The Foreign Policy in Pakistan - Pildat PDF

w w w. p i l d a t .
o r g
PROCEEDINGS
Str engthening National and Pr ovincial L egislative Gover nance Pr oject
SHORT
COURSE ON
THE FOREIGN POLICY
PROCESS IN PAKISTAN
April 12 - 15, 2004
Hotel Pearl Continental
Bhurban, Murree
w w w. p i l d a t . o r g
PROCEEDINGS
Str engthening National and Pr ovincial L egislative Gover nance Pr oject
SHORT
COURSE ON
THE FOREIGN POLICY
PROCESS IN PAKISTAN
April 12 - 15, 2004
Hotel Pearl Continental
Bhurban, Murree
Prepared By
Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And

Transparency - PILDAT
Pakistan Institute of
Legislative Development
A n d Tr a n s p a r e n c y
As a Part of
Pakistan Legislative Strengthening
Consortium - PLSC
PLSC
Pakistan Legislative
Strengthening
Consortium
For the project

“Strengthening National and Provincial Legislative Governance - SNPLG”
This publication was made possible through support provided by the U.S. Agency for
International Development, under the terms of Award No.391-A-00-03-01012-00. The
opinions expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the U.S. Agency for International Development.
We also acknowledge the

Department for International Development - UK for their support.
Published by
Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And Transparency - PILDAT

5 - A, Zafar Ali Road, Gulberg V, Lahore, Pakistan.
December 2004
Short Course on
PILDAT THE FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS IN PAKISTAN PROCEEDINGS
CONTENTS
CONTENTS
Abbreviations and Acronyms
Acknowledgments
Executive Summary
Profiles of Speakers, Resource Persons and Session Chairs 12

Background 17
SPECIAL SESSION
Executive Summary 19
Welcome Remarks
Mr. Ahmed Bilal Mehboob 20
Executive Director, PILDAT
How Security Considerations Influence Foreign Policy in Pakistan:

the role of Security Agencies and how this practise
compares with other countries of the World?
Senator Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Javed Ashraf Qazi 21
Former Director General, ISI
Q&A/ Comments 24
SESSION 1
Introductory Presentation
An Overview of Pakistan's Foreign Policy: 1947 - 2004

Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi 33
Defence & Political Analyst
Q&A/ Comments 36
SESSION 2
Major Foreign Policy Issues facing the Country

Mr. Khursheed Mahmud Kasuri 42
Foreign Minister of Pakistan
Q&A/ Comments 45
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CONTENTS
CONTENTS
SESSION 3
Process of Foreign Policy Formulation in Pakistan

Ambassador (Retd.) Javid Hussain 56

Mr. Shaheen A. Gillani 58
Additional Secretary,
Foreign Policy Planning Ministry of Foreign Affairs
How Foreign Policy should be made in Pakistan?

Mr. Sartaj Aziz 60
Former Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs & Finance
Q&A/ Comments 62
Comments by Session Chair

Mr. Najmuddin A. Shaikh 64
Former Foreign Secretary
SESSION 4
Role of Security Agencies in Shaping Foreign Policy

Brig. (Retd.) Shaukat Qadir 66
Former Vice President Islamabad Policy Research Institute - IPRI
How Security Considerations Influence the Formulation of Foreign Policy

Mr. Najmuddin A. Shaikh 68
Q&A/ Comments 70

Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi 72
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CONTENTS
CONTENTS
SESSION 5
Shaping of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy:

Case Study on the Comparisons of Lahore, Agra and Islamabad Summits
Mr. Abdul Sattar 74
Former Foreign Minister

Case Study on the Gulf Crisis-1990
Dr. Ayesha Siddiqua 76
Security Analyst

Case Study on Recognition of Taliban
Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin 78
Visiting Professor, LUMS
Summary of the Case Studies by the Session Chair 80
Panel Discussion
Views by Mr. Sartaj Aziz 82
Views by Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi 83

Views by Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi 84

MNA, Former Federal Minister
Q&A/ Comments 85

Dr. Ijaz Shafi Gilani 89
Chairman Gallup, Pakistan
SESSION 6
Review and Analysis of Foreign Policy by the

Parliaments of US, UK and India
Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin 92
Visiting Professor, LUMS
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CONTENTS
CONTENTS
Parliament and the Foreign Policy: the Role of Foreign Affairs Committee
Mian Abdul Waheed 94
Former Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee National Assembly
Principle Determinants of Pakistan's Foreign Policy

Sardar Aseff Ahmed Ali
Former Foreign Minister 96
Q&A/ Comments 98

Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi 102
MNA, Former Federal Minister
SESSION 7
Economic Diplomacy and the Role of Foreign Office

Dr. Asad M. Khan 104
Director General, Economic Coordination,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Q&A/ Comments 106

Mr. Sartaj Aziz 109
SESSION 8
Comments by Session Moderator

Mr. Abdul Sattar 112
Views by H.E. Mr. Shivshankar Menon 113

Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan
Views by H.E. Mr. Mark Lyall Grant

British High Commissioner to Pakistan 115
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CONTENTS
CONTENTS
Views by Mr. Larry Robinson 117
Political Counselor, US Embassy
Q&A/ Comments 120
Synthesis of the Session

Senator S. M. Zafar 125
Chairman Senate Functional Committee on Human Rights
and Chairman PILDAT Board of Advisors
Comments by Session Moderator 127
Concluding Remarks
APPENDICES
Appendix A: Programme of the Short Course 130

Appendix B: List of Participants 135
Appendix C: Presentation by Mr. Ahmed Bilal Mehboob, Executive Director, PILDAT 139
Appendix D: Paper by Senator Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Javed Ashraf Qazi, Former DG ISI 143
Appendix E: Paper by Mr. Khursheed Mahmud Kasuri, Foreign Minister of Pakistan 155
Appendix F: Paper by Mr. Shaheen A. Gillani, Add. Sec. Foreign Policy Planning 165
Appendix G: Paper by Mr. Sartaj Aziz, Former Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs &Finance 169
Appendix H: Paper by Brig. (Retd.) Shaukat Qadir, Former Vice President IPRI 175
Appendix I: Paper by Mr. Najmuddin A. Shaikh, Former Foreign Secretary 181
Appendix J: Paper by Mian Abdul Waheed, Former Chairman Foreign Affairs
Committee of National Assembly 187
Appendix K: Paper by Sardar Aseff Ahmed Ali, Former Foreign Minister 193
Appendix L: Presentation by Dr. Asad M. Khan, DG Economic Coordination,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 201
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
Brig. Brigadier
CENTO Central Treaty Organisation
CIA Central Intelligence Agency (USA)
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DG Director General
Dte Directorate
ECOTA Economic Cooperative Organisation
Trade Agreement
FIA Federal Investigation Agency
IB Intelligence Bureau (Pakistan)
IRS Institute of Regional Studies (Pakistan)
ISI Inter Services Intelligence (Pakistan)
ISS Institute of Strategic Studies (Pakistan)
JIB Joint Intelligence Bureau
JIC Joint Intelligence Committee
JSH Joint Staff Headquarter
JUI-F Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazl)
LoC Line of Control
Lok Sabha Lower House of the Parliament of India
LUMS Lahore University of Management Sciences
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MI Military Intelligence
MNCs Multi National Companies
NSC National Security Council
NWFP North West Frontier Province
PPP Pakistan People's Party
R&D Research and Development
SAFTA South Asian Free Trade Area
SEATO South East Asian Treaty Organisation
TPS-OIC Trade Preferential System under Organisation
of the Islamic Conference
US United States (of America)
UK United Kingdom
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO World Trade Organisation
Short Course on
Acknowledgments
P akistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency - PILDAT wishes to acknowledge the active participation
of the MNAs and Speakers and Session Chairs of the Short Course for their invaluable time and quality of interaction
that made the Short Course on Foreign Policy Process in Pakistan a success.
The short course enjoyed the distinction of being addressed by the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Khursheed
Mahmud Kasuri, and four (4) Former Foreign Ministers including Mr. Abdul Sattar, Mr. Sartaj Aziz, Sardar Aseff Ahmed Ali
and Senator S. M. Zafar. In addition, a galaxy of subject specialists, former foreign secretaries, independent analysts and
officials of the Foreign Office were speakers and session chairs at the course including Prof. Dr. Hassan Askari Rizvi,
Defence & Political Analyst; Ambassador (Retd.) Javid Husain; Mr. Shaheen A. Gillani, Additional Secretary Foreign Policy
Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Senator Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Javed Ashraf Qazi, Former Director General ISI; Brig. (Retd.)
Shaukat Qadir, Former Vice President Islamabad Research & Policy Institute; Mr. Najmuddin A. Shaikh, Former Foreign
Secretary; Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi, MNA and Former Federal Minister; Dr. Ijaz Shafi Gilani, Chairman Gallup
Pakistan; Dr. Ayesha Saddiqua; Defence Analyst; Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin, Visiting Professor at LUMS; Mian Abdul Waheed;
Former Chairman Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly and Dr. Asad M. Khan, Director General, Economic
Coordination, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
PILDAT offers its special thanks to H.E. Mr. Shivshankar Menon; Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan; H. E. Mr. Mark Lyall
Grant; British High Commissioner to Pakistan, and Mr. Larry Robinson; Political Counselor, US Embassy (speaker on behalf
of the US Ambassador to Pakistan) for their time and sharing of their thoughts on the issue of Pakistan's Foreign Policy with
a select group of Parliamentarians participating in the Short Course.
PILDAT, in particular, acknowledges the interest, active participation and passionate interaction of the select group of
Parliamentarians throughout the intense schedule of the short course.
Disclaimer
PILDAT has made every effort to ensure the accuracy of views, discussions and presentations in compiling and editing of
this report. However, PILDAT and its supporters do not take any responsibility of any omission or an error since it is not
deliberate. The views expressed at the short course and presented in this report are those of the Speakers, Session Chairs
and participants and do not necessarily represent the views of PILDAT or its supporters.
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Executive Summary
T he Short Course for parliamentarians on Foreign Policy Process in Pakistan, held from April 12-15, 2004 at Bhurban
was an intense and comprehensive exercise for building the knowledge of parliamentarians and politicians on the
process of formulation, review and analysis of foreign policy. Facilitated by expert diplomats, renowned subject
specialists, veteran politicians and policy makers, the course covered a comprehensive array of issues such as formulation
and review of foreign policy including Major Foreign Policy Issues facing the country; Overview of Pakistan's Foreign Policies
in historical perspective; Process of Foreign Policy formulation in theory and practise; Security considerations influencing
foreign policy in Pakistan and other countries; Role of Parliament in shaping and reviewing Foreign Policy as compared to
developed democracies of US, UK and India; Economic Diplomacy and Appraisal of Foreign Policy of Pakistan from the
British, Indian and American perspective. Special emphasis was placed on the use of relevant case studies of shaping of
Pakistan's Foreign Policy during the Gulf Crisis, Lahore, Agra and Islamabad Summits and Recognition of Taliban to identify
major actors and influencing factors in shaping foreign policy.
Actively participated by the select group of parliamentarians, the course highlighted that the process for the formation of
Pakistan's foreign policy needs to be re-analysed and the role of foreign office needs to be restructured. The role of security
agencies, currently dominating, needs to be re-analysed in keeping with norms of democratic government. The major theme
of interaction at the course included the need for a pro-active role of Parliament in shaping and reviewing foreign policy of
the country, for which Parliament and Parliamentary Committees dealing with foreign affairs need to be strengthened. The
address by the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, followed by a candid exchange of views with participating
Parliamentarians at the Course, also stressed the need for a multi-partisan approach and ownership of the foreign policy of
the country. It was felt that lack of independent research support to foreign office as well as the lack of a meaningful
consultation process resulted in the weakness of Pakistan's foreign policy in many instances in the past. Participants
stressed that for an effective foreign policy towards India, given the recent détente, as well as the US and other countries of
the world, it was necessary that input of independent analysts and that of the Parliament be incorporated in the policy. The
foreign policy of the country, it was stressed, should not be dependent on a single institution and its peculiar considerations.
The participants, through detailed feedback at the end of the course, said that the course was an ideal platform through
which not only their knowledge about foreign policy was enhanced from the basic to the exclusive, but it also provided them
with an opportunity to interact and share views with a wide array of subject specialists, current and former policy makers
and academicians. The exclusive setting of the course with only speakers and a select group of Parliamentarians improved a
candid sharing of views. Participants largely felt that the course was an insightful experience.
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Profiles of Speakers,
Session Chairs and Resource Persons
Mr. Khursheed Mahmud Kasuri
MNA (NA-140, Kasur-III, PML)
Mr. Khursheed Mahmud Kasuri was elected to the National Assembly in 2002 and serves as the Foreign Minister of Pakistan.
He graduated with a B.A (Hons.) degree from University of the Punjab in 1961, followed by a tripos degree from Cambridge
University and qualified as Barrister-at-Law at Gray's Inn London.
During his political career, Mian Khursheed Mahmud Kasuri was elected as First Secretary General of Peoples Democratic
Alliance and was appointed Federal Minister for Parliamentary Affairs in the interim government of Prime Minister Mir Balakh
Sher Mazari.
Mr. Sartaj Aziz

Mr. Sartaj Aziz was born in February 1929 and received a Master's Degree in Development Economics from Harvard
University, Cambridge, Mass., USA. He was Minister for State for Food, Agriculture and Cooperatives (1984-1988), Minister
for Food & Agriculture, Local Government and Rural development (1988), Minister for Finance, Planning and Economic
Affairs (1990-1993), Secretary General of the Pakistan Muslim League (1993-1990), Minister for Finance, Planning and
Economic Affairs (1997-1998), and Minister for Foreign Affairs (1998-1999).
Mr. Sartaj Aziz was elected to the Senate of Pakistan on three occasions (1985, 1988 and 1994). He has published several
works on development, agriculture and politics.
Mr. Abdul Sattar

As a Foreign Minister, Mr. Abdul Sattar served in President Pervez Musharraf's cabinet, 1999-2002, and in Prime Minister
Moeen Qureshi's interim cabinet, 1993. Mr. Sattar holds a degree of B.Sc. (Hons) and M.A. in Geography. He has also
attended Fletcher School of Law and a series of instalments in Diplomacy in USA and received the degree of M.A.
In a 39-year career, he held posts of Foreign Secretary, 1986-88, Additional Foreign Secretary (South & East Asia) Director
General (South Asia) and Director (Arab Affairs), in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was Ambassador to India, 1978-82 &
1990-92, USSR, 1988-90, and Austria, 1975-78 when he was also Representative to IAEA and UNIDO in Vienna. Earlier, he
worked as Political Officer in embassies in New Delhi, Jeddah, Washington and Khartoum, and as Vice Consul in San
Francisco. He was a member of the delegation at the Simla Conference, 1972, and participated in the Agra Summit in 2001
as Foreign Minister.
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Sardar Aseff Ahmed Ali graduated from St. John's College, Oxford, UK in 1966. He served as Adviser to Governor of West
Pakistan (1969-71), and Vice President of the Punjab Cooperative Bank (1984-87). He was elected to the National
Assembly on three occasions (1985, 1990, and 1993). Mr. Ali was appointed Minister of State (Economic Affairs) from
1990-93, Federal Minister Narcotics Control in 1993, and Foreign Minister from 1993-96. He served as Chairman of the OIC
Foreign Minsters' Conference (1993-95), and as Chairman OIC Contact Group on Bosnia-Herzegovina (1993-95).
A skilled painter and writer, Mr. Ali contributes regularly to daily newspapers, journals and magazines.
Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi

Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi is an independent Defence and Political Consultant. He was Quaid-e-Azam Professor of Pakistan
Studies at Columbia University, New York (December 1995-July 1999), and Allama Iqbal Professor at Heidelberg University,
Germany (February 1998-January 1991), and Research Scholar at University of New Mexico and Sandia National
Laboratories, Albuquerque (2002). He was also on the Faculty of Political Science, Punjab University, Lahore, (1971-2001)
including Professor and Chairman Department of Political Science.
Dr. Askari is a widely published scholar in national and international journals, contributes regular columns and has authored
four books. He also serves on the Board of Advisors of PILDAT in an honorary capacity.
Ambassador (Retd.) Javid Husain
Ambassador Javid Husain holds a Masters Degree in Economics from the Government College, Lahore. He retired from the
Foreign Service of Pakistan in March 2004 after a distinguished diplomatic career during which he served as the
Ambassador of Pakistan to the Netherlands (1992-1995), to the Republic of Korea (1995-1997) and Iran (1997-2003). He
has also served on diplomatic assignments in Pakistan Embassies/Missions in several important capitals including Paris
(1969-1971), Tripoli (1971-1974), Washington (1974-1978), New York (1982-1985) and Beijing (1985-1988). He was First
Secretary (Political) during his posting at the Pakistan Embassy, Washington, D.C. At the Pakistan Mission to the UN at New
York, he served as Counsellor and later as Minister. From 1985 to 1988, he served as Minister and the second highest
ranking officer in the Pakistan Embassy at Beijing.
Mr. Shaheen A. Gillani

Additional Secretary, Foreign Policy Planning
Mr. Shaheen A. Gillani was born on October 10, 1948. He holds a Master's Degree in Political Science (with specialisation in
International Relations). Mr. Gillani joined the Foreign Service of Pakistan on December 1, 1973, and also served in Pakistani
Diplomatic Missions abroad including Jeddah (1977-80); Dhaka (1981-83); Geneva (1986-90) and Nairobi (1990-94). He
served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad as Desk Officer (1975-77); Director (1983-86); and Director General
(1994-98), served as Ambassador of Pakistan to Hungary (from February 1998 to February 2001) and High Commissioner
of Pakistan to the Republic of South Africa (from February 2001 to December 2003).
Mr. Gillani is presently serving as Additional Secretary (Policy Planning) with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad.
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Senator Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Javed Ashraf Qazi

Former Director General ISI
Senator Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Javed Ashraf Qazi has an M.Sc. in War Studies and an M.Sc. in Strategic Studies. He served as
Director General Military Intelligence (1990-91), Master General of Ordinance (1991-92), Director General ISI (1993-95),
and Corps Commander Gujranwala (1995-96). Senator Qazi was appointed Federal Secretary Science and Technology
(1996-97), Secretary and Chairman Pakistan Railways (1999-2000), and Federal Minister for Communications and
Railways (2000-2002).
He was awarded the Hilal-i-Imtiaz for meritorious services for the nation, and the Sitara-i-Basalat (on two occasions) for
display of exceptional leadership and valour during peace time. He was elected to the Senate of Pakistan in 2003.
Mr. Najmuddin A. Sheikh

Mr. Najmuddin A. Sheikh spent 38 years in the Pakistan Foreign Service before retiring in 1999. In the course of his career,
he served as Ambassador/High Commissioner in Canada (1987-89), Germany (1989-90), USA (1990-91) and Iran (1992-
94). He was Foreign Secretary from 1994-97. In 2002, he served as the President's Special Envoy, and met with leaders in
Russia, Iran, Uzbekistan, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia and Japan to explain Pakistan's point of view.
He is currently a member of the Board of Governors of the Pakistan Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad. He writes a
weekly column on foreign affairs in the “Dawn” newspaper and is a commentator on the same subject on various TV and
radio channels. He regularly attends unofficial international conferences on issues of importance to South Asia.
Brig. (Retd.) Shaukat Qadir

Former Vice President Islamabad Policy Research Institute
Brigadier Shaukat Qadir graduated with an M.Sc. in War Studies from Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan. He
joined the Armed Forces of Pakistan in 1968. Brigadier Qadir has conducted strategic analysis of various national and
international laws, strategies and policies and their effect on the developing world in general and Pakistan in particular, and
coordinated with national and international organizations regarding peace and development initiatives (Pak-India peace
forum, dialogue on Kashmir, Nuclear South Asia and others).
Brigadier Qadir has extensive training experience. He was on the visiting faculty of the regional Centre for Strategic Studies,
Colombo, Sri Lanka, and the Fatima Jinnah University, Rawalpindi, and taught courses on Conflict Resolution, Conflict and
Crisis Management, Geopolitics, Social Decision Making, Pakistan Studies, Islam and Ethics. He was Vice President of the
Islamabad Policy Research Institute and has attended several national and international lectures, conferences and seminars.
Dr. Ijaz Shafi Gilani

Chairman Gallup Pakistan
Dr. Ijaz Shafi Gilani is the Chairman and Chief Executive of the Gallup Pakistan. He is also associated with the International
Islamic University Islamabad as honorary Dean of Social Sciences. He has a Ph.D. in Political Science from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), USA. He has also served as adviser to Prime Minister and Chairman Prime
Minister's Committee for Research and Analysis from 1991-93. Dr. Gilani has directed electoral studies for all local body and
national elections since 1979. He also serves on the Board of Advisors of PILDAT in an honorary capacity.
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Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi

MNA (NA-148, Multan-I, PPPP)
Former Federal Minister
Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi returned to the National Assembly in October 2002 on a PPPP seat. He completed a
B.A degree in 1978 from University of the Punjab followed by an M.A in 1983 from Cambridge University. During his political
career, he has been elected MPA Punjab from 1985 to 1988, 1988 to 1990 and 1990 to 1993. He has also been elected
Chairman District Council Multan from 1987 to 1991, MNA from 1993 to 1996 and District Nazim Multan from 2001 to
2002. He served as Provincial Minister of Finance Punjab from 1990-1993 and Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs
from 1994-1996.
Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin

Visiting Professor
Lahore University of Management Sciences - LUMS
Dr. Tahir Amin holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, United States.
He has been on the Iqbal Chair (1997-2001) at the Cambridge University, Cambridge, UK. He has also been a Visiting
Scholar at the Harvard University (1992) on Fulbright Fellowship and has been a Visiting Fellow (1996) at the Watson School
of International Studies, Brown University, USA. He has also taught at the Boston College, Boston as an adjunct Prof. in the
Department of Political Science. He has been the Prof. and Chairman of the Department of International Relations at the
Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. Dr. Tahir Amin has written several books and articles on International Relations and
South Asian politics.
Dr. Ayesha Siddiqua

Security Analyst
Dr. Ayesha Siddiqua is working as a visiting fellow at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute and correspondent Jane's
Defence Weekly. She has a Ph.D. in War Studies from King's College, London and has also been a civil servant for eleven
years including a two years' stint as Director of Naval Research at Islamabad. She is also the author of a book on Pakistan's
military decision-making titled: 'Pakistan's Arms Procurement and Military Build-up, 1979-99. Dr. Siddiqa has written in
several international journals.
Dr. Asad Majeed Khan

Director Economic Coordination, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dr. Asad Majeed Khan completed doctoral studies in International Economic and Business Law from Kyushu University,
Japan (LL.D - 1998-2002). Earlier, he worked as an Attorney at Law in Lahore (1986-1988) and later joined the Foreign
Service of Pakistan. In addition to working in various sections and directorates of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he also
served in the Pakistan Embassy in Tokyo. He has attended several national and international meetings and seminars on
international trade and security related issues including WTO and regional free trade agreements.
Dr. Asad Majeed Khan is presently working as Director Economic Coordination in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is a
visiting lecturer and resource person at the International Islamic University, Islamabad, Foreign Trade Institute of Pakistan and
Foreign Service Academy on international trade and WTO affairs.
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Mian Abdul Waheed

Former Chairman Foreign Affairs committee of the National Assembly
Mian Abdul Waheed, Former MNA and Chairman National Assembly Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, holds a Masters
in International Law and Diplomacy from Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, United States. He has a long career in the
Foreign Office of Pakistan from 1960 to 1984 during which he has served as Pakistan's Ambassador to Italy and West
Germany amongst other key posts. His political career began in 1987. He has been elected to the National Assembly in
1991, 1993 and 1997.
H. E. Mr. Mark Lyall Grant

British High Commissioner to Pakistan
Mr. Mark Lyall Grant arrived in Pakistan in May 2003 as British High Commissioner designate. Throughout his career he has
worked extensively at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London, and more recently as Director for Africa. From
1996-1998 he was Deputy Head of Mission in Pretoria. He has also served in Paris and in Islamabad from 1982-85.
H.E. Mr. Shivshankar Menon

Born on July 5, 1949, Mr. Menon is an MA in History from Delhi University. He joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1972 and
has since served in various appointments in the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi and in Indian embassies in Beijing,
Vienna and Tokyo. He has also worked in the Department of Atomic Energy. Mr. Menon was previously Ambassador in
China and Israel and High Commissioner in Sri Lanka.
Mr. Lawrence K. Robinson

Counselor Political Affairs
US Embassy
Mr. Larry Robinson is the Counselor for Political Affairs at the United States Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan. His section is
responsible for reporting on political developments in Pakistan, explaining U.S. policy to Pakistani government officials and
other opinion leaders, and coordinating foreign policy initiatives with the Government of Pakistan.
Mr. Robinson was born in Honolulu, Hawaii. He graduated from Yale University with a major in History, the Arts and Letters.
He served in the U.S. Navy from 1970-78. Mr. Robinson joined the Foreign Service in 1978. He has served overseas as
consular officer in London and Belfast, and political officer in Muscat, Shanghai, London and Seoul. He has also served four
tours of duty in the State Department, the first two working on East Asian issues and the most recent two in the Bureau of
South Asian Affairs.
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Background
P ILDAT, an independent, not-for-profit and non-partisan research and training institution working for strengthening
democracy and democratic institutions in Pakistan, has been actively engaged with building the capabilities of
elected legislators towards an effective discharge of their duties. The PILDAT programme of legislative strengthening
has been formulated in consultation with present and veteran legislators, opinion leaders, analysts and academicians to
cater to the specific policy-making and analytical needs of Pakistani legislators at all levels.
PILDAT has recently joined Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Consortium - PLSC which is implementing the programme of
Strengthening National and Provincial Legislative Governance funded by USAID. PILDAT is responsible for the segment of
legislative training in the PLSC.
The Foreign Policy Process in Pakistan
In a democracy, Parliament, as the institution representing public and public's interests, plays an important part in shaping
and reviewing foreign policy, which, before the evolution of democratic government, used to be the exclusive domain of
diplomats and soldiers. In democratic set up, the executive is answerable to public which exercise their control through the
democratic institution of the Parliament.
In order to strengthen Parliament and Parliamentary Committees in Pakistan to provide an active input into foreign policy
making and oversee the implementation of policy by the executive, PILDAT organised the Short Course on the Foreign Policy
Process in Pakistan. Inviting only a select group of parliamentarians, with foreign policy as their area of interest, the course
was designed to enhance the knowledge of parliamentarians about the process of foreign policy formulation as well as
present various case studies, foreign policy issues and role of other state institutions in foreign policy formulation in sharp
focus for the benefit of parliamentarians.
Appendix A carries the detailed programme of the short course. The course was attended by a group of 20 parliamentarians.
A list and profile of parliamentarians is given as Appendix B.
Components of the Short Course
In order to provide documentary support and background information to parliamentarians, PILDAT prepared Dossiers of the
course that included two (2) especially prepared briefing
papers: Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Overview 1947 - 2004
and The Process of Foreign Policy Formulation in Pakistan in
addition to four (4) case studies on the Formulation of
Pakistan's Foreign Policy with special reference to Gulf
Crisis-1990; Recognition of Taliban Regime; Comparison of
Lahore, Agra and Islamabad Summits and Parliament's Role
in Foreign Policy with special reference to the US, UK and
India. The dossier also carried papers and copies of
presentations/speeches of all speakers and resource
persons at the course.
The course, especially held at the Pearl Continental Hotel,

Bhurban, Murree was designed to provide the right
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combination of leisure and learning away from the busy life of the cities.
The course incorporated a social programme in addition to the learning aspects. On the first night of the course,
participating parliamentarians participated in a get-together and introductory dinner. The second evening hosted a live
musical night while on the third evening, a documentary 'Situation Room' was played for the participants at the hotel theatre.
As a special feature of the programme, an evening was set aside for Trekking and Tea at the picturesque Golf Club adjacent
to Hotel Pearl Continental.
Course Dossier and Special Publications
As is PILDAT's practice, a special Course Dossier was prepared which included advanced copies of speeches/presentations
of each resource person in addition to special publications of PILDAT developed for this course.
These publications included:
- Briefing Paper on An Overview of Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947 -

2004
- Briefing Paper on The Process of Foreign Policy Formulation in
Pakistan
- Case Study on Lahore, Agra and Islamabad Summits
- Case Study on Gulf Crisis-1990
- Case Study on Recognition of Taliban
- Case Study on Parliament and Foreign Policy: A Comparative
Analysis of the US, UK and India
The course dossier contained these publications for each participant in addition to a copy
of the programme, profile of participants and speakers, feedback forms and other useful
reading material relating to foreign policy process of Pakistan.
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Special Session
Executive Summary
I n a Special Session held on the evening of April 12, 2004, Senator Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Javed Ashraf Qazi; Former DG ISI,
delivered a lecture to the participants on the topic of How Security Considerations influence Foreign Policy in Pakistan and
How this Practise Compares with other Countries of the World?
Senator Qazi believed that the security agencies, primarily ISI in Pakistan, have a major impact on the formulation of foreign
policy through briefing to the cabinet; regular reports to foreign office and interaction between various echelons of ISI and
MOF both at home and abroad and input at JSHQ, Defence Council and Defence Committee of the Cabinet. He compared the
system of Pakistani security agencies with those of the USA, Israel and India.
A lively Q&A following the presentation of Senator Qazi served to highlight themes such as security agencies' enhanced role
in political arena of the country as well as foreign policy formulation.
19
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Welcome Remarks
Mr. Ahmed Bilal Mehboob

M r. Ahmed Bilal Mehboob began the session

with the recitation of selected verses from the
Holy Quran. He welcomed distinguished
participants and resource persons to the Short Course.
Presenting an overview of the short course, Mr. Mehboob

said that facilitated by expert diplomats, renowned
subject specialists, veteran politicians and policy makers
the course is an effort to orient parliamentarians with the
process of foreign policy formulation and the
constitutional role of legislators in influencing foreign
policy of the country.
Welcome Remarks were followed by a brief introduction

of all participants of the course. After the introductions,
Mr. Mehboob invited Senator Qazi to make his
presentation.
20
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How Security Considerations Influence

Foreign Policy in Pakistan: the Role of
Security Agencies and how this practise
compares with other countries of the World
Senator Lt. Gen.

(Retd.) Javed Ashraf Qazi
I
Former Director General, ISI n the beginning Senator Qazi elucidated that nation
states live and prosper within secure borders in
accordance with their chosen ideologies and
systems. He said that the national security rests on
defence, economy and internal security. The government
has to formulate a number of policies to achieve its
national objectives and aims. These policies are a)
Foreign Policy; to win friends and allies and to support
other government policies and to ensure their success to
enhance national security. b) Economic Policy; to provide
sound base for development. c) Defence Policy; to
ensure security of the state d) Psychosocial Policy; to
ensure internal harmony and development and the more
recent one, e) Media Policy; to win minds and to project
the success of one's own policies. The manifestation of
this can be observed in Iraq war Gulf War etc.
He continued that all these policies are interdependent

and it is imperative for a government to formulate all
these policies for the successful attainment of national
aims. Ministry of Foreign affairs is primarily responsible
for the formulation of these policies. It is to formulate
foreign policy options based on various factors and in
accordance with changing environment and
requirements. Cabinet approves a policy and the Ministry
of Foreign affairs then oversees its implementation. Major
input into the formulation is provided by the intelligence
agencies, primarily by the ISI. This information is
conveyed by ISI formally by three means:
i) Briefing to the Cabinet in which DG ISI briefs the

Cabinet.
21
Short Course on
ii) Regular reports to foreign office and interaction policies and forge regional global alliances to harvest
between various echelons of ISI and MOF optimum advantage amidst competing forces.
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs) both at home and
abroad. Each embassy has ISI personnel. For Senator Qazi was of the view that in the prevailing global
successful interaction, the Foreign Secretary milieu of increasing inter-dependence and awareness of
and the Foreign Minister should have very close social ethos, the use of force for conflict resolution will
interaction with DG ISI, he believed. often invoke international recrimination. Economic,
diplomatic and political coercion will instead form part of
iii) Briefing at JSHQ which the DG ISI gives to all the security calculus and are likely to be used more
the service chiefs. Similarly DG ISI gives his aggressively to achieve the stipulated objectives
input to Defence Council and Defence remaining short of war. Since economy remains the
Committee of the Cabinet. Apart from this, major determinant of viability and power potential of a
informally the Prime Minister is at liberty to ask nation, geo-economics is therefore, attaining dominance
for a paper on any topic to be formulated by the over geo-political alliances. He believed that media also
Intelligence or the Foreign Office can require any has a very effective impact in today's world.
information from ISI.
Talking of the role of UNO, he said that it is increasingly
Senator Qazi illustrated the types of information provided manipulated by the major powers to promote their own
by the Intelligence to the Foreign Policy. It is believed that interests and its influence as a neutral mechanism to
there is no permanence in relation within states. The only enforce measures for greater peace and stability is slowly
factor that dominates all considerations is national diminishing. He said that nations across the globe, due to
interest. Friends and allies of today can be enemies of intermingled interests, remain averse to conflict and
tomorrow and vice versa. Therefore as far as Intelligence escalation that has the potential to upset the status quo
is concerned, intelligence needs to be acquired about all and jeopardise collective interests. The smaller nations
neighbours, allies and other countries in the world of will, therefore, witness growing resistance to the
interest. It relates to a total picture along with current acquisition of technologies, which can disturb the
developments and future likely developments. Hence balance of power in a region. Describing the changing
information about other countries is acquired in the areas patterns of conflict, Senator Qazi said that conflict pattern
of political systems, personalities and historical is shifting from inter-state to intra-state.
perspective of the target countries, Economic strength
and future prospects, defence policy, strength weapon Discussing the role of security agencies, Senator Qazi
acquisitions and future plans and relations with other said that Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) is mainly tuned
states. to the collection of strategic intelligence, which is the
knowledge pertaining to enemy's capabilities,
Senator Qazi also explained the factors affecting security vulnerabilities, probable courses of action, plans and
considerations and foreign policy in the current milieu other related aspects that may affect Pakistan's national
emphasising that in the era of globalisation and common interests directly or indirectly. ISI's charter includes: i)
market economies, national security concerns transcend Procurement and coordination of external strategic
the geographical boundaries of a nation. The ensuing intelligence. ii) Advice to Federal Government on matters
threats are no more confined to military manifestation of national security, and counter-intelligence relating to
alone but also present themselves in a non-military the armed forces. iii) Some aspects of internal security.
fashion. The developed world urges for greater Similarly Military Intelligence (MI) is dedicated to the
improvement in social indices and quality of life has lead collection, analysis and dissemination of tactical
to intensive competition for shrinking resources. The intelligence about enemy designs. The primary role of the
resultant conflict of interests is, therefore, likely to revolve MI is to keep the General Staff updated about enemy
around the energy resource centres. Various power arms build up, movement of troops especially of strike
centres around the globe, therefore, articulate their formations, enemy operational plans, frequency and
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direction of surveillance activity. A similar role is Discussing Israel's main intelligence agency Mossad, he
performed by the Naval Intelligence and the Air added that it is the external intelligence network of Israel,
Intelligence for Navy and Air force. He said that the which operates directly under the Prime Minister. Its
Intelligence Bureau (IB) mainly concentrates on the opinions especially those relating to Israeli Security, are
internal dynamics of Pakistan. Besides monitoring the given due consideration by the political leadership. Over
emerging political scenario, it also keeps a constant the years, this organisation has acquired notoriety for its
watch on the law and order situations, ethnic and thoroughness and ruthlessness in planning and executing
sectarian trends. its operations mainly against the Palestinians. Main
responsibilities of Mossad include: gathering external
As far as the Role of Intelligence in National Policy in intelligence, providing information on all projects which
Pakistan is concerned, he said that intelligence inputs require decisions concerning Israeli security, recruitment
provide a vital basis for policy decisions particularly on of agents, counteracting Palestinian suicide operations,
national security and foreign policy as national security is fomenting racial and ethnic conflicts as in Lebanon and
fundamental to all facets of state policy and strategy, he portraying a negative image of Palestinian people and
added. Arab countries especially in Europe and USA, he said.
Talking about Pakistan's role in the war against terrorism, Concluding his talk, Senator Qazi said that contrary to the
he said that due to Pakistan's frontline role in this, this belief that ISI is a state upon itself, 72 % of the manpower
burden has to be borne by ISI. He said that “our in the ISI consists of uniformed people who join ISI for a
restructuring efforts and development of a national fixed tenure of maximum three years at the end of which
counter-terrorism network proved timely and have they return to their earlier positions. Therefore, they
enabled ISI to maintain its reputation as an effective cannot form their own agendas. At the same time, this
intelligence service.” poses a disadvantage to ISI that its expertise is lost.
Discussing the role of other international intelligence Similarly, he believed that the Intelligence Agencies are
agencies, Senator Qazi said that over the years Indian attacked for their involvement into political arena. The
Intelligence Agency RAW has emerged as an important major internal role of intelligence agencies such as ISI is
instrument of India's national power and has assumed a guarding against law and order disturbances, terrorism,
significant position in formulating the country's domestic enemy agents, etc., but governments have increasingly
and foreign policy. He believed that today, RAW's relied on the ISI because of its effectiveness. ISI has been
tentacles have spread from Maldives to Afghanistan, generally receiving very negative media coverage
Central Asia, Middle East, Europe, USA, Canada and because of misperception of its role and unfortunately ISI
Australia. RAW enjoys active collaboration with the officials, being in uniform, cannot indulge in public
leading intelligence agencies of the world including CIA, debate. Hence they lose an opportunity to present their
M16, Mossad and FIS (Russia). perspective and have to bear the onslaught of the media.
Describing the American Intelligence Agency CIA, he said Please refer to Appendix D for his detailed paper and
that CIA is by far the most powerful and resourceful presentation.
intelligence agency with base stations and presence in
almost all parts of the world. In its over 50 years of
existence, CIA has played a variety of roles in pursuit of
US domestic and global aims, which could be the envy of
any intelligence agency. CIA has its own R&D network
designed to develop computer surveillance, high-tech
electronic intelligence gathering and photographic
reconnaissance facility.
23
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Q&A / Comments Session

Question Army Chief, then wouldn't the ISI be serving the Army
Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi rather then the civil government?
Answer
I would like to draw your attention to two historical facts Senator Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Javed Ashraf Qazi
and would like to have your comments on them. Former Director General, ISI
i) Before 1979, ISI had very limited role in foreign policy You are right that the ISI was a very modest organisation
formulation and it was during Afghanistan War that most before the Afghan War and it was expanded during the
of the assistance to Mujahideen was processed through Afghan War. After the success of Afghan War,
ISI which placed enormous resources at ISI's disposal. government decided that this agency is essential for
safeguarding the national interest of Pakistan. A lot of
ii) The failure of democracy and the establishment of the successful missions of the ISI are not disclosed most of
military rule (especially during General Zia-ul-Haq's the times and the ISI operations more than once have
military rule) have contributed to strengthening the role of combated security threats. If the ISI was allowed to be
intelligence agencies in foreign policy. Had there been actively involved during 1971, perhaps we could have
democracy in Pakistan, do you think that the intelligence avoided the 1971 tragedy of separation. Secondly,
agencies could have played the role which they are elected representatives are not intelligence agents and
playing now? Given the expansion of the role of their role is strictly demarcated. Elected representatives
intelligence agencies, especially ISI, what is the scope of are supposed to formulate policy and present their advice
action left for the elected representatives? And when you to the Prime Minister. ISI functions directly under the
say that the government mostly relies on the ISI, what do Prime Minister. DG ISI is appointed by the Prime Minister
you mean by the “government” as there is a civil from a panel of officers given by the Army Chief. The
government and a military government in Pakistan. As Prime minister can remove the DG ISI if he/she is
you mentioned that 72 % officials of the ISI are in uniform dissatisfied with his performance. Gen. Asad Durrani was
whose decisions of promotion are in the hands of the removed from the DG ISI's job by Prime Minister Nawaz
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Short Course on
Sharif. DG ISI is supposed to report to the Joint Service meet and discuss the policy and the rest was left to the
Headquarter. At the same time, I would not deny that foreign office to further give directions and implement the
since he is an officer in uniform belonging to the Army, policy.
therefore, the Army Chief does have a great influence
over him. I believe that if DG ISI plays a positive role, he Question
can act as a bridge between the political government and Ms. Fauzia Wahab
the Army. MNA (NA-311, Women Sindh-IV, PPPP)
Question Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, in one of her interviews to

Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi the monthly magazine Herald, shared that Brig. Imtiaz and
MNA (NA-148, Multan-I, PPPP) Major Aamir were captured and the tapes that were
Former Federal Minister received from them were forwarded to the ISI. According
to her, they should have faced court martial but the ISI
There is a general perception that the role of ISI has did not do so. Is it not a contradiction then that the DG ISI
become so overbearing vis-à-vis foreign policy that the is directly answerable to the Prime Minister?
input of foreign office has become secondary and
practically there is a feeling that the foreign office has Answer
become redundant. Because of the enormous clout of Senator Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Javed Ashraf Qazi
this organisation, very competent people at the foreign Former Director General, ISI
office are too scared to give their input and as a result we
are unable to gain from the expertise of the foreign office Let me clarify this. On recommendation of Prime Minister
into the foreign policy. Benazir Bhutto, with her consent, both the officers were
retired from the service. It is a different matter that both
Answer of these officers were later subsequently employed by
Senator Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Javed Ashraf Qazi Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in IB.
Question
It should not be so because primarily foreign office is Ms. Samia Raheel Qazi
responsible for formulating the foreign policy and if there MNA (NA-301, Women Punjab-XXIX, MMAP)
is a competent Foreign Secretary or Foreign Minister, they
would not let the ISI to be overbearing. The ISI would be We have already been divided once through a foreign
overbearing if they are allowed to be overbearing. supported insurgency. What precautions can we take so
However, as far as inputs are concerned, there are that such unfortunate incidences do not occur again?
always two channels through which the foreign office Similarly with our involvement in the Afghanistan, a lot of
receives information: Ambassadors send their reports to casualties occurred and still there was no output.
the foreign office and the Defence Attachés and ISI cover
officers send their reports to the DG ISI. In the past, the Answer
ISI did not receive a copy of what the ambassadors were Senator Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Javed Ashraf Qazi
writing to the foreign office and vice versa. This was a Former Director General, ISI
cause of a lot of friction and in Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto's regime, it was decided that ambassadors' After the Afghan war, a lot of Arabs did not return to their
reports would be shared with the DG ISI and the Defence homelands, instead they came to Pakistan, especially to
Attachés' reports would be shared with the foreign office. Peshawar. In Peshawar, they made a base and they
I handed over the Afghan Policy to the foreign office. started operating against their own governments. There
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto asked President Leghari to was a very big anti-Egyptian cell in Peshawar and an anti-
preside over meetings concerning Afghan Policy where Algerian cell operating from Peshawar because of which
the foreign office, ISI, the NWFP government used to in 1991-92, Pakistan was put on the “terrorism watch
25
Short Course on
list” on demands by the Egyptian and the Algerian opinion is concerned, I do not think that we should allow
governments. The killers of Anwar Saadat, Khalid Pakistan to become a base for any foreign nationals of
Islamboli and his brothers and others were also in any type at all. Here I am not referring to Kashmir as
Peshawar. One of the tasks given to me as the DG ISI Kashmiris are not foreign nationals.
was to take Pakistan off this “terrorism watch list”. As a
result, we realised that we should have good relations Question
with all Islamic countries. So we recommended that Ms. Sherry Rehman
these Arabs should be asked to leave Pakistan and in MNA (NA-309, Women Sindh-II, PPPP)
1994, the government ordered them to leave or else they
would be arrested and handed over to their respective What do you consider an Intelligence failure? Something
governments. Majority of them left and settled in like not finding any high value targets in Wana? On a
Afghanistan. Some of them disappeared, some settled in more fundamental level, when the ISI is operating on the
the tribal areas of Pakistan and some went back to their eastern and western borders, both the net effect of long
own countries and some also went and settled in Sudan. inputs and resource diversions to these areas in one
Those who had gone to Afghanistan formed an sense have resulted now in a lessening of your influence
organisation which subsequently came to be known as in the formal structure in Hamid Karzai's government, the
Al-Qaeda. If our government had not acted in 1994 and Northern Alliance while in Indian-held Kashmir, you have
cleared Peshawar, perhaps Al-Qaeda's base would have lost the mainstream Huriyat Party who have now joined
been Peshawar and instead of Afghanistan we would the Chief Minister of Kashmir. Considering that these two
have been the main target which India was demanding. areas have been the main sites of the ISI operations for
the geo-strategic interests of Pakistan, would you not
Most people in Wana today are Chechens and Uzbeks. consider the loss of influence in both these areas a larger
During the Afghan war, they were fighting against the more fundamental failure?
Mujahideen. They were part of the Soviet Army. When
Soviet Union was disintegrated, Russia became a Another question is that where do you draw the line
separate state and Chechnya revolted. Some Chechen between intelligence gathering for foreign policy purposes
rebels escaped to Afghanistan to avoid Russian for inputs in foreign policy and interventions that begin
atrocities. After Uzbekistan's independence, there was an outside Pakistan and creep into the main political arena of
Islamic movement in Farghana Valley and this movement Pakistan domestically? The ISI has had its share of bad
was crushed ruthlessly by Islam Karimof who has been press and it is not just seen as the main driver of foreign
compared to Stalin. These Uzbeks also took refuge in policy in Pakistan, making the Foreign Minister's office a
Afghanistan. When Americans came into Afghanistan, the largely ceremonial one, but it is seen now as the driver of
majority of the people in Wana escaped from Afghanistan domestic politics in Pakistan which is both dangerous for
and took refuge with this tribe in Waziristan with whom ISI as well as for Pakistan.
they had been interacting while they were in Afghanistan.
Most of these people which the Army has arrested speak My third question is that you mentioned the creation of a
very fluent Pushto as well as Dari. Thus it is not true that higher intelligence organisation which should serve the
we invited them and now we are throwing them out, as purpose of coordination between various agencies and
we never invited Chechens and Uzbeks. Expelling them civil departments and ministries. It seems as if
was necessary as we cannot allow them to wage their coordination is a key issue in the higher echelons of the
war from Pakistan. The government had allowed them to security apparatus because security agencies have a
stay on but only on the condition that they give away their Prime Ministerial and Presidential presence, despite that,
weapons and live peacefully. A number of jirgas were why do you think we needed something as controversial
sent to them but they did not accept the offer. As a result as National Security Council which I presume would have
there was no option left but to undertake an army a fair amount of bearing on Foreign Policy making? When
operation. Most of them have escaped to Afghanistan or you say that 70% of ISI staff would stay for three years
hidden in North Waziristan. But as far as my personal then how do you explain the popular and well-
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documented presence of political players like Gen. failure of intelligence comes in. As far as Afghanistan is
(Retd.) Hameed Gul who seems to be running a parallel concerned, once the Afghan Jihad was over we decided
government of Army and hence giving birth to terms that our presence in Afghanistan was no more required. It
such as 'rogue ISI' and 'parallel ISI' and 'three tiers of ISI'? was for this reason that Afghan Policy was handed over
to the Foreign Office. As far as effectiveness with Hamid
Answer Karzai's government is concerned, Americans brought in
Senator Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Javed Ashraf Qazi the Northern Alliance and Northern Alliance inherently
Former Director General, ISI has been anti-Pakistan because of the Pakhtoon factor. If
today the Americans pull out, Northern Alliance would not
As far as the system is concerned, the day you leave the be able to stay in Afghanistan as a result of civil war. It is
ISI, you are not even welcome to enter its premises. None not the failure of ISI that Northern Alliance is against
of the ISI's ex-DGs have been allowed to step back inside Pakistan. They have been against us ever since the days
even as visitors. Gen. (Retd.) Hameed Gul tries to keep of Ahmed Shah Masood who hijacked the school
his importance alive by giving these statements. I was children's bus. Let me tell you that later we realised that
DG ISI after him and nobody from ISI ever visited Gen. evacuating Afghanistan was not a wise decision and it is
(Retd.) Hameed Gul. He was not allowed to visit the ISI for this reason that there was a lot of intelligence about
but he kept on giving such statements like “My Boys in Afghanistan but they did not interfere. Similarly, ISI did
the ISI…” etc. He keeps himself alive in the newspapers get the blame for letting Taliban do as they will but Taliban
through such statements and you publish such were not immune to advise anyway.
statements thinking that it will bring a controversial
subject forward for people to discuss. But the fact is that Vis-à-Vis Kashmir, both factions of Huriyat Conference
the day you leave ISI, your influence and importance also still consider Pakistan as their mainstay. They have
finishes. internal differences and the ISI is not responsible for any
animosity amongst the two factions.
About Mehran Bank, Mehran Bank did not even exist at
that time. Yes, money was distributed but it did not come Question
from Mehran Bank. Mehran Bank was formed much later. Mr. Omar Ayub Khan
It got the name Mehran because the person concerned MNA (NA-19, Haripur, PML)
was Mr. Younis Habib. Mr. Younis Habib at that time was
in Habib Bank. He collected the money from the India's strength is increasing in their value-added weapon
businessmen of Karachi at the behest of those who did systems. Keeping their military strength in perspective as
not want to see Ms. Bhutto back in power and he well as the rapid increase in Indian economy vis-à-vis
distributed that money through the then DG ISI, who is Pakistan's, and then bringing in the Kashmir issue, what
just one man. The rest of the ISI did not even know about in your opinion do you think the role of foreign policy
this. Neither was MI involved in it. It was solely a one input will be for the government fifteen years from now
man show. He was given that money by the President where India is looking at itself as the local power broker
and with the tacit approval of the Chief of Army, he of the region? They are projecting their force in the
distributed that money amongst the various politicians for ASEAN region as well. Where do we stand vis-à-vis
the election campaign. As far as the ISI being not Kashmir if there is some sort of dialogue on Kashmir with
effective in Wana is concerned, the ISI was not present in the rapid increase in Indian conventional forces?
the tribal areas. We had always relied on the tribesmen
themselves and their assurance that they will safeguard Answer
the interests of Pakistan. Lack of presence of the ISI in Senator Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Javed Ashraf Qazi
these tribal areas resulted in lack of information. While Former Director General, ISI
the ISI did report that there are some foreign elements in
Wana, the numbers were underestimated and that is You have counted a lot of our weaknesses but you have
where they suffered casualties and that is where the not counted any of our strengths. Our geo-strategic
27
Short Course on
location is our inherent strength. India desperately wants Answer

to trade with the Central Asian region and dominate it. Senator Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Javed Ashraf Qazi
Pakistan straddles all the routes which India needs. India Former Director General, ISI
cannot interact with any country to the west without
Pakistan's co-operation. This has stifled its growth. India ISI is inherently not authorised to undertake any political
has to resort to sea routes for trade which are much work. Interference in politics by the ISI only takes place
more expensive. Our second strength is our nuclear when a military government comes in. Military
power which guarantees our safety. Despite governments depend more on the ISI as they do not have
preponderance in conventional weapons, India will not a political force to carry out their work. During Martial
dare to attack us. This does not mean that we need not Law, barely less than 5% of the army gets involved in
have any conventional forces but at the same time there this, the rest 95% are in barracks doing their duty. It is for
is no need for us to indulge in an arms race with India. I this reason that exaggerated importance is given to the
personally feel that we need to increasingly rely on the ISI. However this is not appropriate and is not the
resistance by our civil population if they come in. function of the ISI. DGs of the ISI are usually selected
Kashmir struggle has served Pakistan tremendously. It against the panel submitted by the Army; rather they are
has engaged six to seven lakh Indian forces in that small selected to fulfil the Prime Minister's political agenda. It is
valley and as a result, on the rest of the border we had for this reason that more than the ISI, it is the Prime
parity. One of the reasons they retreated their forces from Minister who is to be blamed. Secondly, as far as the
our borders was because of their lack of superiority to media is concerned, they also write what they perceive
conquer Pakistan. However, Kashmir needs to be and sometime these perceptions are not true as the ISI
resolved in the interest of both India and Pakistan. The officials in uniform cannot defend themselves by
leadership in Kashmir is far more realistic than the participating in any kind of debate.
leadership in Pakistan. In 1993-94 Syed Ali Gillani
informed me that India will never give up entire Kashmir. Comment
We should be realistic as the solution lies in between and Sardar Asseff Ahmed Ali
it is only after an honourable solution is reached that this Former Foreign Minister
arms race can end, trade can develop and economy can
become better. I welcome you to a civilian life and I congratulate you for
coming into the Parliament but let me repeat myself that
Question there is an enormous kick in getting elected directly by
Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin the people and I will invite you to go through this
Visiting Prof. LUMS wonderful experience. I also congratulate you on your
comprehensive presentation. But my heart goes out to
I thought that a lot of emphasis in your presentation was you in sympathy and I feel as if you are in the dock and
laid on the formal aspect of ISI's functions. But I feel that we are the jury. We have worked together for two years
there is a huge gap between its theoretical functions and and I want to share this with everyone that it was a very
its practical behaviour. The ISI manipulates the political good period for extending Pakistan's influence in the
forces, formulates political alliances, and quite often world and protecting our national security. I give you a lot
monopolises foreign policy. There are a lot of things that of credit for having played a very positive role for the
the ISI does which we learn through the press success of this cooperation that came about. For the past
substantiated by evidence. three to four years, people have had to hold their noses to
walk past the ISI because of all the political
My second question is that who determines the definition manipulations, all the political pressures, misuse of NAB
of national interest, the uniformed ISI officials or the and because of the artificial exile into which two principal
elected representatives? leaders of Pakistan have been sent by the military regime.
The kind of manipulation and interference that has taken
place in the last three years has not been witnessed
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Short Course on
before. If the ISI was indulging in politics in a covert

manner in the past, this time it took off its fig leaf and it
became a complete overt involvement and blatant
interference in the politics and I myself am a victim to
that. I cannot find any excuses in terms of national
security for this. In apologies for the ISI, I am usually very
proud of the work that the ISI did in Afghanistan and
Kashmir but I cannot, for the life of me, find within the
ISI's charter and morality, legality and legitimacy of
having the ISI interfere in such a blatant manner and to
serve not only the democratic institutions but also the
constitutional institutions of state like the Election
Commission, Supreme Court, and the Parliament.
Speaker in the Parliament were elected because of the
voice of a Major General Zamir. If this kind of overt
interference in the politics keeps taking place, it would
bring a very bad name to a very fine institution and I for
one would like to see the ISI strengthen and its role to be
much more effective.
Answer
Senator Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Javed Ashraf Qazi
I do not deny the ISI's role in the last elections which you
all have so vehemently pointed out. But at the same time,
I would like to emphasise here that this role of the ISI is
very minimal and due credit goes to the ISI for playing a
major role in externally safeguarding the interests of
Pakistan. Their inputs into the foreign policy are extremely
useful. When it comes to its political role, I myself am
against it and the ISI should not be involved in it.
29
Short Course on
Session 1
Executive Summary
C overing an Overview of Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947 - 2004 by Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi, the session was
chaired by Mr. Sardar Asseff Ahmed Ali, Former Foreign Minister of Pakistan. Dr. Rizvi was of the view that the
management of foreign policy is a very difficult and complex affair for a country like Pakistan which does not enjoy
the option of isolation. He believed that unlike the past, Pakistan, as a major participant in the global efforts to curb
transnational terrorism, stands at an enhanced level of its strategic relevance for the major powers, especially the United
States. Despite pursuing a pro-active foreign policy, Pakistan does not have the ambition and capacity to assume the role of
a global or regional power. Its activism reflects a realisation that such a policy facilities the mobilisation of international
support and resources for its domestic socio-economic development, helps to regulate the inputs from the external
environment into the internal context, and contributes to strengthening security and territorial integrity which are the principal
concerns of Pakistan's foreign policy.
Dr. Rizvi described major focus of Pakistan's foreign policy over the years to be security against external and internal
challenges to its national identity, territorial integrity and independence and cultivation of close and brotherly relations with
the Muslim states. The principal strategies and mechanisms to pursue these foreign policy goals have varied over time.
His presentation was followed by a Q&A Session which put emphasis on Pakistan's emerging relations with India and U.S.
and internal dynamics of Pakistan bearing on its foreign policy options.
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Short Course on
Introductory Presentation

Executive Director, PILDAT dedicated to legislative strengthening, Mr. Mehboob said
that PILDAT seeks to prepare and sensitise
parliamentarians to take up a role of policy making which
is constitutionally theirs.
He explained that PILDAT was set up as an indigenous

organisation of likeminded individuals with seed money
from overseas Pakistanis who wanted to contribute to
strengthening of democracy in Pakistan. Since its
inception in October 2001, PILDAT has indigenously
developed its agenda and programmes. On the basis of
this indigenously developed agenda, PILDAT has sought
and received funds from international donor organisations
such as UNDP, DFID, Friedrich Naumann Stiftung,
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, The Asia Foundation and the IRI,
etc. He informed the participants that PILDAT has
recently joined Pakistan Legislative Strengthening
M r. Ahmed Bilal Mehboob formally began the

first session of the course by providing an
overview of the course and its objectives. He
emphasised that the major objective of the course was to
enhance the awareness of parliamentarians and
Consortium which has been set up to implement the
USAID-funded project of Strengthening National and
Provincial Legislative Governance SNPLG. Now many of
PILDAT events and programmes are organised under
SNPLG including the short course on foreign policy.
politicians on the foreign policy process in Pakistan and
to help them determine as to what is their clear role in Mr. Mehboob highlighted that PILDAT exists in the
this formulation. He said that this course aimed to capacity of a non-partisan and independent friend to
prepare parliamentarians and politicians to play an legislatures and legislators and strongly puts its faith,
effective role in shaping, influencing and reviewing devotion and energies in strengthening democracy and
Foreign Policy Process in Pakistan and further to democratic institutions in Pakistan.
strengthen the role of Foreign Affairs Committees.
Shedding light on the role of PILDAT as an organisation Please refer to Appendix C for his detailed presentation.
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An Overview of
Pakistan's Foreign Policy: 1947 - 2004

D r. Rizvi began by quipping that it was not an

easy task to cover 57 years of Pakistan's
Foreign Policy in thirty (30) minutes. As the
author of PILDAT's briefing paper on the topic of
Overview of Pakistan's Foreign Policy, which was
specially developed for this short course, he highlighted
that the paper covers a historical overview of Pakistan's
Foreign Policy.
Dr. Rizvi believed that management of foreign policy is a

very difficult and complex affair for a country like
Pakistan as it neither desires nor can entertain the option
of isolation. Similarly, countries like Pakistan cannot be
over active in pursuance of foreign policy goals. Pakistan
has to be part of the international system because of
issues that require a global and a cooperative approach
such as issues of poverty, environment, drug trafficking,
etc. Imperatives of economic development as well as
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serious security problems with India require Pakistan to groups which has now become a problem for Pakistan.
be part of the global system. In a security dilemma like After September 2001, international system has become
this either one ends up in arms race which is not an more status quo oriented in terms of state boundaries
advisable strategy for Pakistan or that deficiency can be and political divides, even though these boundaries are
compensated through astute diplomacy, he believed. unjust. Pakistan's cause for Kashmir has not brought
Diplomacy is an important instrument to pursue national support from the international community, he added.
objectives in a situation of imbalance, similar to the one
that exists between Pakistan and India. Pakistan's Re-capping phases of Pakistan's foreign policy, Dr. Rizvi
strategies to address these issues have changed over said that initially Pakistan started with a policy of
time, as they should have. The stability has to be in the friendship with all countries. In the mid 50s, it leaned
goals and objectives that are pursued rather than heavily on the West. Pakistan-U.S relations can be
strategies which are time and context bound. Pakistan's divided into three phases:
position in the global system also has varied over time,
he added. i) Mid 50s to early 60s (when Pakistan was part
of the Defence Alliance System)
Pakistan is situated in an area which is close to the areas
of importance to superpowers. For the past 57 years, ii) The 80s (Afghanistan and revival of Pakistan-US
Pakistan has been addressing the basic question of how relations)
to cash on this strategic importance i.e. how to make
itself relevant to the international system, said Dr. Rizvi. In iii) After September 2001 to date.
order for a country to be relevant to the international
system, it needs to have (a) internal stability and a viable All these three phases have certain distinguishing
sustainable system (b) economic viability and the ability features. The first two phases, in terms of US-Pakistan
to attract investment from outside, (c) knowledge, relations ended with a series of complaints from both
academics and technology. He considered these to be the sides and sanctions against Pakistan. In September
main instruments of power in today's world. 2001, when Pakistan joined the global effort to contain
terrorism, it was under four different types of sanctions
Dr. Rizvi explained that Pakistan developed primarily as a which post September 11 were withdrawn. Explaining the
security state, where the overriding factor has always reasons for the problems in Pakistan-U.S. relations, he
been territorial security against external threats. The said that this relationship cannot be that of equality as
major beneficiary in this has been the military for the U.S. will always have greater options available to deal
allocation of resources and making input to the foreign with Pakistan. U.S. operates from a global perspective
policy. With the stronghold of military rule, the role of and its South Asia policy depends upon its global policy.
intelligence agencies also increased in Pakistan's foreign U.S. does not fully share Pakistan's concerns with India.
policy making. Therefore Pakistan's foreign policy, The current relationship that Pakistan has evolved with
especially in the last thirty years has been a policy the U.S. is the least problematic option for Pakistan. He
without a long term vision, where imperatives of was of the view that decision of not joining the coalition
diplomacy were often ignored and the imperatives of would have been very costly. Counterterrorism, he
territorial security were over emphasised. believed, will be a long-term policy for Pakistan and it will
have long-term relations with the U.S. as along with costs
Dr. Rizvi said that in the past, (1980's and 90's) Pakistan there are also benefits for Pakistan. However, there will be
used non-state actors to pursue its foreign policy agenda differences but common grounds will facilitate their
in Afghanistan and later in Indian administered Kashmir. relationship, he believed.
For Islamic groups, this became a part of their ideology,
whereas for the government, it was a foreign policy Dr. Rizvi highlighted that the most troubled and difficult
strategy. He said that it has become difficult for the relationship that Pakistan shares is with India.
government to change the ideology of these Islamic Characteristic features of this relationship are mistrust
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and acrimony. He opined that there has been a change to

pursue a new framework and an attempt to try and
resolve disputes, although solutions are not guaranteed.
According to Dr. Rizvi this change is due to induction of
nuclear weapons and it is for this reason that war is no
longer a sensible option. It is for this reason that there is
more global interest in managing Pakistan-India problem
rather then solving it at the moment. He said that the
expectations that India would surrender Kashmir were
and will always be unfounded. Countries even if they are
wrong, do not surrender territories. After 9/11, Pakistan's
support to resistance in Kashmir has become untenable.
On the one hand, Pakistan has been saved from being
declared a terrorist state as demanded by India. This is a
success but on the other hand, Pakistan, in the current
scenario, will not be in a position to support the Kashmir
militancy. Dr. Rizvi pointed out that Pakistan's policy
towards India has also changed because of international
pressure, hence the declaration of January 2004.
Dr. Rizvi concluded by saying that the issues of foreign

policy have to be viewed as political problems rather than
articles of faith and importance has to be given to
diplomacy rather than narrow security considerations.
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Question Question
Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi Sahibzada Mian Jalil Sharaqpuri
MNA (NA-148, Multan-I, PPPP) MNA (NA-132, Sheikhupura-II, PML)
We cannot have an independent foreign policy as we
The political leadership in Pakistan did realise that war depend on other countries for various issues. However, in
with India was no longer an option and that other options the past, it is seen that Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
should be tried. However when the political leadership pursued an independent policy and so did Prime Minister
presented this opinion, its loyalties were questioned. Nawaz Sharif. Why do we have to succumb to foreign
Today the same thing is being said by the military pressures now?
leadership, and they are being supported and praised. Is
it a change of heart from within or is it due to external Answer
pressures? Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi
Answer
Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi We can pursue an independent policy. Even in democratic
Defence & Political Analyst countries, decisions on foreign policy are taken by the
government despite opposition and the viability of the
It is a combination of both: change of heart as well as government depends on whether it can mobilise support
external pressures. There has been a lot of pressure on afterwards. I agree that we have been hiding our nuclear
both the countries. Another factor is that military has capabilities in the past but as far as Dr. A.Q. Khan is
reanalysed how to sustain its role in the domestic concerned, basically we got caught as there was
context. The role of military's survival now depends on concrete evidence against him available on the
Pakistan's economic development and economic viability. international level.
36
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Question Answer
Mr. Omar Ayub Khan Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi
MNA (NA-19, Haripur, PML) Defence & Political Analyst
You mentioned that diplomacy should be the primary tool As far as relations with Isreal are concerned, we have
which should be used by Pakistan and you also made certain moves to interact with Israel, although on
mentioned that the military's influence in society is now an informal basis. The problem with recognition of Israel
present in so many facets of society that they do not is both domestic and international. If the Palestine issue
have to depend on the boogie of India alone and now the moves towards a solution, we can perhaps recognise
stakeholders of Pakistan are interested in economic Israel.
progress of Pakistan. What in your opinion are the foreign
policy options available to us in managing the Indo- Israel Question
nexus that is coming up on the horizon? Ms. Sherry Rehman
MNA (NA-309, Women Sindh-II, PPPP)
Answer
Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi You mentioned inequality between U.S. and Pakistan in its
Defence & Political Analyst defining eras of cooperation and alignment. I think we
need to separate strategic decision-making from
This nexus will sharpen the imbalance of conventional emotionalism. The problem is that this emotionalism has
security. We can mobilise more international support and also crept into our relations with India. Can you advise us
neutralise our negative options. The nexus between India how we can start to understand that there is a basic
and Israel should not be seen as a conspiracy theory. asymmetry between India and Pakistan? How can we get
Israel's consideration is economic; it wants to sell out of this competitive paradigm? How can we make this
weapons. It is a commercial relationship. shift sustainable? How do you make the foreign office a
higher capacity organisation? With respect to the
Comments privatisation of our foreign policy since Zia's period, we
Makhdoom Syed Ahmad Alam Anwar have become familiar with the term fallout; blow back.
MNA (NA-192, R.Y.Khan-I, PML) How do we unlock ourselves from a situation where we
are still suffering from the fallout while managing a new
The foreign policy of a state is essentially an extension of institutional shift on our western borders?
a country's domestic goals. If we have not been able to
develop a strong civil society, consequently, the Answer
performance of the diplomats and foreign office can also Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi
not be good. Our external image can only become Defence & Political Analyst
positive if we become strong internally.
It is neither advisable nor practical to think that equality
Question exists between India and Pakistan even though the state
Mian Shamim Haider has tried to create this psyche. Pakistan should weigh its
MNA (NA-135, Sheikhupura-V, PML) options in terms of its own strengths. It should try to play
up these factors. We have highlighted our strategic
The situation has changed a lot in the last 5-6 years. Why importance, and this can only be achieved if we can
are we not able to improve our relations with Israel? control extremism. The foreign office needs to strengthen
research work and more academic input is needed. They
are more involved in justifying their policies rather than
analysing them. The fallout has been a very serious
problem for Pakistan. Pakistan is more intolerant now
than it was 20 years ago. We have been socialised into a
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Short Course on
particular type of mind frame since 1979 and an entire Question

generation has been affected as a result. Ms. Aasiya Azeem
MNA (NA-285, Women Punjab-XIII, PML)
Question
Syed Naveed Qamar It is imperative at the moment that India-Pakistan
MNA (NA-222, Hyderabad-V, PPPP) relations should improve. But the kind of statements that
Indian leadership are giving regarding the temporary
When we make Kashmir the core issue of India-Pakistan nature of the border line and that it should not exist are
relations, how do you expect talks to go forward? Would difficult to accept. How can we deal with these
this not sabotage the whole process? Knowing that the statements? We have been brain washing our generation
gulf between the two sides is so large, how will we find a against India and Israel for so long. How can we expect
solution in these circumstances? things to change right away?
Answer Answer
Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi
Defence & Political Analyst Defence and Political Analyst
For the solution, both sides will have to move from their Yes it will take time for people to change their thinking
traditional positions and look for alternatives. Kashmir will about India and Israel. Indian leaders are giving such
be a difficult issue to tackle and at the moment one statements like “border khoon ki lakeer hai”. We should
cannot say how it will be resolved. not worry about such statements. These statements
reflect their thinking that has been prevalent since
Question independence and they never agreed with the two nation
Ms. Fauzia Wahab theory.
MNA (NA-311, Women Sindh-IV, PPPP)
Question
Three factors are important determinants for the strength Sayyeda Farhana Khalid Banoori
of a country: knowledge, academics, and technology and MNA (NA-323, Women NWFP-II, MMAP)
Pakistan is pathetic in all these three. When we look at
education, we see that the policy planners of this country, Pakistan was the only country that recognised Taliban
the elite, do not even send their children to state and now they are considered to be our enemy. Were we
institutions. Similarly we do not have any check and wrong then or now?
balance in these three institutions.
Answer
Answer Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi
Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi Defence & Political Analyst
That policy was pursued in a particular context. Policies
Since the children of our elite do not study in state cannot be absolute. There are always options available,
institutions, you are right that the condition of the given the range of possibilities in front of you.
education in these institutions cannot be improved.
Higher education is a law and order issue and unless this Question
law and order situation is corrected, this issue cannot be Makhdum Khusro Bakhtyar
resolved. MNA (NA-194, R.Y.Khan-III, PML)
India is emerging as a major player in South Asia as well
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as globally because of its economic strengths. There is a U.N gave its Resolution? Secondly, what do you think will
constant tug of war between China and America be the fate of Kashmir, would it become independent or
regarding Indian markets and they are both trying to woo LoC would be accepted as a permanent border?
India. So the current initiative post January 6 (Declaration
between Pakistan and India), needs to be time bound. It Answer
would be in India's interest to prolong this, and bring Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi
these issues for resolution when India is much stronger Defence & Political Analyst
globally and is in a much stronger position to make
negotiations. The final solution regarding Kashmir in my view would
neither be what India wants right now and nor what
Answer Pakistan wishes it to be.
Defence & Political Analyst Comment
Mr. Abdul Sattar
From the point of view of diplomacy, I do not agree that Former Foreign Minister
this should be made time bound. If we make it time
bound then we should consider the event if the solution is No country has revealed the truth about its nuclear
not reached by the deadline and what would be its capabilities. The question is not whether or not to accept
repercussions. However, the negotiation process should Israel but when to accept it. We supported the Taliban,
continue. but we should not say that we changed our policy
suddenly after 9/11. We had realised earlier that our
Question policy towards the Taliban was unsustainable. We knew
Syed Haider Abbas Rizvi this would be harmful to us.
MNA (NA-244, Karachi-VI, MQM)
Question
What is foreign policy and what is a good foreign policy? Mr. Qamar Zaman Kaira
How would you grade Pakistan's foreign policy over the MNA (NA-106, Gujrat-III, PPPP)
last 57 years?
We do not have a group of business class that can
Answer influence our foreign and domestic policies. The military
Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi is the only financial group that has emerged. When you
Defence & Political Analyst say that this is military's business interest, does that
mean it is in the economic interest of the country or is it
Good foreign policy depends on what role your policy has an interest as an institution? Will the solution of Kashmir,
played in achieving your international objectives. which even Congress has rejected, be the beginning of
Historically, we have a mixed track record. It has been a the problem or a solution of the problem?
mixed bag of successes and failures.
Answer
Question Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi
Mr. Naseer Muhammad Defence & Political Analyst
Nazim Charsada
The military has a strong stake in our economic and
The main reason of a switch over from a policy of non- industrial policies. It is difficult to say what the solution of
alignment to a policy of alignment with the U.S. was our Kashmir will be.
inherited problems with India and especially the Kashmir
issue. Was it wise to withdraw from Kashmir when a time
frame was not given for plebiscite at the time when the
39
Short Course on
Session 2
Executive Summary
T he second session consisted of the Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Mr. Khursheed Mahmud Kasuri's views on the Major
Foreign Policy Issues Facing the Country as well as his informal and candid exchange of views with participating
Parliamentarians on crucial issues of foreign policy.
Mr. Kasuri highlighted the need for a bi-partisan approach in the formulation and pursuance of foreign policy of Pakistan. He
believed that the post 9/11 world has brought a host of challenges and opportunities for Pakistan which the Pakistani state is
dealing with in a mature and effective manner. Touching upon major foreign policy issues faced by the country at present,
Mr. Kasuri talked about the introduction of new angle in Pakistan's relations with India; Pakistan's relations with the Muslim
World, especially Pakistan's views on the situation in Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine. He reiterated the government's view
that despite being a frontline state against terrorism, Pakistan believes that the use of force is not an effective strategy
against controlling terrorism but a comprehensive approach of resolving the root cause of terrorism needs to be adopted at
the national level.
Mr. Kasuri's speech was followed by an intensive and candid exchange of views and Q&A between him and the participating
parliamentarians. Some of the exchange was declared off-the-record and has therefore not been included in the
proceedings. Edited Q&A are reproduced at the end of the text of Mr. Kasuri's speech.
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Major Foreign Policy

Issues Facing the Country

MNA (NA-140 Kasur III, PML)
T he Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Kasuri, was
of the view that Pakistan's foreign policy is
guided by its history, geographical location and
ethos of its people, hence maintaining a bipartisan
approach in its foreign policy has been an important
objective of the government. While there are elements of
continuity in the foreign policy, as they should be, there is
also a change of emphasis and nuance, he believed.
Pakistan is firmly committed to the promotion of peace

and security at the regional and global levels. September
11, 2001 events, he believed, brought far-reaching
ramifications for Pakistan on a global and regional level.
These events placed Pakistan in the eye of the storm with
core imperatives of Pakistan's foreign policy - security,
Islamic identity and economic viability - put in grave
danger of being compromised, he added. Like all defining
moments, the situations in the immediate aftermath of
9/11, while posing enormous challenges, also offered
Pakistan with an opportunity to reorient its foreign policy
priorities in the light of the changed situation in order to
promote its vital interests, he said.
Mr. Kasuri believed that Pakistan's support has enabled

the global coalition to make important gains in the anti-
terrorism campaign and brought Pakistan great
appreciation and important stature as a key member of
the international community. Pakistan's decision to join
anti-terrorism efforts has not only dramatically improved
relations with the US and the West but also with Russia,
Iran and the Central Asian states. China is also very
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appreciative of our stand against terrorism. There is wide system was established in 1999 and operationalised in
appreciation of the fact that the reorientation of Pakistan's 2000. As such, there is no question of pilferage or
foreign policy in the aftermath of 9/11 was not an easy leakage from our soil, he said.
option, given its serious implications for Pakistan's
internal stability and external security. The immediate Terming relations between Pakistan and India as another
economic benefit came in the shape of crucial debt relief important issue, he said that Pakistan wants peaceful
enabling the country to avert a looming risk of default on relations with all regional states particularly India. This
its foreign debt service obligations, he explained. quest is actuated by an enlightened sense of national
interest. The long-standing Kashmir issue represents a
Throwing light on the recent operations in South challenge to the international community both in its
Waziristan Agency, he said that these are a part of political and human rights dimensions. Pakistan seeks the
Pakistan's effort to root out terrorism in all its resolution of all outstanding issues including Jammu and
manifestations from its territory. The Government's Kashmir through a peaceful process of dialogue and
commitment to the Pakistani society and the international constructive engagement with India.
community to fight terrorism makes it incumbent on us to
take on this menace frontally, he opined. There is a realisation in India and Pakistan that war is not
an option. Human rights violations in Jammu and
While Pakistan's commitment to combating terrorism Kashmir also have to come to an end. We are looking for
remains firm, said Mr. Kasuri, Pakistan also believes that solutions, which can ensure peace and stability in the
the menace of terrorism can be dealt with effectively only region, justice for the people of Kashmir, and a secure
through a comprehensive approach and not just through future for the people of South Asia, he said. The current
use of force. This approach, he added, includes a India-Pakistan peace initiative enjoys the backing and
consensus on defining terrorism, and a focus on the root support of the international community including USA, EU
causes of terrorism. At the same time, he added, and China and Japan. There is a new momentum which
Pakistan believes that the fight against terrorism should is the outcome of the statesmanship shown by President
not turn into clash between the West and the world of General Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Atal Bihari
Islam as this would have serious risks for world peace Vajpayee. This is a very salutary environment to kick-
and stability. Of equal importance is the need to curb the start the dialogue, he believed.
tendency on the part of some countries to use the
international sentiment against terrorism for advancing Speaking about the Muslim World, Mr. Kasuri said that
their own narrow agenda. This would deprive the Pakistan's position in the Islamic world is a matter of
international campaign against terrorism of its moral satisfaction and pride. At the same time Pakistan is aware
legitimacy. Pakistan rejects the canard of the so-called that world order and global peace cannot be restored
“Islamic terrorism.” Terrorism has no religion, he added. without addressing the conflicts which beset the Islamic
world today. We reject the cycle of violence in the Middle
Speaking on the Nuclear Issue as one of the issues of East, which has a negative impact on the ongoing Middle
foreign policy today, Mr. Kasuri said that the objective of East peace process. Pakistan strongly supports the
our nuclear programme is to deter aggression, so that we Palestinian peoples' struggle for attaining statehood and
can safeguard our national security and protect our political independence. We believe, he said, that
sovereignty. Pakistan shall maintain the competitive edge concerted efforts by the international community should
of its nuclear programme through its national means, he be initiated to stem escalation of violence as it is breeding
emphasised. At the same time, he said, we also want a extremism. Pakistan supports the two state formula, he
strategic restraint regime and conventional balance added.
between Pakistan and India and not an open-ended arms
race between the two countries. Pakistan has a National Mr. Kasuri said that Iraq remains an open wound on the
Command Authority (NCA) headed by the President of body politic of the Muslim world. International approach
Pakistan with Prime Minister as its Vice Chairman. This must be guided by the objective of restoring Iraq's
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sovereignty and political independence; ensuring its unity

and territorial integrity; upholding the right of the Iraqi
people to determine their own future and giving a central
role to the U.N.
Speaking of Afghanistan, he said that it is moving

gradually but inexorably towards a new disposition. An
enabling environment would require rapid reconstruction
of its physical and social infrastructure. Instability in
Afghanistan has a direct bearing on Pakistan. A peaceful,
stable and friendly Afghanistan is vital to our national
security, economic and political interest. Pakistan
supports the Bonn process and efforts of President
Karzai for peace and harmony in Afghanistan. The
international community must help Afghanistan
generously in the process of rehabilitation and
reconstruction. On our part we have pledged US$100
million for this process. A stable Afghanistan is certain to
have a positive impact on the politico-economic
landscape of Central Asia as well as that of South and
Southwest Asia. Politically, it will end the threat of
religious extremism to this region. In the economic field,
construction of road networks and implementation of the
energy pipeline will bring development and prosperity, he
said.
Mr. Kasuri believed that the current international

configuration has immensely altered the traditional
diplomatic functions and practices. The dispersal of
authority away from states, the predominance of
economics over politics, and the growing role of NGOs,
social movements, and other transnational collectivities
highlight the need for national governments to alter their
modes of interaction with each other and with relevant
actors in the multi-centric world. He was of the view that
the best assurance for the consolidation of global peace
lies in the economic development and prosperity of all
regions and all peoples. Economic progress in one region
supports and complements prosperity in an era of greater
prosperity and peace. In this connection the agreement
on SAFTA augurs well for the economic well-being of
South Asia, he concluded.
Please see Appendix E for his complete paper.
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Question potential to create a conflict in Pakistan between the State
Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin and the Society. You mentioned North Waziristan; I think
Visiting Prof. LUMS North Waziristan has a potential to create a serious
conflictual situation between State and the Society. So
Thank you Foreign Minister. One of my major concerns is keeping in view these factors, I wonder whether we really
that our foreign policy appears to be very short term and have thought about the transition that is taking place in
adhocist in nature. It does not have a long term vision. the international system from unipolarity to multipolarity
For example, if we have moved closer to the United and its long term consequences.
States because of our interest, we probably have not
given much thought to the realities of the emerging multi- Answer
polar world where there exist multiple centres of power Mr. Khursheed Mahmud Kasuri
and these centres of power have become very concerned MNA (NA-140 Kasur III, PML)
in the wake of United States' declaration that Pakistan Foreign Minister of Pakistan
would be considered a major ally among the non NATO
countries and here I would like to mention the concern of Thank you very much. These are some very interesting
the Chinese. The recent visit by the Chinese delegation and thought-provoking questions. I am grateful to you
has expressed concern over Pakistan's relationship with that you allowed me to clarify some of these issues. Well,
the United States. I do not know which Chinese delegation you are referring
to because there is hardly any Chinese delegation which
Secondly, I wonder if our government has given enough does not call upon me. I have met the [Chinese] Prime
thought to the forthcoming US election. What if there is a Minister and the Foreign Minister three days ago and I
change in administration from the Republicans to the quote, this information is not hidden, as it was telecast by
Democrats, and possibly a reversal of US global rule the Chinese Television, by New China News agency, by the
way we see it today? APP: Not a word was mentioned about non NATO status,
not one word by the [Chinese] Prime Minister or the
Thirdly I would like to say that the US policy has serious Foreign Minister. When you say a visiting delegation, well
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suppose journalists are visiting Pakistan and some of non NATO ally. Russia does not even bother them; they
them did show concern, its part of their business to ask are not even our direct neighbours.
searching questions.
China understands that in improving their relationship
First of all let me make it clear that there is no official with the United States, their focus is in improving their
visiting delegation that does not call upon me. I make it a own economic conditions. Pakistan is not simply a
point to see all Chinese delegations. They are top priority country you can kick around. It is a country that is
of Pakistan. They understand this and they are trying their economically growing. It is a nuclear power and a missile
best to improve their own relationships with the United power, it is not internationally isolated. To an extent, it
States. USA was the largest investor in China last year. sends signal to India that it is not internationally isolated.
After all Major Non NATO Ally's status is concerned, they It improves our chances of talks with India and we
understand as well as we do. This is even when we were continue to place that as our top priority. We need to have
members of SEATO and CENTO. We had incurred a peaceful resolution of disputes with India. As far as
obligations under SEATO and CENTO. It was made Muslim world is concerned, no, it has not sent any such
absolutely clear to the United States that Pakistan can not signals. I have been to many countries, in fact on the
be used against China. I said it this time also when I was contrary, it has improved our stature in the Islamic world
in China when a reporter asked me this question on a and it amazed me the degree of respect that Pakistan has
programme which is the equivalent of Hard Talk gained as being the only nuclear Muslim power.
programme in China. They [Chinese Government]
understand when being members of SEATO and CENTO, We have not over-estimated the fact that we are a Major
Pakistan did not compromise on its relationship with Non-NATO Ally and the world will change because of it.
China, it is not about to do so as MNNA. This is where I We need to construct our foreign policy with due care
give credit to all governments of Pakistan, not just this and diligence but it does help us and sends signals that
government. As was the case in the nuclear issue, the ours is not a short-term relation with the US based on the
credit does not belong to this government alone, it need to counter terrorism.
belongs to all the governments of Pakistan. They
[Pakistani governments] have not compromised on vital Second question was change of government in the United
and national interests of Pakistan. So even the thought States. For the record, it is not our business, whether it is
does not occur to the Chinese or the Americans that Indian or American elections. Let me tell you the state
Pakistan can be used. I had two hours of discussion with and the nation are not conducted on emotions, but on
Chinese Foreign Minister and it was not brought forward state interests. Geo-political reality and international
because the Prime Minister did not think it was worthy of scenario are not going to change due to any change in
raising. government in the US or India. There is not going to be
radical change now or ever. United States and Pakistan
Secretary of State Colin Powell said that we are looking need each other. I think United States has seen that after
for a long term engagement and strategic relations with walking out on Pakistan. It has also seen that sanctions
Pakistan, which is the reason why they thought it [MNNA] do not work. I have told this to America on their face that
necessary. We listened to it and weighed the pros and the fact that you moved away from Afghanistan after
cons. Those who say that US involvement with this Soviet withdrawal has created all the mess. It is not
country is limited to only terrorism, MNNA status is a Pakistan alone that is responsible but jointly Pakistan and
response to that. It will give us some benefit. We have the United States are responsible for what has happened.
been under sanctions and it has been a problem for our I have said it to the Europeans and the Americans. They
military supplies and equipment. There are some benefits do not deny it. If we are guilty, then they are also guilty in
and we thought we are sending right signals and no various ways. As far as United States is concerned, if
question of annoying anyone. If Russia today has to there is a change in government, it is none of my
tolerate Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia getting into NATO business. You can make your own guesses who we wish
they are hardly in a position to object to our position as to win in the next election and everybody can have their
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personal wish and personal priorities. But for the state to make the bipartisan approach prevail?
state relations, it makes no difference.
Second issue is the shift for the better in our relations
Third question was that the US policy has the potential to with India that we all agree with. The question is that you
create conflict inside our own society. That problem is are about to start a dialogue, and which can have results
there but it has nothing to do with the US policy. We have either way, how do you plan to reach and implement a
to decide ourselves whether our development rests on bipartisan approach in these dialogues? Before October
modern mindset or not. Give me one example in history 2002, there was a military rule in the country and now
or contemporary world where with a mindset of a type we imagine it is a political government. In a political
you can try and achieve certain things including military government, Parliament has a major role to play. Do you
parity with India. If not parity, having credible deterrence think Parliament has a role in foreign policy and how is
at least. Can you have terrorism in your country and your ministry helping create it?
expect even local investment let alone foreign
investment? It is not an easy decision. We have to take Answer
our own people into confidence. This is what the Mr. Khursheed Mahmud Kasuri
government is trying to do. It will not handover certain MNA (NA-140 Kasur III, PML)
people if they surrender before a certain date because we Foreign Minister of Pakistan
were told that some of them are married and have
children over here. The writ of the state must prevail in You have touched upon some painstaking but relevant
the ultimate analysis. So, it is a difficult decision. United questions relating to Iraq war and relations with India. On
States may have been a catalyst. But wasn't there a Iraq, Senator Prof. Khurshid Ahmad and I passed a joint-
debate in Pakistan on this issue before 9/11 that if our resolution from the Senate after considerable
policies are right? I personally have taken part in such amendments and it took many days to get it passed after
debates. People used to talk about creeping talibanisation much debate. Pakistan Senate took precedence over the
in Pakistan. I am not commenting on that. But since there National Assembly. What could be done by the National
was a debate, it means it is nothing new. There are Assembly was done by the Senate.
religious and political parties who disagree with our
policies. Now the question arises of dialogue with India. I want to
state here for the record without fear of contradiction that
Question not once but many times parliamentarians were called to
Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi the Prime Minister house but they did not come. I took
MNA, (NA-148, Multan-I, PPPP) the initiative to call everyone from the opposition to ask
Former Federal Minister that if invited for discussion, would they come and the
unanimous reply was that they would not come. So it
According to your statement that the foreign policy is was not considered appropriate to send out the
formulated and conducted by keeping state interests in invitations.
the forefront, which is absolutely right, we come to this
conclusion that there should thus be a consistency in our Pakistan's foreign policy's main points these days are:
foreign policy. For example, in the government of Mr. Iraq War and Relations with India. As far as PPP's
Jamali, the objectives of the foreign policy should be the connection goes, we live in this country and we were
same but a slight change in method can be expected. The supported and I appreciate that these policies were right
reason why I say this is because like you earlier and we are doing it within the national interests and there
mentioned, during the formulation of our foreign policy, is no contention that we are against nation's vested
there is a key element called the bipartisan approach. My interest. As far as Iraq war is concerned, people have
question is that ever since this government came into their own reservation as to what they wanted to see.
power major events happened like the Iraq war. What did Believe me, we were under tremendous pressure. Late
your government do either before or after the event to during the night, many different countries would call me
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up and ask what is Pakistan doing about this? Everyone show its long term strategic interest; has the Ministry of
was said to believe that Pakistan would vote it. The need Foreign Affairs done its homework in removing our
was to complete the number of votes. We didn't let this sanctions? As far as I know, only three sanctions have
happen. Resolution did not pass. Then there was the been removed out of the four and one still remains. Our
pressure to send the armed forces but that did not exports to America are also a source of foreign
happen. The sentiments of the nation and its people were exchange. You have not managed the task of achieving
taken care of. But sometimes we have to make decisions our economic objectives because we are an important
where sentiments are not involved. A majority of political ally in the fight against terrorism and there is a cost
parties were in favour of peace with India including involved for that. The US needs to compensate us for the
religious parties. JUI went to Delhi and met the Prime damage done to the society. The development of
Minister of India and talks took place. When the Prime infrastructure in Pakistan needs immense financial
Minister of India Mr. Vajpayee came to Islamabad, the investment. So we need to develop a comprehensive
entire leadership was present in the reception that the strategy for this alignment.
Indian ambassador to Pakistan had arranged for them at
Serena Hotel in Islamabad. Answer
So I am saying that on major advancements in the foreign MNA (NA-140 Kasur III, PML)
policy, I believe we have the backing of major political Foreign Minister of Pakistan
parties and we admit that there can be mistakes from
either side. When the question is on War on Terror, where You are absolutely right that there is a cost for everything.
our religious parties believe that our foreign policy is There are no free lunches and this is what the Americans
wrong and we agree. But as far as PPP and PML (N) are believe. You should have strength politically and
concerned, the first Iraq war was during the time of Prime economically. All of us are responsible for weakness in
Minister Nawaz Sharif who adopted a particular policy our political system. Americans are not responsible. Half
which was definitely feasible and in national interests. But the time we have military rule; military blames the
many opposed it as well and it lacked unity. But today, civilians and the civilians blame the military and some
fortunately there is unity and as you rightly mentioned, civilians blame other civilians. In 1947, we developed a
the foreign policy has national interest and continuity. security state for the fear of India. The US did not beg
During the time of SAARC Conference, since 17th Pakistan to join defence pacts. There is no permanent
amendment was being passed, it was thought friendship in this state relationship. There was a time
appropriate to have a briefing for Parliamentarians which when US totally abandoned us and they learnt a lesson
was not attended by some parties. I have myself briefed that they made a mistake by doing that. If they have not
them and I can name them. I did this in the Prime learnt anything from that, then there is nothing I can do
Minister's House. Major foreign policy thrust should have about it. But the least I can do is to put my own house in
bipartisanship and fortunately the foreign policy that is order which requires much more than financial policy.
being made has that spirit. Some of your questions are related to finance and
commerce ministers. But let me tell you this that our
Question macro economic indicators have improved. Not because
Makhdoom Syed Ahmad Alam Anwar Mr. Shaukat Aziz says so or Mr. Humayun Akhtar says so
MNA, (NA-192, R.Y.Khan-I, PML) but the international credit rating says so. Pakistan is now
Former Federal Minister in a position to float a bond and this is very positive.
My humble submission is that there have been phases Strengthening of Pakistan has to start from home and it
when our importance to the US has been at the highest would not be accomplished overnight. A strong Pakistan,
and phases when we were no longer required. Assuming economically, militarily and politically is the need of the
that we are important now and the status of Major Non- day and we all need to work for it. India mobilised its
Nato Ally has been given to us by the US and US has to forces which was the largest mobilisation since the
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Second World War and for ten months those forces were Firstly, it was clearly said by the US State Department
on our border. I told American Secretary of State that I am that Pakistan has been temporarily forgiven for being a
grateful to you for the efforts you undertook at that time. massive proliferator and a semi-rogue nuclear state.
But let me remind you that even during President Nixon's
time Pakistan tried hard but India attacked. The entire Answer
international community was against it but still India Mr. Khursheed Mahmud Kasuri
attacked. India thought it could get away with it even now. MNA (NA-140 Kasur III, PML)
Well we are grateful to the US, European Union and Japan Foreign Minister of Pakistan
for their efforts for no war. If India thought it could have
made minced meat out of Pakistan, it would have done This is absolutely wrong as the US State Department did
so. Reason is not that the war is not a viable option. We not say any such thing. I am sorry, but this is without
have many weaknesses in Pakistan and if we take care of foundation.
those weaknesses, Pakistan would not have to depend on
any one else. Question
Ms. Sherry Rehman
Question MNA, (NA-309, Women Sindh-II, PPPP)
Mian Shamim Haider
MNA (NA-135, Sheikhupura-V, PML) I understand this is an emotional issue and this is exactly
what the people of Pakistan feel when these issues are
Do you feel the time has come that we should start discussed loosely and reported loosely. It would have
thinking about recognising Israel and offset India-Israel been best if public consensus had been managed
axis? through a Parliamentary session on the issue as holding
a briefing is not enough, nor is it enough to say the party
Answer leaders did not come to that briefing. I am just asking a
Mr. Khursheed Mahmud Kasuri question and it is best to discuss it with a cool temper.
MNA (NA-140 Kasur III, PML) Pakistan has given over its nuclear assets to the IAEA,
Foreign Minister of Pakistan which basically allows going in consonance with the NPT
treaty. Are we really doing what the NPT allows us to do?
Pakistan took a bold decision to initiate a debate on the
recognition of Israel. The President of Pakistan was Secondly, I am asking about the allegations of nuclear
wrongly criticised by everyone for doing that. We did not roll-back. It is a very important and high security question
recognise Israel and we had no intention of doing that which is agitating the minds of the people. The Parliament
without thinking the issue through. We would have to face has not been able to take the people into confidence and
obstacles, not just this government, but any government satisfy the people because the Parliamentarians
of Pakistan, whether this Muslim League or the PPP, on themselves are not satisfied.
the issue of recognition of Israel. We can not do it unless
our public view is prepared for it. There is no fixed It has also been said that in this system, the President
solution to this problem. has been making the key decisions with regards to
foreign policy. Vis-à-vis India, there has been emphasis
Question on better relations and we have welcomed it. But in our
Ms. Sherry Rehman minds, it is more of an institutional shift. What we see is
MNA (NA-309, Women Sindh-II, PPPP) President Musharraf talking about the possibility of
reconsidering the United Nations resolutions vis-à-vis
You have given us a new briefing on the nuclear roll-back Kashmir which has been stated, rightly or wrongly, as the
and proliferation situation and I wish you were present in policy of Pakistan for over fifty-five years. So reviewing
the Parliament to answer these questions as well. that policy, through this kind of informal channel, was a
little insensitive. We would like your input on that? What
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is your long term plan vis-à-vis India because one day them to the fact that we are a nuclear power and there
twelve solutions for negotiations to Kashmir are in will be no compromise on it.
President Musharraf's pocket and the next day it is an
entirely different thing. That may or may not be for public As far as I am concerned, we are trying to tell the world
consumption but we would like to know what line you that we are not a super power and we have to behave in a
wish to pursue on it. responsible manner. If we feel that we can do what we
like and disregard what America, Japan and China say on
Answer terrorism, they will make mince meat out of us. We
Mr. Khursheed Mahmud Kasuri cannot run around with notions that we can do what we
MNA (NA-140 Kasur III, PML) like. It is what foreign policy is all about that one has to
Foreign Minister of Pakistan pretend in some ways always that things are bigger than
they actually are, which is what as Foreign Minister I am
First of all, I am sorry as the idea was not to lose temper, trying to do. We have many weaknesses. You can take
but it was a provocative issue. You are a journalist and care of the weaknesses by acting cautiously. On the one
your words count much more that is why I asked you if it hand, we are saying that there would be no roll-back. On
has really come from the State Department. There is no the other hand, we are saying that we will completely
US State Department briefing that I do not know of. It will cooperate with the International Atomic Commission on
come on my table within five minutes of being released its mandate. But then I cover it up by saying that we are
since I am the Foreign Minister of Pakistan today. I went not under pressure. So, the answer is there is no roll-
to the Muslim League House at 9:30 AM and such a back and no question about it. Let me give you the good
question was posed to me. Friendly states do not talk news. The international community has come to terms
through the media. That is why I asked you this question with the fact that Pakistan has suffered sanctions; we
and my response is no. The US State Department did not have been called a rogue State and a failed State. Despite
say anything of this sort. that, there were no compromises on the nuclear power
we possess.
Having said that, you are absolutely right that we have not
come out scot free. We are under observation. That is Now they are really worried about the safety of our
why we need to conduct ourselves with great nuclear weapons. They are worried about what would
responsibility. If we feel that we are a super power, then happen if President Musharraf is not there and religious
we will be more like a bull in a china shop. We entertain parties come into power. I have told them that our
no such foolish notions about ourselves. So how do we religious parties are not the Taliban and they have
conduct our foreign policy? We feel that the nuclear experience in parliamentary practices in all form of
weapons are absolutely essential for our security. Let me reforms. They have gone through the democratic process
refresh your memory. Six or seven foreign ministers have and just because someone has a beard that does not
visited Pakistan from European Union, France, Britain, make him a member of the Taliban. We are on trial and
United States, Netherlands, and Ireland etc. I am a they know that we are a hard nut to crack and they know
politician more than a Foreign Minister. I cannot get over we will not give in. It does not mean that if you are a hard
my instincts so the first thing I do is I state in front of nut, then a stronger hammer can not crack you. Common
them while they are standing next to me, and they are not sense tells you to avoid getting under that hammer. We
prepared that I will say it but I do. I say that there is no have no intention of getting cracked and we have every
roll-back and nothing is happening of that sort. They do intention of steering the course and we are cautious and
not even raise it, by the way. Why? Because they know it watchful of the concerns the international community has
is not negotiable. We will not tolerate it. We have told the about us. The reasons why I keep on equating ourselves
US Senators and the Secretary of State that it is not with other countries like India and the Netherlands is
negotiable. Sometimes I even ask a journalist to ask the because Pakistan alone does not make a good case.
Foreign Minister that we are a nuclear power and they People do not trust us. When I add other countries it is to
have to respond on record. I am trying to acclimatise soften hard lobbies. I do it calculatedly. Some people
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criticise me for it but I feel it would make Pakistan's case asked me why there was a change in the religious
more credible. I have told everybody that we will not sign parties' attitude towards India. I told him that because
NPT. I have suggested to Colin Powell and to the they hate America more than they hate you. Both the
European Union to have multilateral agreements with the countries will be tested in their commitments to peace
three nuclear countries. when the two foreign ministers meet in July/August
2004. We are keeping the cards very close to our chest;
Our prime concern is non-proliferation and we have to so close that even I do not know what I am going to say
satisfy the international community if we wish to save our to him in August. I call in the foreign office people and go
nuclear programme. Otherwise they will have sanctions into a brain-storming session with them. Indians will also
on us and they will do what it takes, whether it is an admit now that they will have to talk about Kashmir. Now
attack from India or any such measures, to buckle us what solution they have in their mind, we will see when
down. we meet. Solution of Kashmir issue is vital; it is central,
whatever word you may choose to use.
The second issue is terrorism. Western powers believe
that Pakistan can play a key role and we are trying to say Question
that yes, we will reform ourselves but you help on Sayyeda Farhana Khalid Banoori
Palestine and Kashmir. So we are trying to push that as MNA, (NA-323, Women NWFP-II, MMAP)
best as the Opposition would have done, if it had been in
power. Everyone in this room agrees on the problems we When making the foreign policy in our country, why are
face. I am not here in an adversarial capacity. I feel we the public and its representatives not taken into
have a common national interest. consideration? Is the foreign policy debatable in the
National Assembly? And if it is, then why is it not
One question was about the UN resolution on Kashmir. discussed on the floor of the National Assembly? I would
After knowing what the President said, without asking the also like to ask why we are opening our borders and
President, I said that his statement was quoted out of increasing the number of our enemies? Would it not be
context. I have so much confidence. Next day the better if we resolve the issue through dialogue and peace
President thanked me. I knew that he could have never without so much human and financial loss?
meant that we would give up the very basis on which we
lay our claim to Kashmir. Indians say that after the British Answer
left, it was up to the ruler to decide on the fate of Mr. Khursheed Mahmud Kasuri
Kashmir. Instead of going into a stupid debate, our claim MNA (NA-140 Kasur III, PML)
rests on the fact that there is a UN Security Council Foreign Minister of Pakistan
Resolution in our favour. Otherwise, we have no locus
standi. So as a politician I know we would have no leg to I am a politician first, then a Parliamentarian and a
stand on if we ever said that. Now what the President political worker. The Foreign Minster-ship comes later. I
was trying to say is that we are being flexible and we can see many former foreign ministers sitting here and I
think of solutions to the Kashmir problem other than the would not remain foreign minister after sometime.
one stated in the resolution, but we can not ignore the What you said has some stark realities to it. You say that
aspirations of the Kashmiris. The President also corrected there is a sudden shift in foreign policy and the
himself a day later as did the Prime Minister. But I did it Parliament has not been taken into confidence. Indian
on the same day. We are telling the Indians that if they politicians also question Vajpayee for going to Srinagar
want durable peace in South Asia, Kashmir needs to be and extending a hand of friendship to Pakistan while the
resolved, not the resumption of flights, trains and rails. I Indian politicians and Parliamentarians were not made
think the Indians understand that because even in my aware of this. Another example is of the US President
private conversations with Mr. Birjesh Mishra who was Bush going to war on Iraq. Was the reason really the fear
here in Lahore during the time of cricket match, we made of terrorism and suspicious of Saddam Hussain's
it very clear including the religious parties in Pakistan. He involvement with Osama Bin Laden or was the purpose to
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take over the Iraqi oil fields? In democratic societies, at the moment or may be using delay tactics the Karachi
certain things and the manner in which they are told, visa office or the Khokrapar Monabao Border. Can you
change when two people talk and then when 10 or a 100 give a certain time frame until when this can be resolved?
or 300 people talk. Every minister is answerable to the
Parliament. I will tell you about my record. The MMA Answer
leader Professor Khurshid Ahmad praised me on the Mr. Khursheed Mahmud Kasuri
Senate floor that the manner in which the foreign office MNA (NA-140 Kasur III, PML)
answers questions is commendable. We cannot hide Foreign Minister of Pakistan
anything. I have never given a short answer. The reason
is because a short answer is like avoiding the question. I am also interested in the opening of the border
My desire is to convince you, not to avoid you. You have personally and I am putting pressure on it but the thing is
the complete right to ask me anything. that the government has different view points and even
the institutions also do not think on the same wavelength.
Tomorrow two genuine motions are coming into the In a democratic government we try to look at the
Senate on foreign policy. The Senate Secretariat asked preferences of the people. As far as speed is concerned,
me yesterday that there are two motions from a Senator there is one group that wants to go slow while the other
of the Peoples Party who wants these to be processed wishes to proceed at a faster pace. But as far as this
quickly. I told them to go ahead. They asked me to pick issue about the border is concerned, there should be a
which one should be put forth. I said put both. Why do consensus on this issue. Many people have relatives
you need to hide it? It is not my personal matter. In fact it there and I, myself am a member of the Human Rights
is the matter of foreign policy for Pakistan. You can ask Commission of Pakistan. Under the issue of human rights
for a debate on the foreign policy. We are answerable on that route must be open. The ball that they put in our
the Parliament floor. How can we disregard the wishes of court means that they have their own set of conditions
the public? We are elected people. We can not ignore the attached to it. Their foreign office throws the ball in our
public wishes. I am not even a member of the Senate. I court and our foreign office throws the ball in their court.
am a member of the National Assembly and I had to Let me assure you that the present government is
contest election and as my opponent, I had a member of committed. We feel it is in the national interest of Pakistan
a religious party and it was a close election. If I cannot to have good relations with India. The problem is that we
satisfy the entire public and representation of the want to take Jinnah House in Mumbai from them. They
Pakistani people, I have to go back to my constituency as have opened some office there that does not want to
well. What happens if a particular decision is taken by shift. We want to open our embassy in the Jinnah House
Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto; there might be a section which and we want our property back.
is not happy and same goes in the case of Mian Nawaz
Sharif. But to make a foreign policy decision by which the Question
entire public is unhappy is not the manner in which things Mr. Omar Ayub Khan
are done. MNA (NA-19, Haripur, PML)
Question I have a very small question regarding the Siachin Glacier.

Syed Haider Abbas Rizvi What process is happening between resolving the
MNA (NA-244, Karachi-VI, MQM) geographical boundaries between the glacier and the de-
escalation of the situation over there and Kargil as well?
The manner in which we have heard you speak here
today is a matter of great joy for us. Whenever we have
had a chance to meet with Indians and raise the issue of
opening visa office in Karachi, they always place the ball
in our foreign office's court. But what is your government
doing for it now? We suppose you may not be interested
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Answer
This is the question that Pakistan government should look

into. My response is a careful response and I will give
that to you. If we start talking and if we find that the
Indians are serious on Kashmir, then we are prepared to
discuss other things. Everything is linked. We need to
look into things at once and come to a consensus. We
have to resolve this Siachin issue. We have a loss of 10
rupees and they have a loss of 100 rupees. Details have
to be looked into, but the fundamental issue is Kashmir
and there will have to be talks on Kashmir.
Question
Mr. Qamar Zaman Kaira
MNA (NA-106, Gujrat-III, PPPP)
It has really been a very nice briefing by you. I want to

know if by administrative measures, by war, by army or
by any other means, this terrorism can be over.
Answer
You asked if we can curb terrorism by administrative

control. The answer is, no we cannot. That is why we
keep stressing that Kashmir, Palestine and social
development should be the concern. But like they say, if
wishes were horses then beggars would ride. What we
have got to do is to find space for ourselves in the
environment that exists. We continue to say what we
believe in the hope that some people will get convinced.
European Union is actually very convinced that what
Pakistan is saying is right. You need to tackle Palestine
and Kashmir. It does not mean that the European Union
entirely agrees with our stance on Kashmir. They do feel
that Kashmir needs a resolution and so does Palestine
and global poverty. But there is the sole super power that
is determining the agenda. The American electorate is in
a position to move its leaders towards resolving this
issue. Pakistan is not in that position.
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Short Course on
Session 3
Executive Summary
T hird Session of the Short Course focused on the Foreign Policy Process of Pakistan where Ambassador (Retd.) Javid
Husain, Mr. Shaheen A. Gillani, Additional Secretary, Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Mr. Sartaj Aziz,
Former Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs and Finance presented their view points. The session was chaired by Mr.
Najmuddin A. Shaikh, former foreign secretary.
Ambassador (Retd.) Javid Husain, as the author of PILDAT's briefing paper on the topic of 'The Process of Foreign Policy
Formulation in Pakistan', presented an overview of the process as it exists in theory. Mr. Shaheen A. Gillani, on the other
hand, focused his presentation on the Foreign Policy Process as it exists with special reference to role of foreign office;
Parliament and its Committees; Cabinet and Ministries; Military and Security Agencies; and Government Think Tanks. Mr.
Sartaj Aziz, drawing upon his experience as the former foreign minister and a veteran parliamentarian as well as the former
chairman of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, emphasised on the role of Parliament in Foreign Policy and the formulation
and implementation of a successful foreign policy in Pakistan.
Presentations of these speakers were followed by a Q&A while the Session Chair concluded the session with his remarks.
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Process of Foreign
Policy Formulation in Pakistan
Ambassador (Retd.) Javid Husain
A mbassador (Retd.) Javid Husain was of the

view that in this growingly interdependent world,
the process of foreign policy formulation is
becoming more and more complex in which, besides
national actors, regional and international forces play an
increasingly important role. He added that this was
especially relevant in case of Pakistan because of its geo-
strategic location.
Drawing an outline of the process of formulation of

foreign policy in Pakistan, he said that constitutionally, the
Cabinet, headed by the Prime Minister, is the supreme
foreign policy making body in Pakistan. The Constitution
requires that the President shall take advice of the Cabinet
or the Prime Minister in the exercise of his functions and
in this regard all important foreign policy decisions
ultimately must be taken by the Cabinet or the Prime
minister and formally communicated to the President.
Mr. Husain said that the Ministry of Foreign affairs is the

focal point for the initiation of all proposals relating to
Pakistan's foreign affairs with the expectation of any
matters that may be assigned to other divisions or
ministries of the government. Rule 13 of the Rules of
Business lays down that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
shall be consulted on all matters which affect the foreign
policy of Pakistan or the conduct of its foreign affairs.
Explaining the role of the Parliament, Mr. Hussain said

that theoretically the Parliament can pass a law in respect
of any aspect of Pakistan's external relations. In practice
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however, an initiative for such a bill would normally come mechanism to synthesise the political, economic and
from the executive which, because of the support of the security aspects of foreign affairs in the consideration of
majority in the National Assembly, would generally foreign policy issues. Foreign Office has been
succeed in getting it adopted by the Parliament. A private undermined to a large extent by the tendency of the
Bill relating to Pakistan's external relations can also be security/intelligence agencies to bypass the foreign office
moved by any member of either House. But the because of their easier access to the rulers especially
possibility of its adoption by the Parliament without the during military regimes. Economic ministries often do not
executive's support is almost nil because of party involve the Foreign Office in the consideration of
discipline. important issues relating to the country's foreign
economic relations. Foreign office is often accused of
He opined that in general the formulation and adhocism as it mostly relies only on the short-term
implementation of foreign policy is considered to be the perspectives and neglects medium or long-term
prerogative of the executive all over the world. perspectives. Foreign policy process also suffers from
Parliaments, at best, can influence this process by lack of coordination between foreign office and various
making known their views on important foreign policy think tanks established by the government for research
issues. He also added that historically, Pakistan has failed on foreign policy issues. In actual practice, the two
to play its due role in the foreign policy formulation Houses of the Parliament and their Standing Committees
primarily because of frequent military takeovers. on Foreign Affairs have not been as active in the
consideration of foreign policy issues as they could or
Presenting an overview of this whole process, he said should have been.
that normally the foreign policy proposal would be
initiated by the foreign office and submitted to the Prime Mr. Husain believed that Foreign Office must strengthen
Minister for consideration. While making such decisions, its Policy Planning Division by allocating more manpower
the foreign office would consult other ministries and and financial resources. He was of the view that it is
departments concerned. While formulating and imperative to activate the Standing Committees on
submitting foreign policy proposals to the government, Foreign Affairs of the two Houses. He also recommended
the foreign office would take into account: that the executive should make a conscious effort to
consult the Parliament and its leaders on foreign policy
a) Views of the Parliament to the extent that they issues more frequently than has been the case in the
are known past.
b) Views of the civil society, media, and think

tanks, etc.
c) Views and policies of other countries and non-

state actors at regional and international levels
d) Regional and international strategic

environment.
He explained that once the foreign policy proposal is

received by the Prime Minister or cabinet, it would be
adopted keeping in view the country's best national
interests.
Mr. Husain believed that Pakistan's foreign policy

formulation process suffers from absence of a
57
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Process of Foreign
Policy Formulation in Pakistan

Additional Secretary,
Foreign Policy Planning
Ministry of Foreign Affairs M r. Gillani maintained that it is a universal
principle that a country's foreign policy
mirrors its national agenda, priorities, social
attitudes and political structure. Foreign policy is a
cumulative process. He said that even revolutionary
governments have to worry about what their
predecessors, whom they condemn, had or had not done
or promised to do or not to do. The feedback from
external environment is already in place before policy
options are drawn, he added. For the foreign policy
makers, the concept of state sovereignty, though
paramount, is not a license for a free choice of action,
particularly in the case of relatively less strong states.
The conduct and formulation of foreign policy is

governed by the interplay of multiple determinants,
explained Mr. Gillani. Some of these core determinants
are geography, history, security and ideology.
Describing the role of various government sector
institutions, Mr. Gillani said that the foreign office is the
core state institution without which a country cannot
anticipate the reaction of other states and thus cannot
formulate a considered foreign policy. The terms “foreign
policy” and “diplomacy” are generally used
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interchangeably. Technically, however, foreign policy can groups, he added.

be seen in the 'legislative' term while diplomacy can be
seen as the 'executive' aspect of the foreign relations of a Mr. Gillani also presented an overview of the challenges
country. confronting the formulation of foreign policy. These
challenges included transformation of global landscape
The Parliament, observed Mr. Gillani, serves as a policy- after 9/11, predominance of economics over politics,
forming agent in direct proportion to the extent of its use growing role of non-state actors such as NGOs,
of the constitutional powers which it possesses to multinational corporations; hazier demarcation between
support, modify or defeat the programme of the domestic and foreign policy issues; social movements,
executive. Foreign policy, he added, must rest upon a etc.
basis of domestic law enacted through the legislative
process. His complete paper can be seen as Appendix F.
Emphasising on the due role of legislative committees, he

said that the committees gather data, listen to the views
of specialised interest groups, hold public hearings on
important issues and carefully weigh alternative courses
of action in the formulation of policy. Parliament and the
committees, by utilising the powers of investigation,
carefully scrutinise the execution of policy by the
executive. They can also instigate a nationwide public
debate on controversial foreign policy issues, he
maintained.
The cabinet and the relevant ministries own the primary

responsibility for the formulation of foreign policy. He
believed that military establishments of nations comprise
the most explicit element of foreign policy as diplomacy
and military strength go hand in hand.
Information gathering and processing is the initial stage

of foreign policy formulation in the bureaucratic
framework, explained Mr. Gillani. This role is performed
by using the global news media, diplomatic missions and
the secret service intelligence. Government Think Tanks
such as the Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS) and
Institute of Regional Studies (IRS) undertake serious
research on a range of key issues.
Similarly the role of institutions outside the ambit of

government, including political parties, pressure groups,
media, think tanks and the civil society, is paramount in
shaping public opinion and the formation of foreign policy
of a country. No prediction about foreign policy trends
can be made in a given country without a careful
assessment of the relative strength of the political parties,
trade unions, military, religious parties and business
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Short Course on
How Foreign Policy

should be made in Pakistan?
Mr. Sartaj Aziz
A
Former Federal Minister former Foreign and Finance Minister of
for Foreign Affairs & Finance Pakistan, Mr. Sartaj Aziz believed that the
formulation and implementation of a successful
foreign policy depends on three major factors:
a) A clear long term vision of the country's role in

world affairs and a broad national consensus on
the main elements of such a vision;
b) An effective institutional framework to

coordinate the three main dimensions of foreign
policy; namely national security, defence policy
and economic objectives; and to determine the
relative priority of each at a given point of time.
c) An efficient and professionally managed foreign

office which can present well-considered
options, whenever required, and can implement
policies effectively, once these have been
formulated by the Government.
Unfortunately, he continued, none of these prerequisites

have been fully met in the case of Pakistan, which had to
build the infrastructure of its foreign policy from scratch.
The second pre-requisite, namely the evolution of an
effective national security system, in which the
consistency of the country's defence, security and
economic policies could be ensured, also became a
victim of the recurrent failure of the political process. As a
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result, Pakistan has remained under direct or indirect accept any deviation from the established parameters. He
military rule for more than half of its independence said that the importance of bringing these varying
existence, he opined. perceptions together will become obvious if we recall that
one of the main causes of political instability and frequent
“When India went nuclear in 1974, Pakistan was forced dissolution of the Parliament (in 1988, 1990 and 1999 for
to become involved in the nuclear arms race. Pakistan example) was this gap in perceptions on major security
was faced with a paradox as it had to be watchful of the issues.
U.S.'s reaction to this nuclear acquisition. In order to
maintain the strategic balance, one of the options for The second important pre-requisite, Mr. Aziz maintained,
Pakistan was to privatise its foreign policy,” he added. is the evolution of an effective national security system
that not only provides a forum for narrowing the gap
The third dimension of a successful foreign policy, i.e., a between the military and civilian establishments but also
competent and professionally managed foreign office, creates a much wider mechanism of analysis and
with its network of embassies and consulates, has partly consultation on policy options and their short and
been undermined by the absence of a well-coordinated medium term implications. Criticising the current set-up
national security system and partly by a steady decline in of the National Security Council, he said that its main
the country's image. There has been a growing gap purpose is to monitor the political process in the name of
between the foreign policy perspectives and the security strengthening democracy, but, in essence, this council
assessments of the military establishment and the will weaken the democratic process. He feared that the
elected or unelected political leadership of the country. As controversy over the National Security Council between
a result, no clear political consensus on the objectives of the treasury and the opposition may, once again, result in
national security has been reached, he said. the loss of an opportunity to create an effective forum for
evolving a consensus on national security issues.
Mr. Aziz believed that the current phase of Pakistan's
history represents a new watershed in the country's Mr. Aziz emphasised that Parliament and its Committees
foreign policy. The events of September 11, 2001, jolted can play a major role in facilitating a wider process of
the main foundations on which Pakistan's foreign policy consultation on major foreign policy issues. He lamented
was built for over two decades namely unflinching that such a role has been very scarcely played by the
support for the Taliban and their predecessors in Parliament and its committees, although they are
Afghanistan; active assistance for Jihadi organisations constitutionally empowered to oversee the executive as
fighting for the liberation for Kashmir from Indian rule; well as formulate and forward foreign policy options in
and the development of nuclear weapons as a deterrent keeping with the aspirations of the people of the country.
to India's superior conventional weapons. Under strong
international pressure, Pakistan has already revised the Concluding his speech, Mr. Sartaj Aziz said that one of
first two policies and is also on the defensive on the third the most important pre-requisites for the success of
plank, following embarrassing reports of nuclear foreign policy is to end the religious, ethnic, provincial
proliferation by our scientists to countries like Libya, Iran and political polarisation in the country. He believed that
and North Korea, he said. the damage of such polarisation is far more lethal to
national security than outside aggression or subversion.
In his opinion, the first important requirement in the
formulation of a coherent foreign policy framework is to His complete paper can be seen as Appendix G.
narrow the wide gap in thinking that continues to exist
between the military establishment and the elected
civilian set-up on different aspects of national security. At
present, according to many independent observers, there
is a state within a state, which regards itself as the
ultimate custodian of the national interest and does not
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Question policy. Spending so much money only on defence
Mr. Omar Ayub Khan immensely neglects other sectors of development.
MNA (NA-19, Haripur, PML)
Comment
Where is the equation of institutionalising economic Ambassador (Retd.) Javid Husain
development in our policy decisions? Secondly, in the
event of a conflict, what is the threshold that will cause We need to create a mechanism where political and
us to launch the nuclear programme? economic imperatives are synthesised and in my opinion,
the office of foreign policy should be under the Prime
Answer Minister.
Mr. Sartaj Aziz
Former Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs & Finance Comment
Mr. Najmuddin A. Shaikh
Defence expenditure has been a burden on our economy. Former Foreign Secretary
It has increased our indebtedness. Unfortunately, our
foreign policy and our defence requirements are not The time for the use of nuclear weapons should be kept
consistent with economic development. Though, in the at a degree that no red lines are identified. Calculated
current scenario, we have some breathing space, but this ambivalence is being maintained deliberately. It will not be
situation may not last for too long. used as long as no one is sure as to when it can be used.
Comment Comment
Mr. Shaheen A. Gillani Ms. Sherry Rehman
Additional Secretary Foreign Policy Planning, Ministry of MNA (NA-309, Women Sindh-II, PPPP)
Foreign Affairs
In the last year and a half, the topic of nuclear
We need to have a balanced approach for our foreign proliferation has never been debated in the Parliament.
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The linkage of ideology with foreign policy has been convince the military to step down?
detrimental to the national interest of Pakistan and in
making rational decisions. Answer
Mr. Sartaj Aziz
Comment Former Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs & Finance
Makhdum Khusro Bakhtyar
MNA (NA-194, R.Y.Khan-III, PML) We have to wait for better times to make more
fundamental changes. We should make the military
The formulation of foreign policy cannot be divorced from establishment realise the single dimensional security
history. Our government has been repeating what Mr. dominance. It is seen that the military mind ignores
Sartaj Aziz has said that economic development and political imperatives.
security are of paramount importance but it is seen more
often than not that the foreign policy becomes a tool to
promote specific party agendas. There is a need for
consensus about what the right track is.
Comment
Mr. Sartaj Aziz
We are in the middle of a new framework. We have to

take advantage of this opportunity. There is no national
consensus about the policies that have been made
because they were made too suddenly. We have to get
the Parliament in working order, only then can it assert
itself. The role and influence of the military can only be
reduced by an effective Parliament.
Question
Sayyeda Farhana Khalid Banoori
MNA (NA-323, Women NWFP-II, MMAP)
Why is foreign policy the domain of only a few?
Answer
Mr. Sartaj Aziz
Parliament, think tanks as well as research institutes, all

need to be involved in policy making decisions.
Question
Visiting Prof. LUMS
It appears that the root cause of the problems faced by

Pakistan is due to the dominance of military. How do we
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Comments by
the Session Chair

Former Foreign Secretary Mr. Shaikh maintained that the responsibility of the
foreign office is to make recommendations about foreign
policy and implement foreign policy. However, the
Parliament is to present policy options as well as oversee
the implementation of foreign policy. The Foreign
Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate has a staff of its
own which comprises hundreds of professional people
who have spent their lives in the foreign policy apparatus.
They bring this expertise to the Congress, he said, adding
that the Parliamentary Committees in Pakistan need to be
patterned after such committees to contribute effectively
to policy making and oversight.
Foreign policy is the hand maiden of domestic policy,

said Mr. Shaikh, hence, it must be determined by the
requirements of the domestic policy. Our focus should be
on two elements: territorial security, and economic
development. These are the objectives that should be
C oncluding the session, Mr. Shaikh remarked that

territorial security is an imperative requirement;
however a question arises about how it can be
achieved and if it can only be achieved militarily.
Territorial security, he added, comes from internal
considered in formulating our foreign policy, he believed.
He said that an independent foreign policy is based on
shared interests. There are trade-offs in every element of
domestic and external policy and there is a need to see
what serves our national interest best and how we can
coherence not just through military security. collectively define our national interest, he concluded.
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Short Course on
Session 4
Executive Summary
T he significant question of how security considerations influence foreign policy in Pakistan was the topic of the fourth
session at the short course. Brig. (Retd.) Shaukat Qadir, Former Vice President, Islamabad Policy and Research
Institute and Mr. Najmuddin A. Shaikh, Former Foreign Secretary, presented their analyses of the issue. The session
was chaired by renowned Defence and Political Analyst Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi.
Brig. (Retd.) Shaukat Qadir was of the view that security agencies of all countries of the world play a significant role in
foreign policy formulation. His presentation covered the formation of ISI and various phases of its relationship with the
formulation of foreign policy. In foreseeable future, the ISI's role in foreign policy would not be diminishing, believed Brig.
(Retd.) Qadir.
Mr. Najmuddin A. Shaikh was of the view that the practise of direct involvement of security agencies into the foreign policy
formulation is not unique to Pakistan. However, he maintained that foreign policy formulation and implementation is not the
domain of security agencies and instead the domain of Parliament and the Foreign Office with only intelligence input required
from the security agencies.
The session concluded with a discussion on the issue by the participants.
65
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Role of Security Agencies in

Shaping Foreign Policy

Former Vice President
Islamabad Policy Research Institute - IPRI
D ifferentiating between the terms of security and
intelligence agencies, Brig. (Retd.) Shaukat
Qadir explained that security agencies are those
that enjoy legal jurisdiction domestically: the FBI in the US
is a security agency with domestic jurisdiction. It also
has intelligence functions, but only domestically.
Consequently, it has little influence over foreign policy
formulation. Whereas the CIA, which is an intelligence
agency, has considerable influence on foreign policy. In
Pakistan, the ISI and the IB are intelligence agencies while
the police, para-military forces, and the Army, when
called out in aid of civil power, are security agencies.
Brig. (Retd.) Qadir said that intelligence agencies have a

role to play in foreign policy formulation in all countries of
the world. This role, he added, does not just include
input, but it sometimes dictates foreign policy in certain
domains as well. Intelligence agencies especially
influence foreign policy in the areas of international
terrorism and international drug smuggling, he added.
The business of intelligence has four steps to it:
collection, collation, analysis, and interpretation or
prediction. Collection is the basic function and all
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intelligence agencies collect information of all kinds. the ISI reached its zenith under Lt. Gen. Mahmood who
Collation implies establishing connections between considered himself responsible for bringing about the
sometimes totally unconnected pieces of information so coup and therefore, specially privileged, opined Brig.
that they can then be analysed and then be interpreted to (Retd.) Qadir. After his ouster, Lt. Gen. Ehsan, a far more
predict an event or for appropriate response. amicable and far less aggressive person, said Brig.
(Retd.) Qadir, has taken over, and the ISI has been purged
Tracing the history of ISI's involvement in domestic and of elements unacceptable to the current political milieu.
foreign policy, Brig. (Retd.) Qadir said that the ISI was However, the influence of ISI continues relatively
created in 1948 as an intelligence agency intended to unabated and in his opinion, it is unlikely that ISI's
provide information of relevance to defence matters to all influence will diminish in the foreseeable future.
three services. In Ayub Khan's time, ISI was tasked to
gather information domestically on political figures of The complete paper of Brig. (Retd.) Shaukat Qadir is
significance, but no major domestic role was assigned to available as Appendix H.
it. Surprisingly, he added, it was in Prime Minister Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto's tenure that it was formally expanded to
include the “Internal Wing.” He said that his purpose for
using the word “surprisingly” was because Prime
Minister Bhutto created the FIA which was intended to fill
the vacuum of domestic intelligence and in his tenure
there appeared to be a deliberate effort to eradicate the
military's influence in politics.
He continued that it was in Gen. Zia-ul-Haq's tenure that

the ISI began to acquire the standing that it still enjoys
when he employed it extensively in the domestic arena to
create his “democratic political setup.” The Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, following the Iranian revolution,
brought the CIA in, and the natural ally of the CIA was the
ISI, he said. He shared that according to a senior
diplomat, “Between 1979 and 1984 the foreign office
was slowly shifted to the ISI HQ and we were left
twiddling our thumbs or acting as spokesmen of their
policies, words of caution were to no avail.” The Afghan
policy took primacy as it had brought back the US; it was
bringing in much needed military assistance including the
F-16s, funding from the entire Muslim world while the
US-led West was prepared to ignore Pakistan's nuclear
programme. Consequently, all other issues and policies
were relegated to suit the Afghan policy. Since the Afghan
policy lay with the ISI, all other policies were also
influenced by it, believed Brig. (Retd.) Shaukat Qadir.
Soviet withdrawal was timed to coincide with the
beginning of the Kashmiri freedom movement and the ISI
only had to shift its vision from one front to the other, he
added.
After the coup d'é·tat of President Gen. Pervez Musharraf,
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How Security Considerations

Influence the Formulation Foreign Policy?

M r. Shaikh believed that it was a sad fact that in

the relatively short periods of democracy in
Pakistan, our legislators have paid little
attention to the area of foreign policy even while
recognising its importance. For some of them it is a
subject of such enormous complexity and delicacy that it
is best left to the experts. More cynically others have
chosen to ignore it because there is no real constituent
pressure to take an interest in this area nor does
specialisation in this field create the sort of influence that
the legislator can use to advance his/her political
ambitions or to solve the day-to-day problems of
constituents, he opined.
However, he believed, Parliament has a crucial role to

play in foreign policy formulation and implementation; not
only to adopt legislation needed domestically to give
effect to foreign policy decisions but also to ratify any
agreements that the government in power reaches with
other countries or groups of countries or international
organisations. Currently in Pakistan the power to ratify
agreements lies with the Cabinet and not directly with the
Parliament but there should be no mistake that in such
ratification the Cabinet is, at least theoretically, reflecting
the will of the Parliament and that when these agreements
are of consequence such ratification would normally be
preceded by a discussion in Parliament or at the very
least in the Foreign Affairs committee of both the National
Assembly and the Senate.
Mr. Shaikh believed that domestic policy is the
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determinant of foreign policy. One foreign policy goal is of security, the intelligence agencies tend to go beyond
the protection of territorial integrity and sovereignty of the the narrow mandate of providing raw information or
country. In the case of Pakistan, the preservation of neutral analysis for their political masters without making
territorial integrity became a major determinant. In policy recommendations. This is as it should be.
Pakistan-India relations, he believed, a way must be Intelligence gathering, 90% of which lies in the public
found to build public opinion in favour of the friendship realm, has to be done, if it is to be done effectively, by
between the two countries. There is also a need to educated and trained personnel and it is almost inevitable
determine the magnitude of the threat size of weaponry, that such persons will draw conclusions from such
relationship of commanders with political leadership and information and wish to share such conclusions along
the ability to deploy military forces rapidly, he added. with the information. The question is whether such
conclusions or recommendations should by themselves
Mr. Shaikh believed that the role of security agencies is become the basis of policy, he said.
very important in terms of collecting information needed,
particularly in the context of external security, for the Good intelligence agencies, with both an information
formulation of a coherent foreign policy. The government gathering and analysis capability, try and ensure that the
would be failing in its duty if it relied solely on the two functions are insulated from each other. Intelligence
ministry of foreign affairs for this purpose even while agencies can develop tremendous capacities for
recognising that the primary responsibility for advising information gathering, but there are inevitably lacunae
the government on foreign policy must rest with this and large bodies of information, the analysis of which
ministry, but it would also be failing in its responsibilities needs capabilities and experience that rest elsewhere in
if it does not expect the same ministry to analyse the the government structure. In addition, an important role
information collected, he added. of gauging the reactions of other countries is the task of
ambassadors and embassies, he emphasised.
Theoretically, said Mr. Shaikh, it is the ministry of foreign
affairs that will be the recipient of foreign policy related The holistic manner required for formulation and
information from the intelligence and other agencies of implementation of successful foreign policy is through
the government and will incorporate it, after analysis, in which intelligence agencies provide the relevant
its recommendations to the government on how information alongside their own analysis, if necessary.
Pakistan's security and other interests could best be Based on that and on other input, the Ministry of Foreign
safeguarded. In practice however the situation has been Affairs should make recommendations, which, once
very different. Pakistan has found itself, forced by the accepted by the government, be subject to deliberation
perceived threat to its security to devote a larger part of and debate either in open session or, if the subject is
its limited resources to defence and as a necessary sensitive, in camera by the relevant committees of
corollary to give the military a greater role in the political Parliament and become the basis of policy only after they
life of the fledgling democracy. This has also meant that have been approved, he concluded.
the military and the intelligence agencies have had a
much greater role to play in determining the policies to be Please refer to Appendix I for Mr. Shaikh's detailed paper.
adopted and equally importantly the measures to be
taken on the ground through overt and covert operations
to tackle these security threats or to pursue Pakistan's
perceived national interests. It has also meant that both
the intelligence agencies belonging to the armed forces
and those theoretically under civilian authority view their
function as going beyond the collection of information,
analysed Mr. Shaikh.
Mr. Shaikh informed that all over the world, on questions
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Comment Comment
Mr. Abdul Sattar Dr. Ayesha Siddiqua
Former Foreign Minister Security Analyst
There comes a time when a stand needs to be taken. Our Intelligence Agencies do not have a proper capacity
When you feel that the policies are epithetical to your own for analysis. We carried out some weapon procurement
beliefs, you need to take a stand. There have been for which we needed input from the ISI and some of the
instances in our history where people have taken a stand, analysis provided by the ISI was way off the mark
for instance, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1975. resulting in wrong decision-making. This goes to prove
Certain elements of the foreign ministry were accused of that we do not have the capacity to analyse.
being communists by the U.S. and they had to pay the
price for voicing their views. Although taking a stand is Comment
not prevalent in developing countries, there are several Ms. Sherry Rehman
examples in the developed countries, where several MNA (NA-309, Women Sindh-II, PPPP)
officials resigned in protest to certain policies with which
they did not agree. The CIA is hardly a salutary example to take for emulating
foreign policy inputs either for security agencies or
There is a lack of resources to bring in proper expertise intelligence agencies. CIA is one organisation with its
even the foreign office suffers from this lack of own intelligence failures. For us to be holding it up as a
resources. There was a time when candidates of model is not recommended.
competitive examinations viewed Foreign Service as the
top priority but now people prefer other professions as Comment
compared to foreign policy services. This portends a Brig. (Retd.) Shaukat Qadir
dark future for the foreign office. Former Vice President IPRI
A common question lurking in many people's minds is
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how to end military's involvement in politics. For this

firstly it is important to understand the military. Secondly,
the military intervenes time and again because of a weak
political base in the country. Our election turnout is
decreasing every year.
The last popularly elected leader in this country was

Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto but he himself made a
situation for the Army to make use of. Thus it was a
result of his mistake that the Army got an opportunity to
hold the reigns. If you serve your people well and
effectively, such situations cannot rise.
Comment
The voters are apathetic. They believe that the real

decisions are not in their control and thus voting does not
empower them. We need to inculcate trust and credibility
so that their belief in the power of voting and elections is
revived.
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Comments by
the Session Chair
W
Defence & Political Analyst rapping-up the session, Dr. Rizvi thanked the
speakers of the session for their in depth
information and analysis on the topic. He
also thanked the participants for their valuable
contribution in terms of their analytical and concise
comments.
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Short Course on
Session 5
Executive Summary
S ession 5 covered the presentation and analysis of three case studies of the Shaping of Pakistan's Foreign Policy,
namely that of Comparison of Lahore, Agra and Islamabad Summits; Gulf Crisis - 1990; and the Recognition of
Taliban. Mr. Abdul Sattar, Former Foreign Minister of Pakistan; Dr. Ayesha Siddiqua, Security Analyst; and Prof. Dr.
Tahir Amin, Visiting Professor of International Relations at LUMS were the respective authors and presenters of these case
studies. A panel comprising Mr. Sartaj Aziz; Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi, former Federal Minister and MNA (NA-
148, Multan-I, PPPP); and Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi analysed the case studies, followed by Q&A/comments of
participants.
Mr. Abdul Sattar was of the view that occurring at different time periods the three summits between Pakistan and India
highlight important phases of Pakistan's relations with India in which efforts were made to normalise relations between the
two neighbours. However, the latest of the summits at Islamabad seems to augur well for the prospects of peace between
India and Pakistan.
Dr. Siddiqua believed that the Gulf Crisis - 1990 as a case study highlights the lack of a cohesive foreign policy approach
between the military and the civilian government of the time. Her thesis concluded that the military's apparent calculation of
the situation was not far-sighted and it embarrassed the civilian government.
Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin maintained that the decision of the recognition of Taliban brings to light a lesson that if the pros and
cons of significant decisions are not thought through, the country has to suffer the consequences of the policy. He believed
that contrary to the widely held perception about the dominant role of the ISI in the making of the Afghan policy, the policy of
the support of the Taliban was a civilian initiative possibly against the wishes of the ISI and the foreign office who wanted to
continue the policy of seeking a broad-based settlement.
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Shaping of Pakistan's Foreign Policy:

Case Study on the Comparisons of
Lahore, Agra and Islamabad Summits
Mr. Abdul Sattar

D uring the past five years, Indian and Pakistani
leaders have met thrice to discuss the course of
bilateral relations with the same purpose to
provide the basis for a dialogue between the two
countries, held Mr. Sattar.
In Mr. Sattar's assessment, the first of these summits,

i.e., the Lahore Summit proved to be ephemeral. The
statements of Indian leaders on return to Delhi making
light of the Kashmir issue deepened pre-existing doubts
in Pakistan. Mr. Sattar opined that although confusion and
controversy surrounded the Kargil war, the policy detour
and its depressing outcome aggravated the differences
between the Prime Minister and the Army high command.
11
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Two and a half years later, the Agra Summit also met
similar fate and this time it was due to difference in
opinion within the Indian political hierarchy and the terms
of the agreement were vetoed by a cabinet committee on
foreign affairs.
Tracing the period between Agra and Islamabad summits,

Mr. Sattar said that after 9/11, India, instead of talking
peace with Pakistan, decided to discredit Kashmir.
Moreover, the attack on the Indian Parliament gave India a
greater excuse to further dishonour Pakistan and the
former deployed its forces on the border. Relations
between Pakistan and India remained volatile throughout
the year 2002 and then all of a sudden India announced a
pull back of the forces to peacetime locations. In Mr.
Sattar's opinion there were two reasons for India's
withdrawal of its forces:
i) Strategic balance
ii) International environment. The
Western powers exhorted the two
countries to resume talks for peaceful
settlement of bilateral issues.
The basis of Islamabad Summit 2004 were laid in April

2003 in which Prime Minister Vajpayee publicly hinted
that India was prepared to consider resumption of
dialogue with Pakistan. As a result, on January 6, 2004,
the two leaders reached an agreement to recommence
the composite dialogue for “peaceful settlement of all
bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir.” Mr.
Vajpayee emphasised on the prevention of hostility and
terrorism and President Musharraf reassured that “He will
not permit any territory under Pakistan's control to be
used to support terrorism in any manner.” This
agreement was greeted with worldwide acclaim, added
Mr. Sattar.
Commenting on Pakistan-India relations and the future

course for discourse, Mr. Sattar said that good wishes
and good intentions are not enough. A provident
approach requires understanding of the reasons and
obstacles to the realisation of the objectives both
countries have professed in every meeting and affirmed
in every agreement.
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Case Study on the Gulf Crisis- 1990
Dr. Ayesha Siddiqua

Security Analyst
D r. Ayesha Siddiqua believed that Gulf Crisis

serves as an important study of the confusions
in Pakistan's policy making and poses various
questions such as what is the relevance of ideology in
policy making; who makes Pakistan's foreign policy and
what are the important factors of consideration in these
policy decisions?
Dr. Siddiqua maintained that two factors highlighted by

the Gulf War were Islamic Nationalism and Pakistan-US
relations. She said that the way events of the crisis
unfolded demonstrated how institutional mechanisms just
did not work. Pakistan's government condemned Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait and these sentiments were also
shared by people of other Muslim countries. Pakistan
dispatched its forces in support of Saudi Arabia. At this
time the debate in Pakistan was at two levels:
a) Issue of assisting Saudi Arabia and providing

for the security of its age-old Middle Eastern
ally; and
b) Question of responding to an American call for
countering Iraq's invasion.
However, she believed, the major twist came from the

Israel factor, when Saddam Hussain equated the situation
of occupation of Kuwait to the occupation of Palestine.
This mobilised the public opinion in support of Saddam
Hussain in Pakistan. She said that it was important to
point out that General Mirza Aslam Beg, the Chief of Army
Staff at that time, had concurred to sending of the troops
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during a meeting of the Cabinet Committee for Defence. It

was only later that he changed his stance and
embarrassed the government by issuing statements
against America's war against Iraq. But the government
had U.S. relations to consider as well as relations with
Saudi Arabia. Pakistan's government tried to convince
stakeholders that Iraq had never supported Pakistan on
the Kashmir issue. Another integral role during this time
was played by the religious parties as well as the
opposition, with the issue of Muslim Nationalism.
Jama'at-e-Islami, in particular, targeted the government.
Any country has three options in such a situation of

conflict: coordinate, capitulate or confront, depending on
what the national interest is, said Dr. Siddiqua. Iran took a
stance in favour of its national interest. Pakistan had to
clearly analyse and re-analyse its position in the global
scenario and determine whether it could propose the
concept of strategic defiance based on its nuclear
capability, analysed Dr. Siddiqua.
In conclusion, she said that the case study shows that

there was a lack of internal dialogue; a very limited role
played by the Parliament and constraints on the
government due to Army Chief's perception. Interestingly,
she said, the case study proves that in terms of decision-
making, the political government eventually had an upper
hand. Dialogue between stakeholders was a pre-requisite,
she believed, in order to reach a consensus in the face of
a crisis.
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Case Study on the Recognition of Taliban

Visiting Prof. LUMS
D r. Tahir Amin explained at the outset that his

perspective and understanding of the subject
was an outsider's perspective reconstructed
from analysing the situation. He said that nonetheless his
analysis has its usefulness and would be helpful in
broadening the understanding of the participants of the
formulation of foreign policy in Pakistan.
Setting the picture in perspective, Dr. Amin said that the

Government of Pakistan officially recognised the Taliban
regime on May 25, 1997 and this decision had serious
consequences. The decision alienated non-Pashtun
minorities in Afghanistan and Pakistan had to face
serious repercussions on its economy, polity, society and
foreign policy. The N.W.F.P and Baluchistan were deeply
influenced by Taliban policies of Islamisation while
Pakistan also faced isolation internationally.
In his view, the answer to the question of why Pakistan

recognised the Taliban regime lies in the analysis of
strategic interests that played an important role in making
such a drastic decision. The general notion was that
Afghanistan provides strategic depth for Pakistan against
India. Taliban were viewed as a pro-Pakistan force and it
was believed that a stable Afghanistan under Taliban
would protect Pakistan's strategic interests vis-à-vis
India.
The origin of Taliban, he explained, is from mujahideen

and the madrassahs that were set up after the Afghan
war. It was Pakistan's policy that Kabul should be in the
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hands of a Pakistan-friendly government and hence the

Taliban were supported. Economic interest was also
foreseen as Pakistan wanted to open up into Central Asia,
and Afghanistan provided the shortest route into Central
Asia. Other economic interests included American
multinationals' interest in a gas pipeline, a Saudi
multinational delta, and an Argentinean company.
Pakistan also thought that since Taliban were students of
religious madrassahs, they would support Pakistan and
never raise the issue of Pakhtunistan.
Dr. Amin said that the policy for recognition of the Taliban
was formulated with the induction of Prime Minister
Benazir Bhutto's regime. Moreover, JUI-F had an active
interest in Afghanistan. According to Dr. Amin, the role of
ISI and foreign office in the recognition of Taliban is a bit
murky as neither was it a policy of the ISI to intervene nor
was the foreign office keen to support the Taliban. In
essence, he added, there was huge support for the policy
from all walks of the society including deobandi sect;
drug dealers, smugglers and transporters.
Dr. Amin concluded that the pros and cons of this

decision were not thought through by the government.
There was complete lack of coordination at policy making
level. There was no input from the think tanks, and there
was no role of the parliamentary committees on foreign
affairs in advising the government as to what steps to
take.
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Summary of the Case Studies

by the Session Chair
B
study.
efore initiating the panel discussion, Dr. Ijaz Shafi
Gilani, the session chair, summarised each case
Dr. Gilani said that Mr. Abdul Sattar presented three

different but important Summits between India and
Pakistan from year 1998 to 2004 saying that in all these
three summits, the expectations were that the relations
between the two countries should become harmonious.
The results of these Summits, especially the first two
Summits, were neither too positive nor encouraging. Mr.
Sattar presented his viewpoint that the 90s were a futile
decade in which no progress on Pakistan-India relations
could be achieved. He also said that the current dialogues
promise a better outcome. According to Mr. Sattar there
are many such issues in which the cooperation should be
more forthcoming and hurdles in this regard should be
removed. Highlighting the questions that could be put to
Mr. Sattar, he said that since Mr. Abdul Sattar has given
his point of view on various foreign policy decisions and
events, he should be asked as to what the different
factors were in influencing our policy decisions; what role
did the politicians and the Parliament play; and do
politicians not have the required knowledge and tools to
deal with foreign policy issues effectively?
Presenting an analysis of Dr. Siddiqua's presentation, Dr.

Gilani said that she gave a succinct and clear picture of
the multi-dimensional facets of the Gulf Crisis from
Pakistan's perspective. The Gulf crisis showed that the
institutional mechanisms for decision making were not
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followed. He said that according to Dr. Siddiqua, Gen.

Hameed Gul was involved in developing military's
perspective of strategic defiance but in effect Gen. Gul
had already been sidelined. Dr. Gilani added that what
was important to note during that time was the role of the
Parliament, its involvement in the decision-making
process and its stance on Gen. Aslam Baig's alternative
policy.
Commenting on Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin's presentation, Dr.

Gilani said that it was an acute analysis of the Taliban
regime. He said that Taliban regime has had a deep
impact on Pakistan's foreign policy process and has had
not only a geo-strategic impact but also economic, social
and cultural consequences for Pakistan.
After the summary, Dr. Gilani invited the panel to present

their views.
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PANEL DISCUSSION
Views by
Mr. Sartaj Aziz
for Foreign Affairs & Finance
M r. Sartaj Aziz believed that contrary to Mr.
Abdul Sattar's remarks that substantial issues
were not discussed in the Lahore Summit, it
consisted of very serious discussions on Kashmir. Mr.
Aziz said that it was basically the Kargil issue that
derailed the process, and had the military not taken over,
the process could have been revived. At that time there
was no precondition that cross border terrorism should
end. It was after 9/11 that cross border terrorism was no
longer possible. He said that Pakistan today is in a weak
position in relation to India because the Kargil issue and
military takeover have destroyed a historic opportunity for
peace with India.
Mr. Aziz emphasised that the key issue in resolving the

state of affairs is public opinion; which, over the years,
has taken the shape of a steadfast belief that Kashmir
belongs to us. He said that today there is great public
sentiment in favour of peace. However, he also addressed
a question of whether India would allow this peace
process to continue. He said that he did not see a
national consensus emerging on peace with India without
Kashmir.
He also pointed to what he termed a 'factual mistake' in

the presentation of Mr. Sattar and said that it is not true
that at the time of Lahore Summit, Pakistan stood
internationally isolated due to friendship with Taliban, was
overtly neutralized and was on the brink of financial
insolvency.
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PANEL DISCUSSION (Contd...)
Views by
Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi
D r. Rizvi said that the case studies serve to

highlight the fact that the foreign policy making
process in Pakistan is very elitist in nature, even
more so than other countries. He pointed out that there
are two things that are important in this elitist process:
idiosyncrasies of the leaders and the sentiments of the
ruling elite. He said that these two possibilities arise in
countries like Pakistan which have weak institutions. It is
important to analyse the decisions of the elite and see
how much unanimity and division there is in these
decisions and opinions.
He said that the Army, despite strategic defiance,

considered relations with Saudi Arabia as important
during the Iraq War. The Army had developed an
impression of playing an oversized role in the region due
to the war in Iraq. He also emphasised that Pakistan and
U.S. relations were important and it was for this reason
that Gen. Beg's strategy was not followed.
Dr. Rizvi said that in terms of Pakistan-India relations,

January 2004 is a case of unanimity. This process will
last as long as the dominant elite remain unanimous in
this regard.
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PANEL DISCUSSION (Contd...)
Views by
MNA (NA-148, Multan-I, PPPP) environment of the Lahore Summit, the environment of
Former Federal Minister Islamabad Summit was much better and more tension-
free. Mr. Qureshi also said that hardliners on both sides
have moderated their rhetoric and the change in the
international scene has facilitated the whole process.
Commenting on the case study on the Gulf Crisis, Mr.

Qureshi said that the study reveals a visible gulf between
political and military leadership and lack of a mechanism
for resolving the crisis. He said that the Gulf Crisis is a
good case study to learn from and understand the
complexities of foreign policy decisions. There was a
functional Parliament during the Gulf crisis but it played
no active role. Foreign policy decision making requires
analysis, and according to Mr. Qureshi, that is seriously
lacking and has, time and again, lead to a state of
M r. Qureshi was of the opinion that Mr. Sattar's

statements were very cautious regarding
Pakistan-India Peace Process. He said that
the realisation that war is no longer an option is
becoming prominent and was of the view that a delay in
confusion for the government.
Discussing the third and the last case study he said that
we did not think through the pros and cons of the
recognition of the Taliban as we should have. He said that
dialogue would weaken Pakistan's position. However, he Pakistan made a mistake by alienating the non-Pashtun
was of the view that a positive element of the delay is that element. He advised that the mechanism for incorporating
both sides have realised that we have to improve the inputs from think-tanks should be made operational in the
environment in both the countries as well as increase the country so that better foreign policy decisions can be
contact amongst people. He said that as compared to the taken.
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Comment players as the decisions consequently affect the
Mr. Abdul Sattar economic development of the country.
Comment
At the time of the Simla Agreement, the Indian Sardar Aseff Ahmed Ali
newspapers reported that Pakistan's President had Former Foreign Minister
promised Ms. Indra Gandhi that LoC would be considered
as an international border and the issue of Kashmir would The relationship between the Army and the rest of the
be resolved on this basis. There is no such justification society has been a troubled one which has defined the
available that President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto would have course of Pakistan's foreign policy. During the Gulf War,
made any such commitment or promise. Indians claim the Parliament held a full debate in both the houses in
that this promise was part of a secret dialogue. However, which majority of the members supported Saddam
Pakistan's President clarified that no such promises were Hussain and Iraq whereas the Prime Minister had decided
made. No such records of the Simla Agreement have to support the coalition. The Prime Minister took a wise
been found. decision, even though it was an unpopular one.
Difference of opinion was also visible in PPP who
If the Foreign Minister at that time found loop-holes in the supported Saddam Hussain, although its Chairperson
Kargil war, he should have detached himself from this Benazir Bhutto supported the U.S. Our Chiefs of Staffs
policy in the interest of the whole nation instead of have two modes; compliance or defiance. We did
defending it. As an MNA, Senator or any government incalculable damage by not sending troops to Saudi
official, it is your right as well as duty to say what is right Arabia.
and to direct the policy makers in the right direction. A
person who does not have ample knowledge of The problem with the Lahore Declaration was that the two
economics is not fit to be the foreign minister of Pakistan permanent establishments were not in tandem with the
as in policy-making in the international framework, the political leadership and even before the Lahore
person in charge needs to be well aware of the economic Declaration's ink became dry, Kargil episode took place.
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We demolished our case and gave ammunition to the Question

Indian Leadership. I believe Mr. Vajpayee had agreed that Mr. Omar Ayub Khan
there will be a joint working group on Jammu and MNA (NA-19, Haripur, PML)
Kashmir but went back on his word as soon as he went
back to Delhi. Had 9/11 not occurred, would we still be claiming that
recognition of Taliban regime was a mistake and was
I disagree that extending support to Taliban Regime was disastrous? What factors and variables would have
Gen. (Retd.) Naseerullah Babar's operation. I will not be changed, had we not recognised the regime in the first
so harsh in passing judgement in hindsight. I believe that place?
at any given time, governments are under extreme
pressure to take such decisions and the government of Question
the time must have its reasons for the decisions it made. Sayyeda Farhana Khalid Banoori
I have to add here that our government had to face a MNA (NA-323, Women NWFP-II, MMAP)
messed-up situation with Afghanistan which was not
created by any political forces, rather created mostly by Indian and Pakistani foreign policies are designed to
the ISI, in particular, Gen. Hameed Gul, who considered demean each other. Can they not make policies which
himself Alexander of Pakistan and was proud of the fact would benefit each other? My second question is that in
that he could extend Pakistan's power to Central Asia by today's world, the word jihad is considered synonymous
subverting those countries. In turn we had to go through with terrorism and mujahideen are called terrorists. Do
a lot of difficulties to change that image for Pakistan. you think that a foreign policy can be formed in line with
Islamic principles?
Question
Mr. Farid Ahmad Piracha Question
MNA (NA-121, Lahore-IV, MMAP) Syed Nayyer Hussain Bokhari
MNA (NA-49, Islamabad-II, PPPP)
It has been 56 years since Pakistan-India discussions
have been in the pipeline, yet they have not progressed. As far as year 1990 is concerned, it was a lost case for
Has there been any movement towards the resolution of Pakistan-India relations. My question is that who pushed
Kashmir? Have we taken into account the Kashmiri point Pakistan into Kargil; and who bailed it out?
of view? Mr. Abdul Sattar, you were against the CTBT
before. However, after coming to the office you Question
supported it - how did that happen? Ms. Sherry Rehman
MNA (NA-309, Women Sindh-II, PPPP)
Question
Sahibzada Mian Jalil Ahmed Sharqpuri How can the Indus Water Treaty be looked at which was
MNA (NA-132, Sheikhupura-II, PML) considered one of the successful treaties between India
and Pakistan? I want to second Dr. Siddiqua's suggestion
From the discussions in this session what I gather is that that Defence Committee of the Cabinet needs to be
our foreign policy has not been consistent from the strengthened. Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin made a comment that
beginning and has been influenced by many the civilian government continued to process the Taliban
personalities. How can we improve the process of policy takeover. In Mr. Ahmed Rashid's view the ISI and the U.S.
making, and what role can Parliamentarians play in this? were pushing for the Taliban's recognition and this was
specifically for the UNICOL contract to win. Can this issue
also be addressed?
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Question Foreign policy is made by the dominant elite, but it needs

Ms. Maimoona Hashmi popular support. Pakistan projected an image of
MNA (NA-302, Women Punjab-XXX, PML(N)) enormous fickleness, not on the basis of what the elite
felt but on the basis of what the masses felt. We need to
Regarding the agreement signed on January 6, 2004, I look at the cause behind this; that is what research and
would like to ask if the Foreign office and the ISI were analysis mean. We need to focus not only on who has
aware of what was going on and if they were they formed the foreign policy and how, but on what we have
included in the formation of this agreement. Why was the done as a nation.
Northern Alliance anti-Pakistan?
Question
Question Makhdum Khusro Bakhtyar
Mr. Ishaq Khan Khakwani MNA (NA-194, R.Y.Khan-III, PML)
MNA (NA-168, Vehari-II, PML)
On the foreign policy matrix, there appears a need to
My question is to Mr. Sartaj Aziz that when did he, as a institutionalise the formation of the foreign policy
foreign minister, come to know that the war in Kargil was process. Please throw some light on the process of
taking place and when was the government informed of formation of the NSC.
that?
Comments
Question Dr. Ijaz Shafi Gilani
Mian Shamim Haider Chairman Gallup, Pakistan
MNA (NA-135, Sheikhupura-V, PML) Session Chair
There are many counties in the world who have long term Politicians have a great way of convincing the public that
policies; why is our foreign policy always of short-term they stand behind their views. During the Gulf War, Prime
duration? Minister Nawaz Sharif's government was in tune with the
public. At the height of the crisis, a public opinion poll
Question was carried out asking public's opinion on Government's
Mr. Qamar Zaman Kaira policy on the issue, and a majority voted positively. The
MNA (NA-106, Gujrat-III, PPPP) same question was asked of Qazi Hussain Ahmed's
policy, and the majority again voted in affirmation. When
What did Pakistan and India gain during the various asked if they thought the policy of the two was similar,
dialogues held between the two countries? Secondly, the public voted negatively. This shows that even the
why did Prime Minister Vajpayee announce early public opinion can vary and can be contradictory.
elections immediately upon going back to India?
Moreover, both governments do not wish to solve the Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin
Kashmir issue. All military governments raise certain Visiting Prof. LUMS
issues in order to take the focus away from their
unjustified presence. Is this government doing the same? A lot of questions were asked regarding the Taliban
regime. The Taliban regime needs to be evaluated
Comment objectively. They were successful to some extent in
Mr. Najmuddin A. Shaikh dealing with drugs. However, their vision of Islam was
Former Foreign Secretary extremely narrow and this created several problems. For
example, their stringent restrictions on education and
There are lessons to be learned from the 1990 Gulf employment. The ISI was apparently divided on their
Crisis. Foreign policy is not a one-way street; you have to decision for support of the regime. According to Mr.
take into consideration the interests of other countries. Ahmed Rashid's documentation, ISI took a long time to
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decide who they wanted to support. It was only when the September 14 - and these were curt calls, asking us to
Taliban won spontaneous victories that they enjoyed such make a decision immediately.
support from the ISI and it is true that Gen. Babar played
a gigantic role in the Taliban issue. Dr. Ayesha Siddiqua
Security Analyst
As to why the Northern Alliance was anti-Pakistan, there
was a high degree of mistrust amongst the Northern It is important to hold dialogues as the beauty of the
Alliance. They believed that Pakistan did not support Mr. policy making process lies in the dialogue that precedes a
Ahmed Shah Masood. Saudi Arabia and UAE initially only final decision. There is still a gap between the decisions
supported the Taliban regime after insistence from and dialogue and the final policy adopted regarding the
Pakistan and later they too withdrew their support and Gulf Crisis. Parliament needs to identify Pakistan's foreign
Pakistan was left isolated in its acknowledgment of the policy issues. We also need to determine what kind of a
regime. country we wish to develop Pakistan into, 15 to 20 years
from now. What are the threats and opportunities we
Mr. Abdul Sattar have, and what kind of alignments and alliances do we
Former Foreign Minister need to get into? I contest the statement that Pakistan is
in a vulnerable position and that India can exploit this
What are the reasons that contentious issues between situation. I believe that we can solve this issue favourably
India and Pakistan have not been solved till now? The if we are able to cooperate, capitulate and confront the
answer to this is that Might is Right. Both sides are not issues facing us.
willing to compromise. Pakistan knows that it is weaker
than India, but we still insist that law and justice should
be the determinants in solution of such contentious
issues. Throughout history, power has never remained
the sole factor in determining crucial issues. The power
disparity comes in the way of a solution through law and
justice. The basic question that needs attention is
whether we should accept everything dished out by India,
or if we are still powerful enough to take a stand.
For the past two to three years, our relations with the
Taliban were becoming increasingly tense. It was
unimaginable in 1997 to envisage in what context the
Taliban would drive their policy. There had been a gradual
shift in Pakistan's position away from the Taliban soon
after Pakistan's recognition of the Taliban. Our policy was
not even popular among our own community (other
Islamic States). It had gradually become clear that the
Taliban had taken up a battle they could not win.
Answer to the question of whether our decision about the

Taliban was taken independently or if it was a result of
pressure from Washington is that we had not received
any message from Washington till September 12.
Therefore, all decisions taken on the night of September
12 were completely independent. However, we did start
receiving calls from the US from September 13 to
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Comments by
Session Chair
Dr. Ijaz Shafi Gilani

D r. Gilani termed the session as a 'very

productive' one and congratulated the speakers,
panellists and the participants for presenting,
highlighting and discussing important facets and issues
of foreign policy formulation in Pakistan. He also
congratulated PILDAT on its successful efforts towards
organising the short course and getting together an
eclectic mix of speakers and participants.
The civil society, in his view, is much stronger on foreign

policy issues today than it used to be a decade earlier. He
concluded that it was the only strength on which a better
foreign policy in Pakistan can be made in the future.
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Session 6
Executive Summary
T he discussion was brought to the crucial connection of Parliament and the Foreign Policy in the 6th session which was
chaired by Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi, MNA (NA-148, Multan-I, PPPP) and Former Federal Minister.
An overview of the role of Parliaments of US, UK, and India in the Foreign Policy Process was presented as a starting point
of the discussion by Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin. He analysed that the US Congress exercises considerable authority in shaping
foreign relations as its committees oversee the country's foreign policy and authorise the international affairs' budget. The
British and the Indian Parliaments, unlike the US, do not enjoy specific powers to restrain the executive but oversee the
policies of the executive through committees and presenting their policy recommendations.
Mian Abdul Waheed presented his views on the role of Parliament in shaping Pakistan's Foreign Policy based on his
experience as the former chairman of National Assembly's Standing Committee on Foreign Relations. He believed that
though constitutionally the Parliament in Pakistan is empowered to review the policies of the executive, especially through its
standing committees, unfortunately the Parliament or its committees have never exercised that role effectively and pro-
actively.
Sardar Asseff Ahmed Ali analysed the principle determinants of Pakistan's foreign policy presenting his views on the major
factors that have contributed to shaping Pakistan's foreign policy so far.
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Review and Analysis of

Foreign Policy by the
Parliaments of US, UK, and India

Visiting Prof. LUMS
P rof. Dr. Tahir Amin said that traditionally, foreign
policy used to be the exclusive domain of the
diplomats and soldiers. However, with the
evolution of democracy, this pattern has changed and the
policy process in a democratic system is shaped by the
inputs of Parliaments, media, various interest groups as
well as the public opinion. Executive branch of the
government is no longer completely independent both in
the formulation and implementation of foreign policies, he
added.
Prof. Amin said that he has studied the role of legislatures

of US, UK and India in their foreign policies on the basis
of constitutional provisions governing the respective
legislatures' control over foreign policy; the mechanisms
used by legislatures to influence foreign policy; certain
cases of effectiveness of legislatures in this domain and
the advantages and disadvantages of the legislative
control over foreign policy making, review and analysis.
The US Constitution divides the powers to conduct

foreign policy among the three branches of the
government: executive, legislative, and judicial. The
executive formulates the policy, the legislature oversees
the policy and judiciary interprets the constitution if a
difference arises between the executive and the
legislature. He said that US President is the head of the
executive and formulates foreign policy with the
Secretary of the State, his principle advisor and with the
assistance of the National Security Council and his
cabinet. The legislative control on foreign policy is
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exercised through two committees: Senate Foreign WMDs were never found.
Relations Committee and the House International
Relations Committee. These two committees oversee the Discussing the constitutional space available to Indian
country's foreign policy and authorise the international Parliament in the domain of foreign policy, Prof. Amin
affairs' budget. He said that there are other committees, explained that since India follows the British
which also share jurisdiction on foreign policy which Constitutional model, making foreign policy decisions is
include the Select Intelligence Committees of both the the function of the cabinet, which, in turn, is responsive
Houses which monitor the activities of the CIA and other as well as responsible to the opinions expressed in the
Intelligence Agencies; the House National Security Lok Sabha. In the U.S. Constitution, the ratification of
Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committees treaties and other international agreements by the Senate
which deal with the defence matters. It was important to is mandatory, but in the Indian Constitution there is no
understand, believed Prof. Amin, that although the such provision. The Indian Parliament also exercises its
President in US is immensely powerful but the Congress control over foreign affairs through three committees:
also exercise significant restraints on the powers of the Consultative Committee of Parliament for the Ministry of
President, creating considerable tensions in the foreign External Affairs, the Estimate Committee and the Public
policy process. Accounts Committee. The Indian Parliament has, in
general, supported its governments' positions on the
Discussing the role of British Parliament in the foreign foreign policy issues, believed Prof. Amin, although
policy of UK, he said that unlike the US Congress, the sometimes it has shown strong disagreement on some
British Parliament does not have specific powers to positions such as its strong criticism of the Indian
restrain the executive. The control of foreign affairs rests government's policies during the Sino-Indian War of
in the hands of the Crown and is shared with the 1962.
Legislature only to the extent that the Crown deems this
desirable. The basic function of the Parliament in UK is to
examine the policies which cabinet has decided.
However, Parliament can normally be consulted only after
decisions have been made. Its control over foreign affairs
results from its place in the government and the general
legislative functions. There are several devices which
enable the Parliament to exercise its control over the
foreign policy. The Parliament has three committees
dealing with issues of foreign affairs: Foreign Affairs
Committee, Committee on European Legislation and the
Committee of Public Accounts which exercise
considerable check on foreign affairs. He said that on the
one hand, compared to the US System, the principal
advantage of British system is that the government is not
paralysed in conducting its foreign policy vis-à-vis other
nations. On the other hand, the governments may abuse
the trust reposed in it or may make erroneous judgments
which may harm the national interests. Offering the
example of the present British Government's policy
towards Iraq, he said the Blair government is facing a lot
of criticism over its Iraq policy. The opposition is blaming
the government for lying to the public about Iraq's
possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in
order to justify the war against Iraq when in actuality, the
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Parliament and the Foreign Policy:

the Role of Foreign Affairs Committee
Mian Abdul Waheed

Former Chairman
Foreign Affairs Committee
of National Assembly of Pakistan M r. Waheed believed that the principles of
Pakistan's Foreign Policy have been Security
and Economic Progress of Pakistan. To
influence and review foreign policy of the country,
standing committees are the major parliamentary tools
comprising treasury, opposition and smaller parties. He
said that the vitality with which the Committee on Foreign
Affairs plays its role depends largely on the support it
receives from the Prime Minister and the Speaker of the
House.
On a dismal note, he continued, compared to most other

democracies, the Parliament in Pakistan has never played
a substantial role in influencing foreign policy of the
country. On any crucial issue of foreign policy, the role of
Parliament has merely been to allow emotional debates in
the plenary. The standing committee on foreign affairs is
a powerful committee if taken full advantage of by
parliamentarians, he added, as the mandate of the
committee includes the authority to review the entire
working of the ministry of foreign affairs including its
foreign policy process.
Relating from his own experience, Mr. Waheed said that

when he was Chairman of the Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs from 1997 to 1999, through this period,
the views of the Committee on many issues, including the
Afghanistan issue, were not taken into consideration by
the government. He said that the committee advocated a
policy of liaison with all the contending groups in
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Afghanistan. As the events unfolded subsequently, it

became clear that the Pro-Taliban policy was incorrect, he
said.
He believed that for committees to function effectively,

avenues of interaction with other best practises in the
World are required through meetings, travels and study
tours. Even though such visits from other countries were
made to Pakistani Parliament during his chairmanship of
standing committee, the Pakistani Parliament never
reciprocated.
Apart from the disruption of democracy which has

contributed in a major way to the lack of institution-
building in the country and hence the lack of organised
parliamentary input to policy-making, he believed that the
delay in the formation of committees also contributes to
the lack of effectiveness of committees as these are
constituted practically after a year of the beginning of
Parliament after elections. Moreover, the Parliamentary
Committees, just like individual legislators, are not
provided independent secretariats, staff and researchers
which are needed for independent and effective
functioning of committees. He concluded that the parties
in power and opposition need to give the seriousness and
importance to strengthening committees that they
deserve as without effective committees, no serious
public input and review of the executive and its policies is
possible.
His complete Paper is attached as Appendix J.
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Principle Determinants of
Pakistan's Foreign Policy

S ardar Aseff Ahmed Ali congratulated PILDAT for

holding the short course and initiating a process
which he termed would 'greatly help in the
capacity-building of the Parliamentarians.'
Presenting an overview of the major factors shaping

Pakistan's foreign policy, he said that since Pakistan's
inception, foreign policy has been largely determined by
three factors: threat perception from India as a hostile
State; the unresolved Kashmir dispute; the need for rapid
economic progress. Since India was historically hostile
and was in alliance with USSR, even though it professed
non-alignment, Pakistan was obliged to seek strategic
alliances with the West. As a consequence of these
imperatives, Pakistan joined the anti-communist alliance
of SEATO and CENTO. However, one of the conditions of
military assistance from USA was non-use of weapons
for any other purpose except for fighting communism.
It is, however, important to note, he added, that the West

had not abandoned India even though India was receiving
massive Soviet military and economic assistance. The
western tilt was towards Pakistan but at no point was it
anti-Indian. In the dispute of Ran of Kutch, Pakistan had
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assumed that the western alliance of Pakistan would developments took place in the first government of Prime
replenish Pakistan's military hardware during the war but Minister Benazir Bhutto. Important nuclear treaties were
it did not prove to be of any benefit to Pakistan during its signed with India, whereas the government of Prime
conflict with India and eventually Pakistan was forced to Minister Nawaz Sharif pushed Afghanistan into further
sign the humiliating Tashkent Declaration. Post-Tashkent, civil war. In the second government of Prime Minister
Pakistan's foreign policy was in doldrums. Benazir Bhutto, the rise of Taliban in Afghanistan and
eventually their take over of Kabul and three quarters of
Sardar Asseff Ahmed Ali was of the opinion that the Afghanistan were major developments. He said that this
Simla Accord signed by Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, as the period also saw Pakistan's quest for deepened relations
then President of Pakistan, was one of the outstanding with Central Asia. The second government of Prime
achievements of Pakistan's diplomacy. It was during Mr. Minister Nawaz Sharif saw significant foreign policy
Bhutto's government that Pakistan's Nuclear Programme developments. India tested its nuclear weapons in 1999
was initiated and the construction of the Kahuta Uranium and Pakistan historically followed reactive policies and
Enrichment Plant was started. He believed that two major tested several sophisticated devices, he added.
events adversely affected Pakistan's foreign policy during
General Zia-ul-Haq's dictatorship: Islamic revolution in Sardar Asseff Ahmed Ali said that not only did the events
Iran and Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan. He said that of 9/11 changed the world, they also changed the
since Gen. Zia-ul-Haq as a military dictator was lacking in fortunes of President General Pervez Musharraf.
moral and political legitimacy, in both these events he President Bush decided to combat terrorism all over the
saw an opportunity for self-aggrandisement. world and that required Pakistan's airspace and several
bases and facilities in Pakistan to launch its attacks on
Sardar Aseff Ahmed Ali was of the view that Pakistan saw the Taliban Government. He said that this was a godsend
an opportunity to strengthen its relations with the West for Gen. Musharraf who conceded to these concessions
during the Soviet-U.S. war in Afghanistan. The war of readily and Pakistan became a key ally of the US war on
liberation of Afghanistan from Soviet troops was fought terrorism.
from the soil of Pakistan in the name of Islam and Jihad.
He said that with time Pakistan's involvement in He said that another significant event during Gen.
Afghanistan became deeper but unfortunately policy Musharraf's regime was the Islamabad Declaration which
managers in Pakistan relied more on military solutions was signed by Gen. Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister
rather than political solutions. They failed to recognise Vajpayee. He termed the declaration 'balanced' and
that in the post-Najeebullah period, there was a political containing the spirit of Simla Accord and the Lahore
crisis in Afghanistan, not a military one. Consequently, Declaration. He believed that it has contributed
Pakistan was sucked into a zero-sum game in significantly in the reduction of tensions in South Asia
Afghanistan. Another setback to Pakistan's Afghan policy since 2001 when a major terrorist event occurred in New
was the withdrawal of the US and its allies from Delhi.
Afghanistan who simply walked away in 1988 while
Pakistan was left to bear almost the entire burden of 3.2 Please refer to Appendix K for the complete presentation.
million refugees.
Along with this major setback in 1990, sanctions were

imposed on Pakistan by the Bush administration for
covertly pursuing the nuclear programme. Pakistan
experienced great economic hardship and isolation. In the
meantime, due to uprising in Indian occupied Kashmir,
Pakistan's relations with India started to become tense on
several fronts and hence Pakistan's profile suffered many
setbacks, he added. He believed however, that a few
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Question Comment
Ms. Sherry Rehman Ms. Samia Raheel Qazi
MNA (NA-309, Women Sindh-II, PPPP) MNA (NA-301, Women Punjab-XXIX, MMAP)
My questions are to Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin. Is there a reason Are we ever going to experience a time when facts
for your not mentioning the National Security Council regarding development, economy and military will be
(NSC) in the US? What is the purpose of the NSC in the presented to us in their true picture? Will we ever present
US? How has civilian authority been paramount in the the public with truth for the sake of vital national interest?
NSC and how has it often taken power away from the During this short course, facts have been presented by
military especially during the Bay of Pigs Crisis? And many speakers that are contrary to reality. We as
lastly, please explain how the appropriation committee parliamentarians face immense hurdles which adversely
has become involved in the subtle subversion of the affect our performance. In order to overcome these
executive? hurdles, we all need to unite.
Question Comment
Mr. Omar Ayub Khan Mr. Ishaq Khan Khakwani
MNA (NA-19, Haripur, PML) MNA (NA-168, Vehari-II, PML)
My question is to Mr. Abdul Waheed. In your experience, How do we bring Pakistan out of the dangers engulfing us
where was the resistance coming from in allowing the presently? The solution to this lies in politicians sitting
Foreign Affairs Committee and other committees to down and drawing parameters as to what extent politics
function during the time of civilian dispensation? can be taken to and how far can we extend our personal
enmities. It is incumbent upon the leadership to provide
personal sacrifices. You should be above any financial
corruption.
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Question Question
Sayyeda Farhana Khalid Banoori Mr. Farid Ahmad Piracha
MNA (NA-323, Women NWFP-II, MMAP) MNA (NA-121, Lahore-IV, MMAP)
How independent is our country in formulating its foreign I feel that policies and agreements in Pakistan are signed
policy? without any involvement of the Parliament. My question is
to Sardar Asseff Ahmed Ali, that how responsible does he
Question consider himself for the failures in foreign policy that he
Brig. (Retd.) Shaukat Qadir mentioned?
Former Vice President
Islamabad Policy Research Institute - IPRI Question
Mr. Qamar Zaman Kaira
My first question is regarding the use of emergency MNA (NA-106, Gujrat-III, PPPP)
powers by the American President under the principle of
clear and present danger. When he does so, he has to go Pakistan has, for a long time, remained a part of
back to the congress to satisfy them as to why he countering the communism strategy. My question is that
assumed those powers according to the American has the break up of USSR been an advantage or a
Constitution. Secondly the 1965 War was no doubt a disadvantage for Pakistan?
piece of idiocy which Mr. Ayub Khan undertook to create
his legitimacy, but the Runn of Kutch was not our doing. Comment
We were attacked and we had to defend ourselves. My Ms. Fauzia Wahab
question is that are you recommending a change in our MNA (NA-311, Women Sindh-IV, PPPP)
Kashmir policies?
As political representatives, we need to be very cautious
Question with our choice of words. It is very heart wrenching to
Sahibzada Mian Jalil Ahmed Sharqpuri hear when someone uses the expression “a failed state”
MNA (NA-132, Sheikhupura-II, PML) for Pakistan. Usage of such terminologies creates
despondency.
Should not the basic goal of our foreign policy be based
on our ideology of two nation theory? Secondly as far as Comment
our involvement in Afghanistan is concerned, we made a Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi
hasty decision and I believe that we could have asked for MNA (NA-148, Multan-I, PPPP)
time before agreeing with the US and could have come Former Federal Minister
up with a better solution. Why did we not do that? We
could have said this is an international issue and we have I would like to clarify a misunderstanding. No one called
to consult China, Saudi Arabia, Russia and Iran. Pakistan a failed state. It was said that that we have had
certain failures in our foreign policy.
Comment
Makhdoom Syed Ahmad Alam Anwar Question
MNA (NA-192, R.Y.Khan-I, PML) Syed Nayyer Hussain Bokhari
MNA (NA-49, Islamabad-II, PPPP)
We have to develop a strategy and examine our flaws. I
do not think we have failed in war, diplomacy or My question is to Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin. He has given a
insurgency. I think we should continue to pursue both. comparative analysis regarding foreign policy and
We must analyse our fault lines. The distance between Parliaments. My question is that in the current situation of
the decision making elite and people must be reduced. Pakistan's defaced and disfigured Parliament, can the
cabinet make any independent decisions? And what
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benefits have we derived from aligning with the U.S? created a bad image for ourselves in front of the world.
Our case regarding the Kashmir resolve is a just case and
Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin we must stand by that case.
Visiting Prof. LUMS
Comments
NSC is an extremely important body in the US but it Mr. Abdul Sattar
constitutes a part of the executive. It is an advisory body Former Foreign Minister
to the President and reflects the civilian supremacy. The
President and the Secretary play a vital role in the NSC. No one is satisfied with the performance of the state. We
The appropriation committee is also very important, as it all had higher expectations from the current governance.
keeps a watch on funding and holds executive A process has been set into motion that is driving us into
accountable. depression. We came close to becoming a failing state,
but we escaped this despondent tragedy. Our country is
Answer on the road to development, but we must develop in each
Mian Abdul Waheed and every facet of life. We need to address questions
Former Chairman such as how can we improve this rate of progress?
Foreign Affairs Committee of National Assembly of In one of the questions it was said that we capitulated to
Pakistan even those demands that the US did not ask of us. I wish
we could place our records before the people and clarify
Committees are formed half way through the Assembly's that we did not accept all their demands, which were six
life. Lack of infrastructure is an important reason for the major demands, but only those which we, under our
ineffectiveness of the committees and the Parliament. foreign policy, considered to benefit our national interest
Members should demand proper infrastructure for the in the long run.
committees.
Comments
Answer Sardar Asseff Ahmed Ali
Sardar Asseff Ahmed Ali Former Foreign Minister
I do not want to give a feeling of pessimism. I believe that
Every country, no matter how powerful it is, has to deal there have been significant successes for Pakistan as
with a lot of pressures of conflicting stand of well and the most important success is that we have
stakeholders within the polity and public opinion, etc. A constructed an economic infrastructure, a nuclear
political government is more equipped to handle programme, missile programme and many such
pressures because of its legitimacy. Military governments monumental structures in the past 57 years. Coming to
do not have legitimacy and thus they are more diplomacy, I feel there have been many significant
susceptible to external pressures. successes in diplomacy as well e.g. the Liaqat-Nehru
pacts of 1951, Geneva Accord, etc. Similarly Simla
There is a national consensus in Pakistan that we have to Accord was Pakistan's diplomacy at its finest. In Prime
stand by our foreign policy and stand by the people of Minister Benazir Bhutto's term Pakistan played a vital role
Kashmir and we must struggle for justice. My differences in Bosnia Herzegovina. In Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's
arise on the whole approach of letting loose jihadi term, Lahore Declaration is a success of Pakistan's
organisations in Pakistan. That undermines our case. I diplomacy.
have been requesting the military elites not to do this for
a long time. We should let the Kashmiri people fight the Coming to military governments: September 1965 war
war of freedom (jihad) as it is their right but not to was a disaster. In 1971, under yet another military ruler,
privatise jihad by opening jihadi organisations in Pakistan. we lost half the country. Then in 1979-1980, we plunged
We have in the past endangered our own society and into Afghanistan and we were given a pittance of $4
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billion and General Zia-ul-Haq placed the entire nation at

stake. Under the next military General, we again faced the
biggest disaster, i.e. Kargil. This is the record of military
establishment versus the political leadership. The political
leadership has been inclusive of the people's opinion as
opposed to military governments who are exclusive of
their policies. In summation, the more exclusive a
country's foreign policy, the greater the dangers to
country's interests whereas the more inclusive the foreign
policy is, the greater the success of the foreign policy will
be.
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Comments by
Session Chair

I n his concluding remarks, Mr. Qureshi thanked the
honourable speakers and participants for their
sharing of views and a valuable interaction on the
issue in the session.
He said that in established democracies, Parliaments play

a role in steering and guiding the executive in formulation
of foreign policy. Parliaments keeps a check on the
executive such is found in the examples of Hutton
Commission and 9/11 investigations, etc. Similarly, he
believed, India had set up a committee that made a report
about the failures in Kargil and presented it to the
Parliament. Such reports if presented to the Parliament
help to clarify the issue and allow the Parliament to assert
itself in a more effective manner, he added.
Mr. Qureshi believed that a time has come where we the

Parliamentarians, through building a consensus, need to
start an effective campaign towards strengthening the
role of the Parliament and its standing committees. In
many ways, this role is already defined in the constitution
and the Parliamentarians by being united need to exert
their powers and the responsibility that is enshrined in the
Constitution, he concluded.
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Session 7
Executive Summary
S ession 7 explored the relationship between economic diplomacy and the role of foreign office. Chaired by Former
Federal Finance and Foreign Minister, Mr. Sartaj Aziz, the session's main speaker was Director Economic Coordination,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Asad M. Khan.
The session highlighted the diplomatic role of the foreign office concerning the economic development of the country in
relation to other ministries of finance and commerce. The realities of the new world demanded that a coherent, well
coordinated negotiating strategy is required to effectively articulate and realise Pakistan's trade and economic objectives. To
achieve these, intensification and institutionalisation of inter-ministerial coordination is required.
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Economic Diplomacy and

the Role of Foreign Office
Dr. Asad M. Khan

Director General
Economic Coordination
Ministry of Foreign Affairs E xplaining the role of the foreign office at the
outset of his presentation, Mr. Asad M. Khan said
that the foreign office acts as Pakistan's window
to the outside world. He said that objectives of a foreign
office include formulating of advice to the government on
foreign policy issues and strategy, implementing the
policy, promoting national interests abroad, countering
hostile activities through external linkages, safeguarding
and promoting Pakistan's political, economic and trade
interests, projecting and preserving Pakistan's image as a
progressive, moderate, democratic responsible nation
and protecting and serving the country's compatriots
abroad.
Diplomacy in general terms is the art of conducting

international relations. A dynamic and vibrant economy is
a critical and important determinant of national security.
He said that in his context, a functional definition of
economic diplomacy would imply the following: 'Securing
enhanced and predictable access for national products to
other export markets, securing greater Foreign Direct
Investment inflows, reducing foreign debt and securing
enhanced development assistance on concessional
terms and lastly generating employment opportunities
abroad for Pakistan's skilled and unskilled labour force.'
He said that the key players in existing distribution of
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work in the government to protect and promote Pakistan's Comparing regionalism versus multilateralism, he said
economic interests abroad are: Ministry of Finance, that neither theory nor evidence provides a robust guide
Economic Affairs and Revenue Division; Ministry of to the choice between regionalism and multilateralism,
Commerce, Ministry of Labour, Manpower and Overseas narrowing down the topic to Pakistan's regional pursuits
Pakistanis, Investment Division and the Ministry of which include agreement on SAFTA, ECOTA, TPS-OIC,
Foreign Affairs. etc. The objective of all these pursuits is to enhance the
welfare of the people by ensuring that comparative
Mr. Khan explained that the functions of the Ministry of advantage work to their advantage through reduction in
Finance, Economic Affairs and Revenue Division are to consumer prices and with only limited trade diversion, he
advise on economic and financial policies, negotiate and added.
coordinate for external economic assistance and
economic cooperation with other countries, secure Discussing the allocation of trade-related personnel in
technical assistance for Pakistan from foreign Pakistani missions abroad, Mr. Khan said that Pakistan
governments and organisations and deal with matters has 103 representative missions abroad with the majority
relating to Pakistan's technical assistance to foreign being two person missions. Out of the total cadre
countries. Ministry of Commerce's functions include strength of 406 officers of the Foreign Ministry, 254
negotiating treaties, agreements, protocols and foreign service career professionals are deployed in these
conventions with other countries and international missions. He believed that there is a need to develop
agencies bearing on trade and commerce and promotion close partnership between the foreign office, the sectoral
of foreign trade including trade offices abroad, trade ministries and the private sector to optimally utilise
delegations to and from abroad, overseas trade Pakistan's limited resources.
exhibitions and conferences and committees connected
with foreign trade. Upon conclusion, Mr. Asad M. Khan opined that if need
be, necessary changes should be made in the rules of
The role of the foreign office, as laid out in the rules of business to reflect and take into account the new needs
business, is that the foreign office is consulted on all and demands on the government in general and Foreign
matters which affect the foreign policy of Pakistan, or the Ministry in particular. Welcoming the establishment of the
conduct of its foreign relations which also include Task Force on Trade Diplomacy with representation from
Pakistan's external-economic relations. He said that it is Commerce and Foreign Office and the creation of WTO
the overall responsibility of the foreign office to maintain Council which provides the necessary framework for
relations and dealings with other countries. inter-ministerial Coordination on WTO issues, Mr. Asad
M. Khan still believed that there is a further need to
In the post cold war era, there were new challenges and intensify and institutionalise inter-ministerial coordination
opportunities for the foreign office, said Mr. Asad M. in the area of economic diplomacy.
Khan. There was an entire shift from geo-politics to geo-
economics. Furthermore, the world saw the Please refer to Appendix L for the complete presentation.
establishment of WTO and integrated treatment of trade,
development and other related issues including finance,
technology, investment and sustainable development.
However, post 9/11 scenario has shifted the focus back
to the political dimension of issues such as terrorism,
weapons of mass destruction proliferation, furthering
democracy and civil rights. He said that Pakistan required
a coherent and well-coordinated negotiating strategy to
effectively articulate and realise Pakistan's trade and
economic objectives at the World Trade Organisation
(WTO).
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Comment Question
Syed Naveed Qamar Ms. Fauzia Wahab
MNA (NA-222, Hyderabad-V, PPPP) MNA (NA-311, Women Sindh-IV, PPPP)
There is a need for coordination amongst the various I am glad that there is an economic coordination desk in
ministries, and more importantly, there is a need for the foreign office. What stand have you taken against the
capacity-building of the various ministries to deal with brain drain of our youth? Have there been measures
this issue. We need to determine if international taken to develop the skill of our manpower and to export
agreements are indeed favourable for us. We need this skilled manpower?
extensive research and analysis before we sign an
international agreement. What is the progress regarding Question
SAFTA and non-tariff barriers. Mr. Omar Ayub Khan
Question
Mr. Farid Ahmad Piracha To date the data that comes out of the bureau of statistics
MNA (NA-121, Lahore-IV, MMAP) is not analysed. We do not have the tools or the
manpower to conduct studies. The commissions that
For the past few years as well as at present, our foreign have been instituted to carry out these studies (academic
investments have decreased and Mr. Shaukat Aziz has institutions) are not equipped with the quantitative
admitted to this fact on the floor of the National background either. My question is that how can we send
Assembly. In Pakistan, over 54 million people are living our trained manpower abroad in the presence of acts
below the poverty line. Our industry is in a deplorable such as the Patriot Act in the US? The bureaucracy is not
state. I request you to identify what we have gained as a helping matters by being unwilling to export skilled
result of the shift in our policy after 9/11. Kindly also give manpower. Do you raise these concerns with your
your comments regarding anti-dumping. counterparts?
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Question stressed and for that the foreign policy has been used as
Ambassador (Retd.) Javid Husain a tool by most of these countries from which we require
market access. Thus foreign office's role becomes
In view of our existing governmental system and rules of paramount for Pakistan too. Is there any kind of a
procedure, the role of the foreign office is that of programme or funding requirement which the foreign
coordination and providing a strategic perspective to the ministry has requested the ministry of finance in its
ministries. Is the foreign office performing these tasks, annual development plan in the forthcoming budget?
and what steps are being taken by the foreign office to
build its capacity to enable it to perform these tasks? Question
Sahibzada Mian Jalil Ahmed Sharqpuri
Question MNA (NA-132, Sheikhupura-II, PML)
Makhdoom Syed Ahmad Alam Anwar
MNA (NA-192, R.Y.Khan-I, PML) Are there any exports or any other targets set for our
commercial attachés and labour attachés? What checks
The implementation of our decisions is extremely slow. and balances system is present if they fail to meet their
We have not yet been able to decide the number of targets?
multinational corporations that would be operational in
Pakistan; how many of these are willing to invest in Dr. Asad M. Khan
Pakistan and how successful have our missions been to Director General Economic Coordination
encourage them to invest here? Secondly, our foreign
exchange earnings can increase tremendously if our I agree with Syed Naveed Qamar's observation regarding
agricultural products are developed and exported. the lack of capacity-building. I think we need to think
seriously about how to go about building our capacity.
Comment We must remember that government alone cannot do all
Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi the research; the bureaucracy is not equipped nor meant
Defence & Political Analyst to carry out the business of institutions. It is the
academic institutions and the specific research
I feel that there are two main issues that need attention institutions attached to the ministries which are
here. Firstly, we cannot only focus on the structure; we responsible for carrying out this research. As regards
also need to focus on the dynamics. Moreover, we need SAFTA, I have attended every single meeting regarding
to focus more on external dynamics instead of internal SAFTA. The real negotiations regarding SAFTA have not
dynamics. The question here is that what has been the even started yet. Once they commence, we will talk about
role of the economic diplomacy in our situation; was this non-tariff barriers. I agree that we need to have more
diplomacy adopted by design or by default after 9/11. It research and that such input needs to come from
is also important to understand the demarcation of roles everyone.
of economic diplomacy and the military.
As I stated in the beginning of my presentation, I will not
Question be passing any value judgment. I think that the speed of
Makhdum Khusro Bakhtyar debt-reduction has been reduced. Our exports have
MNA (NA-194, R.Y.Khan-III, PML) increased, although the report of this quarter fails to live
up to the standard created by previous reports. It is
As you have rightly pointed out, my observation and important for us to address the basic issues. Debt is not
question is that post-Cancun, our agricultural subsidy the only issue here. We can be a very weak country even
issue, which is one of our strengths in gaining market at zero level debt or at higher levels of debt. I think we
access for agricultural products, does not have a realistic have improved our overall image, for example regarding
and realisable time frame. Therefore the focus towards terrorism, etc. As regards Basmati anti-dumping, let me
regional trade and bilateral trade order needs to be clarify that anti-dumping against us has not been levied
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against basmati, but against bed-linen. Anti-dumping is a

technical process. We were able to extend our deadlines
but we have not been able to meet these new deadlines
either.
It is difficult to monitor and quantify the statistical results.

Also, it is difficult to measure the role of our policies in
the results achieved. The foreign affairs committee and
our missions abroad have to play an important role
regarding the foreign policy process. Pakistan has to
respond to the needs for regional trade as opposed to
international trade.
We need to evaluate the trade scenario and determine

which countries will prove to be beneficial for us as trade
partners.
We are assigning a very high priority to economic

coordination issues presently. We should have a full-
fledged director in the ministry, who should be assisted
by two or more assistants so that coordination takes
place effectively and professionally. We are trying to
contribute positively to economic coordination. We are
creating institutional linkages with other institutions. You
cannot exclude the ministry of foreign affairs from the
decision-making process. International trade is very open
to everything that helps certain countries, but whenever
we talk of agriculture or skilled manpower, they are not
willing to discuss it.
Graduates and certificate holders from Pakistan are not

recognised in other countries and this creates a problem
when we think of exporting skilled manpower.
In answer to another question, you cannot make policies

unless you have good input and data which is analysed
by qualified people.
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Comments by
Session Chair
Mr. Sartaj Aziz

for Foreign Affairs & Finance M r. Aziz thanked the speaker and the input of the
participants on the issue.
He said that the issues discussed in this session related

to several committees and discussion on this will be
welcomed in the Parliament. He said that people in the
foreign affairs recognise that the quality of manpower is
not up to the mark because the recruitment is not based
on merit. Similarly, in the ministry of foreign affairs, there
is a need to train a large cadre of such people who will
not leave after gaining their experience. India follows this
policy rigorously. He said that there is an urgent need for
better specialisation and more training. For this purpose
the private sector must also be involved in this process.
In the end he suggested that a large number of working
groups of professionals and experts can be set up for
these specialised subjects for the particular use of
different ministries.
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Session 8
Executive Summary
S ession 8 was the last session of the short course and focused on the Appraisal of Pakistan's Foreign Policy. The
session was moderated by Mr. Abdul Sattar, Former Foreign Minister of Pakistan. Appraisal of the policy was
presented in a panel discussion by the Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan H.E. Mr. Shivshankar Menon, the British
High Commissioner to Pakistan H.E. Mr. Mark Lyall Grant and the Political Counselor US Embassy in Pakistan, Mr. Larry
Robinson.
The panel of speakers analysed various aspects of Pakistan's foreign Policy with special emphasis on its relations towards
India. Views of the three speakers carried a consensus that Pakistan needed to formulate its foreign policy through an
improved and politically inclusive process to reflect multi-partisan support and internal dynamics. Moreover, their views
echoed that Pakistan's policy needed an independent prism free of its India-centric approach.
The panel also answered questions of the participating parliamentarians that mainly related to various aspects of emerging
détente between Pakistan and India relations and the pros and cons of the pre-emptive posture of the current US policy
towards countering terrorism.
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Comments by
Session Moderator
Mr. Abdul Sattar

I n his opening statement, Mr. Abdul Sattar

emphasised that the purpose of the short course
organised by PILDAT has been to provide cutting
edge training on foreign policy process for all
participants. For the benefit of the panel of speakers, Mr.
Sattar summed-up the three-day proceedings of the short
course highlighting that in depth discussions on various
aspects of the foreign policy have taken place over the
period of these days which would benefit all the
participants. The course has helped the opening and
analysis of a lot of closed chapters for the benefit of
parliamentarians, he added.
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Short Course on
Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Appraisal
H. E. Mr. Shivshankar Menon

M r. Shivshankar Menon thanked PILDAT for

inviting him to speak at the short course
commenting that the very fact that an Indian
High Commissioner is invited to address Parliamentarians
to give his appraisal of Pakistan's foreign policy indicates
a welcome change and a spring time that the relationship
between Pakistan and India is experiencing. He said that
the topic made him think that how does one appraise
another country's foreign policy. It would be easy to say
that a foreign policy is good if it coincides with one's
views and wishes, and bad if it does not. This is what
many newspaper columnists do, he quipped. But on a
serious note, foreign policy is judged by its goals and a
broader set of objective criteria, he added, as at the most
general level, all states seek the twin- linked goals of
security and prosperity. Presumably, the goals a country
sets for its own foreign policy should contribute to its
security and prosperity, he said.
He believed that to answer the question of whether

Pakistan's foreign policy has contributed to Pakistan's
security and prosperity, Pakistanis themselves are the
best judges of that. He believed that he does not consider
himself qualified to answer that question as his view
would reflect India's perspective of Pakistan's foreign
policy.
Mr. Menon opined that as far as Pakistan's security is

concerned, if Pakistan is today less secure than before, it
is hardly due to its foreign policy alone. He said that we
live in an increasingly dangerous world. “Unless you
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posit eternally hostile neighbours for Pakistan, which for foreign policy formulation is often neglected, and left to a
obvious reasons I do not, Pakistan has several locational small group who think they know best. Foreign policy is
and other advantages which could help her to achieve one case where process actually affects substance and
relative security in a web of cooperative political relations the wider and more democratic the process of policy
in her neighbourhood,” he added. Pakistan is a natural formulation, the better it is eventually. Otherwise, there is
link between Southern Asia and Central Asia and with a risk that people's wishes and expectations diverge
West Asia. He said that the question that arises is that widely from the regime's foreign policy.
whether Pakistan's Afghan and India policies leveraged
those benefits to Pakistan's advantage. Most Indians find Mr. Menon praised that Pakistan is fortunate to have
it hard to understand Pakistan's past support to the diplomats and officials of the highest international calibre
Taliban and obsession with Jammu and Kashmir. A single that Pakistan can choose to utilise to the best advantage.
point or limited foreign policy goal may make for However, “The setting of foreign policy goals cannot be
operational simplicity and therefore for some tactical left just to the professionals, no matter how good, since
advantage, but it is strategically limiting, he believed. policy decisions are essentially political choices, best
made by parliamentarians like you,” he concluded.
As for the second goal of prosperity, all South Asians
have been guilty, to differing degrees, of missing out on
the stimulating effects of regional integration and
cooperation, he said. “Putting politics first has hurt our
economies,” he said, but despite that it seems we are
capable of learning from experience. During the 1990s,
economic link and integration of the rest of south Asia
increased exponentially. The exception to the regional
trend was Pakistan, whose degree of integration with the
region actually diminished. In the 1990s, India-Pakistan
trade remained stagnant while India's trade was
approximately 30% of total trade within SAARC. However,
a decade later, though total trade between SAARC
countries had increased 2.7 times, trade between India
and Pakistan had not increased appreciably, he explained.
“Nor have we managed to leverage Pakistan's position as
the link between energy sources in central and west Asia
and the growing demand in south Asia into long-term
arrangements to mutual benefit,” adding that he hoped
this mistake will not be repeated in this century.
In conclusion, he said that while he was not able to give a

clear yes or no answer to evaluate the success of
Pakistan's foreign policy, nonetheless he drew two
lessons from the experience. Firstly, foreign policy is too
often blamed for the results of internal and other actions
and choices. He had often heard Pakistani friends
bemoan Pakistan's image in the world as extremist and
fundamentalist but “any foreign policy is only as good as
the polity it represents,” he added.
Secondly, he expressed that even in democratic societies,
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H.E. Mr. Mark Lyall Grant

M r. Grant thanked PILDAT for inviting him to

share his views with the group of
participating parliamentarians. He believed
that foreign policy of a country is a function of its internal
dynamics including economic power, political consensus
and internal challenges faced by it. He believed that one
cannot be separated from the other and the UK
experience has also been the same that the foreign policy
challenges it faces are a direct reflection of internal
challenges faced by the British society. As a simple
manifestation of that, he explained, the British High
Commission in Islamabad has 10 different British
Government departments represented here as its is not
just a foreign office embassy but a British Government
High Commission. Likewise, he believed, the influence
and power projection reflects the internal dynamics of a
country.
Looking at Pakistan's foreign policy from this perspective,

Mr. Grant said that there are certain inherent advantages
of Pakistan in terms of its foreign policy included its geo-
strategic position and size; nuclear capability and its
professional arms forces.
However, Pakistan's vision shows an inconsistency as to

what kind of country Pakistan wants to be and what are
its policies and position in the global context, he said.
This inconsistency, he added, is just not specific to
Pakistan; rather this is an ongoing debate in Britain as
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well. No individual or nation has a perfect, clear vision of repairing Pakistan's image is made as a sufficiently high
its destination but this is a debate that needs to be priority for embassies overseas. He believed that this
discussed by all sections of the society. issue could be tackled with more vigour and priority
through using cultural manifestations, supporting links
To him, the second issue Pakistan faces is the lack of through government-sponsored visits by bringing
political consensus and democracy. In Britain, he said, it influential opinion-formers such as journalists and travel
is a tradition that foreign policy is bi-partisan, which agents, etc., to Pakistan to see the country for what it is.
means that when the Leader of the Opposition goes He said that he was always struck by the visitors from
oversees, he does not criticise Britain's foreign policy UK who come to Pakistan and they go away with a very
even though he may be fundamentally opposed to certain different image than what they came with, adding that
aspects of it, as otherwise, it weakens the country's Pakistan needed to capitalise on this direct contact with
influence oversees. The stronger the democratic political the society which bridges the huge gap that is there about
base of a policy, stronger the influence Pakistan will have Pakistan in its image abroad and the reality on the
overseas, he commented. ground.
The third area, he said is economics. He quipped that the In the end, he emphasised that there are five constant
US is the most influential country in its foreign policy foreign policy priorities for any country: neighbours; trade
terms not because of its diplomats, or because of the and investment partners and donor partners for
quality of its foreign policy, but because it is economically developing countries; international institutions; major
the most powerful country. A country has to be World powers and the like-minded countries. Pakistan
economically strong in order to have international needs to focus on these priorities, he believed. The
influence. Pakistan has to be economically strong and its neighbours are absolutely vital and he said that he was
international influence will increase directly in proportion surprised at the lack of coordination in the sub-continent
to the strength of its economy. which has been hugely damaging for Pakistan, more so
than it has been for India. India-Pakistan used to be 60
Fourthly, he believed that coherence and consistency are per cent in the 1950s and is now less than 1 ½ per cent
important factors in foreign policy in terms of the in Pakistan's trade. The fact that regional organisations in
decision-making process behind it. He believed that the Africa are more powerful than the SAARC is really
UK is a better example than the US in terms of co- surprising, he added. Seen from the British Government's
ordination of policies between different agencies and perspective, we see Pakistan's interest very strongly in
stakeholders. There needs to be input from the de-hyphenating itself from India politically but re-
Parliament, the civil society, academia and the security hyphenating itself with India economically, he
agencies in formulating foreign policy. He said he was not emphasised. He said that too much of Pakistan's foreign
fully convinced if this fully reflects the situation in policy is seen through the prism of India: even Pakistan's
Pakistan, where there are a number of different, possibly Afghanistan and Iran policies are seen through the prism
not competing but certainly not entirely coordinated, of India which is not right, he opined. It gives a distorted
poles of foreign policy with the presidency, the Army, the backdrop to the formulation of foreign policy and leads to
intelligence agencies, the ministry of foreign affairs and a lack of self-worth. The fact that Pakistan is one of the
now the National Security Council. Coordination is 7th or the 8th largest countries of the world, does not
important so that different signals are not sent overseas come out self-evidently from the confidence of the
that weaken the country's stance abroad. political establishment and the foreign policy
establishment as the country is constantly comparing
Mr. Grant said that another important issue is of the itself with India which is second largest country with the
image as Pakistan has certainly suffered from a poor world, he said.
image. That image is gradually being repaired but can
more be done to tackle that, he questioned. He said he
was not sure if the internal policy makers thought that
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Mr. Larry Robinson

Political Counselor,
US Embassy
M r. Robinson said that he brought greetings
from the US Ambassador Nancy Powell who
had some long-standing engagements and he
was representing her.
Endorsing the earlier views on Pakistan's foreign policy

presented by the two high commissioners, Mr. Larry
Robinson said that the process of emerging from colonial
rule brings with it some baggage which the US also
experienced for well over a hundred years after its
independence from the British. He said he witnessed this
in Ireland as well. His analysis of the countries which
have been under colonial rule led him to believe that all
such countries have a tendency to blame their problems
on colonisation. Similarly, he believed, the trauma of
colonialism and trauma of partition continues to play a
part in the mindset of Pakistan and India. Reiterating what
Ambassador Grant earlier said, he said that Pakistan has
tremendous economic potential, human resources and
military power and it should not constantly compare itself
to India and feel small or inferior, believed Mr. Robinson.
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Mr. Robinson said that in looking at the overall foreign coordinated decision-making process whereby input of
policy of Pakistan, he sees very significant strengths and different agents of the political structure are sought and
significant but remediable weaknesses. Agreeing with the incorporated into policies.
earlier remarks of the two high commissioners on the
quality of Pakistani diplomats, he said he has been Looking at the history of Pakistan-US relations, he said
tremendously impressed with the quality of diplomats he that the two countries have often enjoyed quite intimate,
has interacted with over the last five years. He believed but never very easy relations. In the time of a crisis,
that the co-ordination of Pakistan's policy within the Pakistan and US subordinated areas of disagreements to
government is also good, but it leaves much to be over-arching strategic exigency and when the crisis
desired in terms of its coordination with the Parliament. passed, the differences tended to always bubble-up. This
The single-mindedness and focus of Pakistan's foreign created the perception in Pakistan that US always used
policy over the past few decades has been very Pakistan and then walked away, but the US saw it
impressive, yet in a broader sense, dysfunctional, he differently; as it always saw Pakistan doing a number of
added. things that were thought to be unfortunate and bad
decisions on the part of Pakistani governments. On a
Agreeing with the British High Commissioner, he said that personal basis, he believed, US and Pakistani officials
Pakistan's foreign policy has been too indo-centric in have always gotten along well and have had easier and
nature which is an inhibition similar to that the Republic more comfortable relations than those that US officials
of Ireland had for many years thinking of itself smaller enjoyed with their Indian counterparts. But on an official
and inferior compared to its larger neighbour UK. Today, level, the unfortunate syndrome developed in which US
he said Ireland, has a higher per-capita income than the asked Pakistan that it would only be able to help Pakistan
UK. He believed that despite the strained relations if it could assure US that it was not doing A, B or C.
between US and the USSR during the cold war period, “Overtime, successive Pakistani governments have learnt
both countries had channels of communication intact that if they provided those assurances, whether or not the
between them but the hostility between Pakistan and India assurances were accurate, that they would get whatever
has resulted in the absence of communication over the they wanted or needed from the US,” he added. The two
past few decades which is debilitating. countries need to work to develop a more, open, honest
and candid relationship with each other overtime to
Another aspect of post-colonial experience, applying to overcome the unfortunate baggage of the past, believed
both India and Pakistan, is that while the two countries Mr. Robinson.
have excellent diplomats, the foreign services of the two
countries, and Indian Administrative Services, look like a Discussing the issue of US relations with Pakistan and
carry-over from the days of the British Raj in terms of India, he said that the current US administration has a
very small number of administrators supervising a vast very strong policy of de-hyphenating US relations with
bureaucracy largely out of the loop of policy. He said that India and Pakistan. US will pursue each relationship on its
he was astonished by the small size of the foreign own terms and merits while continuing to encourage
services of the two countries which need to be expanded India and Pakistan to find ways to normalise and improve
by both the countries to play the role they aspire to play their relations with each other. However, he added, US
in the world. Every country rewards its diplomats for has a problem in doing this with Pakistan because of the
different qualities and it seemed that both Pakistan and confusion in Pakistan on as it is today and with where it
India have been rewarding those diplomats who were is going. There is a perceptual lag in the US, reflected in
most effective in denouncing the other, he said, adding the US and the British Media, of people in the West not
that such a perspective works only if perpetual hostility is appreciating how much Pakistan has changed over the
the ultimate objective in the relationship of the two past several years, he said. Agreeing with the British High
countries. Commission's viewpoint expressed earlier, he believed
that there was a need in Pakistan both for the foreign
Mr. Robinson believed that Pakistan needs a better office and the legislators, not just in terms of a public
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relations exercise, but to explain to Western Media and

Western legislatures how far Pakistan has come, what
are the policies of its government and where does
Pakistan see itself going. Whether or not Pakistan can
achieve non-partisanship of its foreign policy overseas,
as the United States is still grappling with this, he
quipped, any time a legislator goes overseas, he or she
represents the country of Pakistan as well as a political
party; but there is a stronger need in the West to
understand the country of Pakistan than the party a
legislator represents, he advised.
Upon conclusion, he said that that the sense of what

Pakistan is and what it wants to be is the source of all
government policy. He said he watched with great
fascination the debate going on within Parliament and the
country on what Pakistan aims to be. He said it was
necessary for Pakistan to continue this debate and come-
up with best possible consensus from which it can derive
the coherent and consistent policies that could best
impress the world of what Pakistan is and can be.
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Question this reason that we had poor relationships with the
Ms. Fauzia Wahab democratic governments. Then again due to Kargil war
MNA (NA-311, Women Sindh-IV, PPPP) and nuclear tests we were forced to re-engage with India
and Pakistan. Coming to the present times, our relations
We have noticed from 1958 onwards that the US has with President Musharraf in the beginning were not good
been very supportive of non-democratic forces in but due to changing circumstances and war on terror
Pakistan. It has been more supportive of the military things changed. We have good relations with Pakistan not
rulers in Pakistan as compared to the political leadership. because its lead by a military ruler but in spite of that.
It is for this reason that we should put the blame of our Our top priority is to counter terrorism. Relations with
current mess on the shoulders of the US. military rules are a result of global imperatives.
Answer Question
Mr. Larry Robinson Syed Haider Abbas Rizvi
Political Counselor, US Embassy MNA (NA-244, Karachi-VI, MQM)
I have observed this myself and it seems that our overall Under this new vision of Pakistan-India relations, the core
relations with Pakistan do seem to have been better with issues of the well being of the common man are still
military rulers than democratic governments. But this is uncertain. What is the real truth behind this new
not because US supports and approves of dictatorships. emerging relationship between India and Pakistan? What
Our relations with Pakistan have been up and down over is happening on the Khokhrapar Monabao border?
the decades. We lost interest in South Asia in the 1950s.
However, we re-engaged in the 1960s. Then again we Answer
had poor relations with Pakistan in the late 1970s at the H.E. Mr. Shivshankar Menon
time of the military takeover but that was overwhelmed Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan
by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. When the
occupation ended, all the problems resurfaced. It is for I feel that people should benefit from improved relations
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between the two countries. On Khokhrapar Monabao Answer

border issue, it is a logistical difficulty. Each side will do H.E. Mr. Shivshankar Menon
what it has to. We have to build the roads and that will Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan
take time. We need to look at what we achieved in the last
one year. We need to learn to work with each other, rather Within a month or so we will have a road map of the
than blame each other. meetings between the two countries. As far as the
Chenab issue is concerned, it is too early to comment on
Comment which formula will be considered and which will not be
Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi considered.
Former Federal Minister Question
Mr. Farid Ahmad Piracha
I'm somewhat disappointed to hear that the sole- MNA (NA-121, Lahore-IV, MMAP)
superpower does not have a clear-cut policy vis-à-vis
Pakistan. That the US foreign policy is dependent on My question is to H.E. Mr. Mark Lyall Grant. Do you agree
international events that either force the U.S. to engage with the doctrine of pre-emption which is the cornerstone
with Pakistan or distract US away from Pakistan. of US present foreign policy and do you justify this pre-
emption under any jurisprudence of human rights?
I have also been asked to convey a feeling of my Secondly, to Mr. Shivshankar Menon, as Kashmir is a
colleagues on their behalf. First of all, on behalf of my core issue, without solving the Kashmir issue how can
colleagues, I really appreciate the presence of High we achieve peace between India and Pakistan?
Commissioner Grant and High Commissioner Menon. But
I would also like to highlight the disappointment we all Answer
share for the US Ambassador not being here. She is a H.E. Mr. Mark Lyall Grant
good friend of ours and of our country and we feel her British High Commissioner to Pakistan
presence would have been very useful on this forum. We
would like Mr. Robinson to convey this to her. There has been a change in international jurisprudence
over sovereignty. The world has become a lot more inter-
Answer dependent in the recent times. We have realised the
Mr. Larry Robinson weaknesses of the old concept of sovereignty and one of
Political Counselor, US Embassy its examples is Rwanda. You can argue about whether
coalition in Iraq or coalition in Afghanistan is legitimate or
I will be happy to convey that to Ambassador Powell and illegitimate but as a British government we argue that
again express her regrets for not being able to be here those actions were justified. Afghanistan is a classic case
today. where Taliban government was nurturing and supporting
Al-Qaeda which is a terrorist movement and was
Question threatening the interests of many countries, particularly
Ms. Aasiya Azeem America.
MNA (NA-285, Women Punjab-XIII, PML)
Answer
Why is the dialogue between the governments of India H.E. Mr. Shivshankar Menon
and Pakistan so slow and not clear? Secondly, is the Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan
Chenab formula still under consideration?
We have not really addressed the issue of Kashmir
properly. We are now committed to talking about the
Kashmir issue and resolving it. The process of
communication has to continue. It is important that the
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Kashmiri people are satisfied with the decisions that are Question
ultimately taken. Mr. Omar Ayub Khan
Question
Ms. Sherry Rehman The draft of the Agra Summit was developed by the
MNA (NA-309, Women Sindh-II, PPPP) Foreign Service but the Prime Minister of India said that it
was not the right time. Does the Prime Mister of India
My first question is addressed to Mr. Mark Lyall Grant. have the force to tip the balance on one side, so that
The image of Pakistan is also a production of the western some sort of the settlement can be reached?
media. They always focus on the negative and never on
the positive indicators emerging out of Pakistan. Answer
Secondly I would like to address Mr. Menon. Pakistan is H.E. Mr. Shivshankar Menon
now becoming India-centric in a more positive manner. Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan
We need to go beyond trade, travel and cricket in order to
resolve serious issues between the two countries. My The Indian Prime Minister enjoys a popular mandate in
question is that is the peace process sustainable? With the country, so he will have the mandate to reach peace
the elections in India, there may be a derailment of the with Pakistan. In our country, popular mandate is the
peace process. Do you sense a consensus across the most powerful force to reach on decisions.
political divide in India regarding the commitment to the
peace process? Kashmir is an issue and needs to be Question
dealt with. Do you see a breakthrough on that front in the Syed Naveed Qamar
next year or so? Lastly, do you see the Huriyat MNA (NA-222, Hyderabad-V, PPPP)
Conference in Kashmir reuniting and emerging?
What is the benchmark by which the Indian public and
Answer the government see a solution of the Kashmir Issue?
H.E. Mr. Mark Lyall Grant What solution will be satisfactory for the Indians?
Answer
I agree about the media projecting a certain image of H.E. Mr. Shivshankar Menon
Pakistan. We need to use diaspora to project a positive Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan
image of Pakistan. High Commissioners and diplomats
can also influence a country's image. The foreign policy I cannot go through the solutions on this platform.
machinery can invite influential journalists to improve the However, our goal is a peaceful and durable relationship
image of Pakistan. with Pakistan and that is the benchmark. We do not need
a very rigid definition. We need to take responsibility for
Answer what we need to do. We need to give this whole process
H.E. Mr. Shivshankar Menon an environment where the process has a chance to
Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan succeed. People in India want peace and interaction with
the Pakistani's. They share a lot of common factors
Yes the peace process is sustainable. The Indian which is clear from the fact that in most Indian cities, you
elections will not affect this process. There is a can see Pakistani channels.
consensus on this across the spectrum. Indians have
more direct economic concerns. India's priorities have Question
changed over the last decade. The people realise that Mr. Ishaq Khan Khakwani
there are economic benefits to peace in the region. We MNA (NA-168, Vehari-II, PML)
cannot set any time tables for the issue to resolve until
we start engaging. It is unfortunate that external forces have to come and
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help us resolve our issues. We must do it ourselves. Question

Could you explain the response of New Delhi on the non- Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi
NATO alignment of Pakistan? Why was the reaction so MNA (NA-148, Multan-I, PPPP)
negative? Former Federal Minister
Answer Does the government of India know that there is a huge

H.E. Mr. Shivshankar Menon constituency for peace in Pakistan? If there is no
Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan movement in talks, this constituency will be put at a
disadvantageous position? Moreover, is there a
I do not know why you describe it as hostile. I will send realisation in the US that the gap between the people of
you a copy of what was actually said. I can understand Pakistan and the Government of Pakistan regarding the
Larry feeling peeved about it because basically what was US is widening? Are you doing something to bridge this
said was why didn't you [US] tell us [India] two days ago gap?
when you were here. Frankly what Pakistan does with the
US is Pakistan's business and the US' business. The Answer
media perhaps exaggerated the whole reaction. You see I H.E. Mr. Mark Lyall Grant
feel we should be talking about these issues. We have British High Commissioner to Pakistan
almost no communication. It is lack of communication
that really is the source of the trouble. At the moment we I have been asked questions on terrorism and I think that
take every opinion written in Indian media to be the Indian no cause can justify killing innocent people. We as part of
opinion and what's written in Pakistan as the Pakistani the international community have to take responsibility to
opinion. The Indian reaction was not terribly hostile. deal with the roots of terrorism. It is very easy to fall into
the culture of victimisation. It is important not to fall into
Comment this trap. It is inequality and injustice that cause terrorism.
Mian Shamim Haider
MNA (NA-135, Sheikhupura-V, PML) Answer
H.E. Mr. Shivshankar Menon
Pakistan has done a lot to eradicate terrorism. We believe Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan
that Pakistan is going to be a moderate state. However
terrorism can not be eliminated unless you remove its Regarding nuclear talks, we are ready to discuss these
roots. I believe that the governments of UK and US have issues with the government of Pakistan. Furthermore, the
to play their role in order to remove this causes and roles. government of India realises that there is a constituency
for peace. We will work with that constituency in India as
Comment well as in Pakistan.
Makhdum Khusro Bakhtyar
MNA (NA-194, R.Y.Khan-III, PML) Answer
Mr. Larry Robinson
I would like Mr. Menon to reiterate that there is a realistic Political Counselor, US Embassy
possibility that a time frame for the resolution of all
outstanding issues including the issue of Kashmir will be The widening gap between people and the government of
formulated when the foreign ministers or secretaries meet US is visible but I see that gap only in the media and the
in June-July 2004 so that the fear and suspicions on both Islamabad elite. It is not really present in the rest of the
sides are eliminated that both sides would not wait for a country. Yes, I agree that there is dissatisfaction regarding
more opportune time vis-à-vis their bitter bargain US policy yet there is friendliness towards Americans.
positions. So a time frame should be set in the near The opinion polls do not reflect a gap between the people
future as this will create a better atmosphere. and the government. As far as the role of the media is
concerned, in most countries there is a media
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conventional wisdom that is resistant to change. We I noticed was that there is a visible change in Delhi as
encourage the media to report positive things. regards to their attitude towards Pakistani delegates. We
have come a long way in promoting enough political will
Comment in Delhi and Islamabad driving towards peace. President
Dr. Ayesha Siddiqua General Pervez Musharraf has shown a political wisdom
Security Analyst as well as political will in moving forward. As soon as
there was some normalisation of relations, the civil
Pakistan's India-centricity is definitely a problem. There is society of India and Pakistan has suddenly seen the value
a concern here that a stronger India is a threat to of peace in South Asia. One only hopes for this goodwill
Pakistan's survival. to stay on. I feel Pakistan has fulfilled its part of
commitment of not supporting terrorism. I know there are
Comment no quick solutions but the two negotiating sides need to
Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin continue with the peace initiative.
Visiting Prof. LUMS
The US' current policy of pre-emption is not only coming
President Bush has legitimised six Israeli settlements and for Pakistan but towards the rest of the world as well and
in the process damaged the road map to peace. I am sure diplomats from the State Department have had
Moreover, the British government hailed this decision. many sleepless nights in explaining some of the policies
Why do these governments suffer from internal of President Bush and Prime Minister Blair. But we do
contradictions? You want to eradicate terrorism, yet hope for better relations with United States of America
promote injustice. whom we definitely admire. With Britain too, we do not
have any kind of animosity. We are anglophiles and we
Answer have had a very good relationship with Britain. I thank all
Mr. Larry Robinson three of you to be here on behalf of the group of
Political Counselor, US Embassy parliamentarians.
The Israelis have for the first time decided to withdraw

from the Gaza settlements. History is replete with actions
that are unjust but have to be dealt with. We have to deal
with reality, rather than deal with ideal solutions. For the
first time ever, we have accepted and endorsed the
concept of an independent Palestine State.
Comments
I am very happy that our distinguished panellists in this

session responded to questions exactly as I had
expected. I noted with great interest their remarks and
their observations. May I also add here that some very
good relations and traditions have been established. One
of these traditions is that the High Commissioner from
Delhi becomes the foreign secretary in Islamabad and the
High Commissioner from Islamabad becomes the foreign
secretary in Delhi. This is all very wonderful and I wish
the same could be said about the foreign ministers. What
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Synthesis
of the Session
Senator S. M. Zafar
Chairman Senate Functional
Committee on Human Rights
and Chairman PILDAT
Board of Advisors
I share with Mr. Abdul Sattar the thanks he has given
to the three illustrious speakers. These three
diplomats represent three very important countries
that have great significance for Pakistan: we have had
one or the other type of either intimate or uncomfortable
or comfortable and intimate relationship with these
countries. All three speakers have shared with us their
appraisal of Pakistan's foreign policy and we have seen
and learnt that how a diplomat can convey a lot without
saying much on an issue. In a matter of summary, what
I'm carrying with me from their speeches are the
following points.
Firstly, it was said that every country's foreign policy is as

good as its domestic policy. Secondly, foreign policy is a
result of the internal dynamics including its economic
strength. Thirdly, foreign policy is generally seen as a bi-
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partisan issue, meaning thereby that we have to develop Arabia and siding with Muslim causes since its
our foreign policy through national consensus as it helps independence which clearly shows its steadfast approach
in creating its impact abroad. Fourthly, input from civil in foreign policy. The same approach has been shown in
society on the national policy has to be institutionalised. our relationship with China. I was hoping some reference
Fifthly, in the candid appraisal, an Indian focus was will be made to this particularly from our representative
considered the drawbacks of Pakistan's foreign policy. from the US as we have been instrumental in bridging the
Perhaps it is true and the Q&A session indicated that had gap between china and the US at a very crucial juncture
Kashmir issue not been there, maybe Pakistan's policy of history. Pakistan also constantly followed a close
would not have been India-focused. It was also said that relationship with the US. Pakistan has also been steadfast
Pakistan has not settled for itself the role that it has to in its desire and attempt to resolve the issue of Kashmir. I
play in the world. It was also said that USA has been am happy to say that no government in Pakistan has ever
unjustifiably accused for having dropped Pakistan when staggered on this issue.
the interest of America has been served.
As was mentioned that a good foreign policy must look at
It was also mentioned that the US has decided to get two points: prosperity and security of a country. Pakistan
itself engaged with India and Pakistan in a manner that it has unfortunately been feeling insecurity from its
has not done before. It was also said that USA intends to neighbour. On account of that it adopted a policy by
have a more open honest, workable and sustainable which it can secure itself. One of the reasons to be pro-
relationship with Pakistan. We thought it was like always US was due to that.
but it is good to hear that this stance is there in the US
now. Also gratifying was to hear that the solution of Lastly, an important point raised here was of the image of
Kashmir issue is and will be on the negotiation table. We Pakistan. I would like to say that if any other country
hope that the peace card in India in the hands of BJP other than Pakistan kept 3 million refugees in such
government makes the party win the election. comfort as Pakistan did, allowing them to move
anywhere, that country's image would have been soaring
Another important point was raised by the High high internationally. Also the facts that Pakistan acted as
Commissioner of UK about the doctrine of pre-emption a bridge between China and US and now it is an ally
and dilution of international sovereignty. Although he has against terrorism; it is a moderate Muslim state, with
left and I will privately also share this with him later, I constant evidences of the strong commitment of its
would like to state that as a Pakistani citizen, I feel that people to democracy serve as good example of
the pre-emptive doctrine has made the world a much improving its image abroad.
more dangerous and uncomfortable place. We believe if
the US and the UK revises their policy keeping in view PILDAT, through successfully holding this short course,
what Europe has to say on the issue, it will be far closer has maintained its standard of excellence in conceiving
to what humanity can benefit from. and implementing a stimulating learning and experience-
sharing exercise for legislative strengthening through
It has been good to hear all these comments. It was very getting the right speakers and participants. I sincerely
pleasing that all three speakers have very profusely thank the speakers and am grateful to all participants for
praised our foreign office boys. I am sure that Mr. Sattar their invaluable interaction on such a crucial issue. I am
must be very happy to have heard that. I would now sure every one of the participants and the speakers joins
present my perspective on some of the foreign policy me in conveying my special thanks to the PILDAT team
areas that I believe, as a citizen of Pakistan, we have to that worked behind the scenes to make this course a
offer. success in every aspect. Of course, our special thanks
and accolades are due for the moving spirit behind
Firstly, I believe that Pakistan's foreign policy has followed PILDAT and all its work, Mr. Ahmed Bilal Mehboob under
some constants since the independence of the country. whose management the team excels in its drive towards
Pakistan has shown consistency in friendship with Saudi strengthening democracy in the country.
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Comments by
Session Moderator
Mr. Abdul Sattar
U
Former Foreign Minister pon conclusion of the Q&A/Comments Session,
Mr. Abdul Sattar once again thanked the panel
of distinguished speakers on behalf of PILDAT
as well as the participating parliamentarians for their time
and a valuable interaction with parliamentarians.
He especially thanked participating parliamentarians for

bringing insight into the task that confronts them to
contribute in the foreign policy process. He said that the
dialogue has been largely convergent which is a very
positive sign.
Praising the role of PILDAT as the initiator, organiser and

the facilitator of this short course, Mr. Sattar said that it
was an invaluable effort to provide such a platform where
so many well-learned and competent people were
present to discuss Pakistan's foreign Policy process.
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Concluding Remarks

A t the end of the three day short course on the

Foreign Policy Process in Pakistan, Mr. Ahmed
Bilal Mehboob thanked all speakers and
resource persons and participating parliamentarians for
their keen interest, active interaction and participation that
made the short course a success.
Mr. Mehboob, joined by the group of participants and the

resource persons, also praised the efforts of the PILDAT
team that worked towards the conceptualisation,
organisation and effective facilitation of the short course.
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APPENDIX A
Programme of
the Short Course
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PROGRAMME
Title Time Speaker
Monday Registration of Participants 06:00 - 07:00 pm
April 12, 2004 Welcome remarks and Introduction of the 07:00 - 07:15 pm Mr. Ahmed Bilal Mehboob
Resource Persons Executive Director, PILDAT
Introduction of the Participants 07:30 - 08:15 pm By each participant
Dinner 08:15 - 09:15 pm
Special Session 09:15 - 09: 45 pm Senator Lt. Gen. (Retd.)

How security Considerations Influence Foreign Javed Ashraf Qazi
Policy in Pakistan? Former DG ISI
Q&A/ Comments 09:45 - 10:30 pm
Tuesday Session No 1 10:00 - 10:45 am Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari

An Over-view of Pakistan's Foreign Policy Rizvi
April 13, 2004 Defence & Political Analyst
Session Chair:
Q&A/ Comments 10:45 - 11:35 am
Comments by Session Chair 11:35 - 11:45 am
Session No 2 11:45 - 12: 15 pm Mr. Khursheed Mahmud

Major Foreign Policy Issues facing the country Kasuri
Lunch & Prayer Break 01:30 - 02:00 pm
Session No 3
The Process of Foreign Policy Formulation in
Pakistan
Session Chair:
Presentation on the Process of Foreign Policy 02:00 - 02:10 pm Mr. Javid Husain
Formulation Former Ambassador
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PROGRAMME
Title Time Speaker
Tuesday How Foreign Policy is made in Pakistan 02:10 - 02:40 pm Mr. Shaheen A. Gillani
Add. Sec. Foreign Policy Planning
April 13, 2004 Ministry of Foreign Affairs
How Foreign Policy should be made in Pakistan 02:40 - 03:10 pm Mr. Sartaj Aziz
Former Federal Minister for
Foreign Affairs & Finance
Comments by Session Chair 04:10 - 04:20 pm
Session No 4:
How security Considerations Influence Foreign
Policy in Pakistan?
Session Chair:
Role of Security Agencies in influencing 04:20 - 04: 50 pm Brig. (Retd.) Shaukat Qadir
Foreign Policy in Pakistan and How this Former Vice President IPRI
practice compares with other countries'
04:50 - 05:20 pm Mr. Najmuddin A. Shaikh
practices? Former Foreign Secretary
Comments by Session Chair 06:00 - 06:10 pm
Dinner & Entertainment 08:00 - 10:00 pm
Wednesday Session No 5:
Shaping of Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Three
April 14, 2004 Case Studies
Session Chair:
Dr. Ijaz Shafi Gillani
Case Studies on:
Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Comparisons of 09:00 - 09:15 am Mr. Abdul Sattar

Lahore, Agra and Islamabad Summits Former Foreign Minister
Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Gulf Crisis-1990 Dr. Ayesha Siddiqua

Security Analyst
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PROGRAMME
Title Time Speaker
Wednesday Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Recognition of Taliban 02:10 - 02:40 pm Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin
Visiting Prof. LUMS
April 14, 2004 Panel Discussion: 09:45 - 10:45 am
Mr. Sartaj Aziz
Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi, MNA
Q&A/ Comments: 10:45 - 11:45 am
Comments by Session Chair 11:45 - 11:55 am
Lunch Break 11:55 - 01:30 pm
Session No 6:
Parliament and Foreign Policy
Session Chair:
MNA; Former Federal Minister
Review and analysis of Foreign Policy by the 01:30 - 01:50 pm Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin
parliaments of US, UK, and India Visiting Prof. LUMS
Review and Analysis of Pakistan's Foreign 01:50 - 02:10 pm Mian Abdul Waheed
Policy by the parliament Former Chairman
Foreign Affairs Committee
of National Assembly
Principle Determinants of Pakistan's foreign 02:10 - 02:30 pm Sardar Aseff Ahmed Ali
policy with Special reference to the role of Former Foreign Minister
Parliament
Q&A/Comments 02:30 - 03:30 pm
Comments by Session Chair: 03:30 - 03:40 pm
Session No. 7
Economic Diplomacy and the Role of Foreign 03:40 - 04:10 pm Dr. Asad M. Khan
Office Director General
Economic Coordination
Session Chair:
Mr. Sartaj Aziz
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PROGRAMME
Title Time Speaker
Wednesday Q&A/ Comments 04:10 - 04:50 pm
April 14, 2004 Comments by Session Chair 04:50 - 05:00 pm
Trekking and Tea at Golf Course 05:00 - 07:00 pm
Dinner & Entertainment 09:00 - 10:30 pm
Thursday Session No. 8

April 15, 2004
Session Moderator
Mr. Abdul Sattar
Panel Discussion 10:00 - 11:00 am Panelists:
H. E Mr. Shivshankar Menon

H. E Mr. Mark Lyall Grant

Mr. Larry Robinson

Political Counselor, US Embassy
Synthesis of the Session

By Senator S. M. Zafar 12:00 - 12:10 pm
Comments by Session Moderator 12:10 - 12:20 pm
Concluding Remarks 12:20 - 12:30 pm
Lunch & End of Short Course 12:30 - 01:30 pm
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APPENDIX B
List of Participants
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List of Participants
1 Aasiya Azeem, MNA PML(Q)

2 Farhana Khalid Banoori, MNA MMAP
3 Farid Ahmad Piracha, MNA MMAP
4 Fauzia Wabab, MNA PPPP
5 Ishaq Khan Khakwani, MNA PML(Q)
6 Maimoona Hashmi, MNA PML(N)
7 Makhdoom Ahmad Alam Anwar, MNA PML(Q)
8 Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi, MNA PPPP
9 Makhdum Khusro Bakhtyar, MNA PML(Q)
10 Mian Shamim Haider, MNA PML(Q)
11 Naseer Mohammad Khan, Nazim Charsadda
12 Omar Ayub Khan, MNA PML(Q)
13 Qamar Zaman Kaira, MNA PPPP
14 S. M. Zafar, Senator PML(Q)
15 Sahibzada Mian Jalil Ahmed Sharaqpuri, MNA PML(N)
16 Samia Raheel Qazi, MNA MMAP
17 Sherry Rehman, MNA PPPP
18 Syed Haider Abbas Rizvi, MNA MQM
19 Syed Naveed Qamar, MNA PPPP
20 Syed Nayyer Hussain Baukhari, MNA PPPP
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APPENDIX C
Presentation by
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142
APPENDIX D
Paper by
Senator Lt. Gen. (Retd.)
Javed Ashraf Qazi
Former DG ISI
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How Security Considerations Influence the Formulation of Foreign Policy:

The role of security agencies and how this practice compares with other countries' practices
by
Senator Lt. Gen. (R) Javed Ashraf Qazi
Introduction:
1. Nation states live and prosper within secure borders in accordance with their chosen ideologies/systems. The
national security rests on a tried of defence, economy and internal security. The Government has to formulate a
number of policies to achieve national security. These polices are:
a. Foreign Policy:
To win allies and friends. To support other Govt. policies and ensure their success to enhance national
security.
b. Economic Policy:
To provide sound base for development and defence.
c. Defence Policy:
To ensure security of the state and ensure suitable environments for implementation of other policies.
d. Psychosocial Policy:
To ensure internal harmony and development.
e. Information /Media Policy:

To win mind and ensure successful projection of own policies.
Formulation of Foreign Policy:
2. Ministry of foreign affairs is primarily responsible for formulation of foreign policy options based on various factors
and in accordance with changing environments/requirements. The cabinet approves a policy and the Ministry of
foreign affairs then oversees its implementation.
A major impact into the formulation is provided by intelligence agencies primarily by ISI through various channels.
a. Briefing to the cabinet.
b. Regular reports to foreign office and interaction between various echelons of ISI and MOF both at home
and abroad.
C. Input at JSHQ, Defence Council and Defence Committee of the Cabinet.
Types of Information provided/inputs by intelligence into Foreign Policy
3. The intelligence is provided about all countries of interest whether friendly or hostile. Since there is no permanence
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in relation between states, the only factor, which must dominate all considerations, is National Interest. Friends or
Allies of today can be enemies of tomorrow and vice versa, therefore intelligence agencies have to acquire
intelligence about all neighbors, allies and other countries of interest. It relates to a total picture along with current
developments and future trends. Some aspects covered by intelligence are:
a. Political system, personalities and historical perspective.
b. Economic strength and future prospects.
c. Defence policy, strength, weapon acquisition, and future plans.
d. Relations with other states particularly with Pakistan and policies effecting our interests.
e. Other aspects, which may help in formulation of own foreign policy. It includes actions, which may affect
own internal situations.
4. Security Consideration Affecting Foreign Policy
a. In an era of globalization and common market economies, the national security concerns transcend the
geographical boundaries of a nation. The ensuing threats are not confined to military manifestation alone
but present itself in a variety of nonmilitary fashions. The developed world's urge for greater improvement
in social indices and quality of life has lead to intensive competition for shrinking resources. The resultant
conflict of interests is therefore, likely to revolve around the energy resource centers. Various power
centers around the globe, therefore, articulate their policies and forge regional global alliances to harvest
optimum advantage amidst competing forces.
b. In the post World War II environment, Europe became the center of gravity of politico-economic
development in the world, which resulted in US-Soviet rivalry. The end of cold war brought in an illustrative
change in the world order that remained in a flux owing to crystallization of US strategy, aimed at world
domination as the single most powerful nation in the world. With the passage of time, the European polity
and economy stabilized, resulting in emergence of stable and de-facto united Europe, which increasingly
started challenging the US politico-economic policy precepts. Politico economic stabilization of Europe
and emergence of Asia as the next politico-economic center of gravity however, resulted in US shift from
being Euro-centric to Asia-centric. Long term US politico-economic concerns in Asia range from control
over the world oil sources in the Middle East and Central Asia and their supply routes for sustenance of its
economy to containment of the threat emerging from china and possibly resurgent Islam. With occupation
of Iraq, presence in Afghanistan and other key places in Asia, the United States of America has become a
de-facto regional power which enables her to attain full spectrum domination of the region.
c. 9/11 terrorists' attacks have added new dimensions to the global threat paradigm. International community
lined-up behind the US, with a resolve to route out terrorism, which is likely to haunt the global peace and
stability in more diversified manners. While, the regional players will continue to support the US led
campaign against terrorism, on the geo-political and geo-economic framework, they find themselves at
cross-purpose with the US led nexus. The ensuing clash of interest therefore, is also likely to lead to a
power struggle in this region to garner influence and for greater share in the resources.
d. In this reinvigorated “Great Game”, Pakistan has attained a new found relevance for the US and West. The
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Western propensity for enhanced cooperation with India, due to the advantages of larger Indian market and
US designs to project India as a countervailing factor against rising Chinese power is likely to adversely
affect the conventional asymmetry between India and Pakistan. this is a source of serious concern for us
as Pakistan's threat paradigm essentially remains India-Centric in character. While capitalizing on the
West's leanings, India also continues to benefit from its traditional defence collaboration with Russia. It is
also taking advantage of the anti-Muslim Israeli sentiments, to improve its military skills by collaborating in
training and acquisition of hi-tech equipment.
e. Pakistan has enjoyed strong friendly relations with China. Pursuing her economic goals, China is looking
for stable regional geo-political environment, and has therefore, removed a number of irritants with the
regional countries, including India. Improvement of Sino-Indian relations not withstanding, it assures
Pakistan of its continued traditional friendship and cooperation.
f. The geo-strategic location of Pakistan places it at the economic crossroads of Central Asia. The key factor
in accruing the advantages presented by Central Asian economic opportunities lies in stable Afghanistan.
This is where the Iranian politico-economic interests are at cross-purpose with Pakistan. Iran is also
sensitive to the presence of Pakistani supported US led coalition in Afghanistan and feel that after Iraq they
may be the next target of the US campaign. Taking advantage of such regional sensitivities, the Indians are
exploiting the situation through emerging Russo-Iran-Northern Alliance-Indian nexus. Although, no direct
threat is envisaged from the western border in short term, Indian meddling in Afghanistan, their presence
in the Central Asian States, along with improved relations with Iran, may be viewed as endeavors aimed at
de-factor encirclement of Pakistan
g. In the prevailing global milieu of increasing inter-dependence and awareness of social ethos, the use of
force for conflict resolution will often invoke International recrimination. Economic, diplomatic and political
coercion will instead form part of the security calculus and are likely to be used more aggressively to
achieve the stipulated objectives, short of war.
5. Factors Affecting Security Considerations And Foreign Policy In This Era
The emerging US dictated world order and its objectives
a. Dilution of European politico-economic power base through a divided Europe.
b. Physical domination of Asia in critical areas of politico-economic importance, and proxy support to
neutralize emerging powers in other areas of significance.
c. Garner and sustain the support of key coalition partners in various parts of the globe, in order to project its
combined power in support of its interests through unilateralist pre-emption, while denying other these
measures without US acquiescence.
d. Through selective enforcement of international conventions and regimes on security and economic issues,
dominate/manipulate UN to promote US interests.
e. Link provision of economic, technological and military assistance to their acclaimed values of human
rights, environment, religious tolerance, nuclear proliferation and defence expenditure etc.
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f. Integrate the world's geo-economic sustenance to the American economy,
g. Link provision of economic, technological and military assistance to their acclaimed values of human
rights, environment, religious tolerance, nuclear proliferation and defence expenditure etc.
h. Integrate the world's geo-economic sustenance to the American economy, whereby any negative/positive
growth impact of the US economy directly or indirectly effects the economic growth elsewhere in the
world.
6. Preference To Geo-economics
Economy remains the major determinant of viability and power potential of a nation. Geo-economics is therefore,
attaining dominance over geo-political alliances. In an era of globally competing economies and increased inter-
dependence, it is becoming overly difficult to immune a country's economy from the global economic influences.
Developing economies will therefore, continue to face the economic coercion of donors.
7. Media's Impact
The information flow has brought about mass awareness. At the global level, through astute disinformation and
well-orchestrated themes, media is extensively used for propaganda and socio psychic exploitation, to mould the
opinion of target audience. Countries with greater media resources have a definite edge in voicing their theme
songs.
8. Non-State Power Centres
Emergence and empowerment of trans-national forces like collective economic systems, multinational firms,
international financial institutions and pressure group like amnesty International; Green Peace etc are making ingress
into the sovereignty of smaller nations, increasingly their domestic policies, much to their dismay. Consequently,
ideological forces like religion and race are gaining momentum, with the potential to fuel hostilities.
9. Redundancy of the UNO
The UNO increasingly manipulated by the major powers to promote their own interests through selective
enforcement of international conventions and regimes. Its influence as a neutral mechanism to enforce measures for
greater peace and stability, based on consensus of the world community, is therefore diminishing. Dual standards
and biased approach of this premium world body is a cause of grave concern for countries falling out of step with
the dictates of major world powers.
10. International Aversion to Geographic Changes
National across the globe, due to intermingled interests, remain averse to conflict and escalation that has the
potential to upset the status quo and jeopardizes collective interests. Therefore, there is increasing emphasis on
resolution of the conflicts through peaceful means, rather than military confrontation. The smaller nations will
therefore, witness growing resistance to the acquisition of technologies, which can disturb the balance of power in a
region.
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11. Changing Patterns of conflict
The conflict pattern is shifting from inter-state to intra-state, often with the tacit support of regional and extra
regional players. Force is projected through internal de-stabilization, proxy wars and state sponsored terrorism. The
post 9/11 scenario has tended to provide a kind of false legitimacy to various countries to use force within the
ambience of war against terrorism, either unilaterally or in coalition with other countries. Such a specter is likely to
give rise to asymmetrical inter and intra-state conflicts.
12. Negative Perceptions about Islam
The West is becoming increasingly apprehensive with regard to the global rise of Islamic values. Terrorism
emanating from Islamic extremism is being perceived as a major threat and destabilising phenomenon. Overawed
by the terrorists' attack of 9/11, the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 has overlooked the distinction between the
legitimate armed struggle against foreign occupation and armed insurrection against writ of the legitimate
governments. Such leanings are likely to further aggravate the prevailing sense of deprivation and suppression and
foster greater resistance.
13. Role and function of Intelligence Agencies in Pakistan
ISI is mainly tune to the collection strategic intelligence, which in simple terms is the knowledge pertaining to
enemy's capabilities, vulnerabilities, probable courses of action, plans and other related aspects that may affect
Pakistan's national interests directly or indirectly. The Services intelligence directorates being part of the respective
services HQs, mainly concentrate on the collection and analysis of tactical intelligence, which has a variety of
applications during peace and war. In addition, they also have a counter-intelligence role to deny enemy access to
sensitive installations and lines of communication. The Intelligence Bureau on the other hand mainly concentrates on
the internal dynamics of Pakistan.
14. Military Intelligence (MI)
a. The Military Intelligence Dte is dedicated to the collection, analysis and dissemination of tactical
intelligence about enemy designs. The primary role of the MI is to keep the General Staff updated about
enemy arms build up, movement of troops especially of strike formations, enemy operational plans,
frequency and direction of surveillance activity. A close monitoring of all indicators of war including
formation level exercises, testing of equipment and new inductions in the enemy war inventory also fall
within the realm of MI coverage.
b. MI also has an important counter-intelligence role for the protection of information, men and material. MI
detachments at important stations sensitize the national assets against enemy penetration, subversion or
sabotage.
15. Naval Intelligence (NI)
a. The Naval Intelligence Dte is responsible for keeping the Naval Staff informed about enemy naval buildup,
direction, operational plans, new acquisitions, tactical exercises and overall trend of enemy preparations
for a War. Tactical or operational intelligence provided by NI on the one hand neutralizes enemy designs in
the sea around Pakistan, and on the other directly supports our own current or planned operations.
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b. NI provides credible information and helps in protecting our Naval assets, harbors and installations,
besides keeping our sea-lanes safe for maritime activity both during peace and war. At the same time, NI
should be able to collect Acoustic Data used for interdicting enemy merchant shipping during war.
16. Air Intelligence
a. The primary role of Air Intelligence Dte is to keep Air Staff updated on latest enemy dispositions, upkeep of
enemy Orbit, Weapons and Equipment manuals and provision of target imageries or sketches to the users.
To obviate any surprise attack, movements of enemy's combat aircraft and related weapons need to be
accounted for at all times. This also includes continuous update of all weapons and aircraft including new
inductions, movement of enemy assets and a close analysis of operational exercises conducted by the
enemy.
b. A scrutiny of the previous Gulf War and the recent conflicts in modern warfare. Our enemy has acquired
an almost 1=4 superiority in terms of fighter aircraft, military cargo aircraft and helicopters. This
superiority has got to be met through better intelligence effort and optimum and efficient utilization of
available resources.
17. Intelligence Bureau (IB)
a. The intelligence Bureau mainly concentrates on the internal dynamics of Pakistan. Besides monitoring the
emerging political scenario, it also keeps a constant watch on the law and order situations, fissiparous
tendencies, and ethnic and sectarian trends.
b. In addition, IB also has an important counter-intelligence role, besides special operations against drug
trafficking, smuggling of goods and human smuggling. For its counter-intelligence role, IB has a vast
network within the country and at selective stations abroad to monitor and check enemy designs to gain
access to vital installation, subversion, and sabotage to create an atmosphere of despair and
despondency.
18. Inter Services Intelligence (ISI)
a. Since its inception in 1948 as a modest organization, ISI has grown in size and stature to emerge as the
premier intelligence organization of the country committed to implementing the nation security policy of
Pakistan. The main task of ISI has been, firstly in the collection of strategic intelligence and secondly to
deny access to enemy agents to our areas of vital national importance. During Mr. Bhutto's time, the
Charter of ISI was revised to include Internal Security as well but it is ISI's secondary function since the
main responsibility for it rests on IB.
b. These are some of the basic tasks, which are performed by Intelligence agencies in all countries, big or
small, according to their threat perception and the realization of their national strategic objectives. In this
subtle game of nations, motives seldom discriminate between friends and foes. In the real world of
intelligence, the ends dictate the means to achieve it. There are no holds barred when you are dealing with
your real or potential enemies who may hurt your national interests or your very existence as a state.
c. Apart from acquiring military and politico-diplomatic intelligence, major secret services also try for t
technological, industrial and economic Secrets. In some cases, missions are also undertaken of sabotage,
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subversion and political assassination. Some of the leading Intelligence agencies with huge financial and
material resources at their disposal have also raised their integral Special Forces and teams of irregular
combatants.
d. ISI has neither the resources nor the mandate to embark on such large-scale exploits. It has never raised a
force, regular or irregular not even in Afghanistan, where ISI had its largest and longest commitment during
the Jehad. Nor has it undertaken any assassination missions. But wherever national interests so dictated,
it committed the best human and material resources at its command to achieve the targets laid down by
the government through means other than those mentioned earlier.
Charter of ISI
19. Within the ambit of the existing constraints, the charter of Dte Gen ISI includes:
a. Procurement and coordination of external strategic intelligence.
b. Advice to the Federal Government on matters of national security, and counter-intelligence relating to the
armed forces.
c. Some aspects of internal security
20. Depending upon the geo-strategic and security environment, the emphasis on specific elements of the charter may
vary. A manifestation of this is our current focus on international and domestic counter-terrorism. Similarly, our
commitment in Afghanistan, which was very heavy during Jehad against the Soviet Union, was scaled down
considerably after Soviets were pushed out.
21. It may be of interest to you that nearly 70% of intelligence gathering (universally) is from open sources i.e. media,
diplomatic interaction, etc. This should also tell you why some countries maintain big establishments in target
countries. The analysis and information Management Wings handle this bulk of information. The challenge here is
the enormity of material and its effective collation, analysis and timely dissemination. The remaining 30% of the
information has to be acquired through covert operations. This is done through the Operation Wing by means of
HUMINT. An increasingly potent source of acquisition is what we call the technical means managed by the Technical
Wing. This pertains to satellites, drones, radars, listening devices and other gadgets.
Role of Intelligence in National Policy Formulation in Pakistan
22. Intelligence inputs provide a vital basis for policy decisions particularly on national security and foreign policy.
National security is fundamental to all facets of state policy and strategy. Defence policy, foreign, economic and
internal security policies have to be based on accurate and timely intelligence. As the prime intelligence agency, the
ISI has to furnish this support at the appropriate forums. This, I may add, is a continuous and regular activity of
forwarding reports, assessments and estimates to all concerned.
23. Like the intelligence Service of any country, ISI also has a role to play in the formulation of state policy in its own
specific sphere of activity. However, we also need to understand that like intelligence services worldwide, ISI's role
extends beyond participation in policy formulation and it also had to undertake implementation of the approved
policy and strategy in some crucial fields.
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24. As I mentioned earlier, as important aspect of the ISI's role is its responsibility as National Intelligence Service, both
with external and domestic security mandates, and as a Defence Intelligence Agency. This is the modern trend in the
restructuring of all major Intelligence Services post-9/11. This gives the ISI the benefit of a very wholesome
perspective of our national scenario extending from the external environment, to the military situation and the
domestic national scene including situation in the provinces and major cities of the country. Understandably, we
then have the advantage of addressing issues holistically, which I feel is a significant input in the formulation of any
policy. This also underlines the importance of close interaction between the ISI, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other
ministries & departments of the government.
25. An equally critical role of the ISI is its participation in the implementation of the policy. In the world of real politics, all
state policies have two facets: the overt and the covert, the declared and undeclared. This is universal and not
peculiar to Pakistan alone. Intelligence Services undertake covert operations in support of the overall policy and, let
me add that these activities are never a policy in itself. Those amongst us, who are not privy to the overall policy
parameters, sometimes misunderstand the situation and form their own peculiar ideas about functions of
Intelligence Agencies.
26. Threats to the internal security of Pakistan are as ominous as the external threats. I have no doubt that our
adversaries will spare no efforts to destabilize us internally through subversion and sabotage. We have already been
divided once through a foreign supported insurgency. 'Never Again' that should be our slogan as far as the internal
security is concerned. I feel that the government has rightly assigned this aspect the highest priority it deserves.
ISI's Internal Wing along with IB plays an important role in support of government's domestic policies, which, let me
say, is its most difficult assignment, given our environment of acute ethnic, religious and political polarization and
misunderstanding of ISI's may faceted functions.
27. As you are well aware, Pakistan has played a frontline role in the war against terrorism. The burden of this had to be
borne by the ISI at one of the most complex and difficult periods in our history. There was the conflict in
Afghanistan, the recent Indian build-up on our Eastern Borders and the transition from military government to a
democratic order. However, we have been able to hold our nerves and faced the challenge squarely. Our
restructuring efforts and development of a national counter-terrorism network proved timely and have enabled ISI to
maintain its reputation as an effective Intelligence Service.
28. The rapidly changing international scenario in the aftermath of 9/11, and a volatile regional situation, has had its
compounding impact on Pakistan's security perception also. It squarely called for creating a credible security
parameter around Pakistan's as also to protect our permanent interests abroad. It was with this end in view that ISI
restructured its organization in accordance with contemporary concepts and also proposed the formation of Higher
Intelligence Organization (HID), which has been approved by the government. Previously, DG ISI was the main
coordinator of all Intelligence, but now HID has a two-tier set-up consisting of the Joint Intelligence Board (JIB) and
the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) to coordinate and best utilize all the Intelligence made available.
29. The JIB is headed by the President, and includes the Prime Minister, Minister of Defence, Interior and Foreign Affairs,
Chairman JCSC, Services Chiefs and the DG ISI.
JIC acts as the Secretariat of JIB and is chaired by DG ISI. Its membership includes Secretaries Ministries of Foreign
Affairs, Interior, Defence, Finance, DG TB, and DGs of MI/NI/ AT.
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Overview of other Intelligence Agencies
30. Research & Analysis Wing (RAW)
a. India's main intelligence agency RAW is the bye-product of the 1962 Sino-Indian border clashes when the
Intelligence Bureau reportedly failed to assess the Chinese arms buildup. After a careful study, the External
Wing of the Intelligence Bureau was detached and baptized as RAW in 1963 with the primary aim of
intelligence gathering and subversion in neighboring countries of South Asia including China. Since then,
RAW has come a long way from a modest force consisting of around 250 personnel to start with, to some
10,000 trained manpower today.
b. India has always considered South Asia as its own backyard and RAW is one of the main Indian
instruments to put this concept into action. Over the years, RAW has emerged as an important instrument
of India's national power and has assumed a significant position in formulating the country's domestic and
foreign policy. Today, RAW's tentacles have spread from Maldives to Afghanistan, Central Asia, Middle
East, Europe, USA, Canada and Australia. RAW enjoys active collaboration with the leading intelligence
agencies of the world including CIA, M16, Mossad and FIS (Russia). In relation to Mossad, RAW's
collaboration has gone much beyond the exchange of information. Latest reports indicated the presence of
Mossad operatives in Indian-occupied-Kashmir (bK) for establishing a border-sealing infrastructure in
addition to providing training and hi-tech equipment to RAW personnel.
c. In the context of South Asia, RAW employs the usual techniques of disinformation, espionage, subversion
and sabotage for creating an atmosphere of insecurity, and then projecting India as the sole protector of
smaller nations in the region. Besides Sikkim and Bhutan, which are Indian protectorates anyway, RAW
has acquired a deeper ingress in important tiers of the establishment in Nepal.
d. Indian abetment of Tamil uprising in Sri Lanka is no longer a secret. RAW played an active role in funding,
organizing and harboring the uprising, which finally culminated into the assassination of Prime Minister
Rajiv Gandhi. In another episode, RAW successfully organized an uprising in Maldives and then went
ahead in quick time to quell it.
e. RAW saw its hour of glory in the then East Pakistan in 1971, when it successfully subverted a localized
unrest into an armed uprising spearheaded by Mukti Bahini. Indian armed intervention finally led to the
severance of Pakistan's eastern Wing.
f. RAW has been effectively countered by ISI since the last 10 years. It has come under fire for failure to
contain ISI and for failed operations within Pakistan despite huge funds placed at its disposal.
g. Seeing the success of ISI, the Indian authorities have now detached military intelligence from the purview
of RAW to create a Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) under a serving Lt Gen. The new DIA will maintain
its own data bank, collate and evaluate military intelligence received from the three services, and provide
the interface between military intelligence directorates, RAW. IB and National Security Council Secretariat.
It will also extend integrated intelligence support for joint operations by the Armed Forces.
31. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
a. The American CIA is by far the most powerful and resourceful intelligence agency with base stations and
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presence in almost all parts of the world. In its over 50 years of existence, CIA has played a variety of
roles in pursuit of US domestic and global aims, which could be the envy of any intelligence agency. In
fact, no segment of the cold war apparatus developed after 1947 has been more controversial and
politicized than the CIA.
b. CIA was created in September 1947 under the National Security Act passed by the Congress. It is the pivot
of the US intelligence community with its Director as the anchorman. The link between various agencies is
maintained through inter-agency groups for efficient management and operational control. There are 15
permanent inter-agency committees and a variety of ad-hoc groups each dealing with a specific problem
separately.
c. Like any other intelligence agency, CIA's main function is to collect intelligence from abroad. It also
cooperates with FBI in domestic intelligence effort. CIA is divided into five distinct parts i.e. a Director and
four functional Directorates, the largest of which is the Directorate of Operation commonly known in the
agency as 'clandestine service'. It is the largest Directorate having an estimated strength of over 6,000
officers and men. Nearly 45% of this manpower is employed overseas usually under diplomatic cover for
intelligence collection, espionage, counter-espionage, and covert operations including interference in the
internal dynamics of the country as the US policy at that particular point in time may demand.
d. CIA has its own R&D network designed to develop computer surveillance, high-tech electronic intelligence
gathering and photographic reconnaissance facility. In addition, CIA is known to be operating its own
satellites for obtaining credible imageries of the target areas. Incidentally, the technological gap between
CIA and the rest of intelligence agencies is rapidly widening.
e. In 1974, CIA was authorized covert actions by the congress and the CIA was provided huge funds running
into billions of dollars to expand its network and commit its resources and expertise in attempting to install
pro-US regimes in Italy, Korea, Iran, Vietnam, Cuba, Nicaragua, Panama and Columbia. CIA is one of the
few agencies, which have raised and trained their own combatants and irregulars for operations inside the
target countries. Such combatants were launched into Afghanistan to soften up the area and win over local
warlords before the final assault on was repeated in Iraq also where the allied troops did not face any
worthwhile resistance.
32. Mossad
a. Mossad is the external intelligence network of Israel, which operates directly under the Prime Minister. Its
opinion especially those relating to Israeli Security, is given due consideration by the political leadership.
Over the years, this organization has acquired notoriety for its thoroughness and ruthlessness in planning
and executing its operations mainly against the Palestinians. Since most of the Mossad operations are
covered in a thick blanket of cloak and dagger, not much is known about its organization, functions and
modus operandi, which is apparently subject to frequent changes according to the demands of the
situation.
b. According to available indications, Mossad is pursuing a three-dimensional approach in ensuring the

security of Israel and Jewish interests abroad. This approach broadly includes the following:
1. Keep an eye on the activities of PLO, Hamas and Palestinian extremists and neutralize their plans
and activities as far as possible. This is also extended to the coverage of neighboring Arab States
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both friendly and unfriendly.
2. Maintain regular contacts with Jewish organizations and Jewish population in all countries, but
mainly in USA.
3. Maintain a watch on anti-Zionist states and organizations and neutralize their activities as far as
possible.
c. Based on the above approach, the main responsibilities of Mossad include the following:
1. Gathering external intelligence.
2. Providing information on all projects, which require decisions concerning Israeli security.
3. Recruitment of agents.
4. Counteracting Palestinian suicide operations.
5. Fomenting racial and ethnic conflicts as in Lebanon.
6. Portraying a negative image of Palestinian people and Arab countries especially in Europe and
USA.
d. Mossad has very large financial resources, although the exact quantum of its budget allocation has never
been made public. Apart from the normal allocation by the government, Mossad also derives funds from
other sources including the profits earned by commercial organizations owned by Mossad and used as
cover, commissions on arms transactions, and annual financial assistance provided by CIA.
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APPENDIX E
Paper by
Short Course on
Major Foreign Policy Issues facing the Country
by
Pakistan's foreign policy is guided by its history, geographical location and ethos of its people. It reflects
our national aspirations and is responsive to regional and international imperatives. Maintaining a
bipartisan approach in its foreign policy has been an important objective of the government. Given the
persistent challenges, we have been proactive in our foreign policy. While there are elements of continuity
in the foreign policy, as they should be, there is also a change of emphasis and nuance.
Pakistan in firmly committed to the promotion of peace and security at the regional and global levels. In
keeping with its international obligations and in conformity with the United Nations Charter, Pakistan has
consistently worked for the development of inter-state relations on the basis of sovereign equality, mutual
respect, non-interference and peaceful settlement of disputes. It remains Pakistan's resolve to promote
and enhance bilateral relations and mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields with all the countries
of the world. Pakistan firmly believes in an international order that is based on justice, mutual trust and
confidence.
Pakistan and the US had been close allies during the Cold War period. However, as the decade of 1990's
began, as significant reordering of policies and priorities by the US came into evidence. These changes
brought in new challenges for Pakistan's foreign policy. South Asia was consigned to peripheral status by
the US once the soviets withdrew from Afghanistan. Within the region itself, US-India relationship
improved apparently. After Indian Explosions on May 11 and 13, 1989, Pakistan was obliged to conduct
tests to restore strategic balance in the region. As a result, Pakistan was subjected to discriminatory US
sanctions.
It was against this backdrop that the events of 9/11 unfolded having far-reaching ramifications for
Pakistan on a global and regional level. These events placed Pakistan in the eye of the storm. Once again,
core imperatives of our foreign policy-security, Islamic identity and economic viability were in grave
danger of being compromised.
Coalition against Terrorism
The transforming events of 9/11and the global anti-terrorism campaign have had a deep and profound
impact of Pakistan's foreign policy priorities. Like all defining moments, the situations in the immediate
aftermath of 9/11, while posing enormous challenges, also offered Pakistan with an opportunity to
reorient its foreign policy priorities in the light of the changed situation in order to promote its vital interest.
As president Musharraf told the nation, our decision to join the international coalition against terrorism
was to ensure, a) security of the country against terrorism; b) continuity of economic revival; c) safety of
our strategic assets: and d) focus on peaceful political solution of the Kashmir dispute.
Pakistan's support has enabled the global coalition to make important gains in the anti-terrorism
campaign and brought Pakistan great appreciation and important stature as a key member of the
international community.
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The decision has not only dramatically improved relations with the US and the West but also with Russia,
Iran and the Central Asian states. China is also very appreciative of our stand against terrorism. There is
wide appreciation of the fact that the reorientation of Pakistan's foreign policy in the aftermath of 9/11 was
not an easy option, given its serious implications for Pakistan's internal stability and external security. The
immediate economic benefit came in the shape of crucial debt relief enabling the country to avert a
looming risk of default on its foreign debt service obligations.
The recent operations in South Waziristan Agency are part of Pakistan's effort to root out terrorism in all
its manifestations from its territory. The Government's commitment to the Pakistani society and the
International community to fight terrorism makes it incumbent on us to take on this menace frontally.
These operations are a part of our resolve to flush out foreign terrorists from our country.
While, Pakistan's commitment to combating terrorism remains firm, we believe that use of force alone
would not suffice, if the objective were to eliminate and no merely to suppress terrorism. The menace of
terrorism can be dealt with effectively only through a comprehensive approach. In our view the essential
ingredients of comprehensive approach should include (a) a consensus on defining terrorism, and (b) a
focus on the root causes of terrorism.
There is a need to ensure that the fight against terrorism does not turn into clash between the West and
the world of Islam. This would have serious risks for world peace and stability. Similarly, the regrettable
practices of racial profiling, targeting of the citizens of particular countries or peoples belonging to a
particular religion and regions would severely jeopardize the campaign against terrorism.
Of equal importance is the need to ensure that the fight against terrorism does not turn into a clash
between the West and the World of Islam. This would have serious risks for world peace and stability.
Similarly, the regrettable practices of belonging to a particular religion and regions would severely
jeopardize the campaign against terrorism.
Of equal importance is the need to curb the tendency on the part of some countries to use the
international sentiment against terrorism for advancing their own narrow agenda. This would deprive the
international campaign against terrorism of its moral legitimacy. Pakistan rejects the canard of the so-
called “Islamic terrorism”. Terrorism has no religion.
Some vested interests are trying to project the fight against terrorism as a clash between civilizations and
value systems, more specifically between Islam and the West. This fallacy is dangerous and must be
firmly rejected. Deeply concerned over this insidious trend, President Pervez Musharraf presented his
concept of “Enlightened Moderation” at the OIC summit held in Malaysia. This concept has two facets:
one, the Islamic World must adopt a process of internal reform and renewal by promoting moderation and
human resource development and socio-economic development.
The Nuclear Issue
The objective of our nuclear programme is to deter aggression, so that we can safeguard our national
security and protect our sovereignty. We shall maintain the competitive edge of our nuclear programme
through our national means. There is no question about it. We shall enhance our capability both
qualitatively and quantitatively. The President of Pakistan on several occasions has reiterated our resolve
not to roll back our nuclear programme. In fact we would try to improve our programme in all its
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dimensions. This is the determination and the will of the people of Pakistan. We can sustain our nuclear
programme through indigenous means and resources.
While we would like to enhance our nuclear capability and continue to do so, we also want a strategic
restraint regime and conventional balance between Pakistan and India. We do not want an open-ended
arms race between two countries. Pakistan is a nuclear weapons state and this reality has been weapon
state. We have a National Command Authority (NCA) headed by the President of Pakistan with Prime
Minister as its Vice Chairman. This system was established in 1999 and operational zed in 2000. As
such, there's no question of pilferage or leakage from our soil. We now have a very effective command
and control system.
Pakistan-India Relation
Suspicion and mistrust have characterized Pak-India relationship since 1947. The outcome of this Indian
factor has also created an imbalance geographically, militarily, economically and politically.
No nation can realize its full potential without conditions of regional peace. Unfortunately, Pakistan since
its creation has been deprived of this blessing. Regional conflicts sharpened by cold war dynamics had
created a situation of serious insecurity. We were obliged to develop a credible military deterrence to
ensure our security. We want peaceful relations with all regional states particularly India. This quest is
actuated by an enlightened sense of national interest.
The long-standing Kashmir issue represents a challenge to the international community both in its political
and human rights dimensions. The Kashmiris are struggling for their right of self-determination recognized
and promised to them in a series of Security Council resolutions. Terrorism did not create the tragedy of
Kashmir. On the contrary the long delay in the resolution of the dispute has led to desperation and
militancy. We seek the resolution of all outstanding issues including Jammu and Kashmir through a
peaceful process of dialogue and constructive engagement.
There is a realization in India and Pakistan that War is not an option any you have to look at ways and
means to work for peaceful settlement of disputes between the two countries. Secondly. Human rights
violations in Jammu and Kashmir have to come to an end. We are looking for solutions, which can ensure
peace and stability in the region, justice for the people of Kashmir, and a secure future for the people of
South Asia. The current India-Pakistan peace initiative enjoys the backing and support of the international
community including USA, EU and China and Japan. There is a new momentum which is the outcome of
the statesmanship shown by President Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. This is
a very salutary environment to kick-start the dialogue.
Both India and Pakistan have agreed to commence the composite dialogue process, which collapsed at
Agra. Now we are meeting, after two and a half years, as a result of the decision taken by Presient
Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee on the sidelines of the 12th SAARC Summit in Islamabad. The two
sides are committee to addressing all issues between India and Pakistan, including the issue of Jammu
and Kashmir to the satisfaction of the parties concerned.
The Muslim World
Pakistan's position in the Islamic world is a matter of satisfaction and pride. The special relations with the
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countries of the Middle East region have a historical, cultural, religious, economic and strategic basis.
These are nurtured by mutual trust and confidence that have stood the test of time.
It is quite evident that world order and global peace cannot be restored without addressing the conflicts
which beset the Islamic world today. Failure in resolving these disputes will have serious ramification for
international peace and stability.
Pakistan rejects the cycle of violence in the Middle East, which has a negative impact on the ongoing
Middle East peace process and the Quartet's efforts to give sovereignty and statehood to Palestine. We
strongly support the Palestinian peoples' struggle for attaining statehood and political independence.
Concerted efforts by the international community should be initiated to stem escalation of violence as it is
breeding extremism. Pakistan supports the two state formula.
Iraq remains an open wound on the body politic of the Muslim world. International approach must be
guided by the objective of restoring Iraq's sovereignty and political independence; ensuring its unity and
territorial integrity; upholding the right of the Iraqi people to determine their own future and giving a central
role to the U.N.
Afghanistan is already moving gradually but inexorably towards a new disposition. An enabling
environment would require rapid reconstruction of its physical and social infrastructure. Instability in
Afghanistan has a direct bearing on Pakistan. A peaceful, stable and friendly Afghanistan is vital to our
national security, economic and political interest. Therefore, we fully support the Bonn process and
efforts of President Karzai for peace and harmony in Afghanistan. The international community must help
Afghanistan generously in the process of rehabilitation and reconstruction. On our part we have pledged
US$100 million for this process. A stable Afghanistan is certain to have a positive impact on the politico-
economic landscape of Central Asia as well as that of South and Southwest Asia. Politically, it will end the
threat of religious extremism to this region. In the economic field, construction of road networks and
implementation of the energy pipeline will bring development and prosperity.
Pakistan-US-relations
Pakistan and US relations have seen many ups and downs. Pakistan had been subjected to US sanctions
on account of our nuclear programme, which was inextricably linked to threat to our security in the region.
The closer relations between the two countries during the 1980s saw a decline following the withdrawal
of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and its punitive sanctions against Pakistan complicated the situation in
the region, especially it pushed Afghanistan into total collapse and civil war which allowed it to become a
base for terrorism. Pakistan itself became a victim of terrorism.
9/11 galvanized the world to fight against terrorism. Pakistan is part of the international coalition against
terrorism. This has once again brought Pakistan and United States closer in a cooperative bilateral
relationship. This time, however, both governments have worked to give bilateral relations anew
dimension and endurance. There is recognition that deterioration in their bilateral relations damaged
interests of both sides.
Our role in stemming the tide of terrorism has been acknowledged not only at the level of the US
President, Congressmen & Senators but also worldwide. Our relations characterize cooperation in
political, economic and defence field. We are working mutually on a long term & sustainable relationship.
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While looking beyond the fight against terror, we are aiming to gain access to the US markets and
investment flow to Pakistan. There have been many high level visits from both sides. The US Secretary of
state Colin Powell visited Pakistan recently in March 2004. US decision to designate Pakistan as a Major
non-NATO ally will have long term positive bearing on our relationship with the US. This cooperation,
however, will not be directed against third party.
The Evolving Challenges
The current international configuration has immensely altered the traditional diplomatic functions and
practices. The dispersal of authority away from states, the predominance of economics over politics, and
the growing role of NGOs, social movements, and other transnational collectivities highlight the need for
national governments to alter their modes of interaction with each other and with relevant actors in the
multi-centric world.
A host of new issues including globalization, human rights, democracy, terrorism and the environment
have made their way to the centre stage of international attention. Economic diplomacy is assuming
greater importance in planning and execution of foreign policy. International relations are being
reconfigured to underline the primacy of these issues and new international norms are being rapidly
evolved in these and other areas.
In view of the persistent challenges, the contours of our foreign policy are being constantly re-examined,
refined and redefined, as necessary.
Economy
Among the most significant paradigm shifts that herald the external environment of the twenty-first
century is the increasing preponderance of economics instead of politics in international relations which
is indeed a reflection of a similar development in interstate affairs. The term political economy no applies
both to the internal and external dimensions of politics and economics.
The emerging new international economic environment influenced in several different ways by the
process of globalization has place new responsibilities on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Cognizant of
these external changes we have continued to pursue the country's economic agenda with commitment
and vigour. The objective has been to impart an aggressive thrust to the Ministry's endeavors and that of
Pakistan's Missions in promoting exports, foreign investment inflows and industrialization.
Our missions abroad have been maintaining a proactive approach on the commercial front and reached
out to potential importers and investors. They are concentrating their endeavors to the (a) promotion of
Pakistan's economic and commercial interests, (b) provision of quality assistance to Pakistani
businessmen visiting abroad and (c) assistance in trade enquiries by establishing direct contacts with the
Chambers of Commerce and Industries at home and abroad.
Our Missions also help explore new economic opportunities for enhancement and diversification of our
exports such as in non-traditional items in order to expand our export base. In addition they help organize
trade fairs and single country exhibitions for enhancement of trade with countries of their accreditation.
After a period of slow growth for several years, mainly due to a prolonged drought and unfavorable
external conditions, all vital indicators of the economy are now showing clear signs of a turn around.
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Growth rate of GDP is estimated at 6%. Inflation is under control and interest rates are falling. Pak rupee is
stable and current account is I surplus. There is a phenomenal increase in foreign remittances and foreign
currency reserves, which have crossed dollars 12 billion. The debt burden has eased considerably as a
result of the relief that Pakistan has received. Our international partners agree that Pakistan has achieved
macroeconomic stability and is well on the way to take-off stage and the climate for investment is
conducive in Pakistan.
Nevertheless, we do not underestimate the challenge of achieving sustainable growth, and the continuing
shortage of resources for the vital social sectors. In this endeavor, Pakistan requires the continuing
support and cooperation of its international partners.
The best assurance for the consolidation of global peace lies in the economic development and prosperity
of all regions and all peoples. Economic progress in one region supports and complements prosperity in
an era of greater prosperity and peace. In this connection the agreement on SAFTA augurs well for the
economic well-being of South Asia.
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APPENDIX F
Paper by
Short Course on
by
I. General
(a) Universal principles that underpin the making of a Foreign Policy in any country-including Pakistan:
A country's foreign policy mirrors its national agenda, priorities, social attitudes and political structure;
Foreign Policy does not deal as much with the goals as it does with the possible paths (options);
Foreign Policy is a cumulative process; and
The task of formulating the foreign policy, particularly of comparatively less powerful states, is more
beset with constraints than blessed with sovereign freedom.
(b) The Core Determinants that define the parameters of Foreign Policy:
Geography;
Security;
History; and
Ideology
(c) Role of the various government sector institutions:
Foreign Office;
Parliament and its Committees;
Cabinet and Ministries;
Military Establishments;
Information; and
Government Think Tanks.
(d) Role of Institutions outside the ambit of Government:
Political Parties and Pressure Groups;

Media and Civil Society; and
Public Opinion and Think Tanks.
II. Emerging Challenges confronting the Formulation of a Foreign Policy
Momentous transformation of the global political landscape in the post-cold war era;
The international system of states is now in a flux;
Borders between domestic and foreign policy issues are becoming increasingly hazy;
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Besides bringing about a Paradigm shift in the international order, the events of 9/11 carry serious
implications for the Islamic World;
Muslim countries can no longer formulate policies without taking this new dimension into consideration;
Economic diplomacy is assuming greater importance in planning and execution of foreign policy;
A host of new issues including globalization, human rights, democracy, terrorism and the environment
have made their way to the centre stage of international attention; and
New international norms are being rapidly evolved in these and other areas
III. Formulation of Foreign Policy in Pakistan
(a) Overview
Security has been at the heart of Pakistan's policy since independence;
In managing relations with India, it subsumes our quest for a just solution of the Kashmir issue as well as
our nuclear capability;
Two other key foreign policy objectives continue to be socio-economic development and our Islamic
identity; and
In response to the rapidly changing international scenario, the contours of Pakistan's foreign policy are
also being constantly re-examined, refined and redefined, as necessary.
(b) Role of various state and non-state actors in the making and implementing of our foreign policy:
Enhanced role of the Military Establishment; and
Diminution in the role of Parliament/civil society, etc.
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APPENDIX G
Paper by
Mr. Sartaj Aziz
Former Finance and Foreign Minsiter
Short Course on
How Foreign Policy should be made

in Pakistan
by
Mr. Sartaj Aziz
The formulation and implementation of a successful foreign policy in any country depends on three major factors:
A clear long term vision of the country's role in world affairs and a broad national consensus on
the main elements of such a vision.
An effective institutional framework to coordinate the three main dimensions of foreign policy
namely national security, defence policy and economic objectives and to determine the relative
priority of each at a given point of time.
An efficient and professionally managed foreign office which can present well considered
options, whenever required, and can implement policies effectively, once these have been
formulated by the Government.
Unfortunately, in Pakistan's case none of these pre-requisites have been fully met throughout the past five
decades.
Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah did offer the vision of “friendship with all and an independent foreign policy”,
but the circumstances in which Pakistan came into existence did not allow the realization of this vision. The
mistrust and bitterness created by large scale communal rioting, followed by mass migration and the 1947-48 war
in Kashmir laid the basis of continuing hostility between India and Pakistan. At the same time, India having failed to
maintain the geographical unity of the sub-continent, wanted to assert the political unity of the three fourth of the
territories that came under its control, by calling it India thereby inheriting not only the cultural and historical
legacies of undivided India, but also the international personality and all the foreign assets of British India. Pakistan
was left to build the main infrastructure of its foreign policy from scratch. As tensions with India over Kashmir
continued and Pakistan with its much smaller economy began to look for ways to defend its security, it readily
accepted the option to join the alliances and defence pacts which USA was building in the 1950s, to counter the
Russian influence in the Region. While in the process Pakistan acquired modern weapons but lost the opportunity
to evolve an independent foreign policy and gradually slided into the position of a satellite of another nation. This
fault line in Pakistan's foreign policy has never been fully repaired.
The second pre-requisite, namely the evolution of an effective national security system, in which the consistency of
the country's defence, security and economic policies could be ensured, also became a victim of the recurrent
failure of the political process. As a result, Pakistan has remained under direct or indirect military rule for more than
half of its independence existence. In such a situation, security and foreign policy was handled exclusively by the
military institutions without any major inputs from the civilian leadership or expertise in the Foreign Ministry. Even in
periods of civilian rule, (as the 1972-77 and 1988-99) the political leadership that took over the government from
time to time had only limited space for making any major changes in the main parameters of foreign policy laid
down during the prolonged periods of military rule. This inevitably led to excessive reliance on the military
dimension of national security i.e. the importance of safeguarding national security through stronger defence
capacity and a gradual relegation of the broader political and diplomatic dimensions of national security. This
strategy helped Pakistan to acquire more sophisticated weapons and to maintain a 1:3 strategic balance with India
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in terms of defence expenditures but only for a few years. In 1974, India carried out a nuclear test and forced
Pakistan to engage in a nuclear arms race with India. This was necessary but in pursuing the nuclear option,
Pakistan had to forego access to conventional weapons after the imposition of sanctions by USA in October 1990.
This created a very paradoxical situation and narrowed the foreign policy options which Pakistan could pursue in
the future.
a) The first option was to reduce tensions with India and therefore the growing burden of defence
expenditure, which became even heavier after the imposition of sanctions in 1990.
b) The second option was to maintain the strategic balance with India, by increasing our defence
budget and also increase pressures on the Kashmir issue, and the resultant tensions with India.
Pakistan chose the second option in the wake of the victory which the mujahideen had achieved over Russia in
Afghanistan. If Islamic freedom fighters had defeated a super power why could they not do the same in Kashmir
when the situation is in any case ripe for a major 'Intefada' inside occupied Kashmir? It will, the argument went,
also force India to deploy at least one third of its army in Kashmir, thereby creating a more evenly balanced
situation along the international border between India and Pakistan.
It is difficult to say whether this strategy which Pakistan followed from 1990 onwards in its relations with India was
the result of several incremental steps and decisions or was based on a well considered and comprehensive
framework. But in retrospect it is clear that the strategy imposed enormous economic and political cost on the
country without solving the Kashmir problem in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people. If we had a
coherent national security system to examine all options and their short and longer term implications, the options
chosen may have been different and probably better.
The third dimension of a successful foreign policy i.e. a competent and professionally managed foreign office, with
its network of embassies and consulates, has been partly undermined by the absence of a well coordinated
national security system and partly by a steady decline in the country's image. As already mentioned, there has
been a growing gap between the foreign policy perspectives and security assessments of the military
establishment and the elected or unelected political leadership of the country and as a result no clear political
consensus on the objectives of national security. The Foreign office was caught in the middle of this confusion,
oscillating from one perspective to another between so called 'hawks' and 'doves', depending on who was ruling the
country at a given point of time. Secondly diplomacy draws strength from the internal unity or disunity of a country
and its overall image in the world, which in turn depends on its economic strength and cultural and social ethos. If
a country's polity is divided on the basic thrust of its foreign policy and its image is not very positive, the task of the
diplomats in the foreign office becomes much more complicated. The Foreign office has no doubt thrown up some
outstanding diplomats who have earned a good name for Pakistan, but opportunities for high profile performance in
the international arena have been shrinking, with a negative effect on the morale of the Foreign Service, as a whole.
A new watershed in foreign policy
The current phase of Pakistan's history represents a new watershed in the country's foreign policy. The events of
September 11, 2001, jolted the main foundations on which Pakistan's foreign policy was built for over two decades
namely unflinching support for the Taliban and their predecessors in Afghanistan, active assistance for Jihadi
organisations fighting for the liberation for Kashmir from Indian rule and the development of nuclear weapons as a
deterrent to India's superior conventional weapons. Under strong international pressure, Pakistan has already
revised the first two policies and is also on the defensive on the third plank, following embarrassing reports of
nuclear proliferation by our scientists to countries like Libya, Iran and North Korea, Pakistan has also become an
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active member of the international campaign against terrorism to gain sympathy and support of USA and other
western powers.
In the face of the grim options which Pakistan faced after September 11, these policy changes were probably
unavoidable, but these changes and the resultant policy options for the future are reactive in nature and not a part
of deliberate pro-active policy framework for the medium term. Even more serious, these policy changes do not
enjoy the support of some of the main political parties and also of a large segment of the country's population,
mainly because after September 11, Washington's influence on Pakistan's foreign policy has increased.
The flaws and fault-lines that afflict the foreign policy processes in Pakistan, which I briefly outlined at the outset,
are of a fundamental nature and cannot be removed in the short run. Yet given the importance of these policies for
our survival as a sovereign nation, we, as a nation, have to evolve a more coherent medium term framework for
attaining our vital national security objectives. Let me outline some essential requirements:
The first important requirement in the formulation of a coherent foreign policy framework, is to narrow the
wide gap in thinking, that continues to exist between the military establishment and the elected civilian set
up on different aspects of national security. At present, according to many independent observers, there is
a state within a state, which regards itself as the ultimate custodian of national interest and does not
accept any deviation from the established parameters. The importance of bringing these varying
perceptions together will become obvious if we recall that one of the main causes of political instability
and frequent dissolution of the National Assembly (in 1988, 1990 and 1999 for example) was this gap in
perceptions on major security issues. In the face of such wide divergences in perceptions, it should not
be difficult to understand the agonizing dilemmas that the foreign office professionals face in offering
advice on important issues and the gradual deterioration in the quality and clarity of such advice.
The second important pre-requisite will be the evolution of an effective national security system that will
not only provide a forum for narrowing the gap between the military and civilian establishments but also
create a much wider mechanism of analysis and consultation on policy options and their short and
medium term implications. This in turn will require a strong Secretariat of the NSC, continuing support
from various think tanks and advisory committees and better coordination among various intelligence
agencies.
Ever since President Ziaul Haq created, as a part of his constitutional amendments of March 1985, a
National Security Council, to give the armed forces a constitutional role in supervising the political
process, this institution has become controversial. The 1985 Council was abolished by the Eighth
Amendment within 7 months. Similarly the Council created by President Farooq Ahmad Leghari in
January 1997, died without a single meeting. Even the new National Security Council, whose bill was
introduced in the National Assembly on 2 April, is similar to that created by President Ziaul Haq in 1985.
As is clear from its composition (the absence of Minister for Foreign Affairs, Defence and Interior) the
main purpose of the new council is to monitor the political process in the name of strengthening
democracy, but the oppositions in Parliament believe this council will weaken the democratic process.
Because of this controversy we may once again lose the opportunity to create an effective forum for
evolving a consensus on national security issues.
Thirdly, the Parliament and its Committees can play a major role in facilitating a wider process of
consultation and on major foreign policy issues. After 1985, special joint sessions of Parliament were
held every year to discuss the foreign policy of the country. In addition the Foreign Affairs Committees of
both houses met frequently to discuss various issues. Sometimes these Committees prepared special
reports on different aspects of foreign policy, after prolonged deliberation in which they invited not only
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the Foreign Minister and the Foreign Secretary but many eminent outside experts. (One example is the
July 1955 Report of the Senate's Standing Committee). The present Parliament has not even constituted
its Committees in the past 18 months, nor held any comprehensive debates on foreign policy. Potentially
the Parliament can become a major forum for political debate and decision making in the area of foreign
policy. In the process it will not only narrow the gap between the military and the civilian establishments
but also in reconciling differences among different political parties and viewpoints, and thus move
forward a national consensus on major foreign policy issues.
Finally, one of the most important pre-requisite for the success of foreign policy will be to end the
unending polarization in our society i.e. religions, ethnic, provincial and political polarization. The damage
that such polarization can cause to our vital national interest can be much more lethal through subversion
or aggression from outside.
I hope the participants of this workshop will be able to form their own opinion whether these and many other
requirements for a successful foreign policy will be met in the coming months and years.
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APPENDIX H
Paper by
Former Vice President IPRI
Short Course on
How Security consideration Influence Foreign Policy in Pakistan

Role of Security Agencies
by
Former Vice President IPRI
Let me begin by suggesting that the subject we are interested in studying today is the role of intelligence agencies
rather than security agencies. Security agencies are those that enjoy legal jurisdiction domestically e.g. the FBI in
the US is a security agency with domestic jurisdiction. It also has intelligence functions, but only domestically.
Consequently, it has little influence over foreign policy formulation; whereas the CIA, which is an intelligence
agency, has considerable influence on foreign policy. In Pakistan, the ISI and the IB are intelligence agencies; the
police, para-military forces, and the army when called out in aid of civil power are security agencies. The FIA was
created in Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's period to fill the gap of domestic intelligence, but the intelligence agencies that
influence foreign policy are those that have an external role.
Firstly, let me clarify here that in all countries of the world intelligence agencies have a role to play in foreign policy
formulation; not only in terms of input, but sometimes even dictate foreign policy in certain domains. Two domains
which are usually exclusively those of intelligence agencies and in which they influence foreign policy are those
relating to international terrorism and international drug smuggling. In the US, for instance, in issues relating to
these two matters, the state department may have to modify policies without knowing why. Similarly in Israel,
where drug trade is not a serious matter yet, in the domain of “terrorism” or Palestinian freedom fighters, the
Mossad enjoys exclusive jurisdiction and may dictate foreign policy without explaining why.
Apart from exclusive domains the intelligence agencies have another universally constant role: input; to
comprehend this it is important to understand how intelligence agencies work. The intelligence business has four
steps to it; collect, collate, analyse, and interpret or predict. Let us look at each by turn. Collection is the basic
function; all intelligence agencies collect information of all kinds, sometimes useful, sometimes not; they collect
information on any act that appears suspicious or any act by a person who is held in suspicion. Collation is
perhaps the most difficult link in the entire process; it implies establishing connections between sometimes totally
unconnected pieces of information so that they can then be analysed and then be interpreted to predict an event or
interpreted to respond to. I will attempt to illustrate this through two examples.
Example one: An overseas ISI operative reports that X, a known member of the defunct Jaish-e-Muhammed has
bought a large quantity of Semtec (a very high explosive) in Kazakhstan and has crossed over to Afghanistan. This
will come to the desk of someone in the “External Wing” of the ISI. He will promptly convey this information to his
counterpart in the “Internal Wing” and, of course to his superiors in his own wing. The internal wing will
immediately alert their operatives to monitor X' movements on the Afghan border. Meantime, Y, a person suspected
of having links to an extremist religious Sunni party has been seen aimlessly roaming in Raja Bazaar Rawalpindi
and has twice circled the Imam bar Gah in the city. If ISI operatives spot X crossing the Afghan border, they could
have him arrested by security agencies or, in search of bigger fish, not arrest him. In the latter event, if someone
collated these two unrelated pieces of information, it could be analysed to conclude that the Semtec was intended
for use in Pakistan and perhaps a possible target might be the Imam bar Gah in Rawalpindi city. They could then
proceed to take precautionary security measures and to proceed to try and identify the ring leaders to arrest them.
Example two: We are all aware that India is active in the Central Asian countries. Someone in the Analysis Wing of
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the ISI would sit down to analyse the possibilities and would perhaps consider three possibilities a) it might be an
attempt to re-link itself with Russia, b) it could be an attempt to hem in China in the future, or c) it wants access to
the energy resources of Central Asia without having to depend upon, or permit benefit to accrue to, Pakistan.
Consequently it is trying to ensure continued instability in Afghanistan so that there is no alternative but to take the
lengthier route to the seas via Iran. In the event of the first two possibilities, Pakistan may not be seriously
concerned; however, in the event of the third possibility, the External Wing of the ISI would be tasked to seek
evidence confirming this possibility. If confirmed, it would have serious implications for the foreign policy of
Pakistan, which may be modified to deal with this eventuality.
The ISI was created in 1948 as an intelligence agency intended to provide information of relevance to defence
matters to all three services; to this end it was placed under the defence ministry. In Ayub's time it was tasked to
gather information domestically on political figures of significance, but no major domestic role was assigned to it.
Surprisingly, it was in Zulfiqar ali Bhutto's tenure that it was formally expanded to include the “Internal Wing”. I say
surprisingly, because Bhutto created the FIA intended to fill the vacuum of domestic intelligence and in his tenure
there appeared to be a deliberate effort to eradicate the military's influence in politics. However, it was in Zia's
tenure that the ISI began to acquire the standing that it still enjoys when Zia employed it extensively in the domestic
arena to create his “democratic political setup”. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan following the Iranian revolution
brought the CIA in, and the natural ally of the CIA was the ISI. We have much to thank them for domestically;
including the religious militancy and bigotry, the drug and Kalashnikov cultures and much more, but since this
paper is concerned with only foreign policy, I will confine myself to that issue.
In the words of a senior diplomat, “between 1979 and 1984 the foreign office was slowly shifted to the ISI HQ and
we were left twiddling our thumbs or acting as spokesmen of their policies, words of caution were to no avail”. The
Afghan policy took primacy, it had brought back the US (our relations with the US had reached an all time low when
the US embassy was burned in August 1979), it was bringing in much needed military assistance including the F-
16s, it was bringing funding from the entire Muslim world, and the US led west were prepared to ignore our nuclear
programme. Consequently, all other issues and policies were relegated to suit the Afghan policy. Since the Afghan
policy lay with the ISI, all other policies were also influenced by it.
The Soviet withdrawal was timed to coincide with the beginning of the Kashmiri freedom movement and, quite
naturally, the ISI merely had to shift its vision from the one front to the other, not that they were no longer active in
Afghanistan; that was to continue till the defeat of the Taliban by the US, however, religious militancy shifted from
one front to the other and the ISI continued to enjoy its supremacy. After the Musharaf coup (or counter coup, as
the military prefers to call it), the ISI reached its zenith under Lt Gen Mahmood. He considered himself the person
responsible for bringing about the coup and therefore, specially privileged, which he was. After his ouster, Lt Gen
Ehsan, a far more amicable and far less aggressive person has taken over, the ISI has been purged of elements
unacceptable to the current political milieu, Ehsan is less visible, but its influence continues relatively unabated. It is
unlikely that its influence will diminish in the foreseeable future.
Before I conclude, I wish to add that I could not agree more with Mr Sardar Asif Ahmed Ali, when he said that we
should not have converted the Kashmiri freedom struggle into a Jihad; personally I believe that was the greatest
damage that we did to their cause and they say so. I also fully concur with those who made the point that, while
our Afghan and Kashmir policies merit review, we seem to be doing so under external pressure. As a matter of fact,
I don't believe there was any “Kashmir” or “Afghan” policies; policies have and, a purpose, to achieve, a time span
in which to achieve them and then the methodology is fleshed out. Neither our Afghan policy, nor our Kashmir
policy had an end or purpose in sight, they were open ended; an end in itself. Nor in fact, do we have a policy
today.
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In conclusion, let me offer you a possible foreign policy statement for Pakistan today: “While recognizing the
dynamics of a unipolar world and the compulsions of following a policy of appeasement (even servility!) towards
the US in the interim; Pakistan will seek to reestablish its sovereignty over the next ten years by creating a nexus
between Iran, China, Pakistan, Afghanistan utilizing the energy resources of Central Asia to gain economic
independence”. It has an aim, a purpose, a time span, it is achievable, it can make us what we wish to be; a
sovereign state independent of external issue, the methodology of this would complete the policy. Mind you, the
methodology is a flexible outline, since it needs to adjust to changing times. I only wish this, or something akin to
this was our foreign policy; how different would be our dynamics today?
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APPENDIX I
Paper by
Mr. Najmuddin A. Saikh
Short Course on
How Security Considerations Influence the Formulation of Foreign Policy
by
I would like to start by felicitating PILDAT on the organizing of this Short Course on the “Process of Foreign Policy
Formulation in Pakistan.” for our legislators. In every democracy, it is the task of the people's representatives not
only through the government they set up but through discussions in parliament to determine the broad parameters
of a country's foreign policy. They need to be well informed.
It is a sad fact that in the relatively short periods for which democracy has prevailed in our country our legislators
have paid little attention to this area even while recognizing its importance. For some of them it is a subject of such
enormous complexity and delicacy that it is best left to the experts. More cynically others have chosen to ignore it
because there is no real constituent pressure to take an interest in this area nor does specialization in this field
create the sort of influence that the legislator can use to advance his political ambitions or to solve the day-to-day
problems of his constituents.
The fact however is that in any democracy Parliament has a crucial role to play in foreign policy formulation and
implementation. They not only adopt legislation needed domestically to give effect to foreign policy decisions but
also in many countries to ratify any agreements that the government in power reaches with other countries or
groups of countries or international organisations.
Currently in Pakistan the power to ratify agreements lies with the Cabinet and not directly with the Parliament but
there should be no mistake that in such ratification the Cabinet is, at least theoretically reflecting the will of the
parliament and that when these agreements are of consequence such ratification would normally be preceded by a
discussion in parliament or at the very least in the Foreign Affairs committee of both the National Assembly and the
Senate. As our democracy matures we may well come to the stage where all international agreements will be the
subject of discussion and scrutiny not only by the Cabinet but by Parliament and the Parliament's consent will be
needed to ratify such agreements.
The Parliament also controls the purse strings. It is for the Parliament to determine what funds are made available
for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to the other agencies that play a part in advising the government on foreign
policy issues. In so doing it can determine the role the Ministry and the other agencies can play in helping the
government to formulate foreign policy and thereafter, what resources the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as the
principal instrument of the government for implementation, will have to put these policies into effect.
Just as in the formulation of domestic policy decision makers and strategists have to take account of the views of
various constituencies and various sometimes conflicting interests so too in foreign policy one has to take account
not only of one's own national interests but those of the country towards which a particular initiative or foreign
policy objective is directed.
In domestic politics a successful politician is one who knows either directly or through his aides, not only his own
strengths and weaknesses but also those of his coalition partners and his adversaries. He knows to a nicety which
goals he will need to modify to achieve consensus. And in today's world, he knows how to present a case at the
bar of domestic public opinion so that his assessment rather than that of his opponents is accepted. Pragmatism
may, on occasion, dictate alliances with parties with manifestoes that are incompatible with his own vision of the
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direction in which the country should be advancing. Pragmatism may also dictate that he uses whatever unofficial
intelligence means are available to him to determine the weaknesses and strengths of his negotiating partners.
Similarly, in foreign policy, the successful politician will seek to acquire a sense of the perceived and real strengths
and weaknesses of foreign countries, of the domestic compulsions of the leaders of these countries and, where
necessary, an estimate of the ideological or other considerations that guide decision making in those countries.
Where multilateral negotiations are involved he will also learn how best his country's case can be projected at the
bar of international public opinion. Here too driven by the necessity of protecting his country's national interests he
may make alliances that are contrary to the ideology of the country or the basic philosophy that he espouses
domestically. Again like in domestic politics he will use not only the overt means of gathering information but also
the covert means that his official intelligence agencies can provide him.
In large measure the determinant of foreign policy is domestic policy. Foreign policy is the handmaiden of domestic
policy. If in domestic policy there is a certain ideological thrust and there is a determination that our relations with
other countries will be pursued bearing this ideology in mind despite the costs that it may entail then foreign policy,
will veer towards establishing close relations with the countries that share this ideology. The task is then of
formulating a foreign policy that allows an advance towards this goal without putting at risk other relationships that
are of greater importance in political and economic terms.
If domestic policy recognises that the resources the country can generate internally are not sufficient to fulfill the
economic development requirements of the country and that it needs greater access to foreign markets, large
amounts of foreign assistance and foreign investment etc. foreign policy must then be formulated with these
objectives in mind. Clearly in advancing these objectives there will be domestic policy trade-offs in terms of the
reciprocal opening of our own domestic market to foreign exporters, granting of concessions to foreign investors,
accepting economic conditionalities for foreign assistance etc. but concessions may also have to be made in
foreign policy terms.
There is however one overriding foreign policy goal that cannot be subservient to domestic policy and that is, in
fact, the one area in which domestic policy must bend to the requirements of foreign policy. This goal is the
protection of the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the country. The extent to which this goal becomes the
determinant of foreign policy will vary from country to country. In our own case this has been paramount from the
start because of the circumstances in which Pakistan came into being.
But if one were to move away from the Pakistan example and to look at the situation in a theoretical framework how
would one determine the formulation of foreign policy in the context of an external threat to national security. Firstly
the country's leaders have to use all the means at their disposal to determine what real or potential external threats
to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country exist. Second they have to determine whether these threats
are such as can be met by the nation's own capabilities or by capabilities that it can afford to acquire. Third they
have to determine whether these threats can be mitigated by diplomatic efforts directed at the source of the threat
or by diplomatic efforts to build alliances with other nations that share the same threat perception or for other
reasons can help offset these threats. Fourth they have to determine the maximum and the minimum concessions
that the country would be prepared to make that the sovereign authority believes it can offer to blunt the source of
the threat or to build alliances or to acquire the where withal to mitigate or offset the threat.
Further the foreign policy that is devised vis-à-vis the source of the threat must be such as would follow from a
deep and thorough study of (a) the potential enemy country's strengths and weaknesses (b) the inimical elements
in that country, the rationale, if any for their adversarial posture, the degree of influence they enjoy in decision
making, and the steps that can be taken to mitigate the hostility (c) the friendly elements in that country, the
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reasons they have for seeking friendship, the degree of influence they enjoy in decision making and what steps can
be taken to increase this influence. A second element would be the identification and the highlighting of interests
that are served by friendly rather than hostile relations and finding ways of making these common interests known
to the masses in both countries with a view to building public opinion in favour of friendship rather than hostility.
In seeking support from other countries the foreign policy devised would be one that takes account of the
prospective ally's own needs and its political system. It would be sensitive to the needs of the groups or individuals
who would need to be influenced. It would seek to establish as far as possible the geo-political compulsions, which
would make such support helpful if not essential for the prospective ally. It would stress the affinities between the
peoples of the two countries and the advantages that an alliance would bring in terms of promoting trade and
economic relations on favourable terms etc. Finally it would include what could be offered as a quid pro quo for
such support.
The foregoing list of determinants, by no means comprehensive, would show that information in a number of areas
would have to be gathered and this task would of necessity require primarily the employment of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the embassies it maintains in foreign countries but a number of other agencies including the
defence and economic ministries and above all the intelligence agencies would also need to contribute.
For example, determining the magnitude of the threat will require not only information on the publicly known facts
about the size of the potential enemy's armed forces and about the quality of its weaponry but also less well
publicized or even secret information about the leadership qualities of the military commanders, about the relations
these commanders have with the political leadership, about their ability to deploy rapidly, about their indigenous
capability to manufacture military hardware and a whole host of other such information. Such information, obtained
through overt or covert sources would then need to be assessed primarily by military experts before it becomes an
input in the policy making process.
Similarly identifying inimical and friendly elements in the potential enemy country and the degree of influence they
enjoy would primarily be the function of the ministry of foreign affairs and the envoys it deploys but these efforts
could be usefully supplemented by information obtained covertly by intelligence agencies using tools that are not
available to the personnel of the Foreign Office.
In other words intelligence agencies and other organs of the government have an important role to play in gathering
the information needed, particularly in the context of external security, for the formulation of a coherent foreign
policy. The government would be failing in its duty if it relied solely on the ministry of foreign affairs for this purpose
even while recognising that the primary responsibility for advising the government on foreign policy must rest with
this ministry.
Theoretically it is the ministry of foreign affairs that will be the recipient of foreign policy related information from
the intelligence and other agencies of the government and will incorporate it, after analysis, in its recommendations
to the government on how Pakistan's security and other interests could best be safeguarded. In practice however
the situation has been to say the least very different.
Pakistan has found itself, forced by the perceived threat to its security to devote a larger part of its limited
resources to defense and as a necessary corollary to give the military a greater role in the political life of the
fledgling democracy.
This has also meant however that the military and the intelligence agencies have had a much greater role to play in
determining the policies to be adopted and equally importantly the measures to be taken on the ground through
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overt and covert operations to tackle these security threats or to pursue Pakistan's perceived national interests. It
has also meant that both the intelligence agencies belonging to the armed forces and those theoretically under
civilian authority view their function as going beyond the collection of information.
There is a general impression, and one cannot regard it as inaccurate, that on vital foreign policy issues the
government's policy formulations are based on the conceptual frameworks and the information and analysis
provided by the intelligence agencies and it is these agencies that are given primary responsibility for their
implementation. There is also the general impression that these conceptual frameworks lay an inordinately heavy
emphasis on the military facets of security and downplay the other facets that contribute, as much if not more, to
genuine national security.
Of course it is not in Pakistan alone that intelligence agencies play a role in policy formulation that goes beyond the
provision of raw information obtained overtly or covertly. In the United States where much emphasis has been laid
on the fact that in making his policies the President relies most heavily on his principal foreign policy adviser, and
that is the Secretary of State, there have been periods when the director of the CIA, has been the dominant voice in
policy making. During the period of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the CIA, by and large, dictated American
policies in Afghanistan. It had a larger presence in Afghanistan and perhaps in Pakistan than the State Department
and many of the most delicate negotiations with Pakistan were conducted through the heads of the intelligence
agencies of the two countries.
There is no doubt that all over the world on questions of security the intelligence agencies tend to go beyond the
narrow mandate of providing raw information or neutral analysis for their political masters without making policy
recommendations. This is as it should be. Intelligence gathering, 90% of which lies in the public realm, has to be
done, if it is to be done effectively, by educated and trained personnel and it is almost inevitable that such persons
will draw conclusions from such information and wish to share such conclusions along with the information. The
question is whether such conclusions or recommendations should by themselves become the basis of policy.
Most intelligence agencies have both an information gathering and analysis capability and an operational capability.
Good intelligence agencies try and ensure that the two functions are insulated one from the other. But this is clearly
difficult if not impossible to achieve. There is then a strong temptation to tailor the analysis of the information
gathered to the needs of the operational branch.
Secondly while intelligence agencies can develop tremendous capacities for information gathering there are
inevitably lacunae and, equally importantly, there are large bodies of information the analysis of which needs
capabilities and experience that rest elsewhere in the government structure.
Thirdly, foreign policy is not a one-way street. The viability or otherwise of policy options may depend on the
reactions and needs of other countries. Gauging these accurately needs contact with decision makers in these
countries and that is the task of the ambassadors and embassies.
It would therefore be right and proper that the role of the intelligence agencies should be limited to providing as fully
as possible the information that they are able to gather, along, if necessary, with their own analysis of what this
information could mean to the one body that is institutionally responsible for assisting the leadership in formulating
foreign policy and that body of course is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
This ministry's recommendations, once accepted by the government, should, in a democracy, be subject to
deliberation and debate either in open session or, if the subject is sensitive, in camera by the relevant committees of
Parliament and become the basis of policy only after they have been approved.
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APPENDIX J
Paper by
Mian Abdul Waheed
Former Chairman Foreign Affairs Committee
of the National Assembly
Short Course on
Review and Analysis of Pakistan's Foreign Policy by the Parliament:

Principals, Methodology, Tools And Infrastructure with Special Reference to the Foreign Affairs
Committees of the Senate and the National Assembly
by
Mian Abdul Waheed
Former Chairman Foreign Affairs Committee
Of the National Assembly
The principals of Pakistan's Foreign Policy have been Security and Economic Progress of Pakistan. Additionally, two
factors i.e Solidarity with the Islamic World and Decolonization occupied important place in Pakistan foreign
relations.
The tools available to the National Assembly are the Parliamentary Committee of the Ruling Party, the main
opposition party and other small parties. Important issue, relating to various aspects or foreign and internal policies
are discussed in the Parliamentary Party meetings where guidelines are determined Standing Committee on Foreign
Affairs, comprises members of the National Assembly belonging to the Ruling Party. The only exception was the
election of Madam Benazir Bhutto, as Chairperson of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs during Prime
Minister Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif's first government.
The vitality and the vigone with which the committee on Foreign Affairs can plays its role depends largely on the
support received from the Prime Minister and the Speaker of the House. Rules of procedure and conduct of
Business by the National Assembly were reframed in early 1990,s under the guidance of the then Speaker of
National Assembly Mr. Gohar Ayub Khan. The construction of Parliamentary lodges was undertaken by him Mr.
Gohar Ayub Khan also tried to get offices for members of the National Assembly constructed, but the National
Assembly was dissolved before this project could be undertaken. No attention ever has been paid to creation of
offices for the members of the National Assembly. It is dismaying to say that the people representatives who
occupy the highest position in Pakistan have not been provided with the where-with-all of carrying out their
obligation. This could be attributed to indifference on the part of the governing political leadership as well as mute
resistance by the bureaucracy. In my three terms as a member I tried repeatedly to get this infrastructure created
but failed. Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, Mrs. Benazir Bhutto, Mr. Gohar Ayub Khan and Mr. Yusuf Raza Gillani did
encourage the Parliamentarians to go abroad and project Pakistan's view in important foreign policy and
international issues. However, the scope of such visits, due to various reasons including the resource constraint
was limited. The standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and the National Assembly were hamstrung during the
National Assembly which lasted from 1997 to Oct. 1999 as the then Speaker was opposed to Committees
Sessions being held in places other than Islamabad. Not a single visit by members of the Committee on Foreign
Affairs to any country was allowed.
It a matter of great disappointment that in contrast to most other countries, the National Assembly in Pakistan has
hardly had any or in fact no role, to play in review, analysis or formulation of Pakistan's Foreign Policy. Debates on
foreign policy issues are rare and when held the period of debate is invariably limited to a few days. Whenever an
important issue assumes critical proportions, on insistence by the National Assembly, short lived debates, with a
view to allowing members to vent their criticism are held. Winding up of such debates has never been satisfactory
since issues are papered over.
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National Assembly's Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, if you look at its mandate is a powerful committee with
the authority to review almost everything. Parliamentary Committee of the Ruling and other parties are equally
important forums for review and analysis of Pakistan's foreign policy. Our performance, I must confess has been
disappointingly inadequate.
I was elected to the National Assembly in 1990, 1993 and 1997 i.e thrice consecutively. I have been watching the
performance of the present National Assembly ever since its inception, which unfortunately has done little to show
that it has made improvement over the past.
I become a member of the National Assembly, which stayed in power from 1990-1993. Regrettably the Standing
Committee on Foreign Affairs was elected in early 1993 i.e almost after 2-1/2 years of election of the National
Assembly. Mrs. Benazir Bhutto was elected its chairperson. Election of the Chairman was the only session ever
held by the committee.
Iraq's occupation of Kuwait was the main issue discussed by the Assembly. The mood of the National Assembly
clearly indicated that the religious parties which supported Saddam Hussain left a deep imprint on the minds of the
majority of the Parliamentarians. No one dared oppose Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. I was the first member to
rise and reject Kuwait's occupation by Iraq. My thesis was to oppose the philosophy that big fish eats the small fish
as enunciated in the Indian foreign policy philosophy. I was impelled by the fear that this example could be used by
India to indulge in agrressin against Pakistan. Our support to Iraq over its conquest of a small neighbor could be
used by India to carry out aggression against Pakistan; we would then have little or no logic to plead our case
before the International Community.
In the National Assembly which lasted from 1993-1996 the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs was headed by
Maulana Fazl-ur-Rehman of which I was a member. The Committee was quite active during this period. An
important event was committee's visit to China where useful discussions took place. While reiterating China's deep
and lasting friendship with Pakistan the Chinese leaders made it clear that:
I. Conflicts had to be substituted by conflict resolution and that they had entered an era where they
wanted peaceful relations with India. They also advised Pakistan to improve its relations with
India.
II. The future of interstate relations depended on the strength of economic ties between nations. In
pursuit of this policy the Chinese had undertaken a policy of enhancing economic relations with
India.
III. The Chinese were prepare to held Pakistan in promotion of economic relations and agreed to
recommend to the Chinese Corporations give priority to purchases from and sales to Pakistan,
but the Pakistan side, they added, had to compete with others in price and quality.
I was elected as Chairman of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of the National Assembly that lasted from
1997 to October 1999. A number of meetings were held. All members of the National Assembly who wished to
participate in the discussions, apart from the regular members of the Committee, were invited to participate.
Important intellectuals and Experts on Foreign Policy were asked to deliver lectures on important issues including
the core issue of Kashmir, Kargil, Nuclear explosion by India and Pakistan, relations with India, great powers,
neighboring countries, Central Africa and the Islamic World. European Union and economic issues including
problems faced by overseas Pakistanis were also discussed.
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It is regrettable that the views of the Committee, which were duly conveyed to the concerned authorities, were
hardly ever taken into consideration. Our views on Afghanistan differed from the policy of the government. Whereas
we advocated a policy of liaison with all the contending groups in Afghanistan, we were told that the Talibans were
close to victory in Afghanistan. As the event unfolded subsequently, it becomes clear that the Pro-Taliban policy
was incorrect. I must admit that though it was the duty of the Speaker to ensure that the committee worked
effectively, the speaker at that time hardly ever allowed to committee to play its role.
Exchange of visits by the Foreign Affairs Committees of various countries is a normal phenomenon. Though the
committees from several countries visisted Pakistan, the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of our National
Assembly was never allowed ti reciprocate. All the visits that took place by some of our members to explain
Pakistan's position on the burning issues such as Kashmir, Pakistan's Security, Kargil and Nuclear explosions by
India and Pakistan during 1997-1999 were authorized by the then Prime Minister Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif.
The Speaker, whose primary duty was to make Parliament effective and play its appointed role failed to live up to
his duties.
During Benazir Bhutto's second government there was apprehension that the Pakistan People Party Government
might sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (C.T.B.T). As member of the opposition we explored whether the
Parliament could block ratification of C.T.B.T, in case the Benazir Government signed it. To our dismay we
discovered that the National Assembly had no role to play in ratification to Treaties. There is no such role even
today. In case the National Assembly was empowered to do so, the government, besides ensuring that the will of
the people prevailed, could avoid external pressure by taking shelter behind the fact that ratification of Treaties
rested with the National Assembly.
Some of the factor which hinder contribution by the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs in reviewing and
analyzing on Pakistan's foreign policies are:
I. Committees are formed only when the National Assembly has lived through half of its life.
II. National Assembly has never been allowed to complete its full tenure.
III. There is no permanent office or secretariat. Thus there is no infrastructure.
IV. A lot of time is wasted in finding office and staff for the Committee Chairman.
V. It is dismaying that the members of National Assembly are not provided with offices to work.
They spend most of the time in roaming around and in Cafeteria.
Facts mentioned by me earlier make it a very sad story that. In a parliamentary system of government, the elected
representatives are not provided with the means and the resources or given the opportunity to review and analyze
Pakistan's Foreign policy not to speak of its formulation
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APPENDIX K
Paper by
Short Course on
Principle Determinants of Pakistan's Foreign Policy with

Special Reference to the Role of Parliament:
Principals, methodology, tools and infrastructure available with
Parliament and Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs
by
Introduction:
Pakistan's Foreign Policy since its inception has been determined largely by three factors
1. The threat perception from India as a hostile State

2. The unresolved Kashmir dispute
3. The need for rapid economic progress
Pakistan was therefore obliged to seek strategic alliances in pursuing the above goals of security, Kashmir dispute
resolution, and economic Progress.
Since India was historically hostile and was in alliance with USSR even though it professed non-alignment, Pakistan
was obliged to seek strategic alliances with the West. As a consequence of these imperatives, Pakistan joined the
anti-communist alliance of SEATO and CENTO. These alliances brought Pakistan formally into the camp of so-
called free world against communism.
Out of these alliances Pakistan benefited substantially in strengthening its military capabilities and made rapid
economic progress. Although this policy gave a measure of security to Pakistan, it did little to resolve the Kashmir
dispute beyond verbal support. However, one of the conditions of military assistance from USA was non-use of
weapons for any other purpose except for fighting communism.
In the 1960s the late President Ayub Khan became one of the strongest US allies. The entire western anti-
communist camp considered Pakistan as a strategic ally. But it is to be noted here that the West had not abandoned
India even though India was receiving massive Soviet military and economic assistance. The western tilt was
towards Pakistan but at no point was it anti-Indian.
In 1965, a major turning point was reached because of two Indo-Pak Conflicts.
In the Ran of Kutch, a border dispute led to major battles in which Pakistan Armed Forces tested their mettle
successfully against India. President Ayub Khan made a serious error in over-assessing Pakistan Armed Forces'
offensive capabilities as well as the strength of Western support to him. In September 1965, he went to war against
India across the Cease Fire Line in Kashmir.
The assumptions behind these attacks were that:
1. India would not cross the International border

2. The western alliance of Pakistan would replenish Pakistan's military hardware during the war.
3. The state of training combat readiness, and hardware was superior to India.
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4. The Kashmiri people would rise against the Indian military occupation of Jammu & Kashmir.
Based on these faulty assumptions, his planners hoped President Ayub Khan would be able to militarily force the
solution of Kashmir dispute.
Every one of the assumptions proved to be wrong. In 1965, the war was disastrous and at best stalemate. But the
greater damage to Pakistan was the loss of credibility in the West as a strategic partner. It was realized in the West
that President Ayub Khan was pursuing his own national agenda rather than an anti-communist Western ideological
war. Mercifully Pakistan did not lose much in terms of territory or hardware, and Pakistan's closest allies Iran, China
and Saudi Arabia stood by it. Even the somewhat hostile Afghanistan regime maintained friendly neutrality. Support
came from unexpected quarters like from Indonesia's Sukarno.
Eventually Pakistan was forced to sign the humiliating Tashkent Declaration. Post Tashkent, Pakistan's foreign policy
was in doldrums. It had lost confidence of the West. It failed to achieve military objectives in 1965 war. Ayub Khan,
who was the blue-eyed boy of the West, was sent into rapid decline, which eventually saw his ouster.
However, domestic turbulence overtook him. Power was taken over by Gen. Yahyah Khan. Gen. Yahya Khan
attempted to rebuild bridges with the US. The secret visit of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to China in a
small measure restored Western confidence in him but certainly not enough to reacquire the special relationship.
The crisis in East Pakistan and its mishandling of civil unrest by the Generals escalated tensions with India which
finally exploded into the second major war in the Subcontinent. India, ever the predator neighbor, saw an
opportunity to strike a deadly blow. Such was the human rights record of the army action in East Pakistan that the
world was shocked by its ferocity and cruelty. Therefore, when the Indian Army marched into Dhaka and affected
the surrender of 90,000 Pakistani personnel, the world applauded this Indian conquest. What is mystifying is that
Gen. Yahya Khan mainly hoped for the US and Chinese intervention to support Pakistan, which never came. Even
stranger is the fact that Gen. Yahya Khan opened the Western front when Pakistan was not under attack in the West.
The Western front failed to release pressure in the East. Eventually the Generals, now humiliated, transferred power
to Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto whose PPP had emerged as a majority in the Western provinces. Mr. Bhutto rebuilt some
of the broken bridges in the West and normalized relations with the Soviet Union by withdrawing Pakistan from
SEATO and CENTO.
The Arab Israel war in 1973 presented a rare opportunity to Pakistan for playing a pivotal role in the Middle East as
well as the Islamic world. The Islamic summit in Lahore was a landmark event that projected Pakistan as one of the
key actors in the Muslim world. Mr. Bhutto used the opportunity to recognize the secession of Bangladesh and
rebuilt relationships with the West, Russia, China, Iran and the Arab Middle East. The Arab oil embargo resulting
from 1973 Arab-Israel war sent oil prices sky high and oil-rich Middle East states were flooded by petro-dollars.
The Islamic Summit in Lahore gave Mr. Bhutto an opportunity to build strategic relations with the oil-rich Middle
East. Millions of Pakistani workers, businessmen and professionals were absorbed in Arab oil producing countries.
The loss of Western aid had been largely compensated by remittances of overseas Pakistanis and direct economic
assistance to Pakistan from the oil-rich Arab World.
Mr. Bhutto also signed with India the Simla Accord which brought back 90,000 POWs from India as well as
withdrawal of Indian armed forces from the territories occupied in the 1971 war. In Kashmir, the Ceasefire Line was
converted into LOC (Line of Control). The Simla Accord recognized the need to resolve the Kashmir dispute
peacefully through negotiations.
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The Simla Accord was one of the outstanding achievements of Pakistan's diplomacy. It was during Mr. Bhutto's
government that Pakistan's Nuclear Programme was initiated and the construction of the Kahota uranium
enrichment plant was started.
1977 once again saw internal turbulence in Pakistan. Once again a military dictator Gen. Zia ul Haq took over
power. Two major events in the region affected Pakistan's foreign policy.
1. The Islamic revolution in Iran

2. Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan
The late Gen. Zia ul Haq was lacking in moral and political legitimacy. So in both events an opportunity for self-
aggrandizement presented itself. In Islam he saw an opportunity and rapidly converted all state institutions into the
so-called Islamic mode and took advantage of the rise to pro-Islamic sentiments among the people of Pakistan.
In the meantime, Ronald Regan won the US presidential elections on the platform of demolishing the evil
communist empire. This was to be the final push in the Cold War against the Soviet Union. America also sought to
avenge its humiliating defeat in the Vietnam War. In Afghanistan there was an opportunity to defeat the Soviet
occupation forces but the US had no access to Afghanistan because Iran had turned radically anti-West and anti-
US. Pakistan was the only access and a staging area to mount a covert offensive against Soviet occupation forces
in Afghanistan.
Gen. Zia ul Haq was quick to see this strategic opportunity. Pakistan hosted 3.2 million Afghan refugees as a result
of the war against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Out of this anti-Soviet alliance, Pakistan received about 4 billon
dollars of US assistance mostly of military hardware. The war of liberation in Afghanistan was fought from the soil
of Pakistan in the name of Islam and Jihad.
Fighters were imported to fight in Afghanistan from all over the Muslim world. By 1987-88 the Soviet Union Armed
Forces in Afghanistan had suffered heavy loses and a million Afghans lost their lives. The Evil Empire had
exhausted itself through too many foreign policy adventures. It sued for peace in 1988. The Geneva Accords were
signed to facilitate the peaceful withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. They left behind a destroyed country
and arms dumps believed to be worth over 20 billion dollars. They also left behind President Najeebullah's Afghan
Armed Forces and security apparatus. However, Najeebullah's key ally, the pro-Soviet Gen. Rasheed Dostum of the
North-West Provinces finally abandoned him and formed an alliance with the Panjsheri leader of the North East,
Ahmed Shah Masood. The two marched upon Kabul and took over the city. Islamabad finally woke up to this major
development and with assistance of Saudi Arabia brought about an agreement between the resistance parties and
groups. As a result, first Mujadaddi and then Rabbani were made Presidents.
Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan became deeper and deeper but unfortunately policy managers in Pakistan
relied more on military solutions rather than political solutions. They failed to recognize that in the post Najeebullah
period, there was political crisis in Afghanistan, not a military one.
Consequently, there was blunder after blunder and Pakistan was sucked into a zero-sum game in Afghanistan. The
second aspect of this failure in Afghanistan was the thinking in Rawalpindi's military circles that Afghanistan had
been used to lend strategic depth to Pakistan.
In this modern age of technology, this was a concept based on false assumptions and Bonapartist ambitions. It
was bereft of any realism. The other setback to Pakistan's policy was the withdrawal of the US and its allies from
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any involvement in Afghanistan. They simply walked away in 1988. Therefore, Pakistan was left to bear almost the
entire burden of 3.2 million refugees. Along with this major setback in 1990, sanctions were imposed on Pakistan
by the Bush administration for covertly pursuing the nuclear program. Pakistan experienced great economic
hardship and isolation. In the meantime, Pakistan had helped the uprising in Indian occupied Kashmir. Its relations
with India started to become tense on several fronts. Pakistan's profile suffered many setbacks. The militants who
had come to fight in Afghanistan Jihad remained in North West Pakistan. There was an uprising in North East
Jammu & Kashmir. Internationally, Pakistan suffered from military and economic sanctions. Internally, Pakistan
saw great internal instability. In foreign policy, a few developments did take place in the first Benazir Government.
Important nuclear treaties were signed with India, whereas the Government of Mr. Nawaz Sharif pushed
Afghanistan into further civil war.
In the second Benazir Governemnt, the rise of Taliban in Afghanistan and eventually their take over of Kabul and
three quarters of Afghanistan were major developments. This period also saw Pakistan's quest for deepened
relations with Central Asia. The more insecure Pakistan felt in terms of its security, the more it spent on nuclear
capability. It is by now an open secret that as a cost of Afghanistan war against Soviet Union, the Ronald Regan
administration looked towards Pakistan's nuclear ambitions. In the early and mid-90's India tested its first short-
range missile. There was panic in Pakistan's defence circles. As result South Asia was plunged into a missile race.
The politics of oil and gas pipelines in Central Asia again brought Pakistan on the US screen. The Benazir
Governemnt was quick to seize the opportunity and signed MOUs with Turkmenistan and Afghanistan for delivery
of gas in Pakistan and South Asia from Daulatabad gas-field in Turkmenistan. But the civil war in Afghanistan
followed by the Taliban take-over were the biggest impediments in developing this energy lifeline. The medieval
policy of the Taliban Government based on primitive tribal interpretation of Islam made the regime fairly loathsome
to the world.
The US administration withdrew its support to the Unicoll-Delta alliance to build this pipeline. In the government of
Benazir, Pakistan became the biggest contributor to UN peacekeeping forces in the world. Pakistan also played a
key role in bringing peace and settlement to the war-torn “Bosnia Herzogovina”. Pakistan also played a key role in
the U.N. mediation to end the civil war in Tajikistan. It was after the Benazir Government that Osama Bin Ladan
moved from Sudan to Afghanistan. It appears that he rapidly took over the key decision-making processes of the
Taliban Government. It is alleged that Al-Qaeda made stunning terrorist attacks on US military and civil targets
under Osama Bin Ladan's directions. His ability to destabilize Pakistan and penetration in Pakistan was thought be
considerable.
The second Government of Nawaz Sharif saw significant Foreign Policy developments. India tested its nuclear
weapons in 1999. Pakistan historically following reactive policies, replied in kind and tested several sophisticated
devices. South Asia had turned nuclear which caused great alarm all over the world. But following closely on the
heels of nuclear explosions, both Nawaz Sharif and Vajpayee felt the need to reduce tensions. Therefore Mr.
Vajpayee visited Lahore and signed the Lahore Declaration, which was a balanced statement and in harmony with
the Simla Accord. But while the ink on the Lahore Declaration was still wet, the world heard of a serious conflict in
Kargil. It appears that irregular elements and the Northern Light Infantry crossed the LOC around Kargil sector and
threatened the road to Ladakh and Leh. This was a brilliant tactical victory and if it was taken to a military
conclusion, it would have resulted in severing the entire Ladakh region from military and food supplies. The world,
as expected, was highly shocked because both countries were nuclear and missile-armed. But Pakistan's Generals
had once again miscalculated on the strategic aspects of Kargil. The world did not intervene and did not force India
into a negotiated settlement of the Kashmir dispute, as our military planners had expected.
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Pakistan was seen to be a traditional aggressor. A great deal of pressure was brought upon Pakistan, both on
ground and diplomatically. Eventually Pakistan was forced to withdraw. Therefore, a partial tactical victory had
turned into a major strategic setback. The Indian argument against Pakistan being an irresponsible state was
bought by the world, as Indian diplomats in world capitals projected the image of Pakistan as being irresponsible
and expansionist. Furthermore, while Nawaz Sharif was involved in negotiations with Vajpayee, the Armed Forces
were busy in grabbing Indian Territory. This was the punch-line of Indian diplomats. Kargil resulted in great
bitterness between Prime Minister and the Chief of Army Staff. The tug of war between the two resulted in a take-
over once again by the military Chief of Staff.
Although he had no legitimacy, he sought to arrive on the international stage by easing tensions with India. This
resulted in the failed Agra Summit. As the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan provided International support to Gen.
Zia ul Haq, Musharraf too sought such support.
The events of 9/11 changed the world. But it also changed the fortunes of Gen. Parvez Musharraf. G. W. Bush had
decided to combat terrorism all over the world. His first target was Al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Ladan and their host
government in Afghanistan. The US required Pakistan's airspace and several bases and facilities in Pakistan to
launch its attacks on the Taliban Government. This was a godsend for Musharraf who conceded to these
concessions readily. Then Pakistan became a key ally of the US war on terrorism. Hundreds of Al-Qaeda fighters
have been arrested by the Pakistani government and handed over to the US. The FBI has been authorized to operate
inside Pakistan, hence undermining Pakistan's sovereignty. The tribal belt in the North West has been a host to
foreign Islamic militancy since the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
In this grey zone of Pakistan, remnants of the Taliban and Al-Qaida are still alleged to be present. They enjoy deep
relationships with semi-autonomous tribes. The US and ISAF forces in Afghanistan are engaged in combating a
new resistance against the Karzai Government. This twilight zone between Pakistan and Afghanistan is thought to
be harboring Islamist fighters. The Pakistan army has now launched a major operation to capture Al-Qaeda
operatives and its leaders.
The other significant event during Musharraf's regime was the Islamabad Declaration which was signed by
Musharraf and Vajpayee. This declaration is a balanced one and has the sprit of Simla Accord and the Lahore
Declaration. It has considerably reduced tensions in South Asia since 2001 when a major terrorist event occurred
in New Delhi. Over a million soldiers faced each other for 9 months. Musharraf faced world pressure to stop all
cross border movement on the LOC. In the Islamabad Declaration Pakistan committed not to allow any part of
Pakistan territory to be used for terrorism against India. Now Indians are satisfied on this score and tension has
eased between India and Pakistan. Both agreed to talk on all bilateral issues including Jammu & Kashmir. Many
CBMs have been put into place but time will tell whether Pakistan and India can solve the Jammu & Kashmir
dispute. There is an air of optimism among the people of India and Pakistan for peace.
199
APPENDIX L
Presentation by
Dr. Asad M. Khan
DG Economic Coordination
Short Course on
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Short Course on
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Short Course on
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Short Course on
206
5-A, Zafar Ali Road, Gulberg V, Lahore-54000, Pakistan.
Tel: (+92-42) 111 123 345 Fax: (+92-42) 575 1551
E-mail: info@pildat.org URL: www.pildat.org

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w w w. p i l d a t .

Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And

For the project

We also acknowledge the

Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And Transparency - PILDAT

Profiles of Speakers, Resource Persons and Session Chairs 12

How Security Considerations Influence Foreign Policy in Pakistan:

An Overview of Pakistan's Foreign Policy: 1947 - 2004

Major Foreign Policy Issues facing the Country

Process of Foreign Policy Formulation in Pakistan

Process of Foreign Policy Formulation in Pakistan

How Foreign Policy should be made in Pakistan?

Comments by Session Chair

Role of Security Agencies in Shaping Foreign Policy

How Security Considerations Influence the Formulation of Foreign Policy

Comments by Session Chair

Shaping of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy:

Shaping of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy:

Shaping of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy:

Summary of the Case Studies by the Session Chair 80

Views by Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi 83

Views by Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi 84

Comments by Session Chair

Review and Analysis of Foreign Policy by the

Principle Determinants of Pakistan's Foreign Policy

Comments by Session Chair

Economic Diplomacy and the Role of Foreign Office

Q&A/ Comments 106

Comments by Session Chair

Comments by Session Moderator

Views by H.E. Mr. Shivshankar Menon 113

Views by H.E. Mr. Mark Lyall Grant

Q&A/ Comments 120

Synthesis of the Session

Comments by Session Moderator 127

Appendix A: Programme of the Short Course 130

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

Mr. Sartaj Aziz

Mr. Abdul Sattar

Sardar Aseff Ahmed Ali

Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi

Ambassador (Retd.) Javid Husain

Mr. Shaheen A. Gillani

Senator Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Javed Ashraf Qazi

Mr. Najmuddin A. Sheikh

Brig. (Retd.) Shaukat Qadir

Dr. Ijaz Shafi Gilani

Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi

Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin

Dr. Ayesha Siddiqua

Dr. Asad Majeed Khan

Mian Abdul Waheed

H. E. Mr. Mark Lyall Grant

H.E. Mr. Shivshankar Menon

Mr. Lawrence K. Robinson

The Foreign Policy Process in Pakistan

Components of the Short Course

The course, especially held at the Pearl Continental Hotel,