in the generation of secondary
information. In hospitals, automation of the processes that surround clinical
records has already achieved great bene¢ts to clinicians in many areas by
enabling on-line ordering of tests and viewing of results, electronic prescribing,
automatic communication with other professionals and scheduling of proce-
dures in discussion with patients. Capturing structured clinical data, in a form
that is easily analysed and will yield information that is comparable across the
NHS, remains more elusive because it poses far greater challenges that require
the de¢nition of standards, education, training and culture change. The health
service has not yet moved signi¢cantly from a professional culture that is domi-
nated by clinical tunnel vision, encouraging professionals to see only the needs
of the individual patients in front of them, and unable to set this in the wider
context and con£icts of the NHS. The service is also so under-resourced that
74 Vision and value in health information
clinicians are not given the time to make the cognitive e¡ort that will enable
them to be more precise in their recording of diagnoses and procedures, as well
as the discrete capture of data on other clinical parameters, such as symptoms,
signs, problems and complications.
So much for where we want to be, where we are now and the obstructions to
getting there. How can the NHS move forward?
References
1 Audit Commission (1996) Setting the Record Straight. HMSO, London.
2 NHS Executive (1998) Information for Health. An information strategy for the modern NHS
1998^2005. NHS Executive, Leeds.
3 Williams JG, Morgan JM, Howlett PJ et al. (1993) Let there be light. British Journal of
Health Care Computing 10: 30^2.
4 Cancer Dataset Project (2000) Consultation document for cancer dataset version 1.0.
NHS Information Authority, Birmingham.
5 National Service Framework for Ischaemic Heart Disease. (www.doh.gov.uk/nsf/coronary.
htm)
76 Vision and value in health information
24 NHS Executive (1998) Central Data Collections from the NHS. Health Service Circular
1998/054. NHS Executive, Leeds.
25 K˛rner E (1987) First Report to the Secretary of State of the Steering Group on Health Services
Information. HMSO, London.
26 Williams JG and Mann RY (2002) Hospital episode statistics: time for clinicians to get
involved? Clinical Medicine 2: 34^7.
27 Maynard A and Bloor K (2001) Reforming the contract of UK consultants. BMJ
322: 541^3.
28 National Assembly for Wales. Sharing Clinical Information in the Primary Care Team (SCI-
PiCT). Cardi¡, National Assembly for Wales, Cardi¡. (Unpublished).
29 Williams JG, Cheung WY, Cohen D et al. (2003) Can randomised trials rely on existing
electronic data? A feasibility study to explore the value of routine data in health technol-
ogy assessment. Health Technology Assessment 7(26).
30 Williams JG (1999) The use of clinical information to help develop new services in a dis-
trict general hospital. International Journal of Medical Informatics 56: 151^9.
31 Rigby M, Roberts R, Williams J et al. (1998) Integrated record keeping as an essential
aspect of a primary care led service. BMJ 317: 579^82.
32 Rigby MJ and Williams JG (2000) De¢nition of Episodes Project. Collaborative Exercise: ¢nal
report. NHS Information Authority, Birmingham.
33 Williams JG and Severs MP (1998) Physicians in the information age: are we keeping
pace? Journal of the Royal College of Physicians London 32: 193^4.
34 Severs MP and Pearson C (1999) Learning to Manage Health Information. A theme for clin-
ical education. NHSE, Bristol.
35 Williams JG, Ford DV and Yapp TR (1993) Capturing clinical activity: coming to terms
with information. Gut 34: 1651^2.
36 NHS Information Authority and American College of Pathologists (2000) SNOMED
Clinical Terms. A Global Leader in Healthcare Terminology. NHS Information Authority,
Birmingham.
37 www.rcplondon.ac.uk/college/hiu/recordsstandards
38 Academy of Medical Royal Colleges Information Group. Speci¢cation of Core Require-
ments for Clinical Information Systems in Support of Secondary Care. (www.aomrc.org.uk/
ACIG.htm)
39 Primary Care Information Modernisation Programme. (www.doh.gov.uk/ipu/whatnew/
itevent/tables/infoauditinprimary care.htm)
40 Audit Commission (1997) Comparing Notes: a study of information management in commu-
nity trusts. Audit Commission, London.
41 Department of Health. National Programme for IT in the NHS. http://www.doh.gov.uk/
ipu/programme/index.htm
42 Informing Healthcare: transforming healthcare using information and IT (2003) NHS
Wales, Welsh Assembly Government.
CHAPTER 7
Introduction
NHS organisations produce vast amounts of information for many purposes
ranging from central monitoring requirements through to that used for moni-
toring individual activities. Much of this information is produced for others and
little ¢nds its way into the hands of boards for their deliberations. Indeed, boards
often struggle to know which data sources to use in order to judge whether their
organisations are well managed. However, if they are to meet the require-
ments now placed upon them by HM Treasury to manage key risks facing their
organisations, they need to develop a structured approach to select e¡ective
information for assessing whether they have appropriate risk management
and controls in place.1,2
Edith K˛rner began the move to investing in information-based manage-
ment systems that would provide boards with the information to assess the
e¡ectiveness of their management activities. The original data sets were pro-
ducts of the understanding of consensus management at that time. With the
increasing complexity of the social, political and policy environments in which
all organisations, public and private sector, ¢nd themselves today, there has
been universal recognition of the need to ensure that organisations manage
change and risk in a structured and systematic manner. The controls assurance
agenda recognises the new information needs of boards in an increasingly com-
plex world.
In 2002, the Department of Health (DoH) produced a mandatory set of report-
ing requirements for the general management of all NHS organisations. Entitled
The Governance Standard, the reporting requirements outlined a comprehensive
business planning approach for use by boards in the planning and manage-
ment of health services.3 Compliance with The Governance Standard (see box)
80 Vision and value in health information
would be audited by the internal audit service and substantiated by the external
audit service.
Although NHS organisations had been exhorted to apply the principles of good
business planning to their activities for many decades, this was the ¢rst time
that these principles were a mandatory and full requirement on NHS boards.
The arguments behind the genesis of this standard drew on the logic of good
governance being promoted simultaneously across the private and public sec-
tors. The logic was derived from principles of good governance, that is, the way
in which boards should organise their work to demonstrate accountability in
the use of, in the case of the private company, shareholder funds, and in the
public sector, taxpayers’ money.
The Governance Standard was the key stone of a series of standards promoting
risk management in the NHS as part of a programme known as ‘controls assur-
ance’.3 This had begun in 1994 with the introduction of a number of pilot
studies to improve risk management in healthcare organisations. At the same
time, a set of standards describing the ¢nancial requirements placed on
NHS organisations was produced. Eighteen organisational standards were
added in 1998, each dealing with a speci¢c aspect of responsibility for the safety
Information for good governance 81
of patients and sta¡, where failure to ensure that the requirements of the
standards were met could result in harm being caused to patients or to sta¡, or
sanctions being applied to the NHS organisation for failing to act in a responsi-
ble manner towards its patients or sta¡ through not complying with legislation
or other regulations to protect them. In addition, there was a risk management
system standard that provided the framework for the management of risks
across the whole organisation, and later, a ¢nancial management standard
and the governance standard. The ¢nance standard pulled together the original
standards, and covered areas relating to ¢nancial management, which if
ignored could put the organisation at risk. The governance standard provided
the strategic overview for the management of business risks across the whole
organisation.
are generally accepted behaviours in place to ensure that the people working
within the organisation are clear about the risks that the organisation ^ and
therefore its board ^ is prepared to tolerate and deal with itself. Risks are there-
fore the currency of control. Uncontrolled risks help to identify failings in
control systems. Managed risks help to identify how well the controls are man-
aged within an organisation. Boards are therefore encouraged to study the
management and the treatment of risks by their organisations to ensure that
the control systems are in place and functioning e¡ectively.
Risk management, therefore, is inextricably linked to the requirement to
develop sound processes of internal control, thereby enabling organisations
to sign the assurance statement on internal control:
Risk management grew out of internal control good practice, and the
systems it promotes are designed to give assurance to the Board and key
stakeholders that management processes are e¡ective and coherent, and
that levels of responsibility and accountability are clearly de¢ned.5
The Turnbull report, with its emphasis on internal control, required private
companies to embed risk management throughout their organisations. The UK
Treasury adopted this approach for its government departments and in 2000
required that all government departments develop a framework for risk manage-
ment, and also, sign what was referred to as a ‘Statement of Internal Control’.6
Happily, this development coincided with another government policy to pro-
mote modernisation and innovation in the public sector. A series of disastrous
central government policy implementations led to recognition of the need to
ensure that central government departments were capable of undertaking
strategic planning by use of risk management. The unsuccessful launch of the
Millennium Dome; the failure of the Passport O⁄ce to achieve its targets for
turnaround in issuing new passports; and others led to the realisation that risk
management was vitally important to the development of new public services.7
Too often Central Government does not assess the risk and walks o¡ the end
of a cli¡. It does not consider where it is going and when it marches forward
it does not manage the risk. Too often, there are no pilot projects, no train-
ing and no contingency plans.8
However, a review by the Cabinet O⁄ce revealed that departments had focused
more on better-known risks, such as safety hazards and risks associated
with scienti¢c uncertainty, than on the strategic risks of running their core
businesses.9 A National Audit O⁄ce survey revealed similar ¢ndings, in that
government departments focused on minimising ¢nancial loss or preventing
impropriety rather than on the achievement of broad policy objectives.7 The
Information for good governance 83
result was a concerted move by the Cabinet O⁄ce to put pressure on govern-
ment departments to focus more on the achievement of their objectives by
examining the risks to achieving the objectives. In short, the emphasis was
moving from simply looking at the management of risks to safety, and moving
towards the management of risks to the achievement of the wider policy objec-
tives set for government departments.
A review of risk management by the Public Accounts Committee arrived at a
similar conclusion: ‘risk management is about ensuring the achievement of
outputs and outcomes, and having reliable contingency arrangements to deal
with the unexpected which might put service delivery at risk’.9 But in addition,
it was emphasised that risk-taking was a positive and forward-looking process
that should be encouraged. Risk management is about’ ‘changing behaviour
and having processes in place which support risk-taking and innovation’.
In the Department of Health, the various messages on broadening the scope of
risk management found resonance in the development of the controls assurance
project. Begun in 1994, with the advent of improved scrutiny of decision-
making through the introduction of audit committees, the controls assurance
agenda began to grow by recognising the need for improved patient safety.10
This was supported by developing of standards to improve the healthcare
environment through listing of hard controls covering areas such as ¢re, build-
ings, plant and equipment, medical devices, medicines management, etc., and
through the development of a standard to cover complaints, incidents or adverse
events reporting, etc. The Department of Health took this thinking further by
introducing the National Patient Safety Agency in 2001, which was to promote
the reporting of incidents and near-misses that could be of use in protecting
patients and sta¡.11 Risks to health and safety, in their broadest sense, were
being addressed. During the same period the risks associated with soft controls
also began to develop, in particular those concerning the work of professionals
employed within the NHS. Clinical governance, which had as its emphasis the
cultural and behavioural aspects of healthcare delivery, emerged to promote
greater awareness by clinical sta¡ of risks of clinical activity ^ to patients and
to themselves. The third stage of development arrived with the implementation
of Turnbull in the requirements for boards to pull non-clinical and clinical con-
trols, hard and soft together, into a single uni¢ed system of internal control that
would form the bedrock of governance in the NHS.
The uni¢ed system of internal control comprises a number of separate and
distinct control systems that thread through an organisation. These all contri-
bute to a single management system, leading to the board, which encompasses
all risk-based activities in the NHS ^ ranging from clinical skills through to
the management of estates ^ all ultimately focusing on the overall goals of the
system of healthcare set through the national priorities for healthcare issued by
central government.
84 Vision and value in health information
A call to accountability
Central government requires increased accountability, but there is little agree-
ment as to how this is to be achieved. Under the most recent government
initiative for the NHS, enshrined in the document, Shifting the Balance of Power
within the NHS: securing delivery,12 there is a commitment to allow NHS organi-
sations to take greater responsibility for controlling their functioning. In this
model the role of the centre becomes one of monitoring performance and of
ensuring that objectives are achieved. The model has been speci¢ed as central
standards and policies to be set by the relevant government department and the
Department of Health, and the monitoring to be conducted by a new inspection
and audit agency.13 Assistance with implementation will be in the hands of the
Modernisation Agency and various other agencies.
However, one problem to be tackled within the new accountability frame-
work is the degree of speci¢cation built into the design of both standards and
monitoring procedures. It is possible to write standards that are so speci¢c,
they dictate precisely how organisations should be structured and should oper-
ate. This constrains completely the freedom of local management to determine
the best use of services and resources. On the other hand, too few speci¢c stan-
dards allows local service development to become unequal, and inequity of
service provision £ourishes. The appropriate level of control is a very ¢ne bal-
ance that needs to be struck by central government implementation at local
levels. The search is for what has been described as intelligent accountability:
Intelligent accountability requires more attention to good governance and
fewer fantasies about total control. Good governance is possible only if
institutions are allowed some margin for self-governance of a form appro-
priate to their particular tasks, within a framework of ¢nancial and other
reporting.14
The challenge, therefore, is to use the management of risks, as enshrined in
good governance, to ensure that organisations can deliver the services that
the public want, in the way the public wants to receive them ^ that is, safely
and securely. Accountability, therefore, is about providing services that the
general public can trust, wholly and without thinking. And trust requires that
the public, both as taxpayers and consumers of services, is not exposed to risk.
The range of risks to be addressed is of course very wide ^ most obviously
risks associated with ¢nancial decisions but including risks to reputation,
environmental risks, risks to health and safety, anything in fact which can
adversely impact on business continuity and reduce shareholder value.15
By espousing Turnbull, and previous reports on corporate governance includ-
ing Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel,3,16 ^18 the government has accepted the
Information for good governance 85
Information requirements
O’Neill14 has stated that:
Consultation
Processes
Culture
Culture
Audit
Capability
Outcomes
Stakeholders
Monitoring systems are needed to demonstrate that sta¡ are able to review the
risks they and their patients face continually, and can account intelligently for
the actions that they take when pursuing their professional objectives. Perfor-
mance measures are needed to inform boards that the right balance is being
reached between risk and control. Measures derived from internal management
systems, such as complaints and incident reporting, highlight failures within
the organisational processes that can suggest where unacceptable risks are
being taken. Key performance indicators that focus on the care delivered to
patients can show where there are unacceptable risks in the whole service
delivery system.19
Boards have to determine the nature and the culture of the system of internal
control they wish to see within their organisations. They have to be responsible,
that is, accountable for all failures of systems that are designed to ensure that
services are adequately and safely delivered to patients and equally that sta¡
are safe and able to work e¡ectively.
Controls assurance has created organisational standards to help NHS organi-
sations deal with some of the obvious risks they face when managing their
organisational environments. Other control systems, such as clinical govern-
ance, information governance and research governance, are being developed to
help to manage speci¢c areas known to present high risks to NHS organisations.
88 Vision and value in health information
The remainder of the organisation must determine itself through use of behav-
ioural processes. The most commonly used is known as ‘control self-assessment’,
which uses a total quality management-style approach to team assessment of
risks in the working environment. Teams are encouraged to review the risks
they face in their day-to-day work and to put in place actions and procedures
that will help them to manage risks.20 Risks that need long-term monitoring,
or that cannot be solved by the team, are reported to a risk register, which acts as
an inventory of risks across the organisation. The risk register can be reviewed
by senior management and either acted upon or passed up to higher levels of the
organisation for consideration. At each level, signi¢cant risks are passed up
the organisation and, if serious enough, reach the board for its consideration.
It is common for risk registers also to be used to quantify risk. Each risk is
given a probability of occurring (likelihood ) and a severity rating (how serious
the outcome would be for the organisation, with death usually being the most
serious). In this way, numerical values can be used to determine the degree of
signi¢cance attached to each risk by the people who identi¢ed the risk. Boards
are alerted to actions that are of concern within the organisation.
This information has to be put alongside the key performance indicators used
by boards to monitor their overall performance. Boards have to learn how to
judge the meaning attached to information that is presented, and to decide
how to take approriate actions. Board members, who will ultimately be held
responsible for the quality of the performance of the organisation, have to exer-
cise their judgement.
Central government, in the form of the Department of Health, can dictate key
performance indicators and can dictate the structure of risk management sys-
tems. But, in a system with devolved accountability, each and every board has
to take responsibility for the actions taken within its organisation. There are no
short-cuts to the information required for intelligent accountability. Boards
have to provide environments in which sta¡ can operate intelligently, and can
communicate freely to ensure that risks are managed. Boards have to have a
clear view of their overall direction and their objectives. And boards also have
to develop ways of selecting and judging information intelligently to promote a
relationship of trust with the general public and other stakeholders.
Edith K˛rner recognised the need for management information systems to
re£ect the environments in which healthcare organisations exist, and relate
to appropriately, if they are to provide modern healthcare. The NHS modernisa-
tion agenda requires an approach to management that is able to deal with a
more demanding public, aware of risks to health and with aspirations for the
public services that exist to serve them. The governance agenda has advanced
to meet these new demands, and in so doing, itself demands a new approach to
the use of information to improve the management of healthcare services.
For further information on controls assurance and corporate governance,
visit the controls assurance website (casu.org.uk).
Information for good governance 89
Acknowledgement
The NHS Controls Assurance Support Unit is funded by the Department of
Health. The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and not
of the Department of Health.
References
1 HM Treasury (2002) Audit and Accountability in Central Government. The Government’s
reponse to Lord Sharman’s report. HM Treasury, London.
2 Lord Sharman (2002) Holding to Account. HM Treasury, London.
8 Sir John Bourne (2002) Reinforcing Positive Approaches to Risk Management in Govern-
ment. Institute of Risk Management, London.
9 Public Accounts Committee (2001) Managing Risk in Government Departments ^ ¢rst
report. House of Commons, London.
10 Public Audit Forum (2001) Propriety and Audit in the Public Sector. 1. Public Audit
Forum, London.
11 Department of Health (2000) An Organisation with a Memory: report of an expert group on
learning from adverse events. The Stationery O⁄ce, London.
12 Department of Health (2001) Shifting the Balance of Power within the NHS: securing deliv-
ery. Department of Health, London.
13 Secretary of State (2002) Delivering The NHS Plan. Cm 5503. HMSO, London.
14 O’Neill O (2002) A Question of Trust, BBC Reith Lecture, London.
15 Bibbings R (2001) If it can happen . . . . OSH World. http://www.sheilapantry.com/
oshworld/focus/2001/200108.html
16 Cadbury A (1992) The London Stock Exchange. The ¢nancial aspects of corporate governance.
Business Science Press, London.
90 Vision and value in health information
Introduction
The Ko«rner reports represent an important stage in the continuing evolution of
health services information in the UK. This essay is based on the experience over
a decade of the Department of Health’s former Central Health Outcomes Unit,
and the current outsourced National Centre for Health Outcomes Development,
in the use of health services data to assess outcomes ^ experience in which the
vision of Edith Ko«rner has had a signi¢cant role.
The National Centre for Health Outcomes Development is a key source of
information on assessment of levels of health and outcomes of health interven-
tions, at individual, health authority, NHS hospital trust and local authority
levels for the UK National Health Service (NHS) and the government. It is based
jointly at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, University of
London and the Institute of Health Sciences, University of Oxford. In 1993, the
Department of Health in England set up the Centre for Health Outcomes Unit to
co-ordinate a programme of work to develop methods and systems necessary to
assess health outcomes. Following the evolution of a substantial national pro-
gramme, the unit was contracted out in 1998 and became what is now the
National Centre for Health Outcomes Development.
The following is a re£ection on three aspects of health outcomes assessment
in the NHS:
Proactive interventions
to avoid risk
Remove/reduce exposure to Examples:
amenable determinants [Health promotion – better
of disease/ill health diet, exercise]
Examples:
Adults who are obese
[Blood cholesterol]
Timely detection of risk and
reactive interventions
to remove/reduce risk
Reduce incidence and prevalence Example:
of disease/ill health [Smoking cessation programme]
Examples:
High blood pressure
[Diabetes]
Timely interventions
to detect and treat disease
Reduce potentially avoidable
Examples:
adverse consequences – Treated and controlled high blood
severity, secondary disease and pressure
complications of treatment [Surgery rates in the context of need]
Examples:
Amputations among people with
diabetes
Incidence of stroke
[Complications following surgery] Late interventions
to minimise consequences
Examples:
Optimise function and quality of
[Emergency treatment after stroke]
life
Examples:
Timely discharge from hospital
[Quality of life of people with asthma]
Examples:
Deaths from potentially avoidable causes Note: Comparative data at national level
Deaths following treatment in hospital are not currently available for examples
Survival after diagnosis of cancer in [ ].
Similarly, the action needed to achieve such success is divided into more precise
categories:
This way of presentation helps to clarify and highlight what we are trying to
achieve, covering positive aspects, such as improved quality of life, and negative
aspects, such as avoidable disease and ill health. It re£ects aspects such as clin-
ical signs and disease as well as those of more immediate concern to patients,
such as handicap and impact on quality of life. It shows how lack of action
may lead to a chain of potentially avoidable consequences, from risk to disease,
complications of disease, poor quality of life and premature death, and shows
the kinds of action that may alter these consequences for the better. It should
be noted that presentation of data in the context of such a ‘health outcomes
overview’ describes mismatching outcomes at a point in time. The data on risk
show risk to future health. The data on levels of disease and death show conse-
quences of missed opportunities to reduce risk (if applicable) in the past. It is also
not possible to draw direct inferences on ‘attributable e¡ects’ as there may be
di¡erent populations involved and a time lag between the interventions and
the outcomes. However, such an approach does bring disparate but related
items of information together in a meaningful way.
. The report was concerned with information for health services management.
. Data should be collected because they are essential for operational purposes.
. User-oriented information yields bene¢ts to those who collect it and thus pro-
vides incentives for accuracy and expedition.
. There should be ongoing updating of data speci¢cation.
. The logical consequences of these principles are that:
^ central returns should be a by-product of local data
^ local data should be a by-product of operational processes
^ a minimum data set for central purposes represents a compromise between
what is desirable, feasible and practical
^ standard de¢nitions and classi¢cations are needed to enable comparison
^ there should be the potential for additional data collection to supplement
the minimum speci¢ed.
The hospital episodes statistics (HES) data set,6 which evolved after this report
and replaced the previous hospital inpatients enquiry (a 10% sample of regional
hospital activity data), embodies these principles and procedures in intent, if not
always in practice. HES contain personal, medical and administrative details of
all patients admitted to, and treated in, NHS hospitals in England. The records for
the database (around 12 million annually) are collected from all hospital NHS
trust providers of admitted patient care. There is at least one record for each
patient’s stay in hospital. The following examples illustrate the current use of
HES for outcomes assessment, based on analyses undertaken by the National
Centre for Health Outcomes Development for publication as part of the NHS
Performance Indicators4 and the Compendium of Clinical and Health Indicators.5
local waiting list initiatives and local need. It is unlikely, however, that these
would explain the levels of variation and the pattern observed.
Figure 8.2 Hospital procedures: primary hip replacement. Directly standardised rates for
females (aged 65þ), ¢nancial year 1999^2000.
of people with diabetes in each health authority area, amputations still re£ect
adverse outcomes as they are potentially avoidable.
Figure 8.3 Hospital procedures: lower limb amputations in diabetic patients. Directly
standardised rates for people of all ages, ¢nancial year 1999^2000.
diagnoses.4 The indicators have been generic (for example, all surgery) as well
as operation- (for example, heart by-pass) and condition- (for example, stroke)
speci¢c. All have shown variation between ‘like’ populations and ‘like’ NHS
hospital trusts. In order to measure deaths within a certain time period, it has
been necessary to link HES data between trusts as well as with death registra-
tion data from the O⁄ce for National Statistics. The former enables inclusion of
deaths that may occur in a di¡erent NHS hospital trust after a transfer. The
latter enables inclusion of deaths in the community after discharge from hospi-
tal. The techniques used for linkage are described elsewhere.4 The following
results from data at England level for calendar year 2001 show the importance
of doing this:
Such linkage was constrained because of invalid and missing data in the ¢elds
used for linkage, that is, date of birth, sex and postcode, but more sophisticated
linkage methods involving the NHS number as well have been used more
recently. Linkage of data between years to produce more robust indicators
should also be possible in the future.
20% of the baby tail records had missing data and advised that this indicator
was not feasible.
Variation in indicator values between hospitals and health authority popula-
tions may be due to di¡erences in the types of health conditions and operations
carried out, severity of conditions, seriousness of operations and socio-economic
characteristics of the patients and populations. HES do not have su⁄cient infor-
mation within them to enable adjustment of the indicators to allow for these
explanatory factors. A way round this is to compare ‘like’ with ‘like’ as far as is
possible. For these purposes, hospitals have often been grouped into clusters,
for example small and medium acute, teaching, specialised community, and
likewise health authorities have been grouped into clusters based on the socio-
economic characteristics of their populations. The Ko«rner principle that there
should be ongoing review of data sets should help to address this shortcoming
over time.
In 1997 the then NHS Executive published a consultation document on
potential clinical indicators for the NHS.7 Among the suggestions were several
indicators of complications in hospital following surgery, for example pulmon-
ary embolism (blood clots in the lung), organ damage, wound infections, cen-
tral nervous system problems, etc. The conclusion following the consultation
was that while clinically meaningful as outcome indicators (that is, re£ecting
potentially avoidable adverse events), the coding of clinical data within HES
was insu⁄ciently complete and accurate to make these indicators robust. The
Ko«rner principle that there should be ongoing updating of data sets should help
to address this shortcoming over time.
There have been improvements to the quality of HES data in recent years. The
clinical indicators in the NHS Performance Indicators set are accompanied by a
detailed assessment for each NHS hospital trust separately, of the completeness
of data in all the HES ¢elds used for each indicator. At England level, the percen-
tage of episodes in 1998^1999 that had missing or invalid data in the ¢elds
used for the deaths indicators was 5.46 (ranging by trust from 0.06 to 42.5).
In 2000^01 this changed to 1.34 (range 0^32.5). In relation to the K˛rner
principles, this has happened not because those collecting data at local level
¢nd the data useful, but because those producing management information at
central level have exposed de¢ciencies and made improvements in data comple-
teness mandatory. Trusts are now held accountable for data quality as well as
for the results shown by the indicators.
the data has shown that expectations of health outcomes are not being met opti-
mally by the NHS and has raised issues for further investigation. National data
will remain limited as it is unlikely that routine data systems will ever be su⁄-
ciently detailed and comprehensive to cover all needs and eventualities
(although there is room for improvement). However, national comparative
indicators should act as a trigger for further work . A number of case studies
of follow-up work undertaken by health authorities, following publication of
national comparative data on population health outcomes, show the value
of this.2 For example, She⁄eld, which had high death rates from coronary heart
disease, undertook an angina survey which identi¢ed a mismatch between need
and service access and led to new service policies. In order to support such local
work, 10 working groups, set up by the Department of Health, advised on
health outcomes assessment for each of 10 health topics, for example asthma,
stroke, and made suggestions for potential health outcome indicators, some of
which may require new data collection.2 Alongside these reports, advice on
how to access and use instruments for the measurement of health or health-
related quality of life, and information on national clinical databases concerned
with more detailed risk-adjusted health outcome indicators are available via the
knowledge base.2
Table 8.1 shows the kinds of indicators that would be needed to provide a
more complete picture of health outcomes for coronary heart disease. The indi-
cators in square brackets are ones that cannot be produced as comparative
indicators at national level by use of current routine data. It is remarkable how
little can be monitored using routine data at present, given that heart disease is
a common health problem and one of the largest single causes of premature
death in England. HES cover hospital inpatient care only and are thus limited
in terms of coverage of health outcomes. Comprehensive assessment of health
outcomes in the context of heart disease would require data on risks, levels of
disease, adverse events, quality of life, health promotion, primary care, outpati-
ent care, ambulances, accident and emergency and community care. For exam-
ple, data from the Health Survey for England show that a proportion of patients
with high blood pressure either do not know that they have it or are inade-
quately treated, with variations between NHS regions.2 Such indicators could
be produced from routine data from the various settings listed, if collected along
the same lines as HES. It may even be necessary to link data between settings.
For example, production of meaningful health outcome indicators re£ecting
shared care for heart disease would require the linkage of primary care, hospital
outpatient and hospital inpatient data.
Although much of the discussion has focused on central returns and national
comparative data, the principles and procedures elicited from the Ko«rner reports
did cover local data collection as well. They could be applied to cover data collec-
tion for many of the outcome indicators suggested in Table 8.1. Data on the
number of patients who get to hospital fast and bene¢t from early e¡ective
Information for the assessment of health outcomes 103
Table 8.1 Health outcome indicators in the context of the NHS performance assessment
framework ^ example coronary heart disease
Health improvement: the overall health of populations, re£ecting social and environmental factors
and individual behaviour as well as care provided by the NHS and other agencies
Fair access: the fairness of the provision of services in relation to need on various dimensions:
geographical; socio-economic; demographic (age, ethnicity, sex); and care groups
E¡ective delivery of appropriate healthcare: the extent to which services are: clinically e¡ective
(evidence-based); appropriate to need; timely; in line with agreed standards; provided according to
best practice service organisation; and delivered by appropriately trained and educated sta¡
E⁄ciency: the extent to which the NHS provides e⁄cient services, including: cost per unit of care or
outcome; productivity of capital estate; and labour productivity
^ [Cost of surgery]
104 Vision and value in health information
Note: Comparative data at national level are not currently available for examples in [ ].
Conclusions
Sadly, existing data and comparative indicators to monitor health outcomes
within the NHS only scratch the surface of what is needed, as set out here. This
is because of the complexity of the methods as well as a lack of suitable routine
data. The examples presented, however, show what can be achieved through
the creative use of routine data. Many of these examples are only possible
because of the vision articulated in the reports of the Ko«rner steering group and
the evolution of national data systems based on that vision. Extension of that
vision to the creation of other data sets at national level could ¢ll in many of
the gaps in the ability of the NHS to monitor health outcomes. Further applica-
tion of the principles and procedures for data collection highlighted in the early
Information for the assessment of health outcomes 105
Acknowledgement
The work of the National Centre for Health Outcomes Development is funded by
the Department of Health. All views expressed are those of the author and not
necessarily of the Department of Health.
References
1 Pearson M, Goldacre M, Coles J et al. (eds) (1999) Health Outcome Indicators: asthma.
Report of a working group to the Department of Health. National Centre for Health Out-
comes Development, Oxford.
2 Lakhani A (2000) Assessment of clinical and health outcomes within the National Health
Service in England. In: D Leadbeter (ed) Harnessing O⁄cial Statistics. Radcli¡e Medical
Press, Oxford.
3 Department of Health (2003) (www.doh.gov.uk)
4 Department of Health (2002) NHS Performance Indicators: February 2002. (www.doh.
gov.uk/nhsperformanceindicators/2002/)
5 Lakhani A and Olearnik H (eds) (2001) Compendium of Clinical and Health Indicators, 2001.
National Centre for Health Outcomes Development, London.
6 Statistics Division 2HES (2000) Hospital Episode Statistics: HES the book. Department of
Health, London.
7 Central Health Outcomes Unit and Statistics Division 2HES (1997) Clinical Indicators for
the NHS (1994^95): a consultation document. NHS Executive, Leeds.
CHAPTER 9
Introduction
If we de¢ne child health as referring to both preventive and curative care
delivered from birth to 19 years of age, and informatics as the application of
technology and systems to information handling, then it is in the ¢eld of child
health in the UK where we have seen one of the most successful widespread
applications of informatics to healthcare delivery. However, this lead is in
danger of being destroyed, and the current bene¢ts lost, as a perverse e¡ect of
current and supposedly more integrated strategies.
There are three driving forces behind this. This ¢rst is the move towards gen-
eric integrated record systems in all settings ^ primary, community and sec-
ondary care; this is a legitimate goal provided there are clear objectives and
safeguards, but at present children stand to be disadvantaged as there appears
to be a generic adult focus.1,2 At the same time, existing child health infor-
matics applications are undervalued because their past success has reduced
their pro¢le in an era of de¢cit-correcting strategic informatics investment.
The second is the anxieties raised about the con¢dentiality and alternative
possible uses of large electronically held record systems. However, this type of
system has been proved to have been secure and to have bene¢ted children’s
health in the past, especially in the areas of immunisation and child health
screening, and should continue to do so in the future.3 ^5
Third, the experienced NHS bodies best placed to operate such population-
based systems, such as health authority and regional NHS bodies, are subject
to regular change and destabilisation.6 NHS reforms are not conducive to the
operational stability necessary to create established procedures or the build-up
of valuable databases. In order to address these issues positively and construc-
tively, promoting health gain bene¢ts whilst setting an ethical and practical
108 Vision and value in health information
framework, the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health (formerly the
British Paediatric Association) worked with partner professional organisations
involved in child health to foster a constructive dialogue in the context of pro-
fessional and national policy issues, and to promote clear principles, through
an interprofessional forum on child health informatics, co-chaired by the
authors. Through these discussions, key principles have emerged, and these
are reported here.
the issues and past successes this is the very client group which will lose out
through latest developments.
prescribes statutory responsibilities and data £ows, whereas the Children Act
1989 and the Education Act 1996 each place requirements for interagency
working and for the controlled sharing of certain items of information in
relation to child protection and special educational needs, respectively. Addi-
tionally, there are long-standing requirements for notifying birthweight, and
congenital malformations observable at birth, to the O⁄ce for National Statis-
tics,30,31 and health visitors and general practitioners need rapid noti¢cation of
neonatal discharges regardless of the locality of birth of the child.
. Foundation-setting ^ new records created after birth are intended to last well
into a lifetime ^ these include community health records, primary care
records and, where necessary, hospital records; therefore it is important
that these foundation records are accurate and meaningful.
. Timeliness ^ activities happen extremely fast in the ¢rst eight weeks of life:
neonatal examination, selective immunisation with BCG, midwife and
health visitor clinical visits and primary care-based screening and immuni-
sation. Information needs to travel with speed and with no loss of accuracy
or con¢dentiality, but also without undue cost.
. Stability in stress ^ parents (particularly ¢rst-time parents) will ¢nd the birth
and neonatal period hectic, challenging to their lifestyle and probably stress-
ful; they may not retain information given to them, and some information
they supply later may be inaccurate, therefore the record system itself must
act as a focus for accuracy and stability. The introduction of the parent-held
child health record for nearly all births in the UK has been one successful
response.32,33
. Changes of identity ^ at birth, children’s forenames may not be known or for-
mally recorded, whilst the surname recorded at the time of birth may not be
that chosen for common use thereafter; record systems must be robust
enough to cope with this possible change without loss of data or interruption
to access (while also being able to accommodate intended complete changes
of identity through adoption). The issue of the NHS number at birth will help
greatly in tracking infants in these ¢rst few weeks, long after the new NHS
number is introduced.
. Statutory data requirements ^ there are particular requirements of legislation
or regulation including noti¢cation to registrars of births, to the O⁄ce for
Principles and purpose for child health informatics 113
National Statistics concerning birthweight for all children and to the O⁄ce
for National Statistics for all children with congenital malformations obser-
vable at birth, whilst the system of noti¢cation of births to proper o⁄cers is a
statutory requirement.
. Cross-boundary working ^ a signi¢cant proportion of births (possibly 30% in
some localities) occur outside the health catchment area of residence, requir-
ing rapid information transfer; similarly, many secondary and tertiary care
services for ill children are outside their immediate district of residence,
yet those providing care need comprehensive and accurate information.
Diagnostic support to preventive services such as phenylketonurial (PKU)
screening are often provided regionally, giving major information £ow
problems when strict timeliness is clinically essential.
. Cross-agency working ^ services for children frequently involve social ser-
vices, and possibly voluntary bodies, to complement healthcare. Education
services are involved with all children, including those of pre-school years,
and later in life individual schools also have a key role, often without appre-
ciating the importance of health factors.34,35 Information systems need to be
able to support and learn from partner agencies, but within a sound ethical
framework ^ this issue is not unique to child health but has particular
special dimensions, not least the involvement of education services.
. Unique data sets ^ data sets concerning children are far from being age-
group-speci¢c versions of generic data sets ^ in the clinical domain, infor-
mation about the antenatal history, labour and immediate postnatal period
consist of unique structures, whereas other special information recording
requirements include parental consent to or refusal of procedures such
as immunisation. Developmental surveillance records also need a special
structure, as does information relating to educational need and the needs of
children under the Children Act 1989.
. Added value of data ^ some types of data gain added value by being recorded in
a common format in a common record ^ these include height and weight
data, which, when recorded serially, enable calculation of growth velocities
against norms, hearing test results and assessments, and information about
unscheduled hospital and other clinic attendances that may show patterns
if drawn together. For example, repeat non-attendance at hospital out-
patients, with a reduced uptake of immunisation and screening coverage,
may alert the practitioner to possible neglect.
. Record of professional interpretation ^ certain clinical items may be capable of
recording by standard terminology but with the result that this would lose
the signi¢cant value that can be added either by context or by professional
interpretation, for instance a bruise or a burn is not itself unusual or even
worthy of recording, but if repeated, if in an unusual position for an acciden-
tal cause, or at variance with the explanation given by the parent, may
become highly signi¢cant.
114 Vision and value in health information
. Record as a tool for advocacy ^ the health record may frequently support advo-
cacy for children, who in the early years are unable to give their own clinical
history ^ this may range from the value that can be gained from the hospital
paediatrician in seeing the full developmental history, as ascertained in a pri-
mary care setting, through to seeking to compensate for low motivation of
some parents in presenting the child for preventive services, or to identify
the aggregate of the full range of treatment obtained by presentation at an
intentionally dispersed range of settings. Furthermore, for particular
groups of vulnerable children ^ such as travellers, refugees, those looked
after by the local authority or in temporary accommodation ^ it is often
very di⁄cult for the individual health professional to attain the whole pic-
ture without a comprehensive health record.
. Record partnership ^ the existence of an integrated child health system per-
sonal record for the child has a symbiotic relationship with parent-held
records: the central record will ensure the input to the parent-held record is
complete, whilst thereafter acting as a backstop should the parent-held
record not be presented at consultation.
. Transient information ownership ^ in infancy children are not responsible for
their own health information, and a parent or guardian discharges this
responsibility, which passes to children as they develop the appropriate
maturity in line with the legal ruling from the Gillick case;36 thus the pro-
prietary interest in (and access to) the record changes from an adult advocate
to the data subject at a period which is not temporally de¢ned.
Rationale
The intention behind these principles is to give clear guidance to individual
system users in daily practice, to trusts and general practices in the use
and the selection of systems, and to system developers. It is recognised that
given the sensitivity of the topic, it is unreasonable for all to have to discover
robust and ethical solutions. These principles are based upon professional prac-
tice principles, e¡ective discharge of the duty of care, and the need to protect the
interests of children ^ both for e¡ective and con¢dential services, and for qual-
ity assurance and service development based on robust empirical analysis.
The principles to do not give scope for indiscriminate data sharing or data
aggregation, but nor do they cut across the scope of local ethical committees
to authorise responsible research. They seek to re£ect legal and mandatory
requirements in a client-based and practice-relevant way. They balance the
need for complete information if healthcare delivery is to be e¡ective, with recog-
nition of the heightened sensitivity of more comprehensive information sets.
Enablement
If these principles are to underpin and enable the restoration of sound child
health informatics as a key underpinning plank of local and national health
information systems, two sets of action are needed. One is the widespread use of
these principles by all interests ^ this should range from individual health pro-
fessionals looking for guidance in a speci¢c situation, through to information
managers and senior executives establishing corporate strategic frameworks
and audited operational policies. The other is the development of supportive
informatics initiatives at national level to enable an active child health infor-
matics environment, for instance by the agreement of common terms in areas
where they do not yet exist, such as recording of disability and mental health
status. Professional bodies could also strengthen practical aspects of educa-
tional programmes.
Principles and purpose for child health informatics 117
Conclusion
There is considerable danger that the development of person-based community
and other electronic health records will fail to recognise the particular needs ^
and potential bene¢ts ^ of child health informatics, while stimulating over-
protective safeguards against possible general abuse which would actively
118 Vision and value in health information
References
1 Dick RS and Steen EB (eds) for Institute of Medicine (1991) The Computer-based
Patient Record ^ an essential technology for health care. National Academy Press, Wash-
ington DC.
2 NHS Executive (1998) Information for Health. NHS Executive, Leeds.
3 Rigby M (1982) Keeping tabs on immunisation. Health and Social Services Journal
92: 1104^5.
4 Rigby M (1983) Clean bill of health for module. Health and Social Services Journal
93: 1444^5.
5 Rigby M (1985) Child health comes of age. British Journal of Healthcare Computing
2: 13^15.
6 Smith J, Walshe K and Hunter D (2001) The ‘redisorganisation’ of the NHS. BMJ 323:
1262^3.
7 Galloway T McL (1963) Management of vaccination and immunisation procedures by
electronic computer. Medical O⁄cer 109: 232.
11 Bussey AL and Holmes BS (1978) Immunisation levels and the computer. Lancet i: 450.
12 Rigby MJ (1987) The National Child Health computer system. In: A Macfarlane (ed) Pro-
gress in Child Health Vol 3. Churchill Livingstone, Edinburgh.
13 Begg N, Gill ON and White JM (1989) COVER (Cover of Vaccination Evaluated
Rapidly) ^ description of the England and Wales scheme. Public Health 103: 81^9.
14 Streetly A, Grant C, Pollitt RJ et al. (1994) Variation in coverage by ethnic group of neo-
natal (Guthrie) screening programme in south London. BMJ 309: 372^4.
15 Steering Group on Health Services Information (1984) Fifth Report to the Secretary of
State. HMSO, London.
16 Rigby M (1998) Information in child health management. In: M Rigby, EM Ross and
NT Begg Management for Child Health Services. Chapman & Hall, London.
17 NHS Management Executive Information Management Group (1993) An Information
Management and Technology Strategy for the NHS in England ^ getting better with informa-
tion. Department of Health, Leeds.
18 Audit Commission (1995) For Your Information ^ a study of information management and
systems in the acute hospital. HMSO, London.
19 Department of Health (1999) National Framework for Mental Health. Modern standards and
service models for mental health. Department of Health, London.
20 Department of Health (2000) National Service Framework for Coronary Heart Disease.
Department of Health, London.
21 Department of Health (2001) Diabetes National Service Framework. Department of
Health, London.
22 Bhuptani B, Collier B, Hull M et al. (1993) Community Information Systems for Providers
(CISP) System Overview. NHS Management Executive, Leeds.
23 Rigby MJ and Nolder D (1994) Lessons from a child health system on opportunities and
threats to quality from networked record systems. In: F Roger-France, J Noothoven van
Goor and K Staer-Johansen (eds) Case-based Telematic Systems Towards Equity in Health
Care (Studies in Health Technology and Informatics Vol. 14). IOS Press, Amsterdam.
24 Anderson R (1996) Clinical system security: interim guidelines. BMJ 312: 109^11.
25 Anderson RJ (1996) Security in Clinical Information Systems. British Medical Association,
London.
26 Jenkins S (1997) Information and the NHS (for me or for them?). In: R Anderson (ed)
Personal Medical Information ^ security, engineering, and ethics. Personal information
workshop, Cambridge, UK, 21^23 June 1996, Proceedings. Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
27 Rigby M (1997) Keeping con¢dence in con¢dentiality: linking ethics, e⁄cacy, and
opportunity in health care computing ^ a case study. In: R Anderson (ed) Personal Med-
ical Information ^ Security, Engineering, and Ethics. Personal information workshop,
Cambridge, UK, 21^23 June 1996, Proceedings. Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
28 Roberts R, Thomas J, Rigby M et al. (1997) Practical protection of con¢dentiality in
acute care. In: R Anderson (ed) Personal Medical Information ^ security, engineering,
120 Vision and value in health information
and ethics. Personal information workshop, Cambridge, UK, 21^23 June 1996, Proceed-
ings. Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
29 Noyes P (1991) Child Abuse ^ a study of inquiry reports 1980^1989. HMSO, London.
30 Alberman E (1998) Analysing and promoting the health of children. In: M Rigby,
EM Ros and NT Begg. Management for Child Health Services. Chapman & Hall, London.
31 Macfarlane A (2000) Birth and maternity statistics. In: D Leadbeter (ed) Harnessing O⁄-
cial Statistics (Harnessing Health Information Series). Radcli¡e Medical Press, Oxford.
32 Sa⁄n K (1998) Working with parents. In: M Rigby, EM Ross and NT Begg. Management
for Child Health Services. Chapman & Hall, London.
33 Macfarlane A and Sa⁄n K (1990) Do general practitioners and health visitors like
‘parent held’ records? British Journal of General Practice 41: 249^51.
34 Polnay L (1995) Health Needs of School Aged Children ^ report of a joint working party of the
British Paediatric Association. British Paediatric Association, London.
35 Hall D (ed) (1996) Health of All Children, Report of the Third Joint Working Party on Child
Health Surveillance. Open University Press, Buckingham.
36 Times Law Report (1985) Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Health Authority. The
Times, 21 October.
37 Rigby MJ (1981) Child health ^ a time for better understanding? Health Trends 13: 97^9.
38 Rigby MJ, Tiplady P and Osborne D (1989) Principles, ethics and law in preventive child
health. In: B Barber, D Cao and D Quin et al. Medinfo ’89, Proceedings of the Sixth Confer-
ence on Medical Informatics, Beijing and Singapore 1989. North Holland, Amsterdam.
39 United Nations (1990) Convention on The Rights of the Child. United Nations, New York.
CHAPTER 10
Preamble
I confess to being a hoarder. In a box of papers that I hadn’t touched for years,
there it was . . . Steering Group on Health Services Information. Fifth Report to the
Secretary of State: a report on the collection and use of information about services for
and in the community in the National Health Service. And tucked inside it was a
yellowed paper typed on an old-fashioned typewriter.
9 May 1983
Dear Ms Clark,
As a regular reader (and admirer) of your bi-weekly column, I found the cri
de coeur in your last article of particular interest. And a matter for concern.
We published in April of this year an Interim Report about information
needed by the community health services and we enjoined health authori-
ties to give the report the widest possible circulation among sta¡ delivering
those services in order that they may respond to our invitation to comment
before our recommendations become ¢nal. It is obvious that the report did
not reach you.
I now enclose a copy and hope that you will rejoice in the proposals we
make for a computer based system . . . I shall put you at the top of the list
of future users!
(You understand, of course, that our progress in this ¢eld will depend on
many factors: the view of the Computer Policy Committee, of authorities,
of sta¡ and, not least, of Ministers. So we have some way to go.)
Best regards,
Yours sincerely,
E K˛rner
122 Vision and value in health information
At the time I was working as a health visitor in Reading and I was also writing a
regular column called Nursing Matters in a (then) new journal called The Health
Services. I cannot now ¢nd the article, and I cannot remember exactly what I
wrote, but I have a pretty good idea, for it seems sometimes that I have been
struggling with the same issue for all of the 35 years I have been in and
around health visiting: why are our documentation and information systems
for health visiting so awful?
I re-read K˛rner 5 (as it came to be called) with a mixture of sadness and
anger. Anger because, almost 20 years on, the situation in documentation in
community health services is at least as bad as K˛rner found it. Sadness because
over the years the name K˛rner became a dirty word in health visiting and
‘K˛rner statistics’ became the be“ te noire of community information systems.
It was a fate she did not deserve. I am reminded of a comment by the late Sir Roy
Gri⁄ths, who su¡ered a similar fate in respect of his proposals for introducing
general management into the NHS: ‘Don’t blame me,’ he said, ‘I didn’t imple-
ment the **** thing!’
A personal journey
It was at exactly the time that Edith K˛rner’s steering group began its work that
my own interest in documentation and information systems was beginning.
In 1981 I went back to practice as a health visitor after several years out doing
research and bringing up my children. Two incidents triggered what has now
become ‘my obsession’.
Before taking up my new job, I received a Council of Europe Fellowship to look
at child health services in Denmark and Finland. For one who had been brought
up, as we were in those days, to believe that health visiting was unique to the UK,
and that the way we did things was of course the only right way, it was a real eye-
opener; many of the things I learnt then transformed my thinking about primary
healthcare and changed my practice as a health visitor for ever after.
I remember one visit in particular that I made with a health visitor in Finland.
It was to a young mother with a baby of about three months. After the usual
greetings, the mother undressed the baby while the health visitor got out the
baby’s health record ^ an A4 folder (we were still using those dreadful A5
cards at that time), which she opened at the centile weight charts. The mother
already had out the little book which was her parent-held child health record (an
idea which was only just dawning then in the UK). The health visitor weighed
the baby and recorded the weight both on her own chart and in the mother’s
book. I could see that the line of the baby’s weight was below the printed curve,
and I could see that the health visitor looked worried. They talked for a while ^
of course I could not understand the language, but I could guess the discussion.
Then the mother left us for a moment to fetch ^ guess what ^ another little
New methods of documenting health visiting practice 123
book which was her own record from when she was a baby! They compared the
two charts, they laughed, they talked a bit more, the health visitor wrote in both
the records, then the mother dressed the baby as the health visitor watched, and
the visit was ended.
When we got outside I asked the health visitor to tell me about what had been
going on. She said that they had talked about the baby’s weight and they had
made some decisions about changing the baby’s feeding, but she was not wor-
ried any more because the mother’s own weight pattern had been exactly the
same when she was a baby. I said that I had never seen records used in this
way ^ remember this was 1981 ^ but what a great way to teach! The health
visitor was surprised and asked me what we did, and I told her.
‘Well,’ I said, ‘we aren’t supposed to take records out of the o⁄ce, but of
course if I have four visits to do in a morning I can never remember which
baby has had which immunisations, so I do take the records with me. And
then when I park the car (yes I had moved on from a bicycle!) I look at the
records of the children I am just about to see, and then I do the visit, and then
back in the car, I jot down just the most important things so that I won’t forget,
and then I ¢ll in the rest when I get back to the o⁄ce.’
Her eyes got wider and wider, and then she said ‘You mean you write down
things about people without them knowing? But that’s unethical!’ It was like a
blow between the eyes. I had honestly never thought of it that way before.
Some weeks later I started my new job, taking over a caseload where the pre-
vious health visitor had left about three months previously. On my ¢rst day, at
the top of the pile of urgent visits, there was a request to visit an Asian family
with a mentally handicapped boy of four, who should be starting school that
week, but the forms had still to be completed. When I visited the family at
home, I found a mother who spoke no English, holding the boy on her lap
while feeding him from a bottle. The 12-year-old daughter who acted as inter-
preter told me how proud they were of her little brother because he was the only
boy in the family and she was the youngest of four daughters. I am sure that I
don’t have to spell out the implications.
I went back to the o⁄ce and consulted the child’s records. There was a pile six
inches high, including letters from various agencies, and one form about immu-
nisations from the Child Health Computer System which was then just begin-
ning. But since they were totally unstructured, after an hour’s struggle I still
could not ¢nd who had done what when, or what the family had been told or
had understood about the child’s handicap, or what had been planned for him.
So began a period of four years’ practice as an ordinary health visitor again,
in which I started to think about records and tried to do something about my
own. No one was thinking about computers as things clinicians might use for
record-keeping ^ ‘the computer’ was the thing that sent out these forms about
immunisations that you had to ¢ll in and send back to somewhere unknown,
and they were always wrong anyway.
124 Vision and value in health information
I did not know anything about computers either, but I could already see how
useful proper records might be for several purposes:
. for continuity of care (taking over from or sharing care with other workers)
and to remind myself when the interval between visits might be several
months
. as a tool for teaching and for sharing, and for what we now call contracting
with clients
. for managing my caseload
. and then when, a few months later, I spent the days between Christmas and
New Year struggling to do what were then called ‘end of year stats’, I realised
that if only I had recorded these things as I went along, all I would need to
do now was some simple adding up to produce what I now know is aggre-
gated data.
A year later I changed jobs again, into my ¢rst senior management post ^ as
Director of Community Nursing Services for West Lambeth Health Authority.
And on my ¢rst day, on my desk was the con¢dential internal report into the
death of Jasmine Beckford ^ one of the ¢rst of the many children who have died
because the information that could have identi¢ed risks and might have saved
their lives was held by di¡erent workers in di¡erent places and was not shared.
Of course it was not very long before I found how di⁄cult it was to make the
decisions about planning and resource allocation that I was now required to
make when I did not have the information I needed. I knew that the information
I needed was there in the heads, and possibly in the records, of the health visi-
tors and district nurses who were my sta¡, but there was no way I could get at
it without doing massive special investigations ^ for which I had neither time
nor resources.
The K˛rner recommendations were just beginning to be implemented:
As an indicator of the volume of the service provided, district management
needs to know how many contacts took place during a speci¢ed period
within each community patient care programme. A contact is an event in
which a patient is seen by a nurse face-to-face and may be either a clinic
attendance or a domiciliary visit. We recommend that all face-to-face con-
tacts be recorded. (Fifth Report, paragraph 6.13)1
If only I had known then what I know now about the need to link interventions
with the problems to which they referred! To be fair, K˛rner herself went on
to say:
We recognise that, in workload terms, contacts with patients di¡er greatly
. . . A simple count of contacts cannot be used as a measure of work done
either by individual members of sta¡ or sta¡ groups. (Fifth Report para-
graph 6.15)1
New methods of documenting health visiting practice 125
But the damage was done. That is exactly how the new managerialism of the
time measured performance. As W Barker, whose own work, paradoxically,
was later to experience the same kind of misinterpretation and misuse, wrote
in 1992 in an article entitled ‘Measurement of NHS service provision: activity
levels or outcomes?’:
The more hyperactive the service the better it is seen to perform . . . For the
past decade thinking has been dominated by the Orwellian view of activity:
on Animal Farm four legs were good, two legs were bad. For the NHS four
operations are good, two are bad. Forty patients at surgery are good,
twenty patients are bad. It matters not if a successful GP practice has a
strong health promotion focus so that the other twenty are doing more
exercise and eating better, and thus have less need of the GP. That is not
how health care is measured today.2
My own earlier research3 had already identi¢ed the potential for converting
actual times to average times to target times, and using these as a measure of
health visiting performance described by Young:
Such target times can thus be estimated for each health visiting activity; if
each nurse records weekly the number and type of visits and clinics she
carried out, the administrative sta¡ can estimate a weekly target time for
each nurse. If the nurse also records her actual weekly time on duty, the
weekly target time expressed as a percentage of the actual weekly time
can be returned to each nurse as her performance ratio for that week . . .
The performance ratios could engender a spirit of competition among the
members of a nursing group, but there is no harm in this. As far as the
administrative sta¡ is concerned, the ratios would provide a measure of
overall nursing performance.4
the nursing minimum data set for aggregated information derived from clinical
records. And researchers were using these data for identifying and measuring
the outcomes of clinical practice using new techniques of mining the data held
in databases.
In my mind, the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle were coming together. The key
pieces ^ the lessons I had now learnt ^ were already in place:
. the importance, and potential, of records as a source of information
. the need for structure, standardisation and linkage, and how this could be
achieved
. the way that management information could be derived from clinical records
. the way that databases could be used for research purposes
. and, in particular, an exciting new approach to the identi¢cation and mea-
surement of nursing outcomes, which avoided the problems of the rando-
mised controlled trial.
The ¢nal piece of the jigsaw was my appointment to my present post as Profes-
sor of Community Nursing in Swansea in 1997 ^ back to my roots not only in
terms of geography and culture, but also back to health visiting and child
health. I wanted to work on identifying and measuring the outcomes of nursing
practice, using what I had learnt about health informatics and clinical infor-
mation systems. And the obvious place to start, given my clinical roots and
previous research, was with health visiting records.
My vision
Like Martin Luther King, I have a dream:
. Decision support: I want all health visitors to be able to use their records in the
way I saw that health visitor use them in 1981 in Finland, now not with an
A4 paper folder, but with an electronic notebook. I want them to be able,
during visits, to call onto the screen everything they need to know to make
their assessments and to do what they need to do. That means access not only
to things like each child’s immunisation record, but other information
entered by other agencies, for example hospital admissions, and to be able
to see this alongside relevant information about other members of the family.
. Sharing information with parents: I want health visitors to be able to share this
with the family, to use it for negotiating plans. When health visitors need to
teach about something I want them to be able to pull up diagrams and the
latest evidence and clinical guidelines. I want them to be able to call up and
print o¡ the relevant information for the client on the spot. If they need to
refer or to make an appointment I want them to be able to do it there and
then by email.
128 Vision and value in health information
. The electronic health record: I want all the relevant data to be stored in the child
health system as the electronic patient record that is the beginning of the
child’s electronic health record, and I want mothers to have and to hold a
parent-held child health record that is used by all the agencies that are con-
cerned with their children.
. I want health visitors to record what they do, preferably on site, using stan-
dardised language that the computer system will code and store so that later
they can review and evaluate their own practice, and so that their data can
be aggregated with that of other health visitors to form the database that will
provide managers and policy-makers with the information they need for
policy and ¢nancial decisions.
health services11 showed that, 20 years after K˛rner, NHS trusts in Wales had
almost no information about what health visitors were doing, how they were
doing it, for what clients, for what problems ^ let alone with what results.
In the trust where the project has taken place, health visitors had no access to
computers, and very few had even basic skills in IT or information management.
The trust had been using a K˛rner-based system that had been found to be non-
‘2000-compliant’, and had been abandoned. Health visitors were recording the
same data, however, on paper forms; altogether 38 di¡erent forms were found to
be in use. Four years later this situation remains unchanged. Edith K˛rner
would be horri¢ed.
The emphasis of the project therefore shifted into the development of a struc-
tured documentation system that would enable the kind of analysis necessary
to achieve our original goals to be achieved. Four years on, we have achieved:
. a nursing diagnosis
. a nursing intervention
. a change in the client’s knowledge, behaviour or health status related to the
nursing diagnosis.
Diagnosis
Many people ¢nd the term ‘nursing diagnosis’ di⁄cult because of the idea that
‘diagnosis’ refers only to diseases and to a process that is peculiar to medicine.
However, the process of diagnosis (that is, identi¢cation and labelling of the
‘problem’) is used by many other professionals, and the diagnostic label which
is the end-point of the process refers more generally to the ‘condition’ that the
professional treats: one of the key di¡erences between medicine and nursing is
the ‘conditions’ that each profession diagnoses and treats.15 In medicine or hos-
pital nursing the diagnostic label usually implies a problem. More commonly in
health visiting, which is concerned with normal healthy people, it is a topic
to be discussed as part of health promotion. In the Omaha project the term
‘nursing diagnosis’ is used to describe the topic or health-related issue that is
the focus of a health visiting intervention.
Intervention
The intervention is what the health visitor ‘does’ about the nursing diagnosis
that has been identi¢ed. In the case of a drug or a speci¢c treatment, it is easier
to describe and measure the intervention. Health visiting interventions, such as
teaching and support, are far more intangible and di⁄cult to measure.
Client outcomes
In the acute sector outcomes can usually be measured by determining whether
a disease has been cured or symptoms have improved. In health visiting the
measurement of change is more problematic: in the absence of a de¢ned
New methods of documenting health visiting practice 133
Patient
Interventions
Diagnosis Outcomes
Data
Figure 10.1 The relationship between diagnoses, interventions and outcomes in the
client record.
like. This involves a completely new way of documenting health visiting prac-
tice, but it is exactly what the Omaha system is designed to do.
. service details
. topic or nursing diagnosis
. interventions.
The service details recorded include the date, type of contact (for example, home
visit, telephone contact, clinic attendance or signi¢cant street contact), and
a code for Patient’s Charter compliance. The computerised version includes
who is present during the encounter (important for child protection) and
space for emerging performance indicators, which will replace Patient’s Char-
ter compliance.
The second section of the encounter record concerns the nursing diagnosis or
focus of intervention. Health visitors record each topic, identifying the term and
the code from the problem classi¢cation scheme. Against each topic they
record the ‘Bearer’ ^ the client to whom the topic relates (for example, a topic
such as ‘nutrition’ might relate to an individual or to the family as a whole).
Next, health visitors judge whether the topic constitutes an actual problem
(P), an identi¢ed risk (R), or no problem (that is, a topic for health promotion)
(N). The acronym PRN has proved easy to remember and code, and enables
the record to show the extent of health visitors’ health promotion work, which
traditional documentation rarely captures. Detail is provided in the the paper
version by a second level of classi¢cation, and in the computerised version by
drop-down lists of signs and symptoms for problems, risk factors in the case of
risks and by provision for free text.
Next health visitors score and record the client’s knowledge (K), behaviour
(B) and health status (S) (acronym KBS) in relation to the particular topic, by
use of a simple ¢ve-point Likert scale. In Phase 2, participants also recorded
the client’s level of coping (C) as part of a subproject to test the relevance of
coping as a possible outcome indicator. As topics and the client’s responses are
recorded in successive visits, changes in the PRN and KBS coding provide the
New methods of documenting health visiting practice 135
Table 10.1 Topics most frequently discussed in contacts with families beginning at the
time of the six-month visit
Table 10.2 Topics most frequently discussed in families identi¢ed by health visitors as
‘cause for concern’
The numbers are small, but this analysis does show the potential of the system:
if these data were recorded by all health visitors on all families in their caseload,
it would give us an epidemiology of health visiting ^ identifying the kinds of
trends and patterns that are familiar to medical epidemiology, not of diseases
but of the kind of problems and issues health visitors deal with, which could be
used for health needs assessment and service planning.
Each nursing diagnosis or topic discussed is modi¢ed by the code P, R or N.
When the distribution of PRN codes across an aggregation of all topics discussed
is examined, it can be seen that health visitors more frequently identify items for
health promotion (that is, N and R) than actual problems (P) as shown in Table
10.4. Previously, this important aspect of the health visitor’s role was rarely
documented. Certain topics, however (such as bene¢ts, partner relationships,
temper tantrums) were usually identi¢ed as problems, as shown in Table 10.5.
Interventions
The encounter record records the interventions that health visitors undertake.
As health visitors perform very few ‘hands on’ tasks, those outside the profes-
sion ¢nd it very hard to understand exactly what it is that health visitors
do, and health visitors themselves ¢nd it very hard to articulate their work.
As explained earlier, each topic may provoke one or more than one interven-
tion. Weighing a baby, for example, would usually include all four categories.
The physical act of weighing the baby would be recorded as a procedure (P); the
138 Vision and value in health information
health visitor would judge whether the weight gain was appropriate (A);
the mother might be counselled about the weight gain (T), and a decision might
be made to weigh the baby at clinic next week (C). Table 10.6 shows the
frequency of interventions across all topics recorded.
Almost all topics include ongoing assessment or monitoring (A), which is one of
the most important but least recorded aspects of the health visitor’s role. This
category is followed closely by teaching and guidance (T). A lot of health visi-
tors’ time is also spent on co-ordinating care (C), that is, referring and liasing
with other agencies. The ¢gure for procedures is low, and in reality is much
lower than the ¢gure suggests because in this phase health visitors were asked
to record all ‘protocol’ visits, such as birth visits, development checks and
screening checks as procedures. This was a pragmatic decision because of
the complexity of the records required by the trust for such visits. Other than
‘protocol’ visits, health visitors were asked to record P for any ‘hands on’ activ-
ity, such as demonstrating how to make up a feed or clean a sticky eye as opposed
to just discussing it.
Outcomes
Figure 10.2 shows the changes in the status of the problem and in the client’s
knowledge and behaviour over the database as a whole. This is the ¢rst quanti-
tative evidence that health visitors ‘make a di¡erence’.
3.6
Mean score
3.4
3.2
3.0
2.8
Knowledge Behaviour Status Coping
P < 0.01 P < 0.01 P < 0.005 P < 0.01
Figure 10.2 Change in mean outcome rating score for all topics
New methods of documenting health visiting practice 139
Tables 10.7 and 10.8 show one example taken from the database at a level
which individual practitioners might use to monitor their work with a particu-
lar client.
P P R
Knowledge 3 3 3
Behaviour 2 2 4
Status 3 4 4
Coping 3 3 5
The topic being considered is social isolation in a young mother who is the
subject of domestic violence and lives in overcrowded conditions with ¢nancial
problems. Each of these issues would be recorded separately on the encounter
record, but in Tables 10.7 and 10.8 only the topic of social isolation is illu-
strated. It can be seen that on successive visits the Ps (problems) have changed
to Rs (risk of problems), showing an improved outcome for this mother in rela-
tion to the topic of social isolation. In another family, or for a di¡erent topic, it
may be possible to see the Ps change to Rs and then to Ns (no problems), demon-
strating that a problem had been completely resolved.
Table 10.8 shows the levels of knowledge (K), behaviour (B), status (S) and
coping (C) recorded for the same mother and the same topic of social isolation
over the same timespan. This gives a more sensitive measure of the change in
outcome than PRN, which helps to direct future interventions. For example,
it highlights whether interventions need to be focused on knowledge de¢cit or on
providing support to assist in coping skills. In this particular case it can be seen
that on 24 November 1999 the lowest score was 2 for behaviour (B). The free
text showed that this young mother had isolated herself from her family and
friends because of the domestic violence. The health visitor therefore directed
her intervention at improving the behaviour, and by 21 January 2000 this
score had risen to 4. The free text showed that after counselling by the health
visitor the mother renewed contact with her family and friends. As a result, her
coping skills had also increased to a maximum score of 5. The health visitor had
140 Vision and value in health information
been unable to take away the risk of domestic violence, but had considerably
increased this young mother’s ability to cope with the situation she found herself
in. This is an outcome that the health visitor would have been aware of before
using the Omaha system, but would have found impossible to demonstrate.
Because the Omaha system is a structured and standardised system, it is pos-
sible to link these improved outcomes to particular interventions. At the level of
individual practitioners it is therefore possible to decide whether an interven-
tion is working or whether it would be helpful to try a di¡erent approach. In a
larger database the aggregation of data should be able to show, for example,
whether levels of behaviour (B) in relation to breast feeding improved following
a particular campaign, although very large numbers would be needed to allow
the statistical analysis required to demonstrate acceptable levels of probability.
Table 10.9 How useful is the Omaha system, compared with your present system, for
achieving the following purposes?
Clinical decision-making 0 30 65 5
Creating a caseload pro¢le 0 25 60 15
Identifying and measuring 0 5 90 5
outcomes
Allocation of resources 0 50 45 5
Teaching tool 0 10 80 10
Clinical governance 0 25 70 5
New methods of documenting health visiting practice 141
Future developments
This is a very small scale project undertaken with very little funding support
(a total of »58 000 over ¢ve years), but with an enormous amount of enthu-
siasm and goodwill from its participants. Its signi¢cance lies in the fact that the
developmental work that has been done on a small scale is a prerequisite for
the successful development of any computerised information system and espe-
cially for the development and implementation of an electronic health record.
We have learnt a great deal about the clinical decision-making that is the core
of health visiting practice (as of any professional practice) and how this can be
captured in documentation and clinical information systems; for example, we
have found that use of a structured documentation system changes clinical
practice and improves the focus and speci¢city of the encounter. Perhaps most
important of all, we now understand, and can specify, the requirements for a
system that will support practice as well as meeting management require-
ments ^ and thus overcome the main criticism of the K˛rner approach.
References
1 Steering Group on Health Services Information (1984) Fifth Report to the Secretary of
State. HMSO, London.
142 Vision and value in health information
Introduction
Modern medical practice is dominated by information. Communication between
healthcare sta¡ and patients generates information. Computers and IT process
and distribute information that is central to healthcare. Information is what we
use to make decisions, and good decisions need information about patients, as
well as medical knowledge. The amount of information we need is quite stagger-
ing and doctors and nurses spend about two hours every day and about 15% of
their budgets on gathering and managing information.
We are only now waking up to the potential of IT and electronic communica-
tions to make decision-making easier. We are only now beginning to realise the
full potential of sharing this information openly between the healthcare profes-
sions, on the one side, and the consumers of healthcare, on the other. We are
now at the point of realising the dream of providing equal access to information
for clinicians, managers and consumers.
The problems
In the last few years the speciality of informatics has led these developments, but
it has to be said that information management in the health service has not had a
good record. There has been a poor return on investment in information. The
capital costs of installing computer systems in hospitals and surgeries are sub-
stantial, and there is no doubt that in the past money has not been spent wisely.
Annual maintenance is high; sta¡ training has often been poor; upgrades are
expensive and theft of hardware can be a problem. It is sometimes unclear what
bene¢ts have resulted from all of this investment, and evaluation of information
systems in the NHS has not been good.
144 Vision and value in health information
It is not just hardware that disappears from hospitals, data disappear too.
When information about patients or healthcare sta¡ falls into the wrong hands,
either by accident or by deliberate theft, patients become unhappy about their
personal data being stored in the computer, sta¡ can imagine that management
is spying on them and there is a resulting loss of quality of data until there is a
possibility of bad decisions being made.
People need to be able to rely on information systems, and failure can cause
clinical problems. However, total system failures are very uncommon, but
many health service systems are unreliable and have not been developed with
the same rigorous approaches that are usually made in other systems where
safety is critical, such as air tra⁄c control.
There are issues here, too for the developing world; the increasing costs of IT
could widen the gap between rich and poor countries. Perversely, developments
in the Western world could then hinder, or even deny access to information to
those in the developing world. At a basic level, the infrastructure to manage
information may not be present, and even when it is, the costs of processing
and disseminating information may be too great for local economies to bear.
In the West, the availability of huge amounts of health information tempts
quasi epidemiologists to go on ‘¢shing expeditions’, particularly in the area
of clinical outcome studies, and this kind of unscienti¢c approach brings epi-
demiology into disrepute.
The bene¢ts
After such a long list of areas where information and computers have had a bad
track record in the past, we need to look at examples where there are bene¢ts.
Some of these developments have been hindered because of our inability to
demonstrate bene¢t, and in the context of a continuing debate on the con¢den-
tiality of health information, it is right that this question has been asked.
Of particular signi¢cance to healthcare personnel, in particular clinicians, is
the development of relatively inexpensive workstations. The availability of an
o⁄ce suite of software to do word processing, spreadsheet analysis, presenta-
tions and database management has empowered healthcare professionals to
access and manage data in a way that was unimaginable only 20 years ago.
Patient-based information systems with access on a ‘need to know’ basis are
now commonplace. Data can be added to, and analysed, in ways to match indi-
vidual clinicians’ needs and can be developed into management information
systems. There are new ways of entering data, which speed up the process for
professionals, such as optical character recognition and speech recognition.
These developments further ‘ownership’ of data, and can only lead to improve-
ments in accuracy and comprehensiveness.
Using information for public benefit 145
and so on. Giving patients their medical records is not new, and the idea of a
patient-held medical record o¡ers some signi¢cant advantages.
The issue of con¢dentiality meant that in the past, patients did not have
access to their medical records. Current UK legislation gives patients access to
records made after November 1991 and before that time, if it is necessary for the
patient to understand what was written later. There are occasions when access
is denied because the doctor feels that some information may be harmful to the
patient. Patient-held records circumvent most of the issues about con¢dential-
ity and also have enormous practical advantages to both doctors and patients.
Patient access to their own medical records could be achieved either through
the internet or through smart cards, or through a combination of both. The
smart card would be able to store personal information directly, and would also
serve as an electronic key to provide access to information stored elsewhere.
Users will be able to ¢nd and read their medical records wherever they are, and
ensure that information is accurate and timely.
The internet is a vast treasure house of information, but to achieve its full
potential users should be pointed in the direction of good-quality information,
and websites should instruct them how to assess the quality of information. The
internet is notoriously di⁄cult to control, and indeed one of its main attractions
is that it is ‘uncontrolled’. However, ensuring quality is an urgent priority and
cannot be achieved easily. Consumers must be educated in how to phrase ques-
tions and search for information to answer those questions. This education
could be built into websites; it is unlikely that many people would enrol on a
course when they feel that ¢nding information on the internet is so easy. Provi-
ders of health information need to regulate themselves and an independent
assessor should evaluate their information and issue some kind of ‘seal of
approval’. A website having this cachet should then be guaranteed high-quality
information. Lastly, there need to be sanctions available to stop the distribution
of information that is of such poor quality that it could be harmful.
Mention was made earlier of problems in health information in developing
countries. There is a well-known story of how Bill Clinton, when President
of the USA, visited a village health centre in India. He watched a woman
access the world wide web on a computer and get information on how to care
for her baby. Writers have retold this story as an illustration of the possibility
that this woman would then get better healthcare for her baby because of the
availability of information on the internet. This is far from a common situation
in developing countries, and on a recent visit to Nigeria I met very few public
health colleagues who had any access to the internet themselves, let alone
patients. The population of Africa is about 700 million, and less than one mil-
lion have access to the internet, and eight out of 10 of these individuals are in
South Africa. This is probably more representative of the informatics situation
in the developing world than what President Clinton saw in India.
148 Vision and value in health information
Globalisation or localisation:
common truths or
local knowledge?
Michael Rigby
The work of Edith K˛rner was commissioned speci¢cally within the UK, and
indeed within England. Consequently, most of the essays in this book are
rooted in issues of the English healthcare system.
But we are currently in an era of globalisation. Communications, mass media
and consequent awareness and expectations mean that news and ideas, and
indeed expressed consumer views, travel rapidly around the world. Much of
healthcare claims to be evidence-based.1^ 4 So, is not the development of locally
designed information systems parochial and perverse? Did not Edith K˛rner’s
work implicitly draw upon international experience, and are not her principles
and her learning points generic and universally applicable? If her work was so
seminal, should we not be holding up her guiding principles as universal ideals?
These questions raise a number of important issues. The ¢rst of these is
the paradox, and the tension, between healthcare delivery and its supposed
scienti¢c underpinning. There is a generic desire by the range of stakeholders
from consumers to health professionals to base healthcare delivery upon best
scienti¢c knowledge and re¢ned expertise. Yet at the same time all stakeholders
want healthcare delivery to be localised, both culturally and organisation-
ally ^ and healthcare information systems are integral to healthcare delivery
systems. With the combination of increasingly specialised clinical services and
increasing exchange of reference information through modern communica-
tions, this focus on localised delivery is looking increasingly di⁄cult, yet is
becoming increasingly reinforced.
It is an interesting phenomenon worldwide that healthcare is always a
responsibility of devolved levels of government. This is true in the UK, where
contrary to international and indeed local indigenous consumer belief, there is
150 Vision and value in health information
Genetic di¡erences
Not all groupings within the human race have the same physiological or
genetic make-up. Di¡erent diseases or illness vulnerabilities a¡ect speci¢c
groups, often in ways that are not understood, such as the di¡erence in the inci-
dence of cystic ¢brosis between Finland and its near neighbours, or the fact that
the pro¢le of diabetes in Sardinia replicates that of northern Europe rather than
southern. Other factors are well-known, such as vulnerability to sickle cell dis-
ease by those of Afro-Caribbean origin, with this trait following communities as
they relocate across the globe. Height and body mass also vary by grouping, and
so a whole range of tables from growth velocity of infants to pharmacological
absorption need to be adjusted for di¡erent ethnic groups. And these are just
the more obvious di¡erences that are known.
Climatic di¡erences
The human population is distributed from Artic environments to tropical ones;
however, much scienti¢c research is based in countries with temperate climates.
Many aspects of healthcare are a¡ected by meteorological factors, including
temperature and humidity, in£uencing issues ranging from the best prophylac-
tic approaches to the prevention of pressure sores or to pharmodynamics.
In turn, these variations will in£uence issues such as anticipated length of
stay. It is unsafe to assume that research or clinical trial data from one climatic
region apply optimally in other climatic regions without adjustment.
and cultural (including religious) beliefs will have major implications for a
range of health conditions from teenage pregnancy to the acceptability or
otherwise of organ transplants and blood transfusions. These all undermine
the assumption of ‘universal scienti¢c fact’ in clinical and treatment issues.
Health system
There are many types of health system, both with regard to the type of provision
being either by the public service, private sector or not-for-pro¢t organisations,
and as to whether payment is at the point of consumption, based upon insur-
ance or provided through a tax-funded ‘free’ public service. These variations in
health systems will have major e¡ects upon the information systems needed,
and will also a¡ect pro¢les of delivery patterns. Almost as signi¢cant are varia-
tions in the interface with other services, not least social welfare systems and
social care, but also including housing and education. A health system is not
an island, but a focus. And the information it uses needs to recognise the spe-
ci¢c local bridges to other services, and the amount and nature of the tra⁄c
over them.
Economic status
The healthcare that a country can a¡ord varies tremendously. What is a normal
service and reasonable consumer expectation in one country, such as for
instance a prosthetic hip replacement or open heart surgery, may be neither
physically possible nor economically a¡ordable in another country. At a more
mundane level, the availability and a¡ordability of drugs will vary tremen-
dously. Thus many forms of supposedly objective health information, from pre-
ferred prescribing patterns to outcome measures, as well as the treatment
pro¢les themselves, vary from country to country, and thus data from one
country may not only be irrelevant in another, but actually harmful in that it
will skew aspirations or interpretations.
Those issues concern the information contained within systems, the use of
supposedly ‘universal’ scienti¢c facts, and the application of comparative ana-
lyses. But what about health information systems themselves, the channels
and conveyors of such information? Are there not generic principles that can
apply here?
The answer to that must be mixed. And here the legacy of Mrs K˛rner, and its
under-appreciation, applies yet again. Many of the principles that her steering
group established apply universally, including the importance of timely and
accurate data, and the principle that understanding and relevance must come
from the operational levels upwards to the strategic levels. However, almost
Globalisation or localisation? 153
Rays of light
First, not all countries take the short-term and minimal investment approach
that Edith K˛rner faced. Some countries recognise the importance of developing
health information systems, and for doing so in an open and consultative way,
with a strong move towards evidence-based and need-based systems. Exemplars
of this are Canada, with its strongly supported Canadian Institute for Health
Information,7 and the Commonwealth Government of Australia, with its devel-
opment of an evidence-based e-health system.8 This investment in evidence,
planning and consultation must surely be bene¢cial in the longer-term, and
the vibrancy of the reports produced by the Canadian Institute for Health
Information and Statistics Canada, and the credibility of Australian health infor-
mation policy documents, would give credence to this.
Second, it ought to be possible to have much better exchange of knowledge
and experience about the development of health information systems, and the
availability of comparable data. One positive example is within the European
Union, where the comparatively new health monitoring programme seeks to
provide common analyses of health problems, mortality and morbidity, and
health systems’ e¡ectiveness across all the member states. There are many prob-
lems to be faced in this, given the variety of cultures and health systems across
Europe, but it is an ambitious programme which is now well under way.9
154 Vision and value in health information
Conclusion
So having started with the question as to whether the insight into health infor-
mation as created by Edith K˛rner and her team, and the related e¡orts and
frustrations they encountered, have to be replicated in every country, the
reply must be that there are better ways than this expensive duplication and
frustration. However, there is also the dangerous paradox that attempts to
share this learning run the great danger of creating the fundamental mistake
of turning into global, and top-down imposed, ideas and solutions, when what
is actually needed is systems and information that meet local need and respect
156 Vision and value in health information
the issues and values of local healthcare delivery. And in meeting that conclu-
sion it must be reiterated that this was a fundamental principle of Edith K˛rner
herself. So if the adverse learning points of the K˛rner experience in developing
healthcare information systems are to be avoided, the key underlying principle
of Edith K˛rner ^ the focus on the needs of local healthcare delivery ^ must be
the driving force. In the modern global communications century, the dangers as
well as the bene¢ts of instant global health information communication must be
assessed in any situation and setting.16 That suggests three conclusions.
Mutual learning
First, any attitude of proclaiming answers or knowledge from one country to
another, and particularly from an a¥uent global region to areas less well o¡,
must be avoided as not only demeaning, but likely to be irrelevant, ine¡ectual
and thus wasteful of resources.17 Rather, a context of mutual learning needs to
be developed so that local opinion can develop local systems, but based on
sound principles and knowledge gained from open discussion and exchange.
Second, any form of information system or information itself needs to be made
appropriate for the local setting. Sultan Bahabri, founding Chief Executive of
the International e-Health Association, coined the phrase ‘glocalisation’ for
this.18 This term neatly encapsulates the need to take global information and
render it appropriately local. But that too requires resources.
Third, there is no real leadership or vehicle for this localisation process.
Though most informed commentators see information as vital to the healthcare
process, it is unfortunately the situation that the WHO does not provide strong
leadership in this ¢eld, though individual programmes, and some of the regional
o⁄ces, have particular exemplary programmes and strengths. Indeed, some
WHO initiatives, such as the HINARI programme of low-cost electronic publish-
ing access to the third world, run the risk of making external and potentially
inappropriate information more available in developing countries than appro-
priate local information.19
References
1 Cochrane A (1972) E⁄ciency and E¡ectiveness: random re£ections on health services. Nuf-
¢eld Provincial Hospitals Trust and British Medical Journal, London; printed in revised
format, 1989.
2 Davido¡ F, Haynes B, Sackett D et al. (1995) Evidence-based medicine. BMJ 310: 1085^6.
3 Sackett DL, Richardson WS, Rosenberg W et al. (1996) Evidence-based Medicine: how to
practise and teach EBM. Churchill Livingstone, Edinburgh.
4 Roberts R (1999) Information for Evidence-based Care (Harnessing Health Information
Series No. 1). Radcli¡e Medical Press, Oxford.
5 Finau SA (1994) National Health Information Systems in the Paci¢c Islands: in search of
a future. Health Policy and Planning 9: 161^70.
6 Rigby M (2001) Evaluation: 16 powerful reasons why not to do it ^ and 6 over-riding
imperatives. In: V Patel, R Rogers and R Haux (eds) Medinfo 2001: Proceedings of the 10th
World Congress on Medical Informatics. IOS Press, Amsterdam.
7 (www.cihi.ca)
8 (www.health.gov.au/healthonline/welcome.htm)
9 (europa.eu.int/comm/health/ph/programmes/monitor/index^en.htm)
158 Vision and value in health information
15 (http://208.48.48.190/his.htm)
16 Rigby M (1999) The management and policy challenges of the globalisation e¡ect of
informatics and telemedicine. Health Policy 46: 97^103.
17 Rigby M (2000) And into the 21st century: telecommunications and the global clinic.
In: M Rigby, R Roberts and M Thick (eds) Taking Health Telematics into the 21st Century.
Radcli¡e Medical Press, Oxford.
18 Bahabri S (2002) From Telemedicine to e-Health ^ what’s next? Opening presentation
to First International e-Health Association Conference and Exhibition ‘e-Health 2001’,
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
19 (www.healthinternetwork.org)
20 Arunachalem S (1999) Informatics in clinical practice in developing countries: still
early days. BMJ 319: 1297.
21 Tan-Torres Edejer T (2000) Disseminating health information in developing countries:
the role of the internet. BMJ 321: 797^800.
22 Costello A and Zumla A (2000) Moving to research partnerships in developing coun-
tries. BMJ 321: 827^9.
23 Lam CLK (2000) Knowledge can £ow from developing to developed countries. BMJ
321: 830.
Index
Academy of Royal Colleges, secondary care care planning, and patient records 57,
system speci¢cations 75 61^2
accident and emergency records project 7 CAS see complex adaptive systems
accountability 84^5 CASP see Critical Appraisal Skills
information requirements 85^6 Programme
internal control model 87 central data returns see hospital episodes
see also governance; risk management statistics (HES); minimum data sets
activity levels, as measure of service change management
performance 125 complex adaptive systems (CAS) 35^6
adverse events reporting 83 and knowledge driven paradigms 53^4
avoidable incidents and health outcome leadership needs 38^41
indicators 94, 97^9 Chantler, Cyril 18^19
advocacy role of patient records 57, 62^6 child health information systems 107^18
requirements of record systems 64 background and context 108^9, 122^4
American College of Pathologists, potential problems 109^10
SNOMED-CT collaboration 74 principles and recommendations
American health information 115^17
strategies 33^4 system requirements 111^14
government reports 35 child protection issues 63, 113, 117^18,
IOM reports 35, 60 124
amputations, as outcome indicator chronic illness
97^8, 98 impact on healthcare 37
appraisal, and clinical performance and IT assisted home monitoring 41
measures 72 civil service
audit membership of Steering Group
and Governance Standards 80 Committee 3
see also governance; health outcomes; see also political trends
risk management Clark, J 125
Australia health information strategies Clay, Trevor 20
153 clinical decision support systems (IT)
41^2, 73
Bahabri, S 156 clinical governance 87
Barker, W 125 see also governance
British Medical Association clinical information needs 27, 69^75
and access to health research accident and emergency records
information 146 project 7
on NHS information requirements 19 evidence-based best practice knowledge
systems 70^2, 145
Cadbury, A 84^5 hospital episode statistics 72, 104^5
Canada health information strategies 153 information overload 49, 145
160 Index
trust issues (data reliability), managers/ and Rapid Access Chest Pain Clinic
clinicians perceptions 16, 21, 74 programme 54
Turnball report 81^2, 83 satellite technology 148
Weed, Laurence 61
United Nations Millennium Assembly 148 WHO
USA health information strategies 33^44 HINARI programme 156
government IT reports 35 and quality 131
IOM reports 35, 60 Wickings, I 2
Willcock, LP 21
VIPS system 126 Windsor, P 18, 26
waiting list statistics 73
Walk Don’t Run (1985) 4 Yates, J 2, 21, 22
web-based information Young, Barbara 19
and document management 53 Young, WC 125
patient access 146^7