Constitutional Law BARBRI

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW i.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART ONE: POWERS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I. THE JUDICIAL POWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

A. ARTICLE III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
B. POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
1. Review of Other Branches of Federal Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
a. Separation of Powers and Finality of Court Decisions . . . . . . . . . .1
2. Federal Review of State Acts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
C. FEDERAL COURTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
1. Article III Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
2. Article I Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
a. Limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
D. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
1. Original (Trial) Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
2. Appellate Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
a. Statutory Application of Appellate Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
1) Writ of Certiorari (Discretionary) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
2) Appeal (Mandatory) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
b. Limitations on Statutory Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
E. CONSTITUTIONAL AND SELF-IMPOSED LIMITATIONS ON EXERCISE
OF FEDERAL JURISDICTIONPOLICY OF STRICT NECESSITY . . . .3
1. No Advisory Opinions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
a. CompareDeclaratory Judgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
2. RipenessImmediate Threat of Harm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
3. Mootness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
a. ExceptionCapable of Repetition But Evading Review . . . . . . . . .4
b. Class Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
c. Distinguish Ripeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
4. Standing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
a. Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
1) Injury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
a) Injury Need Not Be Economic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
2) Causation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
3) Redressability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
4) Required at All Stages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
b. Common Standing Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
1) Congressional Conferral of Standing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
2) Standing to Enforce Government StatutesZone of Interests . . .7
3) Standing to Assert Rights of Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
a) LimitationFamily Law Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
4) Standing of Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
5) No Citizenship Standing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
a) CompareTenth Amendment Violation Claims . . . . . . . .8
ii. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
6) Taxpayer Standing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
a) Generally No Standing to Litigate Government
Expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
b) ExceptionCongressional Measures Under Taxing and
Spending Power that Violate Establishment Clause . . . . . .9
7) Legislators Standing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
8) Assignee Standing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Adequate and Independent State Grounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
a. Adequate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
b. Independent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
c. Where Basis Is Unclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Abstention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
a. Unsettled State Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
b. Pending State Proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1) Pending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2) Civil and Administrative Proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3) Exception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Political Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
a. Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
b. CompareNonpolitical Controversy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. Eleventh Amendment Limits on Federal Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
a. What Is Barred? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1) CompareSovereign Immunity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
b. What Is Not Barred? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1) Actions Against Local Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2) Actions by the United States Government or Other State
Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3) Bankruptcy Proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
c. Exceptions to Eleventh Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1) Certain Actions Against State Officers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
a) Actions Against State Officers for Injunctions . . . . . . . . 13
b) Actions Against State Officers for Monetary Damages from
Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
c) Actions Against State Officers for Prospective Payments
from State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2) Congressional Removal of Immunity Under the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
a) CompareArticle I Powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
d. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
II. LEGISLATIVE POWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

A. ENUMERATED AND IMPLIED POWERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Necessary and Proper Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
a. Limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2. Taxing Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
a. Determining What Is a Tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
b. Uniformity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
c. Direct TaxesMust Be Apportioned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW iii.
d. Taxes Are Generally Valid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

3. Spending Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
a. Regulation Through Spending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4. Commerce Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
a. Denition of Commerce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1) Includes Basically All Activity Affecting Two or More States . . . 16
2) Includes Transportation or Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
a) Vehicular Transportation Not Required . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
b. Substantial Economic Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1) Power Not Unlimited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
a) Intrastate Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
(1) Activity vs. Inactivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5. War and Related Powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
a. Economic Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1) During War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2) Postwar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
b. Military Courts and Tribunals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1) Judicial Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2) Court-Martial of Enemy Civilians and Soldiers Permitted . . . . 18
a) Suspension of Habeas Corpus for Enemy Combatants . . . . 18
3) Court-Martial of American Soldiers Permitted . . . . . . . . . . 18
4) Court-Martial of American Civilians Generally Prohibited . . . 18
c. Calling Forth the Militia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6. Investigatory Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
a. Authorized Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
b. Witnesses Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1) Fifth Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2) Relevance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3) Procedural Due Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
c. Enforcement of Investigatory Powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7. Property Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
a. No Limits on Disposition of Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
b. Eminent Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8. No Federal Police Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
9. Bankruptcy Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
10. Postal Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
a. Exclusive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
b. Scope of Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
11. Power Over Citizenship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
a. Exclusion of Aliens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1) Nonresident Aliens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2) Resident Aliens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
b. Naturalization and DenaturalizationExclusive Control of
Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1) No Loss of Citizenship Without Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
a) Proof of Intent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2) Rights of Children of Citizens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
12. Admiralty Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
iv. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
a. Exclusive Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
b. Navigable Waterways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
13. Power to Coin Money and Fix Weights and Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
14. Patent/Copyright Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
B. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1. Broad Delegation Allowed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2. Limitations on Delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
a. Power Cannot Be Uniquely Confined to Congress . . . . . . . . . . . 22
b. Clear Standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
c. Separation of Powers Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
d. Important Liberty Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
e. Criminal vs. Civil Punishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
C. THE SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSESPECIAL IMMUNITY FOR
FEDERAL LEGISLATORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1. Persons Covered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2. Scope of Immunity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
a. Bribes Excluded . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
b. Speeches Outside Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
c. Defamatory Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
D. CONGRESSIONAL VETO OF EXECUTIVE ACTIONS INVALID . . . . . 24
III. THE EXECUTIVE POWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

A. VESTED IN PRESIDENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
B. DOMESTIC POWERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1. Appointment and Removal of Ofcers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
a. Appointment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1) Appointment of Independent Counsel (Special Prosecutor) . . 25
2) No Appointments by Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
b. Recess Appointments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
c. Removal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1) By President . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2) By Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
a) Limitation on Removal Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
b) Limitation on Powers of Removable Officers . . . . . . . . . 25
2. Pardons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3. Veto Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
a. Congress May Override Veto by Two-Thirds Vote . . . . . . . . . . . 26
b. President Has Ten Days to Veto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
c. Line Item Veto Unconstitutional . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4. Power as Chief Executive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
a. No Power to Impound and the Take Care Clause . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
C. POWER OVER EXTERNAL AFFAIRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1. War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
a. Actual Hostilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
b. Military Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2. Foreign Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
a. Power to Recognize Foreign States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3. Treaty Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW v.
a.Supreme Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1) Self-Executing vs. Non-Self-Executing Treaties . . . . . . . . . . 28
a) President Has No Power to Implement Non-Self-Executing
Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2) Conflict with Congressional Acts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3) Conflict with Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
b. Other Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4. Executive Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
a. Conflicts with Other Governmental Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
b. ExamplePower to Settle Claims of United States Citizens . . . . . . 29
D. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE/IMMUNITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1. Executive Privilege . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
a. Extent of the Privilege . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1) National Security Secrets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2) Criminal Proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3) Civil Trials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4) Screening Papers and Recordings of Former President . . . . . . 30
5) Screening by Judge in Chambers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2. Executive Immunity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
a. Absolute Immunity for President . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
b. Immunity May Extend to Presidential Aides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
E. IMPEACHMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1. Persons Subject to Impeachment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2. Grounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3. Impeachment by the House . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4. Conviction by the Senate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
PART TWO: THE FEDERAL SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
IV. RELATIVE SPHERES OF FEDERAL AND STATE POWER . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

A. EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL POWERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1. Power of States Expressly Limited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2. Inherent Federal Powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
B. EXCLUSIVE STATE POWERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
C. CONCURRENT FEDERAL AND STATE POWERSUPREMACY
CLAUSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1. Express Preemption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2. Implied Preemption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
a. Actual Conflict Between State and Federal Law Requirements . . . . 32
b. State Prevents Achievement of Federal Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
c. Field Preemption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3. Presumption Against Preemption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
D. ABSENCE OF FEDERAL AND STATE POWERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
E. INTERSTATE COMPACT CLAUSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
F. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
V. INTERSOVEREIGN LITIGATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
A. SUITS BY THE UNITED STATES AGAINST A STATE . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
vi. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
B. SUITS BY STATE AGAINST UNITED STATESUNITED STATES MUST

CONSENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
C. FEDERAL OFFICER AS DEFENDANT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1. Limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2. Specic Relief Against the Individual Ofcer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
D. SUITS BY ONE STATE AGAINST ANOTHER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
VI. INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAX AND REGULATION IMMUNITIES . . . . . . . 35

A. FEDERAL TAXATION AND REGULATION OF STATE OR LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1. Tax or Regulation Applying to State and Private EntitiesValid . . . . . . 35
2. Tax or Regulation that Applies Only to States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
a. ExceptionCivil Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
b. ExceptionSpending Power Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1) What Is Unduly Coercive? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3. Commandeering State Ofcials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
B. STATE TAXATION AND REGULATION OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT . 37
1. No Direct Tax on Federal Instrumentalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2. Nondiscriminatory, Indirect Taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3. State Regulation of Federal Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
VII. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

A. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
B. ARTICLE IVPRIVILEGES OF STATE CITIZENSHIP . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1. Corporations and Aliens Not Protected . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2. Only Fundamental Rights Protected . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3. Substantial Justication Exception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4. NoteRelationship to Commerce Clause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
C. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTPRIVILEGES OF NATIONAL
CITIZENSHIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1. Corporations Not Protected . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2. Bill of Rights Not Included . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3. Right to Travel and the Privileges and Immunities Clause . . . . . . . . . 40
PART THREE: STATE REGULATION OR TAXATION OF COMMERCE . . . . . . . . . 40
VIII. REGULATION OF FOREIGN COMMERCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

A. LIES EXCLUSIVELY WITH CONGRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
B. MINOR EXCEPTIONS WHERE STATE REGULATION PERMITTED . . . 40
IX. REGULATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

A. REGULATION OF COMMERCE BY CONGRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1. Power of Congress to Supersede or Preempt State Regulation . . . . . . . . 40
2. Power of Congress to Permit or Prohibit State Regulation . . . . . . . . . 41
a. Limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
B. STATE REGULATION OF COMMERCE IN THE ABSENCE OF
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1. Discriminatory Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW vii.
a. Generally Invalid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
b. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1) Regulations Protecting Local Businesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2) Regulations Requiring Local Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3) Regulations Limiting Access to In-State Products . . . . . . . . . 42
4) Regulations Prohibiting Out-of-State Wastes . . . . . . . . . . . 42
c. Exceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
1) Necessary to Important State Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2) State as Market Participant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
a) LimitationInterstate Privileges and Immunities Clause . 43
b) LimitationDownstream Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3) Favoring Government Performing Traditional Government
Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2. Nondiscriminatory LawsBalancing Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
a. Absence of Conflict with Other States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
b. State Control of Corporations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
C. TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENTSTATE CONTROL OVER
INTOXICATING LIQUOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1. Intrastate Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2. Interstate Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3. Federal Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
D. BAR EXAM APPROACH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
X. POWER OF STATES TO TAX INTERSTATE COMMERCE . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
1. Discriminatory Taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
a. Finding Discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
1) Tax Singles Out Interstate Commerce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2) Tax with In-State Subsidy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3) Double Taxation on Out-of-State Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
b. Choosing the Proper Clause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1) Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2) Equal Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
a) Where Congress Approves the Discrimination . . . . . . . . 47
b) Taxes Based on Suspect Classifications or Infringing on
Fundamental Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2. Nondiscriminatory Taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
a. Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
1) Substantial Nexus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2) Fair Apportionment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3) Fair Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
B. USE TAX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
1. Permissible in Buyers State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2. State May Force Seller to Collect Use Tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
C. SALES TAXES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
D. AD VALOREM PROPERTY TAXES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
1. No Tax on Commodities in the Course of Interstate Commerce . . . . . . . 50
a. When Is Property in the Course of Interstate Commerce? . . . . . 50
viii. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1) When Does Interstate Transportation Begin? . . . . . . . . . . . 50

2) Effect of a Break in Transit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3) When Does Interstate Shipment End? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
b. No Apportionment Required . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2. Tax on Instrumentalities Used to Transport Goods Interstate . . . . . . . 51
a. Taxable Situs (Nexus) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
b. Apportionment Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
1) Proper Apportionment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
E. PRIVILEGE, LICENSE, FRANCHISE, OR OCCUPATION TAXES . . . . . 52
1. Taxpayer Has Burden of Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
XI. POWER OF STATES TO TAX FOREIGN COMMERCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

A. IMPORT-EXPORT CLAUSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
1. State Taxation of Imports Prohibited Absent Congressional Consent . . 52
2. State Taxation of Exports Prohibited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
B. COMMERCE CLAUSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
PART FOUR: INDIVIDUAL GUARANTEES AGAINST GOVERNMENTAL OR

PRIVATE ACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
XII. LIMITATIONS ON POWER AND STATE ACTION REQUIREMENT . . . . . . . 53

A. CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON POWER OVER INDIVIDUALS . . 53
1. Bill of Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
a. Rights Applicable to States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
b. Rights Not Applicable to States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2. Thirteenth Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
a. No Requirement of State Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
b. Involuntary Servitude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
c. Congressional Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3. Fourteenth Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
a. Requirement of State Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
b. Scope of Congressional Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4. Fifteenth Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
a. Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
5. Commerce Clause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
a. Civil Rights Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
b. Extent of Commerce Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
6. Rights of National Citizenship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
B. STATE ACTION REQUIREMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
1. Exclusive Public Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
a. Must Be Traditional and Exclusive Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2. Signicant State InvolvementFacilitating Private Action . . . . . . . . . 58
a. Instances of Signicant State Involvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
1) Official Encouragement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
a) Judicial Approval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
(1) Peremptory Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
b) Official Acts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
(1) Discriminatory Law Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ix.
(2) Apparent Legal Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

(3) Public Defenders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2) State Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3) The State as Lessor for a Racially Discriminatory Lessee . . . . . 59
4) Administration of Private Discriminatory Trust by Public
Officials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5) Entwinement of State and Private Entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
b. Instances of Insignicant State Involvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
1) Heavily Regulated Businesses and/or Granting of a Monopoly
to a Utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
a) Electric Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
b) Nursing Home . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
c) School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2) Licensing and Provision of Essential Services . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3) Congressional Grant of Corporate Charter and Exclusive
Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4) No Government Duty to Protect Individuals from Harm by
Private Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
C. TIPS FOR BAR EXAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
1. State Must Be Signicantly Involved in Private Entity . . . . . . . . . . 61
2. No Constitutional Mandate to Outlaw Discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
XIII. RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

A. CONTRACT CLAUSEIMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . 61
1. Not Applicable to Federal Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2. Only Applicable to State Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3. Basic Impairment Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
a. Private Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
b. Public ContractsStricter Scrutiny . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
B. EX POST FACTO LAWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
1. Two Ex Post Facto Clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
a. What Is Criminal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
b. Retroactive Alterations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2. DistinguishProcedural Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3. Indirect Application to Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
C. BILLS OF ATTAINDER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
1. Two Clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2. Two Requirements Preclude Finding of Bill of Attainder . . . . . . . . . . 64
3. Nixon Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4. Draft Registration Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
D. DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
XIV. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

A. BASIC PRINCIPLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
1. When Is Individualized Adjudication Required? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2. Intentional Deprivation vs. Negligent Deprivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
a. Deprivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3. Fair, Neutral DecisionmakerJudge Bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
x. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
4. Protection vs. Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

B. IS LIFE, LIBERTY, OR PROPERTY BEING TAKEN? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
1. Liberty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
a. Commitment to Mental Institution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
1) Adults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2) Minor Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
b. Injury to Reputation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
c. Exercise of Fundamental Constitutional Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
1) ApplicationGovernment Employees Freedom of Speech . . . . 67
2. Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
a. Public Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
b. Welfare Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
c. Continued Public Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
C. WHAT TYPE OF PROCESS IS REQUIRED? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
1. Welfare Benets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2. Disability Benets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3. Public Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4. Public EducationDisciplinary Suspension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
a. Corporal Punishment in Public School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5. Public EducationAcademic Dismissal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
6. Creditors Remedies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
7. Drivers License . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
8. Parental Status Litigation and Hearing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
a. Termination of Parental Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
b. Paternity Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
c. Hearings for Men Who Seek to Establish Paternity . . . . . . . . . . . 70
1) Unmarried Father Living with Mother . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2) Father Who Never Tried to Establish Paternity . . . . . . . . . . 70
3) Mother Married to Another Man . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
9. Detention of Citizen Enemy Combatants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
10. Notice of Adversary Proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
11. Civil Forfeitures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
D. DUE PROCESS RIGHTS ARE SUBJECT TO WAIVER . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
E. ACCESS TO COURTSINDIGENT PLAINTIFFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
1. Fundamental RightsWaiver Required . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2. Nonfundamental RightsWaiver Not Required . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
XV. THE TAKING CLAUSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

A. IN GENERAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
1. Not a Grant of Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2. Scope of Taking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
B. PUBLIC USE LIMITATION LIBERALLY CONSTRUED . . . . . . . . . . 72
C. TAKING VS. REGULATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
1. Actual Appropriation or Physical Invasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
a. ExceptionEmergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
b. Damage from Temporary Interference with Use . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2. Use Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
a. Denial of All Economic Value of LandTaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW xi.
1) Temporary Denials of All Economic Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

b. Decreasing Economic Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
1) Building/Development PermitsTransfer of Occupation
Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
a) Permit Denials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2) Utility Rate Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3) Zoning Ordinances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3. RemedyInverse Condemnation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
a. Who May Sue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
D. JUST COMPENSATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
1. Worthless Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
XVI. INTRODUCTION TO SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

AND EQUAL PROTECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
A. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND
EQUAL PROTECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
1. Substantive Due Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2. Equal Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4. NoteClauses Not Necessarily Mutually Exclusive . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
B. WHAT STANDARD OF REVIEW WILL THE COURT APPLY? . . . . . . . 77
1. Strict Scrutiny (Maximum Scrutiny) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
a. Burden of Proof on Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2. Intermediate Scrutiny . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
a. Burden of Proof Probably on Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3. Rational Basis (Minimal Scrutiny) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
a. Burden of Proof on Challenger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
b. Deference to Legislature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
XVII. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

A. CONSTITUTIONAL SOURCETWO CLAUSES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
B. APPLICABLE STANDARDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
1. Fundamental RightStrict Scrutiny . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2. All Other CasesMere Rationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
a. Business and Labor Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
b. Taxation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
c. Lifestyle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
d. Zoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
1) Statutes Forbidding Nuisances or Promoting Communitys
Preferred Lifestyle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2) Cannot Prohibit Traditionally Related Families from Living
Together . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
e. Punitive Damages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
1) Factors Considered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2) Rule of Thumb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
f. CompareVagueness Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
C. A FEW IRREBUTTABLE PRESUMPTIONS MAY BE INVALID . . . . . . . 80
D. FAIR NOTICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
xii. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
XVIII. EQUAL PROTECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

A. CONSTITUTIONAL SOURCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
B. APPLICABLE STANDARDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
C. PROVING DISCRIMINATORY CLASSIFICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
1. Facial Discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
a. Facial Discrimination Absent Racial Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2. Discriminatory Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3. Discriminatory Motive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
D. SUSPECT CLASSIFICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
1. Race and National Origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
a. School Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
1) Remedying Intentional School Segregation . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
a) Order Limited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
b. Benign Government DiscriminationAffirmative Action . . . . . 84
1) Remedying Past Discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
2) Where There Has Been No Past Discrimination by
Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
a) Remedial Justifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
(1) Local Private Discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
(2) Diversity in Primary and Secondary Public
Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
(3) Diversity in Post-Secondary Public Education . . . . . 85
b) States May Eliminate Race-Based Preferences . . . . . . . . 86
c. Discriminatory Legislative Apportionment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
d. Private Affirmative Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2. Alienage Classications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
a. Federal Classifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
b. State and Local Classifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
1) ExceptionParticipation in Self-Government Process . . . . . . 87
c. Undocumented Aliens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
1) Punitive Laws Against Illegal Alien Adults . . . . . . . . . . . 87
2) Education Rights of Alien Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
a) CompareChildren Living Apart from Parents . . . . . . 87
E. QUASI-SUSPECT CLASSIFICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
1. Gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
a. Intentional Discrimination Against Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
1) Government Interest Must Be Genuine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
b. Affirmative Action Benefiting Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
c. Intentional Discrimination Against Men . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
1) Invalid Discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2) Valid Discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2. Legitimacy Classications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
a. No Punitive Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
1) Inheritance from Father . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
2) Statute of Limitations on Paternity Suits May Be
Discriminatory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
b. Immigration Preference to Legitimate ChildrenPermissible . . . . 90
F. OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW xiii.
1. Age Not Suspect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

2. Wealth Not Suspect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
a. Abortions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
b. Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
XIX. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

A. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
B. RIGHT OF PRIVACY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
1. Marriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
a. Same-Sex Marriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
b. Special Test in Prisoners Rights Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
2. Use of Contraceptives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3. Abortion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
a. Pre-Viability RuleNo Undue Burdens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
1) Informed ConsentNo Undue Burden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
2) Waiting PeriodNo Undue Burden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3) Parental ConsentNo Undue Burden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4) CompareSpousal Consent Is Undue Burden . . . . . . . . . . 94
5) Physician Only RequirementNo Undue Burden . . . . . . . 94
6) Partial-Birth Abortion BanNo Undue Burden . . . . . . . . 94
7) Other Regulations Uncertain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
b. Post-Viability RuleMay Prohibit Abortion Unless Womans
Health Threatened . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
c. Remedy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
d. Financing Abortions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4. Obscene Reading Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5. Keeping Extended Family Together . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
6. Rights of Parents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
a. Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
b. Visitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
7. Intimate Sexual Conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
8. Freedom from Collection and Distribution of Personal Data . . . . . . . . 96
C. RIGHT TO VOTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
1. Restrictions on Right to Vote . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
a. Residency Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
1) Members of Armed Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
2) CompareNonresidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
b. Property Ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
c. Poll Taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
d. Primary Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
1) State Regulation of Party Primaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
2) States May Subsidize Primaries of Major Parties . . . . . . . . . 97
2. Dilution of Right to Vote . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
a. One Person, One Vote Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
1) Establishing Voting Districts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
a) Congressional ElectionsAlmost Exactly Equal . . . . . . 98
(1) CompareApportionment Among the States . . . . . 98
xiv. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
b) State and Local ElectionsVariance Not Unjustifiably

Large . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
c) Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
(1) ExceptionAppointed Officials and Officials Elected
At Large . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
(2) ExceptionSpecial Purpose Government Units (Water
Storage Districts) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
2) Standardless Recount . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
b. Gerrymandering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
1) Racial Gerrymandering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
2) Political Gerrymandering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
c. Multi-Member Districts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
d. States May Use Independent Commissions to Draw Districts . . . . . 99
3. Candidates and Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
a. Candidate Qualications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
1) Fee Must Not Preclude Indigents as Candidates . . . . . . . . . 100
2) Restrictions on Ability of Person to Be a Candidate . . . . . . . 100
3) Required Resignation of Office Is Permissible . . . . . . . . . . 100
b. Campaign Funding, Contributions, and Expenditures . . . . . . . . 100
4. Extraordinary MajoritiesReferendum Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5. Replacement of Incumbent Legislators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
D. RIGHT TO TRAVEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
1. Interstate Travel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
a. Nature of the Right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
b. Standard of Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
1) Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
c. Distinctions Between Old and New Residents . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
2. International Travel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
E. RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
1. Vaccination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
2. Refusal of Medical Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
a. CompareNo Right to Assisted Suicide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
b. CompareCriminal Defendants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
PART FIVE: FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
XX. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ASSEMBLY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
1. Government Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
a. Limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
b. Public Monuments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
c. CompareGovernment Funding of Private Messages . . . . . . . . 104
1) ExceptionFunding of the Arts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
2. Content vs. Conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
a. Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
1) ExceptionUnprotected Categories of Speech . . . . . . . . . 105
a) Falsity in and of Itself Does Not Make Speech
Unprotected . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW xv.
2) Content-Neutral Speech Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

b. Conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3. Reasonableness of Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
a. Overbroad Regulation Invalid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
b. Void for Vagueness Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
1) Burden on Challenger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
2) Funding Speech Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
c. Cannot Give Officials Unfettered Discretion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
1) Unlimited DiscretionVoid on Face . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
2) Statutes Valid on Face . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4. Scope of Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
a. Includes Freedom Not to Speak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
1) Mandatory Financial Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
a) Government Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
b) ComparePrivate Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
(1) ExceptionUniversity Activity Fees . . . . . . . . . . 109
2) State Can Require Shopping Center to Permit Persons to
Exercise Speech Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
b. Includes Symbolic Conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
c. Excludes Freedom to Bar Military Recruitment . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5. Prison Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
B. TIME, PLACE, AND MANNER RESTRICTIONSREGULATION OF
CONDUCT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
1. Public Forums and Designated Public Forums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
a. Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
1) Content Neutral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
2) Narrowly Tailored . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
3) Important Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4) Alternative Channels Open . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
b. ExamplesResidential Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
1) Targeted Picketing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
2) Charitable Solicitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3) Permits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
c. ExampleBuffer Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
1) Content-Neutral/Important Government Interest . . . . . . . . 113
2) Narrowly Tailored . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
d. ExampleDesignated Public Forum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
e. Injunctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
1) Content BasedNecessary to a Compelling Interest . . . . . . 115
2) Content NeutralBurdens No More Speech than Necessary . . 115
2. Limited Public Forums and Nonpublic Forums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
a. Viewpoint Neutral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
b. Reasonableness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
c. Signicant Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
1) Military Bases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
2) Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
3) Government Workplace or Charity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4) Postal Service Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
xvi. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
5) Signs on Public Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

6) Airport Terminals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
7) Candidate Debates on Public Television . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
8) Mailboxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
C. UNPROTECTED SPEECHREGULATION OR PUNISHMENT
BECAUSE OF CONTENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
1. Clear and Present Danger of Imminent Lawlessness . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
a. Allows for Sanctions Against Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
b. Compelling Justification Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
2. Fighting Words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
a. True Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
b. States May Ban Words Likely to Incite Physical Retaliation . . . . . 119
c. Statutes Regulating Fighting Words Tend to Be Overbroad or
Vague . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
d. Statutes Cannot Be Viewpoint-BasedLimits Hate Crime
Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
1) ComparePunishing Racially Motivated Conduct . . . . . . . 119
3. Obscenity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
a. Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
1) Appeal to Prurient Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
a) Average Person . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
b) Material Designed for Deviant Group . . . . . . . . . . . 120
2) Patently Offensive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
a) Community Standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
b) National Standard Not Required . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
3) Lacking in Serious Social Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4) Standard May Be Different for Minors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
a) Pictures of Minors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
b) CompareSimulated Pictures of Minors . . . . . . . . . . 121
b. Question of Fact and Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
1) Jury Question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
2) Independent Review by Appellate Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
3) Evidence of Pandering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4) EvidenceSimilar Published Materials Not Automatically
Admissible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
c. Statutes Must Not Be Vague . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
1) Sweeping Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
2) Construction May Save Vague Statute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
d. Land Use Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
e. Liquor Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
f. Display . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
g. Private Possession of Obscenity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
1) ExceptionChild Pornography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4. Defamatory Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
a. Falsity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
1) Requirement of Factual Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
b. Fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
1) Public Official or Public FigureActual Malice Required . . . 124
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW xvii.
a) Actual Malice Defined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

(1) Actual Malice in False Quotation Cases . . . . . . . . 125
(2) Permitted Inquiries by Plaintiff . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
(3) Petition Clause Does Not Protect Defamatory
Statement Made with Actual Malice . . . . . . . . . . 125
b) Two Ways to Become a Public Figure . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
(1) General Fame or Notoriety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
(2) Involvement in Particular Controversy . . . . . . . . . 125
c) Examples of Persons Not Deemed Public Figures . . . . . . 126
(1) Spouse of Wealthy Person . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
(2) Person Engaging in Criminal Conduct . . . . . . . . . 126
(3) Scientist in Federally Funded Program . . . . . . . . 126
2) Private Individual Suing on Matter of Public ConcernAt
Least Negligence Required . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
a) No Liability Without Proof of at Least Negligence . . . . . 126
b) Presumed or Punitive Damages Allowed Only If Actual
Malice Established . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
c) What Is a Matter of Public Concern? . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
d) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress . . . . . . . . . 127
3) Private Individual Suing on Matter Not of Public Concern . . . 127
c. Procedural Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
1) Federal Summary Judgment Standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
2) Judicial Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
d. Recovery for Depiction in a False Light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
e. True Privacy Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
1) Publishing True Fact of Public Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
2) Publishing Name of Juvenile Charged with Crime . . . . . . . . 128
3) Publishing Information on Judges Competency . . . . . . . . . 128
f. Commercial PrivacyDisclosing a Private Performance Can Violate
Right to Publicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
g. Copyright Infringement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
5. Some Commercial Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
a. Complete Bans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
1) Commercial Sign Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
a) Blockbusting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
b. Required Disclosures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
c. Special Attorney Advertising Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
D. PRIOR RESTRAINTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
1. Sufciency of Governmental Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
a. National Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
b. Preserving Fair Trial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
1) CompareGrand Jury Prior Restraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
c. Contractual Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
d. Military Circumstances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
e. Obscenity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
2. Procedural Safeguards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
3. Obscenity Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
a. Seizure of Books and Films . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
xviii. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1) Single Seizures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

2) Large Scale Seizures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
3) Forfeiture of Business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
b. Injunction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
c. Movie Censorship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
d. Burden on Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
E. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
1. Publication of Truthful Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
2. Access to Trials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
a. Access to Voir Dire Examination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
b. Access to Other Pretrial Proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
c. Compelling Interest in Protecting Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
d. Protective Order in Publishing Information Gained in Pretrial
Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
3. Requiring Members of the Press to Testify Before Grand Juries . . . . . 135
4. Interviewing Prisoners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5. Business Regulations or Taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
6. Monetary Damages for Failure to Keep Identity Condential . . . . . . . 136
7. Broadcasting Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
a. Fairness Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
1) CompareGrant of Equal Newspaper Space . . . . . . . . . . 136
b. Newspaper Ownership of Radio or TV Station . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
c. Prohibiting Indecent Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
d. Political Advertisements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
e. Elimination of Editorial Speech from Stations Receiving Public
Grants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
8. Cable Television Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
a. CompareContent-Based Cable Broadcast Regulations . . . . . . . 137
9. Internet Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
XXI. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND BELIEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

A. NATURE OF THE RIGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
B. ELECTORAL PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
1. Ballot Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
a. Signature Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
b. Primary Voting Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
c. Single Party Limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
d. Nonpartisan Blanket Primary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
2. Party Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
a. Judicial Candidate Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
3. Limits on Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
a. To Political Candidate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
1) Equalizing Large Expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
b. To Ballot Referendum Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
c. Disclosure of Contributors or Recipients of Money . . . . . . . . . . 140
d. Aggregate Contribution Limits Unconstitutional . . . . . . . . . . . 141
4. Limits on Expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
5. CompareRegulations of Core Political Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW xix.
a. Prohibiting Any Election Day Campaigning . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

1) CompareHundred-Foot Limit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
b. Prohibiting Anonymous Campaign Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
c. Prohibiting Judge Candidates from Announcing Their Views . . . . 142
d. Distinguishing Political Speech from Candidate Advocacy . . . . . 142
e. Solicitation of Campaign Funds by Judicial Candidates . . . . . . . 142
C. BAR MEMBERSHIP AND PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
1. Restraints on Speech Activities of Government Employees . . . . . . . . 142
a. Speech Made Pursuant to Official Duties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
b. Other Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
1) Petition Clause Claims Treated Similarly . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
c. Participation in Political Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
d. Bans on Receiving Honoraria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
e. Patronage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
2. Loyalty Oaths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
a. Overbreadth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
1) Knowledge of Organizations Aim Required . . . . . . . . . . . 144
2) Advocacy of Doctrine Protected . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
b. Vagueness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
1) Oaths Upheld . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
a) To Support the Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
b) To Oppose the Overthrow of the Government . . . . . . . 145
2) Oath Not Upheld . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
3. Disclosure of Associations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
a. Fifth Amendment Limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
4. Practice of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
a. Countervailing State Interest Required . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
D. SCHOOL SPONSORSHIP OF EXTRACURRICULAR CLUBS . . . . . . . 146
XXII. FREEDOM OF RELIGION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

A. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
B. APPLICABILITY TO THE STATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
C. FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
1. No Punishment of Beliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
a. What Constitutes Religious Belief? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
1) Courts May Not Find Religious Beliefs to Be False . . . . . . . 147
b. Religious Oaths for Governmental Jobs Prohibited . . . . . . . . . . 147
c. States May Not Exclude Clerics from Public Office . . . . . . . . . . 147
2. No Punishment of Religious Conduct Solely Because It Is Religious . . . 147
3. States Can Regulate General ConductCriminal Laws and Other
Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
a. Generally No Exemptions Required . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
1) Federal Statutory ExemptionOutside the Scope of Exam . . . 148
b. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
c. Cases in Which Exemptions Were Required . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
1) Ministerial Exemption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
2) Unemployment Compensation CasesSome Exemptions
Required . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
xx. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
a) Need Not Belong to Formal Religious Organization . . . . 150

b) LimitationCriminal Prohibitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
3) Right of Amish Not to Educate Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
D. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
1. Sect Preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
2. Cases Unconnected to Financial Aid or Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
a. State Legislature Can Employ a Chaplain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
b. Town Board Can Begin Town Meetings with a Prayer . . . . . . . . 152
c. Displays of Ten Commandments on Public Property . . . . . . . . . 152
d. Some Holiday Displays Are Permissible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
e. Absolute Right Not to Work on a Sabbath Impermissible . . . . . . 153
f. Exemptions from Antidiscrimination Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
3. Cases Involving Financial Benets to Church-Related Institutions . . . . 153
a. Recipient-Based Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
1) CompareTuition Tax Deductions or Credits Limited to
Religious School Tuition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
b. Aid to Colleges, Hospitals, Etc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
c. Aid to Religiously Affiliated Grade Schools or High Schools . . . . . 155
1) Aid Upheld . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
2) Aid Invalidated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
d. Tax Exemption for Religious, Charitable, or Educational Property . 156
e. Tax Exemption Available Only to Religions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
4. Religious Activities in Public Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
a. Prayer and Bible Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
b. Posting Ten Commandments in Classroom Is Invalid . . . . . . . . 156
c. Released-Time Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
1) In Public School Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
2) Nonpublic Building Used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
d. Accommodation of Religious StudentsOn-Campus Meetings . . . 157
e. Curriculum Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
PART ONE: POWERS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
I. THE JUDICIAL POWER
A. ARTICLE III
The federal government is a government of limited powers, which means that for federal action to
be legitimate, it must be authorized. The Constitution is the instrument that authorizes the federal
government to act. Thus, whenever a question involves action by an entity of the federal govern-
ment, the action will be valid only if it is authorized by the Constitution. The Constitution autho-
rizes a federal court system in Article III, which provides that federal courts shall have judicial
power over all cases and controversies:
1. Arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States;
2. Of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;
3. In which the United States is a party;
4. Between two or more states;
5. Between a state and citizens of another state;
6. Between citizens of different states;
7. Between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states; and
8. Between a state or citizens thereof and foreign states, citizens, or subjects.
B. POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
1. Review of Other Branches of Federal Government

The Constitution does not explicitly state that the Supreme Court may determine the consti-
tutionality of acts of other branches of government. However, judicial review of other
branches of the federal government was established in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137
(1803) (per Marshall, C.J.); the Constitution is law and it is the province and duty of the
judiciary to declare what the law is.
a. Separation of Powers and Finality of Court Decisions

The Constitution separates governmental powers among the branches of government.
This separation of powers doctrine prohibits the legislature from interfering with the
courts nal judgments. However, Congress may change federal statutes and may direct
federal courts to apply those changes in all cases in which a nal judgment has not been
rendered.
Example: The Supreme Court inferred a limitations period under an ambiguous
federal securities law. Because new Supreme Court rulings gener-
ally apply to all pending cases, the limitations period imposed by the
Court resulted in the dismissal of many pending cases as time-barred.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Congress amended the securities law to provide (i) a different limita-

tions period and (ii) a special motion for reinstating the cases dismissed
as time-barred by the Supreme Courts ruling. Because the dismissed
cases were nal judgments, the statute providing for the reinstatement
violated the separation of powers doctrine under the Constitution. [Plaut
v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995)]
2. Federal Review of State Acts

Federal review of state acts (executive, legislative, or judicial) was established by the
Marshall Court in a series of decisions. Clear basis exists here in the Supremacy Clause of
Article VI, which states that the Constitution, Laws, and Treaties of the United States take
precedence over state laws and that the judges of the state courts must follow federal law,
anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. [Fletcher v.
Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810)]
C. FEDERAL COURTS
Only the actions of Article III courts are the subject of our outline, but you should know that there
are two types of federal courts.
1. Article III Courts

Article III courts are those established by Congress pursuant to the provisions of Article
III, Section 1. Congress has power to delineate the jurisdictional limits, both original and
appellate, of these courts, although it is bound by the standards of judicial power set forth in
Article III as to subject matter, parties, and the requirement of case or controversy. Thus,
Congress cannot require these courts to render advisory opinions or perform administrative
or nonjudicial functions.
2. Article I Courts
Congress has created certain other courts, however, by way of implementing its various
legislative powers; e.g., United States Tax Court, courts of the District of Columbia. Judges
of such Article I courts do not have life tenure or protection from salary decrease as do
Article III court judges. Article I courts are sometimes vested with administrative as well
as judicial functions, and the congressional power to create such hybrid courts has been
sustained by the Supreme Court. [Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962)]
a. Limitation
Congress may not take cases of the type traditionally heard by Article III courts and
assign jurisdiction over them to Article I courts. [Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982)broad grant of jurisdiction to bankruptcy
courts, including jurisdiction over contract claims, violates Article III]
D. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
1. Original (Trial) Jurisdiction
Under Article III, Section 2, the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in all cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall
be a Party. This provision is self-executing: Congress may neither restrict nor enlarge the
Supreme Courts original jurisdiction, but Congress may give concurrent jurisdiction to lower
federal courts and has done so regarding all cases except those between states.
2. Appellate Jurisdiction
Article III, Section 2 further provides that in all other Cases before mentioned [i.e., arising
under the Constitution, Act of Congress, or treaty], the Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as
the Congress shall make.
a. Statutory Application of Appellate Jurisdiction

Congress has provided two methods for invoking Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction:
appeal (where jurisdiction is mandatory), and certiorari (where jurisdiction is within
the Courts discretion). Very few cases fall within the Courts mandatory appeal juris-
diction; thus, appellate jurisdiction is almost completely discretionary.
1) Writ of Certiorari (Discretionary)

The Supreme Court has complete discretion to hear cases that come to it by writ of
certiorari. A case will be heard if four justices agree to hear it. The following cases
may be heard by certiorari:
a) Cases from the highest state courts where (i) the constitutionality of a federal
statute, federal treaty, or state statute is called into question; or (ii) a state
statute allegedly violates federal law [28 U.S.C. 1257]; and
b) All cases from federal courts of appeals [28 U.S.C. 1254].
2) Appeal (Mandatory)
The Supreme Court must hear those few cases that come to it by appeal. Appeal is
available only as to decisions made by three-judge federal district court panels that
grant or deny injunctive relief. [28 U.S.C. 1253]
b. Limitations on Statutory Regulation

Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868), has been read as giving Congress full power to
regulate and limit the Supreme Courts appellate jurisdiction. However, possible limita-
tions on such congressional power have been suggested:
1) Congress may eliminate specic avenues for Supreme Court review as long as it
does not eliminate all avenues. For example, in McCardle, two statutes had allowed
the Supreme Court to grant habeas corpus to federal prisoners. The Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the repeal of one of the statutes because the other
statute remained as an avenue for Supreme Court habeas corpus review.
2) Although Congress may eliminate Supreme Court review of certain cases within
the federal judicial power, it must permit jurisdiction to remain in some lower
federal court.
3) If Congress were to deny all Supreme Court review of an alleged violation of
constitutional rightsor go even further and deny a hearing before any federal
judge on such a claimthis would violate due process of law.
E. CONSTITUTIONAL AND SELF-IMPOSED LIMITATIONS ON EXERCISE OF
FEDERAL JURISDICTIONPOLICY OF STRICT NECESSITY
Even if a federal court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it still might refuse to
hear the case. Whether the court will hear the case (i.e., whether the case is justiciable) depends
on whether a case or controversy is involved, and on whether other limitations on jurisdiction
are present.
1. No Advisory Opinions
The Supreme Courts interpretation of the case and controversy requirement in Article III
bars rendition of advisory opinions. Thus, federal courts will not render decisions in moot
cases, collusive suits, or cases involving challenges to governmental legislation or policy
whose enforcement is neither actual nor threatened.
a. CompareDeclaratory Judgments
Federal courts can hear actions for declaratory relief. A case or controversy will exist if
there is an actual dispute between parties having adverse legal interest. Complainants
must show that they have engaged in (or wish to engage in) specic conduct and that
the challenged action poses a real and immediate danger to their interests. However,
the federal courts will not determine the constitutionality of a statute if it has never
been enforced and there is no real fear that it ever will be. [Poe v. Ulman, 367 U.S. 497
(1961)anticontraceptive law not enforced for 80 years despite open public sales]
2. RipenessImmediate Threat of Harm

A plaintiff generally is not entitled to review of a state law before it is enforced (i.e., may not
obtain a declaratory judgment). Thus, a federal court will not hear a case unless the plaintiff
has been harmed or there is an immediate threat of harm.
3. Mootness
A federal court will not hear a case that has become moot; a real, live controversy must
exist at all stages of review, not merely when the complaint is led. [See, e.g., De Funis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974)dismissing as moot a white law students challenge to states
afrmative action program, since the student, although originally passed over for minority
applicants with allegedly poorer records, had been admitted to law school while litigation
was pending, was about to graduate by the time the case reached the Supreme Court, and
would receive the same law degree whether or not the afrmative action program was invali-
dated]
a. ExceptionCapable of Repetition But Evading Review

Where there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be
subjected to the same action again and would again be unable to resolve the issue
because of the short duration of the action (i.e., where the controversy is capable of
repetition yet evading review), the controversy will not be deemed moot. [See Weinstein
v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975)]
Examples: 1) Issue concerns events of short duration (e.g., pregnancy, elections,
divorce actions); and
2) Defendant voluntarily stops the offending practice, but is free to

resume it.
b. Class Actions
A class representative may continue to pursue a class action even though the
representatives controversy has become moot, as long as the claims of others in the
class are still viable. [United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388
(1980)]
c. Distinguish Ripeness
Ripeness and mootness are related concepts in that the court will not hear a case unless
there is a live controversy. Ripeness bars consideration of claims before they have been
developed; mootness bars their consideration after they have been resolved.
4. Standing
The Supreme Court will not decide a constitutional challenge to a government action unless
the person who is challenging the government action has standing to raise the consti-
tutional issue. A person has standing only if she can demonstrate a concrete stake in the
outcome of the controversy.
a. Components
A plaintiff will be able to show a sufcient stake in the controversy only if she can show
an injury in factcaused by the governmentthat will be remedied by a decision in
her favor (i.e., causation and redressability).
1) Injury
To have standing, a person must be able to assert that she is injured by a govern-
ment action or that the government has made a clear threat to cause injury to her
if she fails to comply with a government law, regulation, or order. Some specic
injury must be alleged, and it must be more than the merely theoretical injury that
all persons suffer by seeing their government engage in unconstitutional actions.
Example: A Communist Party member would have standing to challenge a
statute making it a crime to be a member of the Communist Party
because the members freedom of association is directly infringed,
but a non-Party member would have no standing.
a) Injury Need Not Be Economic

The injury does not always have to be economic. In some cases, the Court has
found that an individual is harmed because the alleged illegal act or unconsti-
tutional action has an impact on the persons well-being.
Example: Law students were allowed to challenge an Interstate
Commerce Commission rate-setting policy on the ground that
such policies discouraged recycling and thereby diminished
the quality of each students physical environment. If the ICC
rate-setting policy violated congressional statutes, the elimina-
tion of those rate-setting policies would have an impact on the
students physical environment. [United States v. SCRAP, 412
U.S. 669 (1973)]
2) Causation
There must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained
ofi.e., the injury must be traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant
and not be attributable to some independent third party not before the court.
Example: Plaintiffs claiming that a municipalitys zoning policies prevented

low income persons from nding housing in the municipality were
denied standing because they failed to show a substantial proba-
bility that they would be able to afford housing in the municipality
even absent the zoning policies. [Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
(1975)]
3) Redressability
In determining whether a litigant has a sufcient injury to establish standing,
courts ask whether a ruling favorable to the litigant would eliminate the harm to
him. If a court order declaring a government action to be illegal or unconstitutional
(and ending that government action) would not eliminate the harm to the litigant,
then that individual does not have the type of specic injury that would grant him
standing to challenge the government action.
Examples: 1) The Supreme Court held that mothers do not have standing to
challenge the governments refusal to enforce criminal laws that
would require the fathers of their children to pay child support. The
enforcement of the criminal laws against a father who is guilty of
nonsupport would not necessarily result in the fathers providing
support to the mother and her children.
2) Indigents have no standing to challenge an Internal Revenue

Service policy that allows hospitals to receive favorable tax treat-
ment even though they refuse to provide free or subsidized care for
indigents. The indigents could not demonstrate that a different IRS
policy would cause hospitals to provide them with free care.
4) Required at All Stages

Standing must be met at all stages of litigation, including on appeal.
[Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013)]
Example: A district court held unconstitutional a state constitutional amend-
ment that dened marriage as a union between a man and a
woman. After trial, the court enjoined state ofcials from enforcing
the provision, and the state ofcials elected not to appeal. The
proponents of the state constitutional amendment sought to appeal.
Since the proponents were not ordered to do or refrain from doing
anything, they have no injury other than a generalized grievance
in vindicating the validity of a generally applicable state law.
Such an interest does not give the proponents a concrete stake in
the outcome. Therefore, they lack standing to bring the appeal.
[Hollingsworth v. Perry, supra]
b. Common Standing Issues
1) Congressional Conferral of Standing

Congress has no power to completely eliminate the case or controversy require-
ment, because the requirement is based in the Constitution. [See United Food &
Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544 (1996)]
However, a federal statute may create new interests, injury to which may be suf-
cient for standing.
2) Standing to Enforce Government StatutesZone of Interests

In some instances a plaintiff may bring suit to force government actors to conform
their conduct to the requirements of a specic federal statute. Even in such cases,
the person must have an injury in fact. Often, the Court asks whether the injury
caused to the individual or group seeking to enforce the federal statute is within
the zone of interests that Congress meant to protect with the statute. If Congress
intended the statute to protect such persons, and intended to allow private persons
to bring federal court actions to enforce the statute, the courts are likely to be
lenient in granting standing to those persons.
Example: Persons who sold data processing services to private businesses had
standing to challenge a ruling by the Comptroller of Currency that
allowed national banks to make data processing services available
to other banks and bank customers. These plaintiffs had an injury
in fact because the Comptrollers ruling would hurt their future
prots. The plaintiffs were determined to be within the zone of
interests protected by the federal statutes limiting the authority of
the Comptroller and national banks.
3) Standing to Assert Rights of Others

To have standing, the claimant must have suffered or may presently suffer a direct
impairment of his own constitutional rights. A plaintiff may, however, assert third-
party rights where he himself has suffered injury and:
(i) Third parties nd it difcult to assert their own rights (the NAACP was
permitted to assert the freedom of association rights of its members in
attacking a state law requiring disclosure of membership lists because its
members could not le suit without disclosing their identities) [NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)]; or
(ii) The injury suffered by the plaintiff adversely affects his relationship with
third parties, resulting in an indirect violation of their rights (a vendor of beer
was granted standing to assert the constitutional rights of males under 21 in
attacking a state law prohibiting sale of beer to them but not to females under
21) [Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)].
a) LimitationFamily Law Issues

A divorced father sought to challenge on First Amendment grounds, on behalf
of his daughter, the saying of the Pledge of Allegiance at her public school
because the Pledge includes the words under God. A state court order gave
the girls mother nal authority over decisions regarding the girls health,
education, and welfare. The mother objected to the lawsuit, and neither the
mother nor the daughter objected to the Pledge. The Court held that the father
lacked standing to bring the claim. [Elk Grove Unied School District v.
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004)]
4) Standing of Organizations
An organization (unincorporated association, corporation, union, etc.) has standing
to challenge government action that causes injury to the organization itself. An
organization also has standing to challenge government actions that cause an
injury in fact to its members if the organization can demonstrate the following
three facts:
(i) There must be an injury in fact to the members of the organization that
would give individual members a right to sue on their own behalf;
(ii) The injury to the members must be related to the organizations purpose;
and
(iii) Neither the nature of the claim nor the relief requested requires participa-
tion of the individual members in the lawsuit.
[Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333 (1977)]

Example: The All Dentist Association (ADA) is composed entirely of
dentists; its purpose is to promote the professional well-being of
dentists. Assume that most ADA members make between $100,000
and $200,000 per year. The ADA would not have standing to
challenge a change in the federal income tax rates that will disad-
vantage all persons making between $100,000 and $200,000 on the
basis that the statute deprives all persons (in the income category)
of property without due process, because that claim is not related
to the organizations purposethe representation of dentists as
such. But the ADA probably could bring a lawsuit challenging a
state regulation of dental practices if the regulation injures ADA
members, as long as the injury to ADA members does not vary.
5) No Citizenship Standing
As stated above, if an injury is too generalized, there can be no standing. Thus,
people have no standing merely as citizens to claim that government action
violates federal law or the Constitution. Congress cannot change this rule by
adopting a statute that would allow persons to have standing merely as citizens
(where they otherwise have no direct, personal claim) to bring suit to force the
government to observe the Constitution or federal laws. [Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)]
a) CompareTenth Amendment Violation Claims

A person can have standing to allege that federal action violates the Tenth
Amendment by interfering with the powers reserved to the states, assuming
the person can show injury in fact and redressability. [Bond v. United States,
131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011)]
6) Taxpayer Standing
a) Generally No Standing to Litigate Government Expenditures
A taxpayer, of course, has standing to litigate her tax bill (e.g., whether she
really owes X dollars). However, people generally do not have standing as

taxpayers to challenge the way tax dollars are spent by the state or federal
government, because their interest is too remote. Nor do taxpayers have
standing to challenge a law granting tax credits to persons who contribute to
organizations that provide scholarships to students attending private schools.
[Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436
(2011)] Note that such tax credits do not fall under the Establishment Clause
exception beloweven to the extent that the credits are available for contribu-
tions used for religious school scholarshipsbecause the program does not
involve the transfer of government funds; thus, there is no injury for standing
purposes.
b) ExceptionCongressional Measures Under Taxing and Spending Power

that Violate Establishment Clause
There is an exception to the general rule: A federal taxpayer has standing to
challenge federal appropriation and spending measures if she can establish
that the challenged measure:
(i) Was enacted under Congresss taxing and spending power (see II.A.2.,
3., infra); and
(ii) Exceeds some specic limitation on the power.
To date, the only limit that the Supreme Court has found on the taxing power
is the Establishment Clause. (See XXII.D., infra.)
Note: The measure challenged must arise under the taxing and spending
power. Thus, there was no standing to challenge a federal government transfer
of surplus property under the Property Clause that allegedly violated the
Establishment Clause. [Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United
for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982)] Neither was there
standing to challenge expenditures of executive branch general funds that
allegedly violated the Establishment Clause. [Hein v. Freedom From Religion
Foundation, 551 U.S. 587 (2007)]
7) Legislators Standing
Legislators may have standing to challenge the constitutionality of government
action if they have a sufcient personal stake in the dispute and suffer sufcient
concrete injury. [Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997)]
Example: A states lieutenant governor cast the deciding vote to break a tie in
the state senate. Legislators who had voted against the prevailing
position had standing to challenge the right of the lieutenant
governor to vote because his vote completely nullied theirs and
caused the specic legislative enactment to go into effect. [Coleman
v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939)]
Compare: Members of Congress had no standing to challenge the Line Item

Veto Act authorizing the President to cancel (veto) certain spending
and tax law measures that are part of a bill that he signs into law.
Rationale: Rather than causing a personal and concrete injury,
the challenged statute caused only a type of institutional injury to
all members of Congress equally. [Raines v. Byrd, supra]
8) Assignee Standing
An assignee of a legal claim has standing even if the assignee has agreed to
remit any proceeds recovered from the litigation back to the assignor, if this is
done pursuant to an ordinary business agreement made in good faith. [Sprint
Communications Co., L.P. v. APCC Services, Inc., 554 U.S. 269 (2008)a paid
collection agent has standing to bring the claims of an assignor even though the
collection agent will submit any recovery back to the assignor]
5. Adequate and Independent State Grounds

The Supreme Court will hear a case from a state court only if the state court judgment
turned on federal grounds. The Court will refuse jurisdiction if it nds adequate and
independent nonfederal grounds to support the state decision.
a. Adequate
The nonfederal grounds must be adequate in that they are fully dispositive of the
case, so that even if the federal grounds are wrongly decided, it would not affect
the outcome of the case. Where that is the case, the Supreme Courts review of the
federal law grounds for the state courts decision would have no effect on the judgment
rendered by the state court, so that the Supreme Court, in effect, would be rendering an
advisory opinion.
b. Independent
The nonfederal grounds must also be independent: If the state courts interpretation
of its state provision was based on federal case law interpreting an identical federal
provision, the state law grounds for the decision are not independent.
c. Where Basis Is Unclear

If it is unclear whether the state court decision turned on federal or state law, the
Supreme Court may dismiss the case or remand it to the state court for clarication.
However, the Court will usually assume that there is no adequate state ground unless
the state court expressly stated that its decision rests on state law.
Example: When a state supreme court relied on Terry v. Ohio and other federal
cases to suppress evidence from a search and did not cite a single state
case to support its holding, although it referred to its state constitution in
the opinion, the Supreme Court concluded that the state court had rested
its decision on federal law, and therefore refused to dismiss the appeal
based on adequate and independent state grounds. [See Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983)]
6. Abstention
a. Unsettled State Law

When a federal constitutional claim is premised on an unsettled question of state law,
the federal court should stay its hand (abstain temporarily), so as to give state courts a
chance to settle the underlying state law question and thus potentially avoid the needless
resolution of a federal constitutional issue. [Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman,
312 U.S. 496 (1941)]
b. Pending State Proceedings

Generally, federal courts will not enjoin pending state criminal proceedings. [Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)]
1) Pending
State court proceedings are pending if begun before the federal court begins
proceedings on the merits. Hence, the order of ling charges is irrelevant.
Proceedings of substance must occur rst in federal court before an injunction
will issue. [Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975)]
2) Civil and Administrative Proceedings

Federal courts should abstain from enjoining pending state administrative or civil
proceedings when those proceedings involve an important state interest.
Examples: 1) A federal court should not enjoin a pending state civil action to
remove a child from the childs parents due to alleged child abuse.
2) A federal court should not enjoin: (i) a state court order holding
a person or corporation in contempt for failing to pay a civil
judgment; or (ii) a state court judgment that permits a plaintiff to
execute a lien against a defendants property. [Judice v. Vail, 430
U.S. 327 (1977); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987)]
3) Exception
An order enjoining state proceedings will be issued in cases of proven harassment
or prosecutions taken in bad faith (without hope of a valid conviction).
7. Political Questions
The Court will not decide political questions.
a. Denition
Political questions are:
(i) Those issues committed by the Constitution to another branch of government; or
(ii) Those inherently incapable of resolution and enforcement by the judicial process.
Examples: Political questions include:
1) Questions regarding the conduct of foreign relations or issues as to

when hostilities have stopped;
2) Questions relating to which group of delegates should be seated at the

Democratic National Convention [OBrien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972)];
3) The procedures used by the Senate to try impeachments (e.g., the

Court refused to rule on the constitutionality of the Senates delegation of
the duty to take evidence and testimony to a committee of senators prior
to the Senate deciding whether to vote for conviction on an impeachment
of a federal judge) [Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993)];
4) What constitutes a republican form of government guaranteed to

the state by Article IV, Section 4 [Pacic States Telephone & Telegraph
Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912)];
5) Whether the number of votes a candidate for Congress received is

sufcient to elect him [Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972)]; and
6) Questions regarding partisan legislative reapportionment (i.e., partisan

gerrymandering)these are effectively nonjusticiable [see League of
United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006)].
b. CompareNonpolitical Controversy
Presidential papers and communications are generally considered to be privileged and
protected against disclosure in the exercise of the executive power. But where these
documents are necessary to the continuation of criminal proceedings, the question of
production is justiciable and not political. [United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)]
8. Eleventh Amendment Limits on Federal Courts

The Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional bar that modies the judicial power by prohib-
iting a federal court from hearing a private partys or foreign governments claims against a
state government. [See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)]
a. What Is Barred?
The Eleventh Amendments jurisdictional bar extends to the following:
(i) Actions against state governments for damages;
(ii) Actions against state governments for injunctive or declaratory relief where the
state is named as a party;
(iii) Actions against state government ofcers where the effect of the suit will be that
retroactive damages will be paid from the state treasury or where the action is the
functional equivalent of a quiet title action that would divest the state of owner-
ship of land; and
(iv) Actions against state government ofcers for violating state law.
1) CompareSovereign Immunity
The Court has also held that the following are barred by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity:
a) Suits against a state government in state court, even on federal claims,

without the defendant states consent [Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706
(1999)provision in federal Fair Labor Standards Act creating a private

cause of action in state courts against state employers who violate the Act
violates sovereign immunity]; and
b) Adjudicative actions against states and state agencies before federal adminis-
trative agencies [Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports
Authority, 535 U.S. 743 (2002)].
b. What Is Not Barred?
1) Actions Against Local Governments

The Eleventh Amendment protects only state governments. Local governments
(e.g., cities or counties) are not protected.
2) Actions by the United States Government or Other State Governments

Actions by the United States Government or other state governments are not
barred.
3) Bankruptcy Proceedings
The Eleventh Amendment does not apply to federal laws that are exercises of
Congresss Article I power to create bankruptcy laws, and thus does not bar actions
of the United States bankruptcy courts that have a direct impact on state nances.
[Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004); Central
Virginia Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006)]
c. Exceptions to Eleventh Amendment
1) Certain Actions Against State Ofcers

The Supreme Court allows the following actions to be brought against state
ofcials despite the Eleventh Amendment:
a) Actions Against State Ofcers for Injunctions

A federal court may enjoin a state ofcer to refrain from future actions that
violate federal law or to take prospective actions to comply with constitutional
mandates. [Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)]
b) Actions Against State Ofcers for Monetary Damages from Ofcer

A federal court may hear an action for damages against a state ofcer for
violations of federal law if the monetary damages are to be paid out of the
ofcers own pocket. Rationale: By acting outside the scope of federal law,
the ofcer is stripped of his representative capacitythe action is not one
against a state, but rather is against an individual.
c) Actions Against State Ofcers for Prospective Payments from State

A federal court may hear an action for damages against a state ofcer where
the effect of the action will be to force the state to pay money in the future to
comply with the court order. [Ex parte Young, supra] However, federal court
jurisdiction is barred if the action will result in retroactive damages to be paid
from the state treasury. [Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1984)]
Example: P sues the State Commissioner of the Department of Public

Welfare for failing to comply with federal welfare regulations.
The federal court can order future compliance with the federal
regulations, even if this will result in costing the state a large
amount of money in the future. However, the federal court
cannot award back payments of amounts previously improperly
withheld, because the order would require payment from the
state treasury for retroactive relief. [Edelman v. Jordan, supra]
2) Congressional Removal of Immunity Under the Fourteenth Amendment

Congress can remove the states Eleventh Amendment immunity under its power
to prevent discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, the
Equal Pay Actbased on the Fourteenth Amendmentcan serve as a basis for
federal suits against a state by its employees. [Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445
(1976)]
a) CompareArticle I Powers
Unlike its power under the Fourteenth Amendment, Congresss legislative
powers under Article I (see II., infra) do not include the power to abrogate
state immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. [Seminole Tribe of Florida
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 114 (1996)] However, the Supreme Court has held that
states may not assert sovereign immunity in proceedings arising under the
bankruptcy law. [Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, supra]
d. Summary
For most bar exam questions, a key principle to remember is this: The Eleventh
Amendment will prohibit a federal court from hearing a claim for damages against a
state government (although not against state ofcers) unless:
1) The state has consented to allow the lawsuit in federal court;
2) The plaintiff is the United States or another state; or
3) Congress has clearly granted federal courts the authority to hear a specic type of
damage action under the Fourteenth Amendment (e.g., under a civil rights statute).
II. LEGISLATIVE POWER
A. ENUMERATED AND IMPLIED POWERS

The Constitution grants Congress a number of specic powers, many of which are enumerated
in Article I, Section 8. It also grants Congress auxiliary power under the Necessary and Proper
Clause.
1. Necessary and Proper Power

The Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the power to make all laws necessary and
proper (i.e., appropriate) for carrying into execution any power granted to any branch of the
federal government.
Example: Congress has the power to charter banks since that power is appropriate to
executing Congresss enumerated powers to tax, borrow money, regulate
commerce, etc. [McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)]
The Necessary and Proper Clause is not itself a basis of power; it merely gives Congress
power to execute specically granted powers. Thus, if a bar exam question asks what is the
best source of power for a particular act of Congress, the answer should not be the Necessary
and Proper Clause, standing alone.
a. Limitation
Congress cannot adopt a law that is expressly prohibited by another provision of the
Constitution.
2. Taxing Power
Congress has the power to lay and collect taxes, imposts, and excises, but they must be
uniform throughout the United States. [Art. I, 8] Capitation or other direct taxes must
be laid in proportion to the census [Art. I, 9, cl. 4], and direct taxes must be apportioned
among the states [Art. I, 2, cl. 3].
a. Determining What Is a Tax

The determination of whether a legislative enactment imposes a tax does not depend
on the label Congress gives it, but rather on its function. [National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)law requiring individuals
to purchase health insurance or to pay an additional amount of money to the IRS when
they pay their income tax, the amount of which varies by household income, joint vs.
single ling status, number of dependents, etc., and which is estimated to bring $4
billion annually into federal coffers, functionally is a tax regardless of the fact that
Congress labeled it a penalty]
b. Uniformity
Requirement of uniformity in the levy of indirect taxes (generally, this means any kind
of privilege tax, including duties and excises) has been interpreted by the Court to
mean geographical uniformity onlyi.e., identical taxation of the taxed Article in
every state where it is found. [Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340 (1945)]
c. Direct TaxesMust Be Apportioned

A direct tax (imposed directly on property or on the person) has seldom been
employed by Congress because of the cumbersome apportionment requirement;
taxes on income from real or personal property were initially held direct by the
Court, but the resulting need for apportioning such taxes was obviated by the Sixteenth
Amendment (income tax amendment).
d. Taxes Are Generally Valid

Absent a specic restriction such as those above, be very hesitant to rule against a
tax measure on the exam. A tax measure will be upheld if it bears some reasonable
relationship to revenue production or if Congress has the power to regulate the taxed
activity.
Example: Special excise tax levied on dealers in illegal narcotics is valid because it
raises revenue. [United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919)]
3. Spending Power
Congress may spend to provide for the common defense and general welfare. [Art. I, 8]
This spending may be for any public purposenot merely the accomplishment of other
enumerated powers. However, nonspending regulations are not authorized. Remember that
the Bill of Rights still applies to this power; i.e., the federal government could not condition
welfare payments on an agreement not to criticize government policies.
a. Regulation Through Spending

Note that Congress can use its spending power to regulate areas, even where it other-
wise has no power to regulate the area, by requiring entities that accept government
money to act in a certain manner (i.e., attaching strings to government grants). (See
VI.A.2.b., infra.)
4. Commerce Power
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 empowers Congress to regulate commerce with foreign
nations and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.
a. Denition of Commerce
1) Includes Basically All Activity Affecting Two or More States
Chief Justice Marshall, in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824), dened commerce
as every species of commercial intercourse . . . which concerns more states than
one and included within the concept virtually every form of activity involving or
affecting two or more states.
2) Includes Transportation or Trafc

The Court has consistently regarded transportation or trafc as commerce, whether
or not a commercial activity is involved.
Example: Interstate transportation of liquor for personal consumption, women
for immoral purposes (not necessarily prostitution), and interstate
transportation of stolen motor vehicles are all interstate commerce.
a) Vehicular Transportation Not Required

Any transmission across state lines, such as electricity, gas, telegraph,
telephone, TV, radio, and mail transmission (including educational materials
and sale of insurance), will constitute interstate commerce.
b. Substantial Economic Effect

The Supreme Court has sustained congressional power to regulate any activity, local or
interstate, that either in itself or in combination with other activities has a substantial
economic effect upon, or effect on movement in, interstate commerce.
Example: The classic case is the Courts holding that Congress can control a
farmers production of wheat for home consumption. [Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)] Rationale: Cumulative effect of many
instances of such production could be felt on the supply and demand of
the interstate commodity market.
1) Power Not Unlimited

The Supreme Court has recently made clear that the power of Congress to regulate
commerce, although very broad, does have limits so as not to obliterate the distinc-
tion between what is national and what is local. To be within Congresss power
under the Commerce Clause, a federal law must either:
(i) Regulate the channels of interstate commerce;
(ii) Regulate the instrumentalities of interstate commerce and persons and

things in interstate commerce; or
(iii) Regulate activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
a) Intrastate Activity
When Congress attempts to regulate intrastate activity under the third
prong, above, the Court will uphold the regulation if it is of economic or
commercial activity and the court can conceive of a rational basis on which
Congress could conclude that the activity in aggregate substantially affects
interstate commerce. [Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)upholding
regulation of intrastate cultivation and use of marijuana (permitted by state
law for medicinal purposes) because it was part of a comprehensive federal
program to combat interstate trafc in illicit drugs] If the regulated intra-
state activity is not commercial or economic, the Court generally will not
aggregate the effects and the regulation will be upheld only if Congress can
show a direct substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, which it
generally will not be able to do. [See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995)federal statute barring possession of a gun in a school zone is
invalid; United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)federal civil remedy
for victims of gender-motivated violence is invalid]
(1) Activity vs. Inactivity

The Commerce Clause gives Congress power only to regulate existing
commercial activity; it does not give Congress power to compel activity,
even if failure to undertake the activity may affect interstate commerce.
[National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 2.a., supra]
5. War and Related Powers

Article I, Section 8 gives Congress the power to declare war, raise and support armies,
provide for and maintain a navy, make rules for the government and regulation of the
armed forces, and organize, arm, discipline, and call up the militia. Of course, several other
congressional powers may have direct or indirect application to military purposes: tax and
spending power, commerce power, Senates treaty consent power, maritime power, investiga-
tory power, etc.
a. Economic Regulation
1) During War
Regulatory power of Congress, especially in economic matters and mobilization
of troops, in support of war effort is pervasive (although theoretically limited by
the Bill of Rights); thus, the Court has sustained national price and rent control, as
well as conscription and regulation of civilian/military production and services.
2) Postwar
To a considerable extent, this pervasive regulatory power may be validly extended
into post-wartime periods both to remedy wartime disruptions [e.g., Woods v.
Miller, 333 U.S. 138 (1948)rent controls] and to cope with cold war exigen-
cies. Legislation in the eld of veterans rights and limitations thereon may be
extended indenitely as long as veterans or their relatives may survive.
b. Military Courts and Tribunals

The constitutional basis of courts of military justice (trial and review of offenses by
military personnel, including courts-martial and reviewing agencies and tribunals) is
not Article III, but rather Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 (congressional power to make
rules for government and regulation of armed forces), buttressed by the Necessary and
Proper Clause.
1) Judicial Review
The regular federal (or state) courts have no general power to review court-martial
proceedings. However, in habeas corpus cases, the Article III courts, including the
Supreme Court, may make a limited inquiry into the military courts jurisdiction
of the person and offense or the validity of the courts legislative creation.
2) Court-Martial of Enemy Civilians and Soldiers Permitted

Military courts may try enemy civilians as well as enemy military personnel, at
least during wartime.
a) Suspension of Habeas Corpus for Enemy Combatants

Congress does not have the power to deny habeas corpus review to all aliens
detained as enemy combatants absent a meaningful substitute for habeas
corpus review. A meaningful substitute would allow prisoners to (i) challenge
the Presidents authority to detain them indenitely, (ii) contest the military
commissions ndings of fact, (iii) supplement the record on review with
exculpatory evidence discovered after the military commissions proceedings,
and (iv) request release. [Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008)]
3) Court-Martial of American Soldiers Permitted

Military courts have jurisdiction over all offenses (not just service connected
offenses) committed by persons who are members of the armed services, both
when charged and at the time of the offense. [Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S.
435 (1987), overruling OCallahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969)]
4) Court-Martial of American Civilians Generally Prohibited

The Supreme Court has denied Congress the power to authorize the court-martial
trial of American civilians as long as actual warfare has not forced courts to shut
down, even though martial law has been declared [Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2
(1866)]; even though the civilians accused may have been members of the armed
forces when committing the alleged offense [Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955)]
or are dependents of military personnel accompanying the latter overseas [Reid

v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)] or are civilian employees of the military forces at
overseas bases and installations; such trials by court-martial violate the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments, particularly the right to trial by jury.
c. Calling Forth the Militia

Under the Militia Clauses [Art. I, 8, c1. 15, 16], Congress has the power to authorize
the President to order members of National Guard units into federal serviceeven in
circumstances that do not involve a national emergency (e.g., for training outside of the
United States). The President need not obtain the consent of the governor of a units
home state to call it into such service. [Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334
(1990)]
6. Investigatory Power
The power to investigate to secure information as a basis for potential legislation or other
ofcial action (such as impeachment or trying impeachments) is a well-established implied
power. It is a very broad power, in that an investigation need not be directed toward enact-
ment of particular legislation, but the following limitations on its use do exist.
a. Authorized Investigation
The investigatory inquiry must be expressly or impliedly authorized by the congres-
sional house concerned, i.e., by statute or resolution creating or directing the investi-
gating committee or subcommittee.
b. Witnesses Rights
1) Fifth Amendment
The privilege against compulsory self-incrimination (the Fifth Amendment) is
available to witnesses, whether formal or informal, unless a statutory immunity
co-extensive with the constitutional immunity is granted.
2) Relevance
Written or oral information elicited by the investigative body must be pertinent
to the subject of the inquiry.
3) Procedural Due Process

Witnesses are generally entitled to procedural due process, such as presence of
counsel and right of cross-examination; but it is not yet clear whether such rights
are constitutionally required or whether some of them are required merely by
house rule or statute.
c. Enforcement of Investigatory Powers

Congress can hold a subpoenaed witness in contempt for refusing to appear or answer
before Congress.
7. Property Power
Congress has the power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting
the territory or other property belonging to the United States. [Art. IV, 3] Many other
congressional powers (war, commerce, postal, scal, etc.) obviously would be unworkable
if the ancillary power to acquire and dispose of property of all kindsreal, personal, and
intangiblewere not also implied from the main grants.
Example: The Property Clause empowers Congress to even protect wildlife wandering
onto federally owned lands. [Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976)]
a. No Limits on Disposition of Property

There is no express limitation on Congresss power to dispose of property owned by the
United States. The power extends to all species of property, such as leasehold interests
and electrical energy, as well as ordinary realty and personalty. Moreover, disposal may
involve direct competition with private enterprise and has never been invalidated on that
ground.
b. Eminent Domain
Acquisition of property for a public purpose by eminent domain is indirectly recog-
nized by the Fifth Amendment: . . . nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation. Federal taking must be for the purpose of effectuating an
enumerated power under some other provision of the Constitution.
8. No Federal Police Power

Congress has no general police power (i.e., power to legislate for the health, welfare, morals,
etc., of the citizens). Thus, on the bar exam the validity of a federal statute cannot rely on
the police power. However, Congress can exercise police power-type powers as to the
District of Columbia pursuant to its power to legislate over the capital [Art. I, 8, cl. 17]
and over all United States possessions (e.g., territories, military bases, Indian reservations)
pursuant to the property power.
9. Bankruptcy Power
Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 empowers Congress to establish uniform laws on the subject
of bankruptcies throughout the United States. This power has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court as nonexclusive; i.e., state legislation in the eld is superseded only to the
extent that it conicts with federal legislation therein.
10. Postal Power

Article I, Section 8, Clause 7 empowers Congress to establish post ofces and post roads.
a. Exclusive
The postal power has been interpreted as granting Congress a postal monopoly. Neither
private business nor the states may compete with the Federal Postal Service absent
Congresss consent. [Air Courier Conference of America v. American Postal Workers
Union, 498 U.S. 517 (1991)]
b. Scope of Power
Congress may validly classify and place reasonable restrictions on use of the mails,
but it may not deprive any citizen or group of citizens of the general mail privilege
or regulate the mail in such a way as to abridge freedom of speech or press (except
under valid standards, such as obscenity) or violate the ban of the Fourth Amendment
against unreasonable search and seizure.
11. Power Over Citizenship

Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 empowers Congress to establish a uniform rule of naturaliza-
tion.
a. Exclusion of Aliens
Congresss power to exclude aliens is broad.
1) Nonresident Aliens
Aliens have no right to enter the United States and can be refused entry because
of their political beliefs. [Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972)]
2) Resident Aliens
Resident aliens are entitled to notice and hearing before they can be deported.
b. Naturalization and DenaturalizationExclusive Control of Congress

Congress has exclusive power over naturalization and denaturalization. The Supreme
Court has held that this grant gives Congress plenary power over aliens (see
XVIII.D.2.a., infra).
1) No Loss of Citizenship Without Consent

Under the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may not take away the citizenship of
any citizennative-born or naturalizedwithout his consent.
Example: The Court held unconstitutional a statute that provided for loss of
citizenship upon voting in a foreign election. [Afroyim v. Rusk, 387
U.S. 253 (1967)]
a) Proof of Intent
A citizens intent to relinquish citizenship may be expressed by words or
conductand Congress may provide that such intent may be proven by a
preponderance of the evidence. [Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980)]
2) Rights of Children of Citizens

A person born in another country to United States citizen parents does not have a
constitutional right to become a United States citizen. Congress can grant citizen-
ship to children born abroad conditioned on their return to live in the United States
within a specied period of time or for a specied number of years. Such a child
who fails to return to the United States loses his grant of citizenship because he
has failed to meet the statutory condition precedent to his nal grant of citizenship.
12. Admiralty Power

Although congressional power to legislate in maritime matters is not expressed in the
Constitution, the Supreme Court has implied it from the exclusive jurisdiction given the
federal courts in this eld by Article III, Section 2, supported by the Necessary and Proper
Clause of Article I, Section 8.
a. Exclusive Power
The congressional power is plenary and exclusive, except to the extent that Congress
may leave (and has left) some maritime matters to state jurisdiction.
b. Navigable Waterways
The federal admiralty power attaches to all navigable waterwaysactually or poten-
tially navigableand to small tributaries that affect navigable waterways. The federal
maritime power is not limited to tidewaters or interstate waters.
13. Power to Coin Money and Fix Weights and Measures

Congress has the power to coin money and x the standard of weights and measures under
Article I, Section 8, Clause 5.
14. Patent/Copyright Power

Congress has the power to control the issuance of patents and copyrights under Article I,
Section 8, Clause 8.
B. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
1. Broad Delegation Allowed

Congress has broad discretion to delegate its legislative power to executive ofcers and/
or administrative agencies [Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)],
and even delegation of rulemaking power to the courts has been upheld [Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989)].
Example: Congress can delegate the power to establish sentencing guidelines for
criminal cases to a sentencing commission located in the federal courts and
made up, in part, of federal judges, as long as the tasks delegated do not
undermine the integrity of the judiciary or usurp the powers of the other
branches. [Mistretta v. United States, supra]
2. Limitations on Delegation
a. Power Cannot Be Uniquely Conned to Congress

To be delegable, the power must not be uniquely conned to Congress; e.g., the power
to declare war cannot be delegated, nor the power to impeach.
b. Clear Standard
It is said that delegation will be upheld only if it includes intelligible standards for the
delegate to follow. However, as a practical matter almost anything will pass as an intel-
ligible standard (e.g., upholding public interest, convenience, or necessity).
c. Separation of Powers Limitations

While Congress has broad power to delegate, the separation of powers doctrine restricts
Congress from keeping certain controls over certain delegates. For example, Congress
cannot give itself the power to remove an ofcer of the executive branch by any means
other than impeachment (e.g., if Congress delegates rulemaking power to an executive
branch agency (e.g., the FCC), it may not retain the power to re the agency head). (See
III.B.1.b.2)a), infra.) Similarly, Congress cannot give a government employee who is
subject to removal by Congress (other than by impeachment) purely executive powers.
(See III.B.1.b.2)b), infra.)
Example: A federal statute transferred the authority to control two D.C. area
airports from the federal government to a local authority. However, the
statute reserved to a review board a veto power over the local author-
itys decisions. The review board was comprised of nine members of
Congress. The statute violates the separation of powers doctrine in one
of two ways: (i) If the review boards power is considered to be legis-
lative, the statute created an unconstitutional legislative veto (see D.,
infra). (ii) If the review boards power is considered to be executive,
the separation of powers doctrine prohibits members of Congress from
exercising it. [Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens
for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252 (1991)]
d. Important Liberty Interests

If the delegate interferes with the exercise of a fundamental liberty or right, the burden
falls upon the delegate to show that she has the power to prevent the exercise of the right
and her decision was in furtherance of that particular policy.
Example: In Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), the Secretary of State was
required to issue a passport to a Communist because he could not show
that Congress gave him the power to encroach upon the fundamental
right to travel simply because the applicant was a Communist.
e. Criminal vs. Civil Punishment

The legislature may delegate its authority to enact regulations, the violation of which
are crimes, but prosecution for such violations must be left to the executive and judicial
branches. [See United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911)] However, agencies may
enact and impose civil penalties (i.e., nes labeled as civil nes) without prosecution in
court. [Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938)]
C. THE SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSESPECIAL IMMUNITY FOR FEDERAL

LEGISLATORS
Article I, Section 6 provides that For any speech or debate in either House [members of
Congress] shall not be questioned in any other place.
1. Persons Covered
The immunity extends to aides who engage in acts that would be immune if performed by a
legislator. [Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972)]
The Speech or Debate Clause does not extend to state legislators who are prosecuted for
violation of federal law. [United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 (1980)]
2. Scope of Immunity
Conduct that occurs in the regular course of the legislative process and the motivation behind
that conduct are immune from prosecution.
a. Bribes Excluded
Taking of a bribe is not an act in the regular course of the legislative process and is
therefore actionable. [United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972)]
b. Speeches Outside Congress

Speeches and publications made outside Congress are not protected.
c. Defamatory Statements
Republication in a press release or newsletter of a defamatory statement originally made
in Congress is not immune. [Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979)]
D. CONGRESSIONAL VETO OF EXECUTIVE ACTIONS INVALID

A legislative veto is an attempt by Congress to overturn an executive agency action without
bicameralism (i.e., passage by both houses of Congress) or presentment (i.e., giving the bill
to the President for his signature or veto). Legislative vetoes of executive actions are invalid.
[Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)] The legislative veto
usually arises where Congress delegates discretionary power to the President or an execu-
tive agency. In an attempt to control the delegation, Congress requires the President or agency
to present any action taken under the discretionary power to certain members of Congress for
approval. If they disapprove, they veto the action and that is the nal decision on the action. This
is unconstitutional, because, to be valid, legislative action (the veto) must be approved by both
houses and presented to the President for his approval (see III.B.3., infra). In Chadha, the Court
also noted that the legislative veto violates the implied separation of powers requirements of the
Constitution.
Examples: 1) Congress granted to the Immigration & Naturalization Service (INS) the
power to deport or suspend from deportation illegal aliens. INS decisions to
suspend deportations had to be submitted to Congress. Either house could pass
a resolution overriding the decision. This legislative veto provision is unconstitu-
tional. [Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha, supra]
2) By statute, Congress grants to the President the power to send military troops
into combat, without Congresss prior approval, whenever the United States or its
territories are attacked. The statute, however, reserves in Congress the power to
force the President to withdraw the troops. The statute does not provide for presi-
dential veto of Congresss decision to withdraw. The decision in Chadha suggests
that this statute is unconstitutional.
III. THE EXECUTIVE POWER
A. VESTED IN PRESIDENT
The entire executive power is vested in the President by Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution.
Various executive functions may be and are delegated within the executive branch by the
President or by Congress.
B. DOMESTIC POWERS
1. Appointment and Removal of Ofcers
a. Appointment
Under Article II, Section 2, the President is empowered with the advice and consent
of the Senate to appoint all ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges
of the Supreme Court, and all other ofcers of the United States, whose appoint-
ments are not herein otherwise provided for . . . but the Congress may by law vest the
appointment of such inferior ofcers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
courts of law, or in the heads of departments.
1) Appointment of Independent Counsel (Special Prosecutor)

A special prosecutor with the limited duties of investigating a narrow range
of persons and subjects (e.g., to investigate alleged misconduct of a govern-
ment employee) is an inferior ofcer. Therefore, under the Appointment Clause,
Congress is free to vest the power to appoint a special prosecutor in the judiciary.
[Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)]
2) No Appointments by Congress
Although Congress may appoint its own ofcers to carry on internal legislative
tasks (i.e., its staff), it may not appoint members of a body with administrative or
enforcement powers; such persons are ofcers of the United States and must,
pursuant to Article II, Section 2, be appointed by the President with senatorial
conrmation unless Congress has vested their appointment in the President alone,
in federal courts, or in heads of departments. [Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)]
b. Recess Appointments
The Recess Appointments Clause of the Constitution gives the President the power to
make appointments for vacancy without Senate approval during any Senate recess of
sufcient duration. Under the Clause, the Senate is in recess only when it states it is
in recess. If the Senate does not declare a recess and it holds pro forma sessions, the
Senate is not in recess and the President has no power to make appointments without
Senate approval. [NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. (2014)]
c. Removal
As to removal of appointees, the Constitution is silent except for ensuring tenure of all
Article III judges during good behavior.
1) By President
Under the Courts decisions, the President probably can remove high level, purely
executive ofcers (e.g., Cabinet members) at will, without any interference from
Congress. However, after Morrison v. Olson, supra, it appears that Congress may
provide statutory limitations (e.g., removal for good cause) on the Presidents
power to remove all other executive appointees.
2) By Congress
a) Limitation on Removal Power

Congress cannot give itself the power to remove an ofcer charged with the
execution of laws except through impeachment. A congressional attempt
through legislation to remove from government employment specically
named government employees is likely to be held invalid as a bill of attainder.
b) Limitation on Powers of Removable Ofcers

Congress cannot give a government employee who is subject to removal from
ofce by Congress any powers that are truly executive in nature. For this
reason, Congress could not give to the Comptroller General (who could be
removed from ofce not only by impeachment but also by a joint resolution of
Congress) the function of establishing the amount of automatic budget reduc-
tions that would be required if Congress failed to make budget reductions
necessary to insure that the federal budget decit did not exceed a legisla-
tively established maximum amount. [Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986)]
2. Pardons
The President is empowered by Article II, Section 2, to grant reprieves and pardons for
offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment. This power has been
held to apply before, during, or after trial, and to extend to the offense of criminal contempt,
but not to civil contempt, inasmuch as the latter involves the rights of third parties. The
pardon power cannot be limited by Congress, and includes power to commute a sentence on
any conditions the President chooses, as long as they are not independently unconstitutional.
[Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974)]
3. Veto Power
a. Congress May Override Veto by Two-Thirds Vote

Every act of Congress must be approved by the President before taking effect, unless
passed over his disapproval by two-thirds vote of each house. [Art. I, 7]
b. President Has Ten Days to Veto

The President has 10 days (excepting Sundays) to exercise his veto power. If he fails to
act within that time:
(i) The bill becomes law if Congress is still in session; or
(ii) The bill is automatically vetoed if Congress is not in session (a pocket veto).
[Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929)]
Brief recesses during an annual session create no pocket veto opportunity. [Wright v.
United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938)]
c. Line Item Veto Unconstitutional

The veto power allows the President only to approve or reject a bill in toto; he cannot
cancel part (through a line item veto) and approve other parts. Rationale: The
Presidents veto power does not authorize him to amend or repeal laws passed by
Congress. [Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998)]
4. Power as Chief Executive

The Presidents power over internal (i.e., within the United States) affairs as the chief execu-
tive is unclear. Clearly the President has some power to direct subordinate executive ofcers,
and there is a long history of presidents issuing executive orders. Perhaps the best guide for
determining the validity of presidential actions regarding internal affairs can be based on
Justice Jacksons opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952):
(i) Where the President acts with the express or implied authority of Congress, his
authority is at its maximum and his actions likely are valid;
(ii) Where the President acts where Congress is silent, his action will be upheld as long as
the act does not take over the powers of another branch of the government or prevent
another branch from carrying out its tasks [see, e.g., United States v. Nixon, I.E.7.b.,
supraPresidents invocation of executive privilege was invalidated because it kept
federal courts from having evidence they needed to conduct a fair criminal trial]; and
(iii) Where the President acts against the express will of Congress, he has little authority and
his action likely is invalid.
Example: Hamdan was captured in the Afghanistan war, sent to Guantanamo Bay,
and then tried for war crimes by a military commission that had been
created by an Executive Order issued after the 9/11 terrorist attack. Citing
Justice Jacksons Youngstown concurrence, the Court held that the military
commission could not proceed, because the executive order authorizing the
commission went beyond the limitations that Congress had placed on the
President. The Court found that the Executive Order was authorized by an
act of Congress that was interpreted as limiting the Presidents power to
convene commissions to those that comply with the Constitution, laws, and
rules of war, and that the commission here violated the laws and rules of war
in several respects (e.g., it did not require a sufcient showing of the facts
justifying the commissions jurisdiction; it did not provide the accused and his
attorney sufcient access to the evidence). [Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
557 (2006)]
a. No Power to Impound and the Take Care Clause

It follows from the above that the President has no power to refuse to spend appro-
priated funds when Congress has expressly mandated that they be spent. [Kendall
v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. 524 (1838)] Some authorities base this result
on Article II, Section 3, Clause 4the Take Care Clausewhich provides that the
President shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed . . . .
C. POWER OVER EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
1. War
Although lacking the power to declare or initiate a formal war, the President has extensive
military powers (essentially an external eld, although applicable to civil war as well and to
many domestic affairs caught up in military necessities).
a. Actual Hostilities
The President may act militarily under his power as commander in chief of the armed
forces and militia (when federalized), under Article II, Section 2, in actual hostilities
against the United States without a congressional declaration of war. But Congress may
limit the President under its power to enact a military appropriation every two years.
(A military appropriation may not be for more than two years.)
b. Military Government
This power includes the establishment of military governments in occupied territories,
including military tribunals.
2. Foreign Relations
The Presidents power to represent and act for the United States in day-to-day foreign
relations is paramount. He has the power to appoint and receive ambassadors and make
treaties (with the advice and consent of the Senate), and to enter into executive agreements.
His power is broad even as to foreign affairs that require congressional consent. No signi-
cant judicial control has been exercised over this power.
a. Power to Recognize Foreign States

The power to recognize foreign states lies exclusively with the president. [See
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015)legislation requiring the secretary of state,
upon request, to designate Israel and not Jerusalem as the place of birth on the
passport of a U.S. citizen born in Jerusalem infringes on the long-time executive branch
policy of favoring recognition of Jerusalem]
3. Treaty Power
The treaty power is granted to the President by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur. [Art. II, 2, cl. 2]
a. Supreme Law
Like other federal law, treaties are the supreme law of the land. Any state action or
law in conict with a United States treaty is invalid (regardless of whether it is a state
law or a state constitutional provision).
1) Self-Executing vs. Non-Self-Executing Treaties

Some treaties are expressly or impliedly self-executing (i.e., they are effective
without any implementation by Congress). Others are not effective unless and until
Congress passes legislation to effectuate their ends. If a treaty is not self-executing,
it is not treated as the supreme law of the land until Congress acts to effectuate
it, but the treaty itself can serve as an independent basis for Congresss power to
adopt the required legislation (i.e., Congress need not point to one of its enumer-
ated powers, such as the commerce power, as the basis for the legislation).
a) President Has No Power to Implement Non-Self-Executing Treaties

Based on the Youngstown analysis (B.4., supra), the President generally does
not have any independent power to issue a memorandum ordering compli-
ance with a non-self-executing treaty that has not been the subject of effec-
tuating legislation by Congress. [Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491President
had no power to enforce provisions of the Vienna Convention (a non-self-
executing international treaty) by issuing a memorandum requiring states to
grant habeas corpus petitions to reconsider convictions of criminals who are
foreign nationals and who were not informed at the time of their arrest of
their right to notify their consulate of their detention]
2) Conict with Congressional Acts

Valid treaties are on a supremacy parity with acts of Congress; a conict
between an act of Congress and a treaty is resolved by order of adoptionthe last
in time prevails.
3) Conict with Constitution

Treaties are not co-equal with the Constitution. For example, no treaty (or execu-
tive agreement) could confer on Congress authority to act in a manner inconsistent
with any specic provision of the Constitution. [Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)]
b. Other Limitations
Other substantive limitations on the treaty power have not been judicially established;
but in one case the Court expressed in dictum the view that a treaty could not upset the
basic structure of the United Statess federalism, or wield a power barred to the national
government by the Constitution, or cede any part of a state to a foreign nation without
the states consent. The Court has never held a treaty unconstitutional (Reid v. Covert,
supra, invalidated an executive agreement for violating the Fifth Amendment), but it
is conceivable that the treaty power extends only to subjects plausibly bearing on our
relations with other countries.
4. Executive Agreements
The Presidents power to enter into agreements (i.e., executive agreements) with the heads
of foreign countries is not expressly provided for in the Constitution; nevertheless, the power
has become institutionalized. Executive agreements can probably be on any subject as long
as they do not violate the Constitution. They are very similar to treaties, except that they do
not require the consent of the Senate.
a. Conicts with Other Governmental Action

Executive agreements that are not consented to by the Senate are not the supreme law
of the land. Thus, conicting federal statutes and treaties will prevail over an execu-
tive agreement, regardless of which was adopted rst. However, executive agreements
prevail over conicting state laws.
b. ExamplePower to Settle Claims of United States Citizens

The President, with the implicit approval of Congress, has power to settle claims of
United States citizens against foreign governments through an executive agreement.
[Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981)]
D. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE/IMMUNITY
1. Executive Privilege
The executive privilege is not a constitutional power, but rather is an inherent privilege
necessary to protect the condentiality of presidential communications.
a. Extent of the Privilege

Presidential documents and conversations are presumptively privileged, but the privi-
lege must yield to the need for such materials as evidence in a criminal case to which
they are relevant and otherwise admissible. This determination must be made by the
trial judge after hearing the evidence.
1) National Security Secrets

Military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets are given great deference
by the courts.
2) Criminal Proceedings
In criminal proceedings, presidential communiques will be available to the prose-
cution, where a need for such information is demonstrated. [United States v. Nixon,
B.4., supra]
3) Civil Trials
The Court has avoided ruling on the scope of executive privilege in a civil case.
Nevertheless, in Cheney v. United States District Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004), the
Court noted that the need for information in a criminal case is weightier, and the
Executives withholding of information in a civil trial would not impair the judicia-
rys ability to fulll its responsibility to resolve cases as much as in a criminal
trial. Thus, it appears that an Executive branch decision to withhold information
will be given more deference in a civil trial than in a criminal trial.
4) Screening Papers and Recordings of Former President

A federal statute requiring the Administrator of General Services to screen presi-
dential papers is valid, notwithstanding the privilege. [Nixon v. Administrator of
General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977)]
5) Screening by Judge in Chambers

The court will determine in an in-camera inspection which communications are
protected and which are subject to disclosure.
2. Executive Immunity
a. Absolute Immunity for President

The President has absolute immunity from civil damages based on any action that the
President took within his ofcial responsibilities (even if the action was only arguably
within the outer perimeter of presidential responsibility). [Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 731 (1982)] However, the President has no immunity from private suits in federal
courts based on conduct that allegedly occurred before taking ofce. [Clinton v.
Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997)] Rationale: The immunity is intended only to enable the
President to perform his designated functions without fear of personal liability.
b. Immunity May Extend to Presidential Aides

Presidential aides share in this immunity only if they are exercising discretionary
authority for the President in sensitive areas of national concern, such as foreign
affairs. Other aides are entitled only to a qualied immunity (a good faith defense).
[Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)]
Example: The Attorney General does not share the Presidents absolute immunity
for authorizing a warrantless wiretap on national security grounds.
The Attorney General would have a defense to a lawsuit regarding such a
wiretap if it was shown that he was able to act in good faith because his
actions were not violating clearly established or well-settled statutory or
constitutional rights. [Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985)]
E. IMPEACHMENT
1. Persons Subject to Impeachment

The President, Vice President, and all civil ofcers of the United States are subject to
impeachment.
2. Grounds
The grounds for impeachment are treason, bribery, high crimes, and misdemeanors.
3. Impeachment by the House

A majority vote in the House is necessary to invoke the charges of impeachment.
4. Conviction by the Senate

A two-thirds vote in the Senate is necessary to convict.
PART TWO: THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
IV. RELATIVE SPHERES OF FEDERAL AND STATE POWER
A. EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL POWERS
1. Power of States Expressly Limited

Some powers are exclusively federal because of express constitutional limitation on or prohi-
bition of the states exercise thereofsuch as the treaty power, coinage of money, and duty
on imports.
2. Inherent Federal Powers

Others are exclusively federal in view of their naturesuch as declaration of war, federal
citizenship, naturalization, and borrowing money on the credit of the United States. Any
state exercise of these powers would basically subvert the federal system. On the exam, do
not allow states to take actions that might touch upon foreign relations.
Examples: 1) In Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968), the Court held invalid state
statutes that sought to withhold the proceeds of local decedents estates from
heirs living in nations that (i) discriminate against Americans in their probate
laws, (ii) impede the transmission of funds to the United States, or (iii) cons-
cate property inherited by their citizens. The Court concluded that such laws
are so potentially disruptive of a nationally conducted foreign policy that they
are invalid notwithstanding the traditional commitment of probate law to the
states.
2) California adopted an act to aid Holocaust victims that, among other

things, required any California insurer that sold insurance policies in Europe
between 1920 and 1945 to disclose certain information about those policies.
The President of the United States also entered into an agreement with
Germany regarding Holocaust victims claims and informed California that
its law would impede the effectiveness of that agreement. Nevertheless,
California announced that it would enforce its law. Several insurance compa-
nies and a trade association brought suit to enjoin enforcement of the act.
Held: The act interferes with the Presidents power over foreign affairs and is
preempted on that ground. [American Insurance Association v. Garamendi,

539 U.S. 396 (2003)]
B. EXCLUSIVE STATE POWERS

Whereas the federal government has only those powers granted to it by the Constitution, the state
governments are governments of unlimited powers, having all powers not prohibited to them
by the Constitution. This is recognized by the Tenth Amendment, which provides that all powers
not delegated to the federal government by the Constitution are reserved to the states (or to the
people). However, given the expansive interpretation of federal powers (e.g., the commerce power;
see II.A.4., supra), little state power is exclusive.
C. CONCURRENT FEDERAL AND STATE POWERSUPREMACY CLAUSE

Most governmental power is concurrent, belonging to both the states and the federal government.
Thus, it is possible for states and the federal government to pass legislation on the same subject
matter. When this occurs, the Supremacy Clause provides that the federal law is supreme, and the
state law is rendered void if it is preempted. State law may be preempted expressly or impliedly.
1. Express Preemption
A federal law may expressly provide that the states may not adopt laws concerning the
subject matter of the federal legislation. Note, however, that an express preemption clause
will be narrowly construed. [See Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70 (2009)]
Example: A federal law [15 U.S.C. 1334(b)] provides that: no requirement or prohi-
bition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under state law with
respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes that are labeled in
conformity with federal law. A smoker brought a state law consumer fraud
claim against a cigarette company, claiming that the companys advertise-
ments that its cigarettes were light and contain less tar and nicotine were
fraudulent. The cigarette company argued that its advertisements were in
conformity with federal law and, therefore, the state law claim was preempted
by the federal law. Held: The state law claim is not preempted. The state
consumer protection law is based on a duty not to deceive rather than on
smoking or health, and the federal law preempts only state laws based on
smoking or health. [Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, supra]
2. Implied Preemption
Even if federal law does not expressly prohibit state action, state laws will nevertheless be
held impliedly preempted if they actually conict with federal requirements, they prevent
achievement of federal objectives, or Congress has preempted the entire eld.
a. Actual Conict Between State and Federal Law Requirements

A valid act of Congress or federal regulation supersedes any state or local action that
actually conicts with the federal rulewhether by commanding conduct inconsistent
with that required by the federal rule, or by forbidding conduct that the federal rule is
designed to foster.
Example: Federal law [42 U.S.C. 1983] gives state and federal courts jurisdiction
to hear claims for violations of federal rights committed by persons acting
under color of state law. New York determined that the majority of suits
seeking money damages from corrections ofcers under section 1983 are
frivolous and therefore divested its trial courts of jurisdiction to hear such
cases. Held: The states policy of shielding corrections ofcers from suits
under section 1983 violates the Supremacy Clause. State courts must hear
federal claims. They may apply their own procedural rules as they do to
state claims, but they cannot exclude a class of federal claims from being
heard in state court. [Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729 (2009)]
b. State Prevents Achievement of Federal Objective

State law will also be held impliedly preempted if it interferes with achievement of a
federal objective. This is true even if the state or local law was enacted for some valid
purpose and not merely to frustrate the federal law.
Example: A purpose of the federal bankruptcy laws is to give bankrupts a fresh
start, free of their old debts. A state law providing for suspension of
the drivers license of persons who have failed to pay off auto accident
judgments, regardless of the judgment debtors discharge in bankruptcy,
interferes with the federal objective and will fail. [Perez v. Campbell,
402 U.S. 637 (1971)]
c. Field Preemption
A state or local law may also be found to be preempted if it appears that Congress
intended to occupy the entire eld, thus precluding any state or local regulation.
The courts will look at the federal regulatory scheme to deduce Congresss intent. For
example, if the federal laws are comprehensive or a federal agency is created to oversee
the eld, preemption will often be found.
Example: Because Congress has enacted extensive regulatory laws concerning
registration of aliens and employment of aliens who are in the country
unlawfully, states may not make laws concerning these matters (not even
a law making it a misdemeanor to fail to comply with federal immigra-
tion laws). Neither may a state authorize its ofcers to arrest a person
without a warrant whom the ofcer has probable cause to believe has
committed a public offense that makes the person removable from the
United Statesbecause such a law goes beyond the situations in which
federal law provides for warrantless arrests for removable offenses.
However, a state law requiring ofcers conducting a stop or detention
to verify the detainees immigration status if the ofcers have reason-
able suspicion to believe the detainee is an alien unlawfully present in
the United States is not necessarily preempted, at least absent a showing
that this practice will delay release of the detainees. [Arizona v. United
States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012)]
3. Presumption Against Preemption

The Supreme Court has stated that in all preemption cases, especially any involving a eld
traditionally within the power of the states (e.g., regulations involving health, safety, or
welfare), it will start with the presumption that the historic state police powers are not to be
superseded unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. [Wyeth v. Levine,
555 U.S. 555 (2009)]
Example: A person who was injured by a prescription drug that was improperly
administered brought a state law tort suit against the drugs manufacturer,
claiming that the drugs label did not provide adequate warnings. The label
was approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) pursuant
to its power to regulate prescription drugs. The drug company claimed
that the state tort action was preempted. Held: Congress did not intend to
preempt the state court action here. The Court held that while Congress
enacted the legislation here to protect consumers, it did not provide a remedy
for consumers injured by unsafe drugs. Also, Congress had not enacted
an express preemption provision within the statute for prescription drugs
although it did enact an express preemption provision for medical devices.
Moreover, there is no conict between the FDA approval of a warning label
and the state tort failure to warn claim here because the FDA regulation
allowed companies to strengthen warnings without preapproval and, thus,
the company was free to provide stronger warnings. [See, e.g., Wyeth v.
Levine, supra]
D. ABSENCE OF FEDERAL AND STATE POWERS

Some powers are denied to both Congress and the states. For example, the Supreme Court has
held that the Qualications Clauses [Art. I, 2, cl. 2; 3, cl. 3], setting the qualications to serve
in Congress, are exclusive and cannot be altered by Congress or the states. [United States Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)state-imposed term limit for members of Congress
invalidated; and see Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2001)state law instructing each member of
its congressional delegation to support a constitutional amendment for term limits, and providing
that failure to do so be noted on the ballot, was held invalid because it imposes a substantive
qualication rather than regulates the manner in which elections are held]
E. INTERSTATE COMPACT CLAUSE

The Constitution provides that states may enter into agreements or compacts with other states
upon the consent of Congress. [Art. I, 10, cl. 3] However, not all agreements between states are
compacts requiring congressional consent. The Compact Clause reaches only interstate agree-
ments that increase the political power of the states at the expense of federal supremacy (e.g.,
an agreement whereby one state cedes territory to another state). [See United States Steel Corp.
v. Multistate Tax Commission, 434 U.S. 452 (1978)congressional consent not required for
multistate tax compact because the compact does not give member states any powers they could
not exercise in its absence] The Supreme Court has the power to interpret such compactsthe
member states do not have nal authority over interpretation. [West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims,
341 U.S. 22 (1951)]
F. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE

The Full Faith and Credit Clause provides that full faith and credit shall be given in each state
to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. By virtue of the Clause,
if a judgment is entitled to full faith and credit, it must be recognized in sister states (i.e., a party
who loses a case in New York generally may not relitigate it in New Jersey; the New Jersey courts
are bound by the New York ruling). However, not every decision is entitled to full faith and credit.
There are three requirements:
(i) The court that rendered the judgment must have had jurisdiction over the parties and the
subject matter (Note: If the issue of jurisdiction was litigated in one state, that court's ruling
on jurisdiction is nal and must be recognized by other states).
(ii) The judgment must have been on the merits; i.e., on the substance of the plaintiffs claim
rather than on a procedural issue, such as improper venue or jurisdiction; and
(iii) The judgment must be nal.
Although the Clause itself governs only recognition of state judgments in sister states, a federal
statute provides for recognition of state judgments in federal courts as well.
V. INTERSOVEREIGN LITIGATION
A. SUITS BY THE UNITED STATES AGAINST A STATE

The United States may sue a state without its consent.
B. SUITS BY STATE AGAINST UNITED STATESUNITED STATES MUST CONSENT

Public policy forbids a state from suing the United States without its consent. Congress can pass
legislation that permits the United States to be sued by a state in given situations.
C. FEDERAL OFFICER AS DEFENDANT
1. Limitation
Suits against a federal ofcer are deemed to be brought against the United States itself if
the judgment sought would be satised out of the public treasury or would interfere with
public administration and, therefore, are not permitted.
2. Specic Relief Against the Individual Ofcer

Specic relief against an ofcer as an individual will be granted if the ofcer acted ultra
vires:
a. Beyond his statutory powers; or
b. The valid power was exercised in an unconstitutional manner.
D. SUITS BY ONE STATE AGAINST ANOTHER

One state may sue another state without the latters consent. The Supreme Court has exclusive
original jurisdiction.
VI. INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAX AND REGULATION IMMUNITIES
A. FEDERAL TAXATION AND REGULATION OF STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

The Tenth Amendment provides that powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited to the states, are reserved to the states. This reservation of power is
often cited as a restriction on Congresss power to regulate the states.
1. Tax or Regulation Applying to State and Private EntitiesValid

The Supreme Court will not likely strike down on Tenth Amendment grounds a tax or
regulation that subjects states or local governments to regulations or taxes that apply to both
the public sector and the private sector. It has held that in such cases, the states interests are
best protected by the states representation in Congress. [Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985)]
Example: Congress can require state and local governments to follow the provisions of
the Federal Fair Labor and Standards Act requiring minimum wages for all
employees. [Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, supra]
2. Tax or Regulation that Applies Only to States

However, the Tenth Amendment does limit Congresss power to regulate the states alone
by requiring the states to act in a particular way. Congress may not compel states to enact
or enforce a regulatory program. [New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)
federal statute requiring states to either regulate radioactive waste or take title to it is
beyond Congresss power] Similarly, if Congress passes a tax that does not apply to private
businesses but merely taxes state government entities, there is a possibility that the Court
would use the Tenth Amendment to prohibit the tax.
a. ExceptionCivil Rights
Congress may use its power under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to restrict
state activities that it determines would violate the civil liberties of persons within the
state.
Examples: 1) Congress may invalidate state laws establishing a literacy test as a
prerequisite to voting in state elections. [Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
112 (1970)]
2) Congress may restrict changes in state voting laws that have the effect
of diminishing the voting power of racial minorities even though the
change in state law was not purposeful racial discrimination that would
violate Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment. [Rome v. United States,
446 U.S. 156 (1980)]
b. ExceptionSpending Power Conditions

Congress may also regulate states through the spending power by imposing condi-
tions on the grant of money to state or local governments (sometimes referred to as
grants with strings attached). Such conditions will not violate the Tenth Amendment
merely because Congress lacked the power to directly regulate the activity that is the
subject of the spending program if the conditions:
(i) Are clearly stated;
(ii) Relate to the purpose of the program; and
(iii) Are not unduly coercive.
Example: A federal law that would withhold 5% of the federal highway funds
otherwise allocable to a state if the state did not set a 21 years minimum
age for the drinking of alcohol was upheld where the funds withheld
amounted to less than one-half of 1% of the states total budget. [South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)]
1) What Is Unduly Coercive?

There is a limit to the conditions the Supreme Court will tolerate. A condition that
goes beyond mere incentive and turns into compulsion or undue inuence
violates principles of federalism. However, the Court has not set out a brightline
test for making this determination. [National Federation of Independent Business
v. Sebelius, II.A.2.a., supralaw that threatens to withhold from states current
Medicare funding if they do not greatly expand Medicare programs amounts to
a gun to the head, given that the law threatens to withhold about 10% of an
average states total budget]
3. Commandeering State Ofcials

The Supreme Court has held that the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from adopting
a statute that commandeers state ofcials by requiring states to regulate their own
citizens. [Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)striking portions of a federal gun
law that required state law enforcement ofcers to collect from gun dealers reports regarding
prospective handgun purchasers and to conduct background checks on them] However, the
Court has allowed Congress to regulate the states by prohibiting them from performing
certain acts. [See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000)upholding federal act that bars
states (as well as private resellers) from disclosing personal information required on drivers
license applications]
B. STATE TAXATION AND REGULATION OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
1. No Direct Tax on Federal Instrumentalities

A state tax levied directly against the property or operation of the federal government
without the consent of Congress is invalid.
2. Nondiscriminatory, Indirect Taxes

Nondiscriminatory, indirect taxes on the federal government or its property are permissible
if they do not unreasonably burden the federal government.
Examples: 1) State income taxes on salaries of federal employees are valid. However,
a state tax that imposes a higher tax on federal employees (or retired
federal employees) than on state or local government employees (or retired
employees) would violate the principle of intergovernmental tax immunity,
unless Congress had approved this discriminatory tax. [Davis v. Michigan
Department of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989)]
2) Private contractors, acting as purchasing agents for the federal govern-

ment, cannot be compelled to pay state sales or use taxes on materials
purchased on behalf of the federal government. However, state sales or use
taxes are valid where the contractor is working for the federal government on
a cost-plus basis. These extra costs are not characterized as direct taxes.
3. State Regulation of Federal Government

The states have no power to regulate the activities of the federal government unless Congress
consents to the regulation. Thus, instrumentalities and agents of the federal government are
immune from state regulations relating to performance of their federal functions.
Examples: 1) A state may not require a post ofce employee to obtain a state drivers
license in order to drive a mail truck. [Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51
(1920)]
2) A state may not require a contractor to obtain a state license to build facili-
ties on an Air Force base, located within the state, pursuant to a government
contract. [Leslie Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas, 352 U.S. 187 (1956)]
VII. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSES
A. INTRODUCTION
There are two Privileges and Immunities Clauses: the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or
Immunities Clause and the Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. The
Fourteenth Amendment clause protects attributes of United States citizenship and is rarely appli-
cable. The Article IV provision prevents some discrimination by states against nonresidents, and
is usually more relevant on the bar exam.
B. ARTICLE IVPRIVILEGES OF STATE CITIZENSHIP

Article IV, Section 2, the Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause, provides that [t]he
Citizens of each state shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of citizens in the several
states. Thus, it prohibits discrimination by a state against nonresidents.
1. Corporations and Aliens Not Protected

Corporations and aliens are not citizens of a state for purposes of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause.
2. Only Fundamental Rights Protected

The Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause prohibits discrimination by a state against
nonresidents of the state when the discrimination concerns fundamental rightsi.e., rights
relating to important commercial activities (such as pursuit of a livelihood) or civil liber-
ties. However, the Clause applies only if the discrimination is intentionally protectionist
in nature. [See McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709 (2013)state law limiting Freedom
of Information Act requests to state citizens did not violate the Privileges and Immunities
Clause when it interfered with a nonresidents vocation of obtaining property records for
clients, because there was no evidence that the discrimination was protectionist in nature]
The following protectionist measures have been struck down:
a. Statute charging nonresident commercial shermen substantially more for commer-

cial shing license than resident commercial shermen ($2,500 vs. $25) [Toomer v.
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); cf. Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Commission, 436
U.S. 371 (1978)vast difference between resident and nonresident recreational hunting
license constitutional since no essential commercial activity involved];
b. Statute giving resident creditors priority over nonresident creditors as to assets of

foreign corporations in receivership proceedings [Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239
(1898)];
c. Statute or court rule requiring state residency to be licensed to practice law within
the state [Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59 (1988)];
d. State income tax only on nonresidents who earn money within the state [Austin v.
New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975)]; and
e. State law requiring private sector employers to give hiring preference to residents
absent a closely related substantial justication (see below) [Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437
U.S. 518 (1978)], but states may require a person to be a resident to hold government
employment [McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commission, 424 U.S. 645 (1976)
(per curiam)].
3. Substantial Justication Exception

A state law discriminating against nonresidents may be valid if the state has a substantial
justication for the different treatment. In effect, it must show that nonresidents either cause
or are part of the problem it is attempting to solve, and that there are no less restrictive
means to solve the problem.
Example: The Court held that a city ordinance requiring 40% of employees of
contractors and subcontractors working on city construction projects to be
city residents was an apparent violation of the Article IV Privileges and
Immunities Clause because it gave a preference in private sector employ-
ment to city residents. However, the Court found that it could not make a
nal determination as to whether the preference was justied in this case
because the record from the lower courts did not allow it to evaluate the citys
argument that the preference was necessary to counteract grave economic
and social ills in urban environments caused by spiraling unemployment
and declines in the population base of such cities. [United Building &
Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984)]
4. NoteRelationship to Commerce Clause

Although the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Commerce Clause may
apply different standards and produce different results, they tend to mutually reinforce each
other. Consequently, they both have to be considered in analyzing bar exam questions.
C. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTPRIVILEGES OF NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP

The Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause prohibits states from denying
their citizens the privileges and immunities of national citizenship, such as the right to petition
Congress for redress of grievances, the right to vote for federal ofcers, the right to enter public
lands, the right to interstate travel, and any other right owing from the distinct relation of a
citizen to the United States Government.
1. Corporations Not Protected

Corporations are not citizens of the United States and are not protected.
2. Bill of Rights Not Included

The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873), held that the fundamental rights protected
against federal abuse (rst 10 Amendments) are not privileges or immunities of national
citizenship within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment; nor are such other basic
rights as the right to live, work, and eat. Thus, the guarantees of the Bill of Rights are
protected from state action only by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
3. Right to Travel and the Privileges and Immunities Clause

The right to travel, which is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, includes the right of
newly arrived citizens to enjoy the same privileges and immunities as are enjoyed by other
citizens of the state.
Example: A California statute limiting the welfare benets of rst year residents
was held unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or
Immunities Clause. The statute provided that citizens who had lived in
California for less than one year could receive only the benets they would
have received in their prior state of residence. The Court noted that the right
to travel includes the right to be treated equally in a new state of residence.
[Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999)]
PART THREE: STATE REGULATION OR TAXATION OF COMMERCE
VIII. REGULATION OF FOREIGN COMMERCE
A. LIES EXCLUSIVELY WITH CONGRESS

For all practical purposes, the power to regulate foreign commerce lies exclusively with Congress.
Foreign commerce has been held to include trafc on the high seas, even though both terminal
ports are within the United States. [Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434
(1979)]
B. MINOR EXCEPTIONS WHERE STATE REGULATION PERMITTED

The Supreme Court, however, has recognized a few minor exceptions; thus, the states are free to
regulate local aspects of port pilotage and navigation of ships in foreign commerce (e.g., aspects
such as safety of handling); and in one case the Court permitted state regulation of excursion
boat trafc between Detroit and a Canadian island (state barred racial discrimination among
boat passengers) since no Canadians or Canadian products or services were involved. [Bob-Lo
Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948)]
IX. REGULATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE
A. REGULATION OF COMMERCE BY CONGRESS

As already seen, Congresss power over interstate commerce is very broad and pervasive.
However, the power is nonexclusiveit is shared with the states to some degree.
1. Power of Congress to Supersede or Preempt State Regulation

Recall that the Supremacy Clause makes federal law supreme. (See IV.C., supra.) Thus,
if a state law regulating commerce conicts with a federal law, the state law will be void.
Moreover, if Congress desires, it may preempt an entire area of regulation, thus preventing
states from making any laws concerning the area preempted. (See IV.C.3., supra.)
2. Power of Congress to Permit or Prohibit State Regulation

Although Congresss commerce power is nonexclusive, the states power to regulate interstate
commerce is restricted by the negative implications of the Commerce Clause, even absent
federal legislationthe states generally may not discriminate against interstate commerce.
(See below.) Nevertheless, Congress is not so restricted; it may allow the states to adopt legis-
lation that would otherwise violate the Commerce Clause.
Example: A state imposed a 3% tax on out-of-state insurance companies for all
premiums received from insuring residents of the state. No similar tax was
placed on in-state insurance companies. Although such a tax would ordinarily
be held invalid under the Commerce Clausebecause it discriminates
against interstate commercethe tax here was upheld because Congress had
adopted an act permitting the states to regulate insurance in any manner, as
long as the state regulation did not conict with a federal statute specically
regulating insurance. [Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408
(1946); and see Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159
(1985)]
Note: As indicated above, Congress may also prohibit the states from adopting legislation
that would otherwise be permitted under the Commerce Clause.
a. Limitation
While Congress may permit states to adopt regulations that would otherwise violate the
Commerce Clause, such consent will not obviate other constitutional objections to the
regulation. Thus, Congress may not give states the power to restrict civil liberties. (See
X.A.1.b.2)a), infra.)
B. STATE REGULATION OF COMMERCE IN THE ABSENCE OF CONGRESSIONAL

ACTION
If Congress has not enacted laws regarding the subject, a state or local government may regulate
local aspects of interstate commerce if the regulation:
(i) Does not discriminate against out-of-state competition to benet local economic interests;
and
(ii) Is not unduly burdensome (i.e., the incidental burden on interstate commerce does not
outweigh the legitimate local benets produced by the regulation).
If either test is not met, the regulation will be held void for violating the Commerce Clause
(sometimes called the Dormant Commerce Clause or Negative Commerce Clause under
such circumstances).
1. Discriminatory Regulations
a. Generally Invalid
State or local regulations that discriminate against interstate commerce to protect local
economic interests are almost always invalid.
b. Examples
1) Regulations Protecting Local Businesses

Laws designed to protect local businesses against interstate competition generally
will be invalidated.
Examples: 1) A state cannot place a surcharge on out-of-state milk to make
that milk as expensive as (or more expensive than) milk produced
in the state.
2) A state cannot exempt local businesses or products from taxation

or regulation that it seeks to apply to out-of-state businesses or
products that come into the state.
3) A law requiring all locally produced solid waste to be processed

at a local waste processing business was held to violate the
Commerce Clause because it was a trade barrier against competi-
tion from out-of-state waste processors. [C&A Carbone, Inc. v.
Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994)]
2) Regulations Requiring Local Operations

If a state law requires a business to perform specic business operations in the
state to engage in other business activity within the state, the law will normally be
held invalid as an attempt to discriminate against other states where the business
operations could be performed more efciently.
Example: If a state required all businesses that produce melons in the state
and all businesses that purchase melons from local producers to
wrap or package the melons in the state (before the melons were
exported from the state), the law would be invalid as an attempt to
force businesses to locate their packaging operations in the state.
3) Regulations Limiting Access to In-State Products

A state law that makes it difcult or impossible for out-of-state purchasers to have
access to in-state products (other than products owned by the state itself) is likely
to be held invalid.
Examples: 1) A state cannot prohibit in-state owners of ground water from
selling and exporting the water they own to persons in other states.
2) A state cannot require in-state companies to sell products at a

lower price to in-state residents than to out-of-state residents.
4) Regulations Prohibiting Out-of-State Wastes

A state may not prohibit private landll or waste disposal facilities from accepting
out-of-state garbage or waste or surcharge such waste [Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
437 U.S. 617 (1978); Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992)]
unless Congress authorizes such discrimination [New York v. United States,
VI.A.2., suprafederal statute allowing states to impose surcharge on certain
out-of-state nuclear wastes upheld]. This rule applies even to hazardous wastes.
[Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality, 511 U.S. 93
(1994)]
c. Exceptions
1) Necessary to Important State Interest

A discriminatory state or local law may be valid if it furthers an important,
noneconomic state interest (e.g., health or safety) and there are no reasonable
alternatives available.
Example: A state could prohibit the importation of live baitsh (such as
minnows) into the state because the state could demonstrate that it
had no other way of effectively avoiding the possibility that such
baitsh might bring certain parasites into the state or, in other ways,
have a detrimental effect on the states wild sh population. [Maine
v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986)] However, a state could not prohibit
the export of live baitsh to out-of-state purchasers because the sale
of such sh to out-of-state purchasers would not impair any interest
of the state, except the interest of protecting local purchasers of
baitsh from competition by out-of-state purchasers. [Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979)]
2) State as Market Participant

The Commerce Clause does not prevent a state from preferring its own citizens
when the state is acting as a market participant (e.g., buying or selling products,
hiring labor, giving subsidies).
Examples: 1) A state may purchase scrap automobiles from its citizens at a
higher-than-market rate and refuse to pay nonresidents the same
amount. [Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976)]
2) Under the market participant exception to the Commerce Clause,
a city may require that all construction projects funded by the city
be performed by contractors using a workforce composed of at
least 50% bona de residents of the city. [White v. Massachusetts
Council of Construction Employers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983)]
a) LimitationInterstate Privileges and Immunities Clause
While a state or local government does not violate the Commerce Clause
by preferring its own citizens while acting as a market participant, there is
no market participant exception to the Interstate Privileges and Immunities
Clause. Thus, a regulation that interferes with private sector employ-
ment, such as the one in example 2), above, may violate the Privileges and
Immunities Clause unless the regulating entity can show a substantial justi-
cation for the regulation. (See VII.B.3., supra.)
b) LimitationDownstream Restrictions
While a state may choose to sell only to state residents, it may not attach
conditions to a sale that would discriminate against interstate commerce.
Example: Alaska violated the Commerce Clause when it imposed a
contractual requirement on purchasers of state-owned timber
that the timber be processed in Alaska before being shipped
out of state. [South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v.
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984)plurality opinion]
3) Favoring Government Performing Traditional Government Functions

The Supreme Court applies a more lenient standard when a law favors govern-
ment action involving the performance of a traditional government function (such
as waste disposal). Discrimination against interstate commerce in such a case is
permissible because it is likely motivated by legitimate objectives rather than by
economic protectionism.
Examples: 1) A county ow control ordinance that favored a state-created
public waste facility by requiring waste haulers to bring the
wastes to the state facility rather than to private facilities is valid.
[United Haulers Association, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste
Management Authority, 550 U.S. 330 (2007)]
2) A state may exempt from state taxation interest on its own bonds
and bonds of its municipalities while taxing bonds of other states
and their subdivisions. [Department of Revenue of Kentucky v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 328 (2008)issuing debt securities to pay for
public projects is a quintessentially public function with a vener-
able history]
2. Nondiscriminatory LawsBalancing Test

Sometimes a nondiscriminatory state or local law that regulates commerce may impose a
burden on interstate commerce; e.g., a state law regulating the size of trucks within that state
may burden interstate commerce because interstate trucking operations will be subject to the
law when their trucks enter the state. A nondiscriminatory law will be invalidated only if the
burden on interstate commerce outweighs the promotion of legitimate (not discriminatory)
local interests. This is a case-by-case balancing test. Thus, some regulations of trucks will be
upheld, because they do not impose an undue burden on interstate commerce, whereas other
truck regulations will be invalidated, because they would make it extremely difcult for
interstate trucking operators to have their trucks travel into or through the state.
a. Absence of Conict with Other States

State and local laws regulating commerce are more likely to be upheld when there is
little chance that states would have conicting regulations of the same subject matter.
Example: A state could validly apply a state law prohibiting racial or gender
discrimination in the hiring of personnel to an airline doing business
in the state because the law was not discriminatory against out-of-state
businesses, it promoted a legitimate interest, and no other state could
validly require or permit racial or gender discrimination by airlines.
b. State Control of Corporations

A different standard may apply to statutes regulating the internal governance of a
corporation adopted by the state of incorporation. Because of the states long history of
regulating the internal governance of corporations that they create, and because of their
strong interest in doing so, even a statute that heavily impacts interstate commerce may
be upheld.
Example: To protect shareholders of corporations incorporated in Indiana from
hostile takeovers, the Indiana legislature adopted a control share acqui-
sition statute. The statute provided that once a person acquires shares
that take him across a specied ownership threshold (e.g., one-third

ownership of all voting shares), he may not vote those shares unless the
other shareholders consent. Even though most hostile takeover bids origi-
nate from outside the state, the Supreme Court found that the statute did
not violate the Commerce Clause because its aim was to protect current
shareholders, it did not discriminate between takeover bidders based
on their state of origin, and there is no chance that the state law would
conict with the laws of other states because the internal governance of
a corporation is regulated only by the state in which the corporation is
incorporated. [CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69
(1987)]
C. TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENTSTATE CONTROL OVER INTOXICATING

LIQUOR
1. Intrastate Regulations
The Twenty-First Amendment, which repealed prohibition, gives state governments wide
latitude over the importation of liquor and the conditions under which liquor is sold or used
within the state. However, state liquor regulations that constitute only an economic prefer-
ence for local liquor manufacturers may violate the Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause
prohibits both outright economic favoritism for local businesses and attempts to regulate
out-of-state transactions in order to guarantee the competitive position of in-state businesses.
Examples: 1) A state law that prohibits out-of-state wineries from shipping wine directly
to in-state consumers, but permitting in-state wineries to do so if licensed,
discriminates against interstate commerce. [Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460
(2005)]
2) A state law that requires out-of-state distillers or sellers of alcoholic bever-

ages to afrm that the price the distiller/seller is charging liquor retailers
or wholesalers in the state is no greater than the price the distiller/seller is
charging in other states violates the Commerce Clause. Such a price afr-
mation law directly interferes with and burdens interstate commerce. The
Twenty-First Amendment does not authorize this type of state interference
with commerce. [Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor
Authority, 476 U.S. 573 (1986); Healy v. The Beer Institute, Inc., 491 U.S. 324
(1989)]
2. Interstate Regulations
Transitory liquor (liquor bound for out-of-state destinations) is subject to the Commerce
Clause. Thus, a state prohibition on transporting liquor through the state would probably be
held unconstitutional as violating the Commerce Clause.
3. Federal Power
The Twenty-First Amendment does not prohibit Congress from controlling economic trans-
actions involving alcoholic beverages under the federal commerce power. Thus, federal
antitrust law can prohibit a practice of liquor dealers that has the effect of xing minimum
prices. [324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335 (1987)] Similarly, as mentioned above,
Congress may, without violating the Twenty-First Amendment, regulate liquor distribution
by imposing conditions on the grant of federal funds given under the spending power. [South
Dakota v. Dole, VI.A.2.b., supra]
D. BAR EXAM APPROACH

Whenever a bar exam question involves a state regulation that affects the free ow of interstate
commerce, you should proceed as follows:
First, see if the question refers to any federal legislation that might be held either to: (i) super-
sede the state regulation or preempt the eld, or (ii) authorize state regulation otherwise imper-
missible.
Second, if neither of these possibilities is dispositive of the question, ask if the state legislation
either discriminates against interstate or out-of-state commerce or places an undue burden on the
free ow of interstate commerce. If the legislation is discriminatory, it will be invalid unless (i) it
furthers an important state interest and there are no reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives, or
(ii) the state is a market participant. If the legislation does not discriminate but burdens interstate
commerce, it will be invalid if the burden on commerce outweighs the states interest. Consider
whether there are less restrictive alternatives.
X. POWER OF STATES TO TAX INTERSTATE COMMERCE
A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
The same general considerations applicable to state regulation of commerce (supra) apply to
taxation. Pursuant to the Commerce Clause, Congress has complete power to authorize or forbid
state taxation affecting interstate commerce. If Congress has not acted, look to see whether
the tax discriminates against interstate commerce. If it does, it is invalid. If it does not, assess
whether the burden on interstate commerce outweighs the benet to the state. Three tests must be
met: (i) there must be a substantial nexus between the taxpayer and the state; (ii) the tax must be
fairly apportioned; and (iii) there must be a fair relationship between the tax and the services or
benets provided by the state.
1. Discriminatory Taxes
Unless authorized by Congress, state taxes that discriminate against interstate commerce
violate the Commerce Clause. Such taxes may also be held to violate the Interstate Privileges
and Immunities Clause (see VII.B., supra) if they also discriminate against nonresidents of
the state [Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975)], as well as the Equal Protection
Clause if the discrimination is not rationally related to a legitimate state purpose [WHYY,
Inc. v. Borough of Glassboro, 393 U.S. 117 (1968)denial of tax exemption solely because
taxpayer was incorporated in another state is invalid].
a. Finding Discrimination
1) Tax Singles Out Interstate Commerce

If a state tax singles out interstate commerce for taxation, the Court ordinarily will
not save the tax by nding other state taxes imposed only on local commerce
(which might arguably eliminate the apparent discrimination against interstate
commerce).
Example: The Supreme Court invalidated an Ohio statute that gave a tax
credit against the Ohio motor vehicle fuel sales tax (paid by fuel
dealers) for each gallon of ethanol sold as a component of gasohol
if, but only if, the ethanol was produced in Ohio or in a state that
granted a similar tax advantage to ethanol produced in Ohio.
The Supreme Court found that this tax credit system constituted
discrimination against interstate commerce. [New Energy Co. of
Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988)]
However, state taxes that single out interstate commerce are considered nondis-
criminatory if the particular statutory section or scheme also imposes the same
type of tax on local commerce (e.g., sales and use taxes, discussed infra).
2) Tax with In-State Subsidy
A seemingly uniform tax may be ruled to be discriminatory if the proceeds from
the tax are earmarked for subsidies to in-state businesses.
Example: A state imposed a tax on all milk dealers, but the tax law provided
that revenue from the tax would be put into a fund that would be
used to pay subsidies to in-state dairy farmers. This assessment-
subsidy system violates the Commerce Clause because it operates
identically to a tax placed only on sales of milk produced outside
the state. [West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994)]
3) Double Taxation on Out-of-State Income
A state must grant a credit against a local tax for income taxed by another state.
Example: Marylands personal income tax on residents includes both a state
and a county tax. Residents who pay taxes to another state for
income earned in that state are allowed a credit against the state
tax but not the county tax. Such a tax scheme violates the Dormant
Commerce Clause because it leads to double taxation on out-of-
state income and discriminates in favor of intrastate over interstate
economic activity. [Comptroller of Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne,
135 S.Ct. 1787 (2015)]
b. Choosing the Proper Clause
While a state or local tax that discriminates against interstate commerce generally
violates the Commerce Clause, the Clause is not always the strongest argument against
the tax.
1) Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause
If a state or local tax discriminates against a natural person who is a nonresi-
dent, the Article IV Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause is the strongest
argument against the taxs validity, because it is more direct than a Commerce
Clause argument.
2) Equal Protection
a) Where Congress Approves the Discrimination
Although the Supreme Court normally uses the Commerce Clause to invali-
date discriminatory legislation, it may also nd that such discrimination
violates the Equal Protection Clause. This is important where Congress has
given the states the power to do something that would otherwise violate the
Commerce Clause: Congress can give states the power to take actions that
otherwise would violate the Commerce Clause, but it cannot approve state
actions that would violate equal protection. Thus, if Congress has approved a
type of state tax that discriminates against out-of-state businesses, that state
tax will not be in violation of the Commerce Clause, but it might be found to
be a violation of equal protection.
Example: In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869
(1985), the Court invalidated a state tax on insurance compa-
nies that imposed a higher tax on out-of-state insurance
companies than was paid by in-state companies. The Court
found that federal statutes exempted state regulation of insur-
ance businesses from Commerce Clause restrictions but found
that the tax violated equal protection because it did not relate
to a legitimate interest of government (i.e., the state does not
have a legitimate interest in discriminating against out-of-state
businesses simply to protect local economic interests from
competition).
b) Taxes Based on Suspect Classications or Infringing on Fundamental

Rights
The Court may use equal protection analysis rather than Commerce Clause
analysis to strike state taxes that are imposed on the basis of a suspect classi-
cation or that burden a fundamental right. A state tax system giving tax
exemptions only to long-time residents of the state and denying a similar
tax exemption to newer residents will be held to violate the Equal Protection
Clause.
Example: The Court invalidated a state property tax provision that gave
an exemption from the property tax only to those Vietnam-era
veterans who had been residents of the state before May 1976.
[Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985)]
2. Nondiscriminatory Taxes
The Court reviews nondiscriminatory state and local taxes affecting interstate commerce
and balances the state need to obtain the revenue against the burden the tax imposes on the
free ow of commercean approach similar to the one used for examining nondiscrimina-
tory regulations to see whether they impose an undue burden on interstate commerce (see
IX.B.2., supra).
a. Factors
The Court generally considers three factors in determining whether the nondiscrimina-
tory tax is valid:
1) Substantial Nexus
A state tax will be valid under the Commerce Clause only if there is a substan-
tial nexus between the activity or property taxed and the taxing state. Substantial
nexus requires signicant or substantial activity within the taxing state.
Examples: 1) A state in which a sale is made may force the seller to pay a sales
tax if the seller has some signicant contact with the state (e.g.,
carries on business in the state). However, the state may not force
the seller to pay a sales tax if its only contact with the state is the
receipt of orders from sales representatives that may be accepted or
rejected by the seller.
2) If an interstate seller solicits sales in a state by mail only, with

orders shipped to the state by mail or common carrier, the substan-
tial nexus required by the Commerce Clause is not presentthe
mere mailing of catalogs to the state and shipment by mail or
common carrier is not signicant activity within the state. [Quill
Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992)]
2) Fair Apportionment
A state or local tax affecting interstate commerce will be valid under the
Commerce Clause only if it is fairly apportioned according to a rational formula
(i.e., the tax should be based on the extent of the taxable activity or property in
the state). Otherwise the activity or property would be subject to cumulative tax
burdens.
Examples: 1) State A imposes a 1% tax on gross receipts of all businesses
within the state. Harvester is located in State A but makes a
number of sales out of state. The tax is invalid as to Harvesters
out-of-state sales since it potentially subjects those sales to cumula-
tive burdensthe tax by the sellers state and a similar tax by the
buyers statewithout apportioning the tax.
2) Chooch is a resident of State A. It owns railroad cars used in

interstate commerce. The cars are in State A three months each
year and State B three months each year. For a State B property tax
on the railroad cars to be valid, it must fairly apportion the tax, so
that the cars will not be subjected to a similar tax by State A, thus
cumulating Choochs tax burden.
Note: The taxpayer has the burden of proving an unfair apportionment.
3) Fair Relationship
A state or local tax affecting interstate commerce will be valid under the
Commerce Clause only if the tax is fairly related to the services or benets
provided by the state.
Example: A state may levy a tax on passengers enplaning at a state airport
if the tax is related to the benets that the passengers receive from
the state (e.g., the airport facilities). [See Evansville-Vanderburg
Airport Authority District v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707
(1972)]
B. USE TAX
Use taxes are taxes imposed on the users of goods purchased out of state.
1. Permissible in Buyers State

Use taxes are not considered to discriminate against interstate commerce even though they
single out interstate commerce for taxation (i.e., they are imposed only on goods purchased
outside the state), as long as the use tax rate is not higher than the sales tax rate. Rationale:
The purpose of such a tax is to equalize the tax on in-state and out-of-state goods rather than
to give in-state goods an advantage. [See Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937)]
2. State May Force Seller to Collect Use Tax

Often, states force the user to come forward and pay the state the use tax owed. However, a
state may force a nonresident, interstate seller to collect the use tax from the local buyer and
remit it to the state if the seller has the substantial nexus required by the Commerce Clause.
The substantial nexus requirement can be met if the seller engages in some signicant
activity in the buyers state, e.g., maintains ofces there. Merely soliciting orders by mail and
shipping orders into the state is not sufcient. [Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, A.2.a.1), supra]
C. SALES TAXES
Sales taxes are taxes imposed on the seller of goods for sales consummated within the state.
They generally do not discriminate against interstate commerce; rather the issue usually involves
whether there is a substantial nexus (see A.2.a.1), supra) between the taxpayer and the taxing
state, or whether the tax is properly apportioned.
D. AD VALOREM PROPERTY TAXES

Ad valorem property taxes are taxes based on a percentage of the assessed value of the property
in question. Such taxes are generally valid. However, a Commerce Clause issue arises when the
property taxed moves in interstate commerce. Goods in transit are totally exempt from taxation.
Once the goods come to a halt in a state (i.e., obtain a taxable situs), they may be taxed. Then, the
issue usually revolves around whether the tax imposes an undue cumulative burden (i.e., appor-
tionment).
1. No Tax on Commodities in the Course of Interstate Commerce

Commodities in the course of interstate commerce are entirely exempt from local taxation
since each state could otherwise exact a toll as the goods passed through, imposing an
intolerable burden on interstate commerce. [Standard Oil v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952)] Thus,
states may not levy an ad valorem property tax on commodities being shipped in interstate
commerce, even if the goods happen to be in the state on tax day.
a. When Is Property in the Course of Interstate Commerce?

Only property in the course of interstate commerce is immune from local property
taxation.
1) When Does Interstate Transportation Begin?

Interstate transportation begins when (i) the cargo is delivered to an interstate
carrier (the shipper thereby relinquishing further control), or (ii) the cargo actually
starts its interstate journey. Goods merely being prepared for transit are not in the
course of interstate commerce.
2) Effect of a Break in Transit

Once started, a shipment remains in the course of interstate commerce unless
actually diverted. Breaks in the continuity of transit will not destroy the interstate
character of the shipment, unless the break was intended to end or suspend (rather
than temporarily interrupt) the shipment.
3) When Does Interstate Shipment End?

The interstate shipment usually ends when it reaches its destination, and there-
after the goods are subject to local tax.
b. No Apportionment Required
The validity of state taxes on goods in interstate commerce is strictly a Commerce
Clause question; i.e., either the goods are in the course of interstate commerce and
exempt from tax or they are not. There is no need for apportionment.
2. Tax on Instrumentalities Used to Transport Goods Interstate

The validity of ad valorem property taxes on instrumentalities of commerce (airplanes,
railroad cars, etc.) depends on (i) whether the instrumentality has acquired a taxable situs
in the taxing state (i.e., whether there are sufcient contacts with the taxing state to
justify the tax), and (ii) since the physical situs of the instrumentalities may change from
state to state during the year, whether the value of the instrumentality has been properly
apportioned according to the amount of contacts with each taxing state. (The taxable
situs (nexus) is required by the Due Process Clause to establish the states power to tax at
all, and apportionment is required by the Commerce Clause to prevent an intolerable burden
on interstate commerce.)
a. Taxable Situs (Nexus)

In general, an instrumentality has a taxable situs in a state if it receives benets or
protection from the state. [Braniff Airways v. Nebraska Board of Equalization and
Assessment, 347 U.S. 590 (1954)airplanes have taxable situs in nondomiciliary state
where airline company owned no property but made 18 regularly scheduled ights per
day from rented depot space, even though same aircraft did not land every day] Note
that an instrumentality may have more than one taxable situs, upon each of which
states can impose a tax subject to the required apportionment (infra).
b. Apportionment Requirement
If an instrumentality has only one situs, the domiciliary state can tax at full value. If the
instrumentality has more than one taxable situs, a tax apportioned on the value of the
instrumentality will be upheld if it fairly approximates the average physical presence
of the instrumentality within the taxing state. [Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249
U.S. 275 (1919)] The taxpayer has the burden of proving that an instrumentality has
acquired a taxable situs outside his domiciliary state.
1) Proper Apportionment
The following methods have been upheld:
(i) Using the proportion of miles traveled within the taxing state to the total
number of miles traveled by the instrumentalities in the entire operation. [Ott
v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949)]
(ii) Computing the average number of instrumentalities (tank cars) physically

present in the taxing state on any one day during the tax year and taxing that
portion at full valuei.e., as if in the state all year. [Johnson Oil Rening Co.
v. Oklahoma, 290 U.S. 158 (1933)]
Note: Because different states may use different apportionment formulas to tax
the same property, there may still be some double taxation of the same instrumen-
talities. However, the double taxation should be minimal if proper apportionment
formulas have been used.
E. PRIVILEGE, LICENSE, FRANCHISE, OR OCCUPATION TAXES

Privilege, license, franchise, and occupation taxes are cumulatively known as doing business
taxes. States generally can impose such taxeson companies engaged exclusively in interstate
commerce, as well as on interstate companies engaged in local commercefor the privilege of
doing business within the state. Such taxes may be measured by a at amount or by a propor-
tional rate based on revenue derived from the taxing state. In either case, the tax must meet the
basic requirementsthe activity taxed must have a substantial nexus to the taxing state; and
the tax must be fairly apportioned, must not discriminate against interstate commerce, and must
fairly relate to services provided by the state. [Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274
(1977)overruling Spector Motor Service v. OConnor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951)]
Examples: 1) A privilege tax for doing business, based on the gross income derived from
transporting goods within the state, can be applied to a trucking company that
delivers goods coming from outside the state. [Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady, supra]
2) An occupation tax on all businesses, based on gross income derived within the
state, can be applied to a stevedoring company operating within the state that loads
and unloads ships carrying goods in interstate commerce. [Department of Revenue
v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734 (1978)overruling
Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 442 (1947)]
1. Taxpayer Has Burden of Proof

The taxpayer has the burden of showing that the states apportionment formula is unfair.
However, a state tax that discriminates against interstate commerce will be held invalid
regardless of whether the taxpayer can show that an actual, unfair multiple burden is
imposed on his business.
XI. POWER OF STATES TO TAX FOREIGN COMMERCE
A. IMPORT-EXPORT CLAUSE
Article I, Section 10, Clause 2 provides: No state shall, without the Consent of the Congress,
lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for
executing its inspection Laws . . . .
1. State Taxation of Imports Prohibited Absent Congressional Consent

The Import-Export Clause prohibits the states from imposing any tax on imported goods as
such or on commercial activity connected with imported goods as such (i.e., taxes discrimi-
nating against imports), except with congressional consent. [Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419
(1827)]
2. State Taxation of Exports Prohibited

The Import-Export Clause prohibits the states from imposing any tax on goods after they
have entered the export stream.
B. COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Commerce Clause gives Congress the exclusive power to regulate foreign commerce and thus
inherently limits a states power to tax that commerce. Therefore, a state tax applied to foreign
commerce must meet all of the Commerce Clause tests that apply to state taxation of interstate
commerce. (See X.A., supra.) And even if a state tax meets those tests, the tax is invalid if it
would (i) create a substantial risk of international multiple taxation or (ii) prevent the federal
government from speaking with one voice regarding international trade or foreign affairs issues.
[Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, 512 U.S. 298 (1994)]
PART FOUR: INDIVIDUAL GUARANTEES AGAINST

GOVERNMENTAL OR PRIVATE ACTION
XII. LIMITATIONS ON POWER AND STATE ACTION REQUIREMENT
A. CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON POWER OVER INDIVIDUALS

The Constitution provides individuals with a number of rights that restrict the power of the
government (e.g., the right to speak freely). Some rights/restrictions are applicable only to the
federal government, some are applicable only to state and local governments, and some are appli-
cable to all governmental bodies. A few even apply to private action. Several constitutional provi-
sions also give Congress the power to adopt legislation to protect individual rights.
Note: The Constitution sets the minimum level of protection for individuals. States generally are
free to grant broader protections than those granted in the United States Constitution.
1. Bill of Rights
The Bill of Rights (rst 10 Amendments to the Constitution) is the most important source of
limitations on the federal governments power. By its terms, the Bill is not applicable to the
states, although most of its safeguards have been held to be applicable to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
a. Rights Applicable to States

The Supreme Court has stated that only those safeguards in the Bill of Rights that are
essential to liberty are applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Included in this concept are: all the First Amendment guarantees (speech, press,
assembly, right to petition, free exercise, and nonestablishment of religion); the Second
Amendment right to bear arms; the Fourth Amendment (unreasonable search and
seizure); some elements of the Fifth Amendment (privilege against self-incrimination;
compensation for taking of private property for public use); the Sixth Amendment
(speedy and public trial by impartial jury, notice and right of confrontation, compulsory
process, and right to legal counsel in all serious criminal proceedings); and the Eighth
Amendment (cruel and unusual punishment, excessive bail, and excessive ne provi-
sions are assumed to be incorporated but there is no precise ruling).
b. Rights Not Applicable to States

There are four provisions of the Bill of Rights that have not yet been incorporated into
the Due Process Clause:
(i) The Third Amendment prohibition against quartering troops in a persons home;
(ii) The Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury indictment in criminal cases; and
(iii) The Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases.
[See McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010)] The Tenth Amendment, by its terms,
limits the federal governments power over states, and so is inapplicable to the states.
2. Thirteenth Amendment
The Thirteenth Amendment provides that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall
exist in the United States.
a. No Requirement of State Action

The amendment contains no language limiting its effect to governmental action (e.g.,
no state shall . . . ); thus, it is applicable even to private action.
b. Involuntary Servitude
The Court has dened involuntary servitude as forcing someone to perform work
whether compensated or notthrough the use or threatened use of physical injury
or restraint (such as imprisonment), or through the use or threat of legal sanction.
Psychological and other forms of coercion alone are generally inadequate to show invol-
untary servitude.[See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988)] The Thirteenth
Amendment does not prohibit all forms of labor that one person is compelled to
perform for the benet of another: It does not apply to compulsory military service,
civic obligations such as jury duty, convicted prisoners who must perform work as part
of their criminal sentence, or even recipients of medical scholarships who are required
to work pro bono. However, courts are reluctant to order specic performance of a
personal service contract because the order would be tantamount to involuntary servi-
tude.
c. Congressional Power
The enabling clause of the Thirteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to adopt
appropriate legislation, and the Supreme Court apparently will uphold legislation
proscribing almost any private racially discriminatory act that can be characterized as a
badge or incident of slavery.
Examples: The Supreme Court has upheld legislation:
1) Prohibiting private parties from refusing to rent or sell housing to

a person because of race [Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968)];
2) Prohibiting private, nonsectarian schools from refusing to admit

nonwhite children [Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1967)]; and
3) Prohibiting a private employer from discriminating in hiring on the

basis of race [Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989)].
The above are examples of where Congress used its power to adopt statutes prohibiting
badges of slavery; the proscribed activities would not necessarily be held to violate
the Thirteenth Amendment absent the legislation.
3. Fourteenth Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states (not the federal government or private persons)
from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process and equal protec-
tion of the law. As discussed above, this amendment is a most important source of limitations
on the states power over individuals, because, through the Due Process Clause, most of the
protections of the Bill of Rights are applicable to the states.
The meaning of due process and equal protection will be discussed later in this outline.
a. Requirement of State Action

The Fourteenth Amendment applies only if there is action by a state or local govern-
ment, government ofcer, or private individual whose behavior meets the requirements
for state action (see B., below).
b. Scope of Congressional Power

Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is an enabling clause giving Congress the
power to adopt appropriate legislation to enforce the rights and guarantees provided
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Under Section 5, Congress may not expand existing
constitutional rights or create new onesit may only enact laws to prevent or remedy
violations of rights already recognized by the courts. To adopt a valid law, Congress
must point to a history or pattern of state violation of such rights and adopt legislation
that is congruent and proportional (i.e., narrowly tailored) to solving the identied
violation. Note, however, that when Congress is dealing with a type of discrimination
that the Supreme Court reviews using heightened scrutiny (i.e., race, national origin, or
gendersee XVIII.D., E., infra), Congress will generally have more power to act.
Examples: 1) The Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) includes provisions
that, among other things, prohibit states from discriminating against
disabled persons in hiring practices and requires states to make reason-
able accommodations for disabled employees. Under the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause, the Court has recognized a right
of disabled people to be free from irrational state discrimination. In
adopting the ADA, Congress did not identify a history or pattern of
irrational employment practices by the states. Even if there were such
a pattern, the provisions here were not congruent and proportional to
remedying irrational discrimination; they are overinclusive, because
they prohibit states from making employment decisions that are consti-
tutional under the rational basis test. [Board of Trustees of University
of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)] Under similar reasoning,
the Supreme Court has held that Congress has no power under Section
5 to broadly restrict age discrimination by state employers. [Kimel v.
Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000)]
2) The Supreme Court held that there is no violation of the First
Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, where a state law incidentally burdens a religious practice.
[Employment Division v. Smith, XXII.C.3., infra] In response, Congress
adopted a statute, purportedly under Section 5, providing that a state
may not burden religious practices absent a compelling interest. The
statute was held unconstitutional because it sought to expand substantive
First Amendment rights beyond those recognized by the Supreme Court.
[City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)]
Compare: The Court has held that Congress has power under Section 5 to provide
that state governments may be sued for violating Title II of the ADA
(which prohibits state and local government discrimination against
people with disabilities in government programs, services, or activities)
when the discrimination involves access to the courts. Rationale: The
right of meaningful access to judicial proceedings is a fundamental
right under the Due Process Clause, and is thus subject to heightened
judicial scrutiny much more demanding than rational basis. This
heightened scrutiny makes it easier for Congress to show a pattern of
state constitutional violations. [Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004)]
4. Fifteenth Amendment
The Fifteenth Amendment is a limitation on both the states and the federal government.
It prohibits them from denying any citizen the right to vote on account of race or color. As
indicated above, the Fifteenth Amendment contains an enabling clause that allows Congress
to adopt legislation protecting the right to vote from discrimination.
a. Limitations
Fifteenth Amendment legislation can be limited by other constitutional principles. For
example, the Supreme Court found that the Tenth Amendment and principles of equal
sovereignty among the states require Congress to have extraordinary justication to
adopt legislation requiring some, but not all, states to obtain federal approval before
changing any voting law. [Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013)subjecting
states to pre-clearance based on formula containing decades-old data unconstitutional]
5. Commerce Clause
The Supreme Court has allowed Congress to use the Commerce Clause to limit the power of
individuals over other individualsby adopting legislation barring private racial discrimi-
nation in activities connected with interstate commerce. Recall that under the affectation
doctrine, almost any activity can be said to be connected with interstate commerce. (See
II.A.4.a.1), supra.)
a. Civil Rights Act

Provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 barring discrimination in places of public
accommodation are proper and valid exercises of commerce power.
b. Extent of Commerce Power

The reach of the commerce power is broad. Any business that is open to interstate
travelers or that uses products shipped in interstate commerce is covered. [Daniel
v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969)private resort held to be a public place of accommoda-
tion encompassed within the Act because drinks and entertainment facilities had been
purchased and shipped through interstate commerce]
6. Rights of National Citizenship
The Supreme Court has also allowed Congress to limit the power of private individuals to
infringe upon others rights of national citizenship (e.g., the right of interstate travel, the right
to assemble to petition Congress for redress), without pointing to any specic constitutional
source for the power. [Grifn v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971)]
B. STATE ACTION REQUIREMENT

As indicated above, the Constitution generally prohibits only governmental infringement of
constitutional rights. Thus, to nd some action unconstitutional, it is generally necessary to
attribute the action to the state, which includes government agencies and ofcials acting under
the color of state law. However, this does not mean that the act must be directly by a government
actor; state action can be found in the actions of seemingly private individuals who (i) perform
exclusive public functions, or (ii) have signicant state involvement in their activities.
1. Exclusive Public Functions

The Supreme Court has found that certain activities are so traditionally the exclusive
prerogative of the state that they constitute state action even when undertaken by a private
individual or organization. To date, only running a town and running an election for public
ofce have been found to be such exclusive public functions.
Examples: 1) The owner of a company town with all of the attributes of a public town
(e.g., homes, sidewalks, streets, police and re protection, etc.) cannot deny a
persons First Amendment right to distribute religious literature in the town,
since the company town is equivalent to a town. [Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501 (1946)] However, the owner of a shopping mall can deny people their
First Amendment right to picket, since a mall does not have all of the attri-
butes of a town. [Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976)]
2) Running elections is an exclusive public function, so if a private organi-
zation runs a preprimary that has a substantial effect on who is ultimately
elected, its actions will be state action. [Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461
(1953)county political group whose candidate almost always runs
unopposed in primary and general election cannot discriminate]
a. Must Be Traditional and Exclusive Function
To be state action, the activity must be both a traditional and exclusive government
function. Thus, the Court has held that a warehouseman authorized by statute to sell
goods stored with him for unpaid charges is not exercising state action when he makes
the sale, because while resolution of private disputes is a traditional public function, it is
not exclusivethe bailor had state law remedies to check abuses by the warehouseman.
[Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978)] State action exists, and due process
guarantees apply, only if the creditor uses judicial or executive agencies to secure
properties in the possession of the debtor.
2. Signicant State InvolvementFacilitating Private Action

State action also exists whenever a state afrmatively facilitates, encourages, or authorizes
acts of discrimination by its citizens. Note, however, that there must be some sort of afrma-
tive act by the state approving the private action; it is not enough that the state permits the
conduct to occur.
a. Instances of Signicant State Involvement
1) Ofcial Encouragement
Purportedly private action will be given state action status if the action is encour-
aged or sanctioned by the state.
a) Judicial Approval
State court enforcement of restrictive covenants prohibiting sale or lease of
property to blacks constitutes state action even in civil proceedings between
private parties. [Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)]
(1) Peremptory Challenges

The use of peremptory challenges, even by a private party, constitutes
state action, both because jury selection is a traditional public function
and because there is overt, signicant participation by the govern-
ment (the judge) in the jury selection process. Thus, private litigants
and defendants are prohibited from using peremptory challenges in a
discriminatory manner. [See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete, 500 U.S.
614 (1992); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992)]
b) Ofcial Acts
State action may be found in the absence of an unconstitutional statute or
ordinance if it appears that the state sanctions constitutional violations by its
own ofcers.
(1) Discriminatory Law Enforcement

The Court reversed a conviction of sit-in demonstrators where no
statute or ordinance required segregation but the mayor and police had
announced publicly that they would invoke trespass and breach of the
peace laws to enforce a local custom of racial separation in eating places.
[Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963)]
(2) Apparent Legal Authority

Even if a state forbids ofcers from acting in a certain way (e.g.,
depriving persons of their constitutional rights), the forbidden action
may still constitute state action if the state puts the actor in a position to
commit the unconstitutional act.
Example: A sheriff beat a prisoner to death in an effort to secure a
confession. Both the state and the sheriff were held liable.
The actions of the sheriff involved state action because
the sheriff acted under the color of state lawthe state
in effect cloaked him with the apparent legal authority.
[Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945)]
(3) Public Defenders

A public defender does not act for the state when he represents an
indigent client. Therefore, negligence or malpractice by the public
defender is not a denial of due process because the public defenders
actions are not state actions. [Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312
(1982)]
2) State Authorization
In Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), the Court invalidated a state constitu-
tional provision that repealed all existing state laws banning discrimination in
the sale or lease of property and prohibited reenactment of such laws in the future
because such laws authorize private discrimination.
3) The State as Lessor for a Racially Discriminatory Lessee

In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), Delaware was
held responsible under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause for
the exclusion of blacks from a coffee shop which was located in a public building.
The shop was constructed by and leased from the state. The maintenance of the
facility was paid for with public funds and Delaware was able to charge a higher
rent because it allowed the restaurant owner to cater to the prejudices of its white
customers.
4) Administration of Private Discriminatory Trust by Public Ofcials

State action exists where city personnel maintain a park, open to all except
blacks, under a private trust. [Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966)]
5) Entwinement of State and Private Entities

The fact that a state entity helps formulate and adopts the rules of a private entity,
and chooses to follow the order of the private entity pursuant to those rules, does
not convert the private entitys action into state action. However, a state may be so
entwined with a private organization that the organizations actions will be consid-
ered state action. [Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Association, 531 U.S. 288 (2001)]
Example: The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is a volun-
tary association of public and private universities that establishes
rules for its members regarding collegiate sports. Pursuant to its
rules, the NCAA urged a member college to suspend its coach for
recruiting violations. The coach cannot successfully sue the NCAA
for violating his constitutional rights because there is no state
action. [National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian, 488
U.S. 179 (1988)]
Compare: An association that regulates high school sports within a single

state: (i) to which most public high schools belong; (ii) whose
governing body is made up mostly of public school ofcials; (iii)
whose meetings are held during regular school hours; (iv) whose
employees may join the state retirement system; and (v) which is
funded by gate receipts from the regulated sports is so entwined
with the state that its action can be considered state action.
[Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Association, supra]
b. Instances of Insignicant State Involvement
1) Heavily Regulated Businesses and/or Granting of a Monopoly to a Utility
a) Electric Company
State action will not be found merely because the state has granted a
monopoly to a business or heavily regulates it.
Example: In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 419 U.S. 345 (1974), no
state action was found where an electric company terminated
the users service without notice and hearing. The state had
not directed or ordered the termination and the fact that the
company was heavily regulated and the state commission had
approved private utility regulations authorizing such termina-
tion was not enough.
b) Nursing Home
A nursing home operated by a private corporation did not exercise state
action when it discharged Medicaid patients, even though its operation was
extensively regulated by the government. [Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991
(1982)]
c) School
A school operated by a private corporation did not exercise state action when
it discharged teachers (allegedly in violation of their First Amendment rights)
even though the school had contracts with the state to educate or care for
many of its students and it received almost all of its operating funds from the
government. [Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982)]
2) Licensing and Provision of Essential Services

Granting a liquor license and providing essential services (police, re, water,
power, etc.) to a private club that imposes racial restrictions on its members and
guests are not sufcient to constitute state action. [Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S.
163 (1972)]
3) Congressional Grant of Corporate Charter and Exclusive Name

Congressional grant of a corporate charter and exclusive use of a name is not
sufcient to constitute state action. [San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United
States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522 (1987)congressional charter and grant
of exclusive name Olympic does not clothe United States Olympic Committee
with state action]
4) No Government Duty to Protect Individuals from Harm by Private Persons

The mere refusal of government agents to protect a victim from harm by a private
person will not result in a nding that the harm was attributable to state action,
at least when state law does not give the victim a right to government protection.
[DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189
(1989)government not responsible for harm inicted on a child by his father,
even though government social worker had reason to believe the child was being
abused and did nothing to protect the child] However, if government employees
enter into an agreement or conspiracy with private persons to cause harm to a
victim, the victims injuries are the result of state action; the private persons, as
well as the government employees with whom they conspired, will have violated
the victims constitutional rights. [Screws v. United States, a.1)b)(2), supra; Dennis
v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980)]
C. TIPS FOR BAR EXAM
1. State Must Be Signicantly Involved in Private Entity

The state must be signicantly involved in the private entity. Merely granting a license or
providing essential services is insufcient.
2. No Constitutional Mandate to Outlaw Discrimination

States are not constitutionally required to outlaw discrimination. The Constitution forbids
only their encouraging or authorizing it.
XIII. RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION
A. CONTRACT CLAUSEIMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT

The Contract Clause limits the ability of states to enact laws that retroactively impair contract
rights. It does not affect contracts not yet made.
1. Not Applicable to Federal Government

There is no comparable clause applicable to the federal government, although a agrant
contract impairment would be forbidden by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
2. Only Applicable to State Legislation

The provision applies only to state legislation, not court decisions. [See Tidal Oil v.
Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444 (1924)]
3. Basic Impairment Rules
a. Private Contracts
The Contract Clause prevents only substantial impairments of contract (i.e., destruc-
tion of most or all of a partys rights under a contract). However, not all substantial
impairments are invalid. In determining whether legislation is valid under the Contract
Clause, use a three-part test:
(i) Does the legislation substantially impair a partys rights under an existing
contract? If it does not, the legislation is valid under the Contract Clause. If it does,
it will be valid only if it:
(ii) Serves an important and legitimate public interest; and
(iii) Is a reasonable and narrowly tailored means of promoting that interest.
Examples: 1) A Minnesota statute that imposed a moratorium on mortgage foreclo-

sures during a severe depression did not violate the Contract Clause.
[Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934)]
2) A state statute that restricted underground coal mining to protect a

variety of public and private uses of surface land (and buildings) and that
left the owners of subsurface mining rights with some reasonable value
in, or return from, their investment does not violate the Contract Clause.
[Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470
(1987)]
b. Public ContractsStricter Scrutiny

Public contracts (i.e., those in which the state or political subdivision is a party) are
tested by the same basic test detailed above; however, they will likely receive stricter
scrutiny, especially if the legislation reduces the contractual burdens on the state. When
applying the three-part test, note the following:
(i) There is no substantial impairment if the state has reserved the power to revoke,
alter, or amend either in the contract itself or in a statute or law the terms of which
should be considered to be incorporated into the contract [Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819)];
(ii) In determining whether the law serves as a legitimate public interest, note that the
state cannot be obligated by contract to refrain from exercising its police powers
necessary to protect the health and safety of its residents; and
(iii) To be narrowly tailored, the law should not constitute an unnecessarily broad
repudiation of contract obligations.
Example: In Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978), the
Court invalidated state pension reform legislation which increased the
obligation of companies under preexisting pension plans to employees
who previously had terminated their work for the company or who
previously had retired from employment with the company. Because the
legislation constituted a substantial impairment of contract by changing
the compensation for work already completed and because it was not
necessary to remedy an important social problem in the nature of an
emergency, it was held to be a violation of the Contract Clause.
B. EX POST FACTO LAWS
1. Two Ex Post Facto Clauses

Neither the state nor the federal government may pass an ex post facto law. [Art. I, 9
federal prohibition; Art. I, 10state prohibition] An ex post facto law is legislation that
retroactively alters the criminal law (not civil regulation, such as denial of professional
licenses) in a substantially prejudicial manner so as to deprive a person of any right previ-

ously enjoyed for the purpose of punishing the person for some past activity.
a. What Is Criminal
If a laws purpose is civil rather than punitive, it is not an ex post facto law unless its
effect is so clearly punitive as to negate the legislatures intention.
Example: A law requiring any sex offender within the state to register and provide
his name, address, place of employment, vehicle information, etc., to
law enforcement authorities and authorizing law enforcement authori-
ties to make some of this information public is not an ex post facto law,
even if noncompliance can be punished criminally, and even if some of
the law is contained in the states criminal code. The goal of such a law
is not to punish or stigmatize. Rather, legislatures have found that sex
offenders pose a high risk of reoffending, and the release of the infor-
mation required under the act is intended to protect the public from sex
offenders. [Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003)]
b. Retroactive Alterations
A statute retroactively alters a law in a substantially prejudicial manner if it:
(i) Makes criminal an act that was innocent when done;
(ii) Prescribes greater punishment for an act than was prescribed for the act when it
was committed; or
(iii) Reduces the evidence required to convict a person of a crime from what was
required at the time that the act was allegedly committed.
Example: A statute of limitations reects a legislative judgment that after a certain

time, no quantum of evidence is sufcient to convict. Thus, a law that
revives the possibility of a criminal prosecution after the previously
applicable statute of limitations has expired is an unconstitutional ex post
facto law. [Stonger v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003)]
2. DistinguishProcedural Changes
Mere procedural changes in state law will not necessarily trigger the Ex Post Facto Clause. A
modied law can be applied to a crime committed before the laws modication if the defen-
dant had notice of the possible penalty and the modied law does not increase the burden on
the defendant.
Example: Florida had a death penalty statute that was invalidated by the Supreme Court
because the statute restricted discretion in sentencing. Before a new statute
was enacted, D committed a murder. Florida then passed a new death penalty
provision that complied with Supreme Court criteria. The new provision was
applied at Ds trial, and he was sentenced to death. This was not a prohibited
ex post facto law, since the earlier statute (although unconstitutional) gave D
notice of the possible penalty and the new provision made it less likely that
the death penalty would be imposed in a given case. [Dobbert v. Florida, 432
U.S. 282 (1977)]
3. Indirect Application to Courts

Although the Ex Post Facto Clauses prohibit only retroactive legislation, the Supreme Court
has held that due process prohibits courts from retroactively interpreting criminal law in an
unexpected and indefensible way. [Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001)state supreme
courts abolition of common law year and a day rule (which prohibits prosecution for
murder if the victim dies more than a year after an attack) was not unexpected and indefen-
sible because medical science has undermined the rules usefulness and the rule has already
been abolished in most jurisdictions]
C. BILLS OF ATTAINDER
A bill of attainder is a legislative act that inicts punishment without a judicial trial upon
individuals who are designated either by name or in terms of past conduct. Past conduct acts to
dene who those particular persons are.
1. Two Clauses
Both the federal and state governments are prohibited from passing bills of attainder.
2. Two Requirements Preclude Finding of Bill of Attainder

These provisions require both judicial machinery for trial and punishment of crime and
denition of criminal conduct in such general terms as not to ensnare within the denition
a single individual or small group for punishment because of past behavior.
Example: The Court found a provision in the Landrum-Grifn Act, making it a crime
for a member of the Communist Party to act as an ofcer or employee of a
labor union, to be legislative punishment for a party membership, and hence a
bill of attainder. [United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965)]
3. Nixon Case
In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977), Congress passed legisla-
tion to authorize government control of the presidential papers and tape recordings of former
President Nixon. The Supreme Court held that this was not a bill of attainder. The circum-
stances of the Nixon resignation made him a unique class of one as to the need to control
his papers. The act was held nonpunitive and in pursuance of important public policy.
4. Draft Registration Case

In Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841
(1984), the Court upheld a federal statute denying nancial aid for higher education to male
students between the ages of 18 and 26 who had failed to register for the draft. The law
required applicants for the aid to le a statement with their institutions of higher learning
certifying their compliance. Failure to register within 30 days of ones 18th birthday was a
felony, but the regulations allowed men who failed to register in a timely manner to qualify
for aid by registering late. The Court found that this was not a bill of attainder. The law
reasonably promoted nonpunitive goals and was not a legislative punishment taken on the
basis of any irreversible act, since aid was awarded to those who registered late. The Court
also found that the statute did not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrim-
ination.
D. DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS

Under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, retroactive legislation
or other governmental action may be, but is not necessarily, a violation of the Constitution. The
question of whether a retroactive law (that does not violate the Contracts, Ex Post Facto, or Bill
of Attainder Clauses) violates due process is a substantive due process issue. If the law does not
relate to a fundamental civil right, the retroactive law should be upheld if it is rationally related to
a legitimate government interest.
Examples: 1) A retroactive tax law will be upheld as long as the retroactive aspects of the law
are rationally related to legitimate government interests. [United States v. Carlton,
512 U.S. 26 (1994)upholding retroactive modication of the estate tax]
2) Retroactive legislation affecting merely a remedy does not violate due process
(e.g., repealing or extending a statute of limitations), unless it would oust an
already vested property interest. [Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S.
304 (1945)permissible to revive a previously dead cause of action]
XIV. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
A. BASIC PRINCIPLE
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment (applicable to the federal government) and
the Fourteenth Amendment (applicable to the states) provide that the government shall not take
a persons life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Due process contemplates fair
process/procedure, which requires at least an opportunity to present objections to the proposed
action to a fair, neutral decisionmaker (not necessarily a judge).
1. When Is Individualized Adjudication Required?

There is a right to procedural due process only when the government acts to deprive an
individual of life, liberty, or property (see below). There is no right to individualized
adjudication when the government acts generally, even if the action will result in burdening
individuals life, liberty, or property interests.
Example: A state legislature need not provide individuals with an opportunity for a
hearing when adopting the general requirements for obtaining a drivers
license (e.g., age, residence, ability, etc.), but it must provide individualized
process to determine whether a particular person meets the requirements.
2. Intentional Deprivation vs. Negligent Deprivation

Fair process is required for intentional acts of the government or its employees. If an injury
is caused to a person through the mere negligence of a government employee, there is no
violation of the Due Process Clause. [Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Davidson v.
Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986)]
a. Deprivation
A deprivation of life, liberty, or property requires more than a mere denial of
certain kinds of remedies. Only when the government affords no remedy or inade-
quate remedies may a deprivation of life, liberty, or property result. [Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999)]
3. Fair, Neutral DecisionmakerJudge Bias

The Due Process Clause requires a judge to recuse himself when he has actual bias (e.g.,
he has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in a case) or when there is merely
a serious risk of actual bias. A serious risk of actual bias exists when under a realistic
appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, the judges interest poses such a
risk of actual bias or prejudice that it must be forbidden. [Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co.,
556 U.S. 868 (2009)]
Example: The chairman of a company spent over $3 million to support an attorneys
campaign to be elected to the state supreme court after a $50 million verdict
was entered against the chairmans company, knowing that the supreme court
would eventually hear the appeal of the verdict. The $3 million was more
than the total amount spent by all of the other supporters of the attorney, and
the attorney won by fewer than 50,000 votes. When the case was appealed,
the winner of the verdict asked the newly elected justice to recuse himself.
Under these circumstances, recusal was required. [Caperton v. A. T. Massey
Coal Co., supra]
4. Protection vs. Creation

The due process provisions do not create property or liberty interests; their purpose is to
provide procedural safeguards against arbitrary deprivation. Hence, the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause does not, for example, give out-of-state attorneys the right
to appear in state courts without meeting a states bar admission requirements. [Leis v. Flynt,
439 U.S. 438 (1979)]
B. IS LIFE, LIBERTY, OR PROPERTY BEING TAKEN?

Older Supreme Court cases indicated that due process protects rights, but not privileges. This
approach is no longer followed; rather the Court will determine whether a legitimate liberty or
property interest is being taken.
1. Liberty
The term liberty is not specically dened. It includes more than just freedom from bodily
restraints (e.g., it includes the right to contract and to engage in gainful employment). A
deprivation of liberty occurs if a person:
(i) Loses signicant freedom of action; or
(ii) Is denied a freedom provided by the Constitution or a statute.
Examples of liberty interests include:
a. Commitment to Mental Institution
1) Adults
Adults are entitled to an adversary hearing before they are indenitely committed
to a mental institution against their will. The state must prove the basis for
commitment by clear and convincing evidence. However, after a person has been
acquitted of criminal charges on the basis of an insanity defense, the acquitted
defendant can be committed if a court nds by a preponderance of the evidence
that the person should be committed to a mental health care facility. [Jones v.
United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983)]
2) Minor Children
Minor children have a substantial liberty interest in not being conned unneces-
sarily for medical treatment. Thus, they are entitled to a screening by a neutral
factnder before commitment to a mental institution. Mere parental consent to
commitment is not enough. [Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979)]
b. Injury to Reputation
Injury to reputation in itself is not a deprivation of liberty or property. [Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693 (1976)] However, if governmental acts (such as a statement of reasons
given for termination of public employment) so injure a persons reputation that he will
have lost signicant employment or associational opportunities, there is a loss of
liberty.
c. Exercise of Fundamental Constitutional Rights

The Due Process Clause protects a persons freedom to engage in activities that involve
fundamental constitutional rights, such as the right to speak and associate, the right to
travel, and the right to vote.
1) ApplicationGovernment Employees Freedom of Speech

A public employee may not be discharged for engaging in constitutionally
protected speech. (See XXI.C.1., infra.) If a government employee is discharged
for her speech or writing, a hearing must be held to determine whether the speech
was protected. If so, the employee cannot be red. [See Givhan v. Western Line
Consolidated School District, 439 U.S. 410 (1979)Court held that teacher could
not be red for privately communicating her grievances about working conditions
or opinions concerning public issues to her employer]
2. Property
Property includes more than personal belongings and realty, chattels, or money, but an
abstract need or desire for (or a unilateral expectation of) the benet is not enough. There
must be a legitimate claim or entitlement to the benet under state or federal law. [Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Leis v. Flynt, supra] Examples of property interests
include:
a. Public Education
There is a property interest in public education when school attendance is required.
Thus, a signicant suspension (e.g., 10 days) requires procedural due process. [Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)]
b. Welfare Benets
One has a property interest in welfare benets if she has previously been determined to
meet the statutory criteria. [Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)]
c. Continued Public Employment
If there is a state statute or ordinance that creates a public employment contract, or there
is some clear practice or mutual understanding that an employee can be terminated only
for cause, then there is a property interest [Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974)];
but if the employee holds his position only at the will of the employer, there is no
property interest in continued employment [Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976)].
C. WHAT TYPE OF PROCESS IS REQUIRED?

While all intentional governmental deprivations of life, liberty, or property require fair process,
what constitutes fair process in terms of the timing and scope of the hearing varies according to
the circumstances of the deprivation. The Court will weigh:
(i) The importance of the individual interest involved;
(ii) The value of specic procedural safeguards to that interest; and
(iii) The governmental interest in scal and administrative efciency.
[Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)] In all situations, the Court will probably require
fair procedures and an unbiased decisionmaker. Normally, the person whose interest is being
deprived should also receive notice of the governments action and have an opportunity to
respond before termination of the interest. However, the court may allow a post-termination
hearing in situations where a pre-termination hearing is highly impracticable. The Court has made
the following rulings with regard to specic types of deprivations:
1. Welfare Benets
Due process requires an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of welfare benets. It
need not be a judicial or quasi-judicial trial if there is adequate post-termination review; but
the recipient must have timely and adequate notice of the reasons for the proposed termina-
tion, the right to confront adverse witnesses, and the right to present his own arguments and
evidence orally. Counsel need not be provided, but must be permitted. Finally, the decision
must be based solely on evidence adduced at the hearing and must be rendered by an impar-
tial decisionmaker (thus disqualifying any participant in the termination proposal under
review). [Goldberg v. Kelly, supra]
2. Disability Benets
No prior evidentiary hearing is required for termination of disability benets, as long as
there is prior notice to the recipient, an opportunity to respond in writing, and a subse-
quent evidentiary hearing (with retroactive payment if the recipient prevails). Rationale:
Disability benets (unlike welfare benets) are not based on nancial need and hence are not
vital. [Mathews v. Eldridge, supra]
3. Public Employment
A public employee who is subject to removal only for cause (and who, therefore, has a
property interest in his job) generally must be given notice of charges against him that are to
be the basis for his job termination, and a pre-termination opportunity to respond to those
charges. The employee does not have to be given a full, formal hearing before his termina-
tion, as long as there is a fair system of pre-termination notice, an opportunity to respond
(to the person making the termination decision), and a subsequent evidentiary hearing
regarding the termination (with reinstatement if the employee prevails). [Cleveland Board
of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985)] But note: If there is a signicant reason
for not keeping the employee on the job, he may be suspended without pay and without an
opportunity to respond, as long as there is a prompt post-suspension hearing with reinstate-
ment and back pay if the employee prevails. [Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924 (1997)police
ofcer suspended after being arrested and formally charged with a felony]
4. Public EducationDisciplinary Suspension

Although no formal evidentiary hearing is required before a student may be temporarily
suspended (for 10 days or less), due process usually requires notice of the charges and an
opportunity to explain. However, if the students presence poses a danger to persons or
property, or threatens to disrupt the academic process, such notice and hearing may follow
removal as soon as practicable. [Goss v. Lopez, supra]
a. Corporal Punishment in Public School

This may involve constitutionally protected liberty. However, the traditional common
law tort remedies for excessive punishment satisfy procedural due process, and a prior
hearing is not required. [Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977)]
5. Public EducationAcademic Dismissal

No prior evidentiary hearing is required when a student is dismissed for academic
deciencies rather than for disciplinary reasons. Due process is satised if the student
is adequately informed of the deciency and given an opportunity to respond. [Board of
Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978)]
6. Creditors Remedies
Pretrial remedies, such as attachment of property or garnishment of wages, that are merely
designed to provide a plaintiff with some guarantee that there will be assets to satisfy a
judgment against the defendant if the plaintiff eventually wins the case should not be issued
by a court without notice to the defendant and a hearing prior to the issuance of the order.
A court may issue a temporary order of this type if: (i) there are exigent circumstances that
justify the order; and (ii) the defendant is given a hearing after the order is issued but prior
to trial. [Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Connecticut v. Doehr, 501
U.S. 1 (1991)] However, laws authorizing creditors to garnish assets, or a conditional seller to
seize or sequester property, will be upheld without prior notice to the debtor if:
a. The creditor posts a security bond;
b. The application is made to a judge, is not conclusory, and documents narrowly conned
facts susceptible of summary disposition; and
c. Provision is made for an early hearing at which the creditor must show probable cause.
7. Drivers License
The state generally must afford a prior hearing before a drivers license is suspended or
terminated. [Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971)] However, a post-suspension hearing satis-
es due process where a statute mandates suspension of a drivers license for refusing to take
a breathalyzer test upon arrest for drunk driving. [Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979)]
8. Parental Status Litigation and Hearing
a. Termination of Parental Status

Due process does not require the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in every
case in which the state seeks to terminate parental status (i.e., take children from their
parents), but only when fundamental fairness requires the appointment. [Lassiter
v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981)] To terminate parental rights,

the state must prove its allegations of parental neglect or misconduct by clear and
convincing evidence. [Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)]
b. Paternity Actions
A state may allow paternity to be established in a support proceeding brought by
a mother or child by a preponderance of evidenceno greater burden of proof is
required by the Due Process Clause. [Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574 (1987)] However,
due process requires the state to pay for blood tests that might exculpate an indigent
defendant in a paternity action if the state is responsible for the lawsuit (the suit is
brought by a state agency or the state requires the mother to bring the civil paternity
suit). [Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981)]
c. Hearings for Men Who Seek to Establish Paternity
1) Unmarried Father Living with Mother

If the father of a nonmarital child is a part of a family unit that includes the
child, the relationship between the father and child will be protected by due
process. [Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)state cannot take child from
father after mother dies, unless state has a fair process to determine whether the
parental relationship should be severed]
2) Father Who Never Tried to Establish Paternity

The father of a nonmarital child who has never attempted to establish a legal or
personal relationship with the child has no right to notice prior to the adoption of
the child by other persons. [Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983)]
3) Mother Married to Another Man

The Supreme Court has upheld a statute that presumed that a child born during
wedlock was the husbands child where the statute allowed an alleged biological
father to have a hearing regarding visitation rights, but the Court did not rule on
whether a biological father could be denied visitation under these circumstances
without a hearing. [Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989)]
9. Detention of Citizen Enemy Combatants

Due process requires that a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant
have a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for his detention before a neutral
decisionmaker. However, due process does not forbid some tailoring of the proceedings to
alleviate burdens that they may impose on Executive authority during an ongoing military
conict. This may include accepting some use of hearsay, permitting government rebuttable
presumptions, and perhaps use of a properly authorized and constituted military tribunal.
[Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)effect of views of ve Justices in two separate
opinions]
Example: Hamdi, an American citizen, was captured in Afghanistan, classied as an
enemy combatant for allegedly taking up arms with the Taliban, and trans-
ported to a naval brig in Charleston, SC. Hamdis father brought a habeas
corpus petition on his behalf. The appellate court held that because Hamdi
was caught in a combat zone, he had no right to refute the governments
charges. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Hamdi was at least
entitled to some hearing to contest the factual basis for his detention before a
neutral decisionmaker. [Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, supra]
10. Notice of Adversary Proceedings

When the government seeks to use a judicial or administrative process to take or terminate
property interests, it must give notice to those persons whose property interests may be
taken by that process. The form of notice must be reasonably designed to insure that those
persons will in fact be notied of the proceedings.
Example: Personal notice or notice by mail must be given to both mortgagor and
mortgagee before a tax sale of property for unpaid taxes. [Mennonite Board
of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983)]
11. Civil Forfeitures

Procedural due process limits the governments ability to seize property allegedly subject
to forfeiture (which most often occurs when the government claims that the property was
connected to, or was the product of, criminal activity). Absent exceptional circumstances,
the government must provide the owner of real property notice and an opportunity for some
type of hearing prior to seizing real property. [United States v. James Daniel Good Real
Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993)] However, the government might be able to seize personal
property prior to providing the owner a hearing, since personal property can be hidden or
destroyed. [Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974)]
D. DUE PROCESS RIGHTS ARE SUBJECT TO WAIVER

Due process rights are subject to waiver. However, the Supreme Court has not clearly dened
the standard for determining whether someone has validly waived the right to a hearing before
governmental deprivation of liberty or property. Presumably, any such waiver must be voluntary.
Additionally, it is possible that a waiver will be valid only if it is made knowingly (with an under-
standing of the nature of the rights being waived).
E. ACCESS TO COURTSINDIGENT PLAINTIFFS

There may often be a fee for government services, including a fee for use of courts (e.g., a ling
fee). Whether the government must waive such fees for indigents depends on the nature of the
rights involved.
1. Fundamental RightsWaiver Required

The Supreme Court has required a waiver of government fees when the imposition of a fee
would deny a fundamental right to the indigent. (Fundamental rights are examined in the
substantive due process and equal protection sections of this outline.)
Examples: 1) The government cannot deny an indigent the right to marry or divorce
because of the indigents inability to pay a marriage license fee or a divorce
court ling fee.
2) The government must waive even a reasonable ling fee for candidates for
electoral ofce if it can be shown that the candidate cannot afford to pay the
ling fee. The right to be a candidate is connected to the fundamental right of
individuals to vote for candidates of their choice.
3) The government may not require an indigent to pay the cost of a transcript
in order to appeal from termination of her parental rights. [M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,
519 U.S. 102 (1997)]
2. Nonfundamental RightsWaiver Not Required

When there is no fundamental right regulated by the imposition of a fee, the government can
refuse to grant the service to those persons who cannot pay the required fee.
Examples: 1) The federal government can refuse to grant access to bankruptcy courts to
persons who cannot pay a ling fee. There is no fundamental right to receive
a bankruptcy discharge from debts.
2) A state can limit judicial review of welfare termination hearings to those

persons who pay a $25 fee.
XV. THE TAKING CLAUSE
A. IN GENERAL
The Fifth Amendment prohibits governmental taking of private property for public use without
just compensation. The prohibition is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment
[Chicago Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)], and taking questions
often arise in connection with states exercise of their police power (i.e., the power to legislate for
the health, welfare, safety, etc., of the people).
1. Not a Grant of Power

The Fifth Amendment is not a grant of power, but rather is a limitation on power (i.e., a
taking must be for a public purpose and compensation must be paid). The power for a taking
must arise out of some other source (e.g., the police power).
2. Scope of Taking
The concept of a governmental taking probably originally contemplated only physical
appropriations of property. Today, however, the term also encompasses some govern-
mental action that signicantly damages property or impairs its use (e.g., frequent yovers
by airplanes near airport [United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)]). Moreover, even
personal property and intangibles may be the subject of a taking. [See Horne v. Department
of Agriculture, 135 S.Ct. 2419 (2015)raisin growers must be paid just compensation for
being required to set aside a portion of their crops for the government pursuant to federal
regulations, even if the growers retain a contingent interest in the reserved portion; and see
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984)government requirement that trade
secret be disclosed may be a taking where government takes and discloses the secret in such
a way that it diminishes the secrets economic value and interferes with reasonable, invest-
ment-backed expectations of its holders]
B. PUBLIC USE LIMITATION LIBERALLY CONSTRUED

The Court will not review underlying policy decisions, such as general desirability for a partic-
ular public use or the extent to which property must be taken therefor. A use will be held to be
public as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate public purpose, e.g., health, welfare,
safety, moral, social, economic, political, or aesthetic ends. The government may even authorize
a taking by private enterprise, as long as the taking will redound to the public advantage (e.g.,
railroads and public utilities).
Example: A city adopted an integrated development plan to revitalize its ailing economy
by buying up privately held land in its riverfront area, developing some land into
parks, and transferring the rest to developers who would open marinas, stores,
etc. Pursuant to the plan, the city bought up land from willing sellers and initiated
condemnation proceedings against owners who refused to sell. The recalcitrant
owners brought suit against the city, claiming that the use for which the city was
condemning the land (i.e., to transfer the land to private developers) was not a
public use. The Supreme Court held that a taking is for public use so long as the
government acts out of a reasonable belief that the taking will benet the public,
and taking private property to promote economic development has long been
accepted as a public use. [Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)]
C. TAKING VS. REGULATION

While the government must fairly compensate an owner when her property is taken for public use,
it need not pay compensation for mere regulation of property. Thus, whether government action
amounts to a taking or is merely regulation is a crucial issue. The question is one of degree; there
is no clear cut formula for determining whether there has been a taking. The following guidelines
have emerged.
1. Actual Appropriation or Physical Invasion

A taking will almost always be found if there is an actual appropriation or destruction of a
persons property or a permanent physical invasion by the government or by authorization of
law.
Examples: A taking was found in the following situations:
1) Ordinance requiring landlords to allow installation of cable TV in their
rental units but limiting to $1 the fee landlords could charge for this access.
[Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)]
2) Statute abolishing rights of descent and devise of property (although
government has broad authority to regulate this area). [Hodel v. Irving, 481
U.S. 704 (1987)]
3) Requirement that public be given free access to a privately developed
waterway. [Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1980)]
a. ExceptionEmergencies
A taking is less likely to be found in emergency situations, even where there is destruc-
tion or actual occupation of private property.
Examples: 1) No compensation was required when the state ordered the destruction
of cedar trees that threatened to spread disease to apple orchards. [Miller
v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928)]
2) No compensation was required when federal troops destroyed oil

facilities to prevent them from falling into enemy hands. [United States
v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952)]
b. Damage from Temporary Interference with Use

Government action that amounts to a temporary appropriation or physical invasion
of property may also amount to a taking. For example, temporary ooding caused by
government release of dammed up waters can amount to a taking. [Arkansas Game and
Fish Commission v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2013)]
2. Use Restrictions
a. Denial of All Economic Value of LandTaking

If a government regulation denies a landowner of all economic use of his land, the
regulation is equivalent to a physical appropriation and is thus a taking unless principles
of nuisance or property law that existed when the owner acquired the land make the use
prohibitable. [Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)states
zoning ordinance, adopted after owner purchased lots, amounted to a taking because
the ordinance prohibited owner from erecting any permanent structures on his lots]
1) Temporary Denials of All Economic Use

Temporarily denying an owner of all economic use of property does not consti-
tute a per se taking. Instead, the Court will carefully examine and weigh all the
relevant circumstancesthe planners good faith, the reasonable expectations
of the owners, the length of the delay, the delays actual effect on the value of
the property, etc.in order to determine whether fairness and justice require
just compensation. [Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002)nding no taking where there was a
32-month moratorium on land development in the Lake Tahoe Basin while a
comprehensive land-use plan was being developed for the area]
b. Decreasing Economic Value

Generally, regulations that merely decrease the value of property (e.g., prohibit its most
benecial use) do not necessarily result in a taking, as long as they leave an economi-
cally viable use for the property. The Court considers (i) the social goals sought to be
promoted; (ii) the diminution in value to the owner; and (iii) whether the regulation
substantially interferes with distinct, investment-backed expectations of the owner.
[Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 255 (1978)]
Example: The Court upheld a landmark zoning ordinance that prohibited
altering the external appearance of Grand Central Station. It found
historic preservation to be an important government interest and that
certain rights granted to the landmark owners mitigated their loss. [Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York, supra]
1) Building/Development PermitsTransfer of Occupation Rights

Municipalities often attempt to condition building or development permits on
a landowners (i) conveying title to part, or all, of the property to the govern-
ment or (ii) granting the public access to the property (e.g., an easement across
the property). Such conditions constitute an uncompensated taking unless (i) the
government can show that the condition relates to a legitimate government interest
and (ii) the adverse impact of the proposed building/development on the area is
roughly proportional to the loss caused to the property owner from the forced
transfer of occupation rights. [Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S.

825 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994)]
Example: City agreed to approve a permit to expand plaintiffs retail store and
pave a parking lot on the condition that plaintiff dedicate land for
(i) a public greenway and (ii) a bike path. The Supreme Court found
that City did not show a sufcient relationship between the dedica-
tions and the impact that the expansion would have on the area.
[Dolan v. City of Tigard, supra]
a) Permit Denials
The governments demand for property with respect to a land-use permit
application must satisfy the Nollan/Dolan requirements, above, even when
the government denies a permit. A refusal to issue a permit based on a refusal
to dedicate land under terms that do not satisfy the nexus and/or proportion-
ality requirements of Nollan and Dolan constitutes a taking. [Koontz v. St.
Johns River Water Development District, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013)]
2) Utility Rate Regulation

There is no taking where the government sets rates that utility companies can
charge, as long as the rates are not set so low that they are unjust and conscatory.
[Duquesne Light Co. v. Barash, 488 U.S. 299 (1989)]
3) Zoning Ordinances
The Court has long held that governments may adopt zoning ordinances that
regulate the way real property may be used, pursuant to the police power (e.g.,
limiting development in a particular area to single-family homes, restricting build-
ings to a particular height, etc.). Such regulations generally do not amount to a
takingeven if they deny an owner the highest and best use of her property
unless they: (i) amount to a physical appropriation, as in Loretto, (ii) deny an
owner of all economic use, as in Lucas, or (iii) unreasonably interfere with distinct,
investment-backed expectations as set out in Penn Central. [See Lingle v. Chevron,
544 U.S. 528 (2005)]
3. RemedyInverse Condemnation
When a government acts under the power of eminent domain to take property for public
use, it will condemn the property and pay the owner just compensation, as discussed below.
When property is taken by occupation or regulation without condemnation proceedings, the
landowner can bring an action for inverse condemnation. If the court determines that the
government action amounted to a taking, the government will be required to either:
(i) Pay the property owner compensation for the taking (see below); or
(ii) Terminate the regulation and pay the owner for damages that occurred while the
regulation was in effect (i.e., temporary taking damages).
[First English Evangelical Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987)]
a. Who May Sue

The right to claim a taking is not limited to persons who held title to the property at
the time a challenged use restriction was imposed. A person who purchases property
after a regulation is in place still may bring a taking claim. [Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,
533 U.S. 606 (2001)]
D. JUST COMPENSATION
The owner is entitled to the fair market value of her property at the time of the takingnot
the value it would have if put to its highest and best use. The measure is based on the loss to the
owner, not the gain to the taker. Increases in value to the owners remaining property as a result of
the taking cannot be used to offset damages. Due process guarantees notice and hearing, adminis-
trative or judicial, on the amount of compensation, but the hearing need not precede the taking.
1. Worthless Property
Because just compensation is measured by the loss to the owner and not by the gain to
the taker, property that is worthless to the owner can be the subject of a taking, but no
compensation need be paid when it is taken.
Example: A state law required attorneys to keep clients funds in trust accounts on
behalf of their clients and to pay to the client any interest earned on the funds.
If a clients funds were too small to earn enough interest to exceed the costs
of distributing the interest, the attorneys were required to pay the interest
over to a legal aid charity. Although this requirement constitutes a taking, no
compensation is due because the clients have not suffered a pecuniary loss.
[Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. 216 (2003)]
XVI. INTRODUCTION TO SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

AND EQUAL PROTECTION
A. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL

PROTECTION
The Due Process Clauses and the Equal Protection Clause guarantee the fairness of laws
substantive due process guarantees that laws will be reasonable and not arbitrary, and equal
protection guarantees that similarly situated persons will be treated alike. Both guarantees require
the Court to review the substance of the law rather than the procedures employed.
1. Substantive Due Process

Generally where a law limits the liberty of all persons to engage in some activity, it is a due
process question.
2. Equal Protection
Where a law treats a person or class of persons differently from others, it is an equal protec-
tion question. [See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000)equal protection
claims may be brought by a class with as few as one member] However, an at-will govern-
ment employee who claims to be a victim of arbitrary discrimination cannot use the class of
one theory to make an equal protection claim. [Engquist v. Department of Agriculture, 533
U.S. 591 (2008)]
3. Examples
If a law prohibits all persons from purchasing contraceptive devices, there is a due process
issue; if the law prohibits only purchases by unmarried persons, there is an equal protection
issue. A states refusal to have any publicly funded schools raises a due process issue; a state
law that establishes separate schools for children of different races raises an equal protection
issue.
4. NoteClauses Not Necessarily Mutually Exclusive

Since both clauses protect against unfairness, both may be appropriate challenges to the
same governmental act, and a discussion of both may be appropriate in an essay answer. On
the MBE, however, the examiners will probably not include both as alternatives in the same
question. The above approaches can be used as a rough guideline of when each clause applies.
Example: Petitioners challenged state laws limiting marriage as between one man
and one woman and refusing to recognize same-sex marriages from outside
the state. The Court held that the fundamental liberties protected by both
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses extend to certain personal
choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices
dening personal identity and beliefs. This includes the right of same-sex
couples to marry. [Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015)]
B. WHAT STANDARD OF REVIEW WILL THE COURT APPLY?

The Court employs one of three tests in reviewing laws under these clauses, depending on the
circumstances.
1. Strict Scrutiny (Maximum Scrutiny)

The Court uses the strict scrutiny standard when a suspect classication or fundamental
right (these terms will be discussed infra) is involved. Under the strict scrutiny standard, a
law will be upheld only if it is necessary to achieve a compelling or overriding government
purpose. The Court will always consider whether less burdensome means for accomplishing
the legislative goal are available. Most governmental action examined under this test fails.
a. Burden of Proof on Government

When the strict scrutiny standard is applied, the government will have the burden of
proving that the law is necessary. The Court will not allow a loose tting law (i.e., if a
law reaches more people or conduct than is necessary (overinclusive) or does not reach
all of the people or conduct sought to be regulated (underinclusive), it will likely be
struck down).
2. Intermediate Scrutiny
The Court uses intermediate scrutiny when a classication based on gender or legitimacy is
involved. Under the intermediate scrutiny standard, a law will be upheld if it is substantially
related to an important government purpose.
a. Burden of Proof Probably on Government

It is unclear who has the burden of proof when the Court uses the intermediate
standard, but in most cases, it appears to be the government.
3. Rational Basis (Minimal Scrutiny)

The rational basis standard is used whenever the other two standards are not applicable (i.e.,
most legislation). Under the rational basis standard, a law will be upheld if it is rationally
related to a legitimate interest. It is difcult to fail this test, so most governmental action
examined under this standard is upheld unless it is arbitrary or irrational.
a. Burden of Proof on Challenger

Under the rational basis standard, laws are presumed valid. Therefore, the challenger
has the burden of proof. This is a very difcult burden to meet, given the deference the
Court gives to legislatures under the rational basis standard. (See below.)
b. Deference to Legislature
Under the rational basis standard, the Court will usually defer to a legislatures decision
that a law is rational. Loose tting laws are permissible here: The law need not be the
best law that could have been written to achieve the legislative goal. Indeed, it need not
go far at all toward a conceivable legislative goal; the Court will uphold a law taking a
rst step toward any legitimate goal, even if the Court thinks the law is unwise.
Example: City decided that advertisements on motor vehicles are trafc hazards,
so it banned such advertisements except for those on vehicles advertising
the owners own product. Even though the excepted advertisements were
no less distracting than the banned ones, the Court upheld the rst step
law. [Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949)]
XVII. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
A. CONSTITUTIONAL SOURCETWO CLAUSES

There are two separate clauses protecting substantive due process:
(i) The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment (applies to the federal government); and
(ii) The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (applies to state and local govern-
ments).
As indicated above, the same tests are employed under each clause.
B. APPLICABLE STANDARDS
1. Fundamental RightStrict Scrutiny

Where a law limits a fundamental right, strict scrutiny will be applied, and the law (or other
governmental action) will be upheld only if the government can prove that the action is
necessary to promote a compelling or overriding interest. Fundamental rights include:
a. Right to travel;
b. Privacy;
c. Voting; and
d. All First Amendment rights.

2. All Other CasesMere Rationality

In all other cases, the mere rationality test is applied, and the law will be upheld unless the
challenger can prove that the action is not rationally related to any conceivable legitimate
end of government. Examples include the following:
a. Business and Labor Regulations

The Court will sustain all varieties of business regulation; e.g., blue sky laws, bank
controls, insurance regulation, price and wage controls, unfair competition and trade
practice controls, etc.
b. Taxation
Taxation is also invariably sustained. However, discriminatory taxes might still be
invalidated.
c. Lifestyle
There is, as yet, no recognized right to lead a certain lifestyle. Thus, the Supreme Court
will uphold laws: prohibiting drugs (hard or soft), requiring motorcyclists to wear
helmets, or requiring police ofcers to have short hair. [Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238
(1976)]
d. Zoning
Regulation of the ownership or use of property has also been liberally tolerated by the
Court.
1) Statutes Forbidding Nuisances or Promoting Communitys Preferred Lifestyle

Statutes forbidding certain uses as nuisances have been sustained, as have all
kinds of statutes designed to promote the publics enjoyment of space and safety
or to promote a communitys preferred lifestyle and character. For example, the
Supreme Court held that a Long Island suburb could zone out all groups of three
or more persons unrelated by blood, adoption, or marriage. [Village of Belle Terre
v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974)]
2) Cannot Prohibit Traditionally Related Families from Living Together

However, you should know that the Supreme Court held that zoning regulations
that prohibit members of traditional families from living together (i.e., zoning
excluding cousins or grandchildren) violate due process. [Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)]
e. Punitive Damages
The Supreme Court has held that punitive damages do not necessarily violate due
process. However, grossly excessive damagesthose that are unreasonably high to
vindicate the states interest in punishmentare invalid. [TXO Production Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993)]
1) Factors Considered
In assessing whether punitive damages violate due process, the key issue is
whether the defendant had fair notice of the possible magnitude of the punitive
damages. In assessing such notice, the Court will look to:
(i) The reprehensibility of the defendants conduct (e.g., whether the defen-
dant caused physical harm rather than merely economic harm, whether the
defendant acted with reckless disregard for harm, whether the conduct was
repeated rather than isolated, and whether the harm resulted from intentional
malice or deceit rather than from an accident);
(ii) The disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff
and the punitive award; and
(iii) The difference between the punitive damages award and the criminal or
civil penalties authorized for comparable misconduct.
[BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996)]
2) Rule of Thumb
Except for particularly egregious conductespecially when the conduct resulted
in only a small amount of compensatory damagespunitive damages should not
exceed 10 times the compensatory damages. [State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance
Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003)punitive damages of 145 times compensa-
tory damages violate due process]
f. CompareVagueness Doctrine
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a law can be held uncon-
stitutional if it fails to provide minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement ofcers
so as to discourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. [Kolender v. Lawson, 461
U.S. 352 (1983); City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999)holding unconstitu-
tional on vagueness grounds an ordinance that allowed ofcers to disperse suspected
gang members when they were loitering, which was dened as remaining in any one
place with no apparent purpose]
C. A FEW IRREBUTTABLE PRESUMPTIONS MAY BE INVALID

If the government presumes facts against a person so that she is not qualied for some
important benet or right, the irrebuttable presumption may be unconstitutional. Although the
Court often characterizes this as a due process question, it is more accurately an equal protec-
tion question because the government is creating an arbitrary classication. In any case, if the
presumption affects a fundamental right (e.g., right to travel) or a suspect or quasi-suspect classi-
cation (e.g., gender), it will likely be invalid under strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny analysis,
because the administrative convenience created by the presumption is not an important enough
interest to justify the burden on the right or class. If some other classication or right is involved,
the presumption will likely be upheld under the rational basis standard.
Examples: 1) A state may not presume a teacher incapable of continuous service in the class-
room merely because she is four or ve months pregnant or has a child under age
three. [Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974)]
2) The government may presume that a marriage entered into within nine
months of a wage earners death was simply to secure Social Security benets.
[Weinberger v. Sal, 422 U.S. 749 (1975)]
D. FAIR NOTICE
A fundamental principle of our legal system is that laws that regulate people or entities must
give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or required. A regulation that fails to give fair
notice violates the Due Process Clause. [See, e.g., Federal Communications Commission v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012); and see XX.A.3.b., infra]
XVIII. EQUAL PROTECTION
A. CONSTITUTIONAL SOURCE
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has no counterpart in the
Constitution applicable to the federal government; it is limited to state action. Nevertheless, it is
clear that grossly unreasonable discrimination by the federal government violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. [Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)racial discrimination
in the public schools of the District of Columbia held a violation of due process] Thus, there are
really two equal protection guarantees. The Court usually applies the same standards under either
constitutional provision.
Example: The Supreme Court struck down a federal law dening marriage and spouse
to exclude same sex couples as applied to residents of a state that recognized
same sex marriage. The Court found that the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains within it a prohibition against denying
any person the equal protection of laws. And a law that discriminates against some
married couples recognized by a state in favor of other married couples violates
equal protection. It should be noted that the Court did not rely on any of the
traditional due process or equal protection tests (i.e., strict scrutiny, intermediate
scrutiny, or rational basis) in arriving at the holding. [United States v. Windsor, 133
S. Ct. 2675 (2013)]
B. APPLICABLE STANDARDS
As indicated above, the Court will apply one of three standards when examining governmental
action involving classications of persons. If a suspect classication or fundamental right is
involved, the strict scrutiny standard will be applied and the action will be struck down unless
the government proves that it is necessary to achieve a compelling interest. If a quasi-suspect
classication is involved, the Court will likely require the government to prove that the action is
substantially related to an important government interest. If any other classication is involved,
the action will be upheld unless the challenger proves that the action is not rationally related to a
legitimate government interest.
C. PROVING DISCRIMINATORY CLASSIFICATION

The mere fact that legislation or governmental action has a discriminatory effect is not sufcient
to trigger strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny. There must be intent to discriminate on the part
of the government. Intent can be shown in three ways: (i) facial discrimination; (ii) discriminatory
application; or (iii) discriminatory motive.
1. Facial Discrimination
A law may include a classication on its face. This type of law, by its own terms, makes
an explicit distinction between classes of persons (perhaps by race or gender; e.g., all white
males 21 or older may serve as jurors [see Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880)]).
In such cases the courts merely have to apply the appropriate standard of review for that
classication. (The standards for racial classications and gender classications are described
below.)
a. Facial Discrimination Absent Racial Language

In a few cases, the Supreme Court has held that a law used a racial classication on
its face even though the language of the law did not include racial language. In these
cases, the Supreme Court found that the law could not be explained except in racial
terms.
Example: The Court found that a state law establishing districts for the election of
Representatives to the United States Congress should be deemed to use
a racial classication on its face because one bizarrely shaped district
could not be explained except in terms of establishing a district where
minority race voters would control the outcome of the election. The
Court did not rule on the question of whether this racial classication
was narrowly tailored to a compelling interest, such as remedying proven
past discrimination, because that question had not been addressed in the
lower courts. [Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)]
Note: If a legislative districting map could be explained in terms other than race, the
Court would not nd that the law constituted racial discrimination on its face. In such
a case, the persons attacking legislative districts as being based on racial classication
would have to show that district lines were drawn for a racially discriminatory purpose.
[Hunt v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001)Hunt II]
2. Discriminatory Application
In some instances, a law that appears to be neutral on its face will be applied in a different
manner to different classes of persons. If the persons challenging the governmental action
can prove that the government ofcials applying the law had a discriminatory purpose (and
used discriminatory standards based on traits such as race or gender), the law will be invali-
dated.
Examples: 1) A law prohibited operating a laundry in wooden buildings, but gave a
government agency discretion to grant exemptions. It was shown that most
such laundries were owned by people of Chinese descent, but the agency
granted exemptions only to non-Asian applicants. The law was deemed to
involve racial or national origin classication and was invalidated as applied.
[Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)]
2) Laws allow attorneys to move to strike potential jurors from a jury either
for cause or without cause (a peremptory strike). In either case, there is an
equal protection violation when it is proved that an attorney excluded a person
from a jury on account of the persons race or sex. [See Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79 (1986); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994)] Note
that because striking potential jurors from a jury signicantly involves the
state, even attorneys representing private parties are prohibited from discrimi-
natory strikes. (See XII.B.2.a.1)a)(1), supra.)
3. Discriminatory Motive
Sometimes a government action will appear to be neutral on its face and in its applica-
tion, but will have disproportionate impact on a particular class of persons (such as a racial
minority or women). Such a law will be found to involve a classication (and be subject
to the level of scrutiny appropriate to that classication) only if a court nds that the
law-making body enacted or maintained the law for a discriminatory purpose. In such cases,
the court should admit into evidence statistical proof that the law has a disproportionate
impact on one class of persons. However, mere statistical evidence will rarely be sufcient in
itself to prove that the government had a discriminatory purpose in passing a law. Statistical
evidence may be combined with other evidence of legislative or administrative intent to show
that a law or regulation is the product of a discriminatory purpose.
Examples: 1) A police department used results from a written test as a criterion for hiring
police ofcers. Members of identiable racial minorities consistently got low
scores on the test, although there was no proof that the test was written or
otherwise employed for the purpose of disadvantaging minority applicants.
Because of the absence of nonstatistical proof of discriminatory purpose, there
was no equal protection violation. [Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)]
2) A state law gave a preference in the hiring and promotion of civil service
employees to persons who were honorably discharged from the United States
military. The foreseeable and actual impact of this law was to disadvantage
the female population of job applicants, because the majority of veterans are
men. Because there was no proof (other than the statistical impact of the law)
that the legislature enacted the law for the purpose of hurting women (as
opposed to the purpose of aiding veterans), the law was upheld.
3) A statistical study showing that black defendants in capital cases are much
more likely to receive the death penalty than are white defendants in a state
will not in itself establish that a particular black defendant was denied equal
protection by being sentenced to death for murder in that state. The statistical
study is insufcient to prove purposeful discrimination. [McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279 (1987)]
D. SUSPECT CLASSIFICATIONS
1. Race and National Origin

If governmental action classies persons based on exercise of a fundamental right or involves
a suspect classication (race, national origin, or alienage), strict scrutiny is applied. The
result is invalidation of almost every case where the classication would burden a person
because of her status as a member of a racial or national origin minority. The only explicit
race discrimination upheld despite strict scrutiny was the wartime incarceration of United
States citizens of Japanese ancestry on the West Coast. [Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944)found to be necessary to achieve compelling interest of national security]
Example: A state could not deny custody of a child from a previous marriage to a white
mother merely because her new husband was black, where the mother was
otherwise found to be an appropriate parent. Racial prejudice against mixed
race couples does not justify taking a child from his mother. [Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984)]
a. School Integration
Recall that only intentional discrimination will be found to create discriminatory classi-
cations calling for strict scrutiny (see C., supra); thus, only intentional segregation in
schools will be invalidated under equal protection.
Example: No equal protection violation was found where a school system estab-
lished attendance zones in a racially neutral manner, but racial imbal-
ance occurred because of housing patterns. [Keyes v. School District No.
1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973)]
1) Remedying Intentional School Segregation
If it is proven that a school board has engaged in the racial districting of schools,
the board must take steps to eliminate the effects of that discrimination (e.g.,
busing students). If the school board refuses to do so, a court may order the school
district to take all appropriate steps to eliminate the discrimination.
a) Order Limited
A court may not impose a remedy that goes beyond the purpose of remedying
the vestiges of past segregation. Thus, it is impermissible for a court to
impose a remedy whose purpose is to attract nonminority students from
outside the school district when there is no evidence of past segregation
outside the district. [Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995)state not
required to fund salary increases and remedial programs to create magnet
schools to attract suburban students to urban schools]
b. Benign Government DiscriminationAfrmative Action
Government actionwhether by federal, state, or local governmental bodiesthat
favors racial or ethnic minorities is subject to strict scrutiny, as is government action
discriminating against racial or ethnic minorities. [Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200 (1995)overruling Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Commission, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), which applied intermediate standard to federal
discrimination]
Note: Prior to its ruling in Adarand, supra, the Supreme Court upheld a federal require-
ment that 10% of federal grants for public works be set aside for minority businesses.
[Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)] In Adarand, the Court reserved judgment
on whether a Fullilove-type program would survive strict scrutiny. Some commentators
have suggested that it might, because the Court might give Congress more deference
than the states based on Congresss power under the Enabling Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment (see XII.A.3., supra), but the continued validity of Fullilove is, at best,
uncertain.
1) Remedying Past Discrimination

The government has a compelling interest in remedying past discrimination
against a racial or ethnic minority. Thus, if a court nds that a governmental
agency has engaged in racial discrimination, it may employ a race-conscious
remedy tailored to end the discrimination and eliminate its effects. A remedy of
this type is permissible under the Equal Protection Clause because it is narrowly
tailored to further a compelling interest (the elimination of the illegal or unconsti-
tutional discrimination).
Example: When it has been proven that a public employer engaged in persis-
tent racial discrimination, a court may order relief that establishes
a goal for the hiring or promotion of minority persons so as to
eliminate the effects of the past discrimination. [United States v.
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987)]
2) Where There Has Been No Past Discrimination by Government

Even where a state or local government has not engaged in past discrimination, it
may have a compelling interest in afrmative action. However, the governmental
action must be narrowly tailored to that interest. [City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)]
a) Remedial Justications
(1) Local Private Discrimination

Remedying past private discrimination within the governmental
agencys jurisdiction is a compelling interest, but there is no compel-
ling interest in remedying the general effects of societal discrimination.
Thus, for a city to give a preference to minority race applicants for city
construction contracts, it must identify the past unconstitutional or illegal
discrimination against minority-owned construction businesses that it is
now attempting to correct. [City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., supra]
Example: In United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144
(1977), the Court upheld New Yorks revised voting
district plan, based solely on racial statistics, because
the revisions were made to insure that minorities that
had previously been discriminated against in New York
would be represented in the legislature.
(2) Diversity in Primary and Secondary Public Education

A school board may not assign students to a public primary or secondary
school on the basis of race unless necessary to achieve a compel-
ling interest, such as remedying past unconstitutional (i.e., intentional)
discrimination. A majority of the Court has not found diversity itself to
be a sufciently compelling interest. [See Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007)]
(3) Diversity in Post-Secondary Public Education

The Supreme Court has treated post-secondary educational institutions
(e.g., public colleges and universities) differently. It has held that courts
should defer to a public universitys judgments that diversity is itself a
compelling interest in post-secondary education. [Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)] Thus, the
Court held that race and ethnicity could be used as a factor (although
not a predominant factor) in determining whether a particular student
should be admitted. However, while the Court is willing to grant a public
university deference as to the importance of diversity in a student body,
it has held that courts should not give universities deference on the issue
of whether a particular scheme for assuring diversity is narrowly tailored

to that purpose. Strict scrutiny applies, so to pass constitutional muster,
a university must show that no workable race-neutral alternatives would
assure the diversity sought. [Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 133
S. Ct. 2411 (2013)]
b) States May Eliminate Race-Based Preferences

States are not required to have afrmative action programs for admission to
their universities. Moreover, states may eliminate existing race-based prefer-
ences, including by voter initiative. The Court upheld the constitutionality
of a Michigan initiative providing that the state and its political subdivisions
could not discriminate or give preference based on race or gender in educa-
tion, contracting, or employment. [Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Afrmative
Action (BAMN), 133 S. Ct. 1633 (2014)]
c. Discriminatory Legislative Apportionment

Race can be considered in drawing up new voting districts, but it cannot be the
predominant factor. If a plaintiff can show that a redistricting plan was drawn up
predominantly on the basis of racial considerations (as opposed to the more traditional
factors, such as compactness, contiguity, and community interest), the plan will violate
the Equal Protection Clause unless the government can show that the plan is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest. [Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995)
while eradicating the effects of past discrimination would be a compelling state interest,
the redistricting here was driven by the Justice Departments policy of maximizing
the number of districts where racial minority members are the majority, which is not a
compelling interest]
d. Private Afrmative Action

Private employers, of course, are not restricted by the Equal Protection Clause, since
the Clause applies only to the government, and private employers lack state action.
Nevertheless, Congress has adopted statutes regulating private discrimination by
employers pursuant to its power under the enabling provisions of the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments and the Commerce Clause. Thus, if an exam question asks
whether private employer discrimination is valid, the answer generally cannot be based
on equal protection.
2. Alienage Classications
a. Federal Classications
The standard for review of federal government classications based on alienage is
not clear, but they never seem to be subject to strict scrutiny. Because of Congresss
plenary power over aliens, these classications are valid if they are not arbitrary and
unreasonable. Thus, federal Medicare regulations could establish a ve-year residency
requirement for benets that eliminated many resident aliens. [Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67 (1976)]
b. State and Local Classications

State/local laws are subject to strict scrutiny if based on alienage. A compelling
state interest must be shown to justify disparate treatment. For example, a state law
requiring United States citizenship for welfare benets, civil service jobs, or a license to
practice law will be struck down because there is no compelling interest justifying the
requirement.
1) ExceptionParticipation in Self-Government Process

If a law discriminates against alien participation in the functioning of the state
government, the rational basis standard is applied.
Examples: 1) A state cannot require a notary public to be a citizen. A notarys
responsibilities are essentially clerical and do not fall within the
exception for positions related to participation in the governmental
process, and there is no compelling government interest justifying
such a requirement. [Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984)]
2) A state can validly refuse to hire aliens as police ofcers and

primary and secondary school teachers (because such teachers
inuence the attitudes of young minds toward government, the
political process, and citizenship, as well as provide an example for
civic virtues) and for all other positions that have a direct effect on
the functioning of government. [Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68
(1979); Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982)]
c. Undocumented Aliens
1) Punitive Laws Against Illegal Alien Adults

The Supreme Court has not held that undocumented (illegal) aliens are a suspect
classication. Thus, a state law that denies benets to (or imposes burdens on)
persons who are in the United States without the permission of the federal govern-
ment might be upheld under the rational basis test as long as the law was not
totally arbitrary.
2) Education Rights of Alien Children

The Supreme Court has found that undocumented aliens are persons within
the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment and that it would be fundamentally
unfair to punish children for the crimes of their parents (i.e., illegally coming into
the United States). Moreover, the Court found that refusing to educate children of
undocumented aliens would hinder their lives in a way that would work a punish-
ment on them. Therefore, the Court held that it is not rational for a state to deny
children of undocumented aliens a free public education unless the state can show
that the denial furthers a substantial state interest. Moreover, the Court held that
the cost saved in not educating such children is not a sufcient interest. [Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)]
a) CompareChildren Living Apart from Parents

The Supreme Court upheld a state statute that permitted a school district to
deny tuition-free education to any child (whether or not he is a United States
citizen) who lived apart from his parent or lawful guardian if the childs
presence in the school district was for the primary purpose of attending
school in the district. The state does not have to consider such a child to be
a bona de resident of the school district. [Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321
(1983)]
E. QUASI-SUSPECT CLASSIFICATIONS
Classications based on gender or legitimacy are almost always suspect. When analyzing govern-
ment action based on such classications, the Court will apply the intermediate standard and
strike the action unless it is substantially related to an important government interest.
1. Gender
The Court has expressly held that the government bears the burden of proof in gender
discrimination cases and that an exceedingly persuasive justication is required in order
to show that gender discrimination is substantially related to an important government
interest. [United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)]
a. Intentional Discrimination Against Women

Gender classications that intentionally discriminate against women will generally be
invalid under the intermediate standard, because the government is unable to show the
exceedingly persuasive justication that is required.
Examples: 1) A statute giving the husband, as head of the household, the right to
unilaterally dispose of property jointly owned with his wife violates
equal protection. [Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981)]
2) A statute giving preference to males over females to act as admin-

istrator of an estate violates equal protection. [Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971)ease in determining who should serve is not an important
interest]
Compare: 1) A state law that excluded from state disability insurance benets
disabilities arising from normal pregnancy and childbirth was upheld
on a holding that it did not constitute a gender classication and so did
not constitute intentional discrimination. [Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S.
484 (1974)]
2) A state statute granting a hiring preference to veterans was upheld

even though the result would disadvantage women since most veterans
are men. The Court found that the purpose of the statute was to help
veterans, not to discriminate against women. [Personnel Administrator
of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979)]
1) Government Interest Must Be Genuine

The important government interest advanced to justify categorization on the
basis of gender must be genuinenot hypothesized for the purpose of litigation
defense. Neither may the governments justication rely on overbroad generaliza-
tions about males and females that will create or perpetuate the legal, social, and
economic inferiority of women. [United States v. Virginia, supra]
Example: When a state military schools policy of admitting only men
was challenged, the state justied the policy, claiming that: (i)
offering a diversity of educational approaches within the state

(e.g., some schools having men only, some having women only,
and some having both) yields important educational benets,
and (ii) females generally would not be able to meet the schools
physical requirements and would not do well under the schools
adversative approach to education. The Supreme Court found these
arguments unavailing. There was no evidence that the single-sex
school in question was established or had been maintained with a
view toward fostering a diversity of educational opportunities, and
there was some evidence that some women could meet the schools
physical requirements and thrive under the schools adversative
approach. [United States v. Virginia, supra]
b. Afrmative Action Beneting Women

Classications beneting women that are designed to remedy past discrimination
against women will generally be upheld.
Examples: 1) Social Security and tax exemptions that entitle women to greater
benets to make up for past discrimination in the workplace are valid.
[Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977)]
2) A Navy rule granting female ofcers longer tenure than males before
mandatory discharge for nonproduction is valid to make up for past
discrimination against females in the Navy. [Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419
U.S. 498 (1975)]
c. Intentional Discrimination Against Men

Intentional discrimination against men generally is invalid. However, a number of laws
have been held valid as being substantially related to an important government interest.
1) Invalid Discrimination
The following have been held invalid under the Equal Protection Clause:
a) Denial to admit males to a state university or nursing school [Mississippi

University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982)];
b) Law that provides that only wives are eligible for alimony [Orr v. Orr, 440
U.S. 268 (1979)];
c) Law that permits unwed mother, but not unwed father, to stop adoption of
offspring [Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979)]; and
d) Law providing a higher minimum drinking age for men than for women
[Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)].
2) Valid Discrimination
The following have been upheld under the Equal Protection Clause despite their
discriminatory intent:
a) Law punishing males but not females for statutory rape (sexual intercourse
with a minor) [Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981)classi-
cation was found to be substantially related to important interest of preventing
pregnancy of minors];
b) Male-only draft registration [Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981)

classication was found to be substantially related to important interest of
preparing combat troops]; and
c) A law granting automatic United States citizenship to nonmarital children

born abroad to American mothers, but requiring American fathers of
children born abroad to take specic steps to establish paternity in order
to make such children United States citizens. [Nguyen v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 533 U.S. 53 (2001)promotes the important govern-
mental interest of avoiding proof of paternity problems, which are more dif-
cult to resolve for fathers]
2. Legitimacy Classications
Distinctions drawn between marital and nomarital children are also reviewed under the
intermediate scrutiny standard. Such classications must be substantially related to an
important governmental objective. [Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988)]
a. No Punitive Purpose
When the Court examines a classication based on illegitimacy, it gives greater atten-
tion to the purpose behind the distinction. It will not uphold discriminatory legislation
intended to punish the offspring of illicit relationships.
1) Inheritance from Father

A state statute cannot absolutely exclude nomarital children from inheriting from
their intestate fathers. [Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977)]
However, to promote efcient disposition of property at death (an important

government interest), a state can require that the paternity of the father be proved
before his death, since the requirement is substantially related to the important
interest. [Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978)]
2) Statute of Limitations on Paternity Suits May Be Discriminatory

The Supreme Court struck down a state statute that required nomarital children to
bring paternity suits within six years of their birth while allowing marital children
to seek support from parents at any time. The Court found that the law was not
related to the state interest of preventing stale or fraudulent claims. [Clark v. Jeter,
supra]
b. Immigration Preference to Legitimate ChildrenPermissible

Due to the plenary power over immigration, the Court upheld a federal law granting
immigration preferences to marital children. [Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977)]
F. OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS
All other classications are reviewed under the rational basis standard and will be upheld unless
they bear no rational relationship to any conceivable legitimate government interest. Nevertheless,
if the government has no interest in denying a benet or imposing a burden on a group of persons
other than a societal fear or dislike of them, the classication will not meet the standard.
Examples: 1) The Court struck down a zoning ordinance that allowed denial of a special use
permit to a group of unrelated, mentally retarded persons who wished to share
a residential home or apartment building. Retarded persons are not a suspect or
quasi-suspect class and the right to housing is not a fundamental right; thus the
Court applied the rational basis standard. It found that the sole reason the permit
was denied was the applicants mental condition and that the government has no
legitimate interest in prohibiting mentally retarded persons from living together.
[Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)]
2) Several municipalities passed ordinances banning discrimination in housing,

employment, etc., based on sexual orientation. In response, the state voters adopted
a state constitutional amendment prohibiting any state or local action protecting
the status of persons based on their homosexual or bisexual orientation. Held: A
state constitutional provision that identies persons by a single trait and then denies
them the right to seek any specic protections from the lawno matter how local
or widespread the injuryis so unprecedented as to imply animosity toward such
persons and is thus not related to any legitimate state interest. [Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620 (1996)]
1. Age Not Suspect

Age is not a suspect class. Thus, government action based on age will be upheld if there is a
conceivable rational basis for the classication. [See, e.g., Massachusetts Board of Retirement
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976)police ofcer can be forced to retire at age 50, even though
he is as physically t as a younger ofcer; Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991)a state
constitution that requires state judges to retire at age 70 does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause]
2. Wealth Not Suspect

The Court has never held that wealth alone is a suspect classication. However, the lack of
wealth, or the inability to pay a governmentally required fee, cannot be the sole basis upon
which a person is deprived of a fundamental constitutional right.
Example: The government will be required to waive a marriage license fee or divorce
court fee for a person who cannot afford to pay that fee. Marriage and divorce
rights are part of the right of privacy.
a. Abortions
The Supreme Court upheld the governmental refusal to pay for abortions. The Court
found that a woman does not have a fundamental constitutional right to obtain abortion
services; rather, a woman has a fundamental right to make her decision to have an
abortion without government interference.
b. Education
The Supreme Court has not yet held education to be a fundamental right. The Court
has not found that children are denied equal protection when the government provides
greater educational opportunities for children who can afford to pay for access to the
best state-operated schools. In fact, the Court has upheld the use of a property tax to
fund local schools where the tax system resulted in children in districts with a high
tax base getting a signicantly better education than children in tax districts that could
not afford signicant taxes for education. [San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)] The Court has also upheld a statute that authorizes some
school districts in the state to charge user fees for bus transportation to the local public
schools. [Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450 (1988)]
XIX. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
A. INTRODUCTION
Certain fundamental rights are protected under the Constitution. If they are denied to everyone, it
is a substantive due process problem. If they are denied to some individuals but not to others, it is
an equal protection problem. The applicable standard in either case is strict scrutiny. Thus, to be
valid the governmental action must be necessary to protect a compelling interest.
B. RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Various privacy rights, including marriage, sexual relations, abortion, and childrearing, are funda-
mental rights. Thus, regulations affecting these rights are reviewed under the strict scrutiny
standard and will be upheld only if they are necessary to a compelling interest.
1. Marriage
Although not all cases examining marriage regulations clearly use the compelling interest
standard, a law prohibiting a class of adults from marrying is likely to be invalidated unless
the government can demonstrate that the law is narrowly tailored to promote a compelling or
overriding or, at least, important interest.
Note: The Court has indicated that there is a marital zone of privacy [see Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)], so it will likely grant broader protection to private sexual
relations between married persons than it does concerning nonmarried persons.
a. Same-Sex Marriage
The Court has held that the fundamental liberties guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment require every state to issue marriage licenses to two people of the same sex
and recognize same-sex marriages validly performed elsewhere. However, the Court did
not address the standard of review (presumably, strict scrutiny). [Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S.Ct. 1039 (2015)]
b. Special Test in Prisoners Rights Cases

A statute or regulation that restricts the constitutional rights of prison inmates will be
upheld as long as the statute or regulation is reasonably related to legitimate penolog-
ical interests.
Example: Even under this lenient standard, a prison regulation that prohibited
an adult prisoner from establishing a legal marriage relationship with
another adult unless the prison superintendent approved the marriage
was held invalid, because the regulation was not reasonably related to
any asserted penological interest. [Turner v. Saey, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)]
2. Use of Contraceptives
A state cannot prohibit distribution of nonmedical contraceptives to adults except through
licensed pharmacists, nor prohibit sales of such contraceptives to persons under 16 who do
not have approval of a licensed physician. [Carey v. Population Services International, 431
U.S. 678 (1977)]
3. Abortion
The Supreme Court has held that the right of privacy includes the right of a woman to
have an abortion under certain circumstances without undue interference from the state.
[Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)] However, because the Court has held that the states
have a compelling interest in protecting the health of both the woman and the fetus that
may become a child, it is difcult to apply the normal strict scrutiny analysis to abortion
regulations (since these two compelling interests may conict with each other and with the
womans privacy right). Moreover, the Supreme Court has actively been changing the rules
regarding abortions and the Justices have not come to agreement on any applicable standard.
In the Courts latest announcement, the plurality opinion adopted two rules: a pre-viability
rule and a post-viability rule.
a. Pre-Viability RuleNo Undue Burdens

Before viability (i.e., a realistic possibility of maintaining the fetuss life outside the
womb), a state may adopt regulations protecting the mothers health and the life of the
fetus only if the regulation does not impose an undue burden or substantial obstacle to
the womans right to have an abortion. The Court has not specically dened what will
constitute an undue burden, stating that a state can adopt a statute designed to persuade
a woman to choose childbirth over abortion as long as the statute is reasonably related
to that purpose and does not put a substantial obstacle to abortion in the womans path.
A statute will not impose a substantial obstacle or an undue burden simply because
it has the incidental effect of making it more difcult or more expensive to obtain an
abortion. [Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992)]
1) Informed ConsentNo Undue Burden

States can require abortions to be performed by licensed physicians, and it is not
an undue burden to require the physician to provide the woman with truthful
information about the nature of the abortion procedure, the health risks of abortion
and childbirth, and the probable gestational age of the fetus. [Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, supra]
2) Waiting PeriodNo Undue Burden

Requiring a 24-hour waiting period between the time the woman gives her
informed consent and the time of the abortion does not amount to an undue
burden. [Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, supra]
3) Parental ConsentNo Undue Burden

A state may require a minor to obtain her parents (one or both) consent to have
an abortion (or give notice to them even if their consent is not required) if there is
a bypass procedure whereby the minor may obtain the abortion (without notice
to or consent of her parents) with the consent of a judge. The judge is required
to make a prompt decision as to (i) whether the minor is sufciently mature to
make her own abortion decision, and (ii) if she is not sufciently mature, whether
having an abortion without notice to her parents is in her best interests. [Hodgson
v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
497 U.S. 502 (1990); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
supra; Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292 (1997)]
4) CompareSpousal Consent Is Undue Burden

It is an undue burden to require a woman to sign a statement that she has notied
her spouse that she is about to undergo an abortion. [Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, supra]
5) Physician Only RequirementNo Undue Burden

A law restricting the performance of abortions to licensed physicians does not
impose an undue burden on a woman seeking an abortion. [Mazurek v. Armstrong,
520 U.S. 968 (1997)per curiam]
6) Partial-Birth Abortion BanNo Undue Burden

A federal law (the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003) prohibiting intact
D&E (a type of abortion procedure in which a live fetus is partially delivered,
killed, and then fully removed from the womans body) does not on its face
impose an undue burden where other abortion procedures are available (e.g., a
D&E not involving partial live delivery), the law includes specic anatomical
standards and an exception to protect the womans life, and there is uncertainty
within the medical profession whether banning the intact D&E procedure creates a
signicant health risk for women. Although the Court generally upheld the statute,
it also held that the statute could not be applied in situations wherein the womans
health would be endangered. [Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007)distin-
guishing Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)which invalidated a state
partial-birth abortion ban that did not contain clearly dened anatomical standards
nor provide any health exception]
7) Other Regulations Uncertain

Prior to Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, supra, the
Supreme Court upheld a requirement that abortions be performed in a clinic or
medical facility with all of the basic medical equipment that would be found in a
hospital surgery room. The Court also upheld a requirement that tissue from an
aborted fetus be sent to a pathologist. These holdings surely are still valid. But the
Court struck down certain other regulations (e.g., requiring early term abortions to
be approved by another doctor or hospital committee). Whether these regulations
would be found to be undue burdens is uncertain.
b. Post-Viability RuleMay Prohibit Abortion Unless Womans Health Threatened

Once the fetus has become viable, the states interest in the fetuss life can override the
womans right to choose an abortion, but it does not override the states interest in the
womans health. Thus, after viability the state can prohibit a woman from obtaining an
abortion unless an abortion is necessary to protect the mothers life or health. However,
viability is itself a medical question, and a state cannot unduly interfere with the
attending physicians judgment as to the reasonable likelihood that the fetus can survive
outside the womb. [Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979)]
c. Remedy
When a court is faced with a statute restricting access to abortions that may be applied
in an unconstitutional manner so as to harm the mothers health, it should not invalidate
the statute in its entirety if the statute has valid applications. Instead, the court should
attempt to fashion narrower declaratory and injunctive relief against the unconstitutional
application. [Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 546 U.S. 320
(2006)]
Example: Court should not have invalidated an entire statute requiring minors
to give parents notice before obtaining an abortion merely because the
statute did not include an exception for cases where the minors health is
at stake; rather, it should be declared invalid to the extent that it reaches
too far, but otherwise left intact. [Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of
Northern New England, supra]
d. Financing Abortions
Neither federal nor local governments are required to grant medical benet payments
for abortions to indigent women, even if they grant benets to indigent women for
childbirth services. [Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980)] Moreover, a state may prohibit the public funding of abortions by prohibiting
the use of public facilities for abortions and prohibiting any public employee acting
within the scope of her public employment from performing or assisting in the perfor-
mance of abortions. [Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989)]
4. Obscene Reading Material

The right of privacy encompasses the freedom to read obscene material in your home, except
for child pornography. [Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S.
103 (1990)] It does not, however, include the right to sell, purchase, receive, or transport
obscene material. [Paris Adult Theatre v. Slayton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973)]
5. Keeping Extended Family Together

The right of privacy includes the right of family memberseven extended onesto live
together. Thus, a zoning ordinance cannot prohibit extended families from living in a single
household since there is no compelling interest to justify such a rule. [Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)]
6. Rights of Parents
Parents have a fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control
of their children. [Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)]
a. Education
Although the state may prescribe reasonable educational standards, it may not require
that all children be educated in public schools. [Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925)] Neither may the state forbid education in a language other than English.
[Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)]
b. Visitation
A state law was found to be overbroad and in violation of parents rights where it (i)
authorized the courts to grant any person (including grandparents) a right to visit a
child upon nding that this would be in the childs best interests, and (ii) did not allow
the judge to give signicant weight to the parents offer of meaningful visitation oppor-
tunity and the traditional presumption that a t parent will act in the childs best inter-
ests. [Troxel v. Granville, supra]
7. Intimate Sexual Conduct

The state has no legitimate interest in making it a crime for fully consenting adults to
engage in private intimate sexual conduct that is not commercial in nature. Although the
Court has not said what standard of review applies, it has indicated that a statute regulating
such conduct cannot pass even the rational basis test because of the lack of a legitimate
government interest. [Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)a state law making it a crime
for members of the same sex to engage in sodomy violates the Due Process Clause]
8. Freedom from Collection and Distribution of Personal Data

The right of privacy does not prevent the state from accumulating and computerizing the
names and addresses of patients for whom dangerous drugs are prescribed. [Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589 (1977)] And the state can republish the recording of an ofcial act, such as an
arrest. [Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)]
C. RIGHT TO VOTE
The right of all United States citizens over 18 years of age to vote is mentioned in the Fourteenth,
Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments. It extends to all national
and state government elections, including primaries. The right is fundamental; thus, restrictions
on voting, other than on the basis of age, residency, or citizenship, are invalid unless they can pass
strict scrutiny.
1. Restrictions on Right to Vote
a. Residency Requirements
Relatively short residency requirements restricting the right to vote (e.g., 30 days) are
valid because there is a compelling interest in ensuring that only bona de residents
vote. However, longer residency requirements will probably be held invalid (e.g., one
year) because they discriminate against newer residents without a compelling reason,
and thus violate the Equal Protection Clause. Such residency requirements might also
violate the right to travel interstate. (See D.1.b.1), infra.) Note also that Congress may
override state residency requirements in presidential elections. [Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112 (1970)]
1) Members of Armed Forces

The right to vote cannot automatically be denied to members of the armed forces
stationed at a particular locality. They must be given an opportunity to prove their
bona de residency. [Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965)]
2) CompareNonresidents
Laws that prohibit nonresidents from voting are generally valid as long as they
have a rational basis. [See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60
(1978)upholding denial of right to vote in city elections to persons outside of
city limits, but within the citys police and licensing jurisdiction]
b. Property Ownership
Conditioning the right to vote, to be a candidate, or to hold ofce on property ownership
is usually invalid under the Equal Protection Clause, since property ownership is not
necessary to any compelling governmental interest related to voting. [See, e.g., Kramer
v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969)requirement of owning property
or having children in schools to vote in school board elections struck] However, certain
special purpose elections (e.g., water storage district elections) can be based on property
ownership. (See below.)
c. Poll Taxes
Poll taxes are prohibited under the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, and the Supreme Court
has held that they also violate equal protection because wealth is not related to the
governments interest in having voters vote intelligently. [Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)]
d. Primary Elections
1) State Regulation of Party Primaries

States may exercise some control over primary elections, but such regulation is
subject to restrictions under the First Amendment (freedom of political associa-
tion) and the Fourteenth Amendment (Equal Protection Clause). Thus, to prevent
interparty raiding, the Supreme Court has held that states can require a person to
have been registered with a party for a reasonable time before that partys primary
election in order to be eligible to vote in the primary. [Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410
U.S. 752 (1973)11 months registration upheld; Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51
(1973)23 months not upheld] However, if a political party wishes to open its
primary elections to anyone, whether or not registered with the party, the state
cannot prohibit this because the state interest here is overridden by the right of
political association. [Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208
(1986)]
2) States May Subsidize Primaries of Major Parties

States may subsidize the primaries of major parties without similarly defraying
the costs of mechanisms through which minor parties qualify candidates for
the general election [American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974)
upholding law requiring new or small parties to proceed by petition or conven-
tion at their own expense rather than by publicly funded primary], as long as new
or small parties are given some effective way to qualify for the general election
[Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968)unduly burdensome petition require-
ments for new or small parties struck down as not justied].
2. Dilution of Right to Vote

a. One Person, One Vote Principle

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted to
prohibit state dilution of the right to vote, and Article I has been interpreted to place the
same type of restriction on the federal government.
1) Establishing Voting Districts

Whenever a governmental body establishes voting districts for the election of
representatives, the number of persons in each district may not vary signicantly.
This is commonly referred to as the one person, one vote principle.
a) Congressional ElectionsAlmost Exactly Equal

States establish the districts for congressional elections. However, the
Supreme Court requires almost exact mathematical equality between
the congressional districts within a state; thus, deviations of even a few
percentage points between the congressional districts within a state may result
in the invalidation of the congressional district plan.
(1) CompareApportionment Among the States

Congress apportions representatives among the states according to their
respective number. [Art. I, 2] Congresss good faith choice of method
in so apportioning the representatives commands far more deference
than state districting decisions and is not subject to the same precise
mathematical standard as state plans. [United States Department of
Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442 (1992)]
b) State and Local ElectionsVariance Not Unjustiably Large
The variance in the number of persons included in districts for the purpose
of electing representatives to a state or local governmental body must not
be unjustiably large, but the districts need not be within a few percentage
points of each other: If a state can show that the deviation from mathematical
equality between districts is reasonable and tailored to promote a legiti-
mate state interest, the law establishing the districts may be upheld. [Mahan
v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973)16% variance in district populations was
upheld in light of states interest in preserving political subdivisions, although
30% variance would be excessive]
c) Scope
The one person, one vote principle applies to almost every election where a
person is being elected to perform normal governmental functions. [Hadley
v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50 (1970)trustees for junior college
district] However, there are a few exceptions to note:
(1) ExceptionAppointed Ofcials and Ofcials Elected At Large
The apportionment requirement is inapplicable to appointed ofcials.
Neither is it applicable in at-large systems of election, because in such
a system there are no electoral districts to violate the one person, one
vote principle. However, if an at-large voting system were established or
maintained for the purpose of suppressing the voting power of minority
race voters, it would be unconstitutional.
(2) ExceptionSpecial Purpose Government Units (Water Storage

Districts)
The government can limit the class of persons who are allowed to vote
in an election of persons to serve on a special purpose government
unit if the government unit has a special impact on the class of enfran-
chised voters. To date, the Supreme Court has found only water storage
districts to be so specialized that their governing boards are not subject
to the one person, one vote principle. [Salyer Land Co. v. Tulane Water
District, 410 U.S. 719 (1973); Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981)appor-
tionment rules do not apply to water district even if the district is major
supplier of electricity in the state]
2) Standardless Recount
Counting uncounted ballots in a presidential election without standards to guide
ballot examiners in determining the intent of the voter violates the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause. [Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000)]
b. Gerrymandering
1) Racial Gerrymandering
As indicated above, race (and presumably other suspect classications) cannot
be the predominant factor in drawing the boundaries of a voting district unless
the district plan can pass muster under strict scrutiny. [See Miller v. Johnson,
XVIII.D.1.c., supra] Moreover, a districts bizarre shape can be used to show that
race was the predominant factor in drawing the districts boundaries [see Shaw
v. Reno, XVIII.C.1.a., supra], although a bizarre shape is not necessary to such a
nding. Note that the person challenging the reapportionment has the burden of
proving the race-based motive. [Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996)]
2) Political Gerrymandering
The Court has never ruled that a legislative redistricting map should be overturned
on the basis of political gerrymandering, and a number of Justices have suggested
that political gerrymandering is a nonjusticiable issue. [Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S.
267 (2004); and see League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, I.E.7.a.,
suprarefusing to nd a constitutional violation when there was mid-decade
redistricting for partisan political reasons]
c. Multi-Member Districts
A state is generally free to have some multi-member districts together with some single-
member districts, as long as the number of members representing a district is propor-
tional to its population. However, single-member or multi-member districts will be held
to violate equal protection (even though they meet the one person, one vote principle) if
the district lines were drawn on the basis of unconstitutional criteria, such as to suppress
the voting power of racial minorities or an identiable political group.
d. States May Use Independent Commissions to Draw Districts

To avoid gerrymandering, states may use independent commissions to adopt congres-
sional districts, rather than allowing the state legislature to redistrict. [Arizona State
Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission,135 S.Ct. 2652 (2015)]
3. Candidates and Campaigns

a. Candidate Qualications
1) Fee Must Not Preclude Indigents as Candidates
States may not charge candidates a fee that results in making it impossible for
indigents to run for ofce. An unreasonably high ling fee (which was not tailored
to promote a substantial or overriding state interest) might be held totally invalid
so that no candidate would have to pay the fee. A reasonable, valid fee would have
to be waived for an indigent candidate who could not pay the fee.
2) Restrictions on Ability of Person to Be a Candidate

Restrictions on the ability of persons to be candidates must be examined to see
if they violate either the First Amendment right of political association or the
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. Such regulations are judged on a
sliding scale of scrutiny. (See XXI.B., infra.)
Example: The Court invalidated a March deadline for ling a nominating
petition for independent candidates for a November election where
the state allowed the major political parties to name their candidates
later in the year. [Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983)]
Note: A state may require candidates to show reasonable support (signatures or

votes) to qualify to have their names placed on the ballot. [Munro v. Socialist
Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986)upholding requirement of receipt of at least
1% of the votes cast in the primary election]
3) Required Resignation of Ofce Is Permissible

A state may require state ofcials to resign their ofce if they enter an election for
another government ofce. [Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982)]
b. Campaign Funding, Contributions, and Expenditures

Government may allocate more public funds to the two major parties than to minor
parties for political campaigns, and may withhold public funding from candidates who
do not accept reciprocal limits on their total campaign expenses; but such expenses
cannot otherwise be limited, unlike campaign contributions to political candidates,
which may be limited if government chooses. (XXI.B., infra.)
4. Extraordinary MajoritiesReferendum Elections

The government may require a supermajority vote for voter referendums, even though such
a requirement might give a minority disproportionate power. [Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1
(1971)upholding 60% requirement for referendum approval; Town of Lockport v. Citizens
for Community Action, 430 U.S. 259 (1977)upholding requirement that new county
charter be approved by separate majorities of city and noncity voters]
5. Replacement of Incumbent Legislators

A state may validly give to a political party the right to name an interim appointee to the
legislature to ll out the unexpired term of a legislator from that political party who left
ofce. No voter is denied equal protection by this system. [Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic
Party, 457 U.S. 1 (1982)]
D. RIGHT TO TRAVEL
1. Interstate Travel
a. Nature of the Right

Individuals have a fundamental right to travel from state to state, which encompasses
the right: (i) to leave and enter another state, and (ii) to be treated equally if they
become permanent residents of that state. [Saenz v. Roe, VII.C.3., suprastriking
California law that limited welfare benets for new residents to what they would have
received in their prior state of residence]
b. Standard of Review
When a state uses a durational residency requirement (a waiting period) for dispensing
benets, that requirement normally should be subject to the strict scrutiny test. This
means that the government must show that the waiting period requirement is tailored to
promote a compelling or overriding interest. However, in some right to travel cases, the
Court has not been clear as to whether it is using this strict scrutiny, compelling interest
standard of review. The important point to note for the bar exam is that state residency
requirements should not be upheld merely because they have some theoretical rational
relationship to an arguably legitimate end of government.
1) Examples
Because of the ad hoc nature of these rulings, we will list four examples of
Supreme Court decisions in this area:
a) A one-year waiting period before a person may receive subsistence welfare

payments is invalid. Similarly, a law providing that persons residing in the
state for less than a year may receive welfare benets no greater than those
paid in the state of prior residence is also invalid. [Saenz v. Roe, supra]
b) A one-year waiting period for state subsidized medical care is invalid.
c) A one-year waiting period to get a divorce is valid.
d) A state may require a voter to register to vote in a party primary 10 months

before the primary election (to avoid interparty raiding). However, a
23-month registration period would be invalid.
c. Distinctions Between Old and New Residents

Some state laws that have an adverse impact on new residents do not involve a waiting
period. For example, a state may attempt to dispense state benets on the basis of the
length of time a person has resided in the state. A state law that distinguishes between
residents of the state on the sole basis of their length of residency will serve no legiti-
mate state interest. This type of law should be stricken under the rational basis test
because it has no rational relationship to any legitimate state interest.
Examples: 1) A state statute that dispensed differing amounts of state money to
residents of the state based on each residents length of residence was
held invalid.
2) A state statute that grants an annual property tax exemption to a

veteran of military service only if he resided in the state before a specic
date (May 1976) is invalid.
3) A state law that grants a hiring preference (for civil service employ-
ment) to a veteran only if he was a resident of the state prior to joining
the armed services is invalid.
2. International Travel
The Supreme Court has not yet declared that the right to international travel is fundamental,
although the right appears to be protected from arbitrary federal interference by the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court has held that this right is not violated
when the federal government refuses to pay Social Security benets to persons who leave the
country. The test here is mere rationality, not strict scrutiny. [Califano v. Aznavorian, 439
U.S. 170 (1978)] Congress may give the executive branch the power to revoke the passport of
a person whose conduct in another country presents a danger to United States foreign policy.
[Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981)] The Treasury Department, with congressional authoriza-
tion, could restrict travel to and from Cuba without violating the Fifth Amendment. [Regan v.
Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984)]
E. RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT

The Supreme Court had held that the right to refuse medical treatment is a part of an individ-
uals liberty that is protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses.
However, the Supreme Court has not ruled that this aspect of liberty is a fundamental right and
has not explained which standard of review should be used. Nevertheless, the Court has ruled on
the validity of several types of legislation.
1. Vaccination
An individual can be made to submit to vaccination against contagious diseases because
of the governmental and societal interest in preventing the spread of disease. [Jacobsen v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)]
2. Refusal of Medical Treatment

The Supreme Court has assumed (without deciding) that a mentally competent adult has
the right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment (including lifesaving nutrition). [Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)]
a. CompareNo Right to Assisted Suicide

There is no general right to commit suicide; thus, a state may ban persons from giving
individuals assistance in committing suicide. [Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702
(1997)] It is not irrational to permit competent persons to refuse life-sustaining treat-
ment but prohibit physicians to assist in suicide because there is a logical, rational, and
well-established distinction between letting someone die and making someone die.
[Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997)]
b. CompareCriminal Defendants
Under the Due Process Clause, the government may involuntarily administer antipsy-
chotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal charges in order to make
him competent to stand trial if: (i) the treatment is medically appropriate, (ii) the treat-
ment is substantially unlikely to cause side effects that may undermine the fairness of
the trial, and (iii) considering less intrusive alternatives, the treatment is necessary to
further important governmental trial-related interests. [Sell v. United States, 539 U.S.
166 (2003)]
PART FIVE: FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS
The First Amendment prohibits Congress from establishing a religion or interfering with the
exercise of religion, abridging the freedom of speech or the press, or interfering with the right of
the people to assemble. These prohibitions have been made applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. The freedoms, however, are not absolute, and exam questions often focus
on their boundaries. The following material will outline the scope of each freedom.
XX. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ASSEMBLY
A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
The freedoms of speech and assembly protect the free ow of ideas, a most important function in
a democratic society. Thus, whenever the government seeks to regulate these freedoms, the Court
will weigh the importance of these rights against the interests or policies sought to be served by
the regulation. When analyzing regulations of speech and press, keep the following guidelines in
mind:
1. Government Speech
The Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not
require the government to aid private speech nor restrict the government from expressing
its views. The government generally is free to voice its opinions and to fund private speech
that furthers its views while refusing to fund other private speech, absent some other consti-
tutional limitation, such as the Establishment Clause or Equal Protection Clause. Because
government speech does not implicate the First Amendment, it is not subject to the various
levels of scrutiny that apply to government regulation of private speech (see infra). [Pleasant
Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009)] Generally, government speech and
government funding of speech will be upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.
Examples: 1) The government may choose to aid a union representing government
employees by providing for payroll deductions of general union dues while
refusing to allow payroll deductions that will be used by unions to fund
political activities. The decision not to collect funds for political activities is
rationally related to a legitimate government interest (i.e., avoiding the appear-
ance of favoritism), and thus the refusal to collect such funds is constitutional.
[Ysursa v. Pocatello, 555 U.S. 353 (2009)]
2) The government may fund family planning services but except from
funding services that provide abortion information. [Rust v. Sullivan, 500
U.S. 173 (1991)]
3) The government may refuse to fund artists whose work it nds offensive.
[National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998)]
4) The government may reject proposed specialty license plate designs

submitted by private individuals while accepting others. Since license plates
are issued by the state and bear the state name, this is a form of govern-
ment speech, and states are entitled to refuse to issue plates featuring
certain messages or images. [Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate
Veterans, 135 S.Ct. 2239 (2015)]
a. Limitation
Spending programs may not impose conditions that limit First Amendment activities
of fund recipients outside of the scope of the spending program itself. For example,
while the government could prohibit the use of federal funds to advocate for or support
abortion [Rust v. Sullivan, supra], it could not require recipients of federal funds
given to organizations to combat HIV/AIDS to agree in their funding documents that
they oppose prostitution. [Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open
Society International, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013)]
b. Public Monuments
A citys placement of a permanent monument in a public park is government speech
and thus is not subject to Free Speech Clause scrutiny. This is true even if the
monument is privately donated. By displaying the monument, the government is dissem-
inating a message, and the message is not necessarily the message of the donor(s). As
a corollary, the government cannot be forced to display a permanent monument with a
message with which the government disagrees, and the governments refusal to display
a proffered monument likewise is not subject to Free Speech Clause scrutiny.
Example: A city with a Ten Commandments monument in its park was not
required to display a religious monument of another religion (the
Seven Aphorisms of the Summum faith). The Ten Commandments
monument, although privately donated, was deemed government speech.
When the government is the speaker, it may engage in content-based
choices. [Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, supra] (Note: While
an Establishment Clause issue was not raised in Summum, a concur-
ring opinion suggested that the Ten Commandments monument did not
violate the Establishment Clause because it was one of 15 monuments in
the park recognizing the historical roots and morals of the community.
[And see Van Orden v. Perry, XXII.D.2.b., infra])
c. CompareGovernment Funding of Private Messages

In contrast to government funding of speech for the purpose of promoting its own
policies (such as the family planning services involved in Rust v. Sullivan, supra),
when the government chooses to fund private messages, it generally must do so on a
viewpoint neutral basis. [See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of
Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995)state university exclusion of religious magazine from
program nancially supporting many other types of student publications violates the
First Amendment]
1) ExceptionFunding of the Arts

From a nancial standpoint, the government cannot fund all artists, and choosing
among those it will fund and those it will not inevitably must be based on the
content of the art. [National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, supra]
2. Content vs. Conduct

A regulation seeking to forbid communication of specic ideas (i.e., a content regulation) is
less likely to be upheld than a regulation of the conduct incidental to speech.
a. Content
It is presumptively unconstitutional for the government to place burdens on speech
because of its content. To justify such content-based regulation of speech, the govern-
ment must show that the regulation (or tax) is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. [Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members
of the New York State Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S. 105 (1991)striking a law
requiring that proceeds to criminals from books and other productions describing their
crimes be placed in escrow for ve years to pay claims of victims of the crimes]
Example: A state may not prohibit the sale or rental of violent video games to
minors. Such a prohibition is content-based, and the Supreme Court
found that the prohibition was not narrowly tailored to serve a compel-
ling interest. It found the law both underinclusive, because psychological
studies show that such games have only a small effect on youth violence,
and overinclusive, because only some parents object to them. The Court
also declined to add violence as an additional area of unprotected speech
(see below). [Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, 131 S. Ct.
2729 (2011)]
1) ExceptionUnprotected Categories of Speech

The Supreme Court has previously determined that certain categories of speech
(e.g., obscenity, defamation, and ghting words; see C., infra) generally are
proscribable despite the First Amendment. Even in these cases, however, the Court
is less likely to uphold a prior restraint (i.e., a regulation prohibiting speech before
it occurs) than a punishment for speech that has already occurred.
a) Falsity in and of Itself Does Not Make Speech Unprotected

A statute criminalizing speech merely because it is false is a content regula-
tion. And while some categories of false speech are unprotected (e.g., defama-
tion, false advertising, fraud, and perjury), those categorical exceptions are
based on the harm caused. Speech is not unprotected merely for being false.
[United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2536 (2012)Stolen Valor Act making
it a crime to falsely claim to have received military decorations is unconstitu-
tional; while the government may have a compelling interest in maintaining
the integrity of military honors, nothing indicates that the law here is neces-
sary to that purpose]
2) Content-Neutral Speech Regulations

While content-based regulation of speech is subject to strict scrutiny, content-
neutral speech regulations generally are subject to intermediate scrutinythey
will be upheld if the government can show that: (i) they advance important inter-
ests unrelated to the suppression of speech, and (ii) they do not burden substan-
tially more speech than necessary or are narrowly tailored to further those
interests. [Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994)]
b. Conduct
The Court has allowed the government more leeway in regulating the conduct related
to speech, allowing it to adopt content-neutral, time, place, and manner regulations.
Regulations involving public forums (i.e., forums historically linked with the exercise
of First Amendment freedoms) must be narrowly tailored to achieve an important
government interest (e.g., a prohibition against holding a demonstration in a hospital
zone). Regulations involving nonpublic forums must have a reasonable relationship to a
legitimate regulatory purpose (e.g., a law prohibiting billboards for purposes of trafc
safety).
3. Reasonableness of Regulation
a. Overbroad Regulation Invalid

Since the purpose of the freedoms of speech and assembly is to encourage the free ow
of ideas, a regulation will not be upheld if it is overbroad (i.e., prohibits substantially
more speech than is necessary). If a regulation of speech or speech-related conduct
punishes a substantial amount of protected speech, judged in relation to the regula-
tions plainly legitimate sweep, the regulation is facially invalid (i.e., it may not be
enforced against anyonenot even a person engaging in activity that is not constitution-
ally protected) unless a court has limited construction of the regulation so as to remove
the threat to constitutionally protected expression. [Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113
(2003)] If a regulation is not substantially overbroad, it can be enforced against persons
engaging in activities that are not constitutionally protected.
Examples: 1) The Supreme Court struck down as overbroad an ordinance that
prohibited speech that in any manner interrupts a police ofcer in the
performance of her duties. [Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987)]
2) An airport authority rule that bans all First Amendment activi-

ties within the central terminal area is invalid as being substantially
overbroad. [Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S.
569 (1987)]
3) A law banning all door-to-door solicitations will be struck as being

overbroad [Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943)], but a law
requiring solicitors to obtain a homeowners consent to solicit is valid.
[Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951)]
4) An ordinance that prohibited all canvassers from going onto private

residential property to promote any cause without rst obtaining a
permit was overbroad. While the government may have an interest in
preventing fraud from door-to-door solicitation, the permit requirement
here went beyond cases where fraud was likely to occur, and applied
to religious proselytization, advocacy of political speech, and enlisting
support for unpopular causes. [Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of

New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002)]
5) A city ordinance that prohibits homeowners from displaying any sign

on their property except residence identication or for sale signs is
invalid because the ordinance bans virtually all residential signs. [Ladue
v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994)]
b. Void for Vagueness Doctrine

If a criminal law or regulation fails to give persons reasonable notice of what is prohib-
ited, it may violate the Due Process Clause. This principle is applied somewhat strictly
when First Amendment activity is involved in order to avoid the chilling effect a vague
law might have on speech (i.e., if it is unclear what speech is regulated, people might
refrain from speech that is permissible for fear that they will be violating the law).
Vagueness issues most often arise in relation to content regulations, but the same princi-
ples would apply to time, place, and manner restrictions.
Examples: 1) A municipal ordinance that prohibited vagrants was held void for
vagueness when it dened vagrants as rogues and vagabonds . . .
lewd, wanton, and lascivious persons . . . persons wandering or straying
around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object . . . .
[Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972)]
2) A statute that prohibits attorneys representing clients in a pending

case from making statements that would have a substantial likelihood of
prejudicing a trial, but that also allows attorneys to make public state-
ments regarding the general nature of the defense they will present
at trial, is void for vagueness, because it does not give fair notice of the
types of trial-related statements that are punishable. [Gentile v. State Bar,
501 U.S. 1030 (1991)]
1) Burden on Challenger
The person challenging the validity of the regulation has the burden of showing
substantial overbreadth. [Virginia v. Hicks, supra]
2) Funding Speech Activity

Greater imprecision is allowed when the government acts as a patron in funding
speech activity than when enacting criminal statutes or regulatory schemes,
because speakers are less likely to steer clear of forbidden areas when only a
subsidy is at stake. [National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 1., supra
requirement that NEA consider standards of decency and respect for values of
American people is not invalid on its face]
c. Cannot Give Ofcials Unfettered Discretion

A regulation cannot give ofcials broad discretion over speech issues; there must be
dened standards for applying the law. The fear, of course, is that the ofcials will
use their discretionary power to prohibit dissemination of ideas that they do not agree
with. This issue usually arises under licensing schemes established to regulate the time,
place, and manner of speech. To be valid, such licensing schemes must be related to an
important government interest, contain procedural safeguards (see D.2., infra), and not
grant ofcials unbridled discretion.
Example: County required persons desiring to hold a parade, march, or rally to
rst obtain a permit from the county administrator. The administrator
was empowered to charge up to $1,000 for the permit, but could adjust
the fee to meet the necessary expenses of administration and police
protection. This scheme is invalid because it gives the administrator
unbridled discretion despite the $1,000 limit. It also is unconstitutional
because it is a content-based restriction (the administrator theoretically
would adjust the costs based on the popularity of the subject at issue
an unpopular subject would require greater police protection). [Forsyth
County, Georgia v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992)]
1) Unlimited DiscretionVoid on Face

If a statute gives licensing ofcials unbridled discretion, it is void on its face,
and speakers need not even apply for a permit. They may exercise their First
Amendment rights even if they could have been denied a permit under a valid law,
and they may not be punished for violating the licensing statute. [Lovell v. City of
Grifn, 303 U.S. 444 (1938)]
Examples: 1) An ordinance vesting ofcials with the power to grant or deny
parade permits based on their judgment as to the effect of the
parade on community welfare or morals is unconstitutional
on its face. [Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969)]
Similarly, ordinances giving ofcials broad discretion as to who
may place magazine racks on public property or who may obtain
licenses to solicit door to door are invalid. [City of Lakewood v.
Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988); Lovell v. City of
Grifn, supra]
2) A statute prohibiting excessively loud sound trucks is valid

[Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949)], but an ordinance giving
ofcials discretion as to who may use sound trucks is invalid [Saia
v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948)].
2) Statutes Valid on Face

If the licensing statute is valid on its face because it contains adequate standards, a
speaker may not ignore the statute, but must seek a permit. If he is denied a permit,
even if he believes the denial was incorrect, he must then seek reasonably available
administrative or judicial relief. Failure to do so precludes later assertion that his
actions were protected by the First Amendment. [Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345
U.S. 395 (1953)]
4. Scope of Speech
a. Includes Freedom Not to Speak

The freedom of speech includes not only the right to speak, but also the right to refrain
from speaking or endorsing beliefs with which one does not agreethe government
may not compel an individual personally to express a message with which he disagrees.
Examples: 1) A state cannot force school children to salute or say a pledge to the
ag. [West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943)]
2) A motorist could not be punished for blocking out the portion of his
automobile license plate bearing the motto Live Free or Die; as long
as he left the license plate in a condition that served its auto identica-
tion purpose, he did not have to display a slogan endorsed by the state.
[Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)]
3) A state may not require private parade organizers to include in their

parade groups with messages with which the organizers disagree.
[Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston,
515 U.S. 557 (1995)]
1) Mandatory Financial Support

Although the government may not compel a person to express a message, the
government may tax people and use the revenue to express a message with which
people disagree.
a) Government Speech
The Court has held that compelled support of government speech does
not raise First Amendment concerns. [Johanns v. Livestock Marketing
Association, 544 U.S. 550 (2005)beef producers can be required to pay an
assessment to support generic advertising of beef approved by a semi-govern-
mental producers board and ultimately by the Secretary of Agriculture
even if they think generic advertising is a waste of moneybecause the
advertisements are governmental speech]
b) ComparePrivate Speech
On the other hand, it appears that people cannot be compelled to subsidize
private messages with which they disagree.
Examples: The Court has held that while teachers may be forced to pay
union dues to a private union representing a majority of their
fellow teachers, and attorneys may be forced to join a manda-
tory bar association, people may not be forced to pay sums
that will be used to support political views that, or candi-
dates whom, they do not endorse. [Abood v. Detroit Board
of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Keller v. State Bar of
California, 496 U.S. 1 (1990)]
(1) ExceptionUniversity Activity Fees

The government can require public university students to pay a student
activity fee even if the fee is used to support political and ideological
speech by student groups whose beliefs are offensive to the student, as
long as the program is viewpoint neutral (see B.2.a., infra). [Board of
Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000)]
2) State Can Require Shopping Center to Permit Persons to Exercise Speech

Rights
Note that the freedom not to speak does not prohibit a states requiring a large
shopping center (that is open to the public) to permit persons to exercise their
speech rights on shopping center propertyat least as long as the particular
message is not dictated by the state and is not likely to be identied with the owner
of the shopping center. [Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980)]
b. Includes Symbolic Conduct

Speech includes not only verbal communication, but also conduct that is undertaken to
communicate an idea. Of course, not all regulation of symbolic conduct is prohibited.
The Court will uphold a conduct regulation if: (i) the regulation is within the constitu-
tional power of the government; (ii) it furthers an important governmental interest; (iii)
the governmental interest is unrelated to suppression of speech; and (iv) the incidental
burden on speech is no greater than necessary. [United States v. OBrien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968)upholding a prohibition against burning draft cards to protect the govern-
ments important interest in facilitating the smooth functioning of the draft system]
Note, however, that a regulation is not invalid simply because there is some imaginable
alternative that might be less burdensome on speech. [Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic
and Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47 (2006)statute requiring schools of higher educa-
tion to grant the military access to recruit on campus is not invalid merely because the
military could take out ads in newspapers, on television, etc.]
Example: A state may prohibit public nudity, even as applied to nude dancing
at bars and places of adult entertainment. Although nude dancing is
marginally within the protections of the First Amendmentbecause
it involves the communication of an erotic messagethe government
has a substantial interest in combating crime and other secondary
effects caused by the presence of adult entertainment establishments
that is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. [Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991); City of Erie v. Paps A.M., 529 U.S.
277 (2000)city council made ndings regarding secondary effects]
Compare: 1) A prohibition against students wearing armbands to protest the war

in Vietnam was struck because it had no regulatory interest other than
prohibiting the communicative impact of the conduct. [Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969)]
2) A prohibition against mutilating a United States ag (except in cases

of proper disposal of a soiled ag) was held invalid as an attempt to
restrain speech; the Court found that no imminent breach of the peace
was likely to result, and the government has no other interest in prohib-
iting such burnings. [United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990)]
c. Excludes Freedom to Bar Military Recruitment

Requiring schools of higher education to allow military recruiters to recruit on campus
or risk losing federal funding does not implicate free speech rights. This is so even if
the schools disagree with the militarys ban against homosexuals. School recruitment
receptions are not inherently expressive from the schools standpoint; they are merely
a way to help students obtain jobs. Schools are not being asked to say or refrain from
saying anything, and neither are they being asked to associate with the military in
any signicant way. Moreover, there is little chance that a person would attribute the
militarys positions to the schools. Therefore, there is no First Amendment violation.
[Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, supra]
5. Prison Speech
A regulation concerning the activities of prison inmates, including any First Amendment
speech activities, is governed by a different standard in order to facilitate prison order: The
regulation will be upheld if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.
[Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223 (2001)] Thus, a restriction on incoming mail will be upheld
if it is rational; a restriction on outgoing mail must be narrowly tailored because there is less
of a penological interest involved. [See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989)]
B. TIME, PLACE, AND MANNER RESTRICTIONSREGULATION OF CONDUCT

All speech is conveyed through physical action (e.g., talking, writing, distributing pamphlets, etc.),
and while the freedom of belief is absolute, the freedom to convey beliefs cannot be. The extent to
which government may regulate speech-related conduct depends on whether the forum involved is
a public forum, a designated public forum, a limited public forum, or a nonpublic forum.
1. Public Forums and Designated Public Forums

Public property that has historically been open to speech-related activities (e.g., streets,
sidewalks, and public parks) is called a public forum. Public property that has not histori-
cally been open to speech-related activities, but which the government has thrown open for
such activities on a permanent or temporary basis, by practice or policy (e.g., school rooms
that are open for after-school use by social, civic, or recreation groups), is called a designated
public forum. The government may regulate speech in public forums and designated public
forums with reasonable time, place, and manner regulations.
a. Test
To be valid, government regulations of speech and assembly in public forums and desig-
nated public forums must:
(i) Be content neutral (i.e., subject matter neutral and viewpoint neutral);
(ii) Be narrowly tailored to serve an important government interest; and
(iii) Leave open alternative channels of communication.
Remember: Even if a regulation meets the above conditions, it might still be struck
down on other grounds (e.g., overbreadth, vagueness, unfettered discretion; see A.3.,
supra).
1) Content Neutral
The regulation cannot be based on the content of the speechi.e., it must be
subject matter neutral and viewpoint neutralabsent substantial justication (see
C., infra).
Examples: 1) The Court held invalid an ordinance allowing peaceful labor
picketing near schools, but prohibiting all other picketing, since
it was a content-based restriction. [Chicago Police Department v.

Mosely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972)]
2) A law may not forbid only those signs within 500 feet of a
foreign embassy that are critical of the foreign government. [Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988)]
2) Narrowly Tailored
The regulation must be narrowly tailored (i.e., it may not burden substantially
more speech than is necessary to further the signicant government interest).
However, the regulation need not be the least restrictive means of accomplishing
the goal.
Example: A law requiring persons performing at a citys theater to use the
citys sound equipment is narrowly tailored to the citys interest in
preventing excessive noise. [Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781 (1989)]
Compare: An ordinance that prohibited all canvassers from going onto private
residential property to promote any cause without rst obtaining a
permit was not narrowly tailored to the interest of preventing fraud
because it included too much speech that was not likely to give rise
to fraud (e.g., religious proselytization, advocacy of political speech,
and enlisting support for unpopular causes). [Watchtower Bible and
Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, A.3.a., supra]
Note: A regulation that is not narrowly tailored might also fail on overbreadth
grounds. (See A.3.a., supra.)
3) Important Interest
The regulation must further an important government interest. Such interests
include: trafc safety, orderly crowd movement, personal privacy, noise control,
litter control, aesthetics, etc.
4) Alternative Channels Open

The law must leave open alternative channels of communication; i.e., other reason-
able means for communicating the idea must be available.
b. ExamplesResidential Areas
1) Targeted Picketing
The Supreme Court upheld a statute that prevented focused residential picketing
(i.e., picketing in front of a single residence). The street/sidewalk involved was a
public forum, but the ordinance passed the three-part test: (i) it was content neutral
because it regulated the location and manner of picketing rather than its message;
(ii) it was narrowly tailored to the important interest of protecting a homeowners
privacy (because it applied only to focused picketing); and (iii) alternative means
of communications were available because the protesters could march through the
neighborhood in protest. [Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988)]
2) Charitable Solicitations
Charitable solicitations for funds in residential areas are within the protection of
the First Amendment. However, they are subject to reasonable regulation.
Example: A state cannot require professional fundraisers (before making an
appeal for funds) to disclose to potential donors the percentage of
contributions collected over the previous year that were actually
turned over to the charity. The disclosure is not necessary to
promote the state interest of protecting the public from fraud.
However, the state can require a fundraiser to disclose her profes-
sional status. [Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North
Carolina, 487 U.S. 781 (1988)] In Riley, the Court also invalidated
a restriction on the fees that professional fundraisers could charge a
charity, because the particular statute was not narrowly tailored to
protect either the public or the charities.
Compare: States have a signicant interest in preventing fraudulent chari-

table solicitations. This interest justies charging a telemarketing
rm with fraud for telling persons solicited that the rm pays a
signicant amount of each donation to the charity, when in fact
the rm keeps 85% of gross receipts. [Illinois ex rel. Madigan v.
Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 538 U.S. 600 (2003)]
3) Permits
A state may not require persons to obtain permits in order to canvass door to door
for noncommercial or nonfundraising purposes. [Watchtower Bible and Tract
Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, supra]
c. ExampleBuffer Zones
Laws and injunctions restricting expression within so-called buffer zones are often
found in the context of cases dealing with demonstrations on streets and sidewalks
outside abortion clinics. These laws typically set boundaries of a specied number
of feet from clinic entrances within which anti-abortion protestors may not approach
women entering the clinics, in order to ensure unobstructed access and maintain public
safety and the free ow of vehicular and pedestrian trafc.
1) Content-Neutral/Important Government Interest

The Supreme Court has for the most part found buffer-zone laws to be reasonable,
content-neutral regulations of speech that further the important state interest of
preserving access to healthcare facilities and maintaining public order.
Example: The Court upheld the constitutionality of a state law prohibiting
persons within 100 feet of a clinic from approaching within eight
feet of those seeking access to the clinic for purposes of oral
protest, education, or counseling. [Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703
(2000)statute upheld against challenge by petitioners who wished
to counsel women as they enter abortion clinics]
2) Narrowly Tailored
Under the second prong of the time, place, and manner test, buffer-zone laws
will be upheld only if they burden no more speech than necessary to achieve the
purpose of protecting access to healthcare facilities and maintaining order on
public rights-of-way. Moreover, the right of access does not amount to a right to
be free from all communication in the vicinity of a facility that might be unwel-
come. Court decisions in this area tend to be very fact-specic, and the Court has
indicated it is more likely to nd a buffer-zone law narrowly tailored if the state
has rst tried less-restrictive measures to address the problems created by anti-
abortion protests.
Example: A targeted injunction establishing a 36-foot buffer zone between
specic protesters and abortion clinic entrances was upheld where
previous measures had failed to achieve the goal of ensuring public
order and safety. [Madsen v. Womens Health Center, 512 U.S. 753
(1994)]
Compare: 1) An injunction providing for a oating buffer zone of 15 feet

between protesters and persons entering and leaving an abortion
clinic was held to violate the First Amendment. The oating zone
barred all verbal and written communication from a normal conver-
sational distance on public sidewalks, and thus burdened more
speech than necessary to ensure ingress and egress from the clinic.
[Schenk v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357
(1997)]
2) Anti-abortion pamphleteers challenged a state law that made it

a crime for anyone except clinic patients and workers to enter or
remain in an area within 35 feet of entrances to abortion clinics.
The Court held that this provision of the law violated the Free
Speech Clause because it was not narrowly tailored to achieve the
interests of public safety and access to healthcare facilities. The
law burdened more speech than necessary because only one clinic
in the state was the site of disruptive abortion demonstrations one
day a week; the state had not rst tried less intrusive measures
(e.g., enforcing an unchallenged section of the law prohibiting
harassment and intimidation, or seeking a targeted injunction as in
Madsen, supra); and the asserted rationale that the law made the
jobs of police easier was not sufcient to justify such a sweeping
restriction on speech. [McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S.Ct. 2518
(2014)]
d. ExampleDesignated Public Forum

Schools generally are not public forums. However, if a public school or university
allows private organizations and members of the public to use school property for
meetings when school programs or classes are not in session, the property is a desig-
nated public forum for that time, and the school cannot deny a religious organization
permission to use the property for meetings merely because religious topics will be
discussed. Such a restriction would be content discrimination. [Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263 (1981); Lambs Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508
U.S. 384 (1993)]
e. Injunctions
Injunctions that restrict First Amendment activity in public forums are treated differ-
ently from generally applicable ordinances because injunctions present a greater risk
of censorship and discriminatory application. The test to be used to determine whether
an injunction that restricts speech or protest is constitutional depends on whether the
injunction is content neutral.
1) Content BasedNecessary to a Compelling Interest

If the injunction is content based, it will be upheld only if it is necessary to achieve
a compelling government interest.
2) Content NeutralBurdens No More Speech than Necessary

If the injunction is content neutral, it will be upheld only if it burdens no more
speech than is necessary to achieve an important government purpose.
2. Limited Public Forums and Nonpublic Forums

Other than streets, sidewalks, parks, and designated public forums, most public property is
considered to be a limited public forum (e.g., government property opened up for a specic
speech activity, such as a school gym opened on a particular night to host a debate on a
particular community issue) or a nonpublic forum. The government can regulate speech in
such forums to reserve them for their intended use. Regulations will be upheld if they are:
(i) Viewpoint neutral; and
(ii) Reasonably related to a legitimate government purpose.
a. Viewpoint Neutral
Regulations on speech in nonpublic forums need not be content neutral; i.e., the govern-
ment may allow speech regarding some subjects but not others. However, such regula-
tions must be viewpoint neutral; i.e., if the government allows an issue to be presented
in a nonpublic forum, it may not limit the presentation to only one view.
Example: If a high school newspaper is a nonpublic forum, a school board
could decide to prohibit articles in the paper regarding nuclear power.
However, it may not allow an article in favor of nuclear power and
prohibit an article against nuclear power.
Similarly, the government may discriminate based on the identity of the speaker in
nonpublic forums (e.g., a school board might limit speakers to licensed teachers).
b. Reasonableness
Regulation of speech and assembly in nonpublic forums need only be rationally related
to a legitimate governmental objective.
Example: A city bus is not a public forum. The city, therefore, may constitution-
ally sell space for signs on the public buses for commercial and public
service advertising while refusing to sell space for political or public
issue advertising in order to minimize the appearance of favoritism and
the risk of imposing on a captive audience. [Lehman v. Shaker Heights,
418 U.S. 298 (1974)]
c. Signicant Cases
1) Military Bases
Military bases are not public forums; thus, on-base speech and assembly may be
regulated, even during open houses where the public is invited to visit. [See United
States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985)] However, if the military leaves its streets
open as thoroughfares, they will be treated as public forums. [Flower v. United
States, 407 U.S. 197 (1972)]
2) Schools
Generally, schools and school-sponsored activities are not public forums. Thus,
speech (and association) in schools may be reasonably regulated to serve the
schools educational mission.
Examples: 1) Schools can control the content of student speeches or student
newspapers for legitimate pedagogical concerns. [See, e.g., Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986)student
suspended for sexually explicit speech at school assembly]
Similarly, a school may prohibit student speech that may be inter-
preted as advocating or celebrating the use of illegal drugs (BONG
HiTS 4 JESUS) during a school-supervised activity (e.g., a eld
trip). [Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007)]
2) To be given access to the platform of ofcial school recognition

and school funding, a public law school may require extracurricular
student groups to accept all students regardless of their status
or beliefs. [Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971
(2010)school could deny funding to group that limited member-
ship to persons who were willing to sign a statement of faith based
on Christianity and excluded persons who supported homosexuality
and premarital sex; and see XXI.D., infra]
3) A state association that regulates interscholastic high school

sports of schools that voluntarily join may prohibit certain
recruiting statements to middle-school students for athletic
programs. Even if the message involves a matter of public concern,
the rule is necessary for managing an effective high school athletic
league. [Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association v.
Brentwood Academy, 551 U.S. 291 (2007)]
Compare: A school was forbidden to prohibit the wearing of black armbands

in the school (to protest government policies), because that prohibi-
tion was designed to suppress communication, i.e., not related to
regulatory interest. [Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District, A.4.b., supra]
3) Government Workplace or Charity

Neither a government workplace (including a court building and its grounds) nor a
government controlled charity drive constitutes a public forum.
Examples: 1) The government may conduct an annual fundraising drive that

includes some charities but excludes others on some ideologically
neutral basis (e.g., all charities that lobby). However, it cannot
exclude a charity merely because it disagrees with the organiza-
tions political views. [Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and
Education Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985)]
2) A state may develop a system for meeting with and hearing the
views of a select group of its employees (e.g., union representa-
tives) while denying the ability to voice opinions at such restricted
meetings to other government employees. [Minnesota State Board
v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984)]
Compare: In a public forum, the government cannot restrict the ability to

participate in public speech on the basis of union membership.
Thus, the Court has held that a teacher cannot be constitutionally
prohibited from speaking at a meeting of the school board that
was open to the public. [City of Madison Joint School District No.
8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 429 U.S. 167
(1976)]
4) Postal Service Property

Although sidewalks generally are public forums, sidewalks on postal service
property are not public forums. [United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990)]
5) Signs on Public Property

The Supreme Court has upheld a city ordinance prohibiting posting signs on public
property (including sidewalks, crosswalks, street lamp posts, re hydrants, and
telephone poles), even if the sign is temporary in nature and could be removed
without damage to the public property. [Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984)]
6) Airport Terminals
Airport terminals operated by a public authority are not public forums. Thus, it
is reasonable to ban solicitation within airport terminals, since it presents a risk
of fraud to hurrying passengers. [International Society of Krishna Consciousness
v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992)] However, it is not reasonable to ban leaetting
within multipurpose terminals having qualities similar to a shopping mall [Lee v.
International Society of Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. 830 (1992)]; although
such leaetting can still be subject to reasonable time, place, and manner regula-
tions (see B.1., supra).
7) Candidate Debates on Public Television

A public television station debate for congressional candidates from major parties
or who have strong popular support is not a public forum because such debates
are not open to a class of speakers (e.g., all candidates), but rather to selected
members of the class. Exclusion of candidates who are not from a major party and
who lack popular support is permissible because these criteria are (i) viewpoint
neutral and (ii) reasonable in light of the logistics for an educationally valuable
debate. [Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666
(1998)]
8) Mailboxes
A letter/mailbox at a business or residence is not a public forum. Thus, the govern-
ment may prohibit the placing of unstamped items in post boxes to promote
efcient mail service. [United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh
Civic Association, 453 U.S. 114 (1981)]
C. UNPROTECTED SPEECHREGULATION OR PUNISHMENT BECAUSE OF

CONTENT
Restrictions on the content of speech must be necessary to achieve a compelling government
interest. As indicated above, very few restrictions on the content of speech are tolerated. The
Court allows them only to prevent grave injury. The following is a list of the only reasons for
which the Court has allowed content-based restrictions on speech (i.e., the following are catego-
ries of unprotected speech):
(i) It creates a clear and present danger of imminent lawless action.
(ii) It constitutes ghting words as dened by a narrow, precise statute.
(iii) The speech, lm, etc., is obscene. (This category includes child pornography.)
(iv) The speech constitutes defamation, which may be the subject of a civil penalty through a
tort action brought by the injured party in conformity with the rules set out infra.
(v) The speech violates regulations against false or deceptive advertisingcommercial speech
is protected by the First Amendment and it cannot be proscribed simply to help certain
private interests.
(vi) The government can demonstrate a compelling interest in limitation of the First
Amendment activity.
Recall that even if a regulation falls within one of the above categories, it will not necessarily be
held valid; it might still be held to be void for vagueness or overbreadth. (See A.3., supra.)
1. Clear and Present Danger of Imminent Lawlessness

A state cannot forbid advocating the use of force or of law violation unless such advocacy (i)
is directed to producing or inciting imminent lawless action, and (ii) is likely to produce
or incite such action. [Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)]
Example: The clear and present danger test has been applied to hold that a state may
not punish as contempt out-of-court utterances critical of a judge, absent
special circumstances showing an extremely high likelihood of serious inter-
ference with the administration of justice. [See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375
(1962)]
a. Allows for Sanctions Against Speech

The test allows for sanctions against speech causing demonstrable danger to important
government interests. Disclosure of United States intelligence operations and personnel

is clearly not protected speech. [Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981)]
b. Compelling Justication Test

A similar testone of compelling justicationwas employed to hold unconstitu-
tional the Georgia legislatures refusal to seat Julian Bond, an elected black representa-
tive, where Bonds speeches, critical of United States policy on Vietnam and the draft,
led the legislature to doubt his tness and his ability to take the oath of ofce in good
faith. [Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966)]
2. Fighting Words
a. True Threats
The First Amendment does not protect true threatsstatements meant to communi-
cate an intent to place an individual or group in fear of bodily harm. [Virginia v. Black,
538 U.S. 343 (2002)a state may ban cross burning done with an intent to intimidate;
because of cross burnings long history as a signal of impending violence, the state may
specially regulate this form of threat, which is likely to inspire fear of bodily harm]
b. States May Ban Words Likely to Incite Physical Retaliation

States are free to ban the use of ghting words, i.e., those personally abusive epithets
that, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are inherently likely to incite immediate
physical retaliation. [Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)] Chaplinsky
has, however, been narrowly read. Thus, in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971),
the Court held that the state may not punish the defendant for wearing a jacket bearing
the words Fuck the Draft, pointing out that while the four-letter word displayed
by Cohen in relation to the draft is commonly employed in a personally provocative
fashion, in this instance, it was clearly not directed to the person of the hearer.
c. Statutes Regulating Fighting Words Tend to Be Overbroad or Vague

While this classication of punishable speech continues to exist in theory, the Court
rarely upholds punishments for the use of such words. Statutes that attempt to punish
ghting words will tend to be overbroad or vague; the statute will dene the punish-
able speech as opprobrious words, annoying conduct, or abusive language. Such
statutes will fail, as their imprecise terms could be applied to protected (nonghting
words) speech. Such a statute could not be used to punish a person for saying to a police
ofcer, White son of a bitch, Ill kill you. [Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972);
Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974)]
d. Statutes Cannot Be Viewpoint-BasedLimits Hate Crime Legislation

Although the general class of ghting words is proscribable under the First
Amendment, the Supreme Court generally will not tolerate in ghting words statutes
restrictions that are designed to punish only certain viewpoints (i.e., proscribing ghting
words only if they convey a particular message). [R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377 (1992)ordinance that applies only to those ghting words that insult or provoke
violence on the basis of race, religion, or gender is invalid]
1) ComparePunishing Racially Motivated Conduct

The First Amendment does not protect conduct simply because it happens to be
motivated by a persons views or beliefs. Thus, a state can increase a convicted

defendants sentence for aggravated battery based on the fact that the defen-
dant selected the victim of his crime because of the victims race. [Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993)] However, punishment may not be increased merely
because of the defendants abstract beliefs. [Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159
(1992)unconstitutional to increase defendants sentence merely because it was
proved that he belongs to an organization that advocates racism]
3. Obscenity
Obscenity is not protected speech. [Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)] The Court
has dened obscenity as a description or depiction of sexual conduct that, taken as a
whole, by the average person, applying contemporary community standards:
(i) Appeals to the prurient interest in sex;
(ii) Portrays sex in a patently offensive way; and
(iii) Does not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientic valueusing a national,
reasonable person standard, rather than the contemporary community standard. [Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987)]
a. Elements
1) Appeal to Prurient Interest

The dominant theme of the material considered as a whole must appeal to the
prurient interest in sex of the average person. The Supreme Court has found this
to include that which appeals to shameful or morbid interests in sex, but not that
which incites lust (insofar as lust may include a normal interest in sex). [Brockett
v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985)] For exam purposes, it is probably
sufcient merely to know the standard (since its application is a fact determina-
tion).
a) Average Person
Both sensitive and insensitive adults may be included in determining contem-
porary community standards, but children may not be considered part of the
relevant audience.
b) Material Designed for Deviant Group

Where the allegedly obscene material is designed for and primarily dissemi-
nated to a clearly dened deviant sexual group (e.g., sadists), rather than
to the public at large, the prurient appeal requirement is satised if the
dominant theme of the material, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest of that group. [Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966)]
2) Patently Offensive
a) Community Standard
The material must be patently offensive in affronting contemporary commu-
nity standards regarding the description or portrayal of sexual matters.
b) National Standard Not Required

A statewide standard is permissible but not mandatory. A juror may draw on
knowledge of the community or vicinity from which he comes, and the court
may either direct the jury to apply community standards without specifying
the community, or dene the standard in more precise geographic terms.
[Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S.
153 (1974)]
3) Lacking in Serious Social Value

The fact that the material may have some redeeming social value will not neces-
sarily immunize it from a nding of obscenity. It must have serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientic value, using a national standard. [Pope v. Illinois,
supra]
4) Standard May Be Different for Minors

The state can adopt a specic denition of obscenity applying to materials sold
to minors, even though the material might not be obscene in terms of an adult
audience. [Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)] However, government
may not prohibit the sale or distribution of material to adults merely because it is
inappropriate for children.
Example: Because of the present lack of gateway technology that would
permit speakers on the Internet to block their communications, a
federal statutes bar on transmitting indecent or patently offen-
sive messages to minors effectively amounts to a total ban and
thus violates the First Amendment right of adults to receive such
materials. [Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844
(1997)]
Compare: To prevent minors from getting harmful material, the government

may condition its support of Internet access in public libraries
on their installing software to block obscenity and child pornog-
raphyat least when the library will unblock ltered material
on any adult users request. [United States v. American Library
Association, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003)]
a) Pictures of Minors
To protect minors from exploitation, the government may prohibit the sale or
distribution of visual depictions of sexual conduct involving minors, even if
the material would not be found obscene if it did not involve children. [New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982)] The government may also prohibit offers
to provide (and requests to obtain) material depicting children engaged in
sexually explicit conduct when the prohibition requires scienter and does not
criminalize a substantial amount of protected speech. Such offers of material
that is unlawful to possess have no First Amendment protection. [United
States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008)]
b) CompareSimulated Pictures of Minors

The government may not bar visual material that only appears to depict
minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, but that in fact uses young-
looking adults or computer-generated images. [Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002)] A holding otherwise would bar speech that is
not obscene under the Miller test and that does not involve the exploitation of
children as in Ferber.
b. Question of Fact and Law
1) Jury Question
The determination of whether material is obscene is a question of fact for the
jury. Of course, the judge can grant a directed verdict if the evidence is such that
a reasonable, unprejudiced jury could not nd that all parts of the test have been
met.
2) Independent Review by Appellate Court

Appellate courts will conduct an independent review of constitutional claims,
when necessary, to assure that the proscribed materials depict or describe patently
offensive hard core sexual conduct. [Jenkins v. Georgia, supra]
3) Evidence of Pandering
In close cases, evidence of panderingcommercial exploitation for the sake of
prurient appealby the defendant may be probative on whether the material is
obscene. Such evidence may be found in the defendants advertising, his instruc-
tions to authors and illustrators of the material, or his intended audience. In effect,
this simply accepts the purveyors own estimation of the material as relevant.
[Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966)]
4) EvidenceSimilar Published Materials Not Automatically Admissible

The state need not produce expert testimony. Evidence that similar materials are
available on community newsstands, or that the publication has acquired a second-
class mailing privilege, does not necessarily show that the material is not obscene
and hence is not automatically admissible. Nor is there any automatic right to have
other materials held not to be obscene admitted into evidence. [Hamling v. United
States, supra]
c. Statutes Must Not Be Vague
1) Sweeping Language
Attempts to dene obscenity broadly have encountered difculties before the
Court.
Examples: 1) A statute banning publication of news or stories of bloodshed or
lust so massed as to become vehicles for inciting crime is uncon-
stitutionally vague and uncertain. [Winters v. New York, 333 U.S.
507 (1948)]
2) The Court held invalid a statute prohibiting the sale of any

book tending to the corruption of the morals of youth. [Butler v.
Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957)]
2) Construction May Save Vague Statute

A state statute will be upheld if it meets the tests as construed by the courts of the
state. Thus, a seemingly vague obscenity statute may be saved by a state supreme
court opinion that limits it to a proscription of depictions of specic types of sexual
conduct. [Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767 (1977)]
d. Land Use Regulations
A land use (or zoning) regulation may limit the location or size of adult entertain-
ment establishments (i.e., businesses that focus on sexual activities) if the regulation is
designed to reduce the secondary effects of such businesses (e.g., rise in crime rates,
drop in property values and neighborhood quality, etc.). However, regulations may not
ban such establishments altogether. [City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535
U.S. 425 (2002)]
Example: A city ordinance limiting adult entertainment establishments to one
corner of the city occupying less than 5% of the citys area was deemed
constitutional. [City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41
(1986)]
e. Liquor Regulation
The Twenty-First Amendment grants states more than the usual regulatory authority
with respect to intoxicating beverages. Therefore, regulations prohibiting explicit live
sexual entertainment and lms in establishments licensed to sell liquor by the drink,
even though proscribing some forms of visual presentation that would not be obscene
under Miller, do not violate the First Amendment as long as they are not irrational.
f. Display
The Court has suggested that the state may regulate the display of certain material, to
prevent it from being so obtrusive that an unwilling viewer cannot avoid exposure to it.
[Redup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967)]
g. Private Possession of Obscenity

Private possession of obscenity at home cannot be made a crime because of the consti-
tutional right of personal privacy. [Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)] However,
the protection does not extend beyond the home. Thus, importation, distribution, and
exhibition of obscene materials can be prohibited.
1) ExceptionChild Pornography
The state may make private possession of child pornography a crime, even private
possession for personal viewing in a residence. [Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103
(1990)]
4. Defamatory Speech
When a person is sued for making a defamatory statement, the First Amendment places
restrictions on the ability of the government (through its tort law and courts) to grant a
recovery where the person suing is a public ofcial or public gure, or where the defama-
tory statement involves an issue of public concern. In these cases, the plaintiff must prove
not only the elements of defamation required by state law, but also that the statement was
false and that the person making the statement was at fault to some degree in not ascer-
taining the truth of the statement.
a. Falsity
At common law, a defamatory statement was presumed to be false; to avoid liability for
an otherwise defamatory statement on the ground that it was true, the defendant had to
assert truth as an afrmative defense. The Supreme Court has rejected this presumption
in all public gure or public concern cases. In these cases, the plaintiff must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the statement was false. [Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986)]
1) Requirement of Factual Statement

To be defamatory, the false statement must be viewed by a reasonable person as a
statement of fact, rather than as a statement of opinion or a parody. Furthermore,
a public gure cannot circumvent the First Amendment restrictions by using a
different tort theory to collect damages for a published statement about him that is
not a false statement of fact.
Example: Even though a publisher may have intended to cause psychological
distress to a public gure by publishing statements about him that
were derogatory, the public gure cannot receive a judgment for
emotional distress damages if a reasonable person who read or
viewed the publication would not understand it to contain a state-
ment of fact about that public gure. [Hustler Magazine Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988)]
Note: The fact that a publisher labels a statement as opinion will not provide
First Amendment protection if the statement would reasonably be understood to be
a statement of fact. [Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990)]
b. Fault
At common law, a defendant who had no reason to know that the statement he was
making was false and defamatory could still be liable for defamation. Now, however,
a plaintiff in a public gure or public concern case must prove fault on the part of the
defendant. The degree of fault required is higher when the plaintiff is a public ofcial
or public gure than when the plaintiff is a private person suing on a matter of public
concern.
1) Public Ofcial or Public FigureActual Malice Required

A public ofcial may not recover for defamatory words relating to his ofcial
conduct or a matter of public concern without clear and convincing evidence that
the statement was made with actual malice (dened below). [New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)] This rule has since been extended to public gure
plaintiffs. (Note that while the Supreme Court has not specically held that all
statements regarding public ofcials or public gures necessarily involve matters
of public concern, a case to the contrary should be rare.)
a) Actual Malice Dened

Actual malice was dened by the Supreme Court in New York Times v.
Sullivan as:
(i) Knowledge that the statement was false, or

(ii) Reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity.
The plaintiff must show that the defendant was subjectively aware that the
statement he published was false or that he subjectively entertained serious
doubts as to its truthfulness.
(1) Actual Malice in False Quotation Cases

Proof that a defamation plaintiff was inaccurately quoted does not, by
itself, prove actual malice, even if the quotation was intentionally altered
by the defendant. If the published quotation is substantially accurate,
the plaintiff may not collect damages. To show actual malice, the public
gure plaintiff must prove that the defendants alteration of the quotation
materially changed the meaning of the actual statements made by the
plaintiff. [Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991)]
(2) Permitted Inquiries by Plaintiff

In attempting to prove knowing or reckless disregard of the truth, the
plaintiff may inquire into the state of mind of those who edit, produce,
or publish (i.e., conversations with editorial colleagues). [Herbert v.
Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979)]
(3) Petition Clause Does Not Protect Defamatory Statement Made with
Actual Malice
The First Amendment guarantees individuals the right to petition
government for a redress of grievances. However, this right to petition
the government does not grant absolute immunity to persons who make
defamatory statements about public ofcials or public gures in their
communications with government ofcials. The defamed individual may
prevail by meeting the New York Times requirements. [McDonald v.
Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985)]
b) Two Ways to Become a Public Figure
(1) General Fame or Notoriety
A person may be a public gure for all purposes and all contexts if he
achieves general fame or notoriety in the community and pervasive
involvement in the affairs of society, although a citizens participation
in community and professional affairs does not render him a public
gure for all purposes.
(2) Involvement in Particular Controversy

A person may voluntarily inject himself or be drawn into a particular
controversy to inuence the resolution of the issues involved and
thereby become a public gure for a limited range of issues. [Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)]
Note that Gertz appears to allow for the possibility of a persons being an
involuntary public gure for a limited range of issues, although such a
case would be exceedingly rare.
c) Examples of Persons Not Deemed Public Figures
(1) Spouse of Wealthy Person

Marriage to an extremely wealthy person and divorcing such a person
does not amount to voluntarily entering the public arena, even though
press conferences are held by the plaintiff, because going to court is the
only way she could dissolve her marriage. [Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424
U.S. 448 (1976)]
(2) Person Engaging in Criminal Conduct

A person who engages in criminal conduct does not automatically
become a public gure even when the defamatory statements relate
solely to his conviction. [Wolston v. Readers Digest Association, 443
U.S. 157 (1979)]
(3) Scientist in Federally Funded Program

A behavioral scientist engaged in federally funded animal research
studies is not a public gure because he applies for federal grants and
publishes in professional journals. [Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S.
111 (1979)]
2) Private Individual Suing on Matter of Public ConcernAt Least Negligence

Required
When a private individual is defamed, there is less of a need to protect freedom
of speech and press and more of a need to protect private individuals from injury
from defamation because they do not have opportunities as effective for rebuttal as
public gures. Accordingly, defamation actions brought by private individuals are
subject to constitutional limitations only when the defamatory statement involves a
matter of public concern. And even in those cases, the limitations are not as great
as those established for public ofcials and public gures. [Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., supra] When the defamatory statement involves a matter of public concern,
Gertz imposes two restrictions on private plaintiffs: (i) it prohibits liability without
fault, and (ii) it restricts the recovery of presumed or punitive damages.
a) No Liability Without Proof of at Least Negligence

The plaintiff must show that the defendant was negligent in failing to ascer-
tain the truth of the statement. If the plaintiff establishes negligence but not
actual malice, which is a higher degree of fault, he also has to provide compe-
tent evidence of actual damages. (This changes the common law rule that
damages would be presumed by law for injury to reputation and did not need
to be proved by the plaintiff.) Actual damages may be awarded not only for
economic losses but also for injury to the plaintiffs reputation in the commu-
nity and for personal humiliation and distress.
b) Presumed or Punitive Damages Allowed Only If Actual Malice

Established
If the plaintiff establishes that the defendant made the statement with actual
malice, the actual damage requirement is extinguished. The plaintiff can
recover whatever damages are permitted under state law (usually presumed
damages and even punitive damages in appropriate cases). In other words,
there is no constitutional protection for statements made with actual malice,
even though a matter of public concern is involved.
c) What Is a Matter of Public Concern?

The courts decide on a case-by-case basis whether the defamatory statement
involves a matter of public concern, looking at the content, form, and context
of the publication. [Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472
U.S. 749 (1985)]
Example: In Dun & Bradstreet, the Court determined that a credit
agencys erroneous report of plaintiffs bankruptcy, distributed
to ve subscribers, was speech solely in the private interest
of the speaker and its specic business audience. Therefore,
because a matter of public concern was not involved, the First
Amendment restrictions did not apply and the state court
award of presumed and punitive damages was upheld.
d) Intentional Iniction of Emotional Distress

Damage actions by private individuals for intentional iniction of emotional
distress are subject to the First Amendment rights of defendants if the speech
relates to a matter of public concern, despite its outrageous and particu-
larly hurtful quality. [Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011)peaceful
picketing accompanied by signs critical of government policy regarding the
political and moral conduct of the United States and homosexuality in the
military that was conducted in a public place near, but not visible from, nor
disruptive of, a military funeral is protected speech]
3) Private Individual Suing on Matter Not of Public Concern

The Supreme Court has not imposed constitutional restrictions on defama-
tion actions brought by private individuals that do not involve a matter of public
concern. Hence, presumed and punitive damages can be recovered even if actual
malice is not established.
c. Procedural Issues
1) Federal Summary Judgment Standard

When ruling on a motion for summary judgment in a federal court defamation
action in a case involving an issue of public concern, a judge must apply the clear
and convincing evidence standard (i.e., the judge should grant the motion unless
it appears that the plaintiff could meet his burdens of proving falsity and actual
malice at trial by clear and convincing evidence). However, the Supreme Court has
not clearly held that state courts must follow this practice under similar circum-
stances.
2) Judicial Review
An appellate court must review a defamation case by conducting an independent
review of the record to determine if the nder of fact (the jury) could have found
that the malice standard was met in the case. [Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc.
v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989)]
d. Recovery for Depiction in a False Light

To recover damages for depiction in a false light (as opposed to a defamatory injury to
reputation) arising out of comments directed at activities of public interest, an individual
must establish falsity and actual malice whether or not he qualies as a public gure
under Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). However, it is assumed that the Court
would now modify this to mirror the Gertz negligence rule for private plaintiffs.
e. True Privacy Actions
1) Publishing True Fact of Public Record

A newspaper or broadcaster cannot be sued for publishing a true fact once it is
lawfully obtained from the public record or otherwise released to the public. [Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)rape victims name already in
court records open to the public; The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989)
rape victims name inadvertently given to the press by police]
2) Publishing Name of Juvenile Charged with Crime

A state cannot require judicial approval before the media can print the name of a
juvenile charged with murder where the name of the juvenile was obtained through
legal means (reporter heard name of defendant over police frequency radio and
questioned witnesses to the crime). [Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S.
97 (1979)]
3) Publishing Information on Judges Competency

A state cannot make it a crime to publish information, released in a conden-
tial proceeding, concerning the competency of members of the state judiciary.
[Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978)]
f. Commercial PrivacyDisclosing a Private Performance Can Violate Right to

Publicity
In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), the Court held
that state law could award damages to an entertainer who attempted to restrict the
showing of his act to those who paid admission, when a television station broadcast his
entire act. Here the human cannonball had his entire 15-second act broadcast over his
objection.
g. Copyright Infringement
The First Amendment does not require an exception to copyright protection for material
written by a former President or other public gures. Magazines have no right to publish
such copyrighted material beyond the statutory fair use exception. [Harper & Row
Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985)]
5. Some Commercial Speech

False advertising is not protected by the First Amendment, although commercial speech in
general does have some First Amendment protection. In determining whether a regulation
of commercial speech is valid, the Supreme Court asserts that it uses a four-step process.
However, it may be easiest to think about this as an initial question followed by a three-step
inquiry. First, determine whether the commercial speech concerns a lawful activity and is
not misleading or fraudulent. Speech proposing an unlawful transaction (e.g., I will sell you
this pound of heroin for X dollars) and fraudulent speech may be outlawed. If the speech
regulated concerns a lawful activity and is not misleading or fraudulent, the regulation will
be valid only if it:
(i) Serves a substantial government interest;
(ii) Directly advances the asserted interest; and
(iii) Is narrowly tailored to serve the substantial interest. This part of the test does not
require that the least restrictive means be used. Rather, there must be a reasonable
t between the legislations end and the means chosen. [Board of Trustees of State
University of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989)]
[Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)]
Examples: 1) A city could not prohibit the use of newsracks on sidewalks for the distribu-
tion of commercial publications (such as free publications advertising products
or real estate for sale) if the city allowed sidewalk newsracks for the distri-
bution of newspapers. There is no reasonable t between the category of
commercial speech and any substantial interest. Commercial newsracks do not
cause any physical or aesthetic harm different from that caused by newspaper
newsracks. [Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993)]
2) Similarly, a law prohibiting beer bottle labels from displaying alcohol

content was held invalid because, although the government has a substantial
interest in preventing strength wars, the government did not show that the
label prohibition advanced this interest in a material way. [Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995)]
3) The Court struck down a statute prohibiting pharmacies from selling infor-
mation about doctors and the medications they prescribe for marketing or
promoting a prescription drug without the prescribers consent. The statute
also prohibited pharmaceutical companies from using such information in
marketing drugs without the prescribers consent. This is a content-based,
viewpoint-based, and speaker-based restriction and is subject, at the least, to
the scrutiny applied in commercial speech cases. Even assuming that the state
has a substantial interest in protecting prescription condentiality, the law
is not narrowly tailored because it allows pharmacies to disclose prescriber
information to anyone for any reason other than marketing. [Sorrell v. IMS
Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011)]
a. Complete Bans
Complete bans on truthful advertisement of lawful products are very unlikely to be
upheld due to a lack of tailoring. Thus, the Court has struck down total bans against
advertising:
(i) Legal abortions;
(ii) Contraceptives;
(iii) Drug prices;
(iv) Attorneys services; and
(v) Liquor prices.
Note that the Twenty-First Amendmentgiving states the power to regulate liquor
commerce within their bordersdoes not give states power to override First
Amendment protections.
1) Commercial Sign Regulation

It is unclear whether billboards may be totally banned from a city. However, they
can be regulated for purposes of trafc safety and aesthetics.
a) Blockbusting
A town could not prohibit the use of outdoor for sale signs by owners of
private homes as a way of reducing the effect of blockbusting real estate
agents (i.e., encouraging homeowners to sell at reduced prices because of the
threat of a sudden inux of minorities). [Linmark Associates v. Willingboro
Township, 431 U.S. 85 (1977)]
b. Required Disclosures
Commercial speech is protected largely because of its value to consumers. Thus, the
government may require commercial advertisers to make certain disclosures if they
are not unduly burdensome and they are reasonably related to the states interest in
preventing deception. [See, e.g., Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559
U.S. 229 (2010)advertisements by lawyers (and others) as debt relief agencies may be
required to include information about their legal status and the nature of the assistance
provided, as well as the possibility of the debtors ling for bankruptcy]
c. Special Attorney Advertising Rules

The Court has upheld prohibitions against in-person solicitation by attorneys for
pecuniary gain [Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar, 436 U.S. 447 (1978)state interest in
protecting laypersons from fraud and overreaching is substantial, and prohibition here
is narrowly tailored and directly advances that interest] and sending mail solicitations to
accident victims and their relatives within 30 days following an accident [Florida Bar v.
Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995)state interest in protecting lawyers reputation is
substantial, and ban here is narrowly tailored and directly advances that interest].
D. PRIOR RESTRAINTS
A prior restraint is a court order or administrative system that keeps speech from occurring (e.g., a
licensing system, a prohibition against using mails, an injunction). Prior restraints are not favored
in our political system; the Court would rather allow speech and then punish it if it was unpro-
tected. However, the Court will uphold prior restraints if some special harm would otherwise
result. As with other restrictions on speech, a prior restraint must be narrowly tailored to achieve
some compelling or, at least, signicant governmental interest. The Court has also required that
certain procedural safeguards be included in any system of prior restraint.
1. Sufciency of Governmental Interest

The Supreme Court has not adopted a brightline standard for determining when a prior
restraint is justied, but it has said that the governments burden is heavy. For exam purposes,
you should ask whether there is some special societal harm that justies the restraint.
a. National Security
National security is certainly a sufcient harm justifying prior restraint. Thus, a
newspaper could be prohibited from publishing troop movements in times of war. [Near
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)] However, the harm must be more than theoretical.
Thus, the Court refused to enjoin publication of The Pentagon Papers on the basis that
publication might possibly have a detrimental effect on the Vietnam War. [New York
Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)]
b. Preserving Fair Trial

Preserving a fair trial for an accused might be a sufcient basis for prior restraint.
However, the restraint will be upheld only if it is the only sure way of preserving a fair
trial. [Nebraska Press Association v. Stewart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976)]
1) CompareGrand Jury Prior Restraint

A state law prohibiting a grand jury witness from ever disclosing the testimony he
gave to the grand jury (even after the grand jury term had ended) violates the First
Amendment. Such a law is not narrowly tailored to a compelling interest, since any
such interest that the government may have in protecting the grand jury process
can be protected by a nonpermanent prohibition. [Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S.
624 (1990)]
c. Contractual Agreements
The Supreme Court has held that prior restraint is permissible where the parties have
contractually agreed to the restraint. [Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980)
CIA agent contractually agreed to give agency a prepublication review of any item
related to his employment]
d. Military Circumstances
The Supreme Court has held that the interests of maintaining discipline among troops
and efciency of operations on a military base justify a requirement that persons on a
military base obtain the commanders permission before circulating petitions.
e. Obscenity
The Court has held in a number of cases that the governments interest in preventing the
dissemination of obscenity is sufcient to justify a system of prior restraint.
2. Procedural Safeguards
The Supreme Court has held that no system of prior restraint will be upheld unless it
provides the persons whose speech is being restrained certain procedural safeguards. The
safeguards arose in the context of movie censorship for obscenity, but the court has held that
similar safeguards must be provided in all prior restraint cases:
(i) The standards must be narrowly drawn, reasonable, and denite, so as to include
only prohibitable speech (e.g., improper to permanently enjoin witness from disclosing
grand jury testimony; government interest can be protected by nonpermanent injunction
[Butterworth v. Smith, supra]);
(ii) If the restraining body wishes to restrain dissemination of an item, it must promptly
seek an injunction (e.g., improper to allow 50 days before seeking injunction [Teitel
Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968)]); and
(iii) There must be a prompt and nal judicial determination of the validity of the restraint
(e.g., improper to leave an injunction in place pending an appeal that could take up
to a year; government must either lift the injunction or expedite the appeal [National
Socialist Party v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977)]).
A number of other cases, especially in the area of movie censorship, also provide that the
government bears the burden of proving that the speech involved is unprotected. [Freedman
v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965)]
Example: A federal statute authorized the Postmaster General (i) to deny use of the
mails and postal money orders for materials found to be obscene in an admin-
istrative hearing, and (ii) to obtain a court order, upon a showing of probable
cause, to detain incoming mail pending completion of the administrative
hearing. The Court found that this denial of use of the mails violated the
First Amendment: The procedures did not require the government to initiate
proceedings to obtain a nal judicial determination of obscenity, failed to
assure prompt judicial review, and failed to limit any restraint in advance of a
nal judicial determination to preserving the status quo for the shortest xed
period compatible with sound judicial resolution. [Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S.
410 (1971)]
3. Obscenity Cases
Much of the case law in the area of prior restraint has arisen in connection with banning
obscenity.
a. Seizure of Books and Films

As with any seizure by the government, seizures of books and lms may be made
only upon probable cause that they contain obscenity or are otherwise unlawful. (See
Criminal Procedure outline.)
1) Single Seizures
Seizures of a single book or lm (to preserve it as evidence) may be made only
with a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. And even here, a
prompt post-seizure determination of obscenity must be available. If other copies
of a seized lm are not available to the exhibitor, he must be allowed to make a
copy so that he may continue showing the lm until a nal determination has been
made. [Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973)] Of course, if the materials are
available for sale to the general public, an ofcer may enter into the establishment
and purchase the book or lm to use it as evidence in a later prosecution without
obtaining a warrant. [Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985)]
2) Large Scale Seizures

Large scale seizures of allegedly obscene books and lmsto destroy them
or block their distribution or exhibitionmust be preceded by a full adversary
hearing and a judicial determination of obscenity. [Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v.
Indiana, 489 U.S. 46 (1989)]
3) Forfeiture of Business
The First Amendment does not prohibit forfeiture of a defendants adult entertain-
ment business after the defendant has been found guilty of violating the Racketeer
Inuenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and criminal obscenity laws, even
though the business assets included nonobscene books and magazines, where
the entire business was found to be part of the defendants racketeering activity.
[Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993)]
b. Injunction
After seizing material, the government may enjoin its further publication only after it
is determined to be obscene in a full judicial hearing. [Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown,
354 U.S. 436 (1957)]
c. Movie Censorship
The Court has noted that movies are different from other forms of expression, and that
time delays incident to censorship are less burdensome for movies than for other forms
of expression. Thus, the Court allows governments to establish censorship boards to
screen movies before they are released in the community, as long as the procedural
safeguards mentioned above are followed. The censor bears the burden of proving that
the movie is unprotected speech.
d. Burden on Government
When the government adopts a content-based, prior restraint of speech, the govern-
ment has the burden of proving that the restriction is the least restrictive alternative
to accomplish its goal. [Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656
(2004)upholding a preliminary injunction against enforcement of a statute requiring
age verication for access to Internet websites with sexually explicit material, and
criminalizing the failure to obtain age verication, because less restrictive alternatives
(e.g., parents installing lters) are available]
E. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

As a general rule, the press has no greater freedom to speak than does the public. However, a
number of issues have arisen in the freedom of press context.
1. Publication of Truthful Information

Generally, the press has a right to publish information about a matter of public concern,
and this right can be restricted only by a sanction that is narrowly tailored to further a state
interest of the highest order. The right applies even if the information has been unlawfully
obtained in the rst instance, as long as (i) the speech relates to a matter of public concern,
(ii) the publisher did not obtain it unlawfully or know who did, and (iii) the original speakers
privacy expectations are low. [Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001)]
Example: During heated collective bargaining negotiations between a teachers union

and a school board, an unknown person intercepted a cell phone call between
a union negotiator and the unions president. The tape was forwarded to a
radio commentator, who played it on the radio. The commentator was sued for
damages under civil liability provisions of state and federal wiretap laws that
prohibited intentional disclosure of the contents of an electronically trans-
mitted conversation when one has reason to know that the conversation was
intercepted unlawfully. The Supreme Court held that the statute violated the
First Amendment as applied under these circumstances. [Bartnicki v. Vopper,
supra]
2. Access to Trials
The First Amendment guarantees the public and press a right to attend criminal trials. But
the right may be outweighed by an overriding interest articulated in ndings by the trial
judge. [Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980)no majority opinion]
The right probably applies to civil trials, although the Supreme Court has not conclusively
resolved that issue.
a. Access to Voir Dire Examination

The First Amendment guarantee of public and press access to criminal trials also
includes access to proceedings involving the voir dire examination of potential jurors.
In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984), the Court found that
a trial court could not constitutionally close voir dire examination of potential jurors
without consideration of alternatives to closure even though, in some circumstances,
there may be a compelling interest in restricting access to such proceedings to protect
the privacy of potential jurors or the fairness of the trial.
b. Access to Other Pretrial Proceedings

Pretrial proceedings are presumptively subject to a First Amendment right of access for
the press and public. Thus, a law requiring that all preliminary hearings be closed to the
press and public violates the First Amendment. [El Vocero de Puerto Rico (Caribbean
International News Corp.) v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147 (1993)per curiam] If the
prosecution and defense counsel seek to have a judge close pretrial proceedings, the
judge would have to make specic ndings on the record demonstrating (i) that closure
was essential to preserve higher or overriding values, and (ii) that the closure order
was narrowly tailored to serve the higher or overriding value. [Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986)]
If the prosecution seeks to have a pretrial hearing or trial closed to the public and the
defendant objects to the closure, there will be a Sixth Amendment violation if the judge
excludes the public and the press from the hearing or trial without a clear nding that a
closure order was necessary to protect an overriding interest.
c. Compelling Interest in Protecting Children

The government has a compelling interest in protecting children who are victims of sex
offenses. Portions of trials wherein such children testify may be closed to the public and
press, but only if the trial court makes a nding that such closure is necessary to protect
the child in the individual case. A state statute, however, violates the First Amendment
if it requires closure of the trial during testimony of a child victim of a sex offense
without a nding of necessity by the trial judge. [Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982)]
d. Protective Order in Publishing Information Gained in Pretrial Discovery

The Supreme Court has upheld a state trial court protective order prohibiting a
newspaper defendant in a defamation suit from publishing, disseminating, or using
information gained through pretrial discovery from the plaintiff in any way except
where necessary for preparation for trial. [See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S.
20 (1984)]
3. Requiring Members of the Press to Testify Before Grand Juries

In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), the Court held that requiring a journalist to
appear and testify before state or federal grand juries does not abridge freedom of speech
or press, despite the claim that such a requirement would so deter the ow of news from
condential sources as to place an unconstitutionally heavy burden on the First Amendment
interest in the free ow of information to the public. The Courts opinion refused to create
and even rejecteda conditional privilege not to reveal condential sources to a grand
jury conducting a good faith inquiry. This position was afrmed in New York Times v.
Jascalevich, 439 U.S. 1331 (1978).
4. Interviewing Prisoners
Although the First Amendment protects prisoners, and especially those corresponding with
them by mail, from a sweeping program of censorship [Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396
(1974)], it does not permit journalists to insist upon either interviewing specied prisoners of
their choice [Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974)] or inspecting prison grounds [Houchins
v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978)].
5. Business Regulations or Taxes

Press and broadcasting companies can be subject to general business regulations (e.g.,
antitrust laws) or taxes (e.g., federal or state income taxes). Thus, a tax or regulation appli-
cable to both press and non-press businesses will be upheld, even if it has a special impact on
a portion of the press or broadcast media, as long as it is not an attempt to interfere with First
Amendment activities. However, no tax or regulation impacting on the press or subpart of the
press may be based on the content of the publication absent a compelling justication.
Examples: 1) State tax on publishers use of more than $100,000 of paper and ink
products annually violates the First Amendment. [Minneapolis Star &
Tribune v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983)]
2) State sales tax or receipts tax on the sale of general interest magazines
that exempts newspapers and religious, professional, trade, and sports journals
from the tax violates the First Amendment. [Arkansas Writers Project, Inc. v.
Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987)]
3) A state sales tax that exempted the sales of newspapers and magazines
from the tax but did not give a similar exemption to the sale of broad-
cast services (cable or subscription television) did not violate the First
Amendment. The tax was not based on the content of broadcasts and did not
target a small category of publishers. The tax was applicable to all cable or
satellite television sales. (There is no comparable sale of free TV such as
network broadcasts.) [Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991)]
6. Monetary Damages for Failure to Keep Identity Condential
When a reporter or publisher promises a source person to keep his identity condential and
then publishes the source persons name, state contract law or promissory estoppel law may
allow the source person to recover from the reporter or publisher any damages caused by the
publication of his identity. [Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991)]
7. Broadcasting Regulations
Radio and television broadcasting may be more closely regulated than the press. Rationale:
Due to the limited number of frequencies available, broadcasters have a special privilege
and, consequently, a special responsibility to give suitable time to matters of public interest
and to present a suitable range of programs. The paramount right is the right of viewers and
listeners to receive information of public concern, rather than the right of broadcasters to
broadcast what they please.
a. Fairness Doctrine
Accordingly, the Court has upheld, under a regulatory fairness doctrine (which is no
longer enforced), FCC orders requiring a radio station to offer free broadcasting time
(i) to opponents of political candidates or views endorsed by the station, and (ii) to any
person who has been personally attacked in the course of a broadcast, for a reply to the
attack. [Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)]
1) CompareGrant of Equal Newspaper Space

A statute granting political candidates a right to equal space to reply to criticism
by the newspaper violates First Amendment freedom of the press. Decisions
respecting size and content of a newspaper are forbidden to government. [Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)]
b. Newspaper Ownership of Radio or TV Station

Similarly, to promote the diversity of information received by the public, the FCC may
forbid ownership of a radio or television station by a daily newspaper located in the
same community. [FCC v. National Citizens Committee, 436 U.S. 775 (1978)]
c. Prohibiting Indecent Speech

Because of a broadcasts ability to invade the privacy of the home, the First Amendment
does not forbid imposing civil sanctions on a broadcaster for airing a full monologue (in
contrast to isolated use of a few such words) of patently offensive sexual and excre-
tory speech, even though it is not obsceneat least at those times when children are
likely to be listening. [FCC v. Pacica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978)]
d. Political Advertisements
The First Amendment does not require broadcasters to accept political advertisements.
e. Elimination of Editorial Speech from Stations Receiving Public Grants

Congress violated the First Amendment when it forbade any noncommercial educa-
tional station receiving a grant from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting from
engaging in editorializing. [FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984)]
This was the suppression of speech because of its content; the elimination of editorial
speech from stations receiving public grants of this type was not narrowly tailored to
promote an overriding government purpose regarding the regulation of broadcasting
in general or noncommercial broadcasters in particular. Congress could deny persons
receiving the federal funds the right to use those funds for editorial activities, but it
could not condition the receipt of those funds upon a promise not to engage in any such
speech.
8. Cable Television Regulation

While generally regulations of newspapers are subject to strict scrutiny, and regulations of
the broadcast media are subject to less critical review, regulations of cable television trans-
missions are subject to review by a standard somewhere between these two. Rationale: The
physical connection to a viewers television set makes the cable subscriber a more captive
audience than a newspaper reader and distinguishes cable from newspapers, which cannot
prevent access to competing newspapers. On the other hand, unlike broadcast media, which
is limited to a small number of frequencies (see 7., supra), there is no practical limitation on
the number of cable channels; thus, the governments interest in protecting viewers rights is
weaker with regard to cable. [Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, A.2.a.2), supra]
Example: A law requiring cable operators to carry local stations is subject to interme-
diate scrutiny since it is content neutral (see A.2.a.2), supra). Since a must
carry provision directly serves the important interest of preserving economic
viability of local broadcasters and promotes the dissemination of information
to noncable viewers, it is constitutional. [Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
FCC, supra]
a. CompareContent-Based Cable Broadcast Regulations

A content-based cable broadcast regulation will be upheld only if it passes muster under
the strict scrutiny test. [United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S.
803 (2000)law requiring cable operators to limit sexually oriented programs to
after 10 p.m. is invalid because of the less restrictive alternative of enabling each house-
hold to block undesired channels]
9. Internet Regulation
The strict standard of First Amendment scrutiny, rather than the more relaxed standard
applicable to broadcast regulation, applies to regulation of the Internet. Rationale: In contrast
to broadcasting, there is no scarcity of frequencies (see 7., supra) on the Internet and little
likelihood that the Internet will unexpectedly invade the privacy of the home (see 7.c.,
supra). [Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, C.3.a.4), supra]
XXI. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND BELIEF
A. NATURE OF THE RIGHT

Although the First Amendment does not mention a right of freedom of association, the right
to join together with other persons for expressive or political activity is protected by the First
Amendment. However, the right to associate for expressive purposes is not absolute. It may
be infringed to serve a compelling government interest, unrelated to the suppression of ideas,

that cannot be achieved through means signicantly less restrictive of associational freedoms,
at least when the infringement would not signicantly affect an association's right to express its
viewpoints. However, in some cases, as noted below, a more lenient standard will apply.
Examples: 1) A states interest in ending invidious discrimination justies prohibiting private
clubs that are large and basically unselective in their membership, or that are
often used for business contacts, from discriminating on the basis of race, creed,
color, national origin, or sexat least when it is not shown that this would impede
the individual members ability to engage in First Amendment activity. [New
York State Club Association, Inc. v. New York City, 487 U.S. 1 (1988); Board of
Directors of Rotary Club International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537
(1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)]
2) A federal statute making it a crime to provide material support or resources
of any kind to a foreign terrorist organization with knowledge of its being desig-
nated a foreign terrorist organization by the federal government does not violate
the freedom of association (or speech). The statute does not forbid mere member-
ship or association with the organization, only material support (which was dened
in the statute). Moreover, given the difculty of obtaining information about
terrorist threats, any burden that the statute places on a persons freedom of associ-
ation is justied. [Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010)]
Compare: 1) A state antidiscrimination law may not bar the Boy Scouts from excluding an
openly gay assistant scoutmaster from membership. Forced inclusion would signif-
icantly burden the right of expressive association of the Boy Scouts, since one of
the sincerely held purposes of the Scouts is to instill certain moral values in young
people, including the value that homosexual conduct is not morally straight. [Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000)]
2) A city ordinance that restricted admission to certain dance halls to persons
between the ages of 14 and 18 was constitutional; it did not have to be justied
with a compelling interest because the associational activity of meeting in a dance
hall is not an activity within the protection of the First Amendment. [Dallas v.
Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989)]
B. ELECTORAL PROCESS
Laws regulating the electoral process might impact on First Amendment rights of speech,
assembly, and association. The Supreme Court uses a balancing test in determining whether
a regulation of the electoral process is valid: If the restriction on First Amendment activities is
severe, it will be upheld only if it is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest, but if
the restriction is reasonable and nondiscriminatory, it generally will be upheld on the basis of
the states important regulatory interests. [Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992)upholding
prohibition against write-in candidates]
Example: A state may require in-person voters to show a government-issued voter ID. This is
an evenhanded protection of the integrity of the electoral process and is justi-
ed by sufciently weighty interests of detecting voter fraud and protecting
public condence in elections. Thus, the requirement is plainly legitimate and is
not facially invalid. [Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181
(2008)]
1. Ballot Regulation
a. Signature Requirements
The Court has found that the interest of running an efcient election supports a require-
ment that candidates obtain a reasonable number of signatures to get on the ballot.
[Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986)1%] Similarly, a states
interest in promoting transparency and accountability in elections is sufcient to justify
public disclosure of the names and addresses of persons who sign ballot petitions. [Doe
v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010)] However, the Court struck down a severe ballot restric-
tion requiring new political parties to collect twice as many signatures to run for county
ofce as for state ofce. [Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992)]
b. Primary Voting Regulations

A state may enforce a party rule requiring that a person be registered as a member
of the party within a reasonable amount of time prior to a primary to be able to vote.
[Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973)] It may also require that voters in a partys
primary be registered either in the party or as independents. Rationale: The burden
on the partys associational rights is not severe. Thus, strict scrutiny does not apply and
the states important regulatory interests (e.g., in preserving political parties as viable
identiable groups, preventing party raiding, etc.) are sufcient to justify the restriction.
[Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581 (2005)] However, a state may not prohibit a party
from allowing independent voters to vote in the partys primary if the party wishes to
allow independent voters to participate; such a requirement constitutes a severe burden
on the associational rights of the party and can be justied only if it is narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling interest. [Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S.
208 (1986)]
c. Single Party Limitation

A state law that prohibits an individual from appearing on the ballot as the candidate
of more than one party does not impose a severe burden on the association rights of
political parties. The states interest in ballot integrity and political stability are suf-
ciently weighty to justify the law. [Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S.
351 (1997)]
d. Nonpartisan Blanket Primary

A state primary ballot law providing that candidates self-identify their party preference
and that the two top vote getters advance to the general election does not on its face
violate the association rights of political parties. Rationale: (i) The law does not state
that any candidate is a partys nominee, (ii) there was no evidence that voters would be
confused by the self-identications, and (iii) the state may design a ballot that will make
this clear. [Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S.
442 (2008)]
2. Party Regulation
The state has less interest in governing party activities than in governing elections in general.
Thus, the Court has held invalid a statute prohibiting the governing committee of a political
party from endorsing or opposing candidates in primary elections. [Eu v. San Francisco
County Democratic Central Committee, 489 U.S. 214 (1989); and see California Democratic
Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000)state cannot require political parties to allow nonparty
members to vote in the partys primary election] Similarly, it has held invalid state regula-
tions concerning the selection of delegates to a national party convention and the selection of
candidates at such elections. [Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975); Democratic Party v.
LaFolette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981)]
a. Judicial Candidate Selection

A state law that permits political parties to choose nominees for state judgeships at
state conventions does not violate the freedom of association rights of candidates for
judgeships simply because the historic domination of party leaders results in strongly
favoring those that they support. Rationale: This process has been a traditional means
of choosing party nominees. [New York State Board of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552
U.S. 196 (2008)]
3. Limits on Contributions
A statute limiting election campaign contributions is not tested under a strict scrutiny
standard; rather, it must be closely drawn to match a sufciently important interestan
intermediate scrutiny standard. [McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93
(2003)]
a. To Political Candidate
Laws limiting the amount of money that a person or group may contribute to a polit-
ical candidate are valid, since the government has a sufciently important interest in
stopping the fact (or appearance) of corruption that may result from large contributions.
Moreover, such laws do not substantially restrict freedom of expression or freedom of
association (as long as the contributor may spend his money directly to discuss candi-
dates and issues). [Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)]
1) Equalizing Large Expenditures

A law increasing contribution limits for a candidate whose wealthy opponent
achieves an advantage by spending personal funds (exceeding $350,000) violates
the First Amendment. Rationale: Although Congress may raise contribution limits
for both candidates in situations of this kind, penalizing a self-nancing candi-
date who robustly expresses the right to advocate his own election cannot be justi-
ed by leveling opportunities for candidates of different personal wealth. [Davis v.
Federal Election Commission, 554 U.S. 724 (2008)]
b. To Ballot Referendum Committee

The government may not limit contributions to a political committee that supports
or opposes a ballot referendum (as opposed to one that supports a political candi-
date). Such a limitation on contributions to inuence referendum elections violates the
freedoms of speech and association. [Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454
U.S. 290 (1982)]
c. Disclosure of Contributors or Recipients of Money

The government may require a political party or committee to disclose the names of
contributors or recipients of money to or from the party or committee. However, if the
party or committee can show a reasonable probability that disclosure will cause harm
to the party, committee, or private individuals, they have a First Amendment right to
refuse to make such disclosures. [Brown v. Socialist Workers 74 Campaign Committee,
454 U.S. 1122 (1982)]
d. Aggregate Contribution Limits Unconstitutional

The government may not limit the aggregate amount one person or entity contributes
to political candidates or committees during an election even though it may limit the
amount given to a single candidate. Aggregate limits violate the First Amendments
protection of political speech because unlike individual contribution limits, they do
not further the governments interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or the
appearance of such, and they seriously restrict participation in the democratic process.
Spending large sums of money in connection with elections, but not in an effort to
control the exercise of a specic ofceholders duties, does not give rise to such corrup-
tion, nor does the possibility that the contributor may garner inuence over or access
to elected ofcials or political parties. [McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission,
572 U.S. (2014)]
4. Limits on Expenditures
As discussed above, the government may limit the amount that a person is permitted to
contribute to anothers campaign. However, the government may not limit the amount
that a person expends on his own campaign. [Buckley v. Valeo, supra] Neither may the
government limit the amount that a person spends to get a candidate elected, as long as the
expenditures are not contributed directly to the candidate nor coordinated with that of the
candidatei.e., the expenditures must be independent of the candidate and not disguised
contributions. Thus, corporations, unions, etc., may spend whatever they desire to get a
candidate elected. [See, e.g., Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310
(2010)]
5. CompareRegulations of Core Political Speech

Regulation of core political speech must be distinguished from regulation of the process
surrounding elections. Regulation of core political speech will be upheld only if it passes
muster under strict scrutiny. [McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995)]
a. Prohibiting Any Election Day Campaigning

A state law prohibiting any campaigning on election day has been held invalid as
applied to a newspaper urging people to vote in a certain way. The right to comment on
political issues is one of the most essential elements of free speech, and such conduct
by newspapers would pose little danger to conducting elections. [Mills v. Alabama, 384
U.S. 214 (1966)]
1) CompareHundred-Foot Limit
A law prohibiting campaign activity within 100 feet of a polling place is valid.
Even though the law is content based and concerns an essential element of free
speech, it is necessary to serve the compelling interest of preventing voter intimi-
dation and election fraud. [Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992)]
b. Prohibiting Anonymous Campaign Literature

Laws prohibiting distribution of anonymous campaign literature involve core political
speech and have been stricken because they were not narrowly tailored to a compelling
state interest. [McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, supra; Buckley v. American
Constitutional Law Foundation, 525 U.S. 182 (1999)]
c. Prohibiting Judge Candidates from Announcing Their Views

A rule prohibiting candidates for judicial election from announcing their views on
disputed legal and political issues violates the First Amendment. This is both a content-
based restriction and a restriction on core political speech. In either case, it can be
justied only if it is necessary to a compelling state interest. Two state interests were
suggested to support the rule here: It is necessary to maintain an impartial judiciary and
it is necessary to preserve the appearance of impartiality. The Court found that the rule
is woefully underinclusive and so is not tailored at all toward achieving these goals.
For example, it allows candidates to show bias toward political parties while it prohibits
them from stating an opinion about political issues. The Court also found that nding
judges without any preconceptions in favor of particular legal views is not a compel-
ling interest because it would be both impossible to nd such a person and undesirable.
[Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002)]
d. Distinguishing Political Speech from Candidate Advocacy

An ad concerning a political issue, even if sponsored by a corporation, run during an
election campaign will be considered to be core political speechrather than candidate
advocacyunless it is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than one as
an appeal to vote for or against a particular candidate. [Federal Election Commission
v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007)ad urging voters to contact
their senators to encourage them to end a libuster of federal judicial nominations was
core political speechand could not be bannedeven when one of the senators was
running for re-election]
e. Solicitation of Campaign Funds by Judicial Candidates

A state may ban personal solicitation of campaign funds by judicial candidates.
Rationale: If judicial candidates personally ask for money, individuals might feel
obligated to donate in the hopes of garnering a favor from the candidates or from fear
of retribution for not donating. The ban withstands strict scrutiny because it advances
the states compelling interest in preserving public condence in the integrity of the
judiciary, and it does so through means narrowly tailored to avoid unnecessarily
abridging speech. [Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S.Ct. 1656 (2015)]
C. BAR MEMBERSHIP AND PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT

The government often requires persons who accept government jobs to submit to loyalty oaths and
refrain from certain conduct (e.g., campaigning). Such regulations often impact upon the freedom
of speech and association.
1. Restraints on Speech Activities of Government Employees

Under the First Amendment, speech generally cannot be regulated or punished based on the
content of the speech unless the regulation or punishment is necessary to achieve a compel-
ling government interest. However, special rules apply when the government seeks to punish
a government employee for speech or speech-related activities.
a. Speech Made Pursuant to Ofcial Duties

A government employer may punish a government employees speech whenever the
speech is made on the job and pursuant to the employees ofcial duties. This is true
even if the speech touches on a matter of public concern. [Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S.
410 (2006)]
Example: P, a district attorney, reviewed a case, concluded that there were
irregularities in an underlying search warrant, contacted his supervi-
sors, and suggested dismissing the case. Ps supervisors nevertheless
proceeded with the prosecution. At a hearing challenging the warrant,
P again raised his concerns about the warrant, but the court rejected the
challenge. P claims that he was then subjected to retaliatory employment
actions because of his testimony and sued his employer for violating his
First Amendment rights. Ps employer denied undertaking any retalia-
tory actions, but even if such actions did occur, no First Amendment
violation could occur here because the speech was undertaken as part
of Ps joba government employer may evaluate an employee based on
any writing or speech that the employee undertakes as part of his ofcial
duties. [Garcetti v. Ceballos, supra]
b. Other Speech
If speech is not made pursuant to an employees ofcial duties, two tests apply. If a
government employees speech does not involve a matter of public concern, the courts
give the government employer a wide degree of deference and allow the employer to
punish the employee if the speech was disruptive of the work environment. However, if
a matter of public concern is involved, courts must balance the employees rights as a
citizen to comment on a matter of public concern against the governments interest as an
employer in efcient performance of public service.
Examples: 1) A teacher cannot be red for writing a letter to a newspaper attacking
the school superintendents handling of proposals to raise new revenue
for the schoola matter of public concern. [Pickering v. Board of
Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968)]
2) The Court held invalid the ring of a clerical employee from a

constables ofce for expressing her disappointment that an assassina-
tion attempt on President Reagan did not succeed, because in context the
statement could not be understood to be an actual threat or an action that
would interfere with the running of the ofce; rather, the Court viewed it
as a commentary on the public issue of the Presidents policies. [Rankin
v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987)]
Compare: The Court upheld the ring of an attorney for circulating in the ofce
a petition regarding transfer policies. [Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138
(1983)]
1) Petition Clause Claims Treated Similarly

A government employees right under the First Amendment to petition the govern-
ment for redress is governed by the principles discussed above. Thus, unless a
government employees grievance relates to a matter of public concern, it is not a
constitutionally protected activity, and the employee may not bring a constitutional
tort suit (under 42 U.S.C. section 1983) alleging that his employer took retaliatory
actions in violation of the employees right to petition. [Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S.
Ct. 2488 (2011)]
c. Participation in Political Campaigns

The federal government may prohibit federal executive branch employees from taking
an active part in political campaigns. The rationale is twofold: to further nonpartisan-
ship in administration and to protect employees from being coerced to work for the
election of their employers. [United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947)]
d. Bans on Receiving Honoraria

A provision of the Ethics in Government Act banning government employees from
accepting an honorarium for making speeches, writing articles, or making appearances
was held to violate the First Amendment when applied to rank and le employees.
Such a rule deters speech within a broad category of expression by a massive number
of potential speakers and thus can be justied only if the government can show that the
employees and their potential audiences rights are outweighed by the necessary impact
the speech would have on actual operation of the government. The government failed to
cite any evidence of misconduct related to honoraria by the rank and le employees, and
so failed to meet the burden here. [United States v. National Treasury Employees Union,
513 U.S. 454 (1995)]
e. Patronage
The First Amendment freedoms of political belief and association forbid the hiring,
promotion, transfer, ring, or recall of a public employee because of the person's polit-
ical views or political party afliation unless the hiring authority demonstrates that
party afliation or beliefs are appropriate requirements for the effective performance of
the public ofce involved, e.g., policymaking or condential nature of work. [Rutan
v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990)]
2. Loyalty Oaths
It is permissible for the federal government to require employees and other public ofcers to
take loyalty oaths. However, such oaths will not be upheld if they are overbroad (i.e., prohibit
constitutionally protected activities) or are vague so that they have a chilling effect on First
Amendment activities.
a. Overbreadth
1) Knowledge of Organizations Aim Required

Public employment cannot be denied to persons who are simply members of the
Communist Party because only knowing membership with specic intent to
further unlawful aims is unprotected by the First Amendment. [Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967)]
2) Advocacy of Doctrine Protected

A political party may not be denied a place on the ballot for refusing to take a
loyalty oath that it does not advocate violent overthrow of the government as an
abstract doctrine. The First Amendment forbids statutes regulating advocacy that
are not limited to advocacy of action. [Communist Party v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S.
441 (1974)]
b. Vagueness
1) Oaths Upheld
Compare the following oaths that have been upheld:
a) To Support the Constitution

An oath that required public employees and bar applicants to support the
Constitution of the United States and the state constitution has been upheld.
[Connell v. Higgenbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971)]
b) To Oppose the Overthrow of the Government

An oath required of all state employees to oppose the overthrow of the
government . . . by force, violence, or by an illegal or unconstitutional
method has also been upheld. The Court read this oath as akin to those
requiring the taker simply to support the Constitution, to commit
themselves to live by the constitutional processes of our system. Moreover,
the oath provided fair notice, because its violation could be punished only by
a prosecution for perjury, which required proof of knowing falsity. [Cole v.
Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972)]
2) Oath Not Upheld

A loyalty oath for public employees that they promote respect for the ag and . . .
reverence for law and order is void for vagueness, since a refusal to salute the ag
on religious grounds might be found in breach thereof. [Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S.
360 (1964)]
3. Disclosure of Associations
Forcing disclosure of First Amendment activities as a condition of public employment, bar
membership, or other public benets may have a chilling effect. Thus, the state cannot force
every prospective government employee to disclose every organizational membership. Such
a broad disclosure has insufcient relation to loyalty and professional competence, and the
state has available less drastic means to achieve its purpose. [Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960)] The state may inquire only into those activities that are relevant to the position. If
the candidate fails to answer relevant questions, employment may be denied. [Konigsberg v.
State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961)]
a. Fifth Amendment Limitation

If the job candidate refuses to answer on a claim of the privilege against self-incrim-
ination, denial of the job violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. [Spevack v.
Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967)] However, if individuals are ordered by appropriate authori-
ties to answer questions specically, directly, and narrowly relating to their ofcial
duties, and they refuse to do so by claiming the privilege against self-incrimination,
they may be denied the job or discharged without violating the Fifth Amendment,
if they were given immunity from the use of their answers or the fruits thereof in a
criminal prosecution. [Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973); Gardner v. Broderick,

392 U.S. 273 (1968)]
4. Practice of Law
Regulation of the legal profession may conict with the freedom of association rights of
certain groups because it may impair their ability to band together to advise each other and
utilize counsel in their common interest.
a. Countervailing State Interest Required

To overcome a groups right to exercise its First Amendment rights, the state must show
a substantial interest, such as evidence of objectionable practices occurring or an actual
or clearly threatened conict of interest between lawyer and client.
Examples: 1) The NAACP encouraged, instructed, and offered to represent parents
of black children to litigate against school segregation. This was held to
be protected political expression. The states ban on solicitation of legal
business was inapplicable because the NAACP sought no monetary gain.
[NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)]
2) A railroad labor union recommended a specic lawyer to pursue
rights of members injured on the job, and also obtained a fee from a
lawyer for performing investigative services. This was held protected.
[Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964)]
D. SCHOOL SPONSORSHIP OF EXTRACURRICULAR CLUBS
The Supreme Court has held that the compelling interest test does not apply to infringement
cases involving public school sponsorship of extracurricular clubs; instead, the test used in
limited-public-forum-speech cases appliessponsorship of associations can be subject to regula-
tion that is viewpoint neutral and reasonably related to a legitimate government interest. (See
XX.B.2.c.2), supra.)
Example: A public law school ofcially recognized student groups and gave them funding
from mandatory student activity fees only if the groups accepted all students
regardless of their status or beliefs (i.e.,the all comers policy). A group that
required students to sign a statement of faith based on Christian beliefs and denied
membership to persons who supported homosexuality and premarital sex sought
an exemption from the all comers policy and was denied. The group sued the
school, claiming that the policy violated members associational rights. Held: The
all comers policy is constitutional. It is viewpoint neutral in that it draws no
distinctions on point of view. Moreover, it is reasonably related to school purposes
such as encouraging tolerance and providing leadership, educational, and social
opportunities to all students. [Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, XX.B.2.c.2),
supra]
XXII. FREEDOM OF RELIGION
A. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
The First Amendment provides Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
B. APPLICABILITY TO THE STATES

Both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment apply to the states
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
C. FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
1. No Punishment of Beliefs
The Free Exercise Clause prohibits the government from punishing (denying benets to, or
imposing burdens on) someone on the basis of the persons religious beliefs. It is sometimes
said that the government can engage in such activity only if it is necessary to achieve a
compelling interest; sometimes the rule is stated as a total prohibition of such government
actions. In any case, the Supreme Court has never found an interest that was so compelling
that it would justify punishing a religious belief.
a. What Constitutes Religious Belief?

The Supreme Court has not dened what constitutes a religious belief. However, it
has made clear that religious belief does not require recognition of a supreme being
[Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961)], and need not arise from a traditional, or
even an organized, religion [see Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security,
489 U.S. 829 (1989)]. One possible denition is that the belief must occupy a place
in the believers life parallel to that occupied by orthodox religious beliefs. [United
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965)interpreting statutory, rather than constitutional,
provision] In any case, the Court has never held an asserted religious belief to be not
religious for First Amendment purposes.
1) Courts May Not Find Religious Beliefs to Be False

The courts may not declare a religious belief to be false. For example, if a
person says he talked to God and that God said the person should solicit money,
he cannot be found guilty of fraud on the basis that God never made such a state-
ment. However, the court may determine whether the person is sincerely asserting
a belief in the divine statement. [United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), as
described in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)]
b. Religious Oaths for Governmental Jobs Prohibited

The federal government may not require any federal ofce holder or employee to take
an oath based on a religious belief as a condition for receiving the federal ofce or
job, because such a requirement is prohibited by Article VI of the Constitution. State
and local governments are prohibited from requiring such oaths by the Free Exercise
Clause. [Torcaso v. Watkins, supra]
c. States May Not Exclude Clerics from Public Ofce

A state may not exclude clerics (persons who hold an ofce or ofcial position in a
religious organization) from being elected to the state legislature, or from other govern-
mental positions, because that exclusion would impose a disability on these persons
based upon the nature of their religious views and their religious status. [McDaniel v.
Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978)]
2. No Punishment of Religious Conduct Solely Because It Is Religious

The Supreme Court has stated that the Free Exercise Clause prohibits the government
from punishing conduct merely because it is religious or displays religious belief (e.g., the
state cannot ban the use of peyote only when used in religious ceremonies). [Employment
Division v. Smith, supradicta] A law that is designed to suppress actions only because the
actions are religiously motivated is not a neutral law of general applicability. Such a law will
be invalid unless it is necessary to promote a compelling interest.
Example: A city law that prohibited the precise type of animal slaughter used in the
ritual of a particular religious sect violated the Free Exercise Clause because
the Court found that the law was designed solely to exclude the religious sect
from the city. The law was not a neutral law of general applicability; nor was
the law necessary to promote a compelling interest. [Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)]
Compare: A state law that excluded pursuit of a degree in devotional theology from a
college scholarship program for all students did not violate the Free Exercise
Clause. Although a school could provide such scholarships without violating
the Establishment Clause (see infra), the Free Exercise Clause does not
require such scholarships. The exclusion from scholarship eligibility does not
show animus toward religion, but rather merely reects a decision not to fund
this activity. Moreover, the burden that the exclusion imposes on religion is
modest, and there is substantial historical support against using tax funds to
support the ministry. [Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004)]
3. States Can Regulate General ConductCriminal Laws and Other Regulations
Of course, states may prohibit or regulate conduct in general, and this is true even if the
prohibition or regulation happens to interfere with a persons religious practices. The Free
Exercise Clause cannot be used to challenge a law of general applicability unless it can
be shown that the law was motivated by a desire to interfere with religion. [Employment
Division v. Smith, supra]
a. Generally No Exemptions Required
The Free Exercise Clause does not require exemptions from criminal laws or other
governmental regulations for a person whose religious beliefs prevent him from
conforming his behavior to the requirements of the law. In other words, a law that
regulates the conduct of all persons can be applied to prohibit the conduct of a person
despite the fact that his religious beliefs prevent him from complying with the law.
1) Federal Statutory ExemptionOutside the Scope of Exam
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) allows a person to challenge
federal laws of general applicability as burdening his religious beliefs and
practices. If there is a substantial burdening of religious free exercise, under
RFRA the government must meet strict scrutiny. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc.,
573 U.S. (2014), the Court found that a federal requirement that businesses
include contraceptive coverage in their insurance coverage for employees violates
RFRA for close corporations whose owners object to this on religious grounds.
However, RFRA is statutory in nature and is outside the scope of a constitutional
law question.
b. Examples
The Supreme Court has held that no religious exemption was required from the
following religiously neutral regulations, even though certain groups objected because
the regulation interfered with conduct inspired by sincerely held religious beliefs:
1) Prohibition against use of peyote [Employment Division v. Smith, supra

challenged by person whose religious beliefs require use of peyote during religious
ceremony];
2) Denial of tax exempt status to schools that discriminate on the basis of race
[Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983)challenged by
religious school whose tenets require certain separations of races];
3) Requirement that employers comply with federal minimum wage laws [Tony and
Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985)challenged
by employer that argued minimum wages interfere with members religious desires
to work without compensation];
4) Requirement that employers pay Social Security taxes [United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252 (1982)challenged by person whose religious beliefs prohibited payment
and receipt of Social Security type payments]; and
5) Sales and use taxes [Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization of

California, 493 U.S. 378 (1990)challenged as applied to sales of goods and
literature by religious group].
c. Cases in Which Exemptions Were Required
1) Ministerial Exemption
The Supreme Court has held that religious organizations must be granted an
exemption from suits alleging employment discrimination by ministers against
their religious organizations. The government may not interfere with a decision of
a religious group to re one of its ministers. Imposing an unwanted minister would
infringe on the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious groups right to
shape its own faith through appointments. And allowing the government to deter-
mine who will minister within a faith also violates the Establishment Clause by
interfering with ecclesiastical decisions. Moreover, this ministerial exception is not
limited to the head of a religious congregation; it can extend to others in positions
considered by the congregation to be ministerial. [Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
132 S. Ct. 694 (2012)ministerial exemption applied to parochial school teacher
considered to be called, who trained by taking a number of college level courses
and was given a diploma with the title Minister of Religion, who occasionally led
school worship, and whom the congregation prayed for as a minister]
2) Unemployment Compensation CasesSome Exemptions Required

Many state unemployment compensation programs make payments only to persons
who are involuntarily unemployed (i.e., were red or laid off rather than resigned),
and who are available for work (i.e., willing to accept offered employment). Here,
however, unlike other areas of regulation, the Supreme Court has held that the
states must grant religious exemptions. Thus, if a person resigns from a job or
refuses to accept a job because it conicts with her religious beliefs, the state must
pay her unemployment compensation if she is otherwise entitled.
Examples: 1) A state cannot deny unemployment compensation merely
because the applicant quit a job rather than work on a holy day
on which religious beliefs forbid work. [Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963)]
2) A state cannot deny unemployment compensation merely

because the applicant quit his job rather than work on production
of military equipment after his factory converted from nonmilitary
to military production. [Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707
(1981)]
a) Need Not Belong to Formal Religious Organization

A person does not have to be a member of a formal religious organization
to receive the above exemptions from unemployment compensation require-
ments. All that is required is that the person sincerely hold religious beliefs
that prevent him from working on a certain day or on military products.
[Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 1.a., supra]
b) LimitationCriminal Prohibitions
The unemployment compensation cases do not give individuals a right to
disregard criminal laws due to their religious beliefs. Thus, unemployment
compensation laws may disqualify persons red for misconduct (which
includes any violation of criminal law).
Example: A person was red from his job as a counselor at a private
drug abuse clinic when it was discovered that he used peyote
(at times when he was not at work) for religious reasons. All
use of peyote was illegal in the state (even if the use was
part of a religious ceremony). The Supreme Court held that
unemployment compensation could properly be denied here.
[Employment Division v. Smith, supra ]
3) Right of Amish Not to Educate Children

The Supreme Court has required an exemption for the Amish from a neutral
law that required school attendance until age 16, because a fundamental tenet of
Amish religion forbids secondary education. The Court found that the Amish are
productive and law-abiding, and ruled that the right to educate ones children (see
XIX.B.6., supra) and the Free Exercise Clause outweighed the states interest here.
[Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)]
D. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The Establishment Clause, along with the Free Exercise Clause, compels the government
to pursue a course of neutrality toward religion. Government action challenged under the
Establishment Clause will be found invalid unless the action:
(i) Has a secular purpose;

(ii) Has a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
(iii) Does not produce excessive government entanglement with religion.
[Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)the Lemon test] (Note that some recent cases have
simply focused on whether the action is neutral as between the religious and nonreligious when
there is no endorsement of a particular religion.) The Establishment Clause cases can be grouped
into four categories: (i) cases preferring one religious sect over others; (ii) a limited group of
cases unconnected to nancial aid or education; (iii) cases involving nancial aid to religiously
afliated institutions; and (iv) cases concerning religious activities in public schools. The details
regarding the Supreme Court rulings are given below.
1. Sect Preference
Government action that prefers one religious sect over others violates the Establishment
Clause, at least if such action is not necessary to achieve a compelling interest. The Court
generally will not even resort to the Lemon test in such a case, although such action would
fail the rst two prongs of the Lemon test, because if the government is favoring one
religious sect, it is acting with the purpose of and having the primary effect of aiding that
religion.
Example: A state law created a public school district whose boundaries were intention-
ally set to match the boundaries of a particular Jewish neighborhood (so that
several handicapped students would not have to be sent outside their neigh-
borhood to attend special education classes that the state required and which
the students private school could not adequately provide). The Supreme
Court found the law unconstitutional. [Board of Education v. Grumet, 512
U.S. 687 (1994)]
2. Cases Unconnected to Financial Aid or Education

In cases unconnected to nancial aid or education, a good rule of thumb is that a law
favoring or burdening religion or a specic religious group in particular will be invalid, but
a law favoring or burdening a larger segment of society that happens to include religious
groups will be upheld.
Example: The government may not delegate governmental power to religious organiza-
tions because such action would involve excessive governmental entangle-
ment. [Larkin v. Grendels Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982)statute gave
church-afliated schools power to veto nearby liquor licenses]
Compare: The IRS may deny tax exemptions claimed for religious donations when the
sums were paid to the church in exchange for services (e.g., classes) since
this is a general rule that applies to all charities. [Hernandez v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680 (1989)]
a. State Legislature Can Employ a Chaplain

Despite the principle of separation of church and state, the Court has held that a state
legislature could employ a chaplain and begin each legislative day with a prayer. [Marsh
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)] This decision was based on the history of legisla-
tive prayer in America; it does not modify the Religious Activities in Public Schools
rulings examined below.
b. Town Board Can Begin Town Meetings with a Prayer

Extending Marsh v. Chambers, supra, the Court has held that a town board may
begin its meetings with prayers led by clergy members listed in the towns congrega-
tion directory, even if the clergy is predominately Christian. The Court found the
practice is consistent with the tradition of legislative prayer and does not discriminate
against minority faiths nor coerce the participation of nonadherents, and therefore does
not violate the Establishment Clause. The Constitution requires only that the town is
equitable in drawing from available clergy, not that it ensure equal representation of all
faiths. [Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. (2014)]
c. Displays of Ten Commandments on Public Property

If a display of the Ten Commandments is shown to have a predominantly religious
purpose, it violates the Establishment Clause; otherwise, the Ten Commandments may
be displayed. [McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005)]
Example: Two counties posted large copies of the Ten Commandments in their
courthouses. After complaints based on the Establishment Clause, each
county adopted a resolution calling for a more extensive exhibit showing
that the Commandments are Kentuckys precedent legal code and
noting the state legislatures acknowledgment of Christ as the Prince
of Ethics. The displays were then modied to add smaller copies of
other historic texts with religious references (e.g., the endowed by their
creator clause of the Declaration of Independence). A district court
found the displays invalid under the Lemon test because they lacked any
secular purpose. The counties again modied the displayswithout any
guiding resolutionsto include eight equally sized items around the
Ten Commandments (including the Bill of Rights and a picture of Lady
Justice) and the title Foundations of American Law and Government.
The ACLU moved to enjoin these displays, claiming that their purpose
was still religious rather than secular. Given the displays history, the
Supreme Court agreed, nding that the taint from the earlier displays
had not been dissipated even though, on their faces, the most current
displays appeared not to have a religious purpose. [McCreary County v.
ACLU, supra]
Compare: A monument of the Ten Commandments on a 22-acre State Capitol

ground displaying 17 monuments and 21 historical markers commemo-
rating the states people, ideals, and events that compose its identity
communicated not only a religious message but also a secular moral
message, and its setting suggested that the state intended the secular
message to predominate. [Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005)]
d. Some Holiday Displays Are Permissible

If the government maintains a holiday-Christmastime display that does not appear to
endorse religion, the display will survive review under the three-part Establishment
Clause test. If a governments holiday display includes religious symbols (e.g., a nativity
scene or a menorah) as well as other holiday decorations (e.g., a Christmas tree or
a Santa Claus gure), the courts will hold that the display: (i) has a secular purpose
(based on the history of government recognition of holidays); (ii) has a primary
nonreligious effect (it does not endorse religion); and (iii) does not create exces-
sive entanglement between government and religion. If the display includes only the
religious symbols (e.g., only a nativity scene), it will violate the Establishment Clause
because it has a religious effect (it endorses religion). [County of Allegheny v. ACLU,
492 U.S. 573 (1989)]
e. Absolute Right Not to Work on a Sabbath Impermissible

The state may not force employers to grant all employees an absolute right to refrain
from working on their sabbath, because the primary effect of such a law is to advance
religion. [Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985)] However, a state may
require employers to make reasonable efforts to accommodate employee religious
practices.
f. Exemptions from Antidiscrimination Laws

The federal government may exempt religious organizations from the federal statu-
tory prohibition against discrimination in employment on the basis of religion, at least
regarding their nonprot activities. Thus, a janitor can be discharged from his employ-
ment at a gymnasium owned by a religious organization (which was open to the public
and run as a nonprot facility) because he was not a member of that religious organiza-
tion. [Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987)]
3. Cases Involving Financial Benets to Church-Related Institutions

A statute authorizing governmental aid to a religiously afliated institution (hospital, school,
etc.) must be tested under the general test detailed above (secular purpose, primary effect,
and excessive entanglement). However, the Supreme Court applies these tests with greater
strictness when the government aid is going to a religiously afliated grade school or high
school than it does when the aid is going to another type of religiously afliated institution
(such as a college or hospital).
a. Recipient-Based Aid
The government may give aid in the form of nancial assistance to a dened class of
persons as long as the class is dened without reference to religion or religious criteria.
Such a program is valid even if persons who receive the nancial assistance are thereby
enabled to attend a religiously afliated school.
Examples: 1) The Supreme Court upheld a state program that made education
subsidy payments directly to a blind or disabled student even though a
student used his aid to study at a Christian college for the purpose of
becoming a pastor or missionary. The class of persons who received
the aid was dened without reference to any religious criteria; only
an incidental benet would go to the religiously afliated college or
vocational training institution. The aid program thus passed review
under the purpose, effect, and entanglement tests. [Witters v. Washington
Department of Services, 474 U.S. 481 (1986)]
2) The Court held that the Establishment Clause would not prevent a
public school district from paying for a sign language interpreter for
a deaf student at a religious high school under a religiously neutral
program of aid to all handicapped school children in both public and

private schools. [Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1
(1993)]
3) The Supreme Court upheld a program that provided tuition vouchers

to parents of poor children in kindergarten through the eighth grade
which could be used to pay for attending participating public or private
schools of their parents choice, even though a very high percentage of
the recipients chose to attend religiously afliated schools. The program
was part of a larger program that also created publicly funded magnet
schools and community schools that were independent from the local
school district. The Court found that the program did not have the
purpose or effect of advancing religion. Its purpose was secularto
provide educational assistance to poor children in a failing public school
system. Its primary effect was to provide poor children with funds to
attend other schools. Any benet to the religious schools resulted from
parents choosing to send their children to those schools and was not
attributable to the government. [Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S.
639 (2002)]
1) CompareTuition Tax Deductions or Credits Limited to Religious School

Tuition
A state may not use a system of statutory grants, tax credits, or tax deductions to
reimburse parents or students for tuition paid only to religiously afliated schools.
However, a tax deduction to all students or parents based on the actual expendi-
tures for attending any public or private school (including religious schools) has
been upheld. [Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983)]
It would appear that a valid tax deduction statute must allow a deduction for: (i)
expenditures for public as well as private schools; and (ii) some expenditures other
than tuition (such as expenditures for school supplies or books) so that public
school students or their parents may benet from the deduction.
b. Aid to Colleges, Hospitals, Etc.

The Court will uphold a government grant of aid to the secular activity of a religiously
afliated hospital or college (such as a grant to build a new hospital ward or a labora-
tory-classroom building) as long as the government program requires that the aid be
used only for nonreligious purposes, and the recipient so agrees in good faith. [Tilton
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Bradeld v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899)]
Example: The Adolescent Family Life Actwhich provides for grants of govern-
ment funds to a variety of public and private (including religiously
afliated) agencies to provide counseling and educational services to
young people regarding sexual activityhas been upheld. The Act has
a secular purpose (dealing with problems of teenage pregnancy). The
Act does not on its face advance religion because a religiously afliated
organization could contractually be required to use the funds for nonre-
ligious counseling. And the Act does not give rise to excessive entangle-
ment because there is no reason to assume that a signicant percentage
of the funds would be granted to pervasively sectarian institutions.

[Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988)]
c. Aid to Religiously Afliated Grade Schools or High Schools
Programs of aid to these institutions are subject to the same three-part test as are all
other laws under the Establishment Clause. Most of the time, such programs will have a
secular purposeto aid in education. However, if signicant aid is given to the religious
school, the program may be deemed to have a primary effect that advances religion. If
the government program has detailed administrative or legislative regulations that are
designed to ensure that the aid does not result in a primary effect of advancing religion,
the law may be stricken as giving rise to an excessive entanglement between govern-
ment and religion.
1) Aid Upheld
The Supreme Court has upheld state programs that:
a) Provide state-approved textbooks to all students [Board of Education v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968)] (but note that the state may not loan textbooks
to students attending schools that discriminate on the basis of race, since this
would violate the Fourteenth Amendment [Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S.
455 (1973)]);
b) Lend religiously neutral instructional materials (e.g., library books,
computers) to parochial schools as well as to public and other nonprot
private schools, where the program did not dene recipients by reference to
religion and the challenger did not prove that the neutral aid was used for
religious indoctrination. [Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000)overruling
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975)];
c) Provide transportation to and from school to all students [Everson v. Board
of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)];
d) Reimburse private schools for the expenses of compiling state-required data,
such as student attendance records, or administering and grading standard-
ized state educational achievement tests [Committee for Public Education and
Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980)]; and
e) Provide auxiliary services ( e.g., remedial education, guidance, or job
counseling) to all disadvantaged children at their school, including children at
parochial schools [Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997)].
2) Aid Invalidated
The Supreme Court has struck down the following state programs, either because
they had a primary effect that advanced religion or because they involved excessive
entanglement between government and religion:
a) Programs paying a portion of private school teachers salaries (for their
secular classes), since the primary effect would be to advance religion and a
system to ensure that the money/teachers not be used for religious purposes
would involve excessive entanglements. [Lemon v. Kurtzman, D., supra ]; and
b) Programs reimbursing private schools for writing achievement tests (this

would have the primary effect of advancing religion since the schools could
write tests advancing their religious mission) [Levitt v. Community for Public
Education, 413 U.S. 472 (1973)].
d. Tax Exemption for Religious, Charitable, or Educational Property

An exemption from property taxation for real or personal property used exclusively
for religious, educational, or charitable purposes does not violate the Establishment
Clause. Neither the purpose nor the effect of such an exemption is the advancement or
the inhibition of religion, and it constitutes neither sponsorship nor hostility, nor exces-
sive government entanglement with religion. The government does not transfer part of
its revenue to churches but simply abstains from demanding that the church support the
state . . . . [Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)]
e. Tax Exemption Available Only to Religions

Although religious schools or religious associations may be included in tax exemp-
tions available to a variety of secular and religious organizations, a tax exemption
that is available only for religious organizations or religious activities violates the
Establishment Clause. [Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989)an exemp-
tion from the sales and use tax for religious magazines or books (but no other publica-
tions) violates the Establishment Clause]
4. Religious Activities in Public Schools
a. Prayer and Bible Reading

Prayer and Bible reading in school are invalid as establishments of religion. [Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)]
It does not matter whether participation is voluntary or involuntary, and neither does
it matter that the prayer period is designated as a period of silent prayer or meditation.
[Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985)] This rule extends to prohibit public school
ofcials from having clerics give invocation and benediction prayers at graduation
ceremonies. [Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)] Similarly, a school policy autho-
rizing students to elect whether to have a student invocation before varsity games, to
select a student to deliver it, and to decide its content violates the Establishment Clause.
Unlike student speeches at an open public forum (see d., below), this policys purpose is
to encourage religious messages. [Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S.
290 (2000)]
b. Posting Ten Commandments in Classroom Is Invalid

Posting the Ten Commandments on the walls of public school classrooms plainly serves
a religious purpose and is invalid, despite the legislatures statement that it was for a
secular purpose. [Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)]
c. Released-Time Programs
1) In Public School Building
Programs in which regular classes end an hour early one day a week and religious
instruction is given in public school classrooms to students who request it are
invalid. [McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948)]
2) Nonpublic Building Used

Programs in which participating children go to religious classes conducted at
religious centers away from the public school do not violate the Establishment
Clause. [Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952)]
d. Accommodation of Religious StudentsOn-Campus Meetings

As discussed at XX.B.1.c., supra, under the Free Speech Clause, if a public school
allows members of the public and private organizations to use school property when
classes are not in session, it cannot deny a religious organization permission to use the
property for meetings merely because religious topics will be discussed. Such an equal
access rule does not violate the Establishment Clause because the primary purpose of
such programs is secular (to accommodate all interests), people are not likely to assume
that the government endorses the religious ideas discussed, and there is no excessive
government entanglement, at least where the meetings are not run by school personnel.
[Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001)]
e. Curriculum Controls
A government statute or regulation that modies a public school curriculum will violate
the Establishment Clause if it fails the secular purpose test, primary effect test, or
excessive government entanglement test.
Example: A state statute that prohibited the teaching of human biological evolution
in the states public schools was held to violate the Establishment Clause
because the Supreme Court found that the legislature had a religious
purpose for enacting the statute. [Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968)] Similarly, the Court invalidated a state statute that prohibited
instruction regarding evolution science (the theory of human biological
evolution) in the public schools unless that instruction was accompanied
by instruction regarding creation science, because the Court found that
the legislature enacted this statute for the purpose of promoting religion.
[Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987)]
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW MULTIPLE CHOICE QUESTIONS 1.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW MULTIPLE CHOICE QUESTIONS
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
You can use the sample multiple-choice questions below to review the law and practice your under-
standing of important concepts that you will likely see on your law school exam. To do more questions,
access StudySmart Law School software from the BARBRI website.
Question 1 Question 2
A 15-year-old sophomore high school student The owner of a chain of natural food stores
became pregnant, and the school board required located within a particular state contracted with
her to attend a special program for pregnant landowners and construction rms in a neigh-
students instead of her regular classes. The girl boring state in preparation for the opening of
did not want to attend a special program; rather, several new stores in the neighboring state. The
she wanted to attend her regular classes. chains products are stored and sold in bulk
within the stores. Consumers remove the amount
She sued the school district in federal district of product they want from bins within the stores,
court, demanding that she be allowed to attend place the product in plastic bags, and then
her regular classes. Before her case came to trial, present their bags at a checkout counter. Statutes
the girl gave birth to the child. Subsequently, the in the neighboring state in which the chain
district reinstated her in her regular classes. owner would like to open its new stores prohibit
the sale of food in bulk due to the health hazards
When her suit comes before the federal associated with bulk storage and contamination
district court, what should the court do? from consumer access to food sold from bins.
The state has prosecuted other grocers viola-
(A) Dismiss the action, because she is no lon- tions of the statute in the past.
ger pregnant.
The chain store owner seeks an injunction
(B) Dismiss the action, because she is no longer against state ofcials in the federal district
required to attend the special classes. court with jurisdiction over the matter. The state
ofcials move to dismiss the suit on the ground
(C) Hear the case on the merits, because she that the corporation lacked standing to sue.
may get pregnant again before she gradu-
ates from the high school. What would be the probable outcome?
(D) Hear the case on the merits, because it (A) The suit would be dismissed, because the
impacts the right to privacy, which is an owner has suffered no injury.
important federal issue.
(B) The suit would be dismissed, because the
challenged state legislation has no effect on
civil liberties.
(C) The federal court would hear the suit,

because a federal questioninterstate
commerceis involved.
(D) The federal court would hear the suit,

because the owner has undertaken substan-
tial steps to open outlets in the state.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW MULTIPLE CHOICE QUESTIONS
Congress enacted a statute that provided for To gain progress on critical treaty negotiations
direct money grants to the various states to be with another country, the President issued an
distributed by them to police agencies within ofcial pardon to the leader of a radical group
their jurisdictions for the purpose of purchasing who was in a state prison after being convicted
gas-efcient patrol vehicles. One of the objec- of a violent crime in the state. The President
tives of the statute was to help reduce the depen- directed the governor of the state to free the
dency of the United States on imported oil. leader but the governor refused. The Justice
Department brought an action in federal district
Which of the following would provide the best court seeking an order compelling his release.
constitutional justication for the statute?
How is the federal court most likely to rule?
(A) The Commerce Clause.
(A) For the state, because a state ofcial act-
(B) The power to tax and spend for the general ing pursuant to his states constitution need
welfare. not obey inconsistent orders from a federal
ofcial.
(C) The Necessary and Proper Clause.
(B) For the state, because the Presidents consti-
(D) The power to conduct the foreign relations tutional power to pardon prisoners extends
of the United States. only to those convicted of federal offenses.
(C) For the state, because the Presidents order

and the pardon given to the convicted
leader violate his duty to see that the laws
of the United States are faithfully executed.
(D) For the federal government, because the

Presidents actions are authorized by his
power to enter into treaties with other
nations.
A state statute prohibited the sale or posses- A state located in the southern half of the
sion of any food product containing more than United States experienced a strong inux of
one part per billion of a dangerous pesticide. An retirees, due in part to its mild winters and in
out-of-state driver taking her recreational vehicle part to the generous health benets that the state
through a corner of the state was stopped at a historically provided to its elderly residents who
state inspection station. When the state trooper fell below the federal poverty line. The states
learned that the pantry of her RV was stocked Ofce of Budget Management determined that
with food, he asked to test a few samples of her the inux of retirees would bankrupt the states
baked goods. The samples contained about 600 health care benet fund within ve years. To
parts per billion of the prohibited pesticide, and preserve the fund and ensure the health of its
all of the other baked goods in her possession citizens, the state revised its health care statute
were tested and found to have the same level of to make persons ineligible for coverage until
pesticide. All of her baked goods, worth about they have lived in the state for at least one year.
$150, were conscated and destroyed.
If a retiree who was denied benets because
The state in which the driver lived has no she just moved to the state challenges the consti-
laws governing the pesticide level of baked tutionality of the statute in federal court, is she
goods. A federal law designed to protect agricul- likely to prevail?
tural workers requires that any food product
containing more than 500 parts per billion of the (A) No, because the state has a compelling
toxic pesticide must be labeled as such and be in interest in maintaining the scal integrity
special containers. The driver brings an action of its health care fund.
in federal court asserting that the state statute
is invalid because it is preempted by the federal (B) No, because the states do not have a consti-
law. tutional duty to provide health care benets
to retirees even if they fall below the federal
How should the court rule as to this claim? poverty line.
(A) For the state, because the purposes of the (C) Yes, because the requirement improperly
federal law are different from those of the burdens the right of interstate travel in
challenged statute. violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
(B) For the state, because regulation of food
quality is a power reserved to the states by (D) Yes, because the requirement deprives some
the Tenth Amendment. retirees of certain privileges and immuni-
ties in violation of the Privileges and
(C) For the driver, because the federal law does Immunities Clause of Article IV.
not expressly permit states to enact more
stringent pesticide level controls.
(D) For the driver, because the federal law and

the state statute regulate the same subject
matter.
A states pension program provided supple- An abortion provider in a city closed her clinic
mental state pension benets to surviving after protestors picketed in front of her home
spouses and children of state employees. The for long periods of time. The city was left with
program provided that when the spouse remar- just one other clinic providing abortions. The
ried, that spouses benets would be gradu- city then adopted an ordinance prohibiting any
ally terminated based on a statutory formula. picketing on a public sidewalk or street adjacent
Because of statistics showing past disparities to and directed at a specic residence.
between the household income levels of male
surviving spouses and female surviving spouses, A group that wished to picket in front of a
different formulas were used for the termination business owners home because of his labor
schedule depending on whether the surviving practices challenged the constitutionality of the
spouse was male or female. ordinance in federal court.
A widower of a state employee was informed Will the groups challenge to the ordinance
after he remarried that his pension benets likely prevail?
would be terminated in 90 days according to
the applicable formula. Upon learning that a (A) No, because the ordinance is a permissible
similarly situated widow would have continued regulation of the location and manner of
to receive benets for six months after remar- picketing.
rying, the widower decided to le suit in federal
court, alleging that the state program is uncon- (B) No, because the ordinance is a means of
stitutional because it is discriminatory and it preserving a womans fundamental right
unfairly burdens his right to marry. of access to clinics providing abortion
services.
Which of the following best states the burden
of persuasion in this case? (C) Yes, because the government cannot show
that the ordinance is necessary to achieve a
(A) The state must demonstrate that the pro- compelling government interest.
gram is narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling government interest. (D) Yes, because sidewalks and streets in
residential neighborhoods are public
(B) The state must demonstrate that the forums.
program is substantially related to an
important government interest.
(C) The widower must demonstrate that the

program is not substantially related to an
important government interest.
(D) The widower must demonstrate that the

program is not rationally related to a legiti-
mate government interest.
On completion of a major expansion project, The legislature of a state was concerned that
a citys public library board adopted a usage the numerous and strident television, radio,
policy for the new meeting room that was added and newspaper advertisements by auto dealer-
to the facility. To alleviate the scheduling burden ships annoy and mislead the public. Therefore,
on the staff if the meeting room were open to it enacted comprehensive legislation regulating
all groups, the policy provided that the meeting the timing and content of such ads, limiting their
room was to be used only for library purposes duration, frequency, and the types of claims and
by the library staff, the library board, or groups information made and given.
afliated with the library, such as the librarys
teen advisory group or volunteer Friends of Which of the following statements is most
the Library group. A local organization that accurate as to the constitutionality of the states
promoted the political interests of an ethnic ad regulation?
minority in and around the city requested use of
the meeting room for an informational meeting (A) It is unconstitutional, because it infringes
that would be open to the public. Although on the First and Fourteenth Amendment
no other event was scheduled for the meeting rights of auto dealers to free speech.
room at the time requested, the library director
declined the organizations request, citing the (B) It is constitutional if it does not prohibit the
meeting room policy adopted by the library dissemination of truthful information about
board. The organization led suit in federal price and the availability of products, and
district court, challenging the librarys policy is narrowly tailored to serve a substantial
and seeking access to the meeting room. government interest.
How is the court likely to rule? (C) It is constitutional, because it is within the
police power of the state and no federal
(A) The librarys policy is valid, because limit- constitutional rights are infringed.
ing the meeting rooms use to library pur-
poses is reasonably related to a legitimate (D) It is unconstitutional, because it infringes
government purpose. on the rights of the auto dealers to enter
into contracts for advertising.
(B) The librarys policy is valid, because
limiting the meeting rooms use to library
purposes is narrowly tailored to serve a
signicant government interest.
(C) The librarys policy is not valid, because

limiting the meeting rooms use to library
purposes is restricting speech based on its
content.
(D) The librarys policy is not valid unless there

are alternative facilities in the area available
for groups to hold meetings.
To combat fraud and misuse of drivers The mayor of a small city decided that he
licenses, a states department of motor vehicles would like to start each city council meeting
enacted new regulations for the issuance of with a nonsectarian prayer. Several city council
drivers licenses. One of the regulations, which members and citizens objected to the proposal,
were authorized by state law, required for the claiming that it would violate the Establishment
rst time that drivers licenses display a photo- Clause of the First Amendment. The mayor
graph of the person whose name is on the argued that it would not constitute the estab-
license. The regulations did not provide for lishment of a religion because he would invite
any exemptions from this requirement. Living clerics from all of the different religious sects
entirely within the state was a religious sect to take turns giving the prayer at the meetings.
whose followers devoutly believed that allowing When the council members still objected, the
oneself to be photographed was sinful. However, mayor asked the city attorney to research the
because much of the state was rural and sparsely constitutionality of his proposal.
populated, members of the sect needed to travel
by automobile to obtain necessary services and How should the attorney advise the mayor?
to gather for worship. A member of the sect who
was refused a drivers license because he would (A) The proposal is constitutional, because
not allow himself to be photographed challenged by varying the clerics who will give the
the state regulation in federal court. prayer, it does not constitute an establish-
ment of religion.
Is the court likely to uphold the application of
the regulation to the religious group? (B) The proposal is constitutional, because
there is a long history in this country of
(A) Yes, because exempting the churchs mem- allowing prayer at legislative sessions.
bers from the regulation would not have a
secular purpose and would constitute im- (C) The proposal is unconstitutional, because it
proper state advancement of, and entangle- has no secular purpose.
ment with, religion.
(D) The proposal is unconstitutional, because
(B) Yes, because enactment of the regulation its primary effect advances religion.
was not motivated by a desire to interfere
with religion.
(C) No, unless the state shows that the regula-

tion is necessary to promote a compelling
governmental interest.
(D) No, because the opposition to the regulation

arises from a sincerely held religious belief.
ANSWERS TO MULTIPLE CHOICE QUESTIONS 7.
ANSWERS TO MULTIPLE CHOICE QUESTIONS
Answer to Question 1
(C) The court should hear the case on the merits. A real, live controversy must exist at all stages of
review, not merely when the complaint is led. If a true controversy no longer exists, the court
will dismiss the complaint as moot. A case becomes moot, for example, when a party can no
longer be affected by the challenged statute. Here, even though the girl is no longer pregnant, she
can get pregnant again, at which time she will be affected by the policy once again. Thus, the
harm to the girl (being taken out of regular classes) is capable of repetition but evading review
because by the time the case comes to trial, the girl may have given birth, miscarried, or had
an abortion. (C) is therefore correct. (A) is incorrect because, as discussed, she may become
pregnant again prior to graduation from high school. (B) is incorrect because, as discussed, the
harm is capable of repetition. Specically, if the girl gets pregnant again prior to graduation from
high school, she will be required to attend the special classes again. (D) is incorrect because it is
irrelevant. The fact that an important federal issue might be involved does not negate the case or
controversy requirement.
(D) The owner has standing to sue because it can demonstrate a concrete stake in the outcome of the
controversy and an impairment of its rights by the state statute. Federal courts will not consider
a constitutional challenge to government action unless the person challenging the action has
standing to raise the constitutional issue. Under the Supreme Court test, the person must have an
injury in factsuch a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to ensure the concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues. Here, the store owner has taken substan-
tial steps to open outlets in the state by contracting with landowners and construction rms in
that state, but cannot begin to operate these outlets without violating the state statutes; obtaining
the injunction against enforcement will eliminate the problem. The court will therefore hear the
suit. (A) is incorrect even though the store owner has not yet been prosecuted for violating the
statute. A person challenging the constitutionality of a statute does not need to violate it and await
prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief. Where there exists a clear threat of prosecution
if the person fails to comply with the statute (such as previous prosecutions of others), injury
in fact is established. (B) is incorrect because threatened economic injury as well as threatened
injury to civil liberties will create standing. (C) is incorrect. Although it is true that a federal
question is involved, it is not enough that a federal court has jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the question. Federal courts are authorized to hear cases and controversies, and the Supreme
Court has interpreted this language to require the plaintiff to have standingan injury in fact;
a concrete stake in the outcome. The motion to dismiss here was made on standing grounds.
Choice (D) reects the standing challenge, while choice (C) does not. If the court accepts the state
ofcials claim that the store owner lacked standing to sue, it would dismiss the suit regardless of
the federal issues involved.
(B) The statute is authorized by Congresss spending power. Article I, Section 8 gives Congress the
power to spend to provide for the common defense and general welfare. This power allows
Congress to spend for any public purpose as long as it does not infringe on other specic constitu-
tional restrictions (such as the Bill of Rights). The statute here is clearly for a public purpose and
is not otherwise unconstitutional; it is therefore within Congresss spending power. (A) is not as
8. ANSWERS TO MULTIPLE CHOICE QUESTIONS
good a choice as (B). The statute arguably does involve the commerce power because Congress has
very broad power to regulate interstate commerce, including any kind of commerce or transporta-
tion within a state that has a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce. However, that
power is generally invoked for federal legislation that directly regulates the state activity. Here, no
government action is involved except for the grant of money, which more closely implicates the
spending power. (C) is incorrect because the Necessary and Proper Clause is not by itself a basis of
power; it merely gives Congress power to execute specically granted powers. The grant of money
falls within a specic enumerated power of Congress; the Necessary and Proper Clause is not the
primary source of authority here. (D) is incorrect because the power to conduct foreign relations is
vested in the President. Congress shares some of this power in such cases as approval of treaties,
but the Presidents power to act for the United States in day-to-day foreign relations is paramount.
(B) The federal court will rule for the state. The President is empowered by the Constitution to grant
reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment.
Here, the President seeks to pardon a person who has been convicted of a violent crime in a
state. Thus, the Presidents pardon power does not extend to this prisoner, and the state will not
be compelled to release him. (A) is incorrect because, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution, the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States take precedence over state
laws. Any state law that is inconsistent with federal law will be superseded by the federal law.
Although a state ofcial may be acting pursuant to his states constitution, that constitution may
be in conict with the United States Constitution or with other federal law. In such an instance,
the state ofcial will be required to abide by proper directives of a federal ofcial issued in
furtherance of the enforcement and execution of federal law. (C) is incorrect. As noted above, the
President does have the power to pardon those convicted of federal offenses. Thus, an attempted
pardon of a federal offender does not violate the Presidents sworn duty to see that the laws of the
United States are faithfully executed; i.e., the President is not subverting the law by issuing a
pardon. It is in issuing a pardon for a crime that falls outside the scope of his pardon power that
the President runs afoul of the Constitution. (D) is incorrect because the Presidents treaty power
does not authorize his actions here. Although the Constitution gives the President the power to
make treaties, he is not given the authority to use unconstitutional means to facilitate the making
of a treaty. The President is acting here with the goal of advancing negotiations on a critical treaty.
However, in doing so, the President may not disregard the Constitution by issuing a pardon that is
outside the limits of his constitutionally derived pardon power.
(A) The court should rule for the state because the purpose of the federal law is different from the
purpose of the state law. The question here is whether the state law is preempted by the federal
law. Implied preemption will be found where it was the intent of the federal government to occupy
the entire eld with its regulation, the state law directly conicts with the federal law, or the state
provisions prevent achievement of federal objectives. Because the federal law here is aimed only
at occupational safety, no conclusion can be drawn that the federal government intended to occupy
the entire eld of regulation of pesticides, and the state law does not interfere with the federal
law. For regulations involving health, safety, and welfare, the Court will presume that state police
powers are not preempted unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress when it
enacted the federal law. Hence, the state law is not preempted, and (A) is correct and (D) is incor-
rect. (B) is incorrect because the Tenth Amendment reserves to the states only those powers not
granted to the federal government by the Constitution, and the federal government has the power
to regulate pesticides under the Commerce Clause, which gives Congress very broad power to
regulate any activity that, either in itself or in combination with other activities, has a substantial
economic effect on, or effect on movement in, interstate commerce. The production and distribu-
tion of food products containing pesticides would be such an activity. (C) is incorrect because
there need be no specic authorization for a state to regulate, as long as federal preemption does
not apply. While congressional power over interstate commerce is very broad, it is not exclusive
states may regulate local aspects of interstate commerce under certain conditions.
(C) The court will likely nd that the one-year residency requirement is unconstitutional because it
burdens the right to travel. An individual has a fundamental right to travel from state to state,
and a state law that is designed to deter persons from moving into the state is likely to violate the
Equal Protection Clause (as well as the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause).
When a state uses a durational residency requirement (a waiting period) for dispensing benets,
that requirement normally should be subject to the strict scrutiny test, and usually will be found
not to have satised the test. One such requirement that has been invalidated on this basis is a
one-year waiting period for state-subsidized medical care, such as the one here. [See Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County (1974)] (A) is incorrect. The Supreme Court has specically held
that a states interest in scal integrity is not sufcient to justify a one-year waiting period for
welfare or health benets. (B) contains a true statementthe states have no constitutional duty
to provide health care benets for those below the poverty line. However, once a state chooses
to provide such benets, it may not do so in a manner that violates the Constitution, and, as
explained above, the restriction here violates the right to travel. (D) is incorrect because the privi-
leges and immunities protection of Article IV prohibits discrimination by a state against nonresi-
dents when fundamental national rights are involved. Here, the restriction differentiates between
residents. While that could violate the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause,
Article IV is not implicated.
(B) The state has the burden of proving that the program is substantially related to an important
government interest. When analyzing government action based on gender, the courts will apply
an intermediate standard of review and strike the legislation unless it is substantially related to an
important government interest. In these cases, the government bears the burden of proving this
substantial relationship. Here, because the formula used to calculate termination of pension benets
depended on whether the surviving spouse was male or female, the legislation discriminates on the
basis of gender. Thus, an intermediate scrutiny standard will be applied. (A) is wrong because the
court will not apply the strict scrutiny standard in this case. A suspect class is not involved, and the
program does not improperly burden a fundamental right. While marriage is a fundamental right,
strict scrutiny applies only to legislation that directly and substantially interferes with the right to
marry. Laws terminating certain benets upon marriage do not directly and signicantly interfere
with that right, and thus are not subject to strict scrutiny. (C) is wrong because the government,
rather than the challenger, bears the burden of proof in gender discrimination cases. (D) is wrong
for the same reason and also because it applies the incorrect standard; an intermediate scrutiny
standard is applied rather than the minimal scrutiny of the rational basis test.
(A) The groups challenge is not likely to prevail. To be valid, government regulations of speech
and assembly in public forums (such as streets and sidewalks) must (i) be content neutral, (ii)
be narrowly tailored to serve an important government interest, and (iii) leave open alterna-
tive channels of communication. A regulation such as the one here satises this test. The statute
is content neutral because it regulates the location and manner of picketing without regard to
its content. It is narrowly tailored to serve the important interest of protecting the privacy of
homeowners when they are in their homes. It leaves open alternative channels of communication
because it does not ban marching through residential areas or other means of protesting. Hence,
the groups challenge is not likely to prevail. [See Frisby v. Schultz (1988)] (B) is incorrect. The
Court has upheld limited "buffer-zone" restrictions on protestors at clinics providing abortions,
deeming the restrictions a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation that served the important
interest of preserving access to health care facilities. [Hill v. Colorado (2000)] However, unlike an
ordinance regulating picketing directly at the clinics, an ordinance regulating residential picketing
is not a narrowly tailored means of achieving that interest. (C) is incorrect because time, place,
and manner regulations of speech need only be narrowly tailored to serve an important govern-
ment interest as long as they are content neutral; the government does not need to show a compel-
ling interest. (D) is incorrect because, as discussed above, the ordinance here is a permissible
regulation of speech in a public forum.
(A) The court is likely to rule that the library boards meeting room policy is valid because it is
reasonably related to a legitimate government interest. The library board, as a government body,
may reasonably regulate speech-related conduct in public forums and designated public forums
through reasonable time, place, and manner regulations. Some public property, such as streets,
sidewalks, and parks, is so historically associated with the exercise of First Amendment rights
that it is categorized as a traditional public forum. Other public property may become a desig-
nated public forum when the government, by policy or practice, opens it for expressive activity.
However, most locations other than streets, sidewalks, and parks are not public forums and may
be reserved by the government for their intended activity. When a limited or nonpublic forum
is involved, government regulations designed to reserve the forum for its intended use will be
upheld if they are (i) viewpoint neutral, and (ii) reasonably related to the intended purpose of
the nonpublic forum (which must be a legitimate government purpose). Here, a library meeting
room is not a traditional public forum, and the library board has not designated it as a public
forum because its use is limited to library groups for library purposes. Thus, the court would
likely characterize it as a limited public forum or nonpublic forum. The restriction is viewpoint
neutral (i.e., it is not an attempt to limit the presentation of issues to only one viewpoint), and
it is rationally related to the legitimate objective of alleviating the staffs scheduling burden.
Hence, the librarys policy would probably be upheld by the court. (B) is incorrect because it
states part of the standard for restricting speech in public forums. Speech in public forums may
be regulated by reasonable time, place, and manner regulations if the regulation (i) is content
neutral (i.e., subject matter neutral and viewpoint neutral), (ii) is narrowly tailored to serve an
important government interest, and (iii) leaves open alternative channels of communication.
Here, as discussed above, the library meeting room probably would not be characterized as a
public forum. (C) is incorrect because the library, as a limited public forum or nonpublic forum,
is permitted to restrict speech based on content (i.e., subject matter) as long as the restriction is
not based on the viewpoint of the speech. (D) is incorrect because the requirement of alterna-
tive channels of communication is a component of the public forum standard. Here, because the
library meeting room is not a public forum, the policy is valid regardless of the availability of
alternative meeting facilities.
(B) Of all the alternatives, statement (B) most accurately reects the balance between the scope
of First Amendment protection for the dissemination of truthful commercial speech and the
states ability to enact narrowly drawn regulations to advance substantial governmental interests.
Although commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment, it is subject to signicant
regulation. A state may outlaw commercial speech that proposes an unlawful transaction or that
is misleading or fraudulent. If commercial speech concerns a lawful activity and is not misleading
or fraudulent, the government regulation, to be valid, must directly advance a substantial govern-
mental interest and must be no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. The regula-
tion must be narrowly drawn and there must be a reasonable t between the legislations end and
the means chosen. If, as (B) states, the legislation here at issue does not prohibit the dissemination
of truthful information about prices and product availability, and is otherwise narrowly tailored
to serve a substantial state interest, the legislation probably will constitute a valid regulation of
commercial speech. (A) is incorrect because it would overly limit the ability of the state to reason-
ably regulate commercial speech. This legislation does not necessarily violate auto dealers rights
of free speech. If it does not prohibit the dissemination of truthful information and is otherwise
reasonable, the legislation is sufciently narrow to pass constitutional muster. (C) incorrectly
implies that the states police power is broader than it actually is. This legislation does in fact
potentially infringe the federal constitutional right of free speech (which extends to commer-
cial speech). If the legislation does not satisfy the test for reasonable regulations of commercial
speech, the police power of the state would not save it from being found invalid. (D) is a misstate-
ment of the law. The Constitution prohibits any state from passing any law impairing the obliga-
tion of contract. This Contract Clause limits the ability of states to enact laws that retroactively
impair contract rights. (D) refers to infringement of the right to enter into a contract rather than
impairment of a currently existing contract. This is outside the purview of the Contract Clause.
(B) The law will be upheld because it is a neutral law that is applicable to all drivers in the state.
The Free Exercise Clause does not require exemptions from government regulations for a person
whose religious beliefs prevent him from conforming his behavior to the requirements of the law.
Unless the law was motivated by a desire to interfere with religion, it can be applied to regulate
the conduct of one whose religious beliefs conict with the law. Here, the sect member must allow
his photograph to be taken if he wants to obtain a drivers license; the state is entitled to enforce
this regulation because it is a neutral law of general applicability. (A) is incorrect because it may
be possible for a state to make accommodations for groups objecting to a particular state regula-
tion without violating the Establishment Clause, even though it is not required to do so under the
Free Exercise Clause. The state here could permit an exemption from the photograph require-
ment for persons who present legitimate reasons for it; such an accommodation would not be an
impermissible advancement of religion. (C) is incorrect because the compelling interest test
is not currently used to judge the validity of neutral laws that happen to interfere with a persons
religious practices. (D) is incorrect because the sincerity of the sect members beliefs does not
provide a basis for avoiding application of the law to them.
(B) The attorney should advise the mayor that the proposal is constitutional. The First Amendment
prohibits government establishment of religion, and this prohibition has been applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. Generally, under the Establishment
Clause, if government action involving religion does not include a sect preference, it is tested
under the Lemon test: It will be valid only if (i) it has a secular purpose; (ii) its primary effect
neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (iii) it does not produce excessive government entangle-
ment with religion. While it may seem that starting a legislative meeting with a prayer would not
pass the Lemon test, the Supreme Court has held that, because of the long history of legislative
prayer in America, such prayers do not constitute an establishment of religion, and it is permis-
sible for a legislative body, including a municipality, to invite members of the clergy to begin
sessions with a prayer. [Town of Greece v. Galloway (2014)] (A) is incorrect because it is incom-
plete; the mere fact that government action does not have a sect preference does not alone make it
constitutional under the Establishment Clause. (C) and (D) are incorrect because they run counter
to the Supreme Court decision discussed above.
APPROACH TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1.
APPROACH TO EXAMS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
IN A NUTSHELL: The study of Constitutional Law is the study of the history of how the Supreme
Court has interpreted the Constitution. For purposes of law school, the Constitution can be divided into
a few main parts: the main body, the Bill of Rights, and the Civil Rights Amendments. Among other
things, the main body of the Constitution establishes a federal government with limited power (i.e.,
only the power provided for in the Constitution) and divides that power among three branchesthe
legislature (Article I), the executive (Article II), and the judiciary (Article III). Basically, the legis-
lature makes laws, the executive enforces laws, and the judiciary applies laws and determines their
constitutionality. This division of power provides the basis for the separation of powers doctrine; i.e.,
one branch may not usurp the power of another branchat least not without the other branchs permis-
sion (i.e., a delegation of power). Fearing a strong central government, the drafters of the Constitution
included the Bill of Rights, a statement of the rights of individuals against the federal government.
About 80 years later, after the Civil War, our country adopted the Civil Rights Amendments (i.e., the
13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments), which primarily guarantee individual rights against states.
I. IS THERE A CASE OR CONTROVERSY?
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction/doctrine of strict necessity
A. No Advisory Opinions
1. Ripenessharm must actually be threatened
2. Mootnessmust be real, live controversy at all stages; if issue has been resolved, court will
not hear
a. Exceptionsituation capable of repetition yet evading review
3. Standingplaintiff must have a concrete stake in the outcome at all stages of litigation
a. Injury in factspecic injury, not theoretical
1) Taxpayerstoo remote/abstract
a) Exception: Taxing and spending measure violating Establishment Clause
b. Remediable by court decision
4. Adequate and independent state groundscourt will not hear appeal from state court if
adequate and independent nonfederal grounds support state decision
B. Abstention
If action already going on in state court on unsettled question of state law, federal court will
abstain so state can settle issue
C. Political Question
Court will not decide issue that is not suitable for judicial branch
D. 11th Amendment and Sovereign Immunity
Generally cannot sue state in federal court for damages (without states permission)
1. Exceptions: Actions against state ofcers and removal of immunity under 14th Amendment
II. IS LAW WITHIN CONGRESSS POWER?
A. Necessary and Proper Clause

Congress has the power to make laws necessary and proper for executing any power granted to
any branch of federal government
2. APPROACH TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
B. Taxing Power
If revenue raising, generally valid
C. Spending Power
Spending may be for any public purpose; Congress may regulate beyond enumerated powers by
attaching strings to a grant as long as the strings are: (i) clearly stated, (ii) related to the purpose
of the grant, and (iii) not unduly coercive
D. Commerce Power
Congress may regulate:
1. Channels of interstate commerceroads, rails, waterways, phones, etc.
2. Instrumentalities of interstate commercetrucks, trains, planes, etc.
3. Activities having a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce
a. Generally must be economic or commercial activity
E. Property Power
Includes power of eminent domain, to dispose of federal property, and to make rules/laws
regulating federal lands and Indian reservations
F. Miscellaneous Other Powers

War (including power to declare war and fund war), investigatory, bankruptcy, postal, citizenship,
admiralty, coin money, x weights and measures, and grant patents and copyrights
G. Delegation
1. Congress may delegate its power to other branches
a. Intelligible standard requirement for delegation (almost anything sufces)
H. Speech or Debate Clause

Immunity for speech made within Congress
I. Legislative Veto
Congress cannot make a law reserving to Congress the right to overturn discretionary executive
action without passing a new law and presenting it to the President for approval
III. IS PRESIDENT ACTING WITHIN EXECUTIVE POWER?
A. Domestic Powers of President

1. Appointment and removal of ofcers and Supreme Court Justices with advice and consent of
Senate
2. Pardonfederal crimes only
3. Veto power10 days to veto; if President does not do so and:
a. Congress in session = approval
b. Congress out = pocket veto
c. No line item veto
4. Power as chief executive/executive ordersYoungstown guidance from Justice Jackson:
a. If express or implied authority from Congressaction likely valid
b. If Congress silentaction valid if it does not impinge on powers of another branch
c. If against Congresss willaction likely invalid
B. Power Over External Affairs

1. President may commit troops but power to declare war belongs to Congress
2. Treaty powersigns treaties with approval of two-thirds of Senate
a. Treaty is on par with other federal laws (supreme law of land)
b. Treaties cannot conict with Constitution
3. Executive agreementsenforceable if not in conict with federal law, treaties, or
Constitution
C. Executive Privilege/Immunity
1. Privilege extends to documents and conversations but must yield if court decides information
needed in criminal case
2. Immunity
a. President immune from suits for civil damages for actions taken as President
b. Immunity extends to aides exercising discretionary authority of President
D. Impeachment
President, vice president, and all U.S. civil ofcers may be impeached for treason, bribery, high
crimes, and misdemeanors by majority vote of the House; are tried by Senate; and conviction
requires two-thirds vote of Senate
IV. FEDERAL VS. STATE POWER
A. Supremacy Clause
1. Most governmental power shared between state and federal government
2. Federal law supreme, and conicting state law is invalid
a. Actual conictstate law invalid
b. Interference with federal objectivesstate law invalid
c. Preemptionno room for state legislation; Congress controls entire eld
1) Express preemptionnarrowly construed
2) Field (implied) preemptionif federal law comprehensive or a federal agency
oversees area, preemption may be found
3) Presumption that historic state police powers not intended to be preempted unless
that is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress
3. Dormant Commerce Clause (negative implications of Commerce Clause)
a. Congress may delegate commerce power to states
b. Absent delegation, states may not intentionally discriminate against interstate commerce
1) Exception: Necessary to achieve an important state interest (i.e., no reasonable
alternatives available)
2) Exception: State acting as a market participant
a) Might still violate the Privileges & Immunities Clause
b) No downstream restrictionsstate cannot control what happens to goods
after state sells them
3) Traditional government function
c. Nondiscriminatory state lawmay not be unduly burdensome (burden on interstate
commerce cannot outweigh promotion of the legitimate state interest sought to be
served)
1) Nondiscriminatory state tax affecting interstate commercemust be:
a) Substantial nexus between object of tax and taxing state
b) Fair apportionment according to rational formula

c) Fair relationship to services or benets provided by state
4. 21st Amendmentliquor regulationstates can regulate sale of liquor, but cannot favor
local businesses
B. Suits
1. The United States may sue states without their consent
2. States cannot sue the United States without its consent
3. State can sue state in federal court; Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction
C. Federal Taxation/Regulation of States10th Amendment Concerns

1. Tax/regulation applying to both private and state entitiesvalid
2. Tax/regulation of states as statesgenerally invalid
a. Commandeering state ofcialscannot require states to regulate their own citizens
b. Exceptions: Strings on federal grants of money and civil rights
D. State Taxation/Regulation of Federal Government

1. State cannot directly tax federal government
2. State cannot directly regulate federal government
3. State may tax federal employee and contractor salaries (indirect tax)
V. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
A. State Action Limitation

1. The Constitution limits actions of government, so there must be state (i.e., government)
action in order to nd action unconstitutional
2. Private action can sometimes be attributed to government:
a. Traditional and exclusive government function (e.g., running a town or election)
b. Signicant state involvement
1) Ofcial encouragement or use of judicial machinery
2) Entwinement of state and private actors
3) But mere regulation, provision of public services, or licensing not enough
B. Article IV Privileges and Immunities

1. Prohibits states from discriminating against citizens of other states with respect to funda-
mental rights (Note: Corporations and aliens are not citizens)
2. Mainly used to prevent substantially unequal treatment regarding commercial activities
3. Substantial justication exception if nonresidents are part of problem and there are no less
restrictive means to solve problem
C. 14th Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause

1. Prohibits states from denying their own citizens rights of national citizenship (corporations
are not citizens)
D. Prohibitions Against Retroactive Legislation

1. Contracts Clauseapplies only to states
a. Prevents only substantial impairment of a partys rights under an existing contract
b. Exceptionlaw valid if:
1) Serves an important interest; and

2) Is narrowly tailored to promote that interest
c. Public contracts subject to stricter scrutiny
1) State cannot be obligated to refrain from exercising its police power
2) Law should not broadly repudiate government contractual obligations
2. Ex post facto lawsprohibited
a. Makes criminal an act that was innocent when done
b. Prescribes greater punishment than what was prescribed when act was committed
c. Reduces evidence required to convict
d. Specically applies only to legislation, but due process prohibits similar changes by the
courts
3. Bills of attainderprohibits laws inicting punishment without a trial on people by name or
past conduct
E. Procedural Due Process

1. Two Due Process Clauses: 5th Amendment (federal government); 14th Amendment (states)
2. Requires fair process/procedure when government acts intentionally to deprive a person
individually of life, liberty, or property
a. Both actual bias and serious risk of actual bias unconstitutional
b. Liberty includes losses of signicant freedom of action
c. Property includes legitimate claims/entitlements to government benets
1) Public employment is a property right if claim to entitlement through contract,
policy, law, etc.
3. Balancing test for determining fair process in terms of timing (pre- vs. post-deprivation) and
scope of hearing. The Court weighs:
a. Importance of individual right
b. Value of specic procedural safeguard involved
c. Governmental interest in scal and administrative efciency
F. Takings
1. If government takes land for public purpose, it must provide just compensation
2. Public purposes liberally construed
3. Actual or physical appropriation almost always a taking, even if property taken is small
a. Exception: Emergencies
4. Use restrictions (action for inverse condemnation)
a. Denial of all economic valuetaking
b. Decrease in economic valuegenerally not a taking if economically viable use remains
c. Dedicationscannot condition building permits on forced dedication unless:
1) Government can show legitimate interest, and
2) Adverse impact of development roughly proportional to owners loss
5. Just compensationreasonable (fair market) value of property taken at time of taking
G. Substantive Due Process

1. Two Due Process Clauses: 5th Amendment (federal); 14th Amendment (states)
2. Prohibition against unreasonable laws
3. Reasonableness test depends on interest involved
a. Fundamental right (voting, interstate travel, privacy, 1st Amendment rights)strict
scrutiny
1) Government must prove action is necessary to achieve a compelling government

interest
b. All other interestsrational basis
1) Challenger must prove action not rationally related to any legitimate government
interest
4. Requires laws to give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or required
H. Equal Protection
1. 14th Amendment prohibition against unreasonable discrimination by states
2. Test for reasonableness depends on criteria used to classify (suspect or quasi-suspect class)
and nature of right (fundamental right)
a. Discriminatory intent by government:
1) Law discriminatory on its face
2) Discriminatory in application
3) Discriminatory motive
4) If facially neutral, no discriminatory application, and no discriminatory motive,
then rational basis test applies
b. Suspect classication (race and national origin) or fundamental rightstrict scrutiny
1) Government must prove action is necessary to achieve a compelling government
interest
2) Afrmative action (favoring minorities) invalid unless:
a) Seeking to remedy past discrimination within jurisdiction
3) Race can be a factor considered in admission of students in institutions of higher
education to achieve a diverse student body
a) Cannot be a special/weighty factor
4) Alienage can be considered for state employment positions involving the self-
government processincluding police ofcers and primary and secondary school-
teachers
c. Quasi-suspect classication (sex and legitimacy)intermediate scrutiny
1) Government must show discrimination is substantially related to an important
government interest
2) Sex discriminationexceedingly persuasive justication required
a) Interest must be genuine and not hypothesized
d. All other classicationsrational basis standard
I. Abortion
1. Competing interestsmothers right to privacy vs. fetuss interest in becoming a child
2. Pre-viabilityno undue burdens on right to obtain an abortion
3. Post-viabilitymay prohibit abortion except when womans health threatened
4. No right to government funding of abortion services
J. Other Privacy Rightsmarriage, use of contraceptives, obscene reading material in the home
(except child pornography), living with extended family, to educate and raise children
1. Limitations generally subject to strict scrutiny or at least intermediate scrutiny but language
in cases not consistent
2. Intimate private, noncommercial sexual contact between fully consenting adultsnot a right,
but court found no legitimate government interest in regulating
K. Voting Rights
1. Short residency requirement (e.g., 30 days)valid
2. One person, one vote
a. Congressional electionsalmost exact mathematical equality required (a few
percentage points may be fatal)
b. State and local electionsvariance not unjustiably large (16% variance upheld)
3. Feescannot preclude indigent candidates
L. Right to Travel Interstate

1. Durational residency requirements for dispensing benets ordinarily subject to strict scrutiny
(30-day period probably okay; one year invalid)
2. Distinctions between old and new residentsinvalid
M. Freedom of Speech
1. 1st Amendment limits government regulation of private speech
2. 1st Amendment inapplicable to government speech
a. Permanent monuments on government property a form of government speech
b. Government funding of private speechgenerally must be viewpoint neutral
1) Exception: Government funding of the arts
3. Regulation of speech based on contentgenerally prohibited
a. Exceptions: Unprotected categories (see 7., infra)
b. Speech of government employees
1) Ofcial dutiesgovernment may punish public employee for unwanted speech
made as part of employees ofcial duties
2) Private speech of government employee
a) Matter of public concernbalance employees right as a citizen to comment
against governments interest as employer in efcient performance of public
service
b) Not a matter of public concernemployer has broad discretion to punish
employees disruptive speech
4. Overbreadth and vagueness
a. Prohibition against substantially more speech than necessary voidable as to affected
person for overbreadth
b. Prohibition including a substantial amount of protected speech compared to its legiti-
mate sweepvoid as to everyone
c. Regulation failing to give reasonable notice of what is prohibited has chilling effect on
speech and violates due process
d. Ofcial cannot have unfettered discretion over speech issues
5. Scope of speechincludes freedom to refrain from speaking
a. Mandatory nancial support of government speechno 1st Amendment concerns
b. Mandatory nancial support of private speechprotected
c. Speech includes symbolic conduct
6. Time, place, and manner regulation
a. Public forums (e.g., sidewalks and parks) and designated public forums (e.g., school-
rooms open for use after school for social events)regulation valid if:
1) Content neutral
2) Narrowly tailored to serve an important government interest
3) Leaves open alternative channels of communication
b. Limited public forums (i.e., public property open for expressive activities only on a
ceratin topic) and nonpublic forums (i.e., public property not open for expressive activi-
ties)regulation valid if:
1) Viewpoint neutral
2) Reasonably related to a legitimate government purpose
7. Unprotected speechsome speech is not protected by 1st Amendment:
a. Clear and present danger of imminent lawless action
b. Fighting words (including true threats)
1) Statutes often overbroad or vague
c. Obscenity
1) Test:
a) Appeals to the prurient interest in sex;
b) Portrays sex in a patently offensive way; and
c) Does not have serious literary, political, or scientic value judged from a
national standard
2) Standard for minors may be different
3) Can prohibit pictures of minors engaging in sex that would not be obscene if
engaged in by adults
4) Zoning ordinances may limit the location of adult entertainment establishments
if designed to reduce the secondary effects of such businesses (e.g., rise in crime,
reduction of property values)
d. Defamation
1) Public ofcial or gureplaintiff must prove actual malice
a) Actual malice = knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard as to truth
2) Private individual suing on matter of public concernmust prove at least negli-
gence
3) Privacy tortsmedia defendant cannot be sued for publishing a true fact about a
public record lawfully obtained
8. Commercial speech
a. If speech about unlawful activity or untrue or misleading speechunprotected
b. Speech regarding lawful activity and not false or misleadingregulation valid if it:
1) Serves a substantial government interest
2) Directly advances that interest
3) Is narrowly tailored to serve that interest
c. Complete bans usually invalid
9. Prior restraints
a. Invalid unless justied by a special societal harm or pursuant to contract
b. Procedural safeguards
1) Standards must be narrowly drawn, reasonable, and denite
2) Injunction must be sought promptly
3) There must be a prompt and nal determination of validity of restraint
c. Broadcast media may be more closely regulated than press; cable TV between the two;
Internet regulation subject to strict scrutiny
N. Freedom of Association and Belief

1. Electoral processsliding scale to judge restrictions on electoral process
a. Severe restriction on 1st Amendment activity must be narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling purpose
b. Reasonable and nondiscriminatory regulations generally valid

2. Government employees may be sanctioned for speech undertaken as part of ofcial duties;
balancing test determines whether other speech may be sanctionedright to comment on
matter of public concern vs. government interest in efcient and orderly workplace
3. Loyalty oaths for federal employees and public ofcials permissible if not overbroad
a. Oath to support the Constitution and to oppose illegal overthrow of government okay
4. Disclosure of associations for government benets/employment
a. Permissible if relevant to position
5. School sponsorship of extracurricular clubs
a. Can be content based if viewpoint neutral and reasonably related to a legitimate govern-
ment interest
O. Freedom of Religion
1. Free Exercise Clause

a. No punishment of beliefstotal freedom to believe as desired
b. Conduct cannot be punished solely because religious
c. General conduct regulation that incidentally burdens religious practicegenerally valid
d. Religious exemptions for religious belief generally not required except:
1) Amish from mandatory secondary education
2) Conscientious objectors who refuse munitions work from unemployment compen-
sation laws requiring applicants to accept any job
2. Establishment Clausegovernment action/law respecting the establishment of religion valid
if action/law:
a. Has a secular purpose
b. Has a primary effect that neither advances nor prohibits religion
c. Does not cause excessive entanglement between government and religion
1) Prayer in public schools generally prohibited
2) Invocation prayer at legislative sessions and town hall meetings generally valid
(recognizes long history of prayer in America and adults not of tender impression-
able years)
3) Religious symbols in Christmastime displays valid if accompanied by nonreligious
symbols (recognizes historic roots of American Christmas holiday)
4) Displays of 10 Commandments on public property invalid if shown to have a
predominantly religious purpose
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW EXAM QUESTIONS 1.
ESSAY EXAM QUESTIONS
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
The essay questions that follow have been selected to provide you with an opportunity to experience
how the substantive law you have been reviewing may be tested in the hypothetical essay examination
question context. These sample essay questions are a valuable self-diagnostic tool designed to enable
you to enhance your issue-spotting ability and practice your exam writing skills.
It is suggested that you approach each question as though under actual examination conditions. The
time allowed for each question is 60 minutes. You should spend 15 to 20 minutes spotting issues,
underlining key facts and phrases, jotting notes in the margins, and outlining your answer. If you orga-
nize your thoughts well, 40 minutes will be more than adequate for writing them down. Should you
prefer to forgo the actual writing involved on these questions, be sure to give yourself no more time
for issue-spotting than you would on the actual examination.
The BARBRI technique for writing a well-organized essay answer is to (i) spot the issues in a ques-
tion and then (ii) analyze and discuss each issue using the CIRAC method:
C State your conclusion rst. (In other words, you must think through your answer before you
start writing.)
I State the issue involved.
R Give the rule(s) of law involved.
A Apply the rule(s) of law to the facts.
C Finally, restate your conclusion.
After completing (or outlining) your own analysis of each question, compare it with the BARBRI
model answer provided herein. A passing answer does not have to match the model one, but it should
cover most of the issues presented and the law discussed and should apply the law to the facts of the
question. Use of the CIRAC method results in the best answer you can write.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW EXAM QUESTIONS
EXAM QUESTION NO. 1
Sierra Toxics, Inc. (Sierra), is a privately owned company engaged in the business of disposing
of toxic waste generated by chemical and pharmaceutical plants. Sierra operates pursuant to a license
issued by the Commissioner of Ecological Preservation of the state of Alpha. This license authorizes
Sierra to contract with such plants to provide the following services: (i) collection of toxic waste at the
plant site; and (ii) transportation of that waste to Sierras disposal station, which is located in Alpha,
three miles from the border with the state of Beta.
Pursuant to the authority granted by its license, for the past 10 years Sierra has contracted to provide
services to plants in Alpha, and, a few years ago, expanded its business to serve plants just across the
border in Beta. The Beta plants that contract with Sierra dispose of approximately one-half their toxic
waste output through that company and the remainder of their waste through disposal companies
located in Beta.
Shortly after Sierra extended its services to the Beta plants, the residents of the town in which
Sierras disposal station is situated became alarmed at the amount of toxic waste stored there. These
residents were concerned about the proximity of such toxic waste, both to their homes and to the reser-
voir located in their town which supplies water to households in the immediate surrounding area.
The residents petitioned the Commissioner of Ecological Preservation to close Sierras disposal
station. Sierra objected. The Commissioner held an open hearing on the matter at which numerous
witnesses testied. After that hearing, the Commissioner resolved the dispute by issuing an order that,
effective immediately, use of Sierras disposal station would be limited to toxic waste removed from
chemical and pharmaceutical plants in Alpha only. The Beta plants were barred from disposing of their
toxic waste through Sierra.
Both Sierra and the state of Beta have led suit against the Alpha Commissioner of Ecological
Preservation, seeking to rescind that order. The two lawsuits have been consolidated for trial before
the judge for whom you serve as law clerk. The judge has asked you to prepare a memorandum identi-
fying the claims raised and the defenses asserted, and analyzing the legal bases for all such claims and
defenses.
Prepare the memorandum.
EXAM QUESTION NO. 2
State University has had a nationally prominent football program for many years. A recent investiga-
tion by the American Athletic Association (AAA), consisting of public and private educational insti-
tutions nationwide, including State University, uncovered serious violations of the rules and regulations
of the Association. These included recruiting infractions which implicated the head football coach.
After a hearing conducted by the Association in which State University participated and in which
Coach was a witness, the Association placed State University on probation for two years. It ordered that
further sanctions will be imposed unless Coach is suspended for the probationary period. The president
of State University has notied Coach of his intent to impose the required suspension.
As part of his ght against the suspension, Coach granted an interview to the sports editor of the
student newspaper in which he disputed the Associations charges. The president has directed the paper
not to publish the resulting article, and the editorial staff has complied.
Frustrated by his inability to tell his side of the story and threatened by loss of his job, Coach has
retained your law rm to institute appropriate action.
Prepare a legal memorandum setting forth Coachs causes of action, the legal basis for each, and the
defenses to be anticipated.
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW EXAM QUESTIONS
EXAM QUESTION NO. 3
A bill has been introduced in the legislature of the state of Uphoria which would limit appointment
of members of the state police force to male citizens of the United States who are over the age of 20
years.
Senator Strate is chairman of the committee to which this bill has been referred, and he requires
a carefully written summary analyzing the legal principles implicated by this bill. He retains you
to prepare this summary in clear and concise language so that it may be used by members of his
committee in their consideration of the merits of the bill.
Comply with the senators request.
EXAM QUESTION NO. 4
Irma LaTouce and Lester DeJacques were employed as dancers at a Fun City cocktail lounge.
Both dancers received a weekly salary plus commissions on drinks purchased for them by customers
between performances. Police ofcers observed Irma and Lester socializing with lounge patrons and
brought charges against them under a local ordinance which provided:
Entertainers in business premises where alcoholic beverages are sold are prohibited from
mingling with customers.
The stated purpose of the ordinance was to prevent disorderly conduct in premises where liquor is
sold, to encourage temperance, and to discourage opportunities for the solicitation of prostitution or
engaging in any other immoral activity.
At the trial before the local municipal court, the dancers testied that the commissions were earned
for socializing with the clientele, which involved conversation and casual companionship with men
and women who patronized the club. They both admitted that the main purpose of this activity was
to get the customers to buy more drinks. It was stipulated that there had been no disorderly conduct
in the lounge and that neither defendant had solicited any act of prostitution or engaged in any other
immoral activity. The court found both dancers guilty as charged and imposed a ne as provided in the
ordinance.
Irma and Lester have now consulted you. They desire to appeal their convictions. Prepare a brief in
support of Irma and Lester as petitioners.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW EXAM ANSWERS 1.
ANSWERS TO ESSAY EXAM QUESTIONS

ANSWER TO EXAM QUESTION NO. 1
To: Judge
From: Law Clerk
Re: Sierra Toxics
Commerce Clause: The Commissioner of Ecological Preservations (CEPs) order violates the
Commerce Clause. At issue is whether a state may prohibit hazardous waste disposal facilities within
the state from accepting hazardous wastes from outside the state.
The Commerce Clause gives Congress plenary power to regulate commerce among the states. This
power is not exclusive; the states may also regulate commerce. However, state regulation that discrimi-
nates against interstate commerce usually will be stricken as violating the Commerce Clause unless the
regulation is necessary to achieve an important state interest.
Here, the CEPs order clearly discriminates against interstate commerce since it prohibits disposal
of out-of-state wastes but allows disposal of wastes generated within the state. The Commission would
no doubt argue that the states interest in the safety of residents around Sierras disposal facility neces-
sitates the limitation, but this argument will fail. A nondiscriminatory regulation (e.g., limiting the
amount of hazardous waste that may be disposed of at Sierras plant, regardless of where the hazardous
waste was generated) could provide the same protection as the prohibition here. Thus, the regulation
discriminates against interstate commerce without valid justication and so violates the Commerce
Clause.
Contracts Clause: The order of the CEP might also violate the Contracts Clause. At issue is
whether a state order that prohibits a waste disposal facility from accepting wastes from certain
customers violates the Contracts Clause.
The Contracts Clause generally prohibits states from acting to retroactively and substantially impair
existing contracts rights. However, the bar is not absolute; even if a state act substantially impairs
existing contract rights it still will be upheld if the impairment serves an important public interest and
the law is reasonable and narrowly tailored to promote that interest.
Here, it is not clear whether the CEPs order substantially impairs any existing contract rights.
Although we are told that the order prohibits Sierra from accepting hazardous wastes from outside the
state, and that Sierra has contracted with out-of-state customers in the past, we are not told whether
Sierra has any continuing contracts that would be impaired by the CEPs order. Assuming such
contracts exist, the order would violate the Contracts Clause. Since the CEP is a state agency, there is
action by the state. And while safeguarding the community from toxic wastes is clearly an important
interest, as discussed above the order here is not a reasonable way to deal with the problem because it
does nothing to prevent wastes generated within the state from jeopardizing the communitys safety.
Accordingly, the order violates the Contracts Clause.
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV: The CEP order might violate the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, at least with respect to the citizens of state Beta. At issue is whether a
state may prohibit nonresidents from contracting for commercial services in the state.
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV prohibits states from discriminating against
nonresidents in matters concerning fundamental rights, which include important commercial activi-
ties and civil liberties. However, even if a state discriminates against nonresidents, the discrimination
can be upheld if the state has a substantial justication for the different treatment and there are no less
restrictive means to accomplish the states goal. In any case, the Privileges and Immunities Clause is
available only to natural persons; corporations cannot take advantage of its protections.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW EXAM ANSWERS
Here, we are not told whether any of Sierras customers are natural persons; they might all be
corporations. If Beta is allowed to represent the interests of natural persons who are being discrimi-
nated against by the CEPs order, the order probably violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
Contracting for commercial waste disposal services probably is an important commercial activity, and
the CEPs order discriminates against nonresidents by completely prohibiting them from contracting
on an equal basis with residents of Alpha. And while there probably is substantial justication for the
order (to protect the community from hazardous wastes), as discussed above, the order is not the least
restrictive means of protecting that interest. Thus, the order could violate the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause of Article IV.
Procedural Due Process: Finally, it could be argued that Sierra was denied its right to procedural
due process. At issue is whether Sierra had an adequate opportunity to present its case.
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, provides that the government shall not take a persons life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. Due process contemplates fair procedures, which requires at least an
opportunity to present objections to the proposed action and a fair and neutral decisionmaker. The
timing and scope of the hearing due depend on the circumstances of the deprivation. In most cases, the
person being deprived of life, liberty, or property should receive notice of the governments proposed
action and have an opportunity to respond before the deprivation.
Here, the CEP has limited Sierras right to contract, a liberty interest. The facts state that a public
hearing was held, but we are not told whether Sierra was given individual notice of the meeting or was
given an opportunity to speak. Presumably, sufcient notice and an opportunity to respond were given,
and thus Sierra was afforded adequate procedural due process.

To: Partner
From: Associate
Re: Coachs Causes of Action
Coach v. AAA: Coach most likely has no constitutional claims against AAA because AAA is not a
state actor. The rst issue is whether the action of AAA constitutes state action.
To nd state action, an actor must perform public functions or have signicant involvement with
the state. It appears, under this standard, that AAA is not a state actor; regulating sports at public
and private institutions nationwide is not a function traditionally reserved to the states and neither are
its activities so involved with the state as to rise to the level of state action. [Compare: Brentwood
Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 531 U.S. 288 (2001)state action
found where, among other things, private regulating body operated in a single state, was made up
mostly of public school ofcials, and met during school hours]
Furthermore, AAA has given State University a choice of what to do, albeit a coercive choice. State
University does not have to suspend Coach; it could choose to accept further sanctions and not suspend
Coach. Therefore, no causes of action will lie against AAA because it merely made ndings and left
it to State University to decide what actions to take. [See National Collegiate Athletic Association v.
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988)]
Coach v. State University: Coach can make a due process claim against State University. The
actions of State University through its president, constitute state action. The university is an institu-
tion of the state, as indicated by its name, and the president is a state actor. The question, then, is what
constitutional rights Coach has, and whether these rights were infringed by the university.
The Due Process Clause, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that
a person receive adequate notice and a fair hearing before being deprived of life, liberty, or property by
the government. Public employees have been found to have a property interest in their jobs and must
receive due process before being deprived of them. Coach is a public employee because he works for a
state university. Whether Coach suffered a deprivation of his due process rights depends on whether he
was removable for cause. An employee removable only for cause has a property interest in his job, and
thus is entitled to due process before the state deprives him of it.
Assuming Coach is removable only for cause, due process requires that he be given notice of the
charges against him, as well as a pretermination opportunity to respond to the charges. An evidentiary
hearing regarding the termination decision must be provided either before or after the termination, with
reinstatement if he prevails. If no cause is required for removal, Coach is an employee at will and is not
due any process before or after termination.
We should move to secure the above procedural safeguards for Coach. While Coach participated
in the AAA hearing, he appeared only as a witness and not as a party. Coach is entitled to a more
substantial opportunity to respond to the charges against him. Coach has received notice of the
decision to suspend him. He may respond to the presidents notication of suspension and is entitled to
an evidentiary hearing regarding his termination.
The university may assert that a two-year suspension is not the same as a termination. However, our
position is that a two-year loss of job and salary is an infringement of Coachs property rights serious
enough to warrant a hearing.
Should we bring this claim, the university may raise a defense of ripeness. It could claim that no
action has been taken against Coach and that his claim is premature. However, an action is ripe for
review when there is the immediate threat of harm. Here, the president has notied Coach of its intent
to suspend him. Thus, Coachs claim will not fail for lack of ripeness.
Coachs First Amendment claim: Coach likely has no claims against the university for directing
the school newspaper not to publish its interview with him, because his constitutional rights probably
have not been violated. Under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, applicable to states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, government may not restrict freedom of speech or of the press.
In a public forum that has traditionally been open to speech activities, government restrictions on the
content of speech must be necessary to serve a compelling state interest. Further, the state may not
impose a prior restraint on the press by preventing publication of content that it nds objectionable,
absent extraordinary circumstances. Public schools and universities, however, have not traditionally
been considered public forums open to free speech activities, although the Supreme Court has found
that students at a public institution do not shed all First Amendment rights at the schoolhouse door.
Additionally, the contents of a school-funded newspaper can be regulated because the Court has found
that such papers are not public forums, but merely educational devices. If the student publication is part
of a class taught at the educational institution, its content may be regulated by the school for legitimate
pedagogical purposes.
In this case, even if the newspaper were a public forum, it would not give rise to a cause of action
by Coach. Generally, a party cannot assert the constitutional rights of others. To have standing, the
claimant must have suffered a direct impairment of his own constitutional rights. Here, a prior restraint
has been placed on the newspaper. This is a burden on the newspapers rights. And while Coach is
affected, it is not a direct impairment of his rights. Thus, he lacks standing to bring a suit based in the
First Amendment.
The state of Uphorias bill would be valid as to its age and citizenship requirements, but would be
unconstitutional due to its gender classication.
Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, government may not treat
similarly situated people in a dissimilar manner without a sufcient reason. The sufciency of the
reason depends on the basis of the classication. There are three tests:
The rst test is the strict scrutiny or compelling state interest test. This test is used if when govern-
ment action treats people differently based on a suspect classication, such as race, national origin, or
alienage. Under this test, the law is considered to be invalid unless the government can prove that it is
necessary to achieve a compelling state objective.
The second test involves intermediate scrutiny. Under this test, the court will strike down a law
unless the government can show that the law bears a substantial relation to an important government
interest. This is the test used when there is a classication based on gender. Gender classications will
be struck down absent an exceedingly persuasive justication, and the government may not rely on
overbroad generalizations about males and females that will perpetuate the legal, social, and economic
inferiority of women.
The third test is the rational basis test (minimum scrutiny). Under this test, the government action
is valid if the action is related to achieving any conceivable legitimate governmental interest. In other
words, the person challenging the classication must prove that it is arbitrary or irrational. This is
a very loose test, and it is very difcult for a law to fail it. This test is used for all classications
relating to matters of economics or social welfare.
The gender designation of Uphorias bill limiting the appointment of state police ofcers to males
would be subject to intermediate scrutiny review due to its facial gender classication. Therefore, this
component will only be upheld if it is substantially related to an important governmental interest.
This gender classication is not related to an important governmental interest. As in United States v.
Virginia, supra, the government will not be able to show that all women are incapable of performing
the duties of a state trooper. If Uphoria claims that its bill is based on ability to do the work, it can
design a test of each individuals (male or female) ability to perform the work required of a state police
ofcer, and not unfairly discriminate against women. Accordingly, under the intermediate scrutiny test,
this bill would be found invalid due to the fact that it discriminates against women without an exceed-
ingly persuasive justication.
The bill also limits appointment of police ofcers to citizens of the United States. Since this compo-
nent of the bill is based on alienage, it ordinarily falls under the strict scrutiny-compelling interest test.
However, there is an exception to this rule which provides that if, as here, the law discriminates against
alien participation in the functioning of state government, the rational basis test is applied. Under
rational basis, a state can validly refuse to hire aliens as police ofcers, or for other positions which
have a direct effect on the function of government. [Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979)] Accord-
ingly, the bill would be valid as far as its citizenship requirement is concerned.
The bill sets the age for appointment of a police ofcer to be over 20 years. The Supreme Court has
held that age is not a suspect classication, so a rational basis analysis can be applied. The 20-year-
old minimum age requirement in this statute would be held constitutional under the rational basis test
because of the states interest in having police ofcers who are physically and emotionally mature
enough to handle the stress of police work.
A. FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES

Irma and Lester have several winnable First Amendment challenges to the ordinance. Under the
First Amendment, Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ....
This guarantee has been held applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
1. Freedom of Association and Belief: The First Amendment protects freedom of association.
First Amendment rights are considered fundamental rights, and government attempts to restrict them
are subject to strict scrutiny analysis. The government must show the restrictions are necessary to
promote a compelling interest. Under this standard, very few state restrictions on speech are upheld by
courts. Here, it appears that the ordinance impinges on the rights of the entertainers to talk and mingle
with the customers. As such, the ordinance has the effect of chilling their right to freely associate.
Thus, on this ground the ordinance is unconstitutional unless the government can show it is needed to
serve a compelling interest. While the town could argue that curbing disorderly conduct, prostitution,
and intemperance is a compelling interest, it would have a harder time showing that restricting the free
association rights of Irma and Lester in such a way is necessary to promote it and that there are no less
restrictive means available. The town's position is further weakened by the fact that the parties have
stipulated that no actual prostitution, disorderly conduct, or immoral activity took place as a result of
Irma's and Lester's behavior.
2. The Ordinance is Overbroad: If a regulation of speech or speech-related conduct punishes a
substantial amount of protected speech judged in relation to the regulations plainly legitimate sweep,
the regulation is facially invalid (i.e., it cannot be enforced against anyonenot even a person engaging
in activity that is not constitutionally protected). Here, the stated purposes of the ordinance are to (i)
prevent disorderly conduct; (ii) encourage temperance; (iii) discourage prostitution; and (iv) prevent
any other immoral activity. While these purposes are legitimate government interests, the ordinance
as written restricts expression and conduct that have only a peripheral connection with prostitution,
immoral activity, etc. Accordingly, the ordinance chills speech and conduct that are protected under
the First Amendment. Certainly, the ordinance could be worded to restrict only the activities that are
the focus of its basic purposes, i.e., preventing prostitution and drunkenness. Prohibiting mingling of
customers and entertainers goes beyond these legitimate purposes. Therefore, the ordinance is uncon-
stitutionally overbroad and cannot be enforced against anyone.
3. The Ordinance is Vague: Laws regulating speech-related activities are unconstitutional if
they are too vague to give notice of what conduct they forbid. To the extent their vagueness suggests
that they prohibit constitutionally protected speech, they have a chilling effect on speech. Here, the
ordinance prohibits the entertainers from mingling with customers. The word mingling is too
vague to dene what conduct is proscribed by the ordinance. Thus, it appears that the entertainers may
be forced to refrain from conduct and expression protected by the First Amendment in order not to be
considered mingling with the customers. Because this ordinance has, in this manner, the effect of
chilling activity and expression that is protected by the First Amendment, it is unconstitutional.
4. Effect of Twenty-First Amendment on First Amendment Rights: The Twenty-First Amend-
ment gives the states much control over the sale and use of intoxicating liquor within their borders.
Thus, Fun Citys attorneys could argue that the ordinance is a valid exercise of the states constitu-
tionally granted powers with respect to intoxicating liquors. However, this argument fails because,
as a general rule, individual rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment
outweigh state liquor control laws. Here, the ordinance, which constitutes a liquor control regulation,
chills First Amendment rights made applicable, to states under the Fourteenth Amendment. Accord-
ingly, the ordinance is unconstitutional.
B. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS ISSUES

Irma and Lester can also challenge the ordinance as a violation of their rights under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies to state and local governments. Substantive due
process protects certain fundamental rights not articulated within the text of the Constitution and
prohibits arbitrary government action.
Under substantive due process principles, where a fundamental right is limited, the law (or other
government action) must be necessary to promote a compelling or overriding state interest. Funda-
mental rights include interstate travel, privacy, voting, and all rights implied under the First Amendment.
Here the ordinance, as discussed above, chills the entertainers First Amendment rights of associa-
tion and speech. From the facts, Fun City has shown no compelling or overriding interest to do so.
Accordingly, on this ground, the ordinance violates the substantive due process rights of Irma and
Lester.
C. EQUAL PROTECTION ISSUES

Irma and Lester have a strong Equal Protection argument as well. Under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, , governmental acts that classify people for differential treat-
ment may be invalid. It is unconstitutional for the government to treat similarly situated people in a
dissimilar manner absent sufcient justication. Where a suspect classication is involved (i.e., race,
national origin, or alienage), the differential treatment is subject to the strict scrutiny test and must be
necessary to promote a compelling state interest. For nonsuspect classications of individuals, a law
need only be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose, and will be upheld unless unrea-
sonable or arbitrary,
Here, the ordinance seeks to prevent people who work as entertainers in establishments where
alcohol is served from socializing with patrons of the business. Ordinarily, a law that singles out
people in a certain line of work for differing treatment would be subject only to the rational basis test,
as entertainer is not a suspect classication. However, when a classication affects the exercise of a
fundamental right, it is subject to strict scrutiny. Irma and Lester are being prevented from exercising
their fundamental First Amendment right to freely associate. Thus, to sustain the classication, Fun
City must show that it has a compelling interest to impose such restraints on entertainers and no less
restrictive means of achieving the interest. Clearly, Fun City does not have a compelling interest in so
restricting Irma and Lester's rights and, therefore, the ordinance violates equal protection.
D. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Irmas and Lesters convictions should be reversed. Irma and Lester have
been charged with violation of an ordinance which is constitutionally overbroad and infringes on their
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

PART ONE: POWERS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

I. THE JUDICIAL POWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

II. LEGISLATIVE POWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

d. Taxes Are Generally Valid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

III. THE EXECUTIVE POWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

PART TWO: THE FEDERAL SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

IV. RELATIVE SPHERES OF FEDERAL AND STATE POWER . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

B. SUITS BY STATE AGAINST UNITED STATESUNITED STATES MUST

VI. INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAX AND REGULATION IMMUNITIES . . . . . . . 35

VII. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

PART THREE: STATE REGULATION OR TAXATION OF COMMERCE . . . . . . . . . 40

VIII. REGULATION OF FOREIGN COMMERCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

IX. REGULATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

X. POWER OF STATES TO TAX INTERSTATE COMMERCE . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

1) When Does Interstate Transportation Begin? . . . . . . . . . . . 50

XI. POWER OF STATES TO TAX FOREIGN COMMERCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

PART FOUR: INDIVIDUAL GUARANTEES AGAINST GOVERNMENTAL OR

XII. LIMITATIONS ON POWER AND STATE ACTION REQUIREMENT . . . . . . . 53

(2) Apparent Legal Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

XIII. RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

XIV. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

4. Protection vs. Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

XV. THE TAKING CLAUSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

1) Temporary Denials of All Economic Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

XVI. INTRODUCTION TO SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

XVII. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

XVIII. EQUAL PROTECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

1. Age Not Suspect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

XIX. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

b) State and Local ElectionsVariance Not Unjustifiably

PART FIVE: FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

XX. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ASSEMBLY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

2) Content-Neutral Speech Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

5) Signs on Public Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

a) Actual Malice Defined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

1) Single Seizures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

XXI. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND BELIEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

a. Prohibiting Any Election Day Campaigning . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

XXII. FREEDOM OF RELIGION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

a) Need Not Belong to Formal Religious Organization . . . . 150

PART ONE: POWERS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I. THE JUDICIAL POWER

1. Arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States;

2. Of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;

3. In which the United States is a party;

4. Between two or more states;

5. Between a state and citizens of another state;

6. Between citizens of different states;

8. Between a state or citizens thereof and foreign states, citizens, or subjects.

B. POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

1. Review of Other Branches of Federal Government

a. Separation of Powers and Finality of Court Decisions

Congress amended the securities law to provide (i) a different limita-

2. Federal Review of State Acts

1. Article III Courts

a. Statutory Application of Appellate Jurisdiction

1) Writ of Certiorari (Discretionary)