[MASEST Crankcase explosions Two day international conference Tuesday 29 - Wednesday 30 October 2002 London Organised by ‘The Institute of Marine Engineering, Science and TechnologyTHE INSTITUTE OF MARINE ENGINEERING, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 80 Coleman Street, London, EC2R 5BJ Telephone: +44 (0)20 7382 2600 Fax: +44 (0)20 7982 2670 Email: events@imarestorg Web: www.imarest.org President: P S Rickaby, BSc(Hons), CEng, FIMarEST, FIMgt Director General: K F Read, CBE, CEng, FIMarEST, FIEE Published by THE INSTITUTE OF MARINE ENGINEERING, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, a Registered Charity, No 212992, of 80 Coleman Street, London EC2R SBM. (England Reg No 1100685.) Cover design by Purbrooks, 22-26 Stannary Street, London SE11 4AA. In accordance with the terms and conditions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, the written consent of the publisher must be obtained before publishing more than a reasonable abstract. 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IMarEST Conferences © 2002 The Institute of Marine Engineering, Science and TechnologyCRANKCASE EXPLOSIONS CONFERENCE 1 Ahistorical review — where we are today N Rattenbury, Lloyd's Register of Shipping 14 Measures against severe damage of large combustion engines caused by oil mist explosions Dipl Ing H Uebel, Diesel ENSET PTE Ltd 28 Crankcase explosions in two-stroke diesel engines E Ohlsen, MAN B&W Diesel A/S 38 Combustion modelling of crankcase explosions 0.J Evans and A M Milne, Fluid Gravity Engineering Ltd 58 Oil mists and their contribution to marine gearbox explosions Dr D J Rose, Hawkins & Associates Limited 72 Measurement of oil drop distribution and quantity W Heikamp, Mann + Hummel GmbH 90 Lessons to be leamt from designing model-verification experiments for oilmist explosions Or P J Bowen, Cardiff University 110 Oil mist basics and the oil mist detection effici Or Ing H Brunk, Schaller Automation KG 126 Oil mist detection techniques B Smith, QMI Lid 134 Crankcase explosions ~ detection or prevention? M Graddage, Ricardo Consulting Engineers Lid 160 Current understanding of oil-mist explosions Dr P J Bowen, Cardiff University 178 The influence on explosion flame propagation from oil mist properties K Simonsen, MAN B&W Diesel A/S 192 _ Inerting marine gearboxes with nitrogen LtS Day, Warship Support Agency, Ministry of Defence P 8 Lambert, QinetiQ 208 Comparison of air-oil separation systems for CCV W Heikamp, Mann + Hummel GmbH 230 Closed crankcase filtration systems S Burgess, Racor Division, Parker Hannifin Corp 246 Explosion relief vaives and testing procedures N Rattenbury, Lioyd's Register of Shipping J Besau, Hoerbiger Ventilwerke GmbH 268 Gearbox explosion effects modelling P Church, W Huntington-Thresher, QinetiO. NOTESA historical review - where we are today N Rattenbury, Lloyd’s Register of Shipping Page 1Crankcase explosions - A historical review — Where we are today Norman Rattenbury, CEng, F.iMarEST Lloyd's Register of Shipping SYNOPSIS This paper reviews the development of international standards for crankcase safety from the event ‘on the Reina del Pacifico in 1947 when 28 people were killed due a crankcase explosion, to the current situation where the marine industry is again being required to address the problem of erankease explosions particularly in large diesel engines. The paper focuses on four areas concerned with crankcase safety: * A review of the current requirements for crankcase safety, * A classical analysis of a crankcase explosion and factors that could influence the severity of the effects of an explosion. + The possible causes of crankcase explosions. * Areview of current and future research being undertaken in order to develop revised requirements for crankcase safety, INTRODUCTION The occurrence and severity of crankcase explosions in marine engines is again a subject that the marine industry is being called upon to address. Crankcase explosions have been a “fact of life” in diesel engines for the last 70~80 years with the experience of main engine crankcase explosion relief valves lifting with puffs and bangs and oil level dip-sticks in generator engines jumping out being known to many marine engineers whilst on watch in the engine room. Requirements for crankcase safety have evolved over the past 60 years recognising explosion events and research. Classification Societies and Statutory Authorities have published requirements for crankcase safety working in co- ‘operation with the marine industry for defined parameters but the continuing occurrence of crankcase explosions is forcing the industry (o re-evaluate the current requirements. THE EVENT The development of the current international standards for crankcase safety stem from the event on the Reina del Pacifico in 1947 when 28 people were killed and 23 seriously injured due a series of crankcase explosions. Crankcase explosions in the four main engines caused the deaths and injuries The initial explosion was due to an overheating piston in one of the engines and the subsequent ignition of the lubricating oil mist in the crankcase. How the explosion spread to other engines was not conclusively determined but the most probable route was through common drain and vent pipe arrangements, The installation consisted of four independent main propulsion turbo-charged engines of the four-stroke single acting cycle, trunk piston type, with twelve cylinders per engine (630mm bore by 1200mm stroke) with a total ageregate power of 13,420kW. The crankcase doors were of comparatively light construction 2.5mm thick, stiffened round the edges, and secured by a special form of dog. The doors were 1.9m high by 1.0m wide and weighed 70kg each. There were, in addition, small doors, 0.6m high by 1.0m wide, of similar construction below the fuel pumps. Each engine thus had twenty large and four small crankcase doors, also a back gear case door. The end doors were of cast iron 12.5mm thick, provided with ribs, and held by studs and nuts. Author's Biography Norman Rattenbury has been employed by Lloyd's Register for over 24 years where he is currently Principal ‘Surveyor within the Research and Development Department, 2 position he has held since 1999. He is responsible for developing technical requirements that may be applied by Lloyd's Register for classification purposes covering a wide range of engineering topics concerned with the safety and reliability of machinery and systems for marine and industrial applications. Prior to joining Lloyd's Register he served an engineering apprenticeship followed by 10 years in the merchant navy as an engineer officer on a wide range of ship types. IMarEST Crankcase Explosions Conference Paper 2002 Page 3The explosion occurred during a series of trials at sea after engine overhaul. Prior to the incident the cagines had been operating at full propeller shaft speed (134.7rpm) when No. 2 port outer engine eylinder liner overheated. The fuel was shut off to this cylinder and the engine speed began to fall A few minutes later the fuel was shut off to the engine and speed slowed to well below trailing speed and sither stopped altogether or almost stopped. AV, of just before the instant of stopping, stating air was applied in an attempt to prevent seizure. The engine turned for a few revolutions, then the explosion {ook place about six minutes after detection of overheating. It spread to all four engines, The effects of the explosions were least severe at the point of origin, and increased to a maximum at the starboard after comer of the engine room. The explosions wrecked the engines with fifty-seven crankcase doors being blown off the engines’ entablatures, seven partially blown off and fourteen bulged outwards Subsequent examination revealed a partially seized piston and an overheated gudgeon pin bush on No 2 port outer cylinder. The inquiry by the UK Ministry of Transport for this British ship did not apportion blame but it did Cause them to issue a Safety Notice to Engine Builders, Shipowners and Shipbuilders. This provided structions to those operating diesel engines not to open crankcase doors if overheating within the crankcase is detected and not to spray oil onto hot surfaces, Instructions and recommendations to builders for engines over SOODhp (370kW) included the following to be considered: * Provide substantial attachment of crankcase doors to engine entablatures. * Provision of explosion relief valves at each cylinder that reseat after operation to prevent the admission of further air. * Separation of engine vent and oil drain systems from one another to prevent the passage of flame from one engine to another. + Means of detecting overheating should be considered, * To consider the injection of CO; after a hot spot had been detected or after a crankcase explosion Classification Societies issued recommendations for limiting crankcase ventilation and explosion relief valves. These included: * Minimizing crankcase ventilation arrangements to prevent ingress of air following a crankcase explosion. * Specific requirements for the design, sizing and functioning of crankcase relief valves. * Requirements for warning notices to be fitted warning that crankcase doors are not to opened up within ten minutes of engine shutdown following a crankcase explosion. THE RESEARCH Following the Reina del Pacifico event, the British Internal Combustion Engine Research Association (BICERA) and the British Shipbuilding Research Association (BSRA) undertook extensive research (Ref.3) in the 1950s. This research provided the marine industry with information that was to be adopted in standards for crankcase protection in diesel engines: * Requirements for the number and size of relief valves. * Requirements for monitoring of crankcase oil mist concentration, The industry standard today for the minimum size of crankcase relief valves is. L1Sem’/m? of crankcase volume and recent research has shown a scientific reasoning for this value. Whether the standard is soundly based for the large engines found today is a matter for current investigations. In the past two years Lloyd’s Register has initiated a research a programme that identifies four key questions to be investigated + Is the current industry standard for crankcase protection — 11Sem*/m? (relief valve area to crankcase volume) applicable to all engines in particular those with crankcase volumes up to 600m? Does the standard effectively limit the pressure rise in the crankcase for all crankcase volumes - is there a cut-off volume when another standard should be applied? How many devices should be fitted? ee Pct eee soi emus sue SHOT+ [nile a need to address the fat areas of crankease boundaries ~ relief valve area to recognise the flat boundary areas? Should the crankcase relief valve area be not less than 10% of door area as has been suggested in the past. * What are the conditions inside crankcase following an initial explosion? Are we dealing With Pressure or shock wave containment in the secondary explosion following the initiel bressure rise and relief condition? Can the basic crankcase protection for initial explosion protection (pressure) deal with the effects of a secondary explosion? Are the crankcase breather arrangements critical tothe prevention ofa secondary explosion occurring? * Is there a limiting minimum crankcase volume where there is a likelihood of a secondary explosion occurring? ‘The initial results of the investigations are now being considered and these will be referred to later in the paper. SAFETY REQUIREMENTS Hood’ Register first introduced Classification Rules for crankcase safety in 1951. These requirements included the following: * Lightweight spring-loaded valves to relieve crankease pressure in the event of an internal explosion and to prevent the inrush of air thereafter. * At least one relief valve to be fitted to each cylinder crankcase except in the case of small auxiliary engines, where crankcase and doors are inherently strong, one valve was considered sufficient. For small engines of less than Ginch (150mm) bore, the valve could be omitted * The discharge from relief valves to be shielded where necessary to minimize the possibility of danger and damage arising from the emission of flame. * The minimum sizes of relief valves to be determined on the basis of lin’/Sf? (46cm? /m?) of crankease volume for large engines with a volume per cylinder of 100° (2.83m*) and over, and Lin? /L0f? (23em"/mey plus 10in? (65cm*) for smaller engines. No valve to be less than 3inch (75mm) diameter. * Crankcases to be of robust construction and crankcase doors to be securely fastened so that the doors will not be displaced by an explosion. * Lubricating oil drain pipes from engine sump to drain tank to be submerged at their outlet ends. * Tf 0wo or more engines are installed, vent pipes, if fitted, and lubricating oil drain pipes to be independent to avoid inter-communication between crankcases. * Where interior lighting is provided, it is to be flame proof in relation to the interior. No electrical wiring to be fitted inside the crankcase. * Crankcases of large air compressors to be fitted with explosion relief devices as for auxiliary ‘engines where the crankcase volume is 20f (0.6m*) and over. ‘The minimum size requirements for relief valves would in theory limit the crankcase pressure in large engines to about 3bar following a crankcase explosion that would produce a maximum pressure of about 7 ~ Sbar if there were no relief valve arrangements fitted. It should be recognised that erankease Construction was significantly more substantial at that time and the engine power per cylinder much {ess than found in today’s marine engines. With the exception of the requirement for sizing crankcase relief valves, the overall scope remains in a similar form in today's Rules. As a result of the research and investigations in the 1950s a major revision to the Rules was introduced in 1963. The selection of 11Sem*/m’ reflected extensive discussions on the results of tests/analysis and the need for a practical Standard that could realistically be applied to marine engines at that time. ‘The adoption of this standard ‘would limit the maximum pressure rise ina crankcase to approximately |.3bar following an explosion Also introduced into the Rules were requirements for: * Explosion relief valves to open at 0.1 kg/cm? (Ipsi). * Number of explosion relief valves for different cylinder bores and number of cylinders per engine defined. * _ Recommendation for the use of crankcase smoke detectors and alarms warning of overheating of running parts, * Sizing of crankcase vents to be as small as practicable to minimise inrush of air alter a crankcase explosion, Also, vents from the crankcase to be led to a safe position on deck. 'MarBST Crankcase Explosions Conference Paper 2002 Page SIn 1969, the Rules were rationalised and reformatted: * The number and size of valves for different engine sizes and crankcase volumes clearly defined. * The discharge from the relief valves was required to be shielded where necessary by a flame guard or flame trap to minimise the possibility of danger or damage arising from emission of flame. (The change in text from the third item in the 1951 Rules is worthy of note with the terms “flame guards” and “flame traps” being introduced.) In 1971, Rule changes were introduced to reflect experience and legislation stemming from SOLAS amendments and [ACS Unified Requirements M9 and M10 ‘+ Valve lifting pressure increased to 0.2kg/em’, * Requirement for additional valves in chain cases and camshaft spaces over 0.6m’. * Requirements for provision to be made for extraction of gases from crankcases for smoke detection purposes. ‘+ Requirement for warning notice on a crankcase door on each side of engine. With the development of unattended machinery spaces in the mid 1960s, new control engineering requirements for crankcase safety were required. In 1973, requirements for crankcase monitoring were introduced for unattended machinery space (UMS) operation. Previously there were Lloyd's Register guidelines for UMS operation available and these included: * Oil mist monitoring required when there were arrangements to override the automatic stop for loss of lubricating oil supply. ‘+ Audible and visual alarms to operate if crankcase oil mist was detected with indication given on the bridge advising that the speed of the main engine(s) to be reduced. The speed reduction could be effected by manual or automatic control. In 1983, additional contro! engineering requirements for UMS operation were introduced. These recognised the latest SOLAS requirements for crankcase safety and IACS Unified Requirements for alarms, remote indications and safeguards for diesel engines in M35 and M36. Oil mist detection or bearing temperature monitoring are required for engines of 2,250kW and above or having cylinders of ‘more than 300mm bore. ‘+ Alarms to operate for oil mist in crankcase or high bearing temperatures. ‘+ Automatic shutdown of medium and high speed engines required on detection of oil mist or high bearing temperature. From July 2001, automatic slowdown for all stow speed engines has been required following detection of oil mist or high bearing temperature. Following comments from the industry and tests witnessed by Lloyd’s Register it was acknowledged that the emission of flame from a crankcase explosion needed to be addressed. The Rules developed from the experience prior to 1950 called for the shielding of the discharge from the valve to minimize the damage and danger to personnel arising from emission of flame. Tests carried out on large valves fitted with shielding indicated that the operational capability of a valve could be affected so as to allow the emission of large quantities of flame even if a flame screen was fitted. A Rule amendment was agreed and from July 2002 the requirement for arrangement and testing of explosion relief valves includes: + Each valve is to be fitted with a flame arrester that permits flow for crankcase pressure relief and prevents the passage of flame following a crankcase explosion. ‘+ The valves are to be type tested in a configuration that represents the installation arrangements that will used on an engine and in accordance with a standard that is acceptable to Lloyd's Register. ‘+The valves are to be positioned on engines to minimise the possibility of danger and damage arising from emission of the crankcase atmosphere. + Where shielding from emissions is fitted to the valve, the valve is to tested to demonstrate that the shielding does not adversely affect the operational effectiveness of the valve. (Mar€ST Crankease Explosions Conference Paper 2002 Page 6THE EXPLOSION SEQUENCE There is a classical sequence of events in a crankcase explosion that can be summarised in the following stages. * A mechanical fault develops with consequent rubbing of moving parts and a hot spot develops somewhere in the crankcase. © Above about 200deg C lubricating oil begins to vapourise where it is in contact with the hot spot. * The movement of engine components within the crankcase causes the oil vapours to circulate through the engine and as the vapours move into cooler areas they recondense and a white mist of oil droplets is formed. These droplets are about 0.005 to 0.01mm in diameter. * The oil mist concentration steadily increases until it reaches the lower explosive limit of about ‘S0mg/l (13% oil mist — air ratio). * Tests have shown that it is necessary for a hot spot of about 850deg C to ignite oil mist in a crankease under engine operating conditions. There are other causes of lubricating oil vapourisation in a crankcase such as a severe external fire or the products of cylinder combustion finding their way into the crankcase via a failed piston. The process of ignition is complex and is essentially a function of the composition and uniformity of the oil mist mixture within the crankcase where explosions can range from puffs to violent damaging explosions. Following the ignition of an oil rich mist, there will be an expelling of pressure through the relief valves and reduction in crankcase pressure. The reduction in crankcase pressure causes atmospheric air to enter the crankcase thus causing a further flammable mixture to be produced and the possibility of a secondary explosion to occur. Evidence from actual crankcase explosions have generally indicated that the longer the path for the combustion, the more violent the resulting explosion. There are a number of factors that could result in an explosion occurring with greater severity. ‘Instabilities in the flame front: Following the development of an oil mist from a hot spot, there will be a variation in concentrations of flammable vapours within a crankcase. This is thought to provide unstable flame conditions within a crankcase following ignition that are difficult to qualify and quantify. + Shape of the flame: The arrangement of components within the crankcase and the internal physical geometry of a crankcase are considered to have an important influence on the flame path and shape * Flame area: The flame area is another important consideration as it is a determinant of the energy release rate from an explosion. + Flame speed: Recent investigations have shown the importance of the flame travel length in the assessment of the pressure rise in a crankcase explosion. The further a flame can travel, the higher is likely to be the resulting pressure rise. + Turbulence: Churning and mixing of vapours within the crankcase due to moving engine components and the mixing of vapours following an initial ignition are the likely causes of turbulence in a crankcase explosion sequence. Also the venting of explosion products through relief valves and the crankcase ventilation arrangements can play an important role in the turbulence of a crankcase explosion + Formation of cracked oil gases: It has been determined that the components of lubricating oil crack at different temperatures and at different rates and this can effect the way an explosion sequence develops. + Geometry of the crankcase: The different designs of crankcases have differing structural capabilities that affect the containment of a theoretical limiting pressure of 1. 3bar. Tests have shown that the ignition of oil mist vapours within a crankcase is only achievable over a very harrow mixture range, weaker or richer mixtures than about SOmg/! will not ignite. There is no question of self-ignition of the vapour either theoretically or practically as there must always be a cause ‘o start ignition, such as a hot spot from rubbing components. Figure 1 shows the graph of an explosion from tests carried out on a chamber fitted with a relief valve and demonstrates the pressure rise, and decay to a vacuum, following an explosion. The reduced pressure within a crankeuse following a crankcase explosion is a significant concern as this can draw in large quantities of fresh air that can provide conditions suitable for a secondary explosion, IMarEST Crankease Explosions Conference Paper 2002 Page 7Pressure (bar) Time (seconds) Vacuum Figure 1. Explosion Pressure/Time Variation CAUSES OF CRANKCASE EXPLOSIONS Up until the mid 1990s, the adopted standards appeared to be effective as there were no further eported major crankcase explosion incidents with severe loss of life after the Reina del Pacifico, However in the past five years the number and scale of crankcase explosions has been causing serious concern to Owners, Engine Builders and Classification Societies. Loss of life, injury to personnel and damage to ship and machinery have been reported. Listed below are some of the recorded causes of crankcase explosions in large 2-stroke oil engines: Bearing failure in gear drive. Piston inlet cooling oil pipe becoming detached. ‘Wrong spring fitted in piston rod stuffing box. Piston rod interference with cylinder frame. ‘Weight on chain tightener becoming detached. Fire outside the engine. Main bearing failure. Camshaft bearing failure. Gear drive defect. + Piston crown failure. The listing shows the wide range of causes of crankcase explosions and it can be stated all three Principal designers of marine two-stroke, single acting crosshead engines have had crankcase explosion problems. ‘THE PAST 10 YEARS Lloyd's Register as part of an IACS initiative to review the common classification standards for crankcase safety has carried out a review of the number and causes of crankcase explosions over the past 10 years. The figures are for those crankcase explosion events reported to Lloyd's Register where a Surveyor was called by the Owner and a report and survey record issued. Lloyd's Register has about 20% of the world’s fleet in its class so the figures are expected to represent about 20% of all events. It is also acknowledged that not all crankcase explosions are reported to classification societies - Lloyd's Register would only require a crankcase explosion to be reported where damage has resulted. Between 1990 and 2001, a total of 143 explosions were reported that caused damage in one form or the other. 21 explosions occurred in two-stroke engines and 122 in four-stroke engines. There were 5,890 two-stroke type engines at risk and 41,008 of the four-stroke type. The causes of crankcase explosions in different types of engines have been identified under the following headings: + 2stroke engines: Bearings - main, journal and crosshead: 43% Pistons: 38% Other: 19% IMurEST Crankcase Explosions Conference Paper 2002 Page &‘+ 4-stroke engines: Bearings ~ main and journal: 39% Pistons: 47% Other: 14% It can be seen that the causes of crankcase explosions are almost entirely due to problems with pistons and bearings. The high incidence rate attributed to piston problems calls into question whether bearing temperature monitoring to warn of potential crankcase explosive conditions is a feasible means of protecting a crankcase as discussed in the following section. CRANKCASE PROTECTION ‘The mechanical running gear arrangements in marine oil engines are such that there will always be the possibility of a potential cause of a crankcase explosion developing, i.e., moving parts that rub against each other and can cause hot spots, flammable lubricating oil vapour and air as a source of oxygen, The question is how can protection be provided to warn of and deal with the effects of an explosion. Early warning of a potential hazard within a crankcase has been recognised as the best front line defence against crankcase explosions and as previously mentioned there are two acceptable methods for assessment: * Oil mist concentration monitoring. ‘+ Bearing temperature monitoring, The accuracy and reliability of different systems for measuring oil mist concentration has been brought under scrutiny with different manufacturers claiming superior qualities and this is due in part to the current situation where there are no unified requirements for design, installation and testing of the systems. The number and location of the detection devices in different systems and the ability to detect the development of oil mist droplets from a hot spot are important from two aspects: * The detection of an early potential failure condition that could lead to vapourisation of lubricating oil within a crankcase. ‘+ The provision of sufficient warning time before a dangerous accumulation of oil mist vapour develops. ‘The use of bearing temperature monitoring is currently an acceptable method of warning of a potential crankcase hazard provided all bearings within the crankcase are monitored. Where a monitoring system has detected a potential crankcase hazard that could lead to an explosion, there are essentially three areas that need to be considered: ‘Stopping the engine or reducing the engine load to stop further heating of a hot spot thereby limiting the evolution of more oil mist. ‘ _Inerting the crankcase to prevent ignition of the oil mist. * Providing adequate relief valve arrangements to deal with the effects of an explosion. ‘Continuous inerting of engine crankcases has not been a marine practice and this recognises the large ‘crankcase volumes and the continuous movement of crankcase atmosphere due to the large rotating and reciprocating components and associated breathing action at the crankcase vents. Also, it is recognised that maintaining an equal crankcase/machinery space atmosphere pressure is important in minimising oil leakage from the large crankcase doors required for marine engines. Continuous inerting of crankcases that effectively reduces the oxygen levels to below defined limits can change the effectiveness of certain additives in marine lubricants. Injection of inert gas on detection of oil mist has been recognised as a possible method of preventing an explosion but there are no unified requirements for fitting such a system. Questions have been raised regarding whether alternative methods can be used to contain or prevent crankcase explosions. We are questioning whether oil mist detection, bearing temperature monitoring and effective venting provide the most effective strategy for crankcase safety. Three different alternative methods by which a crankcase could be protected can be identified + Preventing an explosive atmosphere from developing by continuous inerting of the crankcase. + Prevention of explosion following detection of a potentially explosive atmosphere by injection of inert gas. ‘+ Suppression of an explosion following ignition by injection of a medium that alters the combustion process such as water fog IMarEST Crankease Explosions Conference Paper 2002 Page 9The alternative methods for preventing or suppressing an explosion after detection of an explosive atmosphere are based on injecting some form of inerting or suppressing medium into the crankcase ‘The common factor with these methods is that even though they may be feasible for small engines, it ‘may not be possible to inject sufficient quantity of the medium into a large crankcase to guarantee prevention of an explosion. As evidence indicates that it is the large crankcases that are most at risk from damage, the development of the alternative methods require careful analysis from capability and Practical considerations. It is felt that the best way of protecting an engine is to improve detection ‘methods so that the engine can be shut down before an explosive atmosphere is generated. Whilst oil mist detectors can provide early warning of an explosive atmosphere, engine manufacturers. and operators have reported problems of unreliability and sensitivity, THE FUTURE There is considerable pressure within the marine industry to address the number of serious crankcase explosions that are currently occurring and work is continuing in a number of areas, Discussions are Continuing within [ACS and CIMAC on the need to change unified requirements for crankcase safety These include: * A complete review of IACS Unified Requirements M9 Safety valves for Crankcases of Internal Combustion Engines and MIO Protection of Internal Combustion Engines against Crankcase Explosions is being undertaken. This will establish a philosophy for a holistic approach to crankcase safety. The process will investigate, develop and propose revised requirements for crankcase safety that will include: Requirements for the submission of plans and particulars. Assessment of engine arrangements. Design of equipment. Testing of equipment and safety arrangements. ‘Type testing requirements. Protection of engine and personnel. Through life survey and inspection. Adoption of standards for type testing of relief valves to verify capacity and functionality. This will address establishing the efficacy of the flame screen arrangements. As previously mentioned, Lloyd’s Register has initiated a research programme to examine a number of areas. Some of the initial findings have indicated the following: * The current industry standard of 11Scm‘/m° relief valve area to crankcase volume for the Protection of crankcases from the effects of a crankcase explosion may not be applicable to all sizes of engines. This appears to be of particular concern where turbulent flame acceleration can dominate The current standard for relief valve area may not be applicable to all crankcase volumes. There is some evidence that we should also be considering potential flame areas and flame path lengths. * It is likely that there is a lower limiting crankcase volume above which there is an increased likelihood of a secondary crankcase explosion occurring. With more knowledge of flame acceleration and related effects of crankcase geometry we should be a position to define the lower limit of volume and associated protection arrangements. In a separate paper to be presented at this conference (7), the results of computer modeling of crankcase relief arrangements are presented and discussed. ‘The effectiveness of crankcase explosion relief valves is a vital factor in the development of a robust holistic approach to crankcase safety ‘IMarEST Crankcase Explosions Conference Paper 2002 Page 10CONCLUSIONS ‘The paper has outlined the development of safety requirements for crankcase safety together with the results of some recent investigations. The conclusions that have become evident during the fist stages of investigations include three areas that will focus research and investigations forthe next phase: * Our knowledge base relating to the mechanism and containment of crankcase explosions in large diesel engines is limited. * The present standards for crankcase protection may not afford sufficient protection for large engines * There is a need to develop a consensus on reliable and effective methods of preventing and limiting the effects of a crankcase explosion. REFERENCES () Lloyd's Register Rules for the Classification of Ships - 1950 to 2002 (2) SOLAS, Chapter I-1 (3) The British Internal Combustion Engine Research Association Reports * Reina Del Pacifico Explosion Inquiry, June 1948 ‘* Findings of the Court in the Reina Del Pacifico Inquiry, June 1948 | Crankcase Explosions Research reports Parts 1 to 5, 1951-1956 (® TACS Unified Requirements M9, M10, M35 and M36 and Unified Interpretations SC76 and SC133 (IACS Blue Book) (5) Tribology Practical Reviews: Crankcase Explosions I Mech E, 1973 (©) Crankcase Explosions: N Rattenbury, Lloyd's Register Technical Association Paper No. 4, Session 2001-2001 (7) Crankcase explosions ~ Explosion relief valves and testing requirements: N Rattenbury and J Besau: 2002 Crankcase Explosions Conference Paper ANNEX TACS Unified Requirement M9: Safety valves for crankases of internal combustion engines ‘M9.1 Internal combustion engines having a cylinder bore of 200mm and above or a crankcase volume of 0.6m and above shall be provided with crankcase explosion relief valves of a suitable type as follows: * Engines having a cylinder bore not exceeding 250mm must have at least one valve near each end, but, over eight crankthrows, an additional valve must be fitted near the middle of the engine. * Engines having a cylinder bore exceeding 250mm but not exceeding 300mm must have at least one valve in way of each alternate crankthrow, with a minimum of two valves. Engines having a cylinder bore exceeding 300mm must have at least one valve in way of each main crankthrow. M9.2__ The free area of each safety valve must be not less than 4Scm?. The combined free area of the valves fitted on an engine must not be less than 1 15cm* per cubic metre of the crankcase gross volume. Note: The volume of the fixed parts in the crankcase may be deducted in estimating the gross volume. JACS Unified Requirement M10: explosions M10.1 Crankcase and crankcase doors must be of sufficient strength, and crankcase doors must be fastened sufficiently securely for them not to be readily displaced by an explosion. otection of internal combustion engines against crankcase M10.2 Additional safety valves must be fitted on separate spaces of crankcase such as gear or chain cases for camshaft or similar drives when the gross volume exceeds 0.6m’ M10.3.Scavenge spaces in open connection with the cylinders must be fitted with explosion relief valves. IMarEST Crankcase Explosions Conference Paper 2002 Page 11M10.4 Crankcase safety valves must be designed and built to open quickly at an overpressure of not more than 0.02N/mm* (0.2bar) in the crankcase and close quickly and automatically in order to avoid inrush of air in the crankcase. They must be of approved type. M10.5__Crankcase safety valve discharges must be properly shielded in order to reduce the possible danger from emission of flame. M10.6 Ventilation of crankcase and any arrangement which could produce a flow of external air within the crankcase, is in principle forbidden. Vent pipes where provided must be as small as practicable. If a forced extraction of the gasses from the crankcase is provided (for smoke detection purposes for instance), the vacuum in the crankcase must not exceed 2.5 x L0’N/mm? (2.5m bar). Joining together of ventilation pipes of two or more engines is not permitted, nor interconnection of crankcase oil drain pipes. M10.7 Lubricating oil drainage pies from the engine sump to the drain tank are to be submerged at their outlet ends. M108 A waming notice must be fitted either on the control stand or, preferably, on a crankcase door ‘on each side of the engine. This warning notice must specify that whenever overheating is suspected within the crankcase, the crankcase doors or sight holes are not to be opened before a reasonable time, sufficient to permit adequate cooling after stopping the engine. IACS Unified Requirement M35: Alarms, remote indications and safeguards for main reciprocating I.C. engines installed in unattended machinery spaces (Extract) Slow speed diesel engines: Oil mist concentration in crankcase ~ Sensor for alarm high value indication and slow down. Medium and high speed diesel en; Oil mist concentration in crankcase ~ Sensor for alarm high value indication and shut down. Only for medium speed engines having a power of more than 2,250kW or a cylinder bore of more than 300mm. One oil mist detector for each engine having two independent outputs for initiating the alarm and shut- down would satisfy the requirement for independence between alarm and shut-down system. IACS Unified Requirement M36: Alarms and safeguards for auxiliary reciprocating internal ‘combustion engines for driving generators in unattended machinery spaces (Extract) il mist concentration in crankcase ~ Sensor for alarm high value and slowdown and for shutdown. For engines having a power of more than 2,250kW or a cylinder bore of more than 300mm. SOLAS Chapter II. Regulation 27: Machinery 27/4 Internal combustion engines of a cylinder diameter of 200mm or a crankcase volume of 0.6m? and above shall be provided with crankcase explosion relief valves of a suitable type with sufficient relief area. The relief valves shall be arranged or provided with means to ensure that discharge from them is so directed as to minimise the possibility of injury to personnel. SOLAS Chapter 1-1 Regulation 47: Fire precautions ~ Applicable to periodically unattended machinery spaces 47/2 Internal combustion engines of 2,250kW and above or having cylinders of more than 300mm bore shall be provided with crankcase oil mist detectors or engine bearing temperature monitors or equivalent devices. aaa ee eu En pe ER ip oeIACS Unified Interpretation SC76: Engine bearing temperature monitors SOLAS Chapter I-1, Regulation 47/2 The wording “or engine bearing temperature monitors" i understood to include al bearings i.e. journal and connecting rod bearings. JACS Unified Interpretation SC133: Oil Mist Detector on High Speed Engines ~ “equivalent device” SOLAS Chapter II-1, Regulation 47/2 An equivalent device could be interpreted as measures applied to high speed engines where specific design features to preclude the risk of crankcase explosions are incorporated. IMarEST Crankease Explosions Conference Page 13Measures against severe damage of large combustion engines caused by oil mist explosions Dip! Ing H Uebel, Diesel ENSET PTE Ltd Page 14Measures against severe damage of large combustion engines caused by oil mist explosions Helmuth Richard Uebel, pip. eng. (Mech.) Regional Manager Asia-Pacific DIESEL ENSET PTE LTD Singapore ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to motivate professionals, engineers and managers to gain interest and participate in the exchange of experiences with reference to the operation of large combustion engines. Especially those professionals who came across severe damages caused by crankcase explosions and costly destruction of vital engine components can engage in discussions or inform themselves through the source of the related information herein. INTRODUCTION Crankcase explosions caused by oil mist ignition have devastating economical, ethical, and even humanistic Consequences. This is as a result of overheating of the moving components inside engines generating a Potentially explosive oil mist. However, the situation is different with oil mist detection, Some detailed explanation is required to convince users of its effectiveness. Large engines being built and tested in major factories and engines being operated in ships and power stations around the world occasionally suffer immense damage, despite well-intended application of control and ‘monitoring systems installed for their protection against such damage. Engine designers, builders and operators should ask themselves what could be the reason why well-designed machines can get severely damaged. Not only the repair is expensive (during or after the warranty time) but also losses due to non-availability of the power plant escalate the costs up to factors of 3 to 5 times the price of spare Parts. These are cases observed when ships are out of order for several weeks or power station engines are down, not producing well-paid electricity The oil mist detection system is a series of measures against severe damage of engine and plant facility, that began after three of the 4 main trunk piston engines (each having 12 cylinders of 630 mm bore) of the ship “REINA DEL PACIFICO” suffered terribie crankcase explosions in the Irish Sea in September of 1947. The ship had undergone extensive repairs and went for sea trials off Belfast. One could assume that qualified personnel were on board, including those to watch the performance of the propulsion engines. Author’s Biography Mr. Helmuth Richard Uebel joined Schaller Automation in 1993 and was in charge of Sales, Marketing and Project Development in Germany, until 1998, tn the same year, he was relocated to Singapore as Regional Manager to establish Diesel Enset Pte. Lid., a new technical and commercial Management Centre for Schaller Automation in the Asia-Pacific Region, Previously led special projects of engine development in Ausiralia and the U.S.A., and worked ten years for the {engine company mtu in the After-Seles management in Europe and the Far East. Page 16Investigations set up by the British Ministry of Transport on this tragic case, where 28 people lost their lives lead to a research programme involving the Institute of Marine Engineers and Mechanical Engineers. As a result of the investigation’s findings, companies were invited to develop an oil mist detection system so as to recognise the potentially dangerous crankcase gas at an early stage. ‘The British company Graviner Ltd. specialised in fire protection equipment, in the early 50°s, was one of several companies that succeeded in producing the first applicable oil mist detector. The device was an ingenious instrument based on the best measurement technology of the time. The “Graviner” met the requirements to warn against intensifying oil mist developing inside the crankcase of large engines. In the course of the last 4 decades, the oil mist detection system has been perfected to a point where reliable crankcase monitoring systems have been delivered to the engine industry. Following the SOLAS regulations for fire precaution, the Classification Societies make it a mandatory alternative to utilise this type of monitoring, being part of the safety system required for marine engines with power in excess of 2250 kW and/ or cylinder bore of over 300 mm. Nevertheless, experts involved with marine engine and land-based power plants such as consultants, surveyors and suppliers of safety monitoring systems, are coming across very variable situations in reference to the true safety of large diesel engines. FACTS AND OBSERVATIONS. A general contemplation about safety measures is that they are not required for an actual engine in operation, which is in optimal mechanical condition. However, safety measures become absolute necessary when a deviation from a quality standard occurs whilst the machine is in production or neglected during its operation. ‘The majority of engine damages occur because of human error (over 80% of cases). ‘¢ Human error is also to be understood as an organisational (corporate) deficiency, ¢.g., * A wrong action based on a mistake can be seen as a lack of prevention. Management in charge of operating diesel engines * May have to find out about the lack of interest of machinery personnel to perform a thorough and conscientious work * Has to be driven to a consequent prevention of machinery accidents, ‘* Companies building machines and transportation systems must ensure for: + Competent and responsible management in organisations, down to the last link in the chain of command. * Installers and supervisors must have professional background and means to deliver the quality requested by the equipment supplier (and manufacturer) * To be noted is that the knowledge is not expressed in the blueprints from the licenser to the licensee. ‘+ Engines built under license Accidents are on the increase, some of the reasons are: « Modules of safety system equipment is very often installed with severe deficiencies so that later they are disabled in their function. " Higher number of engines in operation worldwide. Extreme business pressure: * In cases, does not allow safe technical performance of personnel * Higher specific engine power output demands that operating, personnel is welt trained but tendency to employ unqualified -low pay- personnel increases the risk of accidents Page 17‘Shareholders value * Professionals often have to confront adverse situations and pass decisions leaning against their technical background, very often leading to costly accidents. The aim of this paper is to motivate professionals, engineers and managers to gain interest and participate in the exchange of experiences with reference to the operation of large combustion engines. Especially those professionals who came across severe damages caused by crankcase explosions and costly destruction of vital ‘engine components can engage in discussions or inform themselves through the following neutral moderated source: ‘The InterForum: www.dieselsecuritv.org or, ‘www.marinetalk.com THE OIL MIST DETECTION OF TODAY. There are two remarkably opposed situations observed in existing marine and land-based power plants utilizing oil mist detectors (OMD). ‘The favourable side There are users, including engine manufacturers, who are convinced of the good and beneficial function of the OMD installation on their engine. Examples: ‘* Engine manufacturers have implemented rules in their factories that engines on their test beds must be already equipped with an automatically functioning OMD before starting the trials. * Similarly, some engine manufacturers withdraw the warranty of the engine in case the user disables the OMD during engine operation. ‘+ A number of engine operators speak of the evidence that the OMD has saved an engine from heavy consequential damage, in cases only a bearing shell had to be replaced and the crankshaft remained free of damage. ‘+ Groups of operators report that the OMD does not present operational difficulties and understand the maintenance procedure recommended by the OMD manufacturer. The maintenance of equipment is accepted and remains economically viable. ‘The unfavourable side In principle, we face the situation that over half of the oil mist detector (OMD) systems installed on modern 2-stroke or 4-stroke engines are not performing as expected by the engine users and the equipment manufacturers, Examples: * Oil mist detector many times triggers a false alarm. This is the worst possible deficiency of an OMD system, ‘The OMD is disconnected, disabled by the operator: * Major damage in engine was not detected early enough by OMD. Example: Crankshatt journal overheated, blue colour, deep cracks in surface Crankshaft must be replaced involving extreme high costs, ¢.g. several million US Dollars Page 18‘ Crankcase explosion suffered with catastrophic consequences for owner, financial losses and image, and unfortunate fatalities, The above-mentioned situations need an urgent and thorough clarification amongst the = Engine manufacturers = Supplier of safety equipment (OMD) * Classification Societies * Engine operators or users. Reason of unfavourable situation: Equipment In view of the history, the modern OMD devices have been developed to a point where the function of the device itself is reliable and in their majority acceptable for today’s technical standard. The OMD system installation involving device, crankcase suction pipes, sampling fittings, oil mist release piping and the automatic action on the engine control system, show major function discrepancies in over 50% of the cases. Consequence: ‘+ Clogging of sampling fittings and pipes with cil + OMD cannot receive oil mist in time to recognise a dangerous overheating development inside the engine. + OMD triggers false alarms due to unstable oil mist flow or contamination with oil. ‘+ Operating personnel is constantly trying to perform maintenance on the faulty device. ‘+ The OMD system is disabled. * Owner has to man the engine room due to inoperative OMD. This is a very risky decision or solution. MEASURES TO OVERCOME POOR PERFORMANCE OF OMD INSTALLATION Technical cooperation It is essential to ensure a technical cooperation between engine manufacturer and safety equipment supplier. Often it is found that it is too late to call the OMD system manufacturer after the engine is perfectly designed and the prototype is evident. The OMD system manufacturer should be a partner for the safety system of the power plant, Experience has confirmed that as a matter of facts, the oil mist detection can be ‘made to function to the absolute satisfaction of all parties. ‘The satisfied customers utilizing the OMD method have proved this. However, only around 40% of the ‘customers are convinced that OMD has been of utility Therefore, the balance of the engine makers or users needs to be assured that the OMD installation deficiencies can be eradicated by accepting the technical advice of OMD supplying companies. It is puzzling to learn that simple piping can be made so wrong by technical design staff and assembly personnel of some renowned engine makers carrying the malfunction problems on their power plants for Jong periods (decades) of the useful life of the machine. Until now, the only sure method to overcome technical installation deficiencies was for the OMD supplier wo * Deliver complete engine type adapted systems + Manage inspection and commissioning of OMD system by competent (certified) personnel. CLASSIFICATION SOCIETIES Page 19OR Ae feaultement to obtain a type approval certificate for a module of the safety system like the OMD is to submit a device to a prescribed program of tests. Following the typical approval procedure, itis necessary to test for * Vibration = Temperature Humidity * Power supply "Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) Functional reaction to trigger the alarm. ‘There isa substantial gap to underline the fact that the standards require only a device cetifieation and nota system certification as its in the case of the OMD. In the practical arena, the OMD system (device and sampling pipe array) has to perform a vital function on she running engine and be ready for action practically every second during the operating life ofthe mavsrace rtrefore, it is essential wo locate sampling points inthe crankcase and subsequently the OMD neve ey bbe in an optimal location in order to achieve a fast reaction within a few seconds, However, when tests are conducted under the presence of the surveyor on board of ships, a simple smoke test Js performed (famous eigarete test). The smoke is applied to an external suction point ir the pipe System fo verify whether the device triggers an alarm or not, WHEN THE ENGINE IS STOPPED. Beecd maa Secialised knowledge and experience of OMD company experts, the afore-mentioned method far testing certainly comes very short ofthat as required to verify a safe function of the system, Several aspects concerning approval of safety equipment need to be reviewed before achieving an acceptable reliable standard. MEETING OF LEADING CLASSIFICATION SOCIETIES AND OIL MIST DETECTION SYSTEM MANUFACTURERS IN BLIESKASTEL — GERMANY, 26/27 NOVEMBER, 1998 The meeting was called to clarify the requirements to protect large diesel engines against severe damage and ‘crankcase explosions, caused by overheating of components inside engines. ‘he Participating classification societies (ABS, BV, DNV, GL, LRS, RINA) were informed that the cases uents would need to be reviewed and updated. Principal reason for this call was the fact that diesel qugines can be protected much better at present with available modern technology. Especially, it is now the tine implement improvements at a point where a competitive power plant market leads to higher specific engine Suput Equally, instrumentation and monitoring systems must perform reliably when vital engine components, are submitted to higher specific loads. ‘The Classification Societies agreed to discuss the relevant issues and support recommendations for. Clarification of the requirements for a safe protection — Discussion of SOLAS regulations (Safety Of Life At Sea). Initiation of a study and investigations forthe certification of OMD systems according t0 categories Project OMDEA (Oil Mist Detection Efficiency Approval) CLARIFICATION OF THE REQUIREMENTS Basie Considerations According to SOLAS in Chapter II-1 Construction Page 20Part E Additional requirements for periodically unattended machinery spaces Regulation 47 Fire Precautions Defined in Section 2: “Internal combustion engines of 2,250 kW and above or having cylinders of more than 300 mm bore shall eo vided with crankcase oil mist detectors or engine bearing temperature monitors or equivalent It is understood that this definition has been formulated by SOLAS at the International Convention in 1974, and LACS (International Association of Classification Societies) has adopted it in their rules; hence, from the definition the following conclusion could be derived: In the first place, it remarks provided with crankcase oil mist detectors... In the second place, ..-engine bearing temperature monitors. Inthe third place, cor equivalent devices. To remark here is that itis not clear how to interpret the term “equivalent devices”. In order to make a statement it would be necessary to review the SOLAS records to find out in what context “equivalent devices” became an alternative to oil mist detection or engine bearing temperature monitors. Engine designers, builders and operators cannot be satisfied with such a rule. The only chance to offer safety to a running engine is by means of a well-proven monitoring system, which is able to detect upcoming anomalies inside the entire engine, before the condition becomes critical and produces huge consequential damage. At this point, it is necessary to emphasise the fact that generic sensors measuring temperature and pressure do not suffice to offer the required operating safety, because a number of lubricated sliding surfaces are never monitored, except by OMD. Surfaces that can generate intensive oil mist in addition to the crankshaft bearing system are, for example: Camshaft, their bearings and cams ‘Timing gear shafts and their bearings Guide block and path in cross head engines In case of an overheating phenomenon starting out of one of these sliding surfaces, or a possible seizure occurring in the crankshaft bearings, the last chance to bring about safety is by means of the OMD, considered to be the sensor system that can sample (or measure by comparison) oi! mist coming from any ‘moving component within the interior of the crankcase. Therefore, if explosive oil mist is a possibility in every engine, potentially causing catastrophic damage to the power plant, to machinery space and injury or fatality to operating personnel, the OMD is a cost effective protection system, amounting to less than 2% of the cost of one engine crankshaft replacement. It should be understood that just for the sake of offering an apparent low cost safety solution, which in a given moment may not protect the engine in time, it might be the most costly and risky option for an engine operator. All benefits of oil mist detection experienced with 2-stroke and 4-stroke medium speed engines can be obtained with high-speed diesel engines, Page 21‘The tests conducted over the last five years on high-speed diesel engines have confirmed this. To obtain a clear understanding of all safety regulations it is necessary to decide whether the oil mist detection should follow only the SOLAS regulation 47 (Fire Precaution) or prevent severe damage on crankshaft or other lubricated sliding surfaces of vital engine components. The recommendation should be that the oil mist detection is divided into 3 main groups: * Protection Category | Only for avoidance of explosions (fulfils the requirement of SOLAS). * Protection Category 2 Prevention of severe damage by friction, especially journals on crankshaft or seizure of pistons (surpasses the SOLAS regulations). * Protection Category 3 Extension of category 2, including localisation of damage (to prevent starting of an engine in case that the defect has not been repaired). In order to offer operators a protection not only limited to the SOLAS regulation “fire precaution” but to a category 2 or even better category 3, it is necessary to give the users an assurance that the OMD systems function with the expected reliability level for these categories. To achieve this categorization, SCHALLER AUTOMATION took the initiative and financed the project OMDEA described below PROJECT OMDEA (OIL MIST DETECTION EFFICIENCY APPROVAL) After the November 1998 meeting, the above-mentioned Classification Societies agreed to support the OMDEA project, which comprehends studies, investigations and deduction of recommendations for a certification of OMD systems. Principal objective of OMDEA is to deliver the proper judgement and test criteria for the damage preventing function of oil mist detection systems in their ability as a necessary safety module on large diesel engines. The criteria under scrutiny are to put the Classification Societies and surveying officers into the position of being able to test the function of oil mist detection systems installed on engines as part of the Type Approval Cettification/TAC of engines, under running conditions. In the different project steps, OMDEA is to deliver accredited information gained from independent companies and university-qualified laboratories with reference to: + Experiments with shafts and bearings of different sizes causing frictional heat and study of the oil mist formation. + Evaluation of created shaft and bearing seizures, utilizing different type of lubricating oils. * Construction and test of an oil mist generator with controllable oil mist concentration. * Simulation of bearing and sliding surface seizures in running engines utilizing outside produced oil mist from a controllable oil mist generator. * Performance of oil mist detector sensitivity tests and vulnerability to false alarms, on running engines. * Standard guidelines for Classification Societies and engine makers to approve technically correctly- designed oil mist detection systems. Preliminary test results have been summarized in a diagram shown below (Figure 1), prepared by the laboratory at mkl, Institut fur Maschinenkonstruktionslehre und Kraftfahrzeugbau under the direction of Prof. Albers, at the Universitit Karlsruhe ~ Germany. Page 22Several tests were conducted in the mkI laboratory whereby the results of one of these are shown here. The diagram highlights the reaction time and intensity of different measurements performed in a test rig, The principal components submitted to the test are a steel shaft of 60 mm diameter running in a sliding bearing of bronze material equivalent to normal shells. The shaft/bearing assembly was continuously lubricated with oil during the trials. | TestNo: tot Shaft Characteristics: Steel Date: 29.11.1999 Running Surface: Polished Bearing No.: 4 Bearing Material: Bronze Load: 35 [Kt] Lubrication’ Full / Heating on 90,00 RPM: 2000 1/min Test Bed Condition: Warm. o =e = 0.00 ——— 1-BEAROMOS Signal [mv] 100 |_| — = a-remperatr 1} oo — = atc 600 ‘Torque 0.00 a — s01mat(% opacity) a 50,00 & 5 40,00 i 5 | 00 20.00 1000 o.c0 © 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000 ran000 ra0000 60000 80000 200000 Tie is} Figure 1 Frictional heat created in a test rig: Rotating shaft in a siding beating “Measurement of increment of oil mist thermo-curent and bearing temperature. PERFORMANCE OF TEST. ‘+ The test rig was brought to a constant temperature, approximately 71°C, see curve 2. * A load was applied to the shaft as shown in the diagram; gradually increasing, after 8 seconds from the beginning of the test the load was brought from 2 to 4 KN. Constant load of 3.8 KN is maintained after approximately 50 seconds, see curve 3, ‘« Immediate reaction is shown by BEAROMOS (described in the next section) detecting an increase in thermo-current, measuring over 220 mV, see curve | il mist begins to appear. The concentration remains constant but very low; it is considered to be a normal ‘operational oil mist concentration, see curve 5. * Torque was increased after approximately 73 seconds, see curve 4. Again, the BEAROMOS signal (1) showed and instant steep increase as a result of hot spots developing in the bearing il Mist (5) begins to develop seven seconds after torque increase, showing a typical rapid intensification in concentration. |‘+ Temperature (2) of bearing gradually (slowly) begins to rise after 6 seconds from last torque increase. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS. * BEAROMOS, thermo-current, curve 1 The increase of load after the first 8 seconds from test start produces a disruption in the lubrication oil film allowing that hot spots generate thermo-current increasing practically without delay from average 65 mV to a peak of 220 mV, After a few seconds, the BEAROMOS signals abate and values oscillate between 100 mV and 60 mV. It is assumed that the steel shaft has become smooth after the sustained friction. The shaft runs lubricated but under a mixed friction condition, Increase of torque from 4 to 17 KN clearly produces a strong thermo-electric signal, developing a curve that roughly shows an exponential development of values (oscillating) following the rather uneven torque fluctuations. Within 2 seconds of time the BEAROMOS measured from the previous low value of approximately 60 mV an increment of 180 mV, reaching 240 mV. Within 9 seconds of torque increase, it already reached a value of 450 mV. This signal level could be utilized for warning when applied to machinery bearing systems. Temperature measurement in the bearing, curve 2. At the beginning of the test, the temperature measured 71°C and increased gradually to 76°C. This tendency can be attributed to the gradual increase of load on the shaft. The sudden higher torque applied did not influence the temperature development immediately. A remarkably slow temperature rise was measured, also reflected in the rather flat slope of the curve. At the value of 450 mV measured with BEAROMOS, the temperature did rise 3 °C in 9 seconds to 79 °C. * Qil mist concentration, curve 5, During the increase in shaft load within the first 60 seconds of running time the oil mist concentration remained almost constant at 1% {OP=opacity] (equivalent to 0.2 mg/l). This low concentration is also ‘measured in engines when operating under normal load conditions (range 1% to 1.5%) and is considered as the normal operational oj] mist concentration. At the lapse of 7 seconds after torque increase, the oil mist concentration begins to rise to 1.3% {OP] and 9.6 seconds after torque increase the concentration is 2.5% (0.5 mg/l reaching the level for alarm or emergency shut-down, when applied to a diesel engine. ‘Once the project OMDEA is brought to a conclusion this year, with the support of the classification Societies and the engine industry plus the know-how available today in the automation sector, a statement can now be ‘made that a great number of heavy consequential damages caused by failing lubrication of vital parts inside the engines (and remaining unnoticed by the operator) could be avoided However, if an appropriately installed oil mist detection system, as a versatile solution to minimise heavy damages inside the crankcase, can be a cost effective contribution to safer operation of diesel engines, or in its ‘merits the monitoring of bearing temperatures, the newly developed monitoring technology of today could offer many more benefits. ‘Special attention should be drawn to recent technical developments such as: * Crankshaft Bearing Overheating Monitoring System (BEAROMOS) based on measurable micro- currents produced between the crankshaft and bearing shells. « Installing and utilizing a new alternate engine safety system. BEARING OVERHEATING MONITORING SYSTEM-BEAROMOS, BEAROMOS is a sensor developed with the objective to obtain information of signals that become noticeable when the rotating crankshaft is touching the metallic surface of main bearings. Itis also intended to obtain signals of connecting rod bearings or a shafv/bearing combination, in steam turbines, electric generators or other similar combinations, Page 24Gankshaft is still making contact withthe bearing shel atthe instant when the oil film is partly interrupted. As soon as the oil film is complete, the thermo-electric current is interrupted and the BEAROMOS registers a ahaa Operation. Should at any moment the oil film be interupted again, e.g. due to dirt or metal particles within the bearing clearance, or lack of pressure, overheated oil, et, the sensor will at an eatly stage show signals that can be utilized for taking operational precautions, a pre-alarm or shut-down procedure Gu important aspect of such a measurement is that when integrated in a system it is fice from false alarms, ue to the fact that the signal is only generated when the oil film is interrupted and frictional heat begins to develop in a particular bearing. This target has already been confirmed with previous specific test: nstallations in Europe, where a handful of tests were conducted even in engine manufacturing companies. ‘The BEAROMOS System for diesel engine application would consist of: * One sensor installed in the housing in fromt of the vibration damper. The rotating shaft of the sensor is ‘mechanically attached to the free end of the crankshaft. An angle encoder in the sensor is foreseen to determine which cylinder is firing, in order to enhance the location of the bearing that is starting to fail or making contact with the shaft. The analogue signals generated by the thermo-currents are measured and Converted to digital for further evaluation through the connector plug provided. * Signal evaluation is performed via processor technology in the safety system module (black box) mounted on the engine or if required in a separate evaluation unit utilizing software developed for the particular engine type, permitting the visualization and storage of signals transmitted by the sensor. INSTALLING AND UTILIZING A NEW ALTERNATE ENGINE SAFETY SYSTEM ‘To be mentioned here is that special attention is dedicated to the sensors and safety functions for the diesel engine itself. Excluded in this discussion are the safety system functions relevant gearboxes or controllable pitch propeller, when eventually installed for a propulsion system, Safety systems applied to diesel engines are installed mainly in two different ways. Present safety system on board ships Emphasis is given to sensors and measurements on diesel engines, as required by the rules of the Classification Societies. ‘The typical arrangement of safety systems is to install * Generic and special sensors wired to a junction box on the engine. *+ From the junction box wiring leads to the remote safety system (installed by shipyard). + Remote safety system must return emergency signals via junction box to actuators on the engine. The possibility of errors or failures in the wiring is given; it is often the reason for malfunction and devastating consequential damages in the engine, when a vital signal cannot be executed.Safety system module ctly installed on the engine With the actual available technology, it would be advisable to further contemplate the following arrangement: * Part of the safety system, safety module or “black box” installed on the engine, provided with * Compact box housing module fulfilling most stringent EMC demands. + available with or without alpha-numeric LCD data display * Integrated vibration-free mounted electronic module, + Redundant power supply and evaluation, as per Class requirements * Interface plug connection to ship's main safety system or alarm & monitoring system (for all required standard protocols), + Required generic sensors wired or connected via digital BUS to safety module * Special sensors: Analogue to digital signals in BUS rail to safety module, e.g, for: + Oil mist detection system * Bearing Overheating Monitoring System. «Ignition Pressure Monitoring System. = And possibly others. ‘The advantage of the latter system is: * Safety system for essential emergency signals is installed and tested during the production of the engine and is available for the test bed trials. * Zhe satuipment manufacturer carries out the type approval certification required by the Classification Societies, * Complex and costly wiring in the ship (or power station), as well as wiring mistakes, are significantly reduced. * Emergencies are controlled on each engine individually and automatically, ating directly and instantly for countermeasures. * The suppliers) of such compact system has the opportunity to establish a worldwide replacement service Consisting of small modules that can be replaced by non highly-trained personnel. * The replacement modules would be upgradeable and configurable via Internet data obtained through a central computer located at the manufacturer's headquarter. * Ail things considered the cost and benefits of a compact modular arrangement, utilizing state of art ‘echnology, may be the most user-friendly option for the engine builder and the operators, CONCLUDING REMARKS The engine industry and relevant equipment manufacturing companies have collected a vast knowledge in the last decades. This knowledge could benefit all our society given the case that itis applied in the best of the Consumer's interest. Our way of life has driven professionals like engineers and scientists into situations where the commercial pressure does not always allow delivering quality and safety a it should be. The result of the Stations experienced leads to a fragmented work and responsibility. The professional engineer should be in a Position to use his knowledge to obtain the results that science has taught him. To improve the performance of combustion machines, professionals would welcome the establishment of workgroups dedicated to analyse Sources of inconsistency in our technical profession and, amongst the awakening of interest, have the pleasure to resolve critical circumstances, REFERENCES. ‘The Motor Ship, July 1948 Page 26Crankcase explosions in two-stroke diesel engines E Ohlsen, MAN B&W Diesel A/S Page 28Crankcase Explosions in Two-stroke Diesel Engines Engine designer's view Erik Ohlsen, senior Manager MAN B&W Diesel A/S SYNOPSIS As there will always be a certain risk involved if crankcase explosion occurs, great efforts must be made to maintain the diesel engine and its safety systems in such a way that if there isa risk that an engine failure could occur, this will be overed and rectified before it develops into a situation where an explosion could take place. Care is to be excercised when designing the engine and its safety systems; however, as there are people involved in all activities around the engine, the most important action could be to impart adequate information on the subject to all parties involved in producing, installing and maintaining the engine. INTRODUCTION The degree of attention regarding crankcase explosions seems to follow the normal tendency in the marine market to move in waves. In 1947, the attention reached a summit as 28 people were killed by a crankcase explosion on board the “Reina Del Pacifico” during a sea trial off Belfast. This accident started extensive investigations and research work, resulting in the development of a number of rules and ‘components designed to reduce the risk of a crankcase explosion. Now, 55 years later, we are discussing the same issues For our engines, we have, until recently, specified safety equipment in accordance with the requirements of the classification societies, trusting that this would be sufficient. However, after some serious crankcase explosions in the late 1990s, MAN B&W Diesel initiated our own research programme, We realised, for instance, that a large number of crankcase relief valves, approved by the various classification societies, were in service without a proper flame arrester, as the approval from the classification societies only took the opening pressure into consideration. We therefore continued our research to bring the demands on relief valves in accordance with our requirement for safety, In the following we will share the results with you. RECENT CRANKCASE EXPLOSION INCIDENTS Cause of explosion As the sources of explosion vary to a large extent, this must be taken into consideration when taking precautions and selecting monitoring systems Below is a table of a number of accidents where the cause of explosion is known, the table includes two-stroke engines both of our design and of our competitors” designs: ‘Author’s Biography Erik Ohlsen graduated as a mechanical engineer from the Odense Polytechnic in 1964. He joined our company the same year and, in 1990, was appointed Senior Manager. He is a member of the Society of Danish Engineers. Page 30‘Table 1 Cases of explosions where the cause i known Year | Cause of Explosion Cause of Failure 1995 | Bearing in PTO gearbox 1996 | Inlet pipe for piston cooling oil falling off Incorrect tightening 1997 | Incorrect spring mounted in piston rod stuffing box | Unauthorised spare part 1997 | Piston rod interference with cylinder frame 1999. | Weight on chain tightener falling off Incorrect tightening 1999. | Fire outside the engine 2000 | Main bearing 2000 | Camshaft bearing 2000 | Incorrect shaft in camshaft drive Unauthorised spare part 2001 | Crankshaft failure 2001 | Piston crown failure 2001. | Main bearing 2001 | Crankpin bearing 2002. | Inlet pipe for piston cooling oil falling off Incorrect tightening Consequences for personnel In a number of cases, the consequences have been fatal for members of the crew. In at least two of the cases listed above — both with fatal consequences ~ the explosions were caused by the installation of an unauthorised spare part during a repair. Also, cases with serious injuries have been reported, The hazard is particularly present if the oil mist is ignited outside the crankcase. In the event of a crankease explosion, the pressure wave will send a large amount of oil mist out of the crankcase and into the engine room, where the ventilation will move it around. However, a major part will be sucked up towards the air inlet of the turbocharger. ogame treasurer coms AS : Tee Fig. 1 Oil mist{the oil mist meets a hot spot, there is risk that it will be ignited, Therefor, itis important to maintain the insulating ‘material around the exhaust pipes. Of course, the largest risk of igniting the oil mist would be if the flame arrester on the relief valve did not function Properly, then the flame front from the explosion in the crankcase can ignite the cloud of oil mist in the engine room, We have therefore developed our own relief valve specification. Only relief valves approved according to this specification are accepted on engines ordered after the Ist of May 1999, Consequences for the plant In most cases, the damage has been limited to the engine proper. However, in cases where the oil mist is ignited outside the crankcase, the blast can cause severe damage in the engine room, especially to the electrical equipment. In some cases, in narrow engine rooms, the pressure wave has caused damage to mechanical items. Doors and lifts have been damaged and, in rare cases, also floor plates have been torn loose and thrown around. PRECAUTIONS AGAINST CRANKCASE EXPLOSIONS Maintenance in general, keep the engine in good condition, and follow the engine builder's instructions regarding check of ‘components, especially bearings. When overhauling, follow the engine builder's instructions. Incorrect tightening of bolts has caused a number of accidents. Another item that should be given attention is thick shell bearings. The top clearance must be adjusted by means of shims. We have seen cases of damage as the result of bearings having been assembled with insufficient top clearance, thereby restricting the flow of lube oil, leading to overheating of the bearing. Approved spare parts Original spare parts should always be used. A number of explosions, some with fatal consequences, have been caused by the use of unauthorised spare parts. In one accident, the piston rod stuffing box was mounted with springs supplied from an unauthorised supplier. Since they were of a wrong dimension, they jammed and caused heating of the piston rod and, finally, a crankcase explosion occurred. In that case, two people lost their lives because of a spare part which ‘might have been believed to be of secondary importance to the functioning of the engine. Page 32Inspections Visual inspection of the engine is important for early discovery of any risk of failure, especially so in the case of inspection for white metal fragments inside the crankcase. This inspection can reveal the start of a bearing failure before it develops into a risk of a crankcase explosion. It is therefore part of our recommendations in the instruction book that any time the crew enter the crankcase they should make such visual inspection. If any white metal is found, we recommend that the edges on all bearings in this part of the engine are checked for damage. Furthermore, it is important to regularly check the safety systems and other components related to safety. On one plant, a crankcase explosion caused an engine room fire because the flame arrester, as seen in Fig. 3, had suffered mechanical damage. Fig. 3 Deformation of flame arester Monitoring ‘Asa crankcase explosion can result from various components, and not only from the bearings, we do not agree with the rules of the classification societies, as they only require temperature monitoring of the bearing or, as an alternative, an oil mist detector. As standard, we specify the installation of an approved Oil Mist Detector (OMD), which is to be installed and connected to the safety system. If required by the customer, a bearing monitoring system can be specified as an additional precaution, However, itis important that OMD makers improve their product to prevent the risk of false alarms. The solution to this it be to use two different sources to create the signal. METHODS TO REDUCE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN EXPLOSION Correct installation ‘The crankcase must be sealed off from the engine room. This means that the lubricating oil outlet must be submerged into the oil in the tank in order to eliminate the risk that flames, in the event of a crankcase explosion, could cause outside ignition of an oil mist. Furthermore, it is required that the deaerating pipe from the crankcase is led out of the engine room, i.e. to deck. The areas around the relief valves must be open to allow a free outflow, as this is crucial for the functioning of the flame arresters in the crankcase relief vaives In the unified rules for the major classification societies, as stated in IACS UR MI0.5, it is required that: “Crankcase safety valve discharges must be properly shielded in order to reduce the possible danger from emission of flame.” Page 33As explained above, the oil mist cloud will — shield or no shield ~ move towards the turbocharger inlet, and the risk of injury arises if the cloud is ignited. Therefore, we have never specified shields around the relief valves on MAN B&W two-stroke engines, ‘As we had information that a number of engines were equipped with crankcase relief valves where a shield was welded to the relief valve cover, we decided to test the effect of the shields. These tests were made in 1998, at the FTZU Institute in the Czech Republic. The tests were made in cooperation with a maker of relief valves, Hoerbiger, using valves of this make for the test. The result was that outside ignition occurred both with a small shield welded to the cover on 180° of the circumference and with a large cover around the relief valve. When the same flame arrester was tested without a shield, it managed to quench the flames, thus preventing outside ignition, as can be seen in Fig. 4. Fig. 4 Large, small and no shield ‘The result was so convincing that we recommended that all shields be removed, even from engines in service. We also informed IACS about the results, but they are still considering whether to change their rules. Correct adjustment of safety system The level of oi! mist concentration that activates the alarm and slow-down is set with an ample margin to the lower explosion level for an oil mist, as the concentration in the crankcase can vary a lot. For marine installations, we specify that the oil mist detector is to be connected to an automatic slow-down system, and for stationary plants to the shut- down system. However, when running on testbed, we specify for all engines that the OMD is connected to the shut- down system. Monitoring from control room We have cooperated with makers of OMDs to change the systems so that the OMD monitor is moved from the engine room to the engine control room. This is to eliminate the risk that crew is tempted to enter the engine room to check the oil mist level and, thereby, be injured in the event of a crankcase explosion occurring at that moment. Approved erankease relief valves The crankcase relief valves must be of a type which has proved its ability to open at the specified low pressure and close after having relieved the pressure, thus ensuring that no oxygen enters the crankcase, Furthermore, it must be equipped with a flame arrester with a proven flame quenching ability. As we could not find any rules for test and acceptance criteria, we had to develop such rules ourselves. ‘Our own relief valve specification was developed in 1998; the test set-up can be seen in Fig. 5. The test relief valve is ‘mounted on a test vessel having a volume corresponding to the volume of the engine crankcase on which the actual relief valve could have been mounted. The test vessel is subsequently filled with a mixture of methane and air, which is ignited. The flame arrester must then prove its ability to quench the flame, as no outside ignition is accepted. Page 34Plasticbag 2x02 be P= PRESSURE MEASUREMENT G = GAS CONCENTRATION MEASUREMENT Fig. Testvesel Only relief valves approved according to this specification are accepted on engines ordered after the Ist of May 1999. A draft of this specification was sent to IACS in November 1998, but so far new rules have not been introduced. However, some classification societies have accepted to follow our specification. Follow instructions from engine builder The engine builder gives clear instructions on how to react when an OMD alarm is activated. However, a number of personal injuries have occurred because these instructions were not followed. ‘Some injuries occurred because members of the crew entered the engine room to check for the cause of the activation of an oil mist alarm. Also, on all engines it is clearly stated that the engine must be allowed to cool down after an oil mist alarm, as there have been cases where people have been injured by an explosion occurring when they opened a cover on the crankcase. ‘CONCLUSION As described in this paper, many factors have to be taken into consideration in order to increase the safety level against crankcase explosions. As the consequences of injuries to personnel and damage to plants are serious, paramount attention should still be paid to this subject to minimize the number of accidents. MAN B&W Diesel devotes great attention to safety issues by designing the engines with a proper safety margin against failure, and by issuing clear specifications and instruction manuals both to producers and users. Page 35However, as many other factors than the design influence the safety level, we also specify monitoring systems to ensure early warning and protection if failure happens anyway. The level of safety is relying on the whole chain involved during the engine’s lifetime, i.e. from production and installation in the ship, including the associated systems, to the later running and maintenance of the engine. As the design phase is only one link in the chain, and since there are people involved in all steps, it is important that these people are given the proper understanding of safety issues, including information about the risk involved in the ‘event of a crankcase explosion. It is therefore of great importance that the shipowners ensure that the crew is properly instructed in the running and maintainance of the engine, and that correct spare parts are used. It is also of great importance that the classification societies set the rules, that the time for updating the rules is adapted to the rapid development in the market, and that the class surveyors follow up on production quality REFERENCES Rules of International Association of Classification Societies (IACS), M7-10, IACS Reg. 1991/ rev.2 2000. 2. Digruber M, Besau J, Hruby J “New development on crankcase relief valves give optimum engine room safety", CIMAC congress 2001, Hamburg. 3, Egeberg C-E “Crankcase Explosions”, 1UMI Genoa 2001 Ocean Hull Programme. Page 36Combustion modelling of crankcase explosions D J Evans, Fluid Gravity Engineering Ltd AM Milne, Fluid Gravity Engineering Ltd Page 3820/L004A 2002 40q0190 62 byeulp pue 4a\si6ey s,pAo|] Aq peyoddns sem yom siy pry ‘Bug Aywesy piniy SUllIN WV sueaq rq suolsojdxy eseoyuesD Jo Bulljapoyy UoNSNquwog Anawen ping AR ee Page 40Z0/LO04A 2002 1090190 62 Wwajqoid siy] eulLeXe 0} japow IVA;euy seulbue abie| UI SUOISO|GX8 BJBABS BOW JO BOUEPIAZ Zseulbue abe] ul ¥40M Siu} S80q Jeqg’ | >eunsseJd-19A0 deey pjnoyus siyL eWU/2W9G|. | :sejnd Buljuen yueuND navey pimps UOlONPO}uU| Page 41Z0/L004A 2002 48q0190 62 Jeqg’ | < seunsseid-an0 yeed 0] pes] ued S/WOS} < speeds swe) speeds owe}j d1U0s jsowye 0] pes] ued UOI}eJaj900e OWE} JUS|NGUN | 1sIW eyUBI ued yods-joY (cwu/Bog~) wut Ayjiqeuwuely samo] eAogy ys! ,AYOUWS,, SWWJO} YOIUM [10 Seyesodend jOds-}0OH Ajay pins a5 siseujodAH Bupom ‘suo|sojdxg eseoyuesd jo Buyjepoyy UoRSNquOD Page 42ZO/2004A 2002 4990190 6¢ seinsseid seybiy pue uolyesej900e 3J0WW os se6uo] MoU Ss} BWeI} 10} YJGUd| [SACI] « uoIso|dxe Puoddes e aAi6 0} sseooid yeodal Ued JOdS-}OH « aseoyueso inoUBnosyY} \sIwW [10 peeids pinoo uolsojdxe Arewid ul ung jeled « jods-]Oy punole pasijeoo| aq 0} Ajay!| UOIsojdxe ALE Anamp pint 4 suolso|dxy Alepuode8S suoisojdxg aseayuesg jo Sumjepow UoRSNqWOD, Page 43Z0/L004A Z00z 18q0190 6Z av pure jon fy poods ourepy yunquy) " WWoA sjonpolg es (y voly) quO’JOUe TJ aang pom JSPoW Suojsojdxg eseoyuerd Jo Buyjepowy uoNsnqwiOg Page 44Z0/L004A 2002 18q0190 62 JUCADI9II UOIISOd JUB/\ seseb joejed aie sjonpoid pue sre/jan4 ('o >>/a) JueysuI SI UOLPesquinbe einsseld peeds ewey]y jue}suoD MO}} Q-| Aaanin prt AR suonduinssy Suo|sojdxg eseoyuesg Jo Buljjepoywy UoNSNqUCD, Page 45Z0/L003A 2002 1090190 62 9|ZZOU SIUOS — (wuye G’0 < ainsseid-J8A0) ainsseiq YBIH “a peeds JUaA JUR}SUOD — (ye G'Q > aunssaJd-4J@A0) BINSSe1q MOT] « eyed O1d payUaA SJONPOJY Pure JIV/jeN4 Ayavsg pints Bunus, ‘suoisojdxg eseoyuesg Jo Suljjepow UoNsNquiog, Page 46ZO/LO04A 2002 4800190 62 (awinjon %) uoNesUsDU0D euRUEd v se € se @ : : 00+300°0 = vt $0+300°S @inssald Bd 90+300'1 HIMEN pue suAobing JO s]jNsed jejJUeWULEdX J (pWg’ |) JaqueYyD paeso|D oS UOIEOYOA |OPOV\ Suo|sojdxg eseoyUeID Jo Buljjepoyy voRsNqWOg Page 4720/L004A 2002 48q0190 62 vl6z7'0 E4910 rhLO'0 «98100 | 1 00+300°0 | $0+300'1 | $0+300'2 - SO+300°E + S0+300°7 s$0+300°S $0+300'9 | $0+300°2 $0+300'8 | | | juawuedxy %G'e oO PON %G°E «-----+ queWedxy %'Z ov l8POW SL —— (4) Base UDA, i (ed) aunssaig yedg i $0+300°6 HIMEN pue euAobing jo sjuauedxy yequieyy pelus/, UOHEOIA/ |@POY\ Suo|sojdx3 eseoyuEsD Jo Buljepow UoRsNqWOD Aang pint Page 48Knaoin pry & 20/L004A 2002 48q0190 62 eyes BuljuaA pue 9je1 aseejas AAjoue usamjeq eouRleg e ‘4 x y UO Spuedap OZIS JUBA USAID JO} aINSSOld Yea e« (ueqg’ |) aunssaud ajqeydeooe MO|@q Sal|duu| JUBA aINSSeld MO] « S}NSOY |epo/| ‘suo}sojdx3 eseoyuesd Jo Buljepoyy voRsNqWIOD Page 4920/L004A 2002 1890190 62 SUOISO|GX9 SJOABS B1OW JO\INS soulbue o6ue; Aum urejdxe Jouued SIU] JJ2WWS SI }O9JJ9 yng ‘seulbue |JeEWS UM Je67e] 8g O} Spud} SIU] HullusA pue eseejel Afsoue usEemjaq douR]eg Jo ainseaw ve SI “V/V « Anan pny eal owe ‘suolsojdx3 eseoyuesd jo Burjepoyy uonsnquiog Page 50Z0/L004A 2002 48q0190 62 ujbus] aseoyuRIO UUM S}} Oeypenb pue sweauty ALL }SIW [10 0} ejqeol|dde eyep se6 Suinssy — jUaWedxe Wod yjbua] eseoyUesJO jO uol}oun se peeds ewe ayewnsy peeds owe ayeiajao00e Ajpides ueo S9j0e}SqoO pue SUOIOsIJe1 AAEM ‘Saly|iqelsu] — [2ONWd S| UOeJaJa00e eWeY JUa|NQuN | |9pow au} 0} }NdUI Ue s! peeds ewe) Ananiy ping peeds owe suo}sojdx3 eseoyuesd Jo Burjepoyy uoNsnqwoD Pace 51ZO/L004A 2002 4840190 62 (s) WOLLINSI WOU 39NVISIC “4 U 8 9 ’ z 0 W 13 Bon O86l SSOsnvE ANSWIU3X3 (s/s) a33¢5 3WvT4 eno (ure-oueyjew) AR speeds ewe} jugjnqun, jejuewiuedxy suoisojdxg eseoxueig Jo Buljepow UonSNqWIOg Page 52Z0/L004A (w) @WINJOA aseoyUeID 002 009 00s 00r 00 002 OOL L 1 1 . 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This Paper describes the findings of the Working Party, which issued its final report in 1979, and the work sponsored by the Royal Navy looking into means of preventing gearbox explosions’ This aroce principally as a result of the catastrophic gearbox explosion suffered by HMS Illustrious in 1986. Tey paver ouilines the work programme pursued up othe RN Peer Review in 1998, The work undertaken after the Peer Review is described in accompanying papers submited to this conference, A brief description of how Gi mist ae generated their physical properties and some of their combustion properties wil bs nelages ont the understanding of their role in this complex phenomenon, INTRODUCTION Firm evidence concerning marine gearbox explosions is difficult to obtain. It may be that they occur less Frequently than crankcase explosions or that there isa general reluctance to discuss the incident ‘obvious reasons. There has been occasional journalistic reporting of witness evidence; however, the majority of the Gata included in this the paper has been obtained from reliable sources, namely the MOD ' and Lloyds Register. {2 Summary; the information reviewed shows that there were on average two gearbox explosions a year between 1960 and 1971. after which the frequency decreased dramatically, probably aya eal ct improved paulo the majority of which has been extracted from the Final Report of the Gearbox Explosion Working Party *, In all of these incidents, it is apparent that the failure of a component caused a mechanical rub that resulted in oil mist being generated at a hot ‘spot, which was the ignition source of the oil mist. Not all of the instances described resulted in a gearbox explosion; several were limited to 2 fire in the gearbox. This Situation should not be considered unimportant, as the incident involving HMCS Kootenay was the result of a fire inside a gearbox * * Author's Biography Pronk is Presently a consulting forensic scientist based in Cambridge primarily involved with the investigation of [res and explosions. Prior to joining Hawkins and Associates in 2001, he was a Senior Scientst oe the tase abicants Cente at Qinetig Pyestock (formerly DERA). He managed th Fite Hazards & Fuels Handing swoops ad Page 60‘Table 1 ‘A Review of Marine Gearbox Fires and Explosions Gear OT | Gearbor Enernal Date Location Ignited Explosion Fire Casualties Comments BELTS | FMS Devonshire | Yes Minor Ro None ‘Broken LP pinion tooth from fatigue damaged aft elix of main wheel & HP pinion. ETT1900 | HMS Hampshire | Yes Minor No ‘None ‘Rub in the FP steam turbine manual clutch 3aI962 | SS Verna Yes Niajor Ye Ginalies TEP primary pinion flexible claw type coupling failed, smashing the casing. 31063 | AIMS Kent Ye Minor No Nose ‘Manual clutch white metal missing and steel backing Dec 1564 | SS Seatrain New | Yes Wajor Yes Roa ‘Coupling Bol or gear Fim York failure T6o1965 | HMS Hampshire | Yes Minor We None Bearing shell distortion ‘caused by oil starvation in the gearbox ring main. ‘Sept 1965 | SS Maimohus | Yes Minor We None Tnadequate film carrying capacity ofthe oi im “Tag 1966 | Rolling Milt Yes ‘Minor No None Failure of tapered roll? bearing TSZ.1967 | RFA Regent Ye Minor No None Bearing Ang ofthe LP ‘primary pinion had become ‘dislodged and trapped between clutch elements 1967 CEGB Tiloury | Ves Minor No None “Thrust bearing failure, 5 305.1968 | YI38 Ver Winor We Tone ‘il sarvation when an astem ‘Transmission Test uid coupling was being Facility, operated at 200 % slip. Manchester BIOS | HMCS Kootenay | Yes Wajor Yer Tales Tacorresty fed peumary 3 injured pinion shell bearings in 1965, 305.1970 | ADEB Ye Major Yer None ‘A failed wala gearwhecl bearing 189.1969 | Industral Pump | Yes Wiinor No None Failures of tapered roller 317.1970 | drive Yes No. No None bearings. 21,8:1970 Yes Minor No. None 164.1971 | USN Caleate | Yes ‘Minor No. ‘None ‘Ovetheated forward HP tine intermediate bearing caused by oil stavation, ToT | HCMS Sheena | Yes No Ne None (il starvation caused by inverted fiting ofa primary gearwheel beain BEIT | HCMS Chaudiere | Yes Re Ne Nowe “Thrust bearing failure allowing primary pinion to rub against the forward journal bearing EIST | MV Makar Yer Naor Ye Rowe ‘Rub of the clutch dise carter Jn the input line Nov oT | AMS Zale Ye Minor Ne None Failure of the jackshaft bearing initiated major failure of many components, FIEI7S_| SS London Yes Major Yer Tinjured Failure in the cegion of the Pioneer LP flexible couplin Sages AMS tiastious [Yes aioe Ye Noa Rubbing SSS clutch. It was a result of the explosions in the Canadian Frigate HMCS Kootenay in October 1969 (where several hundred MI of frictional energy was released), and the submarine gearbox at the Admiralty Defence Establishment Barrow (ADEB) in June 1970, that the MOD (N) Gearbox Explosion Working Party was set up. The Working Party was established as a means of discovering and reporting the causes and Page 61mechanisms of previous gearbox explosions; the remit also included investigating means of reducing the future risk of explosion * ‘The Working Party recommended that the condition monitoring of gearboxes be improved. This recommendation had been followed since the early 1970's, leading to a decline in the number of incidents, but in April 1986 HMS Illustrious suffered a gearbox explosion. ‘The cause, an overheated slipper bearing from the SSS clutch, was identified soon after the incident **. It was concluded that the heat source was localized and had occurred over a short period of time (seconds rather than minutes). The grain structure of the metallic components showed that the surface attained a very high temp (>900°C) followed by rapid cooling The HMS Illustrious gearbox was fully instrumented in line with the proposals of the Working Party. Reliable temperature monitoring of bearing journals was thought to provide sufficient warning of failure to prevent an explosion. All bearings were monitored, but the site of failure occurred where mechanical contact was not expected. As a result of this incident the RN tasked the Fuels & Lubricants Centre (FLC) at Pyestock to reconsider the applicability of oil mist detection as a means of complementing temperature ‘monitoring in Naval gearboxes. This work programme led to the successful sea trials of the “candidate system" before the whole task was the subject of a peer review *. The peer review led to the recent work programme, the outcome of which is discussed in other papers presented at this conference. GENERAL PROPERTIES OF OIL MISTS Most oil-lubricated, rotating, machinery produces an oil mist; a feature that can be hazardous if the machinery is encased. Measurements have shown that, although large amounts of oil can be thrown into the machine's atmosphere, only a small proportion is present as "mist". In this context, mist is defined as droplets of 1 - 10 ym diameter; drops larger than this are classified as "spray". The reason for this, distinction is that mist droplets will burn with approximately the same ignition energy as a vapour, whereas the larger drops in spray require extra energy to volatilise them before ignition can take place. Although the properties of fog, micelles and dust clouds have been comprehensively studied ’, the exact nature of oil mists has received less attention, The following section of this paper summarises the practical ‘work conducted at FLC QinetiQ Pyestock (formerly DRA Cobham and FLC QinetiQ Pyestock). ‘The Generation of Oil Mists Oil mists are formed by the volatilisation of oil into the vapour phase: on cooling the vapour condenses to form small airborne droplets. The principle is exactly the same as that for the formation of meteorological fog. Oil mists are not formed by combustion and contain only very small quantities of breakdown products formed by thermal degradation. For an oil mist to be generated in machinery, it is necessary for a high temperature failure to occur. If a cross section from the failure to free air space is drawn then the oil is present in the liquid phase next to a vapour phase. The vapour then begins to condense forming a mixed phase containing both vapour and some oil mist before being present in a region predominantly as a fine mist (Fig 1). ‘Thus, if the failed component contains sufficient thermal mass, it can then increase the mist concentration to the lower flammable limit and, eventually ignite it. A considerable amount of work was conducted to study the effect of fluid composition on the properties of the oil mist generated *. The fluids studied ranged from jet fuel to heavy marine gear and engine oils. The main difference between the fluids studied was the ease of oil mist generation, which was proportional to both the viscosity of the fluid and its ease of vaporisation. Early work suggested that the optimum temperature for creating a dense, dry mist was 160°C above the flash point. Page 62Predominantly Oil vapour starts A mixture of oil vapour —_— Predominantly oil vapour to condense and mist in air oil mist in air Fig The generation of oil mist at hotspot Light Obscuration Characteristics + sat often been considered that oil mists dense enough to obscure vision are flammable. This is not avwoys the case and in some instances, what has been reported to be a dense oil mist or ‘smoke’ was /soolssy mist with a concentration below 10% of the lower flammable limit (If). Oil mist is used as an “ritivial smoke, its function being to reduce visibility to replicate the disorientating effects encountered in © we) fire. A series of experiments was conducted to determine whether there was an appreciable “n%zeence in light obscuration caused by different oils. It was interesting to note that the light from a 800 +a\ogen lamp would not penetrate a 15 mg I"' density oil mist, whilst a 240 mW at 880 nm, LE.D source _-». wore than adequate *, The studies showed that there was no appreciable difference between the light “rewastion caused by different gearbox oi] mists, obscuration being related to both the density and the sponges size of the mist Droplet Size + 2 the small droplet size that makes oil mists so dangerous. Not only does it obscure vision, but if a _psesssally flammable oil mist is generated in a gearbox or engine crankcase, the hazard remains for a % neov¥esable period of time unless the mist is removed, for example, by the scrubbing effect of lubricant + $rom spray bars. Furthermore, the particle sizes are small enough to be inhaled and the occupational _vy rose limnits of oil mists are exceedingly low, 5 for an 8-hour time weighted average exposure and 10 Siz ov) for a 15-minute exposure. Oil mist at this concentration is barely visible under many lighting Canwens. Hiss were conducted to determine the size of a typical oil mist droplet. The results of two techniques or 4 wot require sophisticated laboratory equipment are outlined below, to enable readers to conduct their D+ unvestigations if required, estes’ Law relates the radius of the droplet, r, to the falling velocity, V, the force acting on the droplets (in 1» ‘ave gravity), g, the viscosity of the carrier medium (air), 1 and the densities of the oil and air d; and dy v_gpvsvvely °, The telationship is shown in Equation (1). 28rlds on w Page 63where g = 980.621 cm s%; ds = 1.205x10° g ml" at 20°C and n = 182.7x10* gem‘! ¢", Precipitation experiments require a high density of oil in the air to ensure that the boundary layer of the mist can be clearly distinguished. The range of droplet size was considered to be small for each oil, owing to the clearly defined boundary layers obtained as the mists settled, with the exception of a phosphate ester oil, which possessed a wide-ranging droplet size as indicated by the diffuse boundary layer of the settling mist. Some results are summarised in Table II below. ‘Table II Oit Mist droplet size using Stokes’ Law ‘Git Type Gi Densin ig en) ‘Sedimentation Rate toms) ‘Droplet Diameter im) Gear Oi 0879 AL20°C T3207 224 Lightweight Om (0849 Ar20°C 17810 265, EP Gear Oi 0.880 AL 20°C 7aix0 1.68 Detergent Engine O1 0.886 Ar 20°C T0¢xi0" 198 ‘Phosphate Ester Oil 1126 At 20°C TTIIO™ 152 The technique used to measure oil mist droplet sizes by microscopy was to capture them on a spider’s web. A web was mounted on a projector slide and held in a low concentration mist. This was to ensure that the Particles did not aggregate. Only droplets that did not wet the surface of the web were studied. Calibrated microscope systems were used to measure the oil mist particle size, employing a computer to enable enhancement of the image on a monitor. Using these instruments droplet diameters of 2.1 to 2.6 wm (# 0.2 am) were measured for the gear oil and the light Combustion Properties There are two ways of reducing the probability of an oil mist explosion based on altering the combustion characteristics of the oil. One approach is to employ an additive package, which reduces the formation of mists and increases droplet size (thereby raising the minimum ignition energy required). The second is the adoption of a different base fluid, which does not burn as readily as a mineral oil. Phosphate ester lubricants for example have a wide application where fire resistance is required, but these lubricants are disproportionately expensive to purchase. The determination of the lower flammable limits (If) of oil mists (normally 48 + 2 mg I") is conducted generally using equipment based on that described by Mayes "°. It consisted essentially of a circulation loop with a fan assembly in one arm to ensure the even mixing of the mist (Fig 2). The mist may be ignited using 2 highly incendive spark or a glow plug placed at the bottom of the apparatus. The flame front assed vertically up the flame tube and exited the apparatus by bursting a thin membrane used to seal the ‘equipment during the filling and mixing stages. A burning oil mist will behave differently from a pre-mixed, combustible gaseous system because it is not uniform in composition. Discrete droplets exist in a range of sizes and will even move in different directions and velocities from the main gas stream. The lack of uniformity results in irregularities in the Propagation of the flame front, leading to difficulties in defining the combustion regime geometrically or mathematically. Another complication of mist combustion is that it may follow one of two regimes. In dense regions, where the amount of air is relatively small, droplets in the central part of the mist evaporate rather than ‘burn and the vapour burns at the outer boundary together with droplets at the outer boundary. For heavy fuel fractions (lubricating oil may be considered to be a heavy fuel), combustion is more akin to that of coal Particles, ic. in the early stages of the combustion extensive evaporation occurs where the products burn as 4 diffusion flame, but in the latter stages the residues burn by a heterogeneous surface reaction. thas been confirmed that on account of either gravity or their inertia, the concentration of oil mist droplets ‘may rise far beyond their static concentration (i.e. where they are evenly distributed), so that a flame may Page 64propagate through a mixture, which would not other been found to be more serious for larger droplets, but ‘sustain combustion ''. This phenomenon has offset by the difficulty in igniting the mixture. Circulating fan Bursting film Direction A of ait flow Oilmist — introduced here Ignition source (hot spot or spark plug) Fig2 Equipment used to determine the lower flammable limit of oil mists In the early stages of combustion the flame is probably burning in a fuel rich environment as itis in close proximity to the fuel supply. However, as the flame front progresses, it will rapidly enter a regime where it is fuel lean, at the lower flammable limit. Oil from the spray bars and windage (also that in suspension precipitated by a shock wave) will exist as large diameter drops, too large to exhibit the same behaviour as the smaller mist droplets and will reach the flame front with the evaporation and mixing processes incomplete. This contributes to the collapse of the coherent laminar flame front and the establishment of a combustion system based on droplet combustion". However, the larger droplets are converted into smaller droplets by kinetic energy processes initiated by a deflagration pressure wave. These smaller droplets then possess a lower ignition energy and therefore greater explosibility. The flammability limits, explosion violence, vaporisation and ignition temperatures define the ‘explosibility’ of a fuel. Under normal operation, the vaporisation and ignition temperatures of a gear oil are not low enough to present a significant risk and are of less importance than the ifl. All these parameters, except the upper flammable limit (uff), have been assessed for RN gear oils. The ufl is a seemingly impossible property to quantify owing to technical difficulties and the lack of homogeneity of oil mists *"*, Furthermore, it would appear that there has been no direct characterisation of oil mist explosion violence. This is assessed in special apparatus (typically a 20 litre sphere) yielding three parameters used in determining appropriate explosion protection. These are the maximum pressure, Pmax (bar), which can be estimated by calculation, the maximum rate of pressure rise, (bar/s) and the explosion violence, Ky (bar.m/s). The ‘g” suffix is strictly appropriate to gaseous media; ‘st’ is used for dusts. There is no suffix for mists. Page 65‘These data can be used to give an indication of relative explosion severity in four hazard classes. These are shown in Table III below. Table II The severity of explosion of different Fuels Fiasard Class | Ke (bards) Comment Typical Fuels Gi 6 ‘no explosion @ 116200 weak explosion inilk powder, propane G 20110 300 strong explosion exuia Ge 2300 strong explosion | hydrogen, aceiylené Given the difficulty in assessing the explosion violence of an oil mist, it has been accepted that an ‘equivalence can be made with propane vapour ignited by a weak ignition source, which is 75 bar.m/s and therefore defined as a weak explosion. However, an uncertainty is the influence of turbulence and that caused by secondary ignition processes appropriate to quasi-compartmentalised and obstructed spaces Flame jet ignition, as these secondary ignition processes are known, could occur in gearboxes. Bartneckt !5 showed that for propane: air mixtures, Kg values can increase well above 200 bar.m/s with what is qualitatively described as “medium turbulence”. ‘The Pressure Generated by an Explosion Simple calculations may be made as to what overpressure may be expected from combustion of an oil mist within gearbox, based on the assumption that the mist behaves as a vapour. The sums rely on knowing the free air volume within the gearbox, its heat capacity (0.92 kJ kg K"), density (1.29 g I") and the normal operating temperature. The total heat capacity of the air within the gearbox may be calculated, which, assuming combustion of the lower flammable limit of oil, enables the energy release and temperature rise {normally ~ 1800 K) to be estimated. Using the relationship (P1*T2/T1), a pressure rise is obtained (normally ~ 6.5 bar), given that Pi is 1 bar. This calculation may be valid for a minor primary explosion, but a secondary more violent explosion, as predicted by the Working Party would result in a pressure rise of at least 10 bar. ‘The Working Party considered it impractical to design a gearbox to withstand these higher pressures *. The prevention of the combustion process passing the transition from deflagration (sub-sonic) to detonation (super-sonic) is of major importance. However, itis probable that the volumes and lengths of Compartments in marine gearboxes are too small and short to permit the flame front to accelerate sufficiently to detonate, This transition is a highly unlikely scenario in both the marine gearbox and the diesel engine environment, given the nature of the fuel, but the consequences are so severe that it is worth mentioning briefly. One of the main causes of this occurrence in hydrocarbon combustion is an increase in Pressure and a high degree of turbulence, which promotes the mixing of partially reacted species with reheated vapours, thereby accelerating the combustion reactions. As such, consideration has to be given to the prevention of air entrainment (from the machinery space) back in to the main gear housing. There may be a supply of oil spray (from the lubrication system) and products of partial combustion, which include highly reactive compounds, such as acetylene. In such a situation the concentration of reactive species and oil will easily exceed the lower flammable limit of the oil and the air drawn back in to the gearbox will feed the fire or more probably cause a secondary, more violent explosion. In the Kootenay explosion the oil mist burned within the gearbox for approximately 20 seconds raising the temperature and pressure of the atmosphere within the case, This vented into the machinery space and exhausted the air supply within the gearbox, which, upon cooling, drew fresh air back into the hot mist laden atmosphere within the gearbox thereby causing a secondary explosion °. Page 66RESEARCH INTO THE PREVENTION OF GEARBOX EXPLOSIONS (1970 - 1998) ‘The MOD (N) Gearbox Working Party (1970 to 1978) ‘The MOD (N) Gearbox Working Party was established after incidents involving the Kootenay and the ADEB facility. It conducted literature surveys, investigations of gearbox atmospheres, gear design and the strength of gearbox cases, the construction of the controlled atmosphere test facility (CATF), prototype ‘machinery trials leading to the development and recommendation of condition monitoring systems. The literature surveys revealed that during the early 1970's, very little was known about oil mist explosions. Following the literature survey, investigations were made into the atmosphere inside working gearboxes, where it was determined that under normal operating conditions the concentrations of both oil vapour and mist were low (approximately 2 mg I') '-"", The normal atmosphere of a working gearbox consisted of a rain of oil droplets from the lubrication systems and windage; and it was considered that these droplets were too large to support combustion. ‘The Working Party tasked Vickers to develop a Code of Practice for the design of gearing and the associated systems. The Code of Practice concerned subjects ranging from the construction materials, the design of components, electrical, lubrication, monitoring systems, venting arrangements and fire suppression systems. In light of the incidents involving the Kootenay and the ADEB facility, the Working Party recommended that the strength of gearbox cases be increased to withstand a minor gearbox explosion *. The practical application of flame arrestors was conducted both at the Admiralty Oil Laboratory (AOL) and at the David Brown Gear Industries (DBGI) works at Huddersfield '*. The Working Party considered the sub division of gearboxes using flame arrestors, even though it was thought that the turbulent atmosphere might affect the performance of flame arrestors. No consideration was given to the performance of the flame arrestors being compromised by oil and dirt impinging on them or by mechanical damage. No ‘mention was made of protecting SSS clutch systems. ‘The AOL designed and built equipment capable of measuring the fundamental flammability characteristics of RN gearbox oils. Spontaneous ignition temperature (SIT) measurements were conducted using equipment previously developed for aircraft fuels and confirmed that the results obtained were dependent on the size of the equipment and the test method used "°. It is now known that the SIT values are also dependent on other parameters, for example the geometry of the equipment and the material from which it is made. Of greater significance than SIT and flash point data to this case, were the experiments conducted to determine the Ifl using the equipment described by Mayes "°, in which measurements of droplet size were also made. The study into fire resistant lubricants revealed that these tended to be considerably more expensive than the current RN lubricants, whilst not performing as well. Further to this was that fact that when some fire resistant oils were overheated, they broke down to form compounds that were known neuro-oxins. The objectives of the DBGI trials were to determine the temperature and pressure distribution within a marine gearbox and the effects of blanking off vent-valves and locating them in different positions. The experiments also involved releasing CO; and nitrogen gases (separately) from pressurised cylinders into the test gearbox. The work concluded with a recommendation to complete further work with a “two-level” inerting system suggested by Graviner, although this was not completed. It was assured that injection nozzles could readily be designed to avoid the risk of nozzle blockage via icing and unwanted ignition by electrostatic discharge; both known to be problems with this sort of system. Damaging overpressures were discounted given the gas volumes involved and gearbox venting arrangements. Atter completion of the prototype machinery trials the Working Party was disbanded in 1978, with the final report being issued in October 1979. The Working Party made a number of recommendations, including Page 67.the further development of bearing temperature-sensing equipment to ensure reliability. On review of the incidents relating to gearbox explosions it was noted that in 50% of the cases there was an associated vibration. As such, they recommended the development of suitable vibration analysis (VA) systems, in particular for journal bearing monitoring. It was also recommended that condition-monitoring systems should be developed in order to reduce or eliminate the requirement for routine gearbox inspections. After the HMS Illustrious Incident (1986 to 1998) The HMS Illustrious gearbox was fully instrumented in line with the proposals of the Working Party ‘Temperature monitoring of bearing journals was thought to provide sufficient warning of failure to prevent an explosion, but the site of failure occurred where mechanical contact was not expected. It was asked whether the failure could have been detected and, if 50, what measures can be taken to prevent such an incident from reoccurring, As the flammable mixture in a gearbox is invariably an oil mist, and given the development of the oil mist detection (OMD) systems since 1978, the use of OMDs was investigated to ‘complement thermo sensors. On review of the OMDs available, two candidate systems were subjected to a series of preliminary trials using a purpose built oil mist facility ® followed by a more comprehensive evaluation 2", after which Proposals for a sea trial were made using the preferred candidate system 2 ™. The trial confirmed the capability of the candidate system to indicate the onset of flammable conditions due to mechanical failure in a marine gearbox ™. This was because oil mist transients were detected within a normally operating gearbox where there was no mechanical failure. Information to facilitate the selection ‘of detector head locations for a permanent fit was attained. It was realised that the oil mist concentration reflecting normal operation for one gearbox may not necessarily apply to another. Variations in oil mist levels would probably arise in different gearbox designs and would probably be dependent on parameters such as power levels, gearbox volumes and venting arrangements. ‘The final conclusion was that the candidate system would be a reliable and effective addition to Naval gearbox hazard warning and control systems *. It was also concluded that the development and trials. Process had been a success, An overview document was written to describe the development of the project, from inception to the completion of the successful sea trial of the OMD system ™. The paper discussed the development of a Second line of defence (using oil mist detectors) that may be employed to monitor the state of the gearbox atmosphere itself. A long-term trial using a CVS was proposed “6, in part because of their long remaining service life, but also because it was a CVS that was subjected to a catastrophic gearbox explosion. As with the previous tral, the detector head locations were a compromise between ideal locations and minimising disruption to the smooth running of the ship. A report of the trial was issued shortly afterwards ”” After the CVS trial a Peer Review was conducted to reassess the entire strategy for the prevention of gearbox explosions. After a Peer Review meeting, an interim report was issued *, which included an action grid detailing appropriate areas for future research. ‘The subsequent work programme was conducted at the FIC, Pyestock using the Metre cube and the Y205 gearbox test rigs described elsewhere ® 75 The research programme was broken down into paper studies, experimental studies using small-scale equipment, large-scale rig work and a CFD modelling programme and encompassed the recommendations of the Peer Review. Other authors at this conference discuss this study. CONCLUSIONS Oil mist explosions in marine gearboxes are invariably caused by a mechanical rub, which generates a localised hot spot that then ignites the mist. The research programme up to 1998 showed that whilst improved quality control and engineering may have reduced the frequency of explosions, there was still a equirement for condition monitoring to detect the onset of dangerous conditions. The use of temperature monitoring devices in bearings has proved to be a valuable tool in preventing explosions, but their 'imitation is that they only monitor discrete areas. As such a complementary technology, such as oil mist Page 68detection, would significantly reduce the risk of the onset of an explosive condition and provide a condition-monitoring tool for marine gearboxes. However, the limitations of both of these technologies is that action is still required from the ship's crew in order to prevent the onset of flammable atmospheres and, as such, consideration should be given to technologies that would guarantee a non combustible atmosphere. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. ‘The author is grateful for the opportunity to present this paper and acknowledges the contributions of many people, without which, the technical work programme could not have been completed. These include Drs MH Holness & LM Rudd, Mr A G Walmsley, $ P Heath, N A Hopkinson, P B Lambert, Mr C Timms, 3 Clarke, E Maslin, G Robinson, A Collins and I Taylor. Most importantly, the research could have been conducted without the financial support of the Royal Navy from the Warship Support Agency, MPS 211 REFERENCES 1, M D Cooper, M H Holness & D McNeill, ‘A Review of Marine Gearbox Explosions’, Trans. 1 Mar. E (TM), Vol 93, Paper 10, 1981. 2. D MeNeill, ‘Final Report On Investigations Carried Out By MoD (N) Gearbox Explosion Working Party (July 1970 To December 1978)’, YARD 2554/79, 23° Oct 1979. 3. D K Nicholson, ‘The Kootenay Gearbox Explosion’, Trans. I. Mar. E (TM), Vol 93, Paper 11, 1981. 4. RA Rowley and TM Gaught, ‘Fire In The Forward Gear Room. The ‘Illustrious Gearbox Explosion’’, INE 30, (2), pp. 292 -306, 1987. 5. FJ Plumb, ‘Examination Of An Overheated Slipper Bearing From The Starboard Main Gear Box ‘Clutch, HMS Illustrious’, ARE (UMD) TM 86863, June 1986. 6. CR Smith, ‘Gearbox Explosion Peer Review’, BAe&SEMA Report MS.1014/CRS/v3, 23” Dec. 1998. 7. HL Green, WR Lane, ‘Particulate Clouds’, 2" Edition, E & FN Spon Ltd, London, 1964. 8. M H Hhlness and D J Rose, ‘General Properties of Oil Mists’, DRA WI Acquaint 1No50/94/05 13/1.12/4, May 1994. 9. Handbook of Chemistry and Physics, Ed. R C Weast, S M Selby, 47" edition, C.R.C. Press, Cleveland U.S.A., 1967. 10. PR Mayes, ‘Lubricating Oil Flammability’, AOL Memo No. 9, October 1974 11. Final Report of Investigation Entitled, ‘Study of the Lower Flammability Limits of Lubricating Mists’, City University, London, Under Agreement No. 2090/026, 1" October 1973 to 31" October 1975. 12. A Williams ‘Combustion of Liquid Fuel Sprays’, Butterworths, 1990, 13. J H Burgoyne, ‘Mist And Spray Explosions’, Chemical Engineering Progress, Vol 53, No. 3, pp. 121 ~ 124, March 1957. 14, AM MacLennan, ‘A Study of Kerosine Mist Explosions’, RAE Report No. Chem. 448, September 1949. 15. W Bartneckt, ‘Explosions ~ Course Prevention Protection’, 2nd Edition, Springer-Verlag, 1981 16. R G Collis and M H Holness, "Hydrocarbon Atmospheres In Marine Machinery: Torque Tube Cover On HMS Exmouth’, AOL Technical Memorandum No. 59, Nov. 1971 17, RG Collis and M H Hoiness, ‘Hydrocarbon Atmospheres In Marine Machinery: Gearboxes Of HMS Devonshire’, AOL Technical Memorandum No. 60, Dec. 1971 18. RG Collis, ‘Hydrocarbon Atmospheres In Marine Machinery: Marine Gearbox Atmosphere Tests At David Brown Gear Industries, AOL Technical Memorandum No. 84, April 1974 19. RG Collis, ‘Spontaneous Ignition of Turbine Oils’, AOL Tech. Memo 50, 1971. 20. M Smith, ‘Preliminary Assessment Of Commercial Oil Mist Detectors’, WI Acquaint 22/88/0217/1, December 1988. Page 6921. LM Rudd, ‘A Comparison of Two Oil Mist Detection Systems’, DQA/TS Technical Note 91/5, May 1991 22. LM Rudd, ‘Evaluation of Commercial Oil Mist Detectors’, DQA/TS Technical Note 9/3, Jan. 1992. 23. LM Rudd, ‘Proposal for Sea Trials of Oil Mist Detectors’, Work Item 0217, December 1991 24. L M Rudd, D J Rose M H Holness, “The Ship Trial of a Commercial Oil Mist Detector’, DRA/TR94025/1, Sept. 1994, 25. LM Rudd, D J Rose M H Holness, ‘Preventing Gearbox Explosions’, INE 35(3) 1995. 26. Rose, D. J., 1997: ‘Strategy Plan for the Prevention of CVS Gearbox Explosions, Oil Mist Detector Sea Trial and Project Management Plan’, DERA/SMCIFLCI79/97/3.3/4, October 1997. 27. DJ Rose, ‘Results of the Gearbox Oil Mist Detector Trial Aboard HMS Illustrious’, WI Acquaint 57/9613.3/3, Sept 1996. 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JO S1Oyeredas jUEIOYJNSU! ade|dal 0} sue BUIAeS OWA puke }SOD S9JOYaA UO JO SeyoUaq 4se} oulBue Uo ‘a"| Jueweinseew eoxId Ul Jo a|qedeo ase sWie}shs egoW suia}shs aiqe|ene YIM ssaoons uoNeIedes sulWexa 0} Asey swejsAs uoljeredes mau Buuseuibue Jo} jueLodu! si AQUenb pue Ayyenb JOsos8e }10 Jo aHpeymouy = oT) Fy Fa jz Ed Ed Ey Ayewuins Page 89Lessons to be learnt from designing model-verification experiments for oil-mist explosions Dr P J Bowen, Cardiff UniversityuoResIyIA| Uojsojdxy : Aapee7 yaloig SUOISO/AXJ }SIW-1IO : }SIPUDINS (¥6-066T) "P¥1 yoreesoy |194S -S66T (Sa]eM) Ayssaatun JyIpueg SULAVOUISUZ JO JOOYDS JIpPseg 491N}997] 101/U9S 8uz9 ‘dud ‘oSsq u9Mog't'd SNOISO1dXA4 LSIIA-11I0 Od SLN3AINIYAdX3 NOILVOISINSA “140 0W SNINDISAG WOUs LNYV31 3d OL SNOSS3T Page 92uol}Us]-91d sdUdISURI} 29 oseyd jeuO!}ppe 0} enp swajqoid jeyuoWAedxy eyep uoepljea snosog|4 Sulyesoues sweajqod Ajpejnojed waysfs jo AyIxa]dui09 ease s|y} Ul SSelS01d MO|s 10} UoSeaY Ad L147 40 Aiosaze9 sazeljuasoyyIp ulodyse|y 10 AYIHE|OA (Ad.L41) suojsojdxy eseyd-om, ‘jong-pinbry, :A1039}89 Japeolq Jo JeSqns se aay sUulEg pequosep euswousyd owes ay} Ayjeoiseg }se/q‘UO]}euse]Jap ‘uoIso|dxa —- [osolee ‘Aejds ‘oyesuepu0d : A}JUDJOJIP SJUDAD OqOSEp SoLJSNpul JUSIOIG (uojeyOdsued} pue jeojwayYyooJzed “3a) sjany pinbI| 10 sjjo a/]qewWwey ssn }eYy} Salj}snpul Jo AJBLeA BPM 0} 3S919zUI JO euswouayd 91}eWIs]Ud SUOISO/AX9 }SIW-IO NOILONGOUINI Page 93sowwessoid oinzny ul asn 105 ‘SUOISO|AX9 }SIWU-]10 10J EJEP YABWIYOUDG OpIAO’d 0} S}dwiaye snoleid Sulie9}s pue Sulusisop poules oouolodxe pue ospajmMouy JajsuesL NIV Page 94suo|snjou0g uolssnosig pue sojdwexy suljeos ainssaidioagC puke uoljesedoig owe 901noOs UOI}US] UO}PBSH9}OeIeYD UONUS]-A1d S9130/OpOYyzI|A] UO!}EUO FSIIAI SUO]}pUOD jeyUSWUOAIAU [eINU] poousJ9joy SOIPN}S SNOIAed eugwousyd s1seg AUVINIANS NOILVLNAS3ud Page 959}e1 Suluing jenj uo spuadap asi, osnsseid jo a3ey suoIsojdxe aseoyuesd Ul UO}}EJ9UES OINSS9IGIBAO JO BDINOS UIE JUBWBUIJUOD 91NSS91d19A0 OU <- JUBWOIUIJUOD OU ‘aDU9[NGJAN} }HOYUM uo}}e10UNS VOUZINGIN} JUBoIIUZIS —- yuowsouyuog- : 0} onp (uO}eOI|dde 10J) UOT}eA9UES B1NSSAIGIDAG ainssaidiaao — 21}SOuseIp paezey Aled « u01}e}U9S9d pug Ul [JEEP BOW — MBIAIBAQ «© VNAINONSAHd OISVa Page 96suio}sAs aseyd-z ‘jusisues 9S94} JO UO}}eSI19}9e1eYO puke UOl}e19UaS SOL} |JIe} PLY} 9uUeAZOAd USIsop 0} asua|jeyD - we}jshs jo 932}s JUZINGIN} jeNIU] = - SUO]}IPUOD JUSIqUWe JEU! - (‘939 ‘azIs Ja;doup) sofseyOeeYyo aseyd-omy-— - Ayyouosowoy pue oes se-jany—- uolisodwos jong - : Aq Sujusoaos o}e4 Suluing « (}U09) YN3INONSHd JISVa Page 97poyijuenb poodsowey pue oinssaidiaA0 - SOAN}XIW 7B S}SIW 9]1}EJOAUI ‘O]IVEIOA - (,Wg*Z) a]e9S-wNIpaw - (L66T ‘E66T) ‘12 39 UeMog - poinseow oinssoidiaA0 - SOAN}XIUW 2 S}SIW O]IZEJOAU! ‘| IZEIOA - pouljuos ‘(,WgT) osie] pue jjews - (Z-T66T) YIND/ONL Aq .SOXAIA; : dif ° sisAjeue &}ep 19A0 JQnop awos - powilels spoadsowey jsej‘juajnqin} ‘pouljuooun “(ewiggs) ase] - ("939 ‘jasalp ‘jlo jony) sfany AAeoy - : (686T) Ie 39 doy - G3SLID SAIGNLS SNOIAAYd Page 98gyeos 981P| 10} 9[qeo1}9e1d 9q 0} AjoyIUN So]sojopoyjow je}UsWILIedxa aWOS juaWdojaAap JapoUw! 10J jeI}UaSSa [1€}9p Ul] Pa!pN}s aq 0} ssoooid jeoisAyd SulAjsopun moje SUOI}PUOD Pd][01}U09 ‘pouljap-]]aM AIDA : (cW ¢ OT) SOIPN}s a] e9S-]}eWIS |eIBAVS « ("}U09) G3ALID SAIGNLS SNOIAANd Page 99AY]I}e[OA 0} onp O|WeUdIS UOIsO|dx9 aseoyueRID 10} OAl}ISUDS SSo] A[qeqojd SUOISO]dXxXy siojoweled 3Ssoy} pi0901 pue @INSBOW SPI] }e P|NOYs S}USWIIBdXS 9]e9S-a81e] « 9}ep 0} a]B9S-]/BWIS }e Bj/qQISBoj A[UO [O1}UOD WNYIp UsAoid s}uswWedxo Jo Ayyiqezeodau Aep-oj-Aep ‘jo1ju00 yNouYWM—s- (aseyd oasjela. ‘SozIs }o|dolp *8"9) Soljslua}OReYyo oseyd -OM} UOIPUSI-91d CIA BOUDNIJUI YOOAIPU! OSje—- 9}e1 SujuAng BIA VOUONUI }OOIIP—- Aypjumy pue sinjesodwi9} ‘oinssaid JUDIqUIY e SNOILGNOO TVLNAIAINOMIANA TVILINI Page 100(9}ep 0}) ajeds jews ye alqisnejd Ajuo ynq ‘ajqeajsap jsou! AZozLIYS JSAI4 « UO!}US! B10Joq OWI} ,UOHedISSIP, MOYJe — - SUO!}IPUOD JUDS|NQIN} AeTIWIS, Jepun uosHedwiod sAjeyjenb oyeyapun jo ‘AyQuUenb— - uol}eioues OSIWIUIW- S9139}EJ}S [01}]U09 [e}UBW}AVdxe soUE|NqIN] « ajeos ase] je AyueNnb Jo jo1}U09 0} YNIWIP —- UOIso]dXx9 UO JODY JURBDIIUSIS = - poyjow Ud!}esIWO}e sajuedWIOD0R UaYO-— - BduUd|NGin} UOIUSI-Bd (}409) SNOILLGNOO TVLNAINNOUIANA TVILINI Page 101Apnis SOXaIA Ul posn ‘ajqnedwosyseoj— - IMS 10 ainssaid-Ysiy : S19s]W0Ze pIN|j-a|suIS agieyo oaisojdxe (Al) spoyzow o}WeUApOW9y} (11!) S19S|WIOJE PIN]J-UIM} (11) 40 pINyj-a[suls (}) : suoljdo Arewnd yp « (uirlog - oT) 9zIs Jojdoup jeu SulArea Ayyeoiyeusa}sAs yo ajqedeo-~—- uo}}BJ9UNS GOUB|NQIN} jeUU;WE- oinjxjw eseyd-Z snoouesowoy — - S8A1}00[GO - S3IDSOTOGOHLAIN NOILVINHOS LSIIN Page 10290u9/Nqin} YOeqmMeAp UjeW ‘s}s|wI aul, BJe9S ~9g1e] Ara 10) Ajsnojaaid pasn ssosiui0jze po}eeyiodns—s- 9]B9S-a81e| 10) NIIP {("}e Jo UBMOg ‘1ystAep) ajeos Jews ye a]qeoljdde poyjow sequieyo ,pnojg, uosjIM —- SJos|wioze D1WeUAPOWOYL « 9]B9s-981e| 10J [eUIN}do aq 0} AjayI] AJOLeA WUBDSOAIOYJO—- yoeqmeip e ses SujAuedwogoe jo uolppe —-- ‘Je 38 uaMmog Aq pasn ‘uojdo piny-e/8uls ueyy soyeq = - SJOSIWIOZL PINYJ-UIML SSISOTOGOHLIIN NOILVINUOS LSIIN oeA}I1F2]0A 0} anp jueodW ssa] aseYyd-sAIzeO1 ("030 ‘417) sonbiuyso9} poseq-sese] OAISnA}U! ‘suljdwies [edo] no 3ulj}e]d, jan} 40) }UN0De },USaOp ‘pasiodsip A}JQUeNb [e707 uol}e14}U99U09 aseyd dAl}e/91 puke OF}e1 BDUB]eAINDA a]eos-esie] 10) Ajqeqoid sonbjuyse} aaisnayul - val - AIOWUNIO[9A Sulsewy ajoiped - uoHesiezyeIeVYD VdUB[NQUN] UOIPUS]-Bd « (sapl|s‘*s*9) selpnys ayes 1981e] 10} Ajay!] Sanbjuyde} Aapjo - (“930 ‘SII ‘Vdd Jeue|d “3"9) sonbiuys9} Sulzis yooys-19seE] - (UAdA[eIA] “3"2) UOTJORAIP 19S] JUISUBI} - UMWIAINSB|I] 8ZIS }o/dOIq « : SUI9}SAS JO BDUB[SUBs} 0} ONP S2IWNIIWIG NOILVSIMSALOVYVHO NOILIND Aud Page 104SOO1NOS 9/dI}JNW ‘UDALPADAO :o]QeJISOp }sea]—- (‘1e 39 VAdoy ‘SOXFIA) SAOWUZ|] |eOIWaYD PI|OS - pouinbeds SUIALp-A9A0 ploAe 0} 9189 }nq ‘(Je 32 UBMOg) Aj|nJsseoons pssn - UO!}US] OUIL]4 IO0lld » SUOISO|AX9 JSIW B]L9S-9s1e] 10) ajqeIjouuNn 2A0i1d Ue }Nq ‘S}99jJO UOIUS! 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PaAosdu AJPAISSOASOAd SAeY SOWIWeIZOAd SNOJAGId BAISUBAXa [es1OABS SUOISO|AX9 }SIW 9]B9S-93Ae| JO 9}e1 SujusNG SulusIOUOD 91N}e19}1| U] S8JDUD}SISUODU! SUIOS ayes 4981e] 7e Apejnojyed ‘[01}U09 0} }{NdIVJIp AOA SUOISO|AX9 }SIIA] SNOISNTONOO Page 109Oil mist basics and the oil mist detection efficiency approval (OMDEA) certificate Dr Ing H Brunk, Schaller Automation KG Page 110Oil mist basics and the oil mist detection efficiency approval (OMDEA) certificate H. Brunk’, Dr.-Ing. Schaller Automation KG, Germany SYNOPSIS ‘The first section of this paper describes trials performed at a test bench regarding the failure of sliding bearings. The parameters that were measured are discussed. Because the interrelationships governing the development of oil mist in the event of besring damage are of great interest for large diesel engines, they are ‘analysed in detail. A connection between the heat of friction to be dissipated and the development of oil mist is verified, ‘The second section of the paper presents and describes the new Guideline published by Germanischer Lloyd in Hamburg for the testing of oil mist detectors at diesel engines, and includes report on the first ‘measurements conducted on the basis of this Guideline. Oil Mist Basics The topic of oil mist development at damaged bearing surfaces is as old as engine lubrication itself. In the older as well as later literature on engines, there are unfortunately no detailed treatments of this subject. Furthermore, it is also very difficult to obtain information on events connected with oil mist explosions. The reasons for this surely include the often uncertain cause, the unclear claim adjustment, the question of liability and the poor image suffered by the ship operator whenever such damages occur. However, these factors have also led to the situation where the topic of oil mist development and the associated hazards for people, ship and engine are neglected in the training of young engineers and underestimated in practice. ‘One of the few sources on the oil mist problem is to be found in a reference from 1960; see Literature (2). In this book, a whole chapter is devoted to crankcase explosion with full details - as many as 41 pages. The topics of hot spot, explosion conditions, development of the explosion with the relevant flame, pressure and shock-wave histories, precautions against explosions and a few typical crankcase explosions are described. A detailed list for OM development is also given: “A crankcase explosion can originate at any moving element in an enclosed force-lubricated engine. More explicitly, crankcase explosions are known to have originated, respectively, at pistons, gudgeon pins, cylinder liners and liner details, fuel valve, piston rods, top-end bearings and crossheads, bottom-end bearings, main bearings, camshaft, gear teeth, emergency governors, lubrication systems, engine-driven pumps and so on.” An early device for the detection of oil mist is also shown ina sketch. This unit, made by the company Graviner, functioned with light bulbs and split beams to prevent the false alarms which occurred as a result of voltage fluctuations in the ship's mains supply. Author's Biography ‘Since 2001, Dr. Henning Brunk has been Technology Manager at Schaller Automation in Blieskastel, Germany, with responsibilty for technical development. After studying ship operation technology at Flensburg University of Applied Sciences and marine engineering atthe Technical University of Hanover and then obtaining his doctorate at the Technical University of Hamburg-Harburg, Dr. Brunk joined the Propulsion Plant Department of Germanischer Lloyd in Hamburg, subsequently becoming managing director ofan inland-vessel shipyard on the Rhine. Dr. Brunk is a member of the STG (Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers) in Hamburg and is also aetive in workgroups ofthe CIMAC and the FVV (German Research Association for Combustion Engines) Page 112Fig. 1: The good old “Graviner” The description of damages given in this work is very graphic and impressive. One of its aims was surely to act as a dire warning for the ship's engineers to encourage them not be to be negligent as regards oil mists and bearing damage, and also to prevent accidents. A case of damage is described with the aid of a sketch. A solid wall of the crankcase, having a thickness of 12 mm, is shown with the fragments and fracture edges after the explosion. What is more, the circumstances are also quite remarkable. The damage occurred after an inspection and about $ minutes after the engine was started up. “A six-cylinder four-stroke trunk engine, 95 mm bore, 600 mm stroke, was in service. About after five rhinutes after starting the engine one day, a crankcase explosion occurred. The cause was a partial seizure of No. 6 piston. The engine had been overhauled, and the seizure was brought about by distortion of the cylinder liner, caused by the rubber rings soe.” The cases of damage which have occurred in recent years often exhibit these characteristics. The operating condition immediately after commissioning of the new engine, atthe test bench during trials, or after a repair or overhaul seems particularly susceptible to damage in the lubricating system. The above-mentioned source includes very detailed descriptions of the investigations performed by Dr. Burgoyne and Prof. Newit and of the results obtained. Since these investigations had taken place in the 1960s and no newer results are available, a number of fundamental studies on bearing damage and on oil mist development were performed in the last few years by the company SCHALLER AUTOMATION. This primarily includes the examination of the drop size for various oil mist sources, such as oil mists caused during bearing damage ata test bench, theatre fog machines and other artificial mist generators, e.g. in model building. Page 113{rae ratio (eae Hauge 2 Ree Hautgeot Rate in % Drop Diameter in ym Standard distribution of drop diameter for oil mists The term “oil mist" is used when there is evaporation and recondensation of lubricating oil, for example. This oil mist typically has drop sizes of about 4 yim. Drops with this diameter arrive with inhale deeply into the lung, the inhalation injurious to health. At the same time, there are also smaller and larger drops. The standard distribution of the oil drops within the oil mist is shown in Fig. 2. This illustration depicts the result of the ‘measurement of three bearing tests with failure and oil mist development. With regard to the drop size and the distribution of the drop size, however, it does not matter whether this oil mist from lubricating oil originates “naturally” from seizure in a sliding bearing or “artificially” in one of the oil mist generators, as developed by SCHALLER. The measurements were conducted by the company Malvern Instruments at the Schaller works and at the institute of Prof. Dr.-Ing. Albers at the University of Karlsruhe. Here a laser measurement process called Low Angle Laser Light Scattering (LALLS) was applied; see also . The literature from the 1960s quotes drop sizes of 10 um. This statement must be viewed in the light of the ‘measurement technology that was available 40 years ago. For a typical distribution of the drop size, the associated data — such as the number of drops, the resulting surface area and the average drop spacing — were calculated, Fig. 3 presents a table with the principal data 4 18 ry 1 a rT) od aed wave) moved) snieed eased) Tren ayer] ase! orse-al sos2e] arse sese 1d eave ast] seal easel cose] vareal veres| armed moe er beuuet eget] sare] sree nad viseal econ esses) sae w wees aed sae] 246] zeal ence a] as asa] ase weal 26] 19 aooe a] 50069 72 fora aes] tae] used area] row] sired seo] 8058 eee vel re idee fecea deceit 1a Pesan Toso SAE: ‘Table withthe principal data for an oil mist Lines 1, 2 and 3 describe the values for the drop diameter, the corresponding average drop diameter, and the quantity of drops obtained from the measurement of the diameter distribution, For a single drop in each case, Page 114lines 5, 6 and 7 give the calculated values for the volume, the diameter and the drop surface area, Lines 9 to 14 provide the calculated values for the number of drops at LEL, broken down according to drop diameter, together with the total resulting mass, volume and total surface area, as well as the total surface area of the oil drops when expressed as a rectangle. ‘The main properties are shown in Fig. 4. These values indicate the very large number of drops. However, the decisive factor for ignitability is the total surface area of all drops. Kennwerte OM bei LEL Ratings OM for LEL Number of Drops Anzahl Tropfen ini dmeatLEL in 1 dm* bei LEL Masse SRS nte 205047, Oberflache SHES BOIE3E Oberflache De: S299. Fig. 4: Main properties of oil mists New measurements using today’s measurement methods would be desirable, in order to verify the LEL value and to correct it if necessary. Fig. 5: Bearing test bench of the University of Kartsruhe, Institue of Machine Design and Automotive Engineering (MKL), Prof. Dr-Ing. Albers At the bearing test bench (see Fig. 5) at the University of Karlsruhe, sliding bearings were loaded to failure on commission from SCHALLER AUTOMATION. The time curve of the bearing parameters ~ such as the bearing back temperature at two measurement points, the torque, the splash oil temperature, the thermocontact signal for “touch-down” between bearing shaft and shell — as well as the development of oil mist were studied and evaluated. Furthermore, the measurements for the drop size were also performed at the test bench Data for the bearing shells and the principal data of the test bench: Bearine diametes Da 118.09 to 11815 mm Bearing width We {8mm | Relative hearin clearance 0271 1n 0.4449 haft diameter D= 117.60 to 117.80 mm afi lenoth L=250mm Page 115[ Specific thermal canacitv of the shaft __lcu= 462 Ii(ke K) ee ee == | Sneed. n= 0104000 min [Enoine cutout P=210kW | Max. envine toraue M=250Nm [Lubricatine oil ne. AE 30 Volume of the test cabinet V=401 ‘Table I: Data for test bench Several diagrams are given below to document the results, from which the following parameters can be obtained: Lower diagram: Torque [Nm] «Oil mist density [%0p] Upper diagram: Temperature [°C] in the highly loaded zone of the bearing © Temperature [°C] in the middle of the bearing ‘*, Temperature [°C] of the splash oil These results served as the basis for further considerations. The objective was to obtain an estimation of the conditions prevailing during failure of a bearing in a diesel engine. S10" orenmeraet Bt |) Oretel onl | 23 000 ees ‘Onebet 400] 10" Drahenoment/ Torque [km] Zeit Time (3) Fig. S: Measurement results fora test onthe failure of sing bearing - B ‘The temperature curve for the measurement point within the highly loaded zone of the bearing reacts to the bearing overload with an immediate increase in temperature. In the course of the failure, the temperature rises and falls. The reason for this lis in the behaviour of the hot spot between the bearing shaft and shell. Depending on the development of the bearing damage, the hot spot shifts about within the zone of high bearing load. During this phase, material is removed from the shaft and the shell. As soon as the hot spot comes close to a Measurement point, the temperature registered there increases sharply. This increase and decrease in temperature during the failure history indicates that itis very important to measure the temperature at the “right” position in the bearing, - Page 1168 g Temperatut °C se 8 Dag Tener] = Lager Temperate & 7.000 000 4000 000 40* Drehmomant Torque [Nev] 1.000 Zeit Time (8) Fig. 6: Measurement results for atest on the failure of sling bearing -C In order to measure the temperature of the oil immediately after it leaves the clearance gap, a drip channel was arranged in the area from 3 oclock to 9 o'clock. The temperature of the oil flowing from the channel was then monitored. The measurement point thus lies close to the position at which the oil would be heated up directly in the event of bearing damage. This method is much more direct than the splash oil method which is currently applied for some engines. However, the measurement of this temperature exhibits a sluggish behaviour in contrast to the measurement of the bearing back temperature or oil mist measurement. Tt must therefore be expected that the splash oil method, for which the measurement point is located at some distance from the engine wail, will not deliver any useful values for the timely detection of bearing damage. ‘The measurement values for the frictional torque and the oil mist development are plotted in the lower parts of Figs. 5 and 6. It can be seen immediately that the quantity of oil mist that is produced over time is direetly related to the frictional torque. A rapid increase in the frictional torque is followed, after a short delay, by a steep rise in the amount of oil mist that is produced. With a constant frictional torque, the production of oil mist is slower. Such behaviour was observed for all trials. This relationship will be explored in more detail below. Page 1173000 4/min = 1500 t/min 4000 1/min E 0,5 ‘Opazitatsgradient / Gradient of Opacity %/s) 0,0 0 40 Reibleistung / Friction Performance [kW] Fig. 7: Relationship between the frictional torque and the development of oil mist during failure of sliding bearings ‘The interrelationship obtained from Fig. 7 shows that there is a direct connection between the increase in oil mist and the frictional torque in the defective bearing. During normal operation of a bearing, the frictional loss energy is dissipated through the lubricating oil, through heat conduction in the bearing casing and in the parts mounted outside on the bearing, and also through radiation to the surroundings. After prolonged operation of the bearing, a steady-state condition is achieved for the energy flow. In the case of failure, the frictional power loss caused in the defective bearing by the additional frictional torque is dissipated through an increase in the temperature of the lubricating oil, heat radiation and heat conduction and also through evaporation of oil from the bearing. The proportion of the frictional power which is dissipated through the evaporation of oil can be obtained from Fig. 7. There is a direct relationship between the frictional power and the development of oil mist per unit of time. Even for large frictional powers, it must be expected that the major portion of the frictional power is dissipated through evaporation of the lubricating oil. All other heat transport possibilities (convection and radiation) have a much higher time lag than the evaporation of oil directly at the location of the damage, ice. the hot spot. If the average friction coefficient 4 can now be determined for the case of seizure, one can use this to ascertain the frictional torque for failure in a diesel engine. All tests show that, after a steep rise at the beginning of failure and another steep rise at the end of failure (seizure of the shaft) the frictional torque for failure of the bearing is approximately constant over a wide range. Evaluation of the tests shows that the friction coefficient without starting or seizing events is about i = 0.21 ‘The findings obtained here were applied to two modern diesel engines of typical construction, Page 118Motor Typ [12 M43 [14 K98 MC fi Leistung [10.800 30.080 | kW 2 Drehzalil 500) 94 [1/min > Frequenz 83 16 | 1/6 «| Reibbeiwert 02 0,2 H s_[Drebmoment [206.3 81358 | kNm 274.9 10734,9 | kW 70 700,0_| ki/ke 0,4 15,3 | ke/s . = th wom 02 6a | _ke/s [wT th 02 9,2 | ke/s A V-komp. 30,0 7040 | _m> = LEL 1a 33,1 | kg OL » _| Zeit bis LEL 6 4 s « Trew 0,51 3,51 | ke/s | ‘Table It: Data caleulated fora theoretical case of bearing damage For a four-stroke engine and a two-stroke engine, the principal data are listed in lines 1 to 3 of Table II. Line 4 shows the value of the friction coefficient in the case of bearing damage, as can be derived from the trials at the bearing test bench. Lines 5 and 6 indicate the value for the resulting frictional torque and frictional power. The heat of evaporation r for oil is taken as the average value. It is not possible to specify an absolute value for oils that consist of diverse hydrocarbons with different boiling points and heats of evaporation. The mass of oil theoretically evaporated per second is given in line 8. Part of the oil condenses again through the oil spray in the engine; here we assume a value of 50%. Tests by the Schaller company show that this value can vary strongly, depending on the speed of the engine and the size of the compartment. The quantity of oil produced is then obtained in line 10. With a compartment size of the engine as in line 11, the time at which the value of the LEL is attained in the event of bearing damage can be calculated in line 12, with the result given in line 13, Since these values reflect a very short period of time, the same calculation is repeated with very conservative assumptions: Page 119Motor Typ [12M 43 [14 Kos MC A Leistung | 10.800 80.080 | kw 2 Drehzahl 500 94 [1/min 2 Frequenz, 8,3 «__|_ Reibbeiwert 01 s__|Drehmoment 206,3 ‘ Preit 129,6 7 r Schinierdl 900,0 . +h 01 . = 70% 0,1 © Ta 0,04 ME 30,0 a LEL a. 2 | Zeit bis LEL 33 ‘Table II: Data calculated for another theoretical case of bearing damage In Table III the friction coefficients 1 in line 4 and the specific heats of evaporation in line 9 have been increased conservatively. Nevertheless, it was found that the values in line 13 (Time to LEL), are still very short. In the case of the four-stroke engine, the figure is 4 revolutions and for the two-stroke engine 12 revolutions of the engine. Investigation of the Effectiveness of OMD for Protection against Oil Mist Explosions in Diesel Engines To protect an engine subjected to sliding bearing damage effectively against an explosion, the oil mist concentration in the crankcase, and if necessary also in the gearbox and in the camshaft trough, must be monitored constantly. It is only the monitoring of the explosive medium that can provide adequate warning against an excessive concentration of oil mist and, when required, stop the engine and thus the development of oil mist. “Nowadays, two optical methods are usual for the measurement of oil mist in crankeases 1. Transmission: Here a source (LED) emits light into the test chamber, and the quantity of light which is able {o pass through the space is measured with the aid of a semiconductor receiver diode. The frequency range of the light can lie between 600 and 960 nm. Through reflection and refraction at the drops, the light reaching the receiver is weakened whenever there is an oil mist. The measure for the oil mist concentration in the test chamber is given by the luminous intensity arriving at the receiver. About 4% of the light is reflected from the drop surface, with the remaining portion being refracted within the drop, which acts as a spheroid lens. ‘The focal length of the drops is approx. 1.08 times the diameter of the drops. This results in a very large divergence of the rays, and a weakening of the beam, as soon as an oil mist is present. 2. Remission: Light from an LED is emitted into the test chamber and the light reflected from the mist is ‘measured by means of an optronic device. The measure for the oil mist concentration in the test chamber is siven by the degree of reflection from the mist. Page 120Fig. 8: Drop model — spheroid lens Both of these approaches are indirect methods, since the measurement does not actually take place in the crankcase itself; rather, a sample is taken from the crankease and routed to the measurement chamber. Depending on the installation at hand, it is possible that the oil mist density is altered subsequently by fans, bends in the pipes, oil separators etc. It now depends on the experience and preliminary investigations conducted by the corresponding manufacturer of the oil mist detector as to how the measurement value of the oil mist can best be assessed for the sample transport method used in that particular case. A prerequisite for all measurements and trials is the production of an oil mist that is identical to that occurring during damage. To produce an oil mist in sufficient quantity and with the correct drop size, oil mist generators were therefore developed. Fig.9: Oil mist development from an il mist generator In the oil mist generators developed at SCHALLER, lubricating oil (e.g. HD30) is compressed to a high pressure, heated up and then flashed out via nozzles. The pressures and temperatures correspond to the values found during the bearing examinations. To prevent auto-ignition, nitrogen was used as the propellant. The picture from the publication by Dr. Burgoyne and Prof. Newit, showing the zones in which the oil mist is explosive or non-explosive, will not be shown here. In measurements dating back to the years 1954 and 1955, LEL values for the oil mist were found to be of the order of 47 mg oil / dm air. The measurement methods and possibilities available at the time must be taken into account, At the time, the drop size was believed to be 10 im, A distribution was not specified. Since we now know that this figure is incorrect, the limit values for the LEL should be viewed with due caution. It must be considered that both the counting of the number of drops and the measurement of the drop diameter were inaccurate by today’s standards, However, the values for drop number and drop diameter were used as a basis for the explosion limits, Unfortunately, no newer data are available, New measurements using today's measurement methods would be desirable, in order to verity the LEL value and to correct it if necessary Page 121OM Sensoren 40 5 104 3 3 = wii 2 04 - “|e ver 5 vis a 7 — tase || —= onawos ee Mans 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 %LEL Aarne ta0U0 Meeungeiah Nice Onna 8208 KOE Fig. 10: Normalized representation ofthe signals from the OMD In an oil mist chamber at Schaller Automation, commercially available and historical OMD systems of the ‘Schaller company were tested. The results for the remission devices, as made by the company Telegirtner, and the transmission devices, as made by Schaller and Graviner, are given in Fig. 10. A common trait of all these units is that they no longer deliver useful measurement values above an oil mist density of 35 to 50 % of the theoretical LEL. A simple calculation shows that for 35% to 50% the occlusion through the surface of the drops is so great that no light reaches the receiver after passing through the volume of the measurement path. Hence, to be able to measure values above 50% LEL, either the measurement paths must be shortened or the samples must be diluted. ‘The X-axes show the oil mist concentration in the test chamber. The value for 100% of LEL is set to 47 mg/dm? of oil mist here. The Y-axis shows the measurement value of the corresponding OMD unit, normalized in each cease to the maximum value. With the ability to produce oil mist, knowledge of the design of the various devices, and the measurement ‘methods, the prerequisites for tests at running engines have been achieved. In September 2002, the classification society Germanischer Lloyd published an interim Guideline for the testing ‘of OMD at engines. This Guideline is available from Germanischer Lloyd in Hamburg Klassifikations- und Bauvorschriften / VI Ergdnzende Vorschrifien und Richilinien / 3 Maschinenanlagen / 14 Priifverfahren fir Otnebel-Detektionssysteme Rules for Classification and Construction / VI Additional Rules and Regulations /3 Machinery Installations / 14 Test Procedure for Oil Mist Detection Systems The Guideline describes procedures which are aimed at ensuring that OMD at engines can detect a developing oil mist. Here it does not matter at all what design, what measurement method or what concept of mounting on the engine is implemented for the OMD. The Guideline is subdivided into two parts. The First gives a description of the general boundary conditions, a definition of terms and the documents to be submitted. The second part covers the tests to be performed on the engine with the relevant OMD. The first part of the Guideline makes reference to SOLAS Chapter II-1, Part E, Regulation 47. At this point, the SOLAS regulations demand an effective monitoring of large engines for the development of oil mist. Following Page 122a section with the definition of terms, the documents to be submitted are described briefly. In the chapter on protection categories, the protection category 1 is described as the present level; after technical advancement and improvement of OMD systems, further protection categories could be included here in the future. From today's viewpoint, it seems possible that future systems for the monitoring of large diesel engines will be able to detect a critical state in the crankcase at a very early stage, possibly even before an oil mist actually develops. The second part of the Guideline describes the practical procedure in testing the interaction of an engine in operation with an OMD. For better clarity, the essential requirements of the OMDEA test are grouped in tabular form. The first table outlines the operating conditions under which the effectiveness of the OMD system are to be tested. Table 2.1 Operating conditions 1 | Application | Speed Power Output 2 tale _ | No or lowest passible output 2 Propulsion engine | ced speed | At least 80% of rated cutput ‘ No load , | Generator drive | Rated speed _ ‘Table IV: Operating conditions ofthe OMD for the OMDEA test In order to keep the number of necessary trials at the test bench as low as possible, only a small number of ‘operating conditions for which tests have to be performed are demanded. For instance, a propulsion engine which is driving a propeller must be tested for the condition of low speed and low load as well as at MCR. A generator engine is only tested at rated speed and no load. The various operating conditions are necessary, because the influence of blow-by and the recondensation of oil mist are to be considered by the test. A large number of preliminary investigations for this Guideline demonstrated the substantial influence of blow-by and recondensation of oil mist through the oil spray for various operating conditions. ‘Table 2.2 Location OMD system. Point of introduction. Single moni ‘The side of the engine of crankcase ‘oppesite tne sensor / suction line ‘The side ofthe compartinent Group monitoring] oppasite the sear / suction line of crankcase | with the layest panible distance to the OMD ‘Table V: Location of sampting points ‘To ensure that the system for detecting oil mists is effective in all possible cases, the test oil mist should be introduced at the point located farthest away from the OMD system. Only in this way is it possible to ensure that the oil mist is detected reliably even for the most unfavourable arrangement. Through the tests already performed, it was possible to show that oil mist from the gearbox can also be detected rapidly. Page 123Table 2.3 Test intervals Test intervals Lyear | Visual inspection as per B.l. 5 years | Functional test of the entire system ‘Table Vi: Testntervals for OMD's Following the practice of the classification societies, the system must be subjected to a periodical inspection every 5 years, to make sure that the OMD system continues to function properly after years of service. If prepared properly, the test described for an engine fitted with an OMD System can be conducted within the space of 2 hours. The effort in terms of manpower and costs is low. From the structural viewpoint, it must be ensured that oil mist can be introduced simultaneously into all crankcases; minor modifications may be necessary. A suitable arrangement for an M43 engine of the MAK ‘company is depicted in Fig. 11. Fig 11: OMDEA test setup at a MAK M43 engine For the trials, the oil mist generator (A) sends the oil mist through a distributor (B) with valve control through the mist hoses (C) to the engine compartment (D). The oil mist is blown into the engine with nitrogen for the Purposes of the test. In the tests performed at the first engines, oil quantities of 1% to 2% LEL were sufficient to reliably trigger an alarm. The test sequence is as follows: Oil mist is blown into a compartment and this must immediately cause an alarm. The same amount of oil mist, distributed simultaneously over all compartments, simulates an increase in oil mist content through blow-by. This condition must only trigger an alarm when a high level of oil mist in the compartment is attained. In the Guideline, 10% is specified as the critical value. From our experience, however, this value is very high and can be reduced to 4-6% without increasing the rate of false alarms. It may be expected that all newly developed engines will be subjected to the OMDEA test in addition to the uusual inspections and trials, Only this test can prove that the functional readiness of the OMD system is guaranteed at engines during operation Page 124Literature: 1) Germanischer Lloyd: Klassifikations- und Bauvorschrifien / VI Ergdnzende Vorschrifien und Richtlinien / 3 Maschinenanlagen / 14 Priifverfahren fiir Olnebel Detektionssysteme Rules for Classification and Construction / VI Additional Rules and Regulations /3 Machinery Installations / 14 Test Procedure for Oil Mist Detection Systems 2) Pounder, C.C.: Marine Diesel Ei Abbreviations: OM Oil Mist OMD Oil Mist Detector LEL Lower Explosion Level LED Light Emitting Diode s. Edition 5, Butterworth & Co Lid., 1972 London MCR Maximum Continuous Rating Page 125Oil mist detection techniques B Smith, QMI Ltd Page 126There are basically two ways of measuring oil mist: 1. Obscuration — Absorptometry How Absorption Works? ‘The most common method used by engine builders to monitor oil mist is obscuration. The simplest system connects a pipe to each crankcase. The pipe is coupled to a manifold where the oil mist is mixed and passed into the monitor mounted on the engine. The method is basic, cheap and meets the Classification Societies’ requirements. It does, however, have drawbacks because it gives limited information. Below is an example of this method. Schematic diagram showing principle of absorptometry (On MIST PARTICLES TRANSMITTER. ‘ABSORB LIGHT RECEIVER Typical graph produced by absorptometer 100 [Abtorptometry Senslvity dificut alow eves, ‘ero mist reads 100%. Increasing mist reduces signal by small amounts. Lang light path necessary to achieve sensitivity READOUT SHORT LIGHT PATH ‘OML MIST UNITS, Page 1282. Light Scatter - Nephelometry How Light Scatter Works? ‘A good analogy of how light scatter works is the flecks of dust seen in a beam of sunlight streaming though a window. In reality these are not dust particles but light scatter reflecting from the sun off the dust. The QMI system transposes the sun with an LED transmitter, the dust then becomes oil mist particles. Incorporated is a receiver at approximately 90 degrees to the transmitter. This receives the light scatter. Directly opposite the LED transmitter is another receiver that measures the amount of contamination building up on the LED optos to compensate the oil mist readings. This allows for up to 50% of contamination on the lenses. ‘The main advantage with this system is the detectors are calibrated to a true zero due to the fact all detectors have to be calibrated both electronically and physically so that a calibration certificate can be issued for each detector if requested. If there is no oil mist, no light can be ‘scattered to the receiver. If, however, oll mist is present, then light will be received from the scatter. Thus it follows the more oil mist there is the more light will be received. By use of a complex program, itis possible to obtain readings that are linear in mg/l and this makes it easier to read as it relates to the known LEL of oil mist. By using light scatter, small detectors can be placed along side each crank compartment thereby obtaining readings simultaneously within approximately 0.5 seconds of the mist being produced and not having to look for deviations, “The major problem with this type of system is keeping the lenses clean, therefore a lot of care had to be taken in placing filters and baffles correctly to stop oil splash going into the detectors. Schematic diagram showing principle of nephelometry Nephelometry is highly sensitive at low levels. Zero mist gives zero signal. Signal increases with mist level. Short light path an advantage. measuring receiver ‘compensating receiver transmitter Page 129Typical graph produced by nephelometer 100 READOUT ‘OL MIST UNITS. The common methods of this obscuration system is to use a single pipe which takes the oil mist from the crankcase spaces to the monitor. Monitor mounted on the engine, using compressed air to move the oil mist. ‘Amore advanced method of using obscuration is to take oil mist samples from each crankspace direct to the monitor mounted on the engine. Air or fans move the oil mist to the monitor. Solenoid or pneumatic valves control the oil mist in sequence through the moniter. ‘The monitor looks for a deviation in each set of readings. Clean fresh air is required to move the oil mist samples or to use a comparator. Some systems need a siphon at the crankcase outlets. Page 130Below are two layout examples. —_ onTon $4 ‘MonrToR mu rocameace Monitor mounted on engine taking samples of oil mist from each crankspace LIGHT SCATTER The alternative type of systems available uses the light scatter principle. They are more expensive because in addition to the detection of oil mist they are used for a different purpose. A simple system using one detector for use on mainly small engines and generator sets. This unit has all the salient features associated with light scatter instruments Page 131TO BREATHER CABLE TO MONITOR WHICH IS MOUNTED. IN THE ENGINE ROOM OR ON THE BRIDGE. co DETECTOR BAFFLES A single-headed installation using light scatter Here we have a system that is capable of being used as part of a Health Monitoring System whereas other systems just alarms. In this method detectors are placed at each crankspace So that readings are taken at source. The detector is coupled into a manifold that draws the sample away from the crankspace, The advantage is that accurate readings are taken at each crankspace instantly and continuously. The monitor is placed in the control room or on the bridge well away from the danger zone so that the operative is well out of harms way should the engine become hazardous. This is another important advantage. The light scatter system is able to show the small changes in readings of oil. Readings can be logged continuously. If wear starts in the bearings or piston this will be instantly recognized and the appropriate early warning alarm will be activated. Maintenance can to carried out at an early stage before a major failure takes place in the engine. All engine wear starts from small beginnings and it is beneficial to be able to plan appropriate action in advance, Page 132Summary individual cable to Multiway junction box 19mm (%") / * solid or flexible pipe 12mm (14") baffles Light scatter using detectors for each crank space Oil mist detection systems have to mest certain standards but offer different degrees of protection. Obscuration gives an alarm only whereas the light scatter design is very much faster and more reliable in response to danger. It can be used as a diagnostic tool protecting against danger to the crew and damage to an engine. Page 133Crankcase explosions - detection or prevention? 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