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SECOND DIVISION

PAULINO M. ALDABA, G.R. No. 218242

Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - CARPIO, * J., Chazrperson,

.
PERALTA**
'
MENDOZA,
LEONEN,*** and
CAREER PHILIPPINES, SHIP- MARTIRES, JJ.
MANAGEMENT, INC., COLUMBIA
SHIPMANAGEMENT LTD., and/or Promulgated:
VERLOU CARMELINO,
2 1 JUN 201 7
x-------------------------~~~~~~~~~~~~---------------------~~~~----x
DECISION

PERALTA,J.:

For this Court's consideration is the Petition for Review on Certiorari

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court dated June 4, 2015 of petitioner Paulino
M. Aldaba that seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 dated November
19, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 127057 reversing
the Decision dated July 16, 2012 and Resolution dated August 3 1, 2012 of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), 2 11 d Division granting
petitioner total and permanent disability benefits in the amount of
US$60,000.00.

The facts follow.

On wellness leave.
... Acting Chairperson, per Special Order No. 2445 dated June 16, 2017 .
On leave. Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, Rule 12, Sec. 4. - Leaving a vote. -- A Member
who goes on leave or is unable to attend the voting on any decision, resolution, or matter may leave his or
her vote in writing, addressed to the Chief Justice or the Division Chairperson, and the vote shall be
counted, provided that he or she took part in the deliberation.
1
Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon, with the concurrence of Associate Justices
Melchor Quirino C. Sadang and Pedro 8. Corales.

/
Decision -2- G.R. No. 218242

Petitioner Paulino M. Aldaba was hired by respondents Career

Philippines Shipmanagement Incorporated, and Verlou Carmelina, in behalf
of their foreign principal, petitioner Columbia Shipmanagement Ltd., as
Bosun for work on board the vessel M/V Cape Frio with a basic monthly
salary of US$564.00.

In the course of the performance of his duties, on April 4, 2011,

petitioner was accidentally hit by twisted chains made of heavy metal
causing him to fall and eventually resulted to a back injury.

Thus, on April 7, 2011, when the vessel was at the Port of Hongkong,
petitioner was examined at the Quality Health Care Medical Center by Dr.
Thomas Wong, with the examination showing that petitioner suffered a
fractured back and was declared unfit to work. As such, he was immediately
repatriated.

On April 11, 2011, upon his arrival in Manila, petitioner was referred
by respondents to the company-designated physician at NGC Medical
Specialist, Inc. for treatment and rehabilitation. The x-ray examination on
his back showed a "misalignment of distal sacrum that may suggest
fracture." In addition, the x-ray examination on his thoracic spine revealed
an "anterior wedging deformity, Tl 1 Osteopenia and early degenerative
osseus changes."

The company-designated physician, after the continuing evaluation

and medical treatment for 163 days, issued a Medical Report dated
September 29, 2011 that reads as follows:

1. The patient has reached maximum medical cure.

2. The final disability grading under the POEA schedule of disabilities is
Grade 8 - moderate rigidity or two thirds (2/3) loss of Thereafter, (sic)
motion or lifting power of the trunk.

Petitioner, on the other hand, consulted Dr. Misael Jonathan A.

Tieman, an Orthopedic Surgeon and Diplomate, Philippine Board of
Orthopedics, for an independent assessment of his medical condition and
came out with findings showing that petitioner's injury resulted to his
permanent disability, thus, making him unfit to work as a seafarer in any
capacity.

As a result, petitioner demanded for total disability compensation, but

respondents did not heed such demand. Respondents, however, expressed
willingness to compensate petitioner the amount corresponding to Grade 8

;tr
Decision -3- G.R. No. 218242

disability rating based on the medical findings of the company-designated

physician.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for payment of total and

permanent disability benefits, as well as medical expenses, with prayer for
damages and attorney's fees against respondents with the Arbitration Board
of the NLRC.

The Labor Arbiter, on April 27, 2012, decided in favor of respondents

in a Decision2 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered

ordering respondents to jointly and severally pay complainant Paulino M.
Aldaba disability benefits in the amount of US$16,795.00 which is
equivalent to Grade 8 disability under the POEA Contract, or its peso
equivalent at the time of payment.

All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the NLRC, in its Decision3 dated July 16, 2012 reversed
the Decision of the Labor Arbiter and ruled that petitioner is entitled to a
permanent total disability compensation, thus:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated April 27, 2012 of Labor

Arbiter Pablo A. Gajardo is hereby reversed. Respondents, jointly and
severally, are hereby ordered to pay Complainant-Appellant, by way of
permanent and total disability compensation, the amount of
US$60,000.00, pursuant to the POEA Standard Contract and to pay
attorney's fees of 10% of the total award.

SO ORDERED.

After respondents' motion for reconsideration was denied by the

NLRC, they elevated the case to the CA. On November 19, 2014, the CA
reversed the Decision of the NLRC and reinstated the Decision of the Labor
Arbiter, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition for

Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated July 16, 2012 and
the Resolution dated August 31, 2012 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC)-2 11 d Division in LAC NO. 05-000486-12 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated April 27, 2012 of

CA ratio, pp. 67-79.

Id. at 50-60. ~
Decision -4- G.R. No. 218242

the Labor Arbiter in NLRC-NCR-OFW (M) 12-19022-11 is hereby

REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED. 4

Hence, the present petition wherein the petitioner assigns the

following errors:

The Honorable Court of Appeals committed REVERSIBLE

ERROR CONTRARY TO EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE in
promulgating the assailed decision and resolution

I.
WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO
PERMANENT AND TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS

II.
WHEN IT SOLELY GAVE CREDENCE TO THE CERTIFICATION OF
THE COMPANY PHYSICIAN WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE
FINDINGS OF PETITIONER'S DOCTOR OF CHOICE. 5

Petitioner insists that he is entitled to permanent and total disability

benefits because of his inability to perform his job for more than 120 days,
citing a litany of cases decided by this Court. He further argues that the fact
that he had been evaluated by respondents' company physicians is
substantial c9mpliance with the provision of the "Standard Terms and
Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board
Ocean-Going Vessels" imposed by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) and does not preclude him from seeking medical
attention to a physician of his own choice, more so, if the purpose of which
is to provide an independent medical assessment of his true condition.
According to him, the law does not exclusively vest to the company-
designated physician the sole authority to assess and certify the extent of the
injury/sickness for purposes of payment of compensation and disability
benefits. Lastly, petitioner asserts that he is entitled to the award of damages
because the act of respondents in failing to pay what is due him shows utter
disregard for public policy to protect labor, which is a clear indication of bad
faith and attorney's fees as respondents' act has compelled him to incur
expenses to protect his interest.

Respondents, on the other hand, in their Comment dated September 3,

2015, contend that the 240-day rule enunciated in Vergara v. Hammonia
Maritime Services, Inc. and Atlantic Marine Ltd., 6 and subsequent rulings of
this Court, should govern, considering that the complaint of petitioner was

Rollo, p. 41. (Emphasis in the original)

Id. at 10.
588 Phil. 895 (2008).
t?
Decision -5- G.R. No. 218242

filed on December 28, 2011. In the said decision of this Court, it was ruled
that a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when so declared
by the company physician within the periods he is allowed to do so, or upon
the expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a
declaration of either fitness to work or the existence of a permanent
disability. They also aver that the failure of petitioner to follow the
procedure of submitting conflicting assessments to the opinion of an
independent third doctor bars his claim for disability benefits. Finally, they
insist that the claim for damages and attorney's fees is bereft of any factual
and legal basis as there can be no malice, bad faith or ill-motive that can be
imputed against petitioner.

As a general rule, only questions of law raised via a petition for

8
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court7 are reviewable by this Court.
Factual findings of administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, including labor
tribunals, are accorded much respect by this Court as they are specialized to
rule on matters falling within their jurisdiction especially when these are
supported by substantial evidence. 9 However, a relaxation of this rule is
made permissible by this Court whenever any of the following
circumstances is present:

1. [W]hen the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises

or conjectures;
2. when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible;
3. when there is grave abuse of discretion;
4. when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
5. when the findings of fact are conflicting;
6. when in making its findings[,] the Court of Appeals went beyond the
issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of
both the appellant and the appellee;
7. when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court;
8. when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based;
9. when the facts set forth in the petition[,] as well as in the petitioner's
main and reply briefs[,] are not disputed by the respondent;'

Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:

Section I. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals,
the Regional Trial Court or other com1s, whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Com1 a
verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary
injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set
forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or
proceeding at any time during its pendency.
~ Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. Cristino, G.R. No. 188638, December 9, 2015, 777
SCRA 114, 127, citing Heirs of Pacencia Racaza v. Spouses A bay-A bay, 687 Phil. 584, 590 (2012).
0
Id., citing Mack Sha'p and Dahme (PhUs.), et al '· Rabies, et al., 620 Phi I. 505, 512 (2'(::7JI

'--·'
Decision -6- G.R. No. 218242

10. when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; [and]
11. when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion. 10

Whether or not petitioner's illness is compensable as total and

permanent disability is essentially a factual issue, however, the present case
falls under one of the exceptions because the findings of the CA differ with
that of the NLRC. Thus, this Court shall now proceed to resolve the issue
raised in the petition for review.

The petition is meritorious.

In Jebsen Maritime, Inc. v. Ravena, 11 the Court summarized the

applicable provisions that govern a seafarer's disability claim, thus:

The entitlement of an overseas seafarer to disability benefits is

governed by the law, the employment contract and the medical findings. 12

By law, the seafarer's disability benefits claim is governed by

Articles 191 to 193, Chapter VI (Disability benefits) of the Labor Code, in
relation to Rule X, Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Labor Code.

By contract, it is governed by the employment contract which the

seafarer and his employer/local manning agency executes prior to
employment, and the applicable POEA-SEC that is deemed incorporated
in the employment contract. 13

Lastly, the medical findings of the company-designated physician,

the seafarer's personal physician, and those of the mutually-agreed third
physician, pursuant to the POEA-SEC, govern.

Pertinent to the resolution of this petition's factual issues of

compensability (of ampullary cancer) and compliance (with the POEA-
SEC prescribed procedures for disability determination) is Section 20-B of
the 2000 POEA-SEC 14 (the governing POEA-SEC at the time the
petitioners employed Ravena in 2006). It reads in part:

SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND

BENEFITS

IU
Id. at 127-128, citing Co v. Vargas, 676 Phil. 463, 471 (2011).
II
G.R. No. 200566, September 17, 2014, 735 SCRA 494, 507-510. (Emphasis in the original).
12
Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., et al., supra note 6, at 908; CF. Sharp Crew
Management, Inc., et al. v. Taok, 691 Phil. 521, 533 (2012); Jebsen Maritime, Inc. and/or Alliance Marine
Services, Ltd. v. Undag, 678 Phil. 938, 944 (2011).
13
Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., et al., supra note 6.
14
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 09, Series of 2000. Note that per the POEA Memorandum
Circul" No. JO, Soci" of2010, the POEA omended omending foe the pu<pose the 2000 POEA-S~
Decision -7- G.R. No. 218242

xx xx

B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR

ILLNESS The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer
suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his
contract are as follows:

xx xx

2. If the injury or illness requires medical and/or dental

treatment in a foreign port, the employer shall be liable for
the full cost of such medical, serious dental, surgical and
hospital treatment as well as board and lodging until the
seafarer is declared fit to work or repatriated

However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires

medical attention arising from said injury or illness, he
shall be so provided at cost to the employer until such
time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has
been established by the company-designated physician.

3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the

seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his
basic wage until he is declared fit to work by the
company-designated physician or the degree of
permanent disability has been assessed by the company-
designated physician but in no case shall it exceed one
hundred twenty (120) days.

For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit

himself to a post-employment medical examination by a
company-designated physician within three working
days upon his return except when he is physically
incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to
the agency within the same period is deemed as
compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the
mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his
forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.

If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees

with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed
jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The
third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both
parties.

4. Those illness not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are

disputably presumed as work related.

xx xx

6. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the

seafarer caused either by injury or illness, the seafarer shall
be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits
arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the

(/
Decision -8- G.R. No. 218242

rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the time

the illness or disease was contracted.

xxx

As we pointed out above, Section 20-B of the PO EA-SEC governs

the compensation and benefits for the work-related injury or illness that a
seafarer on board sea-going vessels may have suffered during the term of
his employment contract. This section should be read together with
Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC that enumerates the various diseases
deemed occupational and therefore compensable. Thus, for a seafarer to
be entitled to the compensation and benefits under Section 20-B, the
disability causing illness or injury must be one of those listed under
Section 32-A.

Of course, the law recognizes that under certain circumstances,

certain diseases not otherwise considered as an occupational disease under
the POEA-SEC may nevertheless have been caused or aggravated by the
seafarer's working conditions. In these situations, the law recognizes the
inherent paucity of the list and the difficulty, if not the outright
improbability, of accounting for all the known and unknown diseases that
may be associated with, caused or aggravated by such working conditions.
(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, in situations where the seafarer seeks to claim the compensation

and benefits that Section 20-B grants to him, the law requires the seafarer to
prove that: (I) he suffered an illness; (2) he suffered this illness during the
term of his employment contract; (3) he complied with the procedures
prescribed under Section 20-B; (4) his illness is one of the enumerated
occupational disease or that his illness or injury is otherwise work-related;
and (5) he complied with the four conditions enumerated under Section 32-A
for an occupational disease or a disputably-presumed work-related disease to
be compensable. 15

It is beyond dispute that petitioner suffered an illness that is work-

related during the tenn of his employment contract and such is compensable.
The issue now is whether or not petitioner is entitled to permanent and total
disability benefits because of his inability to perform his job for more than
120 days, which respondents counter as not being the case since the 240-day
rule should govern.

16
This Court, in Marlow Navigation Philippines, Inc. v. Osias,
thoroughly discussed the120-day and 240-day periods, thus:

15
16
Jebsen Maritime, Inc. v. Ravena, supra note 11, at 511-512.
).y
G .R. No. 215471, N ovombe< 23, 20 15, 77 5 SCRA 342, 3 52-3 59. (Emph.,;, ourn
Decision -9- G.R. No. 218242

As early as 1972, the Court has defined the term permanent and
total disability in the case of Marcelino v. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of the
Phil, 17 in this wise: "[permanent total disability means disablement of an
employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar
nature that he was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any other kind
of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do." 18

The present controversy involves the permanent and total disability

claim of a specific type of laborer-a seafarer. The substantial rise in the
demand for seafarers in the international labor market led to an increase of
labor standards and relations issues, including claims for permanent and
total disability benefits. To elucidate on the subject, particularly on the
propriety and timeliness of a seafarer's entitlement to permanent and total
disability benefits, a review of the relevant laws and recent jurisprudence
is in order.

Aiiicle 192(c) ( 1) of the Labor Code, which defines permanent and

total disability of laborers, provides that:

ART. 192. Permanent Total Disability.

xxx

(c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:

(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than

one hundred twenty days, except as otherwise provided in the Rules;
[Emphasis supplied]

The rule referred to is Rule X, Section 2 of the Amended Rules on

Employees' Compensation, implementing Book IV of the Labor Code
(IRR), which states:

Sec. 2. Period of entitlement. - (a) The income benefit shall be

paid beginning on the first day of such disability. If caused by an injury or
sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days except
where such injury or sickness still requires medical attendance
beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability in
which case benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid. However,
the System may declare the total and permanent status at anytime after 120
days of continuous temporary total disability as may be warranted by the
degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or mental functions as
determined by the System. [Emphasis and Underscoring Supplied]

These provisions should be read in relation to the 2000 Philippine

Overseas Em~loyment Administration Standard Employment Contract
(POEA-SEC) 1 whose Section 20 (B) (3) states:

17
150-C Phil. 133 (1972).
18
Id. at 139.
19
Note that there is already a 2010 POEA-SEC. The present case, however, is still governed by the
2000 POEA-SEC as the employment contract was entered into before 2010.

{7
Decision - 10 - G.R. No. 218242

Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is
entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is
declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been
assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this
period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.[Emphasis Supplied]

In Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad, 20 (Crystal Shipping) the

Court ruled that "[permanent disability is the inability of a worker to
perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he
loses the use of any part of his body." 21 Thereafter, litigant-seafarers
started citing Crystal Shipping to demand permanent and total disability
benefits simply because they were incapacitated to work for more than
120 days.
22
The Court in Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc.
(Vergara), however, noted that the doctrine expressed in Crystal Shipping
- that inability to perform customary work for more than 120 days
constitutes permanent total disability - should not be applied in all
situations. The specific context of the application should be considered in
light of the application of all rulings, laws and implementing regulations.
It was provided therein that:

As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-

off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated
physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis
and treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no
case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total
disability as he is totally unable to work. He receives his
basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to
work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the
company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his
condition is defined under the POEA Standard
Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine laws. If
the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such
declaration is made because the seafarer requires
further medical attention, then the temporary total
disability period may be extended up to a maximum of
240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare
within this period that a permanent partial or total disability
already exists. The seaman may of course also be declared
fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his
medical condition. [Emphasis and Underscoring Supplied]

In effect, by considering the law, the POEA-SEC, and especially

the IRR, Vergara extended the period within which the company-
designated physician could declare a seafarer's fitness or disability to 240
days. Moreover, in that case, the disability grading provided by the
company-designated physician was given more weight compared to the
mere incapacity of the seafarer therein for a period of more than 120 days.

20
510 Phil. 332 (2005).
21
Id. at 340. The respondent therein was unable to work from August 18, 1998 to February 22, 1999,
at the least, or more than 120 days, due to his medical treatment.

{7
22
Supra note 11, at 912.
Decision - 11 - G.R. No. 218242

The apparent conflict between the 120-day period under Crystal

Shipping and the 240-day period under Vergara was observed in the case
of Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar (Kestrel). 23 In the said case, the
Court recognized that Vergara presented a restraint against the
indiscriminate reliance on Crystal Shipping. A seafarer's inability to work
despite the lapse of 120 days would not automatically bring about a total
and permanent disability, considering that the treatment of the company-
designated physician may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days. In
Kestrel, however, as the complaint was filed two years before the Court
promulgated Vergara on October 6, 2008, then the seafarer therein was
not stripped of his cause of action.

To further clarify the conflict between Crystal Shipping and

24
Vergara, the Court in Montierro v. Rickmers Marine Agency Phils., Inc.
stated that "[i]f the maritime compensation complaint was filed prior to
October 6, 2008, the 120-day rule applies; if, on the other hand, the
complaint was filed from October 6, 2008 onwards, the 240-day rule
applies."
25
Then came Carcedo v. Maine Marine Phils., Inc. (Carcedo).
Although the said case recognized the 240-day rule in Vergara, it was
pronounced therein that "[t]he determination of the fitness of a seafarer for
sea duty is the province of the company-designated physician, subject to
the periods prescribed by law." Carcedo further emphasized that "[t]he
company-designated physician is expected to arrive at a definite
assessment of the seafarer's fitness to work or permanent disability within
the period of 120 or 240 days. That should he fail to do so and the
seafarer's medical condition remains unresolved, the seafarer shall be
deemed totally and permanently disabled." 26

Finally, in Elburg Shipmanagement Phils., Inc. v. Quiogue, Jr, 27

(Elburg), it was affirmed that the Crystal Shipping doctrine was not
binding because a seafarer's disability should not be simply determined by
the number of days that he could not work. Nevertheless, the
pronouncement in Carcedo was reiterated - that the determination of the
fitness of a seafarer by the company-designated physician should be
subject to the periods prescribed by law. Elburg provided a summation of
periods when the company-designated physician must assess the seafarer,
to wit:

1. The company-designated physician must issue a final

medical assessment on the seafarer's disability grading
within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer
reported to him;

2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his

assessment within the period of 120 days, without any
justifiable reason, then the seafarer's disability becomes
permanent and total;

23
702 Phil. 717 (2013).
24
G.R. No. 210634, January 14, 2015, 746 SCRA 287.
25
G.R. No. 203804, April 15, 2015, 755 SCRA 543.
26
id., citing Kestrel Shipping Co., inc. v. Munar, supra note 23, at 810.
27
G.R. No. 211882, July 29, 2015, 764 SCRA 430.

~
Decision - 12 - G.R. No. 218242

3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his

assessment within the period of 120 days with a sufficient
justification (e.g., seafarer required further medical
treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then the period of
diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The
employer has the burden to prove that the company-
designated physician has sufficient justification to extend
the period; and

4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his

assessment within the extended period of 240 days, then the
seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total,
regardless of any justification.

In essence, the Court in Elburg no longer agreed that the 240-day

period provided by Vergara, which was sourced from the IRR, should be
an absolute rule. The company-designated physician would still be
obligated to assess the seafarer within the original 120-day period from the
date of medical repatriation and only with sufficient justification may the
company-designated physician be allowed to extend the period of medical
treatment to 240 days. The Court reasoned that:

Certainly, the company-designated physician must perform some

significant act before he can invoke the exceptional 240-day period under
the IRR. It is only fitting that the company-designated physician must
provide a sufficient justification to extend the original 120-day period.
Otherwise, under the law, the seafarer must be granted the relief of
permanent and total disability benefits due to such non-compliance.

On the contrary, if we completely ignore the general 120-day

period under the Labor Code and POEA-Contract and apply the
exceptional 240-day period under the IRR unconditionally, then the IRR
becomes absolute and it will render the law forever inoperable. Such
interpretation is contrary to the tenets of statutory construction.

xxx

Thus, to strike a balance between the two conflicting interests of

the seafarer and its employer, the rules methodically took into
consideration the applicability of both the 120-day period under the Labor
Code and the 240-day period under the IRR. The medical assessment of
the company-designated physician is not the alpha and the omega of the
seafarer's claim for permanent and total disability. To become effective,
such assessment must be issued within the bounds of the authorized 120-
day period or the properly extended 240-day period.

Hence, as it stands, the current rule provides: (1) that mere

inability to work for a period of 120 days does not entitle a seafarer to
permanent and total disability benefits; (2) that the determination of
the fitness of a seafarer for sea duty is within the province of the
company-designated physician, subject to the periods prescribed by
law; (3) that the company-designated physician has an initial 120 days
to determine the fitness or disability of the seafarer; and (4) that the
period of treatment may only be extended to 240 days if a sufficient

{7
Decision - 13 - G.R. No. 218242

justification exists such as when further medical treatment is required

or when the seafarer is uncooperative.

For as long as the 120-day period under the Labor Code and the
POEA-SEC and the 240-day period under the IRR co-exist, the Court
must bend over backwards to harmoniously interpret and give life to both
of the stated periods. Ultimately, the intent of our labor laws and
regulations is to strive for social justice over the diverging interests of the
employer and the employee.

In Elburg Shipmanagement Phils., Inc. v. Quiogue, Jr., 28 this Court set

forth the following guidelines, to wit:

1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical

assessment on the seafarer's disability grading within a period of 120 days
from the time the seafarer reported to him;

2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment

within the period of 120 days, without any justifiable reason, then the
seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total;

3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment

within the period of 120 days with a sufficient justification (e.g.
seafarer required further medical treatment or seafarer was
uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and treatment shall be
extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden to prove that the
company-designated physician has sufficient justification to extend
the period; and

4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his

assessment within the extended period of 240 days, then the seafarer's
disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any justification.

In the present case, the company-designated physician was only able

to issue a certification declaring respondent to be entitled to a disability
rating of Grade 8 on the 163rd day that petitioner was undergoing continuous
medical treatment, which is beyond the period of 120 days, without
justifiable reason. It must be remembered that the employer has the burden
to prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient justification to
extend the period. In this case, the respondents failed to do so. Therefore, the
company-designated physician, failing to give his assessment within the
period of 120 days, without justifiable reason, makes the disability of
petitioner permanent and total.

As such, the issue as to whether or not the company-designated

physician be the sole authority to assess and certify the extent of the

28
Supra note 27, at 453-454. (Emphasis ours) {/f
Decision - 14 - G.R. No. 218242

injury/sickness for purposes of payment of compensation and disability

benefits is now rendered moot.

This Court, however, does not see the need to award petit10ner
damages and attorney's fees because petitioner has not given us any proof or
valid reason upon which to grant such award.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45

of the Rules of Court dated June 4, 2015 of petitioner Paulino M. Aldaba is
GRANTED and the Decision dated November 19, 2014 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 127057 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Consequently, the Decision dated July 16, 2012 and Resolution dated
August 31, 2012 of the National Labor Relations Commission, 2nd Division,
granting petitioner total and permanent disability benefits in the amount of
US$60,000.00 is AFFIRMED and REINSTATED, with the
MODIFICATION that the award of attorney's fees be omitted.

SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR:

On wellness leave
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

JOSEC END OZA ~ARVIC M.ur.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

SAIYIU~~~TIRES
Associate Justice
Decision - 15 - G.R. No. 218242

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

~
Associate yustice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the

Division Acting Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice