#1

Philippine Airlines, Inc., petitioner

vs.
Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines et al., respondents
GR No. 200088, February 26, 2018
Ponencia: Martires, J.

Facts:
Antecedently on 5 June 1998, ALPAP went on a labor strike for the alleged unfair labor
practices committed by PAL. The Secretary of DOLE assumed jurisdiction and declared
the strike illegal, which was eventually affirmed by the Court on 29 August 2002.

The instant case arose from filing of suit for damages on 22 April 2003 by PAL against
ALPAP with the Labor Arbiter, alleging that PAL suffered actual damages from
ALPAP’s illegal strike. The LA dismissed PAL’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction,
stating that the damage suit arises from a quasi-delict, not a labor dispute. Hence, the
LA ruled that the damage suit is cognizable by the regional trial court. On appeal, the
NLRC affirmed the LA’s decision. Likewise, the appeal on CA bore the same result,
where the CA opined that the employer-employee relation in the claim for damages by
the PAL is merely incidental, and thus the damages claim is civil in character. Hence
the instant case before the Court.

Issue:
W/N the suit for damages from the illegal strike is exclusively cognizable by labor
tribunals.

Held:
Yes. Under Article 217 of PD 442, it is expressly stated that claims for damages arising
from employer-employee relations are within the exclusive jurisdiction of Labor
Arbiters. For the said provision to apply, jurisprudence evolved the rule is that there
must be a reasonable connection between claim for damages and employer-employee
relations. Absent such connection, the claim is cognizable by the regular courts.

The Court held that in the present case, the claimed damages arose from the illegal
strike, which was closely intertwined with the respondents’ allegations of unfair labor
practices against PAL. This pronouncement has been previously decided by the Court
in several cases during the effectivity of RA 875 (Industrial Peace Act). After the
promulgation of PD 442, which completely superseded RA 875, the Court maintained
its stance, as when it ruled in National Federation of Labor v. Hon. Eisma that a
complaint for damages is deeply rooted in labor dispute and thus should be dismissed
by the regular court for lack of jurisdiction.

Based on the foregoing, the Court ruled that the labor tribunals have exclusive
jurisdiction over the claim for damages by PAL. However, the Court held that to
entertain the present suit of damages is to relitigate an issue passed upon by the
Secretary of Labor when he declared the strike illegal, as affirmed by the Court in 2002.
Wherefore, the Court dismissed the present petition.
#2
G.R. No. 155505
February 15, 2007
EMILIO M. CAPAROSO and JOEVE P. QUINDIPAN, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
COMPOSITE ENTERPRISES INCORPORATED, and EDITH TAN, Respondents.
Ponencia: Carpio, J.

Facts:
Petitioners Caparoso and Quindipan filed a case before the Labor Arbiter charging
respondent Composite Enterprises Incorporated, a confectionery distributor and
supplier. According to their allegations, petitioners were working as deliverymen for
respondent corporation until they were both dismissed from service on 8 October 1999.
Respondent corporation contended that the cause for the dismissal of the petitioners is
the expiration of their contract of employment, which expires monthly.

The Labor Arbiter ruled that the petitioners were regular employees, and hence, were
illegally dismissed. On respondents’ appeal to the NLRC, the LA decision was set aside.
The NLRC ruled that the period stipulated in the employment contract is binding
between the parties. Petitioners raised the issue before the Court of Appeals, which
ruled affirmed the NLRC’s decision, holding that the period of the petitioners’
employment depends on the manpower requirement by the respondent on a given
month. Hence, the petition is brought before the Supreme Court.

Issue:
W/N the petitioners were illegally dismissed.

Held:
No. The petitioners are fixed-term employees who can be validly dismissed upon
expiration of their employment contract. The law does not preclude the fixing of
employment for a definite period even if Article 280 of the Labor Code indiscriminately
disregards oral agreements contrary to the concept of regular employment as defined
therein. The same clause should be construed to prevent the substantive evil of
agreements entered precisely to circumvent security of tenure. In the instant case, the
Court upheld the validity of the petitioners’ fixed-term employment for it does not
circumvent the law on security of tenure. Therefore, the petitioners were not illegally
dismissed by the expiration of their employment contract. The Court dismissed the
instant petition.
#3
G.R. No. 86963
August 6, 1999
BATONG BUHAY GOLD MINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE DIONISIO DELA SERNA IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE
UNDERSECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT,
ELSIE ROSALINDA TY, ANTONIO MENDELEBAR, MA. CONCEPCION Q. REYES,
AND THE OTHER COMPLAINANTS* IN CASE NO. NCR-LSED-CI-2047-87; MFT
CORPORATION AND SALTER HOLDINGS PTY. LTD., respondents.
Ponencia: PURISIMA, J.:

Facts:
A money claims suit amounting to roughly 4.8 million pesos was filed against petitioner
BBGMI before the respondent DOLE Regional Director of the National Capital Region,
who granted the same. On appeal alleging the lack of jurisdiction of the RD to hear and
decide the case, the DOLE Undersecretary affirmed the decision of the RD. The matter
is brought before the Supreme Court.

Issue:
W/N the DOLE RD has jurisdiction over money claims exceeding P5,000.00.

Held:
Yes. Executive Order No. 111 has amended Article 128(b) of the Labor Code so as to
give Regional Directors concurrent jurisdiction with Labor Arbiters over labor standard
cases, including money claims exceeding P5,000.00 where an employer-employee
relationship exists. The Court admitted that there was confusion as to the application of
EO 111, mainly in Servando’s Inc vs SOLE, where the Court held that Regional
Directors cannot hear and decide money claims above P5,000.00 because such cases are
within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. However, the
enactment of RA 7730 clarified the issue by amending Article 128(b) to apply
notwithstanding the limitations provided in Article 129 and 217 of the Labor Code.
Otherwise stated, through RA 7730, the current application of Article 128(b) reinforces
the jurisdiction of DOLE Regional Directors over the present labor standards case.

Wherefore, the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the Regional Director.

#4
G.R. No. 120095
August 5, 1996
JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC., and KARY INTERNATIONAL,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MA. NIEVES CONFESSOR, then Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment, HON. JOSE BRILLANTES, in his capacity as
acting Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment and HON. FELICISIMO
JOSON, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, respondents.
Ponencia: KAPUNAN, J.

Facts:
The DOLE Secretary issued Department Order No. 28, creating the Entertainment
Industry Advisory Council which was tasked with issuing guidelines on the training,
testing certification and deployment of performing artists abroad. The EIAC
recommended the establishment of the Artist’s Record Book as the document that shall
prove the completion by the Filipino entertainer of the new certification procedures.
The ARB shall become a necessary precondition for any contract for overseas
employment for Filipino entertainers. The DOLE issued orders adopting the EIAC
recommendations.

The Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP), with

the intervention of herein petitioners, allege the unconstitutionality of the above orders.
The trial court and subsequently the appellate court dismissed the complaint. Hence,
the matter is brought before the Court.

Issue:
W/N the Orders instituting the ARB are valid.

Held:
Yes. The Court ruled that the challenged Orders are valid as exercises of the State’s
police power. Police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the
common good. In the herein case, the assailed Orders were promulgated to attend to
the alarming number of reports that a significant number of Filipina performing artists
end up as prostitutes abroad, many of whom are subjected to physical and sexual
violence, leading to their deaths. In view of the paramount necessity to protect the
welfare of Filipino performing artists, the DOLE validly exercised police power of the
State through the establishment of the ARB requirement.

Apart from the State’s police power, the 1987 Constitution itself mandates the
government to extend the fullest protection to our overseas workers.

Based on the foregoing, no legal infirmity is found in the assailed Orders. The Court
denied the petition.
#5
G.R. No. L-45748
April 5, 1939
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FRANCO VERA REYES, defendant-appellee.
Ponencia: IMPERIAL, J.

Facts:
The defendant was charged with the violation of Act No. 2549, as amended, which
prohibits and punishes the non-payment of the salary of an employee within the
provided period. In his defense, the defendant invoked the non-imprisonment for debt
clause from the 1987 Constitution. The trial court sustained the defense and thereafter
declared unconstitutional the provision of Act No. 2549 relative to the non-payment of
employee salary. The Solicitor-General contends before the Court that the trial court
erred in its decision.

Issue:
W/N arbitrary non-payment of employee salary within the proper period constitutes a
violation of the non-imprisonment for debt constitutional clause.

Held:
No. An employer who unjustifiably refuses or delays the payment of an employee is not
unlike a person who defrauds another, by refusing to pay his just debt. The offense in
this case therefore is not the non-payment of debt but the employment of fraud to
escape obligation. Hence, the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt
cannot be invoked in this case.

To fortify the constitutionality of Act No. 2549, as amended, the Court held that the
same law is a valid exercise of police power, aimed towards the suppression of possible
abuses on the part of employers who hire employees without paying them the agreed
salaries, causing the latter undue financial difficulties.

Wherefore, Act No. 2549, as amended is declared valid. The Court reversed the decision
of the lower court.
#6
G.R. No. 47800
December 2, 1940
MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner,
v.
A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., Respondents.
Ponencia: LAUREL, J.

Facts:
Commonwealth Act No. 548, which regularly bans animal-drawn vehicles in different
streets of Manila, was enacted by the respondents. Petitioner alleges that CA 548
infringes upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to
insure the well-being and economic security of all the people.

Issue:
W/N CA 548 is unconstitutional for infringing upon the promotion of social justice.

Held:
No. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,"
but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the
State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all
the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.

Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of

interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that
should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social
and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state
of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the
greatest good to the greatest number."

Wherefore, the argument of the petitioner is untenable. The petition is dismissed

accordingly by the Court.
#7
G.R. No. 80609
August 23, 1988
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and MARILYN ABUCAY,
respondents.
Ponencia: CRUZ, J.

Facts:
Marilyn Abucay, a PLDT traffic operator, was convicted for demanding monetary
consideration in exchange for approving applications for telephone installations.
Consequently, petitioner PLDT dismissed the her. On the claim that Abucay was
illegally dismissed, the Ministry of Labor and Employment ruled that the dismissal was
due, but she is to receive one month pay for each of the 10 years of service she rendered
as separation pay.

PLDT challenges the above ruling before the Court, claiming that an employee
dismissed for cause is entitled neither reinstatement nor backwages. Equity and
compassion, PLDT claims, cannot be a substitute for law.

Issue:
W/N an employee may receive separation pay from employer after valid dismissal.

Held:
Yes. Although the Labor Code disentitles persons dismissed for cause from separation
pay, the rule admits of an exception based upon considerations of equity. Equity has
been defined as justice outside law, being ethical rather than jural and belonging to the
sphere of morals than of law. There is no shortage of cases wherein the courts have
granted separation pay to erring employees albeit their valid dismissal, in consideration
of their long years of service.

However, the Court takes this opportunity to define the parameters of this exception.
Separation pay should not be considered warranted when the cause of separation is
more serious than mere inefficiency, amounting to moral turpitude. In the case at bar,
Aburcay was dismissed for dishonesty which reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty to the
company to where she rendered 10 years of service. Hence, the Court rules that the
grant of separation pay is unjustified.

Wherefore, the Court affirms the assailed decision except for the grant of separation
pay.
#8
G.R. No. 47800
December 2, 1940
MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner,
v.
A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., Respondents.
Ponencia: LAUREL, J.

Facts:
Petitioner brings before the Supreme Court a petition for a writ of prohibition for the
enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 548, which shall prohibit animal-drawn vehicles
to pass and pick up passengers in various streets of Manila. Calalang contends that CA
548 constitutes an unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge
the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion.

Issue:
W/N CA 548 is unconstitutional for being an unlawful interference of personal liberty
and property.

Held:
No. Considering that it aims to promote safe transit upon national roads by avoiding
obstructions, the enactment of CA 548 is based on public welfare. In the promotion of
the general welfare of the people, the State may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations. To the fundamental aim of the
government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Hence, CA 548, being a valid
exercise of police power, is not an unlawful interference of personal liberty and
property. The Court therefore upheld the constitutionality of CA 548.
#9
G.R. No. 158693
November 17, 2004
JENNY M. AGABON and VIRGILIO C. AGABON, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), RIVIERA HOME
IMPROVEMENTS, INC. and VICENTE ANGELES, respondents.
Ponencia: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Facts:
Petitioners were dismissed by the private respondent for allegedly abandonment of
work. Consequently, petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of
money claims before the Labor Arbiter who sustained the complaint. The NLRC
however reversed the Labor Arbiter decision because it found that the petitioners had
abandoned their work. On appeal, the CA upheld the reversal of the NLRC. Hence, the
present petition for review before the Court.

It should be noted that based on the factual findings of the CA, it appears that the
petitioner’s dismissal was for a just cause as they had indeed abandoned their
employment, a violation of Art. 282 of the Labor Code. However, the private
respondent dismissed the petitioners without following the requirement of notice and
hearing pursuant to the IRR of the Labor Code.

Issue:
W/N the dismissal is valid despite the lack of statutory due process.

Held:
Yes. Where the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process should not
nullify the dismissal or render it illegal or ineffectual. An employer should not be
compelled to continue employing a person who is manifestly guilty of misfeasance or
malfeasance. On the other hand, an employee who is clearly guilty of conduct violative
of Art. 282 should not be protected by the Social Justice Clause of the Constitution.
Social justice, as the term suggests, should be used only to correct an injustice.

The Court therefore upholds the validity of the dismissal. However, it is deemed proper
to impose sanctions against the employer for failure to observe statutory due process in
dismissing the petitioners.
#10
G.R. No. 117040
January 27, 2000
RUBEN SERRANO, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ISETANN DEPARTMENT
STORE, respondents.
Ponencia: MENDOZA, J.

Facts:
Petitioner was laid off by private respondent on the account of the latter’s cost-cutting
measure. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter, who
in turn decided in favor of the petitioner due to the failure of the private respondent to
observe the notice requirement under Art. 283 of the Labor Code. However, the appeal
with the NLRC resulted in the reversal of the LA decision, ruling that the dismissal is
for just cause under Art. 283 and must therefore be considered valid.

Hence, the matter is brought before the Court for review.

Issue:
W/N the failure to observe the notice requirement under Art. 283 of the Labor Code is
tantamount to a denial of the constitutional right to due process.

Held:
No. The Due Process Clause of the Constitution is a limitation on governmental powers;
it does not apply to the exercise of private power, such as termination of employment
under the Labor Code. Further, Art. 283 requires the service of a 30-day written notice
before an employee is laid off not to afford him an opportunity to be heard on any
charge against him, for there is no adversary. The purpose of the notice is to prepare the
employee for the eventual loss of his job and for DOLE to determine whether there is
just cause for the termination of his employment. It is when the employee questions the
legality of his dismissal before a tribunal that the constitutional due process may be
availed.

Wherefore, the Court grants the petition with an order for the private respondent to pay
backwages and other monetary awards.
#11
G.R. No. 162994
September 17, 2004
DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO and PEDRO A. TECSON,
petitioners,
vs.
GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.
Ponencia: TINGA, J.

Facts:
Petitioner Tecson, during his employment in Glaxo, married an employee of Glaxo’s
rival company. Tecson was reminded by his superiors that he must act on the manifest
conflict of interest which their relationship might engender. Unable to find a common
ground, Tecson and Glaxo submitted the matter for voluntary arbitration.

The National Conciliation and Mediation Board rendered in its decision declaring as
valid Glaxo’s policy on relationships. Aggrieved, Tecson filed a petition for review with
the CA, which denied the same. Hence, the present petition before the Court, where
petitioners contend that subject relationship policy, among others, violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because it creates invalid distinctions among
employees on account only of marriage. Additionally, they claim that the policy
restricts the employees’ right to marry.

Issue:
W/N the company policy of Glaxo is violative of the equal protection clause.

Held:
No. The equal protection clause does not find application in the present case because
the clause is addressed only to the state. Otherwise stated, the equal protection clause
erects no shield against merely private conduct however discriminatory or wrongful.
The only exception occurs when the state is found to be involved in the wrongful
private conduct. Such exception is not present in this case. Wherefore, finding no merit
in the petition, the Court sustained the decision of the CA affirming the NCMB.
#12
G.R. No. 168081
October 17, 2008
ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
Ponencia: REYES, R.T., J.

Facts:
The petitioner was dismissed from his service as a flight steward due to his failure to
comply with the weight requirements of the respondent corporation. Aggrieved,
petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter, who granted the
same. Part of the decision is the finding of the LA that other overweight employees
were not treated similarly since they were promoted instead. The subsequent appeals
bore contrary results. The NLRC sustained the LA decision while the CA later declared
the dismissal valid.

The matter is therefore elevated before the Court.

Issue:
W/N the dismissal of the petitioner for his obesity is invalid for being discriminatory.

Held:
No. The Court held that the administrative bodies grossly misappreciated the evidence
presented by the petitioner for substantiating his claim that he was being discriminated.
There is nothing on the records which could support the finding of discriminatory
treatment. The weights of the supposed overweight cabin attendants and other relevant
data that could have adequately established a case of discrimination were not indicated.

Petitioner could not even invoke the equal protection clause of the Constitution, since
the clause cannot be invoked against private individuals. The guaranty is meant to erect
a shield against the government. In view of the foregoing as well as other grounds, the
Court upheld the validity of the dismissal.
#13
G.R. Nos. 170384-85 March 9, 2007
LORNA DISING PUNZAL, Petitioner,
vs.
ETSI TECHNOLOGIES, INC., WERNER GEISERT, and CARMELO D. REMUDARO,
Respondents.
Ponencia: CARPIO MORALES, J.

Facts:
For circulating an e-mail containing negative and malicious remarks against the Senior
Vice President of the respondent corporation, the petitioner was dismissed from service
immediately. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the
Labor Arbiter. The complaint was dismissed because the dismissal was for just cause
and she was afforded due process. The NLRC reversed the LA decision, finding that
while the petitioner is indeed guilty of misconduct, the penalty of dismissal is
disproportionate to her infraction. On appeal with the CA, the LA decision was
reinstated.

The petitioner presents before the Court a petition for review. The Court inevitably
found the petitioner guilty for serious misconduct warranting her dismissal. However,
the matter beforehand also deals with the petitioner’s contention that she was denied
due process.

Issue:
W/N the petitioner was accorded her right to due process in her dismissal.

Held:
No. Art. 277 (b) of the Labor Code expressly mandates that prior to termination of
employment, an employer should afford his employee an ample opportunity to be
heard and defend himself with the assistance of his representatives if he so desires. The
mandate was not followed in this case as the records do not show that the petitioner
was informed of her right to be represented by counsel during the conference with her
superiors. In light of such procedural lapse, the petitioner is entitled to an award of
nominal damage.
#14
G.R. No. L-25018
May 26, 1969
ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR., petitioner-appellee,
vs.
BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, respondent-appellant, SALVADOR
GATBONTON and ENRIQUETA GATBONTON, intervenors-appellants.
Ponencia: FERNANDO, J.

Facts:
During the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged immorality, the counsel
for complainants therein announced that the first witness to be presented shall be
herein petitioner Pascual, who was the respondent in the administrative case. Pascual
interposed in his defenSese the self-incrimination clause in the Constitution. The Board
of Medical Examiners did not defer so long as a restraining order from a competent
authority is produced by Pascual.

Therefore, Pascual prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction with the
lower court, which granted the same. Denying the claims, the Board appeals before the
Court.

Issue:
W/N the right against self-incrimination is available for Pascual who is the respondent
in the administrative case.

Held:
Yes. The self-incrimination clause is applicable in all proceedings with penal aspect. The
administrative case partakes the nature of a criminal case because the Pascual may very
well lose his license as a medical practitioner in a resulting unfavorable decision. Hence,
Pascual may avail of the right against self-incrimination.

The Board assumes that Pascual is allowed to the witness stand so long as he objects to
the questions which answers could lead to penal liability. On the contrary, the Court
declares that the right against self-incrimination covers not only the right to refuse
answering accusatory questions but also the right to remain silent and forego testimony
altogether. The objective of revealing the truth to an alleged offense should not be
accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect
accorded the human personality.

Wherefore, the Court affirms the decision of the lower court.

#15
G.R. No. L-19052
December 29, 1962
MANUEL F. CABAL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR., and THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, respondents.
Ponencia: CONCEPCION, J.

Facts:
Petitioner Cabal was charged of contempt before the lower court for refusing to take the
witness stand in a committee investigation on an administrative graft case wherein
Cabal is also the defendant. A motion to quash was filed by the petitioner, but the
respondent judge denied the same. For fear of being summarily punished for contempt,
the petitioner brings herein petition before the Court praying for the restraint of the
respondent Judge to continue with the contempt proceedings.

The respondents argue that the investigation on the graft case is in the character of an
administrative proceeding, whereas the right against self-incrimination defense raised
by the petitioner only applies to criminal proceedings.

Issue:
W/N the right against self-incrimination is applicable to an investigation on an
administrative charge of graft.

Held:
Yes. A graft charge filed under RA 1379, while concededly an administrative
proceeding, provides for the penalty of forfeiture of the respondent’s property deemed
manifestly out of proportion to his salary in favor of the State. Proceeding for forfeiture
of property are considered penal in nature, as the position of the witness is virtually
that of an accused in trial where his property is at the risk of being taken away.
Otherwise stated, forfeiture proceedings are technically administrative proceedings but
in substance and effect, a criminal one. Hence, the constitutional guarantee against self-
incrimination applies.

Wherefore, the Court grants the petition and enjoins the respondent from further
proceedings on the contempt case.
#16
G.R. No. 113271
October 16, 1997
WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION and MS. EMMA CO, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ANTONIA MELODIA
CATOLICO, respondents.
Ponencia: DAVIDE, JR., J.

Facts:
Private respondent Catolico was dismissed from service due to dishonesty detrimental
to the interests of the company after she denied receiving a refund check found in her
possession. A complaint for illegal dismissal was thereafter filed with the Labor Arbiter.
The decision of the LA sustained the complaint. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the
decision of the LA, ruling further that the refund check was inadmissible as evidence
for violating the constitutional prohibition against illegal searches and seizures.

Aggrieved, petitioners raise the matter before the Court.

Issue:
W/N the check is admissible as evidence against Catolico.

Held:
Yes. The right against illegal searches and seizures safeguarded by the Constitution
finds no application if the illegal search or seizure is perpetrated by a private
individual. In such cases, the recourse of the offended party is to file a criminal or civil
case against the offender.

Though admissible, the Court found that the evidence against Catolico is unfounded,
and that she was denied due process. Hence, the Court declared the dismissal illegal.
#17
G.R. No. 157010
June 21, 2005
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs.
FLORENCE O. CABANSAG, respondent.
Ponencia: PANGANIBAN, J.

Facts:
Respondent Cabansag was dismissed from service by the PNB Singapore branch
apparently as a cost-cutting measure. Cabansag filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
with the Labor Arbiter, who rendered PNB guilty of illegal dismissal for non-
observance of due process. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA on appeal.

The Court of Appeals did not appreciate the contention of the PNB that the dismissal
case should be tried under Singaporean law, since such law supposedly governs the
employment contract of Cabansag. According to the CA, Cabansag did not waive
Philippine labor laws when she secured an employment pass from Singapore. The CA
affirmed the decision therefore of the NLRC and LA.

Hence, the matter is brought for review before the Court.

Issue:
W/N Philippine labor laws are applicable to OFWs.

Held:
Yes. Obtaining a local work permit does not imply that the foreign worker shall be
bound by the local laws, and that her national laws are waived. It simply means that her
legal status in the country is that of a worker. Absent clear and convincing evidence, the
petitioner’s contention that Cabansag was locally hired and thus Singaporean laws
apply cannot be countenanced.

Therefore, the presumption that the respondent is a migrant worker is reinforced. The
basic policy of the State to afford protection to labor extends to all Filipino workers
whether employed locally or overseas. Hence, the petitioner cannot escape the
jurisdiction of the NLRC and the LA in the instant illegal dismissal case.

Wherefore, the petition is denied, and the assailed decision is affirmed.

#18
G.R. No. 89222
April 7, 1993.
CARMEN SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM (Philippine Navy), respondents.
Ponencia: NOCON, J.

Facts:
The late Francisco Santos died of liver cirrhosis at the end of his 32-year long
employment as a welder of the Philippine Navy. Mrs. Carmen Santos therefor filed a
claim for the death benefit of her husband. The GSIS denied the claim on the ground
that the cause of death is not an occupational disease. On appeal to the Employees’
Compensation Commission, the denial of the GSIS is affirmed on the same ground.

Petitioner brings the case before the Court for review.

Issue:
W/N liver cirrhosis is a compensable sickness in the case at bar.

Held:
Yes. Although not listed as a compensable sickness under the ECC rules, the Court
declares the late Francisco’s liver cirrhosis as a compensable sickness since his working
environment exposed him to burned electrodes and chemicals which would likely
cause malfunction of the liver in the long term.

The Court also notes that the ECC, as an agency tasked with implementing the social
justice mandate by the Constitution, should be more liberal in resolving compensation
claims of employees. The liberal approach is likewise embodied in Section 4 of the
Labor Code.

Premises considered, the Court finds merit in the petition. The ECC decision is
reversed.
#19
G.R. No. 101761
March 24, 1993.
NATIONAL SUGAR REFINERIES CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NBSR SUPERVISORY UNION,
(PACIWU) TUCP, respondents.
Ponencia: REGALADO, J

Facts:
Respondent union were supervisors of petitioner corporation enjoying overtime, rest
day and holiday pay under Art. 82, Book III of the Labor Code. Upon privatization of
the said corporation, the supervisors were considered managerial employees not
entitled to the benefits under Art. 82. Consequently, respondent union filed a
complaint. The LA and on appeal, the NLRC both decided in favor of the respondent
union.

Hence the present petition. Respondents aver that supervisors are rank-and-file
employees according to Art. 212(m), Book V of the Labor Code. Petitioners counter that
the definition under Art. 212 only applies within Book V; hence the definition of
managerial employees under Art. 82, Book II must apply since the same book is the
basis for the terms of employment in question.

Issue:
W/N supervisors are managerial employees for the purposes of determining
employment terms under Art. 82.

Held:
No. The present question is a factual one: the determination of whether an employee is
a managerial employee rests on the character of work performed, not the position of the
title. It is therefore inefficacious to decide whether Art. 82 or Art. 212(m) of the Labor
Code applies. A cursory perusal of the job evaluation reveal that the supervisory
employees are in fact managerial employees.

While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of
the working class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute will be
automatically decided in favor of labor. In the matter at hand, the Court decides in
favor of the employer.

Wherefore, the petition is granted, and the assailed decisions are set aside.
#20
G.R. No. L-62207
December 15, 1986
JUAN BONIFACIO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM [Ministry of Education & Culture]
and EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents-appellees.
Ponencia: FERNAN, J.

Facts:
The late wife of the petitioner was a classroom teacher who died of carcinoma of the
breast. After her unfortunate death, the petitioner filed a claim for death benefits with
the GSIS, which denied the same on the ground that the principal ailment of the
decedent is not an occupational disease for her work as a teacher. The ECC affirmed the
decision on appeal.

Hence the present petition for review before the Court.

Issue:
W/N the carcinoma of the breast is an occupational disease for classroom teachers.

Held:
No. Under the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, the carcinoma of the
breast is clearly not an occupational disease for classroom teachers. In this case
therefore, the petitioner bears the burden to prove that the sickness is aggravated by
working conditions of her late wife. The petitioner failed to satisfy the burden
incumbent upon him.

The contention that the law must be decided in favor of the employee is not applicable
in this case because the law in question left no room for doubt in its interpretation.

Wherefore, the petition is dismissed and the assailed decisions are affirmed.
#21
G.R. No. 77875
February 4, 1993
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO SANTOS, JR., HOUDIEL MAGADIA, GILBERT ANTONIO, REGINO
DURAN, PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, and THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.
Ponencia: REGALADO, J.

Facts:
Individual respondents, who were rank-and-file employees in PAL, submitted a formal
grievance to the office of their manager, in complaint of the deductions to their salaries
in the amount of the losses of inventoried items. The grievance was not resolved within
five days because the manager was on leave at that time. Invoking the collective
bargaining agreement, respondents believed that the grievance was resolved in their
favor because it was not resolved in five days. When the manager came back, he denied
the petition of the respondents and later on suspended them.

A complaint for illegal suspension was filed with the LA, who ruled in favor of the
petitioner corporation. The NLRC, on appeal, reversed the decision of the LA. Hence,
this petition for review is filed before the Court.

Issue:
W/N it was correct to resolve the grievance in favor of the employees after the
expiration of five days.

Held:
Yes. The provisions of the CBA must be applied categorically. The Court found no merit
in the petitioner’s contention that the grievance machinery must not be interpreted to be
resolved upon expiration of the prescriptive period without the participation of the
division head. The NLRC is correct in ruling that everything under the manager’s
authority would have to stand still during his absence. An officer-in-charge should have
been assigned to look into the grievance so as to comply with the prescriptive period.

The above interpretation is a manifestation of the Court’s sympathy with the employees
as imposed by the Constitution and in consideration of that the grievants rely so much
on their meager income for daily subsistence.

Wherefore, the Court affirms the NLRC decision. Petition is denied.

#22
G.R. No. 215568
August 03, 2015
RICHARD N. RIVERA, Petitioner,
v.
GENESIS TRANSPORT SERVICE, INC. AND RIZA A. MOISES, Respondents.
Ponencia: LEONEN, J.

Facts:
Petitioner Rivera, a bus conductor for respondent Genesis Transport Service, Inc., was
dismissed from service on the account of remitting the amount of P198.00 instead of the
correct amount of P394.00 worth of bus ticket receipts. Though claiming honest mistake
on his part, Rivera found the dismissal arbitrary, and so he filed a complaint with the
Labor Arbiter.

Genesis claimed as defense that the admitted misdeclaration is a serious misconduct

and a willful breach of trust reposed to Rivera. The LA, giving credence to the defense,
sustained the dismissal. The appeals to the NLRC and subsequently to the CA yielded
the same results. Hence, the matter is brought before the Court.

Issue:
W/N the dismissal of Rivera is justifiable.

Held:
No. The Court, in taking a preferential view in favor of labor, finds for the petitioner.
While it is true that breach of trust is a valid ground for dismissal of employees, the
same must be supported by substantial evidence. It appears that the respondents failed
to adduce proof of ill-motive or even of gross negligence on the part of the petitioner.
Instead, the petitioner stood charged with a lone, isolated instance of wrongdoing. The
Court is therefore inclined to believe that the error in a single ticket issued by the
petitioner was an honest mistake. Even more so after taking judicial notice of a bus
conductor’s nature of work and Rivera’s years of service.

Wherefore, the assailed decision affirming the legality of the dismissal is reversed and
set aside by the Court.
#23
G.R. No. 76633
October 18, 1988
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), MINISTER OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, HEARING OFFICER ABDUL BASAR and KATHLEEN
D. SACO, respondents.
Ponencia: CRUZ, J.

Facts:
Petitioner Eastern challenges the decision of POEA which granted an award to Mrs.
Saco as death benefits in view of the demise of her husband, an employee of the
petitioner. The arguments laid down by the petitioner are as follows: 1) the late Mr.
Saco was not an overseas worker; 2) the promulgation of Memorandum Circular No. 2
by the POEA is a violation of the principle of non-delegation of legislative powers; and
3) petitioner was denied due process when POEA sustained the validity of its own
issuance.

Issue:
W/N Mrs. Saco is entitled to death benefits from petitioner.

Held:
Yes. First of all, the late Mr. Saco is clearly an overseas worker, under categorical
application of pertinent laws and also under the implied recognition of the petitioner
through its acts. Second, Memo. Circ. No. 2 is an administrative regulation aimed to fill
in the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to
provide. Its promulgation is within the power of subordinate legislation granted to
administrative agencies. Finally, administrative agencies such as the POEA may
interpret and apply their own regulations by virtue of their quasi-judicial powers.
Petitioner is therefore not denied due process.

Any other doubts still remaining regarding the rights of the parties in this case are
resolved in favor of Mrs. Saco, in line with the express mandate of the Labor Code.
Wherefore, the petition is dismissed.
#24
G.R. No. 202645
August 05, 2015
FORTUNATO R. BARON, MANOLO B. BERSABAL, AND RECTO A. MELENDRES,
Petitioners,
vs.
EPE TRANSPORT, INC.* AND/OR ERNESTO P. ENRIQUEZ, Respondents.
Ponencia: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Facts:
Petitioners, employed as taxi drivers of respondent EPE Transport Corporation, Inc.,
filed complaints against the latter for imposing boundary rates non-compliant with the
Collective Bargaining Agreement. Three days after, petitioners claim to be prevented
from entering EPE’s premises. Consequently, they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
with the LA.

The LA dismissed the illegal dismissal case for lack of cause of action since it is found
that the petitioners are the ones who failed to return to work. On appeal, the NLRC
reversed the decision by the LA, holding that EPE did not direct the petitioners to
report back for work. On further appeal, the CA concurred with the LA, finding that the
petitioners failed to name the persons who prevented them from reporting for work.

Hence, the present petition.

Issue:
W/N the onus to prove the illegality of dismissal is incumbent on the workers.

Held:
No. On the contrary, under Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code, the onus of proving that
an employee was not dismissed illegally fully rests on the employer. The failure to
discharge such onus would mean that the dismissal was not justified and, therefore,
illegal. This is also supported by Art. 4 of the Labor Code, which states that all doubts in
the application of the said Code shall be resolved in favor of labor.

In view thereof, EPE failed to satisfy its burden to prove that the petitioners abandoned
their work deliberately and unjustifiably without intention of returning. At best, the
petitioners merely failed to report for work.

Wherefore, the Court grants the petition. The NLRC decision is reinstated.
#25
G.R. No. 84811
August 29, 1989
SOLID HOMES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
TERESITA PAYAWAL and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Ponencia: CRUZ, J.

Facts:
Respondent Payawal filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City against petitioner
Solid Homes, alleging that the latter had mortgaged in bad faith the subdivision lot
already sold to Payawal. The RTC rendered a judgment in favor of Payawal. On appeal,
the CA sustained the RTC decision. Hence, the matter is brought before the Court.

Petitioners argue that the RTC had no jurisdiction, this being vested with the National
Housing Authority under P.D. No. 957.

Issue:
W/N the RTC had jurisdiction to hear the case.

Held:
No. P.D. No. 957, as amended by P.D. No. 1344 clearly vests exclusive jurisdiction to the
National Housing Authority to hear and decide cases involving specific performance of
contractual obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot against dealers. The clear
intention of the law in increasing the vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
powers to administrative bodies is a result of the growing complexity of the modern
society. Specialized in the particular fields assigned to them, administrative bodies can
deal with the problems thereof with more expertise than the legislature or courts of
justice.

For lack of jurisdiction, the petition is granted. The decision by the CA is set aside.
#26
G.R. No. 101279
August 6, 1992
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of the Department of Labor & Employment,
and JOSE N. SARMIENTO, as Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, respondents.
Ponencia: GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.

Facts:
Reports of abuse of Filipino domestic helpers employed in Hong Kong reached the
country. In response, the DOLE and POEA ordered via circulars that private
employment agencies are temporarily suspended from recruiting Filipinos for Hong
Kong-based jobs. In lieu of the private employment agencies, the POEA shall take over
the processing and deployment of workers bound for Hong Kong.

Petitioner PASEI challenges the validity of the said circulars before the Court.

Issue:
W/N the assailed circulars are invalid for being in excess of the rule-making authority
of DOLE and POEA.

Held:
No. The authority of the DOLE and POEA to promulgate circulars is based on pertinent
laws. On one hand, the Labor Code clearly grants the SOLE the authority to issue
orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives of the same
Code. On the other hand, EO 797 which created the POEA grants the same the authority
to regulate private sector participation in the recruitment and placement of overseas
workers.

Citing Solid Homes, Inc vs Payawal, the Court reiterates the constitutionality of vesting
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies, in view of the
growing complexity of the modern society. More importantly, the assailed circulars
were issued to curtail the rampant violations in deploying domestic helpers to Hong
Kong. Hence, they are a valid exercise of police power delegated to the executive
branch of the Government.

However, the questioned circulars are suspended pending the statutory requirements
of proper publication. The petition is therefore granted.
#27
G.R. No. 81958
June 30, 1988
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D.
ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, respondents.
Ponencia: SARMIENTO, J.

Facts:
Petitioner PASEI challenges the constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1,
Series of 1988 of the DOLE on the ground that the same is an invalid exercise of the
lawmaking power since police power is not executive but legislative in character.

Issue:
W/N DO No. 1 of DOLE is unconstitutional.

Held:
No. DO No. 1 of DOLE is a valid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police
power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may
not be lawfully delegated. The Labor Code itself vests the DOLE the rulemaking powers
in the enforcement whereof.

The Court dismisses the petition.

#28
G.R. No. 85279
July 28, 1989
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION T.
BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO
DE ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO,
petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C.
PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY, respondents.
Ponencia: CORTES, J

Facts:
The SSS filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City against petitioner SSSEA for
staging an illegal strike, resulting in damages suffered by the SSS. The RTC held that the
strike was illegal. The CA, on appeal, affirmed the RTC decision. The matter is therefore
brought before the Court.

Petitioner SSSEA claims that the RTC had no jurisdiction to hear the illegal strike case,
as the jurisdiction lay with the NLRC. On the contrary, the SSS contends that its
employees are covered by civil service laws; hence they are not allowed to strike and
the RTC may issue injunctions thereof.

Issue:
W/N SSS employees may stage a strike.

Held:
No. It is worth emphasizing that the applicable law to government employees is not the
Labor Code but the civil service laws, rules and regulations. Among such measures is
Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 issued by the Civil Service Commission, which
expressly prohibits government officers and employees from staging any form of mass
actions which will result in temporary stoppage of public service.

The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot
be secured through compulsion by law. Relations between private employers and
employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. In contrast, the terms and conditions
of government workers are fixed by law, and therefore within the ambit of legislation or
government agencies. Hence, government workers cannot use the same weapons
available to private employees.

Corollary to the foregoing, the jurisdiction over the illegal strike case falls within the
jurisdiction of the RTC, not of the NLRC.

Wherefore, the current petition is denied by the Court.

#29
G.R. NO. 166365
September 30, 2005
DUTY FREE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
ROSSANO J. MOJICA, Respondent.
Ponencia: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Facts:
Respondent Mojica is a stock clerk in Duty Free Philippines who was found guilty of
Neglect of Duty by the Discipline Committee of the DFP. Consequently, Mojica was
forcibly resigned from his service.

A complaint for illegal dismissal was filed by Mojica against DFP before the NLRC. The
LA declared the dismissal illegal. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the LA,
finding for the validity of the dismissal. On further appeal, the CA reversed the decision
of the NLRC. Hence, the present petition before the Court.

Issue:
W/N the NLRC had jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case.

Held:
No. DFP, created under EO No. 46, is under the exclusive authority of the Philippine
Tourism agency which is the implementing arm of the Department of Tourism
regarding regulation of tax and duty free shops. In other words, DFP is a government
owned corporation. Consequently, Mojica is a civil service employee governed by civil
service laws and not by the Labor Code. Clearly then, the NLRC has no jurisdiction
over the illegal dismissal case.

Wherefore, the decision of the CA is annulled and the complaint for illegal is dismissed
by the Court.
#30
G.R. No. 148415
July 14, 2008
RICARDO G. PALOMA, Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. and THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 156764
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
RICARDO G. PALOMA, Respondent.
DECISION

Ponencia: VELASCO, JR., J.

Facts:
Petitioner Paloma filed a complaint with the NLRC against respondent PAL, claiming
that the latter had not commutated Paloma’s accumulated sick leaves totaling 392 days.
Paloma invokes that under EO 1077, which allows retiring government employees to
commute all accrued leaves without limit, he is entitled to a total of 450 days of leave
credits. PAL, in its defense, countered that Paloma had only accrued 58 days of sick and
vacation leave per company policy.

The LA held that PAL is not covered by the civil service system and accordingly, EO
1077 finds no application to Paloma. The NLRC affirmed the LA decision on appeal.
PAL filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which granted the same. However, upon
motion for reconsideration by Paloma, the CA amended its decision and ruled that EO
1077 is applicable because PAL is a GOCC under civil service law. But on the same vein,
the CA ruled that PAL’s existing policy on leave limits shall still remain pertinent.

Hence, before the Court, Paloma files this petition for review on certiorari while PAL
seeks reconsideration of the Amended Decision by the CA.

Issue:
W/N EO 1077 is applicable to Paloma as an employee of PAL.

Held:
No. EO 1077 is only applicable to employees of GOCCs under civil service laws, i.e.
GOCCs with original charter. Since PAL is a GOCC incorporated under the Corporation
Code, EO 1077 finds no application to PAL’s employees. Therefore, the leave limits of
the company policy shall be controlling in determining the amount of accrued leave
credits by Paloma.

The contention that under the 1973 Constitution, PAL was considered a GOCC under
civil service law, is without merit. Earlier, the Court had ruled that the constitution in
effect shall become the basis for resolution of cases, even if the cause of action is accrued
during the effectivity of an earlier constitution. In the present case, since Paloma filed
his complaint during the effectivity of 1987 Constitution, the latter’s definition that
GOCCs without original charters are not governed by civil service laws shall prevail.
Wherefore, Paloma’s petition is dismissed while PAL’s petition is given due course. The
assailed Amended Decision is annulled and set aside.
#31
G.R. No. L-65428
February 20, 1984
BAGUIO WATER DISTRICT, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his official capacity as the Director of the
Bureau of Labor Relations of the Ministry of Labor and Employment, and BAGUIO
WATER DISTRICT EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION, Respondents.
Ponencia: ABAD SANTOS, J.

Facts:
Petitioner BWD brings before this Court for review the respondent’s decision, ruling
that the civil service laws are not applicable to water districts by virtue of Sec. 25 of PD
198. The aforementioned provision exempts water districts from civil service laws. The
amendatory provisions of PD 1497 did not so much as abrogate the exemption of the
original Sec. 25.

Issue:
W/N BWD is under civil service law.

Held:
No. Sec. 25 of 198 should be understood to be amended by PD 1497 to the effect that
water districts are no longer exempted from civil service laws. BWD is one those water
districts created pursuant to PD 198, as amended, which is a special law. Hence, its
officers and employees are part of the Civil Service.

Wherefore, the Court grants the petition.

#32
G.R. No. 86773
February 14, 1992
SOUTHEAST ASIAN FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT CENTER-AQUACULTURE
DEPARTMENT (SEAFDEC-AQD), DR. FLOR LACANILAO (CHIEF), RUFIL CUEVAS
(HEAD, ADMINISTRATIVE DIV.), BEN DELOS REYES (FINANCE OFFICER),
petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and JUVENAL LAZAGA,
respondents.
Ponencia: NOCON, J.

Facts:
Respondent Lazaga was employed by petitioner SEAFDEC-AQD, an international
organization to which the Philippines is a signatory. Due to cost-cutting measures,
SEAFDEC-AQD terminated the services of Lazaga without payment of separation pay.
Lazaga consequently filed a complaint for nonpayment of separation benefits with the
NLRC. The LA and on appeal, the NLRC, granted the petition.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed the present petition before the Court. They contend that the
NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case inasmuch as the SEAFDEC-AQD is an
international organization.

Issue:
W/N the NLRC has jurisdiction over the nonpayment of benefits case against
SEAFDEC-AQD.

Held:
No. SEAFDEC-AQD is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of the NLRC. As
an intergovernmental organization, it enjoys functional independence and freedom
from control of the state in whose territory its office is located because its juridical
personality is distinct from the municipal law of such state.

The obvious reason for this ruling is that subjection of an international organization to
the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium through which the
host government may influence and impair the impartiality of the organization.

Wherefore, the decision of the NLRC is set aside by the Court.

#33
G.R. No. 157802
October 13, 2010
MATLING INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL CORPORATION, RICHARD K.
SPENCER, CATHERINE SPENCER, AND ALEX MANCILLA, Petitioners,
vs.
RICARDO R. COROS, Respondent.
Ponencia: BERSAMIN, J.

Facts:
Respondent Coros was dismissed from service as the Vice President for Finance and
Administration by petitioner Matling. A complaint for illegal dismissal was therefore
filed with the NLRC by respondent. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case, as the same is with the SEC
since Coros was a corporate officer. The LA granted the motion to dismiss.

On appeal, the NLRC ruled that Coros was not a corporate officer; hence, his dismissal
case is properly cognizable by the LA, not the SEC. The CA affirmed the decision of the
NLRC on appeal.

Hence, the matter is brought before the Court for review.

Issue:
W/N Coros was a corporate officer.

Held:
No. Section 25 of the Corporation Code defines corporate officers as the President,
Treasurer, Secretary and such other officers as may be provided for in the by-laws. The
position of Vice President for Finance and Administration is not listed as a corporate
officer under the by-laws of Matling. Furthermore, the fact that the Board created the
appointive position does not designate the same as a position of a corporate officer
unless the by-laws are first amended. Clearly therefore, Coros did not hold a corporate
office.

Corollary to the foregoing, the SEC has no jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case.
The respondent is right in contending that the NLRC has jurisdiction, pursuant to Art.
217 of the Labor Code.

Wherefore, the Court denies the present petition.

#34
G.R. No. 120969
January 22, 1998
ALEJANDRO MARAGUINOT, JR. and PAULINO ENERO, Petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (SECOND DIVISION) composed of
Presiding Commissioner RAUL T. AQUINO, Commissioner ROGELIO I. RAYALA and
Commissioner VICTORIANO R. CALAYCAY (Ponente), VIC DEL ROSARIO and VIVA
FIMS, Respondents.
Ponencia: DAVIDE, JR., J.

Facts:
For failing to sign a suspiciously blank document, petitioners Maraguinot and Enero
were dismissed from their service as crew men of Viva Films. Accordingly, the
petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the LA. Private respondents
interposed as a defense that the petitioners are merely project employees of the
association producers who are independent contractors. The industry of Viva Films,
they allege, is not to create movies but to distribute them. As such, no employer-
employee relationship exists between the petitioners and Viva Films.

Aggrieved with the decision of the lower tribunal, the petitioners raise the instant
petition.

Issue:
W/N the petitioners are employees of private respondents.

Held:
Yes. The arguments of private respondent must fail. First of all, petitioners cannot be
considered project employees of the associate producers who are not independent
contractors under the contemplation of the law. They have no equipment or capital as
they merely lease the equipment owned by Viva. Nor are these producers considered
labor-only contractors, as they do not supply, recruit nor hire the workers. It is actually
Viva Films itself which recruits the crew members from available free-lancers.
Therefore, the relationship between Viva Films and its producers appear to be that of
agency, where the latter make movies on behalf of Viva, whose business is to make
movies.

Corollary to this, the employment relationship between the petitioners and producers is
actually one between petitioners and Viva, with the latter being the direct employer.

The same conclusion is reached by using the control test. It appears that Viva’s control
is evident in its mandate that the end result must be a “quality film acceptable to the
company”. As such, Viva Films exercise means and methods to control the movie
production, where the directors and producers acting as mere supervisors to the
petitioners.

All these circumstances indicate an employment relationship between petitioners and

Viva. Thus, the private respondent may be sued for illegal dismissal, which the Court
found impressed with merit. The petition is therefore granted.
#345
G.R. No. 151228
August 15, 2002
ROLANDO Y. TAN, petitioner,
vs.
LEOVIGILDO LAGRAMA and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
Ponencia: MENDOZA, J.

Facts:
Private respondent Lagrama was dismissed from service as a film mural painter for
petitioner Tan on the ground of unhygienic practice. Lagrama sought for relief by filing
for an illegal dismissal case with the LA. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case, claiming
that Lagrama was not his employee because he paid Lagrama on a piece-work basis.

The LA ruled on the illegality of the dismissal. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the
decision of the LA. On petition for review, the CA reinstated the LA ruling. The matter
is finally brought before the Court for review.

Issue:
W/N an employment relationship exists between Lagrama and Tan.

Held:
Yes. The fourfold test is simply applicable in this case. Put briefly, the tests are the
power of the alleged employer to: 1) the selection and engagement of employees, 2)
control, 3) dismissal, and 4) the payment of wages. Applying the fourfold test, it
appears that Tan is the employer of Lagrama.

First, Tan personally engaged the services of Lagrama without the intervention of a
third party. Second, evidence shows that lagrama performed his work as a painter
under the supervision and control of petitioner. Third, via Tan’s position paper
submitted with the NLRC, he stated that he had the right to fire Lagrama. Finally, Tan
paid the wages of Lagrama. Payment by piece-work basis is of no moment, as it is
merely a method of computing compensation.

In addition, the fact that Lagrama was not reported as an employee to the SSS is not
conclusive of his employment. Otherwise, an employer would be rewarded for his
failure to perform his obligation.

In view thereof, the Court ruled that an employment relationship exists between
Lagrama and Tan. Therefore, the former is entitled to security of tenure, which was
further found to be violated by the latter. The Court denies the petition.
#356
G.R. No. 170087
August 31, 2006
ANGELINA FRANCISCO, Petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, KASEI CORPORATION,
SEIICHIRO TAKAHASHI, TIMOTEO ACEDO, DELFIN LIZA, IRENE BALLESTEROS,
TRINIDAD LIZA and RAMON ESCUETA, Respondents.
Ponencia: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Facts:
Petitioner Francisco worked for respondent corporation in different designations within
a span of six years until she was constructively terminated. Consequently, Francisco
filed a constructive dismissal complaint with the LA. The private respondents claim as
their defense that Francisco was never their employee, as she was merely a technical
consultant working beyond their control and supervision. It is further averred that
Francisco was not reported as an employee of the corporation to the BIR and SSS.

The LA found for the petitioner. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA
but removed the payment of damages in favor of Francisco. Subsequently, the CA
affirmed the decision of the NLRC. Hence, this present recourse.

Issue:
W/N petitioner was an employee of the respondent corporation.

Held:
Yes. The Court employed the economic realities test aside from the control test. The
former test is a comprehensive analysis of existing economic conditions prevailing
between the parties. This two-tiered test is especially helpful in understanding the true
nature of complex working relationships without a written agreement.

By applying the control test, there is no doubt that petitioner is an employer of Kasei
Corporation as she was under the direct control and supervision of the corporation’s
technical consultant.

Under the broader economic reality test, the same conclusion as above is reached. It is
evident that the petitioner received salaries, benefits, 13th month pay, bonuses and
others during her service to the company.

Based on the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion that petitioner was an
employee of respondent corporation. Entitled to security of tenure, petitioner’s
constructive dismissal from service amounts to illegal termination. The petition is
therefore granted.
#37
G.R. No. L-41182-3
April 16, 1988
DR. CARLOS L. SEVILLA and LINA O. SEVILLA, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, TOURIST WORLD SERVICE, INC., ELISEO S. CANILAO,
and SEGUNDINA NOGUERA, respondents-appellees.
Ponencia: SARMIENTO , J.

Facts:
Respondent TWS established a branch office using the premises leased pursuant to a
lease contract. Sevilla run the office as a “branch manager”, earning her salary from
commissions from the airline tickets sold by her efforts.

Years later, TWS considered closing the branch office since it was suffering losses. Its
corporate secretary, upon a visit to the branch office, padlocked the premises without
notice to Sevilla. Unable to resume work, Sevilla filed a complaint for damages with the
trial court.

The trial court held that Sevilla, as a mere employee of TWS, is bound by the acts of
latter in terminating the lease and padlocking the premises. On appeal, the CA affirmed
the lower court decision. Hence, the present petition before the Court, where Sevilla
claims that she is not an employee but a co-venturer in the joint venture contract
between TWS and the lessor of the premises; hence, the padlocking of the premises
should not have been done without her consent.

Issue:
W/N petitioner is an employee of TWC.

Held:
No. Sevilla was not subject to control by TWC either as to the result of the enterprise or
as to the means used in connection therewith. Instead, she relied on her own gifts and
capabilities to sell airline tickets in behalf of TWC, retaining commissions from each
successful booking. Neither was Sevilla included in the company’s payroll, as her
fluctuating salary depends on her booking success. Therefore, Sevilla was not an
employee of TWC. Her designation as “branch manager” is not controlling because
titles are weak indicators of employment as opposed to the right of control test and
economic parameters.

On the other hand, the Court disagrees with Sevilla’s argument that she is a considered
a co-venturer. In view of the foregoing facts, it is opined that the relationship between
Sevilla and TWC is that of an agent and a principal.

An agency cannot be revoked at will when it is one coupled with interest. It appears
that Sevilla acquired an interest in the business entrusted to her, which she run using
her own name even after TWC had stopped operations. Accordingly, the summary
ousting of Sevilla from possession of the business entitles her to damages.

The petition is therefore granted. The CA decision is reversed and set aside.
#38
G.R. No. L-21696
February 25, 1967
VISAYAN STEVEDORE TRANSPORTATION COMPANY (VISTRANCO) and
RAFAEL XAUDARO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, UNITED WORKERS' & FARMERS'
ASSOCIATION (UWFA) VENANCIO DANO-OG, BUENAVENTURA AGARCIO and
137 others, respondents.
Ponencia: CONCEPCION, C.J.

Facts:
Complainants/private individual respondents are workers regularly engaged during
milling season by VISTRANCO, a vessel loading company, through UWFA. Allegedly
due to union activities, VISTRANCO refused to engage the services of the
complainants. Consequently, the latter filed a complaint for unfair labor practices where
the CIR found the petitioner company guilty. Hence this petition for review before the
Court.

VISTRANCO alleges that it had never had an employer-employee relationship with the
complainants because 1) their services are engaged by the UWFA and 2) their services
cease at the end of each milling season.

Issue:
W/N the complainants are employees of the petitioner.

Held:
Yes. The claims of VISTRANCO are untenable. In the first place, there was no
independent contract between UWFA and the complainants. On the contrary, the
complainants worked under the direction and control of the officers of VISTRANCO.
Therefore, they must be deemed employees of the petitioner, in accordance with
previous rulings of the Court.

Further, the conclusion of each milling season does not terminate the services of the
said workers, but instead places them on a mere leave of absence. Hence, during off-
season, their employer-employee relationship is deemed suspended, not severed.

The complainants are therefore clearly employees of the petitioner; hence the latter
must be held liable for illegally dismissing the former. Wherefore, the decision of the
CIR is affirmed by the Court.
#39
G.R. No. L-8967
May 31, 1956
ANASTACIO VIAÑA, Petitioner,
vs.
ALEJO AL-LAGADAN and FILOMENA PIGA, Respondents.
Ponencia: CONCEPCION, J.

Facts:
Deceased Alejandro Al-Lagadon was a worker aboard the fishing sailboat owned by
petitioner Viana when the sailboat sank as a consequence of a collision with a US
Vessel. Upon the disappearance of their son, the respondents claimed compensation
with the Referee of the WCC, which rendered a decision in their favor. Viana filed a
petition for review, but the WC Commissioner affirmed the assailed decision.

Hence Viana brings before the Court the present petition, wherein he alleges that the
respondents are not entitled to compensation because the deceased was not his
employee but his industrial partner. The Referee in contrary claims that since the salary
of the deceased can be reckoned in terms of money, the same was an employee of the
petitioner.

Issue:
W/N the deceased was an employee of the petitioner.

Held:
Inconclusive. The contentions of both parties are untenable. On one hand, the Court
disagrees with the view that to be able to reckon Alejandro’s share in terms of money is
evidence of his employment. On the other hand, the Court cannot accept that the
deceased was the petitioner’s industrial partner because the latter shared in the profits,
not in the losses.

In determining the existence of an employment relationship, the fourfold test is

generally considered, namely: 1) the selection and engagement of the employee, 2) the
payment of wages, 3) the power of dismissal, and 4) the power to control the
employees’ conduct, which is the most important test. Applying the foregoing test, the
facts before the Court are insufficient to warrant a reasonable conclusion.

Hence, the matter is remanded to the WCC for further evidence and findings.
#40
G.R. No. 118101
September 16, 1996
EDDIE DOMASIG, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (SECOND DIVISION), CATA
GARMENTS CORPORATION and/or OTTO ONG and CATALINA CO., respondents.
Ponencia: PADILLA, J.

Facts:
Petitioner Domasig worked for respondent Cata Garments Corporation until he was
dismissed for allegedly being pirated by a rival corporation. Domasig filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal and unpaid monetary claims with the LA. The respondent
corporation claimed in their defense that Domasig is not their employee as he is a mere
commission agent and that he had no regular schedule.

The LA ruled in favor of Domasig. On appeal however, the NLRC remanded the case
back to the LA for further proceeding. The NLRC did not find the identification card
and salaries in cash vouchers submitted by Domasig as satisfactory evidence for
concluding on the existence of an employer-employee relationship. Hence, this present
petition alleging grave abuse of discretion by the NLRC.

Issue:
W/N the submitted documents constitute satisfactory evidence of an employment
relationship.

Held:
Yes. Adjudging the existence of an employer-employee relationship requires substantial
evidence only, which is defined as relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion. In the case at bar, the ID card and salary vouchers
presented by the petitioners are constitutive of substantial evidence.

ID cards are not only security measures but also mainly identify the holder as a bona
fide employee of the firm that issues it. Together with salary vouchers, these documents
are adequate evidence to support the conclusion that the petitioner was indeed an
employee of the respondent. Such conclusion was not overcome nor denied by the
evidence submitted by the respondent.

The Court rules therefore that the NLRC committed an error and grave abuse of
discretion in remanding the case to the LA. Wherefore, the NLRC decision is set aside
and the LA decision is reinstated.
#41
G.R. No. L-66890
April 15, 1988
HERMINIO FLORES and HERMINIA FLORES, petitioners,
vs.
FUNERARIA NUESTRO and /or FORTUNATO NUESTRO and the NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.
Ponencia: YAP, J.

Facts:
Petitioners Herminio and Herminia worked for Funeraria Nuestro as utility man and as
bookkeeper, respectively. They were registered by respondent Fortunato with the Social
Security System.

An altercation had ensured between Herminio and Fortunato, resulting in the physical
assault of the former. Later, Herminio and his family vacated their living quarters at the
funeral parlor and sought protection from the police.

Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and monetary claims with the LA. The
respondent, in his defense, denied the existence of employer-employee relationship
with the petitioners. The LA dismissed the complaint, holding that no employment
relationship existed. The NLRC, on appeal, held otherwise. Thus, the issue is brought
before the Court for review.

Issue:
W/N the petitioners are employees of the private respondent.

Held:
Yes. That the respondent had registered the petitioners with the SSS is proof that they
were indeed his employees. The coverage of SSS is predicated on the existence of an
employer-employee relationship.

Finding merit on the other allegations of the petitioners, the Court grants the present
petition.
#42
G.R. No. L-32245
May 25, 1979
DY KEH BENG, petitioner,
vs.
INTERNATIONAL LABOR and MARINE UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.,
respondents.
Ponencia: DE CASTRO, J.

Facts:
Petitioner Dy Keh Beng, a proprietor of a kaing factory, was charged of unfair labor
practice for dismissing Solano and Tudla from service due to their union activities. The
petitioner contended that Solano and Tudla were not his employees because 1) they
produced kaing on a pakiaw basis, with each piece of work being done under a separate
contract and 2) the petitioner did not have the right to direct the manner and method of
their work.

The Hearing Examiner reported that Solano and Tudla were in fact employees of Dy
Keh Beng due to their continuous services. The Court of Industrial Relations adopted
the report of the Hearing Examiner. Petitioner seeks a review by certiorari of the above
decision by the CIR.

Issue:
W/N the respondents are employees of petitioner.

Held:
Yes. Petitioner really anchors his contention of the non-existence of employee-employer
relationship on the control test. It should be borne in mind that the control test calls
merely for the existence of the right to control the manner of doing the work, not the
actual exercise of the right. In the instant case, it is natural to expect that those working
under Dy would have to observe Dy’s requirements of size and quality of the kaing.
Some control would necessarily be exercised by Dy as the making of the kaing would
be subject to Dy’s specifications.

Further, the so-called pakiaw system generally practiced in our country is, in fact, a labor
contract between employers and employees. Units of time and units of work are just
yardsticks whereby the rate of compensation is determined.

Wherefore, the Court found that the CIR did not abuse its discretion in adopting the
findings of the Hearing examiner.
#43
G.R. No. 85279
July 28, 1989
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION T.
BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO
DE ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO,
petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C.
PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY, respondents.
Ponencia: CORTES, J.

Facts:
SSS filed a complaint with the RTC against SSSEA for staging an illegal strike. SSSEA
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over
the case, as jurisdiction lay with the DOLE since the case involves a labor dispute.

The RTC and, on appeal, the CA both declared the strike illegal, giving credence to the
view of SSS that since petitioners are government employees, they are not allowed to
strike. Aggrieved, SSSEA brought the matter before the Court.

Issue:
W/N the employees of SSS have the right to strike.

Held:
No. While the government employees’ right to organize is recognized by the
Constitution, it is admitted that the Labor Code and the Civil Service Decree are both
silent on whether they may stage a strike. The air is cleared when the President Cory
Aquino issued EO 180, referring to CSC Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987, which
enjoined government officers and employees from staging any forms of mass actions
which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.

The right to strike is afforded private employees because their employment relationship
rests on an essentially voluntary basis. On the contrary, terms and conditions of
government employment are fixed by law which may only be changed by the
legislative. Hence, government workers cannot use the same weapons employed
private workers to secure concessions from their employment.

Wherefore, having declared illegal the strike staged by the SSSEA, the Court denied the
instant petition for review.
#44
G.R. No. 101761.
March 24, 1993.
NATIONAL SUGAR REFINERIES CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NBSR SUPERVISORY UNION,
(PACIWU) TUCP, respondents.
Ponencia: REGALADO, J.

Facts:
Respondent union, who are supervisors working for Nasurefco, filed a complaint for
the non-payment of the benefits they enjoyed before the evaluation by the petitioner
Nasurefco. Respondent union contends that they are entitled to workers benefits under
the Labor Code because Article 212(m) Book V of the same code does not classify
supervisory employees as managerial employees. The LA ruled in favor of the
respondent union. Respondent NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA on appeal. Hence,
the present petition is filed by the petitioners before the Court.

Issue:
W/N supervisors are entitled to worker benefits under the Labor Code.

Held:
No. Book III of the Labor Code deems supervisors as managerial employees. Since
workers benefits are found in Book III, not in Book V, the classification of the former
must prevail. In other words, for the purposes of labor relations, respondent union are
supervisory employees. But for the purposes of determining entitlement to worker
benefits, they are members of the managerial staff, hence they are not entitled thereto.

Wherefore, the assailed decision of the NLRC is annulled. Petition is granted.

#45
G.R. No. 156367
May 16, 2005
AUTO BUS TRANSPORT SYSTEMS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO BAUTISTA, respondent.
Ponencia: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Facts:
Respondent Bautista was employed by petitioner Autobus as driver-conductor paid on
commission basis per travel. Due to an accident by fault of Bautista, he was dismissed
from service by Autobus. Respondent thereafter filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
with monetary claims for nonpayment of 13th month pay and service incentive leave
pay.

In this petition before the Court, the petitioner contends that the IRR of the Labor Code
states that those who are paid on a commission basis are not entitled to service incentive
leave.

Issue:
W/N Bautista is entitled to service incentive leave.

Held:
Yes. Petitioner’s interpretation of the IRR provision is misplaced. By the rule of ejusdem
generis, the clause excluding those who are paid on a commission basis from service
incentive leave serves merely to amplify the scope and definition of field personnel.
Thus, a worker paid on commission basis is only exempted from service incentive leave
if he is a field personnel.

Perusal of the observations of the lower courts reveal that Bautista is a field personnel.
As a bus driver, Bautista is subjected to mechanisms of Autobus, such as assignment to
strategic routes, regular checkup of the bus, observance of departure and arrival
schedule, and overseeing of dispatchers. Bautista is therefore under constant
supervision of Autobus. Hence, he cannot be considered a field employee but a regular
employee who is entitled to, not exempted from, service incentive leave.

Wherefore, the instant petition is denied by the Court.

#46
G.R. No. 79255
January 20, 1992
UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES (UFE), petitioner,
vs.
BENIGNO VIVAR, JR., NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NESTLÉ
PHILIPPINES, INC. (formerly FILIPRO, INC.), respondents.
Ponencia: GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

Facts:
Petitioner employees and respondent Nestle submitted for voluntary arbitration the
question whether salesmen, sales representatives, truck drivers, merchandisers and
medical representatives, i.e. sales personnel are field personnel who are exempted from
holiday pay under Art. 82 of the Labor Code. Unsatisfied with the decision of the LA
that the said sales personnel are field personnel, the instant petition is brought before
the Court for review.

Under the Labor Code, field personnel are those whose working hours cannot be
reasonably ascertained. Petitioner argues that since they are required to report on 8 am
and on 4.30 pm, their period of work can be determined with certainty. Further, they
are supervised by the Supervisor Of the Day (SOD) during their work. Finally, petition
avers that the incentive bonus they receive quarterly is proof of actual hours in the field.

Issue:
W/N the said sales personnel are considered field personnel.

Held:
Yes. The sales personnel are field personnel because their work hours cannot be
determined with certainty. The 8 am to 4.30 pm schedule is purely a management
prerogative to exercise administrative control over such personnel. The extent and
scope of their work within the above period is still subject to their individual capacity
and industry. The supervision of the SOD is merely to enforce the above schedule. The
incentive bonus is implemented by evaluating the result of their work, not of their
working hours which is difficult to measure.

Hence, the Court is not convinced with the position of the petitioner employees.
Wherefore, the LA decision relative thereto is affirmed.
#47
G.R. No. L-18353
July 31, 1963
SAN MIGUEL BREWERY, INC., petitioner,
vs.
DEMOCRATIC LABOR ORGANIZATION, ET AL., respondents.
Ponencia: BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.

Facts:
Respondents filed a complaint against petitioner, demanding payment of overtime pay
among other things. The presiding judge decided in favor of the respondents, ruling
that the Eight Hour Labor Law applies and thus, any work beyond eight hours must be
compensated. The CIR en banc affirmed the above decision on appeal.

Aggrieved, the petitioner brought the matter before the Court. Petitioner contends that
since the respondents are paid on a commission basis, the sales they make beyond the
eight hour work time are paid not with overtime pay but with commission.

Issue:
W/N respondents are entitled to overtime pay.

Held:
No. The Eight Hour Labor Law does not apply to workers who are paid by commission,
regardless of the time employed. Such salesmen, to a great extent, works individually
without restriction to the time he shall work. Any time these workers render beyond
eight hours are paid by commission in lieu of extra compensation.

Wherefore, the decision of the CIR ordering the payment of overtime pay is set aside.
#48
G.R. No. 112574
October 8, 1998
MERCIDAR FISHING CORPORATION represented by its President DOMINGO B.
NAVAL, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and FERMIN AGAO, JR.,
respondents.
Ponencia: MENDOZA, J.

Facts:
Respondent Agao, a fisherman employed by Mercidar, filed a complaint for
nonpayment of service incentive leave pay. The LA, and on appeal the NLRC, ruled in
favor of Agao. In this petition for review, petitioner maintains that Agao is a field
personnel because his work hours cannot be ascertained due to his work being
performed away from the principal place of business. Thus, petitioner contends the
lower tribunals erred in their judgment because Agao was not entitled to service
incentive leave.

Issue:
W/N Agao is a field personnel.

Held:
No. In deciding whether an employee’s working hours in the field can be determined
with reasonable certainty, query must be made if his time and performance is
constantly supervised by the employer. In the present case, the duration of Agao’s work
is under the effective control and supervision of petitioner through the vessel’s patron
or master. Hence, as the NLRC correctly decided, Agao is not a field personnel.
Consequently, he is entitled to service incentive leave.

Wherefore, the Court dismisses the instant petition.

#49
G.R. No. 207286
July 29, 2015
DELA ROSA LINER, INC. AND/OR ROSAURO DELA ROSA, SR. AND NORA DELA
ROSA, Petitioners,
v.
CALIXTO B. BORELA AND ESTELO A. AMARILLE, Respondents.
Ponencia: BRION, J.

Facts:
Respondents filed a complaint against their employer, petitioner Dela Rosa Liner for
nonpayment of salaries and monetary claims. Petitioner, in its defense, cited that the
compromise agreement previously executed between the parties covers all claims and
damages to either party whether known or unknown, foreseen or unforeseen. Hence,
petitioners aver that pursuant to the said agreement, the respondents had waived their
monetary claims granted by the Labor Code.

Dissatisfied with the decisions of the lower and appellate courts, petitioners file the
present petition for review.

Issue:
W/N the respondents waived their worker benefits by virtue of the compromise
agreement.

Held:
No. The Court found that the coverage of the cited clause of the compromise agreement
is too sweeping. The clause effectively excludes any claims by the respondents against
the petitioners, including those granted by law and jurisprudence. Also, the Court had
previously held that while rights may be waived, the waiver must not be contrary to
law, public policy, morals, or good customs. Since the worker benefits provided by law
are for the protection and welfare of the workers, it would take more than a general
waiver to give up these legal entitlements.

Wherefore, the Court dismisses the present petition and affirms the assailed CA
decision.
#50
G.R. No. 189255
June 17, 2015
JESUS G. REYES, Petitioner,
vs.
GLAUCOMA RESEARCH FOUNDATION, INC., EYE REFERRAL CENTER and
MANUEL B. AGULTO, Respondents.
Ponencia: PERALTA, J.

Facts:
Petitioner Reyes filed a complaint against the respondents, alleging that he was illegally
dismissed from his service as administrator. Respondents claimed in their defense that
they had no employer-employee relationship with Reyes, as the latter worked as a
consultant or advisor who had control over his working hours. The NLRC ruled in
favor of the petitioner but the CA reversed the said ruling on appeal. Aggrieved, Reyes
files the instant petition for review before the Court.

Issue:
W/N Reyes was an employee of the respondent company.

Held:
No. It is a well settled rule that where a person who works for another in a manner
more or less at his own pleasure, not subject to definite hours or conditions, no
employment relationship exists. The facts of the present case reveal that Reyes, either as
a consultant or administrator, was never subject to definite working hours. Reyes did
not even devote his time exclusively to working for the respondents as it was shown by
the resume of the petitioner that he concurrently held consultancy with other
companies during his stint with the respondent company. Hence, under the control test
and economic reality test, Reyes was not an employee of respondent company.

Wherefore, the instant petition is denied by the Court.

#51
G.R. No. 182255
June 15, 2015
PETRON CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
ARMZ CABERTE, ANTONIO CABERTE, JR., MICHAEL SERVICIO,* ARIEL
DEVELOS, ADOLFO GESTUPA, ARCHIE PONTERAS, ARNOLD BLANCO, DANTE
MARIANO,* VIRGILIO GALOROSA, and CAMILO TE,* Respondents.
Ponencia: DEL CASTILLO, J.

Facts:
Respondents were dismissed on the pretense that their service contract with ABC, a
contractor hired by petitioner Petron had expired. However, respondents alleged in
their complaint for illegal dismissal that ABC was a labor-only contractor and that the
true employer Petron, in disallowing them to enter their work premises, had illegally
dismissed them from their services. Petron countered by asserting that ABC is an
independent contractor which has substantial capital and investment, and control over
the manner and method on how the respondents accomplished their work. In support
of its assertion, Petron submitted various documents and proof of posting of a
performance bond.

The LA and on appeal, the NLRC both ruled in favor of the respondents. However, the
CA on review reversed the NLRC decision. Hence, the present petition.

Issue:
W/N ABC is a labor-only contractor.

Held:
Yes. A labor-only contractor is one which does not have substantial capital or
investment to perform he job on its own account; and the workers he supplies are
directly related to the main business of the principal. The law presumes a contractor to
be a labor-only contractor, and thus the principal bears the burden of establishing
otherwise.

The Court held that Petron failed to overcome its burden. The documents submitted
were mere proof that ABC is engaged in a contracting business. The performance bond
posted was not shown to be enough to cover contingent liabilities of ABC. Therefore,
the Court declared ABC as a labor-only contractor. Consequently. Petron, as the true
employer of the respondents, had illegally dismissed the latter. The instant petition is
denied.
#52
G.R. No. 202015
July 13, 2016
ANTONIO VALEROSO AND ALLAN LEGATONA, Petitioners,
v.
SKYCABLE CORPORATION, Respondent.
Ponencia: DEL CASTILLO, J.

Facts:
Petitioners were sales representatives soliciting cable subscriptions for respondents
until they were released from service. Thus, petitioners filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and monetary claims with the LA.

In its defense, respondent averred that it had no employment relationship with

petitioners because the latter are independent contractors and later, employees of
Armada which was an independent contractor.

On the other hand, the petitioners maintained that they were regular employees, as
evidenced by respondent’s daily monitoring of their area of work and quota
production, as well as giving incentives for outstanding performance.

The LA dismissed the complaint due to petitioners failing to establish that respondent
was their employer. The NLRC reversed the LA ruling on appeal, finding that the
petitioners have performed their services in over a year and are therefore considered
regular workers. The CA reinstated the LA ruling. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:
W/N petitioners are regular employees of respondent.

Held:
No. In determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists, the most
determinative factor is the “right of control test”. Under this test, the person for whom
the services are performed reserves the right to control not only the end to be achieved
but also the means by which such end is reached. Employing the control test, it is
shown that the daily supervision of respondent over petitioners does not dictate upon
them the manner in which they should perform their duties. Therefore, there is no
employment relationship in the present case. The petition is denied.
#53
November 28, 2016
G.R. No. 218980
PHILIPPINE AUTO COMPONENTS, INC., Petitioner
vs.
RONNIE B. JUMADLA, ROY A. ARIZ AND ROY T. CONEJOS, Respondents
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 219124
RONNIE B. JUMADLA, ROY A. ARIZ AND ROY T. CONEJOS, Petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AUTO COMPONENTS, INC., Respondent.
Ponencia: MENDOZA, J.

Facts:
Employees of PACI were caught unloading automotive parts of petitioner PACI
without authorization. In the police station, said employees implicated respondent
Jumadla et al. as the masterminds of the pilferage committed. Accordingly, PACI
dismissed respondents from employment due to breach of trust.

Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PACI. The LA ruled in favor
of respondents because the allegation of their participation in the pilferage was not
supported by evidence. On appeal and further appeal, the NLRC and CA sustained the
LA decision on the same ground. Hence, the instant petition before the Court.

Issue:
W/N respondents were illegally dismissed.

Held:
No. The Labor Code provides that an employer may terminate an employment based
on fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed on the employee. Herein there are two
requisites, which are: 1) the employees are holding a position of trust and confidence,
and 2) there is an act that would justify the loss of such trust.

In the present case, the first requisite is fulfilled because respondents were managerial
staff charged with the delicate task of ensuring the proper handling and distribution of
PACI’s products. The second requisite is likewise fulfilled due to the respondent’s
negligence in the performance of their duties. Although their involvement in the
pilferage is unsubstantiated, their negligence facilitated the unauthorized transporting
of products out of petitioner’s warehouse. Therefore, the respondents had violated
PACI’s trust and for which their dismissal is justified. Petition is granted.
#54
G.R. No. 184841
November 21, 2016
GERINO YUKIT, DANILO REYES, RODRIGO S. SUMILANG, LEODEGARIO O.
ROSALES, MARIO MELARPIS,1 MARCELO R. OCAN, DENNIS V. BATHAN,
BERNARDO S. MAGNAYE, LORENZO U. MARTINEZ, ANTONIO M. LADERES,
SOFIO DE LOS REYES BAON, MARIO R. MIGUEL, RODOLFO S. LEOPANDO,
EDGARDO N. MACALLA, JR., MARIANO REYES, ALEJANDRO CUETO, VIRGILIO
RINGOR and JASON R. BARTE, Petitioners
vs.
TRITRAN, INC., JOSE C. ALVAREZ, JEHU C. SEBASTIAN, and JAM TRANSIT INC.,
Respondents
Ponencia: SERENO, CJ.

Facts:
Tritan sent a Notice of Closure to the DOLE, citing irreversible business losses to justify
the permanent closure of the establishment. Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against Tritan, alleging that closure of the company was a mere play to
circumvent their security of tenure. In their defense, respondents denied the allegations
and asserted that the closure was justified due to serious losses sustained by the
company. In support thereof, they submitted the Audited Financial Statements
prepared by external auditors.

The LA ruled in favor of petitioners for failure to substantiate the business losses. The
NLRC initially affirmed the LA decision on appeal, but after reconsideration, it reversed
the same due to the serious business losses suffered by the company. On petition for
certiorari, the CA sustained the NLRC ruling. Hence, the present petition.

Issue:
W/N the closure of business by respondents is valid.

Held:
Yes. The law considers the decision to close business operations as a management
prerogative that courts cannot interfere with, provided that the same is done in good
faith. The Court held in this case that the closure is justified due to serious business
losses as shown in the company’s AFS. It is also noted that the AFS was prepared by
independent and reputable auditing firms. The bare allegations of the petitioners of the
credibility of the AFS cannot prevail in view of the strict national standards governing
the auditing profession.

Consequently, the dismissal of the petitioners is valid under the Labor Code. The
petition is therefore denied.
#55
G.R. No. 221241
September 14, 2016
MARIO N. FELICILDA, Petitioner,
v.
MANCHESTEVE H. UY, Respondent.
Ponencia: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Facts:
Petitioner was dismissed from his services as truck driver due to the report of him
sleeping while on the job. Consequently, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against respondent. In his defense, respondent denied the existence of the
employer-employee relationship because the petitioner was not under his control with
respect to the means and methods by which he performed his job as a truck driver.

The LA ruled in favor of the petitioner. The NLRC affirmed the LA ruling on appeal,
finding that the respondent exercised control and supervision over petitioner’s work by
determining the latter’s delivery areas and schedule. However, the CA set aside the
NLRC ruling because there was no evidence to show that the respondent exercised
control over the means and methods of the petitioner’s work. Hence, the present
petition.

Issue:
W/N the petitioner is an employee of the respondent.

Held:
Yes. The control test is the most significant determinant of the existence of an
employment relationship. In this case, control can be safely deduced from the facts. The
respondent owned the trucks, and the cargoes therein are delivered exclusively to the
respondent’s clients. The schedule and route to be followed by the petitioner is likewise
exclusively determined by the respondent.

Also finding that the petitioner is illegally dismissed, the Court grants the petition.
#56
G.R. No. 187950
January 11, 2017
CRISTINA BARSOLO, Petitioner,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Respondent.
DECISION
Ponencia: LEONEN, J.

Facts:
Petitioner’s husband was employed as a seaman by Vela International Marine Lrd.,
when he died of myocardial infarction. Cristina filed a claim for death benefits with the
Social Security System. Despite myocardial infarction being a compensable disease, the
SSS denied petitioner’s claim because her husband was a smoker. The appeal with ECC
was likewise denied. The CA agreed with the ECC on appeal, finding that Cristina
failed to prove a causal relationship between Manuel’s work and the illness that
brought about his death. Hence, the present petition.

Issue:
W/N petitioner is entitled to the death benefits of her late husband.

Held:
No. Under the ECC guidelines, since the petitioner’s late husband had a heart disease
prior to his employment, the petitioner must prove that the nature of work caused the
acute exacerbation of myocardial infarction. Petitioner failed to adduce any proof to the
same. Moreover, her husband’s death occurred four years after his last disembarkment
with Vela’s vessel. Other factors, such as his smoking habit, have already played a role
in aggravating his illness. Hence, petitioner’s claim is defeated. The petition is denied.
#57
G.R. No. 182297
June 21, 2017
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner
vs.
FE L. ESTEVES, Respondent
Ponencia: VELASCO, JR., J.

Facts:
The late Antonio Steves was a utility worker of the Gubat District Hospital until his
death after he was rushed to the hospital for body weakness, headache and vomiting.
Respondent thereafter filed a claim for death benefits with the GSIS. Petitioner GSIS
denied the claim on the ground that the underlying cause of death, diabetes mellitus, is
not work-related. The ECC affirmed the GSIS decision. However, the CA reversed the
ECC decision on appeal. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:
W/N the petitioner may claim the death benefits from her late husband.

Held:
No. Antecedently, the Court disagreed with the stance of the petitioner that Antonio’s
death is not compensable because its cause is diabetes mellitus. Records show that the
deceased was not diabetic because neither his medical history nor the evidence reflects
such conclusion.

Nevertheless, the respondent still failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that
the death of the deceased was compensable. The conditions in order to consider the
cause of death compensable was not complied with. Under the ECC rules, to establish
brain hemorrhage as a compensable sickness, evidence must be presented to show a
history of any trauma to the head at work. Such was not proved or even mentioned. The
death of Antonio cannot be concluded as compensable. The petition is granted.
#58
G.R. No. 221096
June 28, 2017
CLAUDIA'S KITCHEN, INC. and ENZO SQUILLANTINI, Petitioners
vs.
MA. REALIZA S. TANGUIN, Respondent
Ponencia: MENDOZA, J.

Facts:
Respondent Tanguin, a billing supervisor for petitioner Claudia’s Kitchen, was placed
on preventive suspension due to the pending investigation of her alleged forceful
selling of jewelry to her co-employees. Tanguin was barred from entering the work
premises as a consequence. Hence, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

The LA ruled against the illegal dismissal due to the validity of the preventive
suspension. On appeal, the NLRC held a similar view but further ordered the
reinstatement of the respondent. However, the CA ordered payment of separation pay
in lieu of reinstatement. The CA, in applying the doctrine of strained relations, found
that Tanguin was constructively dismissed on ground of loss of confidence. Reinstating
her would only create an atmosphere of antagonism.

Unsatisfied, the petitioners bring the matter before the Court.

Issue:
W/N the doctrine of strained relationship is applicable to the case at bar.

Held:
No. Under the said doctrine, the payment of separation pay is an acceptable alternative
to reinstatement when the latter option is no longer desirable or viable as when the
employer no longer trusts his worker. Strained relations must not be applied loosely,
because, since all labor disputes involve some hostility, reinstatement would never be
possible. Strained relations must be demonstrated as a fact.

The CA ruling that reinstatement of Tanguin may create an atmosphere of antagonism

is a mere presumption without any factual basis. It must be noted that Tanguin herself
asked for reinstatement in her appeal before the NLRC.

Nonetheless, the Court found that the complaint for illegal dismissal is premature.
Respondent should answer the complaints against her. Petitioners are ordered to accept
her without prejudice to the result of the investigation. The petition is therefore granted.
#59
G.R. No. 197899
March 6, 2017
JOAQUIN LU, Petitioner
vs
TIRSO ENOPIA, ROBERTO ABANES, ALEJANDRE BAGAS, SALVADOR BERNAL,
SAMUEL CAHAYAG, ALEJANDRO CAMPUGAN, RUPERTO CERNA, JR.,
REYNALDO CERNA, PETER CERVANTES, LEONARDO CO ND ES TABLE,
ROLANDO ESLOPOR, ROLLY FERNANDEZ, EDDIE FLORES, ROLANDO FLORES,
JUDITO FUDOLIN, LEO GRAPANI, FELIX HUBAHIB, JERRY JUAGPAO,
MARCIANO LANUTAN, JOVENTINO MATOBATO, ALFREDO MONIVA,
VICTORIANO ORTIZ, JR., RENALDO PIALAN, ALFREDO PRUCIA, PONCIANO
REANDO, HERMENIO REMEGIO, DEMETRIO RUAYA, EDGARDO RUSIANA,
NESTOR SALILI, VICENTE SASTRELLAS, ROMEO SUMAYANG, and DESIDERIO
TABAY, Respondents
Ponencia: PERALTA, J.

Facts:
Respondents worked as crew members of a fishing mother boat owned by petitioner
Lu, the sole proprietor of MGTR. Sometime later, Lu allegedly terminated the
respondents’ services for their refusal to sign the joint venture agreement with the
former. A complaint for illegal dismissal was filed with the LA. In his defense, Lu
claimed that his relationship with respondents is that of a joint venture and that all the
elements of an employment relationship are absent. Respondents were hired by the
piado; they were not paid wages but shares in the catch; and petitioner has no
supervision over the daily fishing operations save for some contact through radio.

The LA and NLRC, on appeal, both ruled in favor of petitioner. However, the CA
reversed the NLRC decision on review. Hence, the present petition.

Issue:
W/N respondents are employees of petitioner.

Held:
Yes. The Court found that all elements of an employer-employee relationship exist in
this case. Though hired by the piado, the employer stated in the respondents’ SSS was
MGTR; the communication through radio establishes constant monitoring by the
petitioner of the progress of fishing operations; and compensation on a percentage
commission falls within the meaning of the term “wage” under the Labor Code. Also
evidently, petitioner wielded the power to dismissal over respondents.

Also agreeing with the CA that the dismissal was illegal, the Court denies the present
petition.
#60
G.R. No. 206390
January 30, 2017
JACK C. VALENCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
CLASSIQUE VINYL PRODUCTS CORPORATION, JOHNNY CHANG (Owner)
and/or CANTINGAS MANPOWER SERVICES, Respondents.
Ponencia: DEL CASTILLO, J.

Facts:
Petitioner Valencia filed a complaint against respondent Classique Vinyl on the account
of Valencia’s unjustified dismissal. Classique Vinyl, for its part, pointed to CMS as the
legitimate contractor and hence, employer of Valencia; therefore, there was no dismissal
to speak of.

The LA agreed with Classique Vinyl and declared CMS as Valencia’s employer. The
NLRC, on appeal, affirmed the decision of the LA with emphasis on the provisions of
the employment contract of Valencia with CMS. The CA denied a subsequent petition
for certiorari. Hence, the present petition.

Issue:
W/N Classique Vinyl is the true employer of Valencia

Held:
No. The evidence adduced, and even Valencia’s allegations, point towards CMS as the
true employer of the petitioner. Valencia’s selection and engagement were undertaken
by CMS; his pay slips were not paid for by Classique Vinyl; and most importantly, the
employment contract Valencia signed with CMS states that the latter possesses the
power of dismissal and control over him. The burden of proof on Classique Vinyl to
prove that CMS was a legitimate contractor was satisfied when the latter’s registration
documents were submitted. Notably, Valencia was unable to repudiate the evidence
presented by Classique Vinyl and CMS.

Where, the instant petition is denied.

#61
G.R. No. 190809
February 13, 2017
DE LA SALLE ARANETA UNIVERSITY, Petitioner
vs.
JUANITO C. BERNARDO, Respondent
Ponencia: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

Facts:
In a complaint with the LA, respondent Bernardo alleged that when his services as part-
time faculty of DLS-AU was terminated, the latter did not pay him his retirement
benefits. DLS-AU claimed in its defense that only its full-time permanent faculty for at
least five years immediately preceding termination may avail of retirement benefits
under company policy.

The LA dismissed respondent’s complaint, ruling that he is barred by prescription

because he claimed his retirement benefits ten years after his mandatory retirement at
age of 65, when the cause of action accrued.

The NLRC reversed the LA decision, stating that respondent was not barred by
prescription because the cause of action accrued when he was dismissed from service.
Further, the NLRC ruled that retirement law does not exclude part-time employees. The
CA affirmed in toto the NLRC judgment.

Aggrieved, DLS-AU filed the instant petition.

Issue:
W/N part-time employees are entitled to retirement benefits.

Held:
Yes. RA 7641 or Retirement Pay Law provides for the minimum retirement benefits that
all employees are entitled to regardless of agreements. The IRR of RA 7641 categorically
states that the general coverage of RA 7641 encompasses all private sector employees,
including part-time employees thereof. Secretary of DOLE, through his Labor Advisory,
dispelled any doubt as to the application of RA 7641 to part-time employees.

The Court finds no fault in NLRC’s reliance on the IRR of RA 7641 and the Labor
Advisory anent the same. Contemporaneous and practical interpretations of law by
administrative officials charged with its enforcement carries great weight and should be
respected. Also, both the IRR and Labor Advisory are consisted with Art. 4 of the Labor
Code, which provides for the construction of labor laws in favor of workers.

Wherefore, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

#62
G.R. No. 213486
April 26, 2017
EDITHA M. CATOTOCAN, Petitioner,
v.
LOURDES SCHOOL OF QUEZON CITY, INC./LOURDES SCHOOL, INC. AND REV.
FR. CESAR F. ACUIN, OFM CAP, RECTOR, Respondent.
Ponencia: PERALTA, J.

Facts:
The new retirement policy issued by respondent LSQC retires employees who have
rendered 30 years of service, even if they are aged below 60 years. Initially, petitioner
Catotocan and other employees expressed disagreement with the said new policy.
However, when Catotocan was retired by LSQC, she complied with the procedure to
avail of the benefits under the retirement policy.

Later, Catotocan filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and monetary claims, alleging
that the implementation of a retirement age lower than the minimum stated in the
Labor Code is tantamount to constructive dismissal. The LA, NLRC on appeal, and the
CA on certiorari, all ruled against petitioner on ground that her post-retirement actions
constituted implied consent to the assailed addendum in LSQC’s retirement policy.
Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:
W/N fixing a retirement lower than 60 years is tantamount to illegal dismissal.

Held:
No. The Labor Code permits the fixing of retirement age lower than 60 years, provided
that the benefits are not less than those provided in the said Code. The retirement plan,
to be effective, must be voluntarily accepted by the employees. In this case, Catotocan
consented freely to the assailed retirement policy by her acts of compliance thereto.
Hence, the Court agrees with the lower tribunals in finding that petitioner was not
illegally dismissed.

While the Court has, more often than not, been inclined towards the plight of workers,
such inclination has not blinded it to the rule that justice is in every case for the
deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and applicable law and
doctrine. The petition is therefore dismissed.
#63
G.R. No. 220617
January 30, 2017
NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
BENNY A. PUEDAN, JR., JAYFER D. LIMBO, BRODNEY N. AVILA, ARTHUR C.
AQUINO, RYAN A. MIRANDA, RONALD R. ALAVE, JOHNNY A. DIMAYA,
MARLON B. DELOS REYES, ANGELITO R. CORDOVA, EDGAR S. BARRUGA,
CAMILO B. CORDOVA, JR., JEFFRY B. LANGUISAN, EDISON U. VILLAPANDO,
JHEIRNEY S. REMOLIN, MARY LUZ A. MACATALAD,* JENALYN M. GAMUROT,
DENNIS G. BAWAG, RAQUEL A. ABELLERA, and RICANDRO G. GUATNO, JR.,
Respondents.
Ponencia: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Facts:
Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Nestle Philippines, Inc (NPI)
and Ocho de Septiembre, Inc. (ODSI), wherein the latter is also alleged to be a labor-
only contractor. The LA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. However, the NLRC on
appeal reversed the LA decision. The NLRC found that ODSI was a labor-only
contractor of NPI based on the circumstances surrounding the Distributorship
Agreement between them. The CA affirmed the decision by NLRC. Hence, the present
petition.

Issue:
W/N ODSI was a labor-only contractor of NPI.

Held:
No. The reliance on the Distributorship Agreement is misplaced. Perusal of the said
agreement reveals that the relationship between NPI and ODSI is that of a seller and a
re-seller. In fact, re-selling and re-distributing is the principal business of ODSI. The
rules provided in the agreement are merely guidelines towards the achievement of a
mutually desired result between NPI and ODSI. The rules do not show control by NPI
over the means and methods by which ODSI conducts its business. Hence, there is no
labor-only contracting relationship between them. Accordingly, NPI cannot be
solidarily held liable with ODSI with its monetary obligations towards respondents.
Petition is granted.
#64
G.R. No. 193500
November 20, 2017
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioners
vs.
SIMEON TAÑEDO, JR., Respondent
Ponencia: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

Facts:
Respondent was a records officer at the BIR whose job includes legwork. In the latter
part of his long career, varicosities were found in his leg. Respondent filed a claim for
compensation benefits with GSIS. His claim was denied on the ground that varicosities
is not considered an occupational disease under PD 626. The ECC affirmed the GSIS
denial of the claim, as there was no showing that the conditions of respondent’s job
largely brought the progression of the disease.

The CA however granted the respondent’s appeal. GSIS therefor filed the present
petition before the Court.

Issue:
W/N the varicosities suffered by the respondent is a compensable disease.

Held:
No. A compensable disease is any illness accepted as an occupational disease listed in
PD 626, or any illness caused by the nature of work. It is undisputed the respondent’s
medical condition is not an occupational disease in the list in PD 626. Hence, it was
incumbent in the respondent to prove through substantial evidence that there is a
reasonable connection between his work and his disease. The Court ruled that
respondent failed to prove such connection. Since his assertions were not substantiated
by credible proof, they are mere speculations on which the award of compensation
cannot be properly based.

Wherefore, petition is granted.

#65
G.R. No. 227734
August 09, 2017
ROMEO ALBA, Petitioner,
v.
CONRADO G. ESPINOSA, ET AL., Respondents.
Ponencia: REYES, JR., J.

Facts:
Respondents were construction workers hired by petitioner Alba for his projects in
several residential villages within Metro Manila and nearby provinces. When
respondents realized that they were deprived of statutorily-mandated benefits, they
confronted Alba, which resulted in their dismissal.

A complaint for illegal dismissal with monetary claims was filed by respondents against
Alba. The LA dismissed the complaint, finding no employer-employee relationship
between Alba and the respondents. The NLRC reversed the LA decision upon review,
giving no evidentiary weight to the documents submitted by Alba. The CA affirmed the
NLRC reversal. Hence, the present petition.

Issue:
W/N respondents are employees of Alba.

Held:
Yes. In determining the existence of employment relationship between the parties, the
Court applied the fourfold test. It was found that: a) Alba hired the respondents and
concomitantly b) has the power dismiss them or reassign them to other projects; c) Alba
paid the wages of the respondents, as the arrangement of the clients’ payment of
workers’ wages was by mere concession to facilitate payment, and; d) Alba exercised
control over the means and methods of work by the respondents, which is not negated
by any foreman or architect.

In view of the foregoing, the Court declared that an employer-employee relationship

existed between Alba and the respondents. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the
present petition.
#66
G.R. No. 185938
September 06, 2017
ALICIA M.L. COSETENG AND DILIMAN PREPARATORY SCHOOL, Petitioners,
v.
LETICIA P. PEREZ, Respondent.
Ponencia: REYES, JR., J.

Facts:
For involvement in anomalies, respondent Perez was suspended from her work as
teacher in the petitioner school. Without reporting back to work, Perez resigned.
Sometime later, Perez filed a complaint for constructive dismissal, with claims for
separation pay. Petitioners contend that they merely suspended Perez.

The LA found that Perez resigned voluntarily from work and was not constructively
dismissed. On appeal, the NLRC ruled that Perez was constructively dismissed because
she was placed on floating status. The NLRC ruling was affirmed by the CA on review.
Hence, the present petition before the Court.

Issue:
W/N Perez was constructively dismissed.

Held:
No. There is constructive dismissal when continued employment is rendered
impossible due to the acts of the employer. In this case, the Court found that Perez was
merely reassigned effective from the time she was supposed to return to work.
Reassignment is within the School’s management prerogative especially if done in view
of preventing any disruption of students’ learning. Further, it is a recognized rule that
not every inconvenience endured by an employee results in a finding of constructive
dismissal.

Therefore, Perez is deemed resigned voluntarily. The Court grants the present petition.
#67
G.R. No. 221493
August 2, 2017
STERLING PAPER PRODUCTS ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
KMM-KATIPUNAN and RAYMOND Z. ESPONGA, Respondents,
Ponencia: MENDOZA, J.

Facts:
Respondent Esponga, a worker for petitioner Sterling, was prohibited by a supervisor
from taking a nap on the sheeter machine for safety issues. A confrontation between
Esponga and the supervisor ensued in front of other employees. Allegedly, Esponga
uttered disrespectful words and made rude gestures against the supervisor. After the
incident, Esponga no committed to his work.

After Esponga’s failure to attend administrative hearings, Sterling dismissed him from
service. Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the LA, who granted the
same. Upon appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA decision, finding that the respondent’s
cessation of work in defiance of the supervisor was a valid ground for dismissal. The
CA held otherwise, ruling that Esponga’s actions were merely simple misconduct not
warranting dismissal. Dissatisfied, Sterling filed the present petition.

Issue:
W/N Esponga was illegally dismissed.

Held:
No. The Court has been previously ruled in a series of cases that utterance of obscene,
insulting or offensive words against a superior constitutes gross misconduct. In
addition, Esponga’s assailed conduct was related to his work, as the confrontation
rooted from his dangerous act of napping on a sheeter machine. Finally, the utterance
by Esponga was intended to disrespect and humiliate his supervisor because it was
done in front of other employees, not in a secluded space.

It is well-settled that gross misconduct is a valid ground for dismissal under the Art.
282 of the Labor Code. Therefore, Esponga was not illegally dismissed. The present
petition is granted.
#68
G.R. No. 208053
October 18, 2017
MEATWORLD INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioner
vs.
DOMINIQUE A. HECHANOVA, Respondent
Ponencia: DEL CASTILLO, J.

Facts:
Respondent worked as a head butcher for petitioner Meatworld. Due to alleged
infractions, respondent was suspended temporarily from his work. After his
suspension, he was informed that he could not be reassigned by Meatworld due to lack
of available outlets. When respondent was finally allowed to report to work, he arrived
late. He was scolded therefor by the vice president of Meatworld and was told to resign
or else he shall be dismissed.

Respondent filed a complaint for illegal constructive dismissal. Petitioner claimed that
respondent’s tardiness in reporting for work has caused the loss of available
assignments. The LA, NLRC on appeal, and CA on certiorari, found for the respondent.
Unfazed, Meatworld filed the present petition.

Issue:
W/N respondent was illegally dismissed.

Held:
Yes. Petitioner’s repeated failure to reassign respondent leads to the conclusion that
petitioner was giving respondent a hard time in order to make his employment
unbearable and eventually, force him to resign. Such constitutes illegal constructive
dismissal.

The claim of the petitioner that no assignment was available during those instances
must also fail. The employer should bear the burden of proving that there are no posts
available to which the employee temporarily out of work can be assigned. In this case,
the lack of available assignments was not substantiated by petitioner with satisfactory
proof.

Hence, the Court affirms the ruling by the lower tribunals.

#69
G.R. No. 211892
December 6, 2017
INNODATA KNOWLEDGE SERVICES, INC., Petitioner
vs.
SOCORRO D'MARIE T. INTING, ISMAEL R. GARAYGAY, EDSON S. SOLIS,
MICHAEL A. REBATO, JAMES HORACE BALONDA, STEPHEN C. OLINGAY,
DENNIS C. RIZON, JUNETH A. RENTUMA, HERNAN ED NOEL I. DE LEON, JR.,
JESS VINCENT A. DELA PENA, RONAN V. ALAMILLO, ENNOH CHENTIS R.
FERNANDEZ, FRITZ J. SEMBRINO, DAX MATTHEW M. QUIJANO, RODOLFO M.
VASQUEZ, MA. NAZELLE B. MIRALLES, MICHAEL RAY B. MOLDE, WENDELL B.
QUIBAN, ALDRIN O. TORRENTIRA, and CARL HERMES CARSKIT, Respondents
Ponencia: PERALTA, J.

Facts:
For a client company based in the US, petitioner IKSI hired respondents to review
various litigation documents. The contract duration is five years. However, before the
termination of the agreed term, respondents were placed on indefinite forced leave due
to the changes in business conditions with the contract undertaking. Consequently,
respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

The LA held that respondents were only placed on forced leave as a cost-cutting
measure. The said ruling is affirmed by the NLRC on appeal. On further review
however, the CA declared that respondents were illegally dismissed. Hence, the
petition for review before the Court.

Issue:
W/N respondents were project employees of petitioner.

Held:
No. Among the kinds of employees contemplated by Art. 295 of the Labor Code are
project employees. Employers claiming that their workers are project employees have
the burden of showing that a) the duration and scope of the employment was specified
at the time they were engaged; and b) there was indeed a project.

In the matter at hand, while IKSI was able to prove the presence of a specific project, it
failed to prove that respondents were made to work only for that specific project. It
appears on record that IKSI required respondents to work on a project which was
separate from the one they signed up for. This act by IKSI brought respondents outside
the realm of the project employee category. The five year period therefore is not actually
the duration of the project but that of the employment contract.

IKSI’s contracts of employment are evidently ambiguous. In the interpretation of

contracts, obscure words and provisions shall not favor the party that caused the
obscurity. Consequently, the terms of the present contract should be construed strictly
against the employer, for being the party who prepared it. Petition is dismissed.
#70
G.R. No. 191049
August 07, 2017
TOMAS P. ATIENZA, PETITIONER,
v.
OROPHIL SHIPPING INTERNATIONAL CO., INC., ENGINEER TOMAS N. OROLA
AND/OR HAKUHO KISEN CO., LTD., RESPONDENTS.
Ponencia: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Facts:
Petitioner was employed as an Able Seaman by respondent Orophil. In the course of his
employment contract, he was diagnosed to have contracted Tolosa Hunt Syndrome
(THS). The company-designated physician declared petitioner fit to work; however, a
check up with an independent physician declared him unfit for sea duty. Hence,
petitioner filed a complaint for payment of disability benefits with the NLRC.

In its defense, Orophil asserted that THS was not work-related. The LA ruled otherwise,
finding that petitioner’s illness is work-related. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA
decision since the petitioner failed to prove that his illness is work-related. The CA, on
review, affirmed the ruling of the NLRC. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:
W/N petitioner’s illness is compensable.

Held:
Yes. The Court takes this opportunity to clarify the demarcation between presumption
of work-relatedness and compensability. The former pertains to the legal assumption
that an illness is work-related even if it is not listed as one by the ECC; whereas, the
latter pertains to entitlement to receive compensation due to the connection between
work conditions and illness. This also means that the employee is not burdened to
prove that his illness is work-related because conversely, the employer bears the onus to
dispute the presumption. However, the establishment or presumption of work-
relatedness of an illness does not mean that it is automatically compensable. The
employee must still prove compliance with compensability under Section 32-A of 2000
POEA-SEC.

In the case at bar, it is found that petitioner’s work as seaman exposed him to the risk of
aggravating his THS, which is a viral infection in the eye. Further, since the company-
designated physician failed to issue a final assessment within 120 days, there is
conclusive presumption that petitioner’s disability is total and permanent. Therefore,
petitioner is entitled to maximum disability benefits under POEA-SEC.
#71
G.R. No. 222699
July 24, 2017
MAUNLAD TRANS INC., CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES and/or AMADO CASTRO,
Petitioners
vs.
GABRIEL ISIDRO, Respondent
Ponencia: TIJAM, J.

Facts:
Respondent Isidro worked for petitioner MTI as a bartender for its vessel M/S Miracle.
While on board, Isidro was diagnosed of knee synovitis and later of psoriasis. When
Isidro was repatriated, the company-designated doctor only treated psoriasis as the
knee synovitis was not in Isidro’s medical history. After a few months, the psoriatic
lesions have decreased in size. However, upon check up with an independent
physician, Isidro was said to be unfit to work due to his knee synovitis. Hence,
respondent filed a complaint for full disability benefits.

The LA held the respondent entitled to disability benefits for his psoriasis. On appeal,
the NLRC modified the LA ruling by granting Isidro full disability benefits. The latter is
affirmed by the CA. Thus, the present petition by MTI.

Issue:
W/N respondent is entitled to full disability benefits.

Held:
No. The burden of proof in establishing a claim for disability benefits falls on the
seafarer-claimant. In the case at hand, respondent failed to discharge of his burden to
prove his entitlement due to his knee synovitis. Respondent’s psoriasis is better
supported by evidence on record since the same was the actual ailment complained of
and thus treated by the company physician for months. Such record cannot be
outweighed by a medical finding by another physician after one checkup. Therefore, the
Court holds petitioners liable for respondent’s psoriasis only.

Wherefore, the petition is granted.

#72
G.R. No. 220002
August 2, 2017
EUGENIO M. GOMEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
CROSSWORLD MARINE SERVICES, INC., GOLDEN SHIPPING COMP ANY S.A.,
and ELEAZAR DIAZ, Respondents,
Ponencia: PERALTA, J.

Facts:
Petitioner Gomez, while working for respondents, injured his back while in the
performance of his duties. Accordingly, Gomez was treated by the company-designated
physician upon his return to the mainland Philippines. Even after multiple treatment
sessions, the injury persisted beyond 120 days. Before the lapse of the 240-day period,
the company-designated physician declared petitioner suffering from permanent partial
disability. However, the diagnosis of an independent physician concluded that
petitioner is suffering from permanent total disability. Hence, petitioner filed a
complaint for disability benefits with the LA.

The LA, and on appeal, the NLRC ruled in favor of petitioner due to the latter’s evident
total inability to perform his work permanently. Contrary to the lower tribunals, the CA
ruled in favor of respondents after observing the provisions of the Labor Code.
Therefore, the present petition.

Issue:
W/N petitioner is entitled to benefits for permanent total disability.

Held:
No. Article 192 of the Labor Code clearly states that permanent total disability may only
be declared by the company-designated physician within the 240-day medical
treatment period or upon the expiration thereof without declaration of fitness to work
or otherwise. In the case at bar, the company-designated physician had not declared
petitioner’s disability permanent, nor the 240-day period had expired with the
company-designated physician failed to make such declaration. Hence, the Court
concurs with the CA findings. Wherefore, petition is denied.
#73
October 2, 2017
G.R. No. 206826
CAREER PHILIPPINES SHIPMANAGEMENT, INC. and COLUMBIAN
SHIPMANAGEMENT, LTD., Petitioners
vs.
EDUARDO* J. GODINEZ, Respondent
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 206828
EDUARDO J. GODINEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
CAREER PHILIPPINES SHIPMANAGEMENT, INC and COLUMBIAN
SHIPMANAGEMENT, LTD., Respondents

Ponencia: DEL CASTILLO, J.

Facts:
Respondent Godinez was employed by petitioners as Desk Cadet onboard the vessel
MN Norviken. During his stint, he was subjected to multiple and various kinds of
humiliation from Second Officer Dayo. Later, Godinez exhibited weird and nonsensical
behavior indicative of mental disturbance. The ship captain therefor recommended for
his disembarkment.

Upon repatriation, Godinez was attended by the company-designated physician, who

confirmed that respondent was suffering from bipolar disorder. Based on some
unsigned medical reports and a signed certificate produced by petitioners, Godinez was
said to be functionally stable and fit to return to work. He sought to be rehired by
petitioners, but he was denied.

Godinez consulted an independent specialist, who diagnosed him with bipolar disorder
but was declared unfit to work as a seaman for he was prone to relapse due to
emotional triggers. Thereafter, Godinez filed a claim for disability benefits and other
monetary claims with the LA.

In his complaint, Godinez argues that he should be paid permanent total disability
benefits for contracting bipolar disorder during his employment since such illness was
work-related and aggravated by the harsh treatment he received from his superiors. On
the other hand, petitioners aver otherwise since bipolar disorder is chiefly rooted in
hereditary gene defects; and that Godinez was not maltreated because the alleged
abuser has been repatriated during the alleged period.

The LA ruled in favor of respondent. It was found that bipolar disorder was work-
connected and compensable and that no evidence was submitted to prove their claims
of repatriation. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA ruling, with the addition of moral
and exemplary damages due to the evident bad faith in the part of the petitioners.
Further review with the CA resulted in an affirmation of the NLRC decision with
reduction of damages for being excessive.

Hence the present petition.

Issue:
W/N Godinez is entitled to disability benefits.

Held:
Yes. The Court believes that Godinez was unjustifiably maltreated by his superior.
According to Godinez in his position paper, he was always verbally abused, starved,
humiliated and shouted at during his stint as Desk Cadet. These were all done in a daily
and regular basis, which took a toll on the emotional and psychological health of
Godinez. It had become traumatic and unbearable for him to continue working.

Godinez was a 20-year-old boy filled with innocence, dreams, idealism and optimism
when he applied for work with Career Phils. All these were shattered by his horrible
experience onboard M/V Norviken under the hands of Dayo, who robbed him of his
positive expectations he had coming to his very first job as a seafarer. The weight of all
the unnecessary cruelty and lack of compassion of his immediate superior was too
much for a young man to handle. Like a tender twig in a vicious storm, he snapped.
Coupled with the utter lack of a professional and medical response to the boy’s
progressing medical condition, led to the complete breakdown of Godinez’s body,
mind, and spirit.

The Court concludes that Godinez’s grave illness was directly caused by the inhumane
treatment inflicted upon him and aggravated by the failure of Career Phils to provide
timely medical intervention.

It is noted by the Court that petitioners submitted no less than four dubious and
irregular pieces of evidence to support their defense. Thus, it has become evident that
Career Phils acted in malice and bad faith, entitling Godinez to an award of moral and
exemplary damages. The Court warns against the continued use of underhanded tactics
that undermine the interests of labor, damages the integrity of the legal profession,
mock the judicial process as a whole and insult the intelligence of the Court.

Wherefore, the Court denies the present petition. The assailed CA decision is affirmed.