CASE DIGESTS

TOPIC: Authentication and Proof of Documents

CAEDA VS. CA
G.R. NO. 103554 MAY 28, 1993
FACTS:
Mateo Caballero executed a last will and testament on December 5, 1978 leaving by
way of legacies and devises his real and personal properties to persons not appearing to be
related to him. In the course of the probate proceedings, herein petitioners, who claim to be
nephews and nieces of the deceased, appeared as oppositors raising the issue of genuineness
of the signature of the testator. The probate court found the last will and testament to be in
order.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), petitioners assert that the will in question is null
and void for the reason that its attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails to specifically
state that the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing the will in their
presence and that they also signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another. What appears in the attestation clause is as follows: "we do certify
that the testament was read by him and the attestator, Mateo Caballero, has published unto us
the foregoing will consisting of THREE PAGES, including the acknowledgment, each page
numbered correlatively in letters of the upper part of each page, as his Last Will and Testament,
and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature
and on the left hand margin in the presence of the said testator and in the presence of each and
all of us. The CA found the quoted clause in order and affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the above attestation clause is in substantial compliance with the
requirements of the Civil Code and merits the allowance of the wills.
RULING:NO.
Among the requirements of the contents of the attestation under Article 805 of the Civil
Code is the it must state that the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the
will and all its pages, and that said witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one another.
The subscription of the signature of the testator and the attesting witnesses is made for
the purpose of authentication and identification, and thus indicates that the will is the very same
instrument executed by the testator and attested to by the witnesses. The attestation clause,
therefore, provide strong legal guaranties for the due execution of a will and to insure the

authenticity thereof. Where it is left unsigned, it would result in the invalidation of the will as it
would be possible and easy to add the clause on a subsequent occasion in the absence of the
testator and its witnesses.
Careful reading of the attestation clause shows that the same does not expressly state
therein the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in
the presence of the testator and of each other.
Petitioners are correct in pointing out that the aforestated defect in the attestation clause
obviously cannot be characterized as merely involving the form of the will or the language used
therein which would warrant the application of the substantial compliance rule.
The rule on substantial compliance in Article 809 cannot be invoked or relied on by
respondents since it presupposes that the defects in the attestation clause can be cured or
supplied by the text of the will or a consideration of matters apparent therefrom which would
provide the data not expressed in the attestation clause or from which it may necessarily be
gleaned or clearly inferred that the acts not stated in the omitted textual requirements were
actually complied within the execution of the will. In other words, defects must be remedied by
intrinsic evidence supplied by the will itself.
In the case at bar, contrarily, proof of the acts required to have been performed by the
attesting witnesses can be supplied by only extrinsic evidence thereof, since an overall
appreciation of the contents of the will yields no basis whatsoever from with such facts may be
plausibly deduced.

VDA.DE PEREZ VS. TOLETE

G.R. NO. 76714 JUNE 2, 1994
FACTS:
Subject of this case is the probate of the will of Spouses Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr.
Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens and practicing doctors in New York,
U.S.A. The spouses executed separate wills for the benefit of each other. The spouses and their
family perished when they were trapped by fire that gutted their home.
Thereafter, their wills were admitted to probate with the Surrogate Court of the County of
Onondaga, New York. Then, petitioner who is the mother of Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan filed for
the reprobate of the will with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. The will was
denied probate for the reason that the documents did not establish the law of New York on the

procedure and allowance of wills. The petitioners motion for reconsideration to be given
sufficient time to prove New York law was denied. On appeal, petitioner contend that the
evidence submitted to the RTC were already sufficient to allow probate of will.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it was necessary to prove the foreign law.
RULING:NO.
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been
probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in
accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not
in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the
foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and
allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429;
Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Except for the first
and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the
foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them
(Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, 56 SCRA 266 [1974]).
Petitioner must have perceived the omission of the fifth requirement above as in fact she
moved for more time to submit the pertinent procedural and substantive New York laws but
which request respondent Judge just glossed over. While the probate of a will is a special
proceeding wherein courts should relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the best
evidence of which the matter is susceptible before a purported will is probated or denied probate
(Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]).
Respondent Judge was ordered to give the petitioner a reasonable time within which to
submit evidence.

CEQUENA VS. BOLANTE

G.R. NO. 137944. APRIL 6, 2000
FACTS:

The lot subject of the controversy was originally declared for tax purposes in the name of
Sinfroso Mendoza, father of the respondent. It was subsequently declared under the name of
Margarito Mendoza, father of the petitioners, on the basis on an affidavit.
After trial, the trial court declared that the lot in question lawfully belongs to the heirs of
Margarito Mendoza. On appeal the CA reversed the decision because the genuineness and the
due execution of the affidavit allegedly signed by the respondent and her mother had not been
sufficiently established. The notary public or anyone else who had witnessed the execution of
the affidavit was not presented. Petitioners dispute the ruling of the CA on the contention that
that it was unnecessary to present a witness to establish the authenticity of the affidavit because
it was a declaration against respondent's interest and was an ancient document. As a
declaration against interest, it was an exception to the hearsay rule. As a necessary and
trustworthy document, it was admissible in evidence. And because it was executed on March
24, 1953, it was a self-authenticating ancient document.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not an affidavit is considered an exception to the hearsay rule being a declaration
against interest?
2. Whether or not the document can be considered as an ancient document?
RULING:
The court found the contention of the petitioners untenable.
FIRST: Before a document is admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule under the
Dead Man's Statute, the offeror must show (a) that the declarant is dead, insane or unable to
testify; (b) that the declaration concerns a fact cognizable by the declarant; (c) that at the time
the declaration was made, he was aware that the same was contrary to his interest; and (d) that
circumstances render improbable the existence of any motive to falsify.
In this case, one of the affiants happens to be the respondent, who is still alive and who
testified that the signature in the affidavit was not hers. A declaration against interest is not
admissible if the declarant is available to testify as a witness.
SECOND: The affidavit cannot be considered an ancient document either. An ancient
document is one that is (1) more than 30 years old, (2) found in the proper custody, and (3)
unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. It must on its face appear
to be genuine. The petitioners herein failed, however, to explain how the purported signature of
EduardaApiado could have been affixed to the subject affidavit if, according to the witness, she
was an illiterate woman who never had any formal schooling. This circumstance casts suspicion
on its authenticity.

Not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule on authentication. Thus, an
affidavit does not automatically become a public document just because it contains a notarial
jurat. Furthermore, the affidavit in question does not state how the ownership of the subject land
was transferred from Sinforoso Mendoza to Margarito Mendoza. By itself, an affidavit is not a
mode of acquiring ownership.

HEIRS OF SALUD DIZON SALAMANT VS. TAMAYO

G.R. NO. 110644. OCTOBER 30, 1998
FACTS:
The parties are the heirs of AugustinDizon who died intestate on May 15, 1942 leaving
behind his five children Eduardo, Gaudencio, Salud, Valenta and Natividad as surviving heirs.
Among the properties left by the decedent was a parcel of land in Barrio San Nicolas, Hagonoy,
Bulacan, with an area of 2,188 square meters covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 10384.
Eduardo and Gaudencio sold their hereditary rights to Salud sometime in 1944 and
1949, respectively. Sometime in 1987, petitioners instituted an action for compulsory judicial
partition of real properties registered in the name of Agustin Dizon. The action was prompted by
the refusal of herein respondent NatividadDizon Tamayo to agree to the formal distribution of
the properties of deceased Agustin Dizon among his heirs.
Petitioners contend that Lot 2557, Cad 304-D, described and covered by OCT No.
10384 in the name of the heirs of Agustin Dizon is part of the Dizon estate while respondent
claims that her father donated it to her sometime in 1936 with the consent of her co-heirs. In
support of her claim, respondent Natividad presented a private document of conformity which
was allegedly signed and executed by her elder brother, Eduardo, in 1936. Petitioners, however,
question the authenticity of the document inasmuch as it is marred by the unexplained erasures
and alterations.
ISSUE:
Whether the document presented by Natividad can qualify as an ancient document.
RULING:
No. An ancient document refers to a private document which is more than thirty (30)
years old, produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is
unblemished by alterations or circumstances of suspicion. The document which was allegedly
executed by Eduardo was marred by unexplained erasures and alterations. While the document
was originally penned in black ink, the number thirty-six (36) in blue ink was superimposed on

the number fifty-six (56) to make it appear that the document was executed in 1936 instead of in
1956. Moreover, a signature was blotted out with a black pentel pen and the three other
signatures of the alleged witnesses to the execution of the document at the lower portion of the
document were dated June 1, 1951.

SECURITY BANK & TRUST CO. VS. TRIUMPH LUMBER AND CONSTURCTION
CORP.
G.R. NO. 126696. JANUARY 21, 1999
FACTS:
Triumph Lumber and Construction Corp (TLCC) is a depositor of Security Bank and
Trust Co (SBTC). TLCC claims that SBTC was grossly negligent in allowing the encashment of
three (3) checks all payable to cash and all drawn against their deposit account with SBTC
despite the forgery of the drawers signature. TLCC requested that the amount wrongfully
encashed amounting to a total of P300,000.00 be credited back to their account but despite
demand, SBTC did not heed their request. Further TLCC claims that per findings of the PC
Crime Laboratory, the signatures the authorized signatories of plaintiff were forged.
Petitioner bank alleged that the failure of TLCC to produce the originals of the checks
was a fatal omission inasmuch as there would be no evidentiary basis for the court to declare
that the instruments were forgeries. Further it is of the contention that the opinion of the PC
Crime Laboratory examiner has no weight and deserves no consideration as she did not use as
basis of her analytical study the standard signatures of Chun Yun Kit and Co YokTeng on the
specimen signature cards.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not forgery was duly established.
2. Whether or not there was proper identification of the handwriting of the authorized signatories.
RULING:
FIRST: No, forgery was not duly established as Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court was not complied with by private respondent. The Section explicitly provides that when
the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself. It was not also shown that the case falls under the exceptions
provided in the Rules allowing mere photocopies. Thus, the original must be presented.
SECOND: The proper procedure in the investigation of a disputed handwriting was not
observed. Thus, the opinion of the Crime Laboratory Examiner could not be given credence.
The rule is that the genuineness of a standard writing may be established by any of the

following: (1) by the admission of the person sought to be charged with the disputed writing
made at or for the purposes of the trial, or by his testimony; (2) by witnesses who saw the
standards written or to whom or in whose hearing the person sought to be charged
acknowledged the writing thereof; (3) by evidence showing that the reputed writer of the
standard has acquiesced in or recognized the same, or that it has been adopted and acted upon
by him in his business transactions or other concerns.
The records only showed mere photocopies of the specimen signatures. Nobody was
presented to prove that the specimens were those of the authorized signatories. The Crime
Laboratory examiner never saw the parties write the specimen signatures, thus she could not be
considered to have adequate knowledge of the genuine signatures of the parties whose
signatures on the questioned checks were claimed to be forged. That knowledge could be
obtained either by (a) seeing the person write some other documents or signatures (ex
visuscriptionis); (b) seeing documents otherwise known to him to have been written by the
person in question (ex scriptisolimvisis); or (c) examining, in or out of court, for the express
purpose of obtaining such knowledge, the documents said to have been written by the person in
question (ex comparationescriptorum). The examiner could not be a witness under the first and
the second and even on the third. Under the third, it is essential that (a) certain specimens of
handwriting were seen and considered by her and (b) they were genuinely written by the person
in question. Now, as stated above, the examiner had no adequate basis for concluding that the
alleged specimen signatures in the long bond paper were indeed the signatures of the parties
whose signatures in the checks were claimed to have been forged. Moreover, we do not think
that the alleged specimens were sufficient in number.

PEOPLE VS. AGRESOR

G.R. NOS. 119837-39. DECEMBER 9, 1999
FACTS:
Erwin Agresor was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City with
three (3) counts of rape under three separate informations all allegedly committed against his
second cousin, Ritchie Calaustro. In his defense, appellant Erwin Agresor claimed that he and
Ritchie were sweethearts, and their sexual intercourse consensual. He presented eight (8)
letters purportedly written by the Ritchie addressed to him to prove his defense. Ritchie denied
authorship of the letters and presented her writings on her notebook for comparison.
The trial court found the letters to be forgeries in comparison to the writings on Ritchies
notebook stating that material differences were noted as follows: 1) the letters in the genuine
writings are uniform in sizes and shapes (round) unlike in the love letters wherein some letters

are larger than the others and/or slimmer than the others; and 2) the letters in the genuine
writings show a uniform slant to the left unlike in the love letters wherein some letters stand
erect notably the signature Ritchie.
Counsel for the accused did ask the court for time to file a motion so that the handwriting
may be submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to ascertain its
authenticity. Such motion was, however, denied by the court, ruling that "The Court itself can
determine whether or not that handwriting is the handwriting of the private complainant."
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not it was proved that the letters are forgeries.
2. Whether or not the assistance of handwriting experts should have been employed.
RULING:
FIRST. The Court found no difference between the two sets of writings that can be
described as material. The size and proportions of letters do not have much significance in the
identification of handwriting for the simple reason that they can be appreciably changed
according to the circumstances. The mood and the relative importance of the document may
also unconsciously affect the handwriting, and may account for the variations therein.
In any case, the test of genuineness ought to be the resemblance, not the formation of
letters in some other specimens but to the general character of writing, which is impressed on it
as the involuntary and unconscious result of constitution, habit or other permanent course, and
is, therefore, itself permanent. The identification of handwriting should not rest, therefore, on the
apparent similarity or dissimilarity of one feature but should be based on the examination of all
the basic characteristics of the handwriting under study.
The court, on its own examination of the love letters, concluded that they are devoid of
any unusual pen pauses, pen lifts, tremors and retouchings that characterize forgeries. Also, the
sheer number of the love letters weighs against any suspicions of forgery since it would greatly
increase the risk of discovery.
SECOND: The trial court should not have simply brushed aside the motion of the
accused to submit the letters for examination by an expert since the authenticity of the letters
will serve to prove his primary defense of their being sweethearts with Ritch.
It is true that the opinion of handwriting experts are not necessarily binding upon the
courts, the expert's function being to place before the court data upon which the court can form
its own opinion. Ultimately, the value of the expert testimony would still have to be weighed by
the judge, upon whom the duty of determining the genuineness of the handwriting devolves.
Nevertheless, the handwriting expert may afford assistance in pointing out distinguishing marks,

characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing which
would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer.

VELOSO VS. CA
G.R. NO. 102737. AUGUST 21, 1996
FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco Veloso was the owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 49138 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila. The title was registered
in the name of Francisco A. Veloso, single, on October 4, 1957. The said title was subsequently
canceled and a new one, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 180685, was issued in the name of
Aglaloma B. Escario, married to Gregorio L. Escario, on May 24, 1988. The transfer was
supported by a General Power of Attorney and Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Irma Veloso,
wife of the petitioner and appearing as his attorney-in-fact, and defendant AglalomaEscario.
Petitioner Veloso filed an action for annulment of documents, reconveyance of
property. He alleged that he was the absolute owner of the subject property and he never
authorized anybody, not even his wife, to sell it; that he only learned of the transfer to Escario
when he verified his copy with the Registry of Deeds upon discovering that his copy of the title
was lost; that he has not executed the power of attorney; that his signature was falsified; and
that the same was not duly notarized. Atty. Tubig, the notary public, himself testified that he did
not sign thereon nor was it ever recorded in his notarial register. To bolster his argument,
petitioner and Atty. Tubig presented documents containing their genuine signatures and said
that when compared to the power of attorney it showed some difference.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not there was adequate proof supporting petitioners claim of forgery of the
power of attorney.
RULING:
No. An examination of the records showed that the assailed power of attorney was valid
and regular on its face. It was notarized and as such, it carries the evidentiary weight conferred
upon it with respect to its due execution.
The basis presented by the petitioner was inadequate to sustain his allegation of forgery.
Mere variance of the signatures cannot be considered as conclusive proof that the same were
forged. Forgery cannot be presumed. Petitioner, however, failed to prove his allegation and
simply relied on the apparent difference of the signatures. His denial had not established that

the signature on the power of attorney was not his. Forgery should be proved by clear and
convincing evidence and whoever alleges it has the burden of proving the same.
There had never been an accurate examination of the signature, even that of the
petitioner. To determine forgery, it was held in Cesar vs. Sandiganbayan that:
The process of identification, therefore, must include the determination of the extent, kind, and
significance of this resemblance as well as of the variation. It then becomes necessary to
determine whether the variation is due to the operation of a different personality, or is only the
expected and inevitable variation found in the genuine writing of the same writer. It is also
necessary to decide whether the resemblance is the result of a more or less skillful imitation, or
is the habitual and characteristic resemblance which naturally appears in a genuine
writing. When these two questions are correctly answered the whole problem of identification is
solved.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF PAREJA VS. PAREJA

G.R. NO. L-5824 MAY 31, 1954
FACTS:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon declaring Julio
Pareja, Regina Pareja, Paz Pareja, and Jose Pareja, as well as Soledad ParejaMarcial,
acknowledged natural children and heirs of the deceased NatividadPareja.
The record discloses that NatividadPareja died on April 6, 1943. He and Eulogia
Fernandez lived together as man and wife without being married, although both had no
impediment to contract marriage, and out of their relationship the said Julio Pareja, Regina
Pareja, Paz Pareja, and Jose Pareja were born. Soledad Pareja was recognized by the
deceased as his natural child, in compliance with a judgment rendered by this court in which he
was found guilty of the seduction of Timotea Patria, as a result of which crime Soledad was
begotten. She was declared by the trial court an acknowledged natural child, and she opposed
the claim of the other children of the deceased, the appellees herein, as acknowledged natural
children. So trial was held and evidence submitted, after which the court entered the order
appealed from.
It is to be noted that no action for recognition was instituted during the lifetime of the
deceased to compel him to recognize the appellees. Claim is made, however, that he had
recognized them in the records of their births and in their baptismal certificates.
ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the birth certificates and baptismal certificates presented can be
considered as public documents which can be used as proof of filiation.
RULING: NO.
Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, those
executed by private individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and those issued by
competent public officials by reason of their office.
Recognition of natural children must be precise, express, and solemn. None of the
documents presented satisfies the requirements of precision and solemnity required by the
Spanish Civil Code. The trial court failed to distinguish the public document as mentioned in the
code from "public instruments" in general. "Public instruments" and "public documents" have
been used interchangeably. "Public instruments," under the Spanish notarial law, are a class of
public documents.
Certificate of birth, which are copies of official records, or copies of public writings,
although issued by public officers, are in no sense public documents as defined in articles 131
and 1216 of the Spanish Civil Code. Neither are the baptismal certificates public documents or
public writings, because the parochial records of baptisms are not public or official records, as
they are not kept by public officers, and are no proof of relationship or filiation of the child
baptized.

SALONGA VS. CRUZ-PANO

G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985
FACTS:
A series of bombings occurred in Metro Manila area for which one Victor Burns Lovely
and his two brothers were charged. Mr. Lovely implicated herein petitioners. Thereafter, Salonga
was placed under arrest. The records reveal that in finding a case against the petitioner, the
respondent judge relied only on the testimonies of Col. Balbino Diego and Victor
Lovely. Petitioners participation was based only on the statement of Lovely "that it was the
residence of ex-Senator Salonga where they met together with Renato Taada, one of the
brains of the bombing conspiracy
The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty guaranteed by
the due process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been established to warrant the
filing of an information for subversion against him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a prima facie case against Salonga.
RULING:
No. After a painstaking review of the records, this Court finds the evidence offered by the
prosecution utterly insufficient to establish a prima facie case against the petitioner. The term
"prima facie evidence" denotes evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to
sustain the proposition it supports or to establish the facts, or to counter-balance the
presumption of innocence to warrant a conviction.
The respondents admit that no evidence was presented directly linking petitioner
Salonga to actual acts of violence or terrorism. There is no proof of his direct participation in any
overt acts of subversion. However, he is tagged as a leader of subversive organizations for two
reasons (1) Because his house was used as a "contact point"; and (2) Because "he mentioned
some kind of violent struggle in the Philippines being most likely should reforms be not instituted
by President Marcos immediately."
The "contact point" theory or what the petitioner calls the guilt by visit or guilt by
association" theory is too tenuous a basis to conclude that Senator Salonga was a leader or
mastermind of the bombing incidents. To indict a person simply because some plotters,
masquerading as visitors, have somehow met in his house or office would be to establish a
dangerous precedent. The right of citizens to be secure against abuse of governmental
processes in criminal prosecutions would be seriously undermined.
Furthermore, the alleged opinion of the petitioner about the likelihood of a violent
struggle here in the Philippines if reforms are not instituted, assuming that he really stated the
same, is nothing but a legitimate exercise of freedom of thought and expression. No man
deserves punishment for his thoughts. Cogitationispoenam memo meretur.
The prosecution has failed to produce evidence that would establish any link between
petitioner and any subversive organization. Evidence must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. (People v. Dayad,
56 SCRA 439). In the case at bar, the prosecution cannot even present a credible version of the
petitioner's role in the bombings even if it ignores the subsequent disclaimers of Lovely and
without relying on mere affidavits including those made by Lovely during his detention.

BENEDICTO VS. CA

G.R. NO. 125359. SEPTEMBER 4, 2001

FACTS:
Petitioner is among the accused in twenty-five criminal cases for violation of Central
Bank Circular No. 960. The charge sheets alleged that the trio failed to submit reports of their
foreign exchange earnings from abroad and/or failed to register with the Foreign Exchange
Department of the Central Bank within the period mandated by Circular No. 960. Said Circular
prohibited natural and juridical persons from maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad
without prior authorization from the Central Bank. It also required all residents of the Philippines
who habitually earned or received foreign currencies from invisibles, either locally or abroad, to
report such earnings or receipts to the Central Bank. Violations of the Circular were punishable
as a criminal offense under Section 34 of the Central Bank Act.
Among the defenses raised by petitioners was that their alleged violations of Circular
No. 960 was covered by the absolute immunity granted in the Compromise Agreement of
November 3, 1990. The said compromise agreement gives them immunity for claims which are
the subject matter of an enumeration of cases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was absolute immunity by virtue of the Compromise Agreement.
RULING:
In construing contracts, it is important to ascertain the intent of the parties by looking at
the words employed to project their intention. In the instant case, the parties clearly listed and
limited the applicability of the Compromise Agreement to the cases listed or identified therein.
Nowhere is there a mention of the criminal cases filed against petitioners for violations of
Circular No. 960. Conformably with Article 1370 of the Civil Code, the Agreement relied upon by
petitioners should include only cases specifically mentioned therein. Applying the parol evidence
rule, where the parties have reduced their agreement into writing, the contents of the writing
constitute the sole repository of the terms of the agreement between the parties. Whatever is
not found in the text of the Agreement should thus be construed as waived and abandoned.
Scrutiny of the Compromise Agreement will reveal that it does not include all cases filed by the
government against Benedicto, his family, and associates.