[G.R. No. L-19450. May 27, 1965.

]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs . SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA,
defendant-appellant
FACTS: The Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the crime
of Malicious Mischief, before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality.
Assistant City Attorney Ariston D. Fule, after securing the permission of the Secretary of
Justice, was allowed to appear as private-prosecutor of the complainant, who was his relative,
on the condition that that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he would be
considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any payment for his
services
The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the
counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al., vs. Blanco, et al., 79 Phil. 647
wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant
Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in
private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the appearance of
City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling.
Counsel for the accused later on also presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from
Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 127, now Sec.
35, Rule 138, Revised Rules, which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the
superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a
member of the bar or give professional advice to clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in
appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice.
MAIN ISSUE: Whether or not City Attorney Fule should be allowed to appear as private
prosecutor in the case at bar.
DECISION OF THE COURTS: The Justice of Peace Court ruled, on both times, that Fule had
the right to appear as private prosecutor of the complainant and further stated that he (Fule)
was not actually engaged in private law practice.
The Court of First Instance, after accused filed an appeal on the JPCs ruling, likewise
held that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear before the Justice of the Peace Court in
Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of the
offended party. The CFI also noted that it did not appear that Fule was being paid for his
services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity and that the case at bar does not
provide any possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City
Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case.

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, dismissed the appeal and conformed with the
decision of both lower courts stating that the appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not
conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law and that the
permission that Asst. City Attorney Fule had received from his immediate superior, the Secretary
of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative, was never refuted.
The Court also believed that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute
private practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an
isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the
same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Private practice of law would imply
that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a
source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
RELEVANCE TO THE COURSE: Attorneys-at-law employed in the government are prohibited
to engage in private practice. An isolated appearance as counsel on one occasion though, is not
conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The word private
practice of law contemplated in Section 32, Rule 127, now Section 35, Rule 138, Revised
Rules, that bars certain attorneys from practicing should be understood as frequent, active and
continued practice of legal profession and that this professional services are made available to
the public for a compensation as a source of the legal practitioners livelihood or as
consideration of the said services.

[G.R. No. L-18727. August 31, 1964.]

JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendant-appellant, ROMULO
CUI, intervenor-appellant.
FACTS: The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and
Doa Benigna Cui for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and
incapacitated and helpless persons. It acquired corporate existence by Act No. 3239 and
endowed with extensive properties by the said spouses through a series of donations,
principally the deed of donation. When the spouses died, administration eventually passed to
Dr. Teodoro Cui.
Section 2 of the Act gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of
their incapacity or death, to such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order
prescribed to them.
Jesus Ma. Cui and Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of
the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa Benigna Cui. Incumbent administrator,
Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a convenio entered into
between them and embodied in a notarial document. The next day, Antonio Ma. Cui took his
oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the convenio or of his
brothers assumption of the position.
When Dr. Teodoro Cui died, the plaintiff wrote a letter to the defendant demanding that
the office be turned over to him. When it was not complied with, he filed the complaint in this
case. Romulo Cui later on intervened, claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson of
Vicente Cui, another one of the nephews mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio in their
deed of donation.
As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications
to the position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equal
circumstances would be preferred pursuant to Section 2. However, before the test of age may
be, applied the deed of donation provides for a lawyer. If not a lawyer, the administrator should
be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be the
one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified.
The specific point in dispute is the meaning of the term titulo de abogado. Jesus Ma.
Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas but is not a
member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui,
on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred by this Court, was reinstated

by resolution, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio
de Barili.
Plaintiff likewise contended that even if Antonio is a member of the Bar, he is
nevertheless disqualified by virtue of Paragraph 3 of the deed of donation, which provides that
the administrator may be removed, on the ground, among others, of ineptitude in the discharge
of his office or lack of evident sound moral character.
MAIN ISSUE: Whether or not Jesus Ma. Chui is entitled to the office of administrator.
DECISION OF THE COURTS: The Court a quo decided in favor of the plaintiff and said that the
phrase "titulo de abogado," taken alone, means that of a full-fledged lawyer, but that "as used in
the deed of donation and considering the function of purpose of the administrator, it should not
be given a strict interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a law degree or diploma
of Bachelor of Laws.
The Supreme Court however, reversed the decision of the Court a quo and ruled that the
plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the office of administrator. Hence, Antonio
should be the Hospicios administrator.
Jesus is the older of the two and under equal circumstances would be preferred
pursuant to Section 2 of the deed of donation. However, with respect to the preference given in
the deed, before the test of age can be used, the one among the legitimate descendants of the
nephews named, who is a lawyer (titulo de abogado), would be preferred. The founders of the
Hospicio provided for a lawyer, first of all, because in all of the works of an administrator, it is
presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession would be a
distinct asset.
Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws but is not a member of the Bar, not
having passed the examinations. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar
and although disbarred in 1957, was reinstated by resolution, about two weeks before he
assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio.
The term titulo de abogado means not mere possession of the academic degree of
Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the
practice of law. A Bachelors degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain
academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. By itself, the
degree merely serves as evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the
examinations has successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or
university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education.

In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of
the Supreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Bar
examinations, taking the lawyers oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this
certificate being his license to practice the profession.
Reference is made to the fact that the defendant Antonio was disbarred (for immorality
and unprofessional conduct). However, it is also a fact, that he was reinstated before he
assumed the office of administrator. His reinstatement is recognition of his moral rehabilitation,
upon proof no less than that required for his admission to the Bar in the first place. Also, when
defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his
previous disbarment were wiped out.
RELEVANCE TO THE COURSE: A Bachelors degree alone, conferred by a law school upon
completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal
profession. The English equivalent of abogado is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a
fixed and general signification, and has reference to that class of persons who are by license
officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar
duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. In this jurisdiction,
admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of the Supreme Court.
According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Bar examinations, taking the
lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being his license
to practice the profession.
Additionally, once a disbarred lawyer is restored to the roll of lawyers as per the sound
discretion of the Supreme Court, the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous
disbarment are wiped out. The Court, before reinstating, requires evidence of reformation before
an applicant is entitled to reinstatement, notwithstanding if the attorney has received a pardon
following his conviction, and that the requirements for reinstatement have been held to be the
same as for original admission to the bar, except that the court may require a greater degree of
proof than in an original admission (7 G.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 815.)