LOAN
In Carolyn Garcia v. Rica Marie Thio, G.R. No. 154878, March 16, 2007, Rica
received from Carolyn a crossed check in the amount of $100,000.00 payable to the order
of Marilou Santiago. Thereafter, Carolyn received from Rica payments. Again, Rica
received a check in the amount of P500,000.00 from Carolyn and payable to the order of
Marilou and payments were again made by her representing interests. There was failure
to pay the principal amounts hence, a complaint for sum of money with damages was
filed. Rica contended that she had no obligation to her as it was Marilou who was indebted
as she was merely asked to deliver the checks to Marilou and that the check payments
she issued were merely intended to accommodate Marilou. The RTC ruled in favor of
Carolyn but the CA reversed on the ground that there was no contract between Rica and
Carolyn. On appeal, the SC
Held: There was a contract of loan between Carolyn and Rica.
A loan is a real contract, not consensual, and as such is perfected only upon the
delivery of the object of the contract. This is evident in Art. 1934 of the Civil Code which
provides:
An accepted promise to deliver something by way of commodatum
or simple loan is binding upon the parties, but the commodatum or simple
loan itself shall not be perfected until the delivery of the object of the
contract. (Emphasis supplied)
Upon delivery of the object of the contract of loan (in this case the money received
by the debtor when the checks were encashed) the debtor acquired ownership of such
money or loan proceeds and is bound to pay the creditor an equal amount. (Naguiat v.
CA, G.R. No. 118375, October 3, 2003, 412 SCRA 591).
It is undisputed that the checks were delivered to Rica. However, these checks
were crossed and payable not to the order of Rica but to the order of a certain Marilou
Santiago.
The Court agree with petitioner. Delivery is the act by which the res or substance
thereof is placed within the actual or constructive possession or control of another.
(Buenaflor v. CA, G.R. No. 142021, November 29, 2000, 346 SCRA 563). Although Rica
did not physically receive the proceeds of the checks, these instruments were placed in
her control and possession under an arrangement whereby she actually re-lent the
amounts to Marilou.
Several factors support this conclusion.
(1) Carolyn did not know personally Marilou. This was admitted by Rica, hence, it is
not possible for Carolyn to grant loans in such big sum of money even without any
acknowledgment of debt. It was Rica who had transactions with Marilou.
(2) It is unbelievable that Rica would put herself in a position where she would be
compelled to pay interest out of her own funds for loans she never contracted.
(3) When Marilou filed a petition for insolvency, it was Rica who was listed as a debtor.
Hence, Rica is the debtor and not Marilou. In People v. Mala, G.R. No.152351,
September 18, 2003, 411 SCRA 327 and People v. Dayag, 155 Phil. 421 (1974), it was
ruled that:
In the assessment of the testimonies of witnesses, this Court is
guided by the rule that for evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed
from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself such as
the common experience of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony except its
conformity to our knowledge, observation, and experience. Whatever is
repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous, and is outside of juridical
cognizance.
No interest if there is no written agreement
to pay it; exception.
Whether the debtor is liable to pay interest since there was no written agreement
to pay interest, the SC
Held: No, because no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in
writing. (Art. 1956, NCC).
Be that as it may, while there can be no stipulated interest, there can be legal
interest pursuant to Article 2209 of the Civil Code. It is well-settled:
When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of
a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due
should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the
interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially
demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12%
per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial
demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil
Code. (Eusebio-Calderon v. People, G.R. No. 158495, October 21, 2004,
441 SCRA 137; Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 97412, July
12, 1994, 234 SCRA 78; Garcia v. Thio, G.R. No. 154878, March 16, 2007).
Hence, Rica is liable for the payment of legal interest per annum to be computed
from the date when she received the demand letter. From the finality of the decision until
it is fully paid, the amount due shall earn interest at 12% per annum, the interim period
being deemed equivalent to a forbearance of credit. (Cabrera v. People, G.R. 150618,
July 24, 2003, 407 SCRA 247).
