G.R. No. 155830. August 15, 2012.

NUMERIANO P. ABOBON, petitioner, vs. FELICITAS

ABATA ABOBON and GELIMA ABATA ABOBON,
respondents.
Civil Law Land Registration A fundamental principle in
land registration under the Torrens system is that a certificate of
title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title
to the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein.A fundamental principle in land registration under the
Torrens system is that a certificate of title serves as evidence of
an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor
of the person whose name appears therein. The certificate of title
thus becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel of land
hence, anyone who deals with property registered under the
Torrens system may rely on the title and need not go beyond the
title. This reliance on the certificate of title rests on the doctrine
of indefeasibility of the land title, which
_______________
*FIRST DIVISION.

400

400

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Abobon vs. Abobon

has long been wellsettled in this jurisdiction. It is only when the

acquisition of the title is attended with fraud or bad faith that the
doctrine of indefeasibility finds no application.
Same Same Under the law that the owner has not only the
right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without other limitations than
those established by law, but also the right of action against the
holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it.It is
beyond question under the law that the owner has not only the
right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without other limitations
than those established by law, but also the right of action against

the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it. He

may exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal of the
thing, and, for this purpose, he may use such force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened
unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.
Same Damages Moral Damages To be recoverable, moral
damages must be capable of proof and must be actually proved
with a reasonable degree of certainty.To be recoverable, moral
damages must be capable of proof and must be actually proved
with a reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely
on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact
and amount of damages. Yet, nothing was adduced here to justify
the grant of moral damages. What we have was only the
allegation on moral damages, with the complaint stating that the
respondents had been forced to litigate, and that they had
suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety and wounded feelings
from the petitioners refusal to restore the possession of the land
in question to them. The allegation did not suffice, for allegation
was not proof of the facts alleged.
Same Same Attorneys Fees As to attorneys fees, the general
rule is that such fees cannot be recovered by a successful litigant as
part of the damages to be assessed against the losing party because
of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to
litigate.As to attorneys fees, the general rule is that such fees
cannot be recovered by a successful litigant as part of the
damages to be assessed against the losing party because of the
policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.
Indeed, prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code, such fees
could be recovered only when there was a stipulation to that
effect. It was only under
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401

Abobon vs. Abobon

the present Civil Code that the right to collect attorneys fees in
the cases mentioned in Article 2208 of the Civil Code came to be
recognized. Such fees are now included in the concept of actual
damages.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Manolo A. Flor for petitioner.
BERSAMIN, J.:

The controversy involves the rightful possession of a

parcel of registered land. The respondents, who were the
registered owners, sued the petitioner, their first cousin, to
recover the possession of the land in question, stating that
they had only allowed the petitioner to use the land out of
pure benevolence, but the petitioner asserted that the land
belonged to him as owner by right of succession from his
parents.
Antecedents
Respondents Felicitas and Gelima Abobon were the
plaintiffs in this action fer recovery of possession and
damages brought against petitioner Numeriano Abobon
(Numeriano) in the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
LabradorSual in Pangasinan (MCTC). They averred that
they were the registered owners of that parcel of
unirrigated riceland with an area of 4,668 square meters,
more or less, and situated in Poblacion, Labrador,
Pangasinan, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 201367 of the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan
(Exhibit A) that they had allowed Numeriano, their first
cousin, the free use of the land out of benevolence and that
they now immediately needed the parcel of land for their
own use and had accordingly demanded that Numeriano
should vacate and return it to them but he had refused.
402

402

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Abobon vs. Abobon

In his answer, Numeriano admitted being the first

cousin of the respondents and the existence of TCT No.
201367 covering the land in question, and having received
the demand for him to vacate. He alleged, however, that he
did not vacate because he was the owner of the land in
question. He asserted that if the land in question related to
the unirrigated riceland with an area of 3,000 square
meters that he was presently tilling and covered by tax
declaration no. 2 in the name of his father, Rafael Abobon
(Rafael), then the respondents did not have a valid cause of
action against him because he had inherited that portion
from his parents that he and his predecessorsininterest
had also continuously, publicly and adversely and in the
concept of owner possessed the parcel of land for more than
59 years that in 1937, his grandfather Emilio Abobon
(Emilio), the original owner, had granted that portion of

3,000 square meters to Rafael when he got married to his

mother, Apolonia Pascua, by means of a donation propter
nuptias that since then his parents had possessed and
tilled the land that he himself had exclusively inherited
the land from his parents in 1969 because his brother Jose
had received his own inheritance from their parents that
the possession of his parents and his own had continued
until the present that assuming that the respondents were
the true owners of the land, they were already estopped by
laches from recovering the portion of 3,000 square meters
from him.
On August 23, 2000, after due proceedings, the MCTC
ruled in favor of the respondents,1 finding that the
respondents parents Leodegario Abobon (Leodegario) and
Macaria Abata (Macaria) had purchased the property on
February 27, 1941 from Emilio with the conformity of
Emilios other children, including Rafael that on February
4, 1954, Leodegario and Macaria had registered their title
and ownership under TCT No. 15524 that on February 16,
1954, Leodegario and Macaria had sold the land to Juan
Mamaril that on February
_______________
1Records, pp. 244253.
403

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Abobon vs. Abobon

25, 1954, Juan Mamaril had registered the land in his

name under TCT No. 15678 that on November 13, 1970,
Juan Mamaril had sold the land back to Leodegario, and
TCT No. 87308 had been issued under the name of
Leodegario that on January 16, 1979, Leodegario had
submitted a sworn statement as required by Presidential
Decree No. 27 to the effect that his tenant on the land had
been one Cornelio Magno that on April 15, 1993, the
respondents had inherited the land upon the death of
Leodegario that on October 22, 1994, the respondents had
adjudicated the land unto themselves through a deed of
extrajudicial settlement that after due publication of the
deed of extrajudicial settlement, the respondents had
registered the land in their own names on December 20,
1994, resulting in the issuance of TCT No. 201367 to them
that after the 1989 palay harvest, the respondents had
allowed the petitioner the free use of the land out of

benevolence that the respondents had started to verbally

demand that the petitioner vacate the land on May 25,
1993 and that because the petitioner had refused to
vacate, the respondents had then brought a complaint in
the barangay on May 31, 1996, where mediation had failed
to settle the dispute.
The MCTC further found that the 3,000 squaremeter
land Numeriano referred to as donated to his parents was
not the same as the land in question due to their
boundaries being entirely different that in the donation
propter nuptias (Exhibit 11), Emilio had stated that the
parcels of land thereby covered had not been registered
under Act No. 496 or under the provisions of the Spanish
Mortgage Law, whereas the land in question had already
been registered that even assuming that the 3,000 square
meter land was inside the land in question, his claim would
still not prosper because the donation propter nuptias in
his parents favor had been invalid for not having been
signed and accepted in writing by Rafael, his father that
the donation propter nuptias had also been cancelled or
dissolved when his mother had signed as an instrumental
witness and his father had given his consent to
404

404

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Abobon vs. Abobon

the sale of the land in question then covered by Original

Certificate No. 28727 by Emilio to Leodegario and that his
parents assent to the sale signified either that his parents
had conformed to the dissolution of the donation propter
nuptias in their favor, or that the land sold to Leodegario
had been different from the land donated to them.
The MCTC held that the respondents were not guilty of
laches because of their numerous acts and transactions
from 1941 until 1996 involving the land in question,
specifically: (a) the sale of the land to Juan Mamaril and its
repurchase by Leodogario (b) the registration of title and
ownership (c) the extrajudicial partition of the property by
the heirs of Leodegario (d) Numerianos free use of the
land from 1989 onwards upon being allowed to do so by the
respondents (e) the verbal demands from the respondents
since 1993 for Numeriano to vacate the land and (f) the
commencement of the action to recover possession against
Numeriano. It considered such acts and transactions as
negating any notion of the respondents abandonment of
their right to assert ownership.2

The MCTC disposed thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant as follows:
1. Declaring the plaintiffs as the true and lawful owner and
possessor of the land in question
2. Ordering the defendant to vacate the premises in question and to
surrender its possession to the plaintiffs
3. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the amount of
P20,000.00 as moral damages and the amount of P5,000.00 as
exemplary damages
4. Ordering the defendant to pay the amount of P10,000.00 as and
for attorneys fees
405

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Abobon vs. Abobon

5. Dismissing the counterclaim
6. Ordering the defendant to pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.3

Numeriano appealed to the Regional Trial Court in

Lingayen City, Pangasinan (RTC), which, on April 16,
2001, upheld the MCTC,4 viz.:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES wellconsidered, the appeal taken
by defendant/appellant is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Citing the variance between the description of the land

in question and the description of the land covered by the
donation propter nuptias, as well as the failure of
Numeriano to explain his parents participation in the sale
of the land in question in 1941 to Leodegario and Macaria,
the RTC concluded that the land in question was really
separate and distinct from the property donated to his
parents in 19375 and lent credence to the respondents
claim that they had allowed him to use the land only out of
their benevolence.6
Still dissatisfied, Numeriano appealed via petition for
review to the Court of Appeals (CA), submitting that he
was the lawful owner and possessor of the 3,000 square
meter parcel of land that he occupied and cultivated and
that the respondents TCT was invalid.7
On May 16, 2002, however, the CA rejected Numerianos
submissions and affirmed the RTC,8 holding that the
respon

_______________
2Id., at p. 252.
3Id., at pp. 252253.
4Id., at pp. 289295.
5Id., at pp. 293294.
6Id., at p. 295.
7CA Rollo, pp. 722.
8Rollo, pp. 119127 penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr.
(later Presiding Justice), and concurred in by then Associ
406

406

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Abobon vs. Abobon

dents were in possession of a certificate of title that enjoyed

the conclusive presumption of validity, by virtue of which
they were entitled to possess the land in question that the
parcel of land that he owned was different from the land in
question and that his impugning the validity of the
respondents TCT partook of the nature of an
impermissible collateral attack against the TCT,
considering that the validity of a Torrens title could be
challenged only directly through an action instituted for
that purpose.9
The CA, pointing out that the MCTCs declaration that
the respondents were the true owners of the land in
question went beyond the ambit of a possessory action that
was limited to determining only the issue of physical
possession,10 deleted the declaration, and disposed as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered. The
Decision under appeal is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that the declaration by the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of respondents as to the owners of the subject parcel of land
is deleted.
SO ORDERED.

Hence, this appeal, with Numeriano positing as follows:

I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN AWARDING POSSESSION OF SUBJECT
PREMISES TO RESPONDENTS WITHOUT CITING ANY
REASONS THEREFOR AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT
EVIDENCE ON HAND SHOWS PETITIONER BECAME THE

LAWFUL
OWNER
THEREOF
PRIOR
RESPONDENTS ACQUIRED THE SAME.

TO

TIME

_______________
ate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. (later Presiding Justice) and Associate
Justice Mario L. Guaria III (retired).
9Id., at p. 125.
10Id., at pp. 126127.
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Abobon vs. Abobon

II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE LOT BEING CLAIMED
BY RESPONDENTS IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT BEING
CLAIMED BY PETITIONER.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER SHOULD FILE A
SEPARATE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF TITLE AS THERE
IS NO NEED THEREFOR.
IV.
ASSUMING SANS ADMITTING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT
THE LAWFUL OWNER OF SUBJECT PREMISES, WHETHER
OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE RTCS AND MCTCS DECISIONS
ORDERING PETITIONER TO PAY DAMAGES, ATTORNEYS
FEES AND COSTS OF SUIT AND DISMISSING HIS
COUNTERCLAIM.11

Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
First of all, a fundamental principle in land registration
under the Torrens system is that a certificate of title serves
as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to
the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein.12 The certificate of title thus becomes the best
proof of owner
_______________
11Id., at pp. 1314.
12Federated Realty Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127967,
December 14, 2005, 477 SCRA 707, 716717 Clemente v. Razo, G.R. No.

151245, March 4, 2005, 452 SCRA 768, 778 Vda. de Retuerto v. Barz, G.R.
No. 148180, December 19, 2001, 372 SCRA 712, 719.
408

408

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Abobon vs. Abobon

ship of a parcel of land13 hence, anyone who deals with

property registered under the Torrens system may rely on
the title and need not go beyond the title.14 This reliance on
the certificate of title rests on the doctrine of indefeasibility
of the land title, which has long been wellsettled in this
jurisdiction. It is only when the acquisition of the title is
attended with fraud or bad faith that the doctrine of
indefeasibility finds no application.15
Accordingly, we rule for the respondents on the issue of
the preferential right to the possession of the land in
question. Their having preferential right conformed to the
ageold rule that whoever held a Torrens title in his name
is entitled to the possession of the land covered by the
title.16 Indeed, possession, which is the holding of a thing or
the enjoyment of a right,17 was but an attribute of their
registered ownership.
It is beyond question under the law that the owner has
not only the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without
other limitations than those established by law, but also
the right of action against the holder and possessor of the
thing in order
_______________
13 Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. 24864, May 30,
1996, 257 SCRA 174, 183.
14Sandoval v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106657, August 1, 1996, 260
SCRA 283, 295 Lopez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 49739, January 20,
1989, 169 SCRA 271, 276.
15Sacdalan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128967, May 20, 2004, 428
SCRA 586 Alfredo v. Borras, G.R. No. 144225, June 17, 2003, 404 SCRA
145, 169 Heirs of Pedro Lopez v. De Castro, G.R. No. 112905, February 3,
2000, 324 SCRA 591, 617 Bornales v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L
75336, October 18, 1998, 166 SCRA 519, 524525.
16 Spouses Esmaquel and Sordevilla v. Coprada, G.R. No. 152423,
December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 428, 439 Javelosa v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 124292, December 10, 1996, 265 SCRA 493, 504505 Pangilinan v.
Aguilar, G.R. No. L29275, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 136.
17Article 523, CIVIL CODE.

409

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Abobon vs. Abobon

to recover it.18 He may exclude any person from the

enjoyment and disposal of the thing, and, for this purpose,
he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to
repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical
invasion or usurpation of his property.19
Secondly, Numeriano denies to the respondents the
right to rely on their TCT, insisting that he had become the
legal owner of the land in question even before the
respondents had acquired it by succession from their
parents, and that he had acted in good faith in possessing
the land in question since then. He argues that he did not
need to file a separate direct action to annul the
respondents title because by proving that they are owners
thereof, said title may be annulled as an incidental
result.20
Numerianos argument lacks legal basis. In order for
him to properly assail the validity of the respondents TCT,
he must himself bring an action for that purpose. Instead of
bringing that direct action, he mounted his attack as a
merely defensive allegation herein. Such manner of attack
against the TCT was a collateral one, which was disallowed
by Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (The Property
Registration Decree), viz.:
Section 48. Certificate not Subject to Collateral attack.A
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law.

Thirdly, the core issue in an action for the recovery of

possession of realty like this one concerned only the
priority right to the possession of the realty.21 As such,
Numerianos asser
_______________
18Article 428, CIVIL CODE.
19Article 429, CIVIL CODE.
20Rollo, p. 23.
21Acosta v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 140967, June 26, 2003, 405 SCRA 55,
60.
410

410

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Abobon vs. Abobon

tion of ownership in his own right could not be finally and

substantively determined herein, for it was axiomatic that
the adjudication of the question of ownership in an action
for the recovery of possession of realty would only be
provisional and would not even be a bar to an action
between the same parties involving the ownership of the
same property.22
Fourthly, Numeriano insists that the land he occupied
had been donated to his parents and was different from the
land in question.
His insistence was bereft of factual support. All the
lower courts uniformly found that his evidence related to a
parcel of land entirely different from the land in question.
According to the MCTC, the land for which he has
presented evidence to support his claim of ownership is
entirely different from the land the plaintiffs are
claiming.23 On its part, the RTC held that the land,
subject matter of this controversy is all of 4668 sq. meters
and bearing different boundaries from that of the donated
property and was already registered under OCT No. 28727
as early as 1926, such that the subject property is
separate and distinct from that property donated to the
defendants parents in 1937.24 Agreeing with both lower
courts, the CA declared: (i)n fine, what these decisions are
saying is that petitioner may have evidence that he owns a
parcel of land but, based on the evidence he had presented,
the said parcel of land is different from the one he is
presently occupying.25
We sustain the lower courts. The findings of fact of lower
courts, particularly when affirmed by the CA, are final and
conclusive upon the Court. In this as well as in other
appeals, the Court, not being a trier of facts, does not
review their
_______________
22Madrid v. Mapoy, G.R. No. 150887, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 14,
24.
23Records, p. 248.
24Id., at p. 294.
25Rollo, p. 126.
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Abobon vs. Abobon

findings, especially when they are supported by the records

or based on substantial evidence.26 It is not the function of
the Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again,
unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower
courts are absolutely devoid of support or are glaringly
erroneous as to constitute palpable error or grave abuse of
discretion.27 There has been no such showing made by
Numeriano herein.
Lastly, the Court must undo the awards of moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
To be recoverable, moral damages must be capable of
proof and must be actually proved with a reasonable degree
of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation,
conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and
amount of damages.28 Yet, nothing was adduced here to
justify the grant of moral damages. What we have was only
the allegation on moral damages, with the complaint
stating that the respondents had been forced to litigate,
and that they had suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety
and wounded feelings from the petitioners refusal to
restore the possession of the land in question to them.29
The allegation did not suffice, for allegation was not proof
of the facts alleged.
The Court cannot also affirm the exemplary damages
granted in favor of the respondents. Exemplary damages
were proper only if the respondents, as the plaintiffs,
showed their entitlement to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages.30
_______________
26FGU Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137775,
March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 337, 348.
27Id., at p. 349.
28Fidel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 168263, July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA
186, 196.
29Id.
30The Civil Code provides:
Article 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not
be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate
or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of
whether or not exemplary damages should
412

412

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Abobon vs. Abobon

Yet, they did not establish their entitlement to such other

damages.
As to attorneys fees, the general rule is that such fees
cannot be recovered by a successful litigant as part of the
damages to be assessed against the losing party because of
the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to
litigate.31 Indeed, prior to the effectivity of the present
Civil Code, such fees could be recovered only when there
was a stipulation to that effect. It was only under the
present Civil Code that the right to collect attorneys fees
in the cases mentioned in Article 220832 of the Civil Code
came to be recog
_______________
be awarded. In case liquidated damages have been agreed upon,
although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated
damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the court may consider
the question of granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages,
the plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for liquidated
damages.
31Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. of the Phil. v. Ines Chaves & Co., Ltd.,
No. L17106, October 19, 1996, 18 SCRA 356, 358 Heirs of Justiva vs.
Gustilo, L16396, January 31, 1963, 7 SCRA 72.
32 Article 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered,
except:
(1)
(2)

When exemplary damages are awarded

When the defendants act or omission has compelled the plaintiff

to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest

(3)

In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff

(4)

In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against

the plaintiff
(5)

Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in

refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and demandable claim
(6)

In actions for legal support

(7)

In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers

and skilled workers

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Abobon vs. Abobon

nized.33 Such fees are now included in the concept of actual

nized.33 Such fees are now included in the concept of actual

damages.34
Even so, whenever attorneys fees are proper in a case,
the decision rendered therein should still expressly state
the factual basis and legal justification for granting them.35
Granting them in the dispositive portion of the judgment is
not enough36 a discussion of the factual basis and legal
justification for them must be laid out in the body of the
decision.37 Considering that the award of attorneys fees in
favor of the respondents fell short of this requirement, the
Court disallows the award for want of the factual and legal
premises in the body of the decision.38 The requirement for
express findings of fact and law has been set in order to
bring the case within the exception and justify the award of
the attorneys
_______________
(8)

In actions for indemnity under workmens compensation and

employers liability laws

(9)

In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a

crime
(10)
(11)

When at least double judicial costs are awarded

In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable

that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.

In all cases, the attorneys fees and expenses of litigation must be
reasonable.
33See Reyes v. Yatco, 100 Phil. 964 (1957) Tan Ti v. Alvear, 26 Phil.
566 (1914) Castueras v. Bayona, 106 Phil., 340.
34Fores v. Miranda, 105 Phil. 266 (1959).
35 Buduhan v. Pakurao, G.R. No. 168237, February 22, 2006, 483
SCRA 116.
36 Gloria v. De Guzman Jr., G.R. No. 116183, October 6, 1995, 249
SCRA 126.
37Policarpio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94563, March 5, 1991, 194
SCRA 129.
38Koa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84847, March 5, 1993, 219 SCRA
541, 549 Central Azucarera de Bais v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 87597,
August 3, 1990, 188 SCRA 328, 340.
414

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Abobon vs. Abobon

fees. Otherwise, the award is a conclusion without a

premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and
conjecture.39

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision

promulgated on May 16, 2002 by the Court of Appeals, with
the MODIFICATION that the awards of moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorneys fees are DELETED.
The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio,** LeonardoDe Castro (Acting Chairperson),
Del Castillo and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed with modification.
Notes.It is a fundamental principle in land
registration that a certificate of title serves as evidence of
an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in
favor of the person whose name appears therein Such
indefeasibility commences after one year from the date of
entry of the degree of registration. (Del Prado vs.
Caballero, 614 SCRA 102 [2010])
The award of moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorneys fees, awarded as an incident to an intra
corporate case, are exempt from the rule on immediate
execution. (Heirs of Santiago C. Divinagracia vs. Ruiz, 639
SCRA 361 [2011])
o0o
_______________
39Ballesteros v. Abion, G.R. No. 143361, February 9, 2006, 482 SCRA
23.
** Vice Justice Estela M. PerlasBernabe, who is on leave, per Special
Order No. 1284 issued on August 6, 2012.

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