PEOPLE V. SIONGCO G.R. NO.

186472 JULY 5, 2010

Rule 115 Rights of the accused

FACTS: Appellants Siongco, Boton and Enriquez, induced 11-year old Nikko Satimbre, a resident of
Balanga, Bataan, to board a bus bound for Pilar, Bataan and promised the latter a “Gameboy”. He was
then bought to Dinalupihan, Bataan where he was kept for the night. Two days after, Siongco called
Elvira Satimbre, Nikko’s mother, and demanded P400,000.00, in exchange for the release of her son.
Siongco further threatened that Nikko would be killed if Elvira failed to give the ransom money. Nikko
was moved to Taguig City and was cautioned not to tell anybody that he was kidnapped. Appellants
were finally arrested in an entrapment operation conducted by the PAOCTF four days after Nikko was
kidnapped. The RTC convicted appellants of kidnapping with serious illegal detention, then punishableby
death, with the exception of Boton, on the ground of reasonable doubt. The CA affirmed the conviction
byt modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua.

On review, the appellants claimed that they were deprived of their right to an independent and
competent counsel when the RTC appointed Atty. Michael Moralde (Atty. Moralde) as their counsel de
oficio during the pre-trial conference, direct examination and cross-examination of the prosecution’s
principal witness, Nikko. This was so, despite Atty. Moralde’s manifestation during Nikko’s cross-
examination that the defense of his actual client, accused Boton, conflicts with that of the other
accused.

ISSUE: Whether Appellants were deprived of their right to an independent and competent counsel by
the appointment of Atty.Moralde.

HELD: NO, A scrutiny of the records shows that Atty. Moralde was appointed as appellants’ counsel de
oficio in six (6) hearings, because their regular counsel de oficio, Atty. Antoniano from the Public
Attorney’s Office (PAO), was inexplicably absent. There is no denial of the right to counsel where a
counsel de oficio is appointed during the absence of the accused's counsel de parte, or in this case the
regular counsel de oficio, pursuant to the court's desire to finish the case as early as practicable under
the continuous trial system. The choice of counsel by the accused in a criminal prosecution is not a
plenary one. If the chosen counsel deliberately makes himself scarce, the court is not precluded from
appointing a de oficio counsel, which it considers competent and independent, to enable the trial to
proceed until the counsel of choice enters his appearance. Otherwise, the pace of a criminal prosecution
will be entirely dictated by the accused, to the detriment of the eventual resolution of the case.
CresencioMilla v. People of the Philippines

G.R. no. 188726, January 25, 2012

Sereno, J.

Facts:

CresencioMilla sold a real property to Market Pursuits, Inc. (MPI) by presenting falsified
documents thereby causing the latter to believe that the registered owners of the said lot are actually
selling their property. After the sale, MPI discovered that the CTC given to them by Milla are spurious
and the title of the property was not transferred under its name.

Consequently, MPI demanded the return of the amount it paid to Milla who then issued 2
checks covering the said amount. However, the checks were dishonored for having been drawn against
insufficient funds. MPI demanded Milla to make good of his checks but the demand went unheeded
which led them to file a criminal charge of Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents against
Milla.

The RTC found Milla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of estafa through
falsification of public documents. The CA affirmed RTC’s decision. In this Petition, as part of his defense,
Milla contended that his issuance of the two checks before the institution of the criminal complaint
against him novated his obligation to MPI, thereby enabling him to avoid any incipient criminal liability
and converting his obligation into a purely civil one.

Issue:

Whether novation is applicable when the accused issued 2 checks resulting to the
extinguishment of his criminal liability.

Held:

In Quinto v. People, the Court exhaustively explained the concept of novation in relation to incipient
criminal liability, viz:
Novation is never presumed, and the animus novandi, whether totally or partially, must appear by
express agreement of the parties, or by their acts that are too clear and unequivocal to be mistaken.

The extinguishment of the old obligation by the new one is a necessary element of novation which may
be effected either expressly or impliedly. The term expressly means that the contracting parties
incontrovertibly disclose that their object in executing the new contract is to extinguish the old one.
Upon the other hand, no specific form is required for an implied novation, and all that is prescribed by
law would be an incompatibility between the two contracts. While there is really no hard and fast rule
to determine what might constitute to be a sufficient change that can bring about novation, the
touchstone for contrariety, however, would be an irreconcilable incompatibility between the old and
the new obligations.

There are two ways which could indicate, in fine, the presence of novation and thereby produce the
effect of extinguishing an obligation by another which substitutes the same. The first is when novation
has been explicitly stated and declared in unequivocal terms. The second is when the old and the new
obligations are incompatible on every point. The test of incompatibility is whether or not the two
obligations can stand together, each one having its independent existence. If they cannot, they are
incompatible and the latter obligation novates the first. Corollarily, changes that breed incompatibility
must be essential in nature and not merely accidental. The incompatibility must take place in any of the
essential elements of the obligation, such as its object, cause or principal conditions thereof; otherwise,
the change would be merely modificatory in nature and insufficient to extinguish the original obligation.

The criminal liability for estafa already committed is then not affected by the subsequent novation of
contract, for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the State in its own
conation.

In the case at bar, the acceptance by MPI of the Equitable PCI checks tendered by Milla could not have
novated the original transaction, as the checks were only intended to secure the return of the P2 million
the former had already given him. Even then, these checks bounced and were thus unable to satisfy his
liability. Moreover, the estafa involved here was not for simple misappropriation or conversion, but was
committed through Millas falsification of public documents, the liability for which cannot be
extinguished by mere novation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARTURO LARA y ORBISTA

REYES, J p: [G.R. No. 199877. August 13, 2012.]

FACTS:

o Information charging Lara with robbery with homicide was filed with the RTC.

o Following Lara's plea of not guilty, trial ensued.

PROSECUTION: 3 witnesses: Enrique Sumulong, SPO1 Bernard Cruz and PO3 Efren Calix

SUMULONG:

 May 31, 2001, 9:00 AM, he withdrew the amount of P230,000.00 from the Metrobank-Mabini
Branch, Pasig City to defray the salaries of the employees of San Sebastian and while at around
10:30 AM, while the pickup he was riding was at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues,
Pasig City, Lara suddenly appeared at the front passenger side of the pick-up and pointed a gun at
him stating, "Akin na ang pera, iyong bag, nasaan?";

 Bautista, one of those who accompanied him told him not to give the bag. He threw the bag in
Bautista's direction and Bautista alighted from the pick-up and ran. Seeing Bautista, Lara ran after
him while firing his gun

 He then ran towards Mercedes Plaza and called up the office of San Sebastian to relay the incident
and when he went back to where the pick-up was parked, he went to the rear portion of the vehicle
and saw blood on the ground;

 He was informed by one bystander that Bautista was shot and the bag was taken away from him;

 June 7, 2001: While on his way to Pasig City, he saw Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street, San Miguel,
Pasig City and he alerted the police and Lara was thereafter arrested. At the police station, he, Atie
and Manacob (other companions at pickup) identified Lara as the one who shot and robbed them of
San Sebastian's money.

SPO1 CRUZ

 Around 7:55 PM on June 7, 2001, Sumulong went to the police station and informed him that he
saw Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street

 4 police officers and Sumulong went to Dr. Pilapil Street where they saw Lara, who Sumulong
identified and they then approached Lara and invited him for questioning.
 At the police station, Lara was placed in a line-up where he was positively identified by Sumulong,
Manacob and Atie; and after being identified, Lara was informed of his rights and subsequently
detained.

PO3 CALIX

 May 31, 2001: he was informed of a robbery that took place and he, together with 3 other police
officers, proceeded to the crime scene wherein upon arriving one of the police officers who were
able to respond ahead of them, handed to him 11 pieces of empty shells and 6 deformed slugs of a
9mm pistol;

 As part of his investigation, he interviewed Sumulong, Atie, Manacob at the police station; and
before Bautista died, he was able to interview Bautista at the hospital where the latter was brought
after the incident.

DEFENSE:

LARA

o May 31, 2001: he was at his house, digging a sewer trench while his brother, Wilfredo, was
constructing a comfort room which was corroborated by his sister, Edjosa Manalo and neighbor,
Simplicia Delos Reyes.

o June 7, 2001 and at around 7:00 in the evening, while he was at the house of one of his cousins,
police officers arrived and asked him if he was Arturo Lara and after confirming that he was Arturo
Lara, the police officers asked him to go with them to the Barangay Hall. He voluntarily went with
them and while inside the patrol car, one of the policemen said, "You are lucky, we were able to
caught you in your house, if in another place we will kill you".

o He was brought to the police station and not the barangay hall as he was earlier told where he was
investigated for robbery with homicide and when he told the police that he was at home when the
subject incident took place, the police challenged him to produce witnesses but when his witnesses
arrived at the station, one of the police officers told them to come back the following day.

o While he was at the police line-up holding a name plate, a police officer told Sumulong and Atie,
"Ituru nyo na yan at uuwi na tayo"; and when his witnesses arrived the following day, they were told
that he will be subjected to an inquest.

RTC: GUILTY of robbery with homicide sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua, with all the accessory penalties prescribed by law.
  Rejected Lara's defense of alibi as follows because Enrique Sumulong positively identified
accused Arturo Lara as the person who carted away the payroll money of San Sebastian Allied
Services, and the one who shot Joselito Bautista which caused his instantaneous death on the
same day. Also, it is not impossible for him to be at the place

ARGUMENTS:

 On appeal, Lara pointed out several errors that supposedly attended his conviction. First, that he
was arrested without a warrant under circumstances that do not justify a warrantless arrest
rendered void all proceedings including those that led to his conviction.

 Second, he was not assisted by counsel when the police placed him in a line-up to be identified by
the witnesses for the prosecution in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. The police
line-up is part of custodial investigation and his right to counsel had already attached.

 Third, the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the
prosecution failed to present a witness who actually saw him commit the alleged acts. Sumulong
merely presumed that he was the one who shot Bautista and who took the bag of money from him.
The physical description of Lara that Sumulong gave to the police was different from the one he
gave during the trial, indicating that he did not have a fair glimpse of the perpetrator. Moreover, this
gives rise to the possibility that it was his unidentified companion who shot Bautista and took
possession of the money. Hence, it cannot be reasonably claimed that his conviction was attended
with moral certainty.

 Fourth, the trial court erred in discounting the testimony of his witnesses. Without any showing that
they were impelled by improper motives in testifying in his favor, their testimonies should have
been given the credence they deserve. While his two (2) witnesses were his sister and neighbor, this
does not by itself suggest the existence of bias or impair their credibility.

CA: AFFIRMED conviction.

 AUTOMATIC APPEAL TO SC as the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua

ISSUES:

1. Whether Lara's supposedly illegal arrest may be raised for the first time on appeal for the purpose of
nullifying his conviction? (YES)

2. Whether the identification made by Sumulong, Atie and Manacob in the police line-up is inadmissible
because Lara stood therein without the assistance of counsel? (NO, identification not custodial
investigation)

3. Whether there is sufficient evidence to convict Lara? (YES)

4. Whether Lara's alibi can be given credence so as to exonerate him from the crime charged? (NO)

HELD: DENY appeal.

1. YES. That Lara was supposedly arrested without a warrant may not serve as a ground to invalidate the
proceedings leading to his conviction considering its belated invocation. Any objections to the legality of
the warrantless arrest should have been raised in a motion to quash duly filed before the accused enters
his plea; otherwise, it is deemed waived. Further, that the accused was illegally arrested is not a ground
to set aside conviction duly arrived at and based on evidence that sufficiently establishes culpability:

 Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired through compulsory process such as a
warrant of arrest or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or
to the court.

 Any objection to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be
made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. An accused submits to
the jurisdiction of the trial court upon entering a plea and participating actively in the trial and this
precludes him invoking any irregularities that may have attended his arrest. In voluntarily submitting
himself to the court by entering a plea, instead of filing a motion to quash the information for lack of
jurisdiction over his person, accused-appellant is deemed to have waived his right to assail the
legality of his arrest.

 Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient ground to reverse and set aside a
conviction that was arrived upon a complaint duly filed and a trial conducted without error. The
warrantless arrest, even if illegal, cannot render void all other proceedings including those leading to
the conviction of the appellants and his co-accused, nor can the state be deprived of its right to
convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to their culpability.

 As Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: Sec. 9. Failure to move
to quash or to allege any ground therefor. — The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a
motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a
motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any
objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g) and (i) of
Section 3 of this Rule.

2. NO. There was no legal compulsion to afford him a counsel during a police line-up since the latter is
not part of custodial investigation and this does not constitute a violation of his right to counsel

 That he stood at the police line-up without the assistance of counsel did not render Sumulong's
identification of Lara inadmissible. The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise
 moment custodial investigation begins and being made to stand in a police line-up is not the
starting point or a part of custodial investigation.

 People v. Amestuzo: The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-
called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial investigation.
Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police
who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating
statements.

 Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed
by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage.

 The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be
claimed by the accused during identification in a police line-up because it is not part of the
custodial investigation process. This is because during a police line-up, the process has not yet
shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory and it is usually the witness or the
complainant who is interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of the line-up.

 An exception to this rule is when the accused had been the focus of police attention at the
start of the investigation. In the case at bench, appellant was identified in a police line-up by
prosecution witnesses from a group of persons gathered for the purpose. However, there was
no proof that appellant was interrogated at all or that a statement or confession was extracted
from him. During the police line-up, the accusatory process had not yet commenced.

 Assuming there was interrogation, any allegation of violation of rights during custodial
investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or
confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their conviction. Here, appellant
was convicted based on the testimony of a prosecution witness and not on his alleged
uncounseled confession or admission.

3. YES. Contrary to appellant's assertion, prosecution witness Sumulong actually saw him shoot Bautista,
the victim. Also, it is apparent from the assailed decision of the CA that the finding of guilt against Lara is
based on circumstantial evidence.

 Not only direct evidence but also circumstantial evidence can overcome the presumption of
innocence. Direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a
trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. Even in the absence of direct evidence,
conviction can be had if the established circumstances constitute an unbroken chain,
consistent with each other and to the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, to the exclusion of
all other hypothesis that he is not.
 REQUISITES OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE: Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, circumstantial evidence sufficed to convict upon the concurrence of the
following requisites: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

 It is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be convicted of the crime for which he is
charged. Resort to circumstantial evidence is essential since to insist on direct testimony would,
in many cases, result in setting felons free and denying proper protection to the community.

 Here, the following circumstantial evidence are tellingly sufficient to prove the guilt of appellant:

o While the vehicle was at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City,
appellant suddenly emerged and pointed a gun at prosecution witness Sumulong,
demanding from him to produce the bag containing the money.

o Prosecution witness Sumulong threw the bag to the victim who was then seated at the
backseat of the vehicle.

o The victim alighted from vehicle carrying the bag

o Appellant chased and fired several shots at the victim.

o The victim sustained several gunshot wounds.

o The police officers recovered from the scene of the crime six deformed empty shells.

 Indeed, in cases of robbery with homicide, the taking of personal property with intent to gain
must itself be established beyond reasonable doubt. The mere presence of the accused at the
crime scene is not enough to implicate him. It is essential to prove the intent to rob and the use
of violence was necessary to realize such intent.

o In this case, Lara's intent to gain is proven by Sumulong's positive narration that it was
Lara who pointed the gun at him and demanded that the bag containing the money be
turned over to him. That Lara resorted to violence in order to actualize his intent to gain
is proven by Sumulong's testimony that he saw Lara fire the gun at the direction of
Bautista, who was running away from the pick-up in order to prevent Lara from taking
possession of the money.

o Notably, the incident took place in broad daylight and in the middle of a street. Thus,
where considerations of visibility are favorable and the witness does not appear to be
biased against the accused, his or her assertions as to the identity of the malefactor
should be normally accepted.

o Lara did not allege, much less, convincingly demonstrate that Sumulong was impelled by
improper or malicious motives to impute upon him, however perjurious, such a serious
 charge. Thus, his testimony, which the trial court found to be forthright and credible, is
worthy of full faith and credit and should not be disturbed. If an accused had nothing to
do with the crime, it is against the natural order of events and of human nature and
against the presumption of good faith that a prosecution witness would falsely testify
against the former.

4. NO. In view of Sumulong's positive identification of Lara, the CA was correct in denying Lara's alibi
outright. It is well-settled that positive identification prevails over alibi, which is inherently a weak
defense. Such is the rule, for as a defense, alibi is easy to concoct, and difficult to disapprove.

 In order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be demonstrated that:

o that he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime

o he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at
the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.

 Physical impossibility "refers to the distance between the place where the
accused was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed,
as well as the facility of access between the two places.

 Proximity of Lara's house at the scene of the crime wholly negates his alibi. He himself admitted
that his house was just a stone's throw (about three minutes away) from the crime scene. Lara
and his witnesses failed to prove that it is well-nigh impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime.

DISPOSITIVE: CA AFFIRMED
People vs Ricardo Rio

GR No. 90294, 24 September 1991

201 SCRA 702

FACTS

Accussed-appellant Ricardo Rio was charged and convicted of the crime of rape before the RTC
of Makati City and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He filed an appeal and as a
consequence, the branch clerk of court forwarded the records to the CA. the appellate court, however,
forwarded the records to the SC in view of the penalty imposed upon the accused.

However, accused-appellant, in his two letters addressed to the clerk of court, manifested his
intention to withdraw the appeal “due to his poverty.” Upon inquiry of the clerk of court of the trial
court, through the recommendation of the SolGen, the accused-appellant submits that he was no longer
interested in pursuing his appeal and had, in fact, withdrawn his appeal. The Court denied his motion to
withdraw and appointed a counsel de oficio for him. All the letters reveal that the only reason he
offered for the withdrawal of his appeal is his inability to retain the services of a counsel de oficio on
account of his poverty.

ISSUE

Whether or not the right to counsel of accused-appellant ceased upon his conviction by the trial
court.

HELD

The Supreme Court held in the negative. This right to counsel de oficio does not cease upon the
conviction of an accused by the trial court. It continues, even during appeal, such duty of the court to
assign a counsel de oficio persists where an accused interposes intent to appeal. Even in a case, where
the accused has signified his intent to withdraw his appeal, the court is required to inquire into the
reason for the withdrawal. Where it finds the sole reason for the withdrawal to be poverty, the court
must assign a counsel de oficio, for despite such withdrawal, the duty to protect the rights of the
accused subsists and perhaps, with greater reason. After all, “those who have less in life must have more
in law.”
 The Court admonishes members of the Bar to be more conscious of their duties as advocates of
their clients causes whether acting de parte or de oficio for public interest requires that an attorney
exert his best efforts and ability in the prosecution or defense of his client’s cause.

Lawyers are an indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice in this
jurisdiction. And a lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and candor not only protects the
interests if his client; he also serve the ends of justice, does honor to th Bar and helds maintain the
respect of the community to the legal profession. This is because the entrusted privilege to practice law
carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar and to the
public.

Teofilo Martinez vs. People of the Philippines

FACTS:

Teofilo Martinez, herein petitioner, was accused of homicide. Before the Regional Trial Court, petitioner
filed a motion to be allowed to litigate as pauper. However, this was denied by the trial court and
prompted petitioner to go to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for certiorari. Petitioner alleged
that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued
the assailed orders.

Later on, petitioner also filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to litigate as pauper attaching thereto
affidavits by himself and two disinterested persons of his eligibility to avail this privilege. The appellate
court subsequently issued a resolution denying the motion and directing the petitioner to pay the
proper docketing fees within five (5) days from notice. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but this was also denied by the appellate court. Petitioner then filed a manifestation
through his counsel that he was transmitting the docket fees required "under protest" and that the
money was advanced by his counsel. The transmittal was evidenced by two (2) postal money orders
attached to the motion to litigate as pauper.
In the assailed resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner
failed to pay the required docket fees. Petitioner moved for reconsideration citing his compliance with
the required docket fee. In the second assailed resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the latest motion
on the ground that it was short of 150.00.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion
to appeal as pauper litigant?

RULING:

In the case at bar, the Supreme Court applied the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. The Court held that a
motion to litigate as indigent can be made even before the appellate courts, either for the prosecution
of appeals, in petitions for review or in special civil actions. It maintained that the interpretation of the
present rules is more in keeping with the Bill of Rights, which decrees that "free access to the courts and
quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of
poverty."

A perusal of the records shows that petitioner complied with all the evidentiary requirements for
prosecuting a motion to appear in court as pauper. The affidavits executed by himself and two other
disinterested persons were enough to convince the court that petitioner is qualified to litigate as
indigent.

The assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals were set aside for having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion. Accordingly, the case is remanded for appropriate action to the Court of Appeals which is
further ordered to allow the petitioner to litigate as pauper and to return to him the docket fees he
paid.
People of the Philippines v. Rustico Bartolini

Facts:

The Regional Trial Court of Bislig City, Surigao del Sur charged appellant Rustico Bartolini with
three counts of rape for raping his two daughters.

.Criminal Case No.99-1-2083-H

On or about 7:00 in the morning sometime in the month of March 1995, appellant Bartolini with lewd
and unchaste designs, willfuly, unlawfully and feloniously rape his daughter,[AAA], by means of force
and intimidation, against his daughter’s will, to the damage and prejudice of the said [AAA], who was
then 14 years old.

Criminal Case No.99-1-2084-H

On or about March 2,1998 at 8:00 in the morning, Bartolini with lewd and unchaste designs and
by means of force and intimidation, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge or rape
his own daughter,[BBB], against the latter’s will, to the damage and prejudice of [BBB].

Criminal Case No.99-1-2085-H

On or about 3:00 in the afternoon sometime in the month of March 1994, Bartolini with lewd and
unchaste designs and by means of force and intimidation, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously rape his
daughter [BBB],16 years old against the latter’s will, to the damage and prejudice of the said [BBB].

Upon arraignment, appellant Bartolini pleaded not guilty to the three charges filed against him.

According to him, he could not have raped BBB because that day he had been out to deliver
shrimps, prawns and crabs to a certain Benjamin Castanas. He claimed that he arrived there at 4:20 am
and stayed there for breakfast and left for home at 10:00 am.

Issue:

Whether or not the crime committed was incestuous rape

Ruling:

The court held that the qualifying circumstance of relationship of BBB to appellant was
specifically alleged and proven during the trial but the specific averment of the victim’s age at the time
the offense against her was committed is absent in the information. Such an omission committed by the
prosecutor is fatal in the imposition of death penalty against the offender. The requirement for
complete allegations on the particulars of the indictment is based on the right of the accused to be fully
informed of the nature of the charges against him so that he may adequately prepare for his defense
especially so if the case involves the imposition of death penalty in case accused iss convicted. Thus,
even if the victim is below 18 years old and the accused is her parent, but these facts are not alleged in
the information, or if only one is so alleged as in the instant case, their proof as such by evidence
offered during trial cannot imposed death penalty.

Settled is the rule that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will not
disturb the findings of the trial courts considering that the latter are in a better position to decide the
question as they have heard their deportment and manner of testifying during trial. These findings will
not ordinarily be disturbed by an appellate court absent any clear showing that the trial court has
overlooked, misunderstood,or misapplied facts or circumstances of weight or substance which could
very well affect the outcome of the case.

In Criminal Case Nos. 99-1-2083-H and 99-1-2084-H, appellant Rustico Bartolini is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of Qualified rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua in lieu of death while in Criminal Case No. 99-1-2084-H, appellant is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

Patula vs. People

G.R. No. 164457. April 11, 2012

Facts:

Anna Lerima Patula, a saleswoman of Footlucker’s Chain of Stores, Inc. in Dumaguete City, was
charged with estafa. The information filed in the Regional Trial Court in Dumaguete City charged her of
having collected and received the total sum of P131,286.97 from several customers of said company but
has failed to remit the said amount to the company despite the repeated demands. She, instead,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated the money and converted the proceeds of the sale
for her own use and benefit. Trials on the merits ensued having pled not guilty at the arraignment.

The first witness of the Prosecution was Lamberto Go, the branch manager of Footlucker’s in
Dumaguete. He defined the duties and responsibilities that Patula has as sales representative. He also
testified that at first her volume of sales was quite high, but later on dropped. He then confronted her
and decided to subject her to an audit by the auditor of the company. It was then that he learned there
were discrepancies between the confirmations from the customers and Footlucker’s records.
 Karen Guivencan, Footlucker’s auditor, was the second and last witness of the Prosecution. It
was in the course of her audit that she discovered differences between the original receipts held by the
customers and the duplicate copies of the receipts submitted by Patula to the office. She then presented
a list of the discrepancies between the customers’ confirmations and the office records as per audit.

However, during Guivencan’s direct-examination, petitioner’s counsel continuously objected

and question the evidences and testimony of Guivencan on the ground that they were hearsay because
the persons who actually made the entries were not themselves presented in court. They also regarded
Guinvencan’s testimonies to be irrelevant because they did were not proof of estafa but of falsification,
an offense not alleged in the information.

Despite these objections, the RTC rendered their decision finding Patula guilty of estafa. RTC
denied their motion for reconsideration.

Issues: (Copy from case?)

Ruling:

The Supreme Court believed that there was no violation of the petitioner’s right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation despite the information not alleging falsification. It is believed
by the court that the falsification was done in order to conceal her misappropriation. This then shows
that the falsification was not an offense separate and distinct from the estafa charged against her, but
rather an essential ingredient in establishing the crime duly alleged in the information.It is then believed
that the RTC was correct in its decision with this specific concern.

The court also ruled that neither ledgers nor receipts were admissible as judicial evidence
against the petitioner. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, Section 19 and 20, distinguishes between a public
and a private document and provides how private documents should be duly authenticated,
respectively. With the aforementioned sections it can be proven that the documents presented by the
Prosecution were considered to be private documents which needed proper authentication. However,
Prosecution failed to authenticate these documents before presenting them, thus failing to prove the
authenticity of the evidence during examination.

Guivencan’s testimony on the ledgers was also considered inadmissible as judicial evidence for
being hearsay. Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, states that witness can testify only to those facts
that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as
otherwise provided in these rules. Since Guivencan was not the one who prepared the said ledger, her
testimony could not be considered reliable. The Prosecution’s defense was that the ledgers was done in
the ordinary course of business and, therefore, exempt from the hearsay rule, as per Section 43, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court. However, Prosecution and the RTC failed to consider the requisites in applying
this rule, such as that the person who made the entry must be dead or unable to testify. However, this is
not true with the current case, therefore Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court could not be applied.
The testimony is therefore proven to be hearsay and inadmissible.

With all the foregoing considerations, Prosecution was then unable to present reliable evidence
on damage to establish the Petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The petitioner was, therefore,
acquitted as without prejudice to the filing of a civil action against her for the recovery of any amount
that she may still owe to Footlucker’s.

JACOB AND LEGARDA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (635 SCRA 94, 2010)

The Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution dated March 27, 2000 finding probable cause against
several public officers and private individuals, including petitioners Monico V. Jacob (Jacob), President,
and Celso L. Legarda (Legarda), Vice-President and General Manager for Marketing, both of Petron, for
perpetrating the so-called "tax credit scam."

Petitioners provided an undisputed account of the events that subsequently took place before the
Sandiganbayan:

On April 14, 2000, petitioners and the four other Petron officers who were similarly charged filed a
Motion for Reinvestigation [with the Office of the Ombudsman].

On 17 April 2000, the [Sandiganbayan Fourth Division] issued an Order giving the prosecution a period
of sixty (60) days within which –

… to re-assess its evidence in these cases and to take appropriate action on the said motion for
reconsideration of accused movants and to inform the Court within the same period as to its findings
and recommendations including the action thereon of the Honorable Ombudsman.

Sixty (60) days passed but the Office of the Ombudsman did not even bother to submit a report on the
status of the motions for reconsideration. Months passed, and then, AN ENTIRE YEAR PASSED. There
was still nothing from the respondent Office of the Ombudsman.

In the meantime, petitioner Jacob was arraigned on 1 June 2000 while petitioner Legarda was arraigned
on 18 May 2001.

In all the hearings conducted in the cases the defense verbally and consistently invoked their right to
speedy trial and moved for the dismissal of the cases. In the course of more than one year, however, the
[Sandiganbayan 4th Division] kept affording the prosecution one chance after another. The sixty days
granted to the prosecution became more than four hundred days – still, there was no resolution in sight.
Justice Nario, as the Chairman of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, ordered the dismissal of all
criminal cases arising from the purported tax credit scam on the ground that the accused, including
petitioners, had already been deprived of their right to a speedy trial and disposition of the cases against
them. Petitioners assert that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in reversing Justice Nario’s
order of dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939 because such reversal violated petitioners’
constitutional right against double jeopardy.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING

TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONERS’ RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL.

HELD: NO.An accused’s right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public trial" is guaranteed in criminal
cases by Section 14(2), Article IIIof the Constitution. This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one
free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its "salutary objective" being to assure that an
innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of
having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and
consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. Intimating historical perspective on
the evolution of the right to speedy trial, we reiterate the old legal maxim, "justice delayed is justice
denied." This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of disputes, much more so in
criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial

In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case
and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay;
(c) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice should be
assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial was designed to protect,
namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused
to trial; and to limit the possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the
last.

Irrefragably, there had been an undue and inordinate delay in the reinvestigation of the cases by the
Office of the Ombudsman, which failed to submit its reinvestigation report despite the lapse of the 60-
day period set by the Sandiganbayan, and even more than a year thereafter.

Nevertheless, while the re-investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman delayed the proceedings in
Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939, the said process could not have been dispensed with as it was
undertaken for the protection of the rights of petitioners themselves (and their co-accused) and their
rights should not be compromised at the expense of expediency.
In Corpuz, we warned against the overzealous or precipitate dismissal of a case that may enable the
defendant, who may be guilty, to go free without having been tried, thereby infringing the societal
interest in trying people accused of crimes rather than granting them immunization because of legal
error.

We agree with the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division that Justice Nario’s dismissal of the criminal
cases was unwarranted under the circumstances, since the State should not be prejudiced and deprived
of its right to prosecute the criminal cases simply because of the ineptitude or nonchalance of the Office
of the Ombudsman.

There can be no denying the fact that the petitioners, as well as the other accused, was prejudiced by
the delay in the reinvestigation of the cases and the submission by the Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor
of his report thereon. So was the State. We have balanced the societal interest involved in the cases and
the need to give substance to the petitioners’ constitutional rights and their quest for justice, and we
are convinced that the dismissal of the cases is too drastic a remedy to be accorded to the petitioners.
The People has yet to prove the guilt of the petitioners of the crimes charged beyond reasonable doubt.
We agree with the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that before resorting to the extreme sanction of
depriving the petitioner a chance to prove its case by dismissing the cases, the Ombudsman/Special
Prosecutor should be ordered by the Sandiganbayan under pain of contempt, to explain the delay in the
submission of his report on his reinvestigation.

Churchille Mari and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

----vs----

Hon. Rolando Gonzales, RTC Judge and PO1 Rudyard Paloma

Right to Speedy Trial

FACTS:

1. Private Complainant Mari executed a sworn statement before the police alleging that she was
raped by Private Respondent Paloma. Preliminary Investigation ensued and a warrant of arrest
against Paloma was eventually issued by MCTC. Paloma voluntarily surrendered.
 2. Paloma filed a motion for bail. During the hearing for bail, Petitioner failed to appear, and an
Order granting bail was given to Paloma, set at 200k.

3. An administrative order from SC divested the first-level courts of the authority to conduct
preliminary investigation. Hence, the records of the case was forwarded to the Public
Prosecutor, who found probable cause to file the Information. RTC then found cause to issue a
warrant of arrest and Paloma was recommitted to detention.

4. During the different stages of arraignment, pre-trial, and trial, both Public and Private
Prosecutors, as well as the Complainant herself failed to appear despite due notice. Some of
their reasons for failing to appear:

a. That there is still a pending petition for change of venue

i. Dismissed by Respondent Judge as it is not excusable for not appearing in

hearings

b. That there are other cases being handled by the Private Prosecutor

i. Dismissed by the Judge. This argument was raised on the latter part of the case
when the prosecution has already failed to appear multiple times. Also, the
accused has already invoked his right to a speedy trial. Accused was already in
jail.

5. The Respondent Judge eventually dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. MR likewise
denied. Hence, this petition

ISSUE: W/N The accused right to speedy trial is violated (YES)

HELD:

Petitioners argue that Respondent Judge dismissed the case too hastily. According to S10 of Speedy Trial
Act, now embodied in S3 R119:

SEC. 3. Exclusions. - The following periods of delay shall be excludedin computing the time within which
trial must commence:

(a) Any period of delay resulting from otherproceedings concerning the accused, including but
notlimited to the following:
xxxx

(5) Delay resulting from orders of inhibition, orproceedings relating to change of venue of cases or
transfer from other courts.

Court disagrees, a reading of the rule would show that the rule shows that the only delay that may be
excluded from the time limit are those resulting from the proceedings concerning the accused. The
change of venue proceeding can only be excluded if the accused was the one who filed for it, contrary to
what happened in this case.

Further, records show that the 30-day limit in R119 S1 had already been breached. SC agrees with the
RTC in observing that the prosecution appeared to be intentionally delaying the proceedings by failing to
appear on the hearings set by the court, filing a motion for cancellation of hearing on the day of the
hearing itself, or not even bothering to appear on the date they set for hearing on their motion.

Petitioners are also mistaken that the mere pendency of their petition for change of venue would
interrupt the proceedings before the trial court. It is the same as when a petition for certiorari is filed; it
does not interrupt the proceedings before the trial court unless a writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order is given.

Further, in recent jurisprudence, in determining w/n the accused is deprived of the right to speedy trial,
the following factors are to be considered:

a. Duration of the delay

b. Reason for such delay

c. Assertion of the right (to speedy trial) or failure to assert it

d. Prejudice caused by such delay

In determining the right to a speedy trial, the courts are required to do more than a mathematical
equation. In this case, the accused was already deprived of liberty for 4 months when he was first
incarcerated by the MCTC, and again for 6 months after the Information was filed before the RTC
following the Adm. Order. Verily, the accused was already deprived of liberty and it is vexatious to delay
the proceedings by a mere motion for change of venue, especially so if there’s no WPI or TRO.
WHEREFORE, Petition is DISMISSED.

COCOFED vs. Republic

Bill of Rights; right to speedy trial versus right to speedy disposition of cases. The right to a speedy trial is
available only to an accused and is a peculiarly criminal law concept, while the broader right to a speedy
disposition of cases may be tapped in any proceedings conducted by state agencies. In this case, the
appropriate right involved is the right to a speedy disposition of cases, the recovery of ill-gotten wealth
being a civil suit. An examination of the petitioners’ arguments and the cited indicia of delay would
reveal the absence of any allegation that petitioners moved before the Sandiganbayan for the dismissal
of the case on account of vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays that attended the proceedings.
Petitioners are deemed to have waived their right to a speedy disposition of the case. Moreover, delays,
if any, prejudiced the Republic as well. What is more, the alleged breach of the right in question was not
raised below. As a matter of settled jurisprudence, but subject to equally settled exception, an issue not
raised before the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.Philippine Coconut Producers
Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines; Wigberto E. Tanada, et al., intervenors;
Danilo S. Ursua vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 177857-58 & G.R. No. 178193, January 24, 2012.

Constitutionality of PD 755, 961, 1468. This case cannot be resolved without going into the
constitutionality of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 in particular. For petitioners predicate their claim over
the sequestered shares and necessarily their cause on laws and martial law issuances assailed by the
respondent on constitutional grounds. This case is for the recovery of shares grounded on the invalidity
of certain enactments, which in turn is rooted in the shares being public in character, purchased as they
were by funds raised by the taxing and/or a mix of taxing and police powers of the state. As may be
recalled, P.D. No. 755, under the policy-declaring provision, authorized the distribution of UCPB shares
of stock free to coconut farmers. On the other hand, Section 2 of P.D. No. 755 authorized the PCA to
utilize portions of the CCSF to pay the financial commitment of the farmers to acquire UCPB and to
deposit portions of the CCSF levies with UCPB interest free. The CCSF, CIDF and like levies that Philippine
Coconut Authority is authorized to collect shall be considered as non-special or fiduciary funds to be
transferred to the general fund of the Government, meaning they shall be deemed private funds.

In other words, the relevant provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, as well as those of P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468,
could have been the only plausible means by which close to a purported million and a half coconut
farmers could have acquired the said shares of stock. It has, therefore, become necessary to determine
the validity of the authorizing law, which made the stock transfer and acquisitions possible.
creating more funds , specifically the CCSF (Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund) and CIDF (Coconut
Industry Development Fund)

PD 755 was enacted to provide credit facilities to coconut farmers.

- The Philippine Coconut Administration (PCA) is authorized to handle the funds

- The PCA were authorized to use the funds to acquire a bank and to deposit the portion of fund levies.
They purchased the First United Bank (FUB), later renamed UCPB, but reimbursed the money from the
funds.

- The funds were for the benefit of coconut farmers. The funds were used to pay for the financial
commitments of farmers and provided them with free shares of the bank.

- The stock certificates for the farmers were in the name of the PCA but were supposed to be distributed
to the farmers who possessed COCOFUND receipts (PCA Administrative Order No. 1)

Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. was one of the mediators of the PCA funds and it was discovered that he
caused the issuance of PD 1468 (Revised Coconut Industry Code) through collaboration with Marcos.

The Aquino Administration initiated the recovery of ill-gotten gains through the implementation of the
following executive orders

- EO 1 – establishment of the Presidential Committee on Good Governance (PCGG)

- EO 2 – “Ill-gotten gains” included shares of stocks

- EO 14 – The Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction

The Sandiganbayan ordered the sequestration against stocks in banks owned by more than a million
coconut farmers and CIIF companies

ISSUES AND RULING

W/N the Sandiganbayan abused its power of judicial review?

- No, since the case cannot be solved unless the constitutionality issue is addressed. The case is for the
recovery of shares grounded on the invalidity of the enactments and rooted in the nature of the shares
being public.

W/N Sections 1 and 2 of PD 755, Article 3, Section 5 of PD 961, and Article III, Section 5 of PD 1468 are
unconstitutional?
- The levy implemented takes on the nature of taxes since they utilized the taxing power and police
power of the State, thereby making it a public fund.

- The funds were intended for the exclusive benefit of private persons.

- Article VI, Section 29 (3) – “All money collected on any tax levied for a special prupose shall be treated
as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only.”

- The Court also considered the fact that the enactment of the decrees were facilitated by Conjunago Jr.
as a tool for his own economic empire

W/N Article 3, Section 5 of PD 961, Article 3, Section 5, PD No. 1468 violate Article IX, Section 2 of the
Constitution?

- Yes, they violate Article IX, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which states that the Commission on
Audit shall have the power to handle the use of funds pertaining to the Government or its subdivisions.
The provisions mentioned above state that the funds shall not be construed to mean special funds or
national government funds

- The provisions divest the Commission on Audit of its constitutionally mandated function

W/N PD 755 and PCA Administrative Order No.1 and Resolutions 074-075 are invalid delegations of
legislative power

- Yes, PD 755 did not specify the means of distributing the bank shares not claimed by beneficiaries and
did not specifically define “coconut farmers”. The PCA assumed authority to define who “coconut
farmers” (intended beneficiaries) are and decided that those who did claim shall also be given “gift of
bank shares” since the law failed to provide guidelines regarding undistributed shares. The laws failed
the completeness test in the sense that they failed to provide guidelines for rules and regulations (the
delegate may only implement rules and regulations that enforce the law).

FINAL RULING:

Petition denied and the stocks are now considered property of the Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 151258 December 1, 2014
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law
signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). Hazing was pre-
requisite in joining for which Lenny was one of few who had undergone the process. After the initiation,
Lenny’s condition worsened due to the blows he received, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital.
Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the 35 Aquilans. Four of the accused
(Tecson, et. al.) were found to be guilty of homicide by the trial court but was reduced to crime of slight
physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor by the Court of Appeals. However, upon
appeal to the Supreme Court by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Supreme Court ruled that they
should be liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide instead.

In Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration, Tecson et. al. clarified the effect of the decision of the
Supreme Court to their criminal liability. According to Tecson et. al., they immediately applied for
probation after the CA rendered its Decision lowering their criminal liability from the crime of homicide,
which carries a non-probationable sentence, to slight physical injuries, which carries a probationable
sentence. Hence, they have already been discharged from their criminal liability and the cases against
them closed and terminated by virtue of their granted Applications for Probation for which the terms
therein are already been complied wit

Held: SC have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the case pursuant to the right
of the accused to speedy trial is tantamount to acquittal.[58] As a consequence, an appeal or a
reconsideration of the dismissal would amount to a violation of the principle of double jeopardy.[59] As
we have previously discussed, however, where the dismissal of the case is
capricious, certiorari lies.[60] The rule on double jeopardy is not triggered when a petition challenges the
validity of the order of dismissal instead of the correctness thereof.[61] Rather, grave abuse of discretion
amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents double jeopardy from attaching

This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended Information was filed against Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano, Cabangon, Concepcion, and De Vera.[64] On 29 November
1993, they were all arraigned.[65] Unfortunately, the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28
March 2005 or almost 12 years after arraignment.[66]
G.R. No. 189171 : June 3, 2014
EDILBERTO L. BARCELONA, Petitioner, v. DAN JOEL LIM and RICHARD TAN, Respondents.
SERENO, C.J.:

FACTS:

On 14 August 2000, respondent businessman Dan Joel Lim (Lim), the owner of Top Gun Billiards, filed a
Sinumpaang Salaysay (sworn statement) with the Criminal Intelligence Division of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). Lim claimed as follows: (1) his employees, Arnel E.Ditan and Pilipino Ubante, were
influenced by petitioner to file a labor complaint against Lim; and (2) petitioner, then an NLRC officer,
demanded 20,000 for the settlement of the labor case filed against Lim. On the strength of this sworn
statement, the NBI organized an entrapment operation against petitioner.

On 16 August 2000, Lim informed the NBI that petitioner would drop by Top Gun Billiards around seven
oclock in the evening, expecting to receive the 20,000 petitioner was demanding from him; otherwise,
petitioner would order that Top Gun Billiards be closed. After Lim handed him the marked bills,
petitioner began counting them. The latter was arrested by the NBI right when he was about to put the
money in his bag.

After being duly informed of his constitutional rights, petitioner was brought to the NBI office where he
was booked, photographed, and fingerprinted. Thereafter, he underwent ultraviolet light examination.
The Certification of the NBI-Forensic Chemistry Division stated that his hands "showed the presence of
Yellow Fluorescent Specks and Smudges," and that "similar examinations made on the money bills
showed the presence of yellow fluorescent specks and smudges.

NBI Director Federico M. Opinion, Jr. recommended the prosecution of petitioner for robbery under
Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and violation of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019 or the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The NBI filed the Complaint. Finding probable cause, the City Prosecutor
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila an Information against petitioner for the crime of
robbery.

Finding a prima facie case against petitioner, Chairperson Seres issued Administrative Order No. 9-02,
formally charging him with dishonesty and grave misconduct.

The Board resolved the administrative case ex parte. It found that petitioner had been caught red-
handed in the entrapment operation. His guilt having been substantially established, the Board found
him guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct. Upon approval of this recommendation by NLRC
Chairperson Seres, petitioner was dismissed from service.

Petitioner appealed to the CSC.

Petitioner further claims that even before Chairperson Seres formally charged him with dishonesty and
grave misconduct, the former had already filed an urgent request for an emergency leave of absence
because of the alarming threats being made against him and the members of his family.

Petitioner asked the CSC to nullify the Order of Chairperson Seres. The Order barred petitioner from
entering the NLRC premises a month before the hearing conducted by the Board. He then questioned its
impartiality. Six years after petitioner had filed his Appeal Memorandum, the CSC dismissed it.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review, but it was dismissed by the CA.

Hence, this Petition praying for the reversal of the Decision and Resolution of the appellate court and
the dismissal of the administrative Complaint filed against petitioner.

ISSUES: Whether the factual findings of the CSC are supported by evidence;

Whether the right of petitioner to the speedy disposition of his case has been violated by the CSC;

HELD: Court of Appeals decision is sustained.

POLITICAL LAW: due process of law

Contrary to the assertions of petitioner, Chairperson Seres did not act as the formers accuser, judge and
executioner. To be clear, the accusers of petitioner were Lim and Tan, while his judge was an
independent Board formed to investigate his case. This Court is aware that the Board only had the
power to recommend, and that that latters recommendation was still subject to the approval of the
Chairperson. Still, petitioner cannot claim that he was denied due process on this basis alone, because
the remedy to appeal to the proper administrative bodythe CSC in this casewas still made available to
him.

This Court finds that both Chairperson Seres and the Board essentially complied with the procedure laid
down in the Civil Service Rules. Where due process is present, the administrative decision is generally
sustained. Mangubat v. De Castro, 246 Phil. 620 (1988).

The claim of petitioner that he was denied due process is negated by the circumstances of the case at
bar.

The Report/Recommendation of the Board shows that both complainant and respondent were given the
opportunity to be heard by the Board and to adduce their respective sets of evidence, which were duly
considered and taken into account in its Decision.

POLITICAL LAW: Civil Service Rules

Petitioner further claims that Chairperson Seres violated Section 12 of the Civil Service Rules when the
latter dispensed with the requirement of conducting a preliminary investigation. It is important to note
that this preliminary investigation required by Section 12 of the Civil Service Rules is not the same as
that required in criminal cases. Section 12 defines a preliminary investigation of administrative cases in
the Civil Service as an "ex parte examination of records and documents submitted by the complainant
and the person complained of, as well as documents readily available from other government offices."
Petitioner presents no evidence to prove that either Chairperson Seres or the Board failed to examine
these records. In fact, the records show that, on 28 September 2000, Lim and Tan appeared in the
preliminary investigation conducted by the Board to confirm their sworn statements and the criminal
cases they had filed against petitioner. That he submitted no documents for consideration in the
preliminary investigation was his choice.

According to petitioner, no formal charge was ever filed against him as mandated by Section 16 of the
Civil Service Rules. He now claims that Chairperson Seres had no right to place him under preventive
suspension, because Section 19 of the Civil Service Rules requires that a formal charge be served on
petitioner before an order of preventive suspension may be issued. The provision reads:

SECTION 19. Preventive Suspension. Upon petition of the complainant or motu proprio, the proper
disciplining authority may issue an order of preventive suspension upon service of the Formal Charge, or
immediately thereafter to any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation, if the charge involves:

a. dishonesty;
b. oppression;
c. grave misconduct;
d. neglect in the performance of duty; or
e. If there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his
removal from the service.

An order of preventive suspension may be issued to temporarily remove the respondent from the scene
of his misfeasance or malfeasance and to preclude the possibility of exerting undue influence or
pressure on the witnesses against him or tampering of documentary evidence on file with his Office.

In lieu of preventive suspension, for the same purpose, the proper disciplining authority or head of
office, may reassign respondent to other units of the agency during the formal hearings.

In this case, the Order was the formal charge. It was served on petitioner, but he refused to receive it.
He claims that on 27 September 2000, or a month before the hearing conducted by the Board,
Chairperson Seres barred him from entering the NLRC premises. Petitioner was thereby denied access to
evidence and witnesses that could support his case. But, as revealed by Section 19, Chairperson Seres
had the right to issue an Order of preventive suspension pending investigation by the Board, because
petitioner was being charged with dishonesty and grave misconduct.

Moreover, the Order of Chairperson Seres preventing petitioner from entering the latters office was also
valid under Section 19. This Order was meant to preclude petitioner from possibly exerting undue
influence or pressure on the witnesses against him or to prevent him from tampering with documentary
evidence on file with his office. This preventive measure is sanctioned by law.

Lastly, the CSC has the power and the authority to amend the Civil Service Rules whenever it deems the
amendment necessary. The insinuation of petitioner that this change was made for the sole purpose of
hurting his appeal is a mere product of his imagination. The CSC is under no obligation to review all the
cases before it and, on the basis thereof, decide whether or not to amend its internal rules.

We note, though, that the authority of the CSC to amend the rules does not give it the authority to apply
the new provision retroactively. The consequence of an illegal retroactive application of a provision is
discussed below.

POLITICAL LAW: speedy disposition of cases

Section 16, Rule III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, reads:

Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial, or administrative bodies.

The right to a speedy disposition of cases is guaranteed by the Constitution. The concept of speedy
disposition is flexible. The fact that it took the CSC six years to resolve the appeal of petitioner does not,
by itself, automatically prove that he was denied his right to the speedy disposition of his case. After all,
a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient, as the facts and circumstances
peculiar to the case must also be considered. Binay v. Sandiganbayan, 374 Phil. 413

The right to a speedy trial, as well as other rights conferred by the Constitution or statute, may be
waived except when otherwise expressly provided by law. Ones right to the speedy disposition of his
case must therefore be asserted. Due to the failure of petitioner to assert this right, he is considered to
have waived it.
HON. GREGORIO. N. GARCIA, Judge of the City Court of Manilavs.HON. FELIX DOMINGO, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Manila

FERNANDO, J.:

Facts:

In Branch I the City Court of Manila presided over by petitioner Judge, there were commenced, by
appropriate informations eight (8) criminal actions against respondent Edgardo Calo, and Simeon
Carbonnel and Petitioner Francisco Lorenzana.

The accused wanted for the speedy trial so they requested to held the trial even on Saturday on the
chamber of Judge Gamboa. The petitioner granted the request.(as police officers under suspension
because of the cases, desired the same to be terminated as soon as possible and as there were many
cases scheduled for trial on the usual criminal trial days (Monday, Wednesday and Friday).

On appeal the prosecution said that there was no trial, therefore the petioner judge order should be
reversed.

Issue:

Whether or not the judge denied the accused of public trial.

Held:

Yes. Public trial possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge
conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His
being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown.

There is the well-recognized exception though that warrants the exclusion of the public where the
evidence may be characterized as "offensive to decency or public morals." 21

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted .

RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE TV OF TRIAL OF JOSEPH ESTRADA [360 SCRA 248; A.M. NO 01-4-03-SC; 29 JUN
2001]

Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a letter requesting the Court to allow live
media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former
President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full transparency
in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The request was seconded by Mr.Cesar N.
Sarino and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano andAttorney Ricardo Romulo.

Issue: Whether or Not live media coverage of the trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed
against former President Joseph E. Estrada should be permitted by the court.

Held: The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the other
hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and
impartial trial. When these rights race against one another, jurisprudence tells us that the right of the
accused must be preferred to win.

Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial
that is not lifted about its individual settings nor made an object of public’s attention and where the
conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence but only be evidence and
argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded.

An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where
his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with
and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secret conclaves of
long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial, it only implies that the court doorsmust
be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and
observe the trial process.

The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public
information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive
means of conveying the proceedings to the public. Nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding
consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due process which must never be allowed to
suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions.
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC September 13, 2001

FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners’ request for permission
to televise and broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The
motion was filed by the Secretary of Justice, as one of the petitioners, who argues that there is really no
conflict between the right of the people to public information and the freedom of the press, on the one
hand, and, on the other, the right of the accused to a fair trial; that if there is a clash between these
rights, it must be resolved in favor of the right of the people and the press because the people, as the
repository of sovereignty, are entitled to information; and that live media coverage is a safeguard
against attempts by any party to use the courts as instruments for the pursuit of selfish interests.

On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterates his objection to the live TV and radio
coverage of his trial on the ground that its allowance will violate the sub judice rule and that, based on
his experience with the impeachment trial, live media coverage will only pave the way for so-called
"expert commentary" which can trigger massive demonstrations aimed at pressuring the Sandiganbayan
to render a decision one way or the other. Mr. Estrada contends that the right of the people to
information may be served through other means less distracting, degrading, and prejudicial than live TV
and radio coverage.

ISSUE: Whether or not television and radio coverage of plunder case be allowed.

HELD: No. The Court has considered the arguments of the parties on this important issue and, after due
deliberation, finds no reason to alter or in any way modify its decision prohibiting live or real time
broadcast by radio or television of the trial of the former president. By a vote of nine (9) to six (6) of its
member, the Court denies the motion for reconsideration of the Secretary of Justice.

In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court, by the vote of eight (8) Justices, has resolved
to order the audio-visual recording of the trial for documentary purposes. Seven (7) Justices vote
against the audio-visual recording of the trial. Considering the significance of the trial before the
Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and the importance of preserving the records thereof, the
Court believes that there should be an audio-visual recording of the proceedings. The recordings will
not be for live or real time broadcast but for documentary purposes. Only later will they be available for
public showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its decision in every case to which the
recording pertains. The master film shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records
Management and Archives Office for historical preservation and exhibition pursuant to law.

OLAGUER V. MILITARY COMMISSION

[GR L-54558, 22 May 1987]

IN RE: Sec. 18, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution

FACTS:

On 24 December 1979, herein Petitioners – all, of which, are civilians – were arrested by the military and
were subsequently detained at Camp Crame and were then transferred to Camp Bagong Diwa.
Sometime in 1980, the then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces created the Respondent Military
Commission No. 34 for the purposes of trying the said Petitioners of their alleged crimes. Hastily, the
said Respondent Commission sentenced the Petitioners to death. Petitioners now come to the Supreme
Court to challenge the said Military Commission.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the actions of the military are Constitutional?

HELD:
It must be noted that in 1981, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2045, thereby officially lifting
Martial Law. Furthermore, between 1981 and 1986, the Petitioners were given provisional liberty
thereby rendering their Petitions for Habeas Corpus moot and academic.

It has been held in a long line of cases that Military Commissions/Tribunals have no jurisdiction to try
civilians for alleged offenses when Civil Courts are open and functioning. Such being the case here, the
respondent Military Commission’s actions of trying the Petitioners and rendering sentence is null and
void.

And assuming that the same does have jurisdiction, the fact that the trial(s) were conducted hastily –
i.e., the Petitioners were never actually given a chance to defend themselves or even present their own
evidences – due process was actually denied to the Petitioners; hence, their sentence should be treated
as unconstitutional.
117. Ho Wai Pang vs People of the Philippines

GR No. 176229

Del Castillo, J.

October 19, 2011

Doctrine: Rights of Suspects; Infraction of the rights of an accused during custodial investigation or the
so-called Miranda Rights render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during
such investigation."The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is
not otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of
custodial investigation."

Facts:

 13 Hongkong nationals came to the Philippines via UAE Flight which arrived at NAIA. The group
leader, Sonny Wong, presented a Baggage Declaration Form to Customs Examiner Cinco. In the
first bag, she saw few personal belongings such as used clothing, shoes and chocolate boxes
which she pressed. In the second bag, Cinco noticed chocolate boxes which were almost of the
same size as those in the first bag. Becoming suspicious, she took out 4 of the chocolate boxes
and opened one of them. She saw a white crystalline substance inside contained in a white
transparent plastic. She called the attention of her immediate superiors Duty Collector Alalo and
Customs Appraiser Sancho, who advised her to call the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) and the
police. She guided the tourists to the Intensive Counting Unit (ICU) while bringing with her the 4
boxes earlier discovered.

 At the ICU, Cinco checked Pang's bag and only found personal effects, but recalled that 2 of the
chocolate boes discovered earlier at the express lane belonged to him. Cinco called the other
tourists and examined their bags and found a total of 18 chocolate boxes.

 NARCOM Agent de Castro corroborated the testimony of Cinco. He conducted a test on the
white crystalline substance using the Mandelline Re-Agent Test. The substance was found
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). The chocolate boxes were bundled
together with tape, placed inside a plastic bag and brought to the Inbond Section.

 The 13 tourists were brought to NBI for further questioning. The confiscated substance were
turned over to the Forensic Chemist who weighed and examined them, and found them positive
as shabu. Out of the 13 tourists, the NBI found evidence for violation of RA 6425 only against
petitioner Pang and his 5 co-accused.
  Six separate informations were filed. Petitioner Pang filed a Motion for Reinvestigation, which
was granted by the trial court. The reinvestigation gave way to a finding of conspiracy among
the accused and this resulted to the filing of a single Amended Information. They plead guilty,
and invoked denial as their defense. They claimed to have no knowledge about the
transportation of illegal substance taken from their traveling bags which provided by the travel
agency.

 RTC found them guilty. All the accused appealed to the SC, but later on, all accused except for
petitioner Pang withdrew their appeal. SC granted the withdrawal. Petitioner Pang's appeal was
referred to the CA for proper disposition and determination.

 CA denied the appeal, and affirmed the RTC decision. While conceding that petitioner’s
constitutional right to counsel during the custodial investigation was indeed violated, it
nevertheless went on to hold that there were other evidence sufficient to warrant his
conviction. The CA also rebuked petitioner’s claim that he was deprived of his constitutional
and statutory right to confront the witnesses against him. The CA gave credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and quoted with favor the trial court’s ratiocination
regarding the existence of conspiracy among the accused.

Petitioner:

 He was not assisted by a competent and independent lawyer during the custodial investigation.
He was not duly informed of his rights to remain silent and to have competent counsel of his
choice. CA should have excluded the evidence taken during such investigation.

 He was deprived of his right to know and understand what the witnesses testified to. Only a full
understanding of what the witnesses would testify to would enable an accused to comprehend
the evidence being offered against him and to refute it by cross-examination or by his own
countervailing evidence

Respondent (OSG):

 Nothing mentioned in full text on contention regarding violation of rights during custodial
investigation (part in outline)

 Petitioner was given the opportunity to confront his accusers and/or witnesses of the
prosecution when his counsel cross-examined them. It is petitioner’s call to hire an interpreter
to understand the proceedings before him and if he could not do so, he should have manifested
it before the court. Petitioner was nevertheless able to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses
and that such examination suffices as compliance with petitioner’s right to confront the
witnesses against him.
Issue:

Whether he was duly informed of his (constitutional) right to remain silent and to have competent
counsel during custodial investigation, in accordance with Section 12, Article 3 of the Constitution

Held:

Constitutional right was violated, but substance discovered during inspection at NAIA still admissible as
evidence.

 Section 12, Article 3:

 Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel.

 Petitioner Pang was subjected to all the rituals of a custodial questioning by the custom
authorities and the NBI in violation of his constitutional right. However, the Constitution only
prohibits as evidence confession and admissions of the accused as against himself.

 "Infractions of the so-called Miranda rights render inadmissible ‘only the extrajudicial confession
or admission made during custodial investigation.’ The admissibility of other evidence, provided
they are relevant to the issue and are not otherwise excluded by law or rules, are not affected
even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation.” - Aquino vs Paiste

 Petitioner Pang did not make any confession or admission during his custodial investigation. The
prosecution did not present any extrajudicial confession extracted from his as evidence of his
guilt. No statement was taken from him during his detention and subsequently used in evidence
against him. The determination of his guilt was based on the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses and on the existence of the confiscated shabu.

 “Any allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and material only
to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes
the basis of their conviction.” - People vs. Buluran

 Petitioner's conviction was on the strength of his having been caught in flagrante delicto
transporting shabu into the country and not on the basis of any confession or admission. Cinco's
testimony was found to be direct, positive and credible by the trial court; it need not be
corroborated. She witnesses the entire incident and provided direct evidence as eyewitness to
the very act of the commission of the crime.
Other issue:

Whether he was denied of his right to cross-examine

 SC agrees with OSG.

 Petitioner did not register any objection to the presentation of the prosecution's evidence,
particularly on the testimony of Cinco despite the absence of an interpreter. It has not been
shown that the lack of an interpreter greatly prejudiced him. Petitioner, through counsel, was
able to fully cross-examine Cinco and the other witnesses and test their credibility. The right to
confrontation is essentially a guarantee that a defendant may cross-examine the witnesses of
the prosecution. Petitioner's constitutional right to confront witnesses against him was not
impaired.

Conspiracy among the accused was duly established

 Conspiracy is the common design to commit a felony. It need not entail a close personal
association or at least an acquaintance between or among the participants to a crime. It need
not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into
and pursue a common design. The assent of the minds may be and, from the secrecy of the
crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, indicate
that they are parts of some complete whole.

 It can be deduced from petitioner and his co-accused's collective conduct, viewed in its totality,
that there was a common design, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments in bringing
about the crime committed.

Guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt

 Cinco's first testimony declared that she did not see any chocolate boxes in petitioner's bag. But
she clarified in her succeeding testimony that she recalls taking 2 chocolate boxes from his bag
when they were still at the counter. This sufficiently explained why Cinco did not find any
chocolate boxes from petitioner’s bag when they were at the ICU. This slight clash in Cinco’s
statements neither dilute her credibility nor the veracity of her testimony.

 Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a witness, his testimony must be
considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a
testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and anchor a conclusion on the basis of said
parts. “In ascertaining the facts established by a witness, everything stated by him on direct,
cross and redirect examinations must be calibrated and considered.”
  There is nothing in the records which would show a motive or reason on the part of the witness
to falsely implicate the accused. Petitioner presented no evidence or anything to indicate that
the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by any improper motive.

 Verily, the evidence adduced against petitioner is so overwhelming that this Court is convinced
that his guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt. Nothing else can speak so
eloquently of his culpability than the unassailable fact that he was caught red-handed in the
very act of transporting, along with his co-accused, shabu into the country. In stark contrast, the
evidence for the defense consists mainly of denials.

Gimenez v. Nazareno

160 S 1 [April 15, 1988], EN Banc, Gancayno, J.

This is a petition for review and certiorari of the decision of the trial court dated November
6,1973,.

Facts:

On August 3, 1973, Samson Suan, Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula, Fernando Cargando, Rogelio Baguio and the
herein private respondent Teodoro de la Vega Jr., were charged with the crime of murder.

On August 22, 1973 all of them were arraigned and each of them pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. Following the arraignment, the respondent judge, Hon. Ramon E. Nazareno, set the hearing of
the case for September 18, 1973 at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. All the acused including De la Vega, Jr.,
were duly informed of this.

Before the scheduled date of the first hearing, De la Vega, Jr., escaped from his detention center and on
the said date, failed to appear in court. This prompted the fiscals (FISCAL CELSO M. GIMENEZ and
FEDERICO B. MERCADO) handling the case to file a motion to proceed with the hearing of the case
against all the accused praying that de la Vega, Jr. be tried in absentia invoking the application of Section
19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.

Pursuant to the provision, the lower court proceeded with the trial of the case but nevertheless gave De
la Vega, Jr., the opportunity to take the witness stand the moment he shows up in court. 1
On November 6,1973, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case against the five accused
while holding in abeyance the proceedings against the private respondent.

On November 16,1973 the petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration questioning the decision of the
trial court on the ground that it will render nugatory the constitutional provision on "trial in absentia"
cited earlier. However, this was denied by the lower court .

Hence, this petition.

Issues:

1. Whether or not a court loses jurisdiction over an accused who after being arraigned, escapes
from the custody of the law

2. whether or not under Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, an accused who has been
duly tried in absentia retains his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and
cross-examine witnesses who testified against him

Ruling:

1. No. The court did not lose jurisdiction over an accused who after being arraigned, escapes from
the custody of the law. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of parties but
continues until the case is terminated. Where the accused appears at the arraignment and
pleads not guilty to the crime charged, jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his person and
this continues until the termination of the case, notwithstanding his escape from the custody of
the law.

2. No. The Court ruled that an escapee who has been duly tried in absentia waives his right to
present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified
against him. Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon the
evidence presented in court. The court need not wait for the time until the accused who escape
from custody finally decides to appear in court to present his evidence and cross examine the
witnesses against him. To allow the delay of proceedings for this purpose is to render ineffective
the constitutional provision on trial in absentia.

Nor can it be said that an escapee who has been tried in absentia retains his rights to cross-examine and
to present evidence on his behalf. By his failure to appear during the trial of which he had notice, he
virtually waived these rights. This Court has consistently held that the right of the accused to
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses is a personal right and may be waived. 10 In the same
vein, his right to present evidence on his behalf, a right given to him for his own benefit and protection,
may be waived by him.

Under Section 1 (c) of Rule 115 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure:

... The absence of the accused without any justifiable cause at the trial on a particular date of which he
had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present during that trial. When an accused
under custody had been notified of the date of the trail and escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived
his right to be present on said date and on all subsequent trial dates until custody in regained....

Adjudication:

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court in so far as it suspends the proceedings against Teodoro de
la Vega, Jr. is reversed and set aside. The respondent judge is hereby directed to render judgment upon
the innocence or guilt of the herein private respondent Teodoro de la Vega, Jr. in accordance with the
evidence adduced and the applicable law.

B. Remedies

1. Bail

Parada v. Veneracion

AM No. RTJ-96-1353

March 11, 1997

Torres, Jr., J:
Facts: Danilo Parada was charged with 4 counts of Estafa. He was duly bonded with an accredited
bonding company. In October of 1993, Parada’s counsel formally notified the court and the manager of
the bonding company of change of address. Apparently, the notice of hearing was sent to complainant’s
former address. For failure to appear on the date of hearing, respondent judge ordered the arrest of the
accused, confiscation of the bond and a trial in absentia was conducted. No bail was recommended for
Parada’s arrest.

Issues: Whether or not respondent judge was correct in not recommending bail for Parada

Whether or not the trial in absentia was correctly held

Held: No, the judge was not correct in not recommending bail

No, the trial in absentia was not correctly held

Ratio: First Issue: Regarding bail (Main)

The warrant of arrest with no recommendation for bail that was issued by respondent Judge is a
downright violation of Parada’s constitutional right to bail. The rule is clear that unless charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of guilt is strong, all persons detained,
arrested or otherwise under the custody of the law are entitled to bail as a matter of right. It should be
noted that the crime with which Parada was charged is estafa which is undoubtedly a bailable
offense. This circumstance could not have escaped the attention of the respondent judge when he
issued on June 3, 1994 the order of arrest of Parada with no recommendation for his bail. In so doing,
respondent judge exhibited that degree of ignorance so gross which the Court can not countenance.

Second Issue: Regarding the trial in absentia

Section 14 (2), Article 3 of the Constitution provides, inter alia, that trial may proceed notwithstanding
the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable. The requisites then of a valid trial in absentia are: (1) the accused has already been
arraigned; (2) he has been duly notified of the trial; and (3) his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

In the subject criminal cases, requisite numbers two (2) and three (3) of a valid trial in absentia are
clearly wanting. Parada had not been duly notified of the trial because the notice of hearing was sent to
the former address of Parada’s counsel despite the fact that the latter formally notified the court of his
change of address. His failure to appear therefore in the June 3, 6, 7 and 8, 1994 hearings is justified by
the absence of a valid service of notice of hearing to him.