Nationalities Papers, Vol. 32, No.

2, June 2004

The Bosnian Muslims and Albanians: Islam and Nationalism

Aydin Babuna1
Introduction
The drastic changes in the Balkans in the 1990s and the disintegration of Yugoslavia
in particular have resulted in a large number of publications attempting to explain the
break-up of this country and the political developments in the Balkans. Some of
these publications deal partly with the local Muslims who were engaged in the
Balkan conflicts but, with some exceptions, they are focused mainly on recent
developments, with less attention paid to the historical contexts in which the Muslim
nationalist movements were shaped.
Although religion played a more important role in the nation-building process of
the Bosnian Muslims than in that of the Albanians, there are very few studies that
examine the reasons for this and the impact of Islam on the Muslim nationalist
movements in historical perspective. The following article examines from a comparative perspective the role of Islam in the Bosnian Muslim and Albanian national
movements from the Ottoman period up to the end of the Cold War. The Sunni
Muslims of Bosnia and the Albanians, who are divided into three religions and a
variety of sects, present contrasting societal structures for the analysis of different
aspects of Islam.
The following article also examines the relations and differences between the
Albanians and the Bosnian Muslims in historical perspective, these being of great
importance for the understanding of recent developments in the Balkans. In the
1990s, one of the most widely held interpretations for the events in the Balkans was
the return of ancestral hatreds or the return of the suppressed.2 Religion and
ethnic nationalism were considered the most important factors, while local histories
and the differences among the Muslim communities and the distinct national groups
of the Balkans were ignored. Finally, the article also examines the national development of the Bosnian Muslims (since 1993 Bosniaks)3 from the perspective of the
religious brotherhood between the two Muslim communities, in contrast to traditional studies, which focus solely on the Bosnian Muslims.
The Bosnian Muslims and Albanians in the Ottoman Empire
The Bosnian Muslims
The Ottomans occupied Bosnia in 1463 and twenty years later Hercegovina. The
occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina was carried out step by step and it was completed
ISSN 0090-5992 print; ISSN 1465-3923 online/04/020287-35 2004 Association for the Study of Nationalities
DOI: 10.1080/0090599042000230250

A. BABUNA

by the incorporation of the Bihacka Krajina into the Bosnian province in 1592.
Bosnia-Hercegovina remained for a long time a part of the Rumeli Bejlerbejlik4
(European Turkey) until 1580, when it became an independent Bejlerbejlik. During
the Ottoman period an intensive Islamization process took place in Bosnia-Hercegovina. This process continued for centuries and included not only the local
aristocracy but also the peasants. The cities contributed to this process as centers of
the new Islamic culture.5 The conversion6 of one section of the South Slavs marked
the beginning of the ethnogenesis of the Bosnian Muslims.7
During the reign of Mehmet the Conquerer, Ottoman society was organized on the
basis of the millet8 system. In this system every religious group constituted a
community of its own known as a millet. These communities enjoyed semi-autonomy and were ruled by their own religious leaders, who were at the same time agents
of the state. As members of the Muslim millet, the Bosnian Muslims enjoyed a
privileged position under the Ottomans. They provided many sadrazams (prime
ministers) for the empire and represented the state in Bosnia-Hercegovina. When the
Christian nationalities began to fight for their independence against the Ottomans the
Bosnian Muslims were on the side of the state, with which they had identified
themselves.
The millet system, in which religion and nationality were often synonymous,
affected the Bosnian Muslims more than the Serbs and Croats and religion would
play a more dominant role in their national development.9 An important sign of the
impact of the millet system on the Bosnian Muslims is the fact that during the
autonomy movement against Austro-Hungarian rule they still referred to themselves
as islamski narod10(Islamic nation) or as islamski millet11 (Muslim millet) in petitions
submitted to the Austro-Hungarian officials.
The main social classes within the Bosnian Muslim community in the Ottoman
period were: sipahis,12 ulema (high-ranking clerics) and reaya (peasants).13 The
landowners were largely Muslim. Though there were also some Muslim peasants, the
overwhelming majority of the peasants were Serbs and Croats. The position of the
landowners was strengtened by the state, since Bosnia-Hercegovina was a border
zone (serhat). The lands were concentrated in the hands of the local aristocracy,
which was not the usual practice in the other parts of the empire.14 Some sipahis in
Bosnia-Hercegovina had possessed large estates since the beginning of Ottoman
rule15 and began to inherit them from their families in the late sixteeth century.16
These privileges contributed to the development of a Bosnian Muslim self-consciousness.
As the Ottoman Empire declined, its agricultural and military system weakened.
Though the collapse of the imperial institutions was slower than in the other Ottoman
provinces, it was also clearly felt in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Many sipahis converted
their lands into great estates (cifluks) by illegal means. Some local notables (ajans),
particularly the captains (kapetan), the commanders of the military districts, began to
challenge the central authority. The reforms of the Ottoman Sultan, Mahmud II, met

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with the resistance of the Bosnian ajans under the leadership of Husein Kapetan
Gradascevic. The ajans defeated the Ottoman army in 1831 and ruled the Bosnian
province for a short time independently. However, they were to be destroyed by the
Ottomans permanently in 18501851.
By the end of the seventeenth century the Ottomans were forced to adopt a
defensive position against Europe. In the wars fought by the Ottomans against
Austria, Venice and Russia the Bosnian Muslims suffered many casualties. On the
other hand, the rise of Serbian and Montenegrin nationalism posed a threat not only
to the existence of the Ottoman Empire but also to that of the Bosnian Muslims.
Gradually, the conflict between the Serbs, Montenegrins and the Ottomans supported
by the Bosnian Muslims came to be considered a struggle between Islam and
Christianity. These conditions forced the Muslim upper class (sipahis) and the
Muslim peasants to come closer in order to survive. The lifting of some of the taxes
levied on the Muslim peasants was an important step in this process.17 Under these
conditions religion played the role of a unifying political ideology and provided a
basis for the development of a common culture among the Muslims. The resistance
of the Bosnian ajans to the Ottoman government strengthened Bosniak consciousness while their conflicts with the Christians strengthened their Muslim identity.18

The Albanians
The Ottomans conquered northern Albania in 14641479.19 However, they were
held up for 24 years by the Albanian military leader Skanderbeg, who was able to
unite his countrymen and offer resistance to the Ottomans. After his death the
Ottomans continued with their conquests in Albania. Shkoder was the last city to fall,
in 1478.
Before the Ottoman occupation, the Albanians had been divided between the
Catholic and Orthodox churches. The Ottomans introduced a new religion, Islam, to
the region. The record book of timars (Ottoman military fiefs) shows that between
the years 1431 and 1432, 70% of the fiefs in southern and central Albania were held
by Albanians. The Ottomans did not force the Christian feudal lords who wanted to
preserve their possessions or part of them as timars to become Muslim. Some
families preserved their Christian faith for generations. The Ottomans tried to keep
the vulnerable frontier in peace and secure the necessary recruitment.20 At first there
were few conversions but this changed in the seventeenth century and gradually the
most widespread Islamization process in the Ottoman Balkans took place in Albania.
The Catholics were concentrated in the north with their center in Shkoder. The
Orthodox were to be found mainly south of the Shkumbin river and in the districts
of Korce and Gjirokaster. They were under the jurisdiction of the Ohrid Archbishopric. After the abolition of this archbishopric the Orthodox lived mainly under the
cultural influence of the Greeks while the Catholics looked for support to the

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Catholic states, particularly the Habsburg Empire. The Muslims were scattered
throughout Albania but were concentrated mainly in the central regions of the
country and in Kosovo. The Albanian Muslims, like the Bosnian Muslims, enjoyed
a privileged position within the millet system of the empire. They provided the
empire with many grand viziers (prime ministers). The famous Koprulu grand vezirs
in the seventeenth century were of Albanian origin and it has been estimated that at
least thirty Albanians held this position.21
The majority of the Muslim Albanians were Sunni, but Bektashism was
more widespread in Albania than in the other parts of the Balkans and became
the largest Sufi order in the country. Bektashism, which was confined to the
Ottoman territories,22 was introduced into Albania sometime in the fifteenth
century by the Ottoman janissaries.23 Its expansion seems to have occurred in
the last quarter of the nineteenth century or even at the beginning of the twentieth
rather than during the time of Tepedelenli Ali Pasha.24 Bektashism played
an important role in the dissemination of Islam among the native Christian populations in the Balkans. In the eyes of the Christians this democratic and mysterious sect
was not very different from Christianity itself.25 The Bektashis lived mainly in the
south although a few of them inhabited the central regions of Albania and Kosovo.
There were some other Sufi orders such as the Halveti, Rifai, Sadi, Kadiri and
Naqsibendi in the Albanian territories. The geographical locations and the different
practices of the various orders tended to isolate their followers from the rest of the
Muslims.26
An interesting phenomenon that emerged mainly in the north and in the middle of
the Albanian lands was crypto-Christianity. The crypto-Christians usually inhabited
areas near to those inhabited by the Muslims. They professed Islam but practiced
Christianity in private. They appeared mainly at the times when anti-Christian
feelings were high. In south-central Albania, in Shpat, there were Orthodox cyrptoChristians while the Catholic crypto-Christians were to be found in the north, mainly
around Pec (Ipek) and on the plain of Kosovo.27
In addition to religious division, tribal structure was another divisive force in
Albanian society. There were two important subgroups in Albania: the Gegs and the
Tosks. The Gegs lived in the northern mountainous areas. The basic unit was the clan
(fis). They developed a self-governing tribal organization similar to that of the
Montenegrins. Judgements were made on the basis of unwritten customary law
(kanun).28 The central government faced difficulties in controlling these clans and
collecting the taxes. In contrast to the Gegs the Tosks were in general integrated into
Ottoman society.29 They had no tribal system and lived mainly in the southern
lowland areas, which were easier for the government to control. They were usually
subject to the timar system but there were some Orthodox Tosk villages in remote
mountainous areas which enjoyed autonomy in return for the payment of taxes.30 All
these regional distinctions were of prime importance for the Ottoman administrations ability to rule the Albanian territories.

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THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS AND ALBANIANS

In the eighteenth century the military fiefs became more and more hereditary.
Many sipahis gradually converted their timars into great estates and became local
ajans, while the system of farming out the state lands created another class of ajans.
The government was also increasingly unable to control its local officials. On the
other hand, many conflicts took place between the tribes. The Ottomans governed the
Albanian territories through the native rulers (pashas, beys). The central government
played them off against each other to prevent union between them.31 In the north, the
Bushati family dominated the area around the city of Shkoder while in the south Ali
Pasha was in control of Janina and its surroundings until the 1820s.32 In the 1830s
the Albanian ajans came out in opposition to the reforms of the Ottoman Sultan
Mahmud II.

The Rise of Muslim Nationalism in Bosnia-Hercegovina

Bosnia-Hercegovina was occupied by Austria-Hungary in 1878 in accordance with
the Treaty of Berlin. Thus, the traditional ties of the Muslims with Istanbul were cut
off. The Bosnian Muslims were now also divided from the Slavic Muslims in the
Novi Pazar district, in Montenegro and in Macedonia. They were also separated from
the non-Slavic Muslims, particularly the Albanians and Turks in Kosovo and
Macedonia. One of the important consequences of this was that the Bosnian Muslim
community was insulated from the influence of the Sufi orders, which were widespread among the Albanians who remained under Ottoman rule. These developments
were to contribute to the evolution of the distinct identity of the Bosnian Muslims
free from the Islamic brotherhood.33
The Austro-Hungarian period was of particular importance for the political and
national development of the Bosnian Muslims. Benjamin Kallay, the Austro-Hungarian ruler (18821903), considered the Muslims the main element of the territorially
based Bosnian nation, which he encouraged in order to counterbalance the rising
Serbian and Croatian nationalisms. However, the Muslims, who enjoyed a dominant
position during the Ottoman period, opposed the political, social and economic
changes after the occupation. They were also engaged in conflict with the cultural
values of the new Catholic administration. In the Austro-Hungarian period the
Muslims were to make political, economic and cultural demands in a modern sense
for the first time in their history.
After the occupation, the Muslims were subject to a rapid ethnic development. In
contrast to the past, cases of conversion from Islam to Christianity now had social
implications. Indeed, some individual cases of conversion were considered a threat
to the existence of the Muslim community. The conversion of a Muslim girl, Fata
Omanovic, from the village of Kuti near Mostar in 1899, caused general discontent
among the Muslims and marked the beginning of a province-wide opposition to
Austro-Hungarian rule. This opposition gradually led to the recognition in 1909 of

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the autonomy of the Muslim religious organization by the Austro-Hungarian administration.

Dzabic, the influential leader of the Muslim opposition until 1902, was the man of
the Sultan and played an important role in Ottoman pan-Islamic policy in BosniaHercegovina.34 During his leadership the Muslims laid emphasis on their religious
rather than economic demands. The main question between the Bosnian Muslims and
the Austro-Hungarian government was the demand of the Muslims that the Reis-ululema (the Muslim religious leader in Bosnia-Hercegovina) should receive the
consent (mensura) of the Seyh-ul-islam (religious leader) in Istanbul to carry out his
religious duty. However, this was considered a threat to Austro-Hungarian sovereignty in Bosnia-Hercegovina and was rejected by the government.35
After the end of the leadership of Dzabic in 1902, the Muslim movement
stagnated. It was, however, to revive in 1905 and the first Muslim party of
Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Muslim Peoples Organization (Muslimanska narodna organizacija), was established in 1906. This party, which was led by Ali Beg Firdus, a
big landowner, concentrated particularly on economic demands. However, the
Muslim leadership, which was mainly composed of the landowners, also used
religious symbols like Dzabic in order not to lose the support of the Muslim
community. On the other hand the clandestine and limited support of the Ottomans
for the Bosnian Muslims gradually decreased with the improvement of the relations
between the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman Empires on the brink of World War
I.
According to the statistics of 1910 91.15% of the landowners with kmets,36
70.62% of the landowners without kmets and 56. 65% of the free peasants were
Muslim. Only 4.58% of the kmets were Muslim while 73.92% of them were
Orthodox and 21. 49% Catholic.37 In a society with this social structure it was
extremely difficult to separate religious rights from economic ones. The rights of the
landowners meant Muslim rights and the rights of the kmets meant Christian rights.
Given these circumstances it was not difficult for the Muslim landowners to incite
the religious feelings of their co-religionists in order to protect their own economic
interests.
Under the Ottomans, the Bosnian Muslims referred to themselves as Turcin (Turk)
in popular speech.38 The term did not have a national connotation but simply meant
those who belonged to the religion of the Turks.39 They referred to the Ottomans as
Turkuse (Anatolian Turks) or Osmanlija (Ottomans). This identification reflected the
repeated participation of Slavic Muslims in the suppression of anti-Turk revolts.
However, under Austro-Hungarian rule, they preferred the term Muslimani(Muslims)
instead of Turci (Turks), which could now be perceived as a political term.40
Although some of the first Muslim intellectuals who emerged during the AustroHungarian period declared themselves to be Croats or Serbs the overwhelming
majority of the Bosnian Muslims did not join them. Nor did the nationality policy of
the Austro-Hungarian government, Bosnjastvo (Bosnianism), succeed. Alhough

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some Muslim intellectuals called themselves Bosniaks this national identity did not
become popular among the Muslims. However, this policy of the Austro-Hungarian
government contributed to the cultural and political development of the Bosnian
Muslims through the attention paid to their distinctiveness. The Austro-Hungarians
allowed the Bosnian Muslims to call their language a Bosnian language until 1907.41
In 1908 there were 124 different associations, institutions and clubs established by
the Muslims.42
Austro-Hungarian rule witnessed the emergence of capitalism in Bosnia-Hercegovina. During the same period Bosnia-Hercegovina underwent an intensive industrialization and bureaucratization process, bringing about drastic socioeconomic
changes in the country. The Muslims had difficulties in dealing with the new
situation and many of them joined the opposition against the Austro-Hungarian
government. The clerics and later the landowners led the Muslim opposition. There
was as yet no Muslim bourgeoisie that could have taken the lead of the Muslim
movement.
The elite conflict constituted the main dynamics of the emergence of Bosnian
Muslim nationalism. The Muslim elite, composed of the intellectuals, landowners
and clerics (hodzas), was in conflict with the Catholic Austro-Hungarian administration and with the elites of the other ethnic groups. There was also rivalry and conflict
within the Muslim elite itself. The basic forms of the elite conflicts were: (1) conflict
between the government (Landesregierung) and the landowners; (2) conflict between
the government and the Muslim clerics; (3) conflict between the Muslim and Croat
clerics: and conflict between the radical and the moderate wings of the Muslim
elite.43
The Rise of Albanian Nationalism
The formation of the League of Prizren in 1878 was a turning point in the
development of the Albanian nationalism.44 The League was established for the
defense of the Albanian territories assigned to the neighboring countries by the
Congress of Berlin and did not aim at an independent Albania. The representatives
who came to Prizren were mostly landowners, Muslim clergymen and chieftains.
Thirty-eight of the 43 representatives in Prizren were Muslim. Most of the representatives came from Kosovo, northern Albania and Macedonia, and there were also
some Muslim landowners from Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Sandjak of Novipazar.45
Although the League was originally backed by the Ottomans, they suppressed both
the League and its leaders when it began to challenge Ottoman sovereignty in the
region. The Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamit II, who was also the caliph of the Sunni
Muslims, followed a pan-Islamist policy stressing Islamic brotherhood among the
Muslim subjects of the empire. However, this policy did not succeed in suppressing
Albanian opposition to the Ottomans. Not only the nationalistically minded Albanians but also the mountain clans challenged the Ottoman administration, which to

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them stood for taxes and military conscription. Ottoman attempts to bring the region
under control were to continue for three decades after the Congress of Berlin.
With the revolution of 1908, the Young Turks, political opponents of Abdulhamit
II, came to power in Istanbul. Some of the early leaders of the Young Turk
movement, like Ibrahim Temo, were Albanians by origin.46 The Young Turk
propaganda was influential among the Albanian officers and soldiers of the Third
Army located in Macedonia and Kosovo.47 The Young Turks enjoyed the support of
some Albanian leaders like Mithat Frasheri in Macedonia, but the decisive support
was to come from the conservative Albanians in Kosovo. In return for their support,
the Albanians expected the Young Turk organization, the Committee of Union and
Progress (CUP), to grant autonomy to Albania. There were 26 Albanian deputies
including Ismail Kemal Vlora in the new Ottoman Assembly summoned after the
Young Turk revolution. Within ten months after the proclamation of the new liberal
Ottoman constitution,48 66 Albanian clubs and cultural associations were established
and 34 elementary schools were opened.49 However, it soon became clear that the
Young Turks had no intention of granting autonomy to Albania.
Though the Albanians came out in opposition to Ottoman rule, they still accepted
the religious predominance of Istanbul, but, in contrast to the pan-Islamist policy of
Abdulhamid II, the Young Turk policy towards the Albanians was secular and
nationalist. The Young Turks did not see the unity of the Ottoman Empire as resting
on a religious basis. Thus, conflict between them and the Albanians was inevitible.50
Even the conservative Sunni peasants of the central lowlands joined the revolts
against the Young Turks. The Kosovars who had supported the Young Turks before
the revolution later offered fierce resistance to them.
After the Young Turk revolution, Bulgaria declared its independence and AustriaHungary annexed Bosnia-Hercegovina. On the other hand, there was no improvement in the situation of Macedonia despite great-power interference. In 1910 an
Albanian revolt broke out in Prishtina and spread to Kosovo. The mountaineers also
participated in this revolt, which continued for three months. This was followed by
some other revolts and in August 1912 the Albanian guerillas managed to take
Skopje. Thereupon, the Ottoman government accepted some of the demands of the
rebels but the First Balkan War prevented any solution to this conflict.51 With the
London Conference of May 1913 after the First Balkan War, Albania gained its
independence. Italy and Austro-Hungary, who both wanted to deprive Serbia of an
Adriatic outlet, played an important role in the establishment of this state.
The Albanians were the last nation to develop their own particular nationalism in
the Balkans. The distinctive social status of Albanian communities of different
religious backgrounds in the Ottoman Empire constituted an important obstacle to
their unification.52 All three religious elements participated in the national movement
of the Albanians, each in its own way and according to its own strength. The
Orthodox nationalists were mainly active outside the Ottoman Empire. They made
their greatest contribution to the national cause (mainly educational53 and propaganda

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work) through the Albanian colonies.54 The Catholics, who were the least numerous,
historically looked for support from Austria-Hungary and Italy. Their national
consciousness was imbued with Catholicism. Some of their leaders like Monsigner
Prenk Doci (Dochi) were in favor of a small Catholic Albania rather than a greater
Albania.55
As the majority group (7080%), the Muslims played the main role in the creation
of an independent Albania. Like the Bosnian Muslims, the Muslim Albanians had
identified themselves with the imperial ideology of the Ottomans within the framework of the millet system and it was they who represented the state in Albania.
Though they considered themselves Albanians and there was an increasingly strong
resistance to the Ottoman authorities, the majority of the Muslim Albanians preferred
to remain in the Ottoman Empire as long as their traditional rights and privileges
were respected.56 Many of them became politically active only when they realized
that the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was inevitable.57 Gradually, the Muslims
considered an autonomous Albania, which would be a first step towards independence, as the best solution. When the question of a foreign protectorate was raised,
most of them were inclined towards Austro-Hungary. However, the survival of the
Ottoman Empire had been considered vital to their destiny and the Muslim Albanians
supported the Ottomans as long as they could hold out in the Balkans.58 In the spring
of 1914 a pro-Ottoman revolt broke out in Shijaku and Kavaja. This was a social
protest as well as a religious resistance movement. The leader of the revolt was
Haxhi Qamili, a sheikh of a Melami tekke (Sufi chapel).59
The Bektashis played an important role in the development of Albanian nationalism. Bektashism, which was closely linked with the janissary troops, was banned at
the time of the extermination of the janissary troops by the Ottoman Sultan in 1826.
However, the number of the tekkes was on the increase after 1850 in the southern
part of Albania. The reaction of the local people to the killing of 500 notables from
southern Albania by the Ottomans in Bitola in 1830 seems to have played an
important role in this. Bektashism offered them an alternative to Sunni Islam, which
was represented by the sultan-caliph. The Bektashis were to become more and more
nationalistic after the Congress of Berlin.60
Regional differences went deeper in Albania than in the other Balkan countries.
The mountainous north was backward and inhabited by the tribes while in the
southern lowlands there was a more progressive but still patriarchal society.61 These
differences were also visible in the Albanian League. The Albanians of the south
regarded the administrative authority in its national aspect while the northern
Albanians were mainly interested in government policies on taxation and military
service. These regional differences created difficulties for the Albanians in providing
a single leadership.62 At the turn of the twentieth century, however, national
conscioussnes was also to spread in the north.63
Like the other nationalist movements in the Balkans, the Albanian cultural
awakening preceded and accompanied the political struggle. During this process the

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pre-Ottoman, even the pre-Christian, past became important.64 In the second half of
the nineteenth century some European historians put forward that the Albanians were
the descendants of the Illyrians, the oldest inhabitants of the Balkans. Thus, the
Albanians found an ancient heritage, just like the other Balkan nations.65 The
formation of the Society for the Printing of Albanian Writings in Istanbul in 1879
played an important role in the cultural awakening of the Albanians. This society, led
by Sami Frasheri, published books, journals and newspapers in the Albanian
language and translations of foreign works. The great Albanian poet Naim Frasheri,
the brother of Sami Frasheri, also played an important role along with some other
poets, like Gjergj Fishta, in the national awakening of the Albanians.
The Albanian landowners (nobility) supported the autonomy of Albania
against the Ottomans. Though there were rivalries among them the landowners who
had common interests were able to constitute a relatively cohesive political
group. However, they did not all conceive of autonomy in the same way and they
were not in favor of independence.66 It was too early to speak of an Albanian
bourgeoisie that could have shaped the Albanian nationalist movement.67 As the
independent Christian states emerged in the Balkans, some Albanian leaders eventually developed national programs that were in line with contemporary European
nationalisms. They stressed cultural and linguistic rather than religious unity and
favored the creation of an Albanian state with the unification of the vilayets of
Janina, Kosovo, Bitola and Shkoder. The language of the administration and
education was to be Albanian.68
The Albanians had no geographic center. Historically, they had lived in different
administrative districts. The blood kinship69 and the spoken language were the most
important unifying elements.70 However, the Albanian language lacked a standard
literary form or even a generally accepted alphabet. In 1908, the Albanian representatives met in Bitola and accepted the Latin alphabet as standard for the Albanian
language. This marked an important step in the national movement of the Albanians.
The acceptance of the Latin alphabet meant not only the standardization of the
Albanian language but also an orientation towards Western culture.71 The Ottomans
opposed the Latin alphabet and tried to impose the Arabic script on the Albanians,72
but the adoption of the Latin alphabet was confirmed in another meeting of the
Albanian leaders held in Elbasan in 1909.
The Bektashi Frasheri brothers were among the first Albanians to express political
opinions about Albania. Abdul Frasheri favored the principle of administrative
autonomy but was ready to accept any form of government that would preserve it.
Sami Frasheri stressed the unity of the Albanians. He criticized the identification of
the Albanian Muslims as Turks but he did not advocate the idea that Albania should
break away from the Ottoman Empire.73 However, according to Sami Frasheri,
Albania should be prepared for independence in the event that the Ottomans could
not remain in the Balkans. Another member of the Frasheri Family, Naim Frasheri,
was one of the most important poets of Albanian nationalism. His main concern was

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also the union of the Albanians. Naim Frasheri was to make an important contribution to the rise of Albanian nationalism, particularly among the Bektashis.74

The Bosnian Muslims and Albanians in the Inter-war Period

The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes
The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes75 that was established after World
War I included the Bosnian Muslims as well as the Albanians of Kosovo and
Macedonia. This state was the first experience of the idea of the unification of the
South Slavs (Southslavism). The Bosnian Muslims were not only under-represented
in the bureaucracy of this state76 but were also exposed to Serbian revenge in the
initial post-war years and 2,000 Muslims were killed between 1918 and 1920 in
retaliation for their participation in the anti-Serbian units (suckor) during the war.77
In this period the Bosnian Muslims were not free to realize their national
orientation.78 They had to declare themselves as either Serbs or Croats. The Muslim
Party, the Jugoslav Muslim Organization (Jugoslovenska Muslimanska Organizacija,
JMO), founded in 1919, favored the concept of Southslavism (Jugoslovenstvo). This
vague concept offered them protection from external pressures, particularly from the
Serbian side in terms of their national identity. Bosnjastvo was ignored in the
inter-war period. Jugoslovenstvo, which was advocated by the Bosnian Muslim
leadership, was to be the official ideology of Socialist Yugoslavia after World War
II.
Though the JMO did not pursue a clear national policy, it contributed to the
national development of the Bosnian Muslims by stressing their history, traditions
and cultural and social characteristics. The Muslims tried to preserve their ethnic
identity within the concept of Jugoslovenstvo. Though the landowners played a
leading role in the establishment of JMO, the central commission of the party
included representatives of various social classes of the Bosnian Muslim community.
In time, the clerics were outnumbered by the intellectuals and tradesmen. As a result
of this, JMO increasingly stressed the political, economic and cultural rights of the
Bosnian Muslims in addition to the religious ones.79
The JMO, which represented mainly the interests of the Bosnian Muslim landowners, eventually gained the support of different segments of the Bosnian Muslim
community. It won the votes of the overwhelming majority of the Bosnian Muslims
in the elections of 1920, 1923, 1925 and 1927. Under the leadership of Mehmet
Spaho, JMO became not only the most successful Muslim party but also the most
important political party in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The autonomy of Bosnia-Hercegovina was the major political aim of the Bosnian Muslims in the inter-war period.
The Muslims thought that they could protect their rights in an autonomous BosniaHercegovina better than in a centralist state.80 The JMO showed concern for the
Slavic Muslims in the Novi Pazar district and in Montenegro but it showed far less

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concern for the Albanians and the other non-Slavic Muslims of Kosovo and
Macedonia.81
Vardar Macedonia and Kosovo became parts of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats,
and Slovenes after World War I. In this new state, Macedonia was referred to as
South Serbia and Kosovo as Old Serbia. The identity of the Albanians of
Kosovo and Macedonia, like that of the Bosnian Muslims, was suppressed by the
Serbs, and the Albanians were not recognized as a distinct nation.82 The use of the
Albanian language was prohibited and Albanians were forced to emigrate. Armed
resistance was widespread in Kosovo and Macedonia in the 1920s with the Albanian
kacaks (outlaws ) fighting against Serbian rule. The kacak movement was suppressed
by the Serbs in the second half of the 1920s, but it nevertheless contributed to the
development of a national consciousness among the Albanians.83
It was the Muslim party Cemiyet (Association) which represented the rights of the
Muslims in the southern regions, the Bosnian Muslims in Sandjak and the Albanians
and Turks in Kosovo, Metohija and Macedonia. This continued until the suppression
of the party in 1925.84 Cemiyet and the JMO, the political party of the Bosnian
Muslims, agreed on some policy demands, but the fellow feeling between Bosnian
Muslims and Albanians was not sufficiently strong for common action and a plan for
the union of these parties failed. The differences between the two communities
increased when the Serbian governments tried to Slavicize the Islamic institutions of
Kosovo through the pro-Serbian Slavic Muslims.85
After 1918 there were three religious centers for the Muslims in the Kingdom of
the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes: the suprime muftiate in Belgrade, the muftiate in Bar
(Montenegro) and the Islamic hierarchy in Sarajevo, which had remained essentialy
unchanged since 1909. The most important Serbian politician in the inter-war period,
Nikola Pasic, opposed the unification of these religious centers.86 However, in 1930,
a Supreme Council of the Islamic Religious Community was established under the
leadership of the Reis-ul-ulema in Belgrade. The new center was put under strict
state control.87 Two medzlis-i-ulema (regional leaderships), one of them in Sarajevo
and the other in Skopje, were created. The center in Sarajevo was for the Muslims
in Bosnia and in the northwestern part of the kingdom while the center in Skopje was
for the Muslims in Macedonia, Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro and Sandzak.88
The unification of the religious centers brought about no closer relations between
the Bosnian Muslims and the Albanians. In 1936 the office of the Reis-ul-ulema was
transferred from Belgrade to Sarajevo and Fehim Spaho, the brother of Mehmed
Spaho, the leader of JMO, became the new Reis-ul-ulema. This strengthened the
domination of the Slavic Muslims in the official religious hierarchy and high-lighted
the double-minority status of the non-Slavic Muslims. In addition to the official
hierarchy there were many Sufi tarikats in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes (from 1929 Yugoslavia). Most of them were in the territories under the
control of the religious center in Skopje and were mainly concentrated among the
Albanian Muslims in Kosovo. There were also 18 tarikats in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

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The relations between the official Islamic hierarchy and the Sufi tarikats was tense
and these tarikats, more particularly the Bektashis, were considered by the official
Islamic leaders as alien to Islam.89
The conflict between the Albanians and the Yugoslav state was ethnic rather than
religious.90 The Serbian rulers considered the Albanians merely Albanian-speaking
Serbs91 and they first tried to assimilate the Albanians through education in the
Serbian language. Bosnian Muslim teachers with pro-Serbian orientation were used
to help in this process but they faced fierce opposition from the Albanians, and when
it became clear that this assimilation process was doomed to failure the Serbian
officials prevented the Albanians from attending the secular schools. The Albanians
were offered only religious education in the so-called Turkish schools, mektebs
(elementary schools) and medreses (secondary schools).92 However, the Muslim
clergy, following the trend in the late Ottoman years, began to replace Turkish and
Arabic in these schools with Albanian. The ban on secular education in Albanian
turned the Islamic institutions such as the mektebs and medreses and the lodges of
the Sufi orders into the main centers of Albanian national education.93 The Muslim
clergy heralded the superiority of national rather than religious identity by furthering
education in Albanian, but, their engagement in this process implied the strengthening of the religious element in Albanian nationhood. This contrasted with the efforts
of the nationalists, who tried to construct an Albanian national identity on a purely
secular foundation.94

Albania
The Albanian state that was established after the Balkan Wars had left half of the
Albanians living in the Balkans outside its frontier. There were less than a million
people in Albania after World War I. In post-Ottoman Albania, 70% of the
population were Muslim, 20% Orthodox and 10% Catholic. The Bektashis constituted approximately 15% and the Sunni Muslims 55% of the total population.95 The
population was divided socially into two different classes: those who had lands and
those who did not. The majority of the landowning class was composed of the
Muslims, who had also filled most of the administrative posts. The landowners had
always held the principal ruling posts in the central and southern regions. However,
in this period the countrys peasants began to dispute the semi-feudal rights of the
landowners.96
The first political parties in Albania were established in the inter-war period. They
were led by some prominent individuals. The countrys biggest landowner, Shefqet
Verlaci, was the leader of the conservative Progressive Party. This party opposed any
agricultural reform program. Another political party, the Popular Party, included
Ahmed Zogu and the reform-minded Orthodox bishop Fan S. Noli. The tribes in the
north were traditionally suspicious of the central governments. The Albanian

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governments could usually control only Skhoder and its environs and the Roman
Catholic Church was the main link between Tirana and the tribesmen.97
Zogu, who was the chief of Mati, a central Albanian Muslim tribe, had distinquished himself during the early post-war years and became prime minister in 1922.
However, two years later he was forced to take refuge in Yugoslavia and Fan Noli
replaced him as the new prime minister. In 1924 Zogu returned to Albania at the
head of his private army and regained power. With the support of the highlanders,
particularly those of the provinces of Mat and Dibar, he established an authoritarian
regime. Zogu became president in 1925 and in 1928 he transformed the Albanian
Republic into a monarchy and became king of Albania. He was successful in the
integration of the conservative Sunni Muslim landowners into the state bureaucracy
and winning over their support.98
In the inter-war period, the Albanian state took important steps towards the
secularization of society, and of the educational system, while in Kosovo and
Macedonia there was a ban on secular education in Albanian. According to the first
constitution of independent Albania promulgated in 1920, Albania had no official
religion and religious freedom was guaranteed by the state. Moreover, monogamy
was enforced by law and the compulsory use of the veil by women was abolished.99
Albania also witnessed a number of important church reforms in the 1920s. In 1922
the Albanian Orthodox Church proclaimed itself autocephalous.100 The Orthodox
Albanians carried out the most energetic reforms. They wanted to move Albania
away from its Muslim, Turkish past in which the Christians were the peasants and
constituted the underclass.101
In 1923, the Albanian Sunni Muslim representatives met in Tirana to consider
the reforms to be carried out within the Islamic Community. This congress,
which was summoned on the initiative of Zogu, broke with the caliphate in Istanbul.
It expressed the opinion that there had been no caliph since Mohammed and
that the Albanians owed allegiance primarily to their native land. The Islamic
Community was reorganized after the second congress of the Sunni Muslims in
1929. A general council composed of a president and four grand muftis was
established. The grand muftis would be based in Shkoder, Tirana, Korce and
Gjirokaster.102 Thus, the Albanian state placed the Muslims under state control. On
the other hand, the Sharia law was subordinated to a new civil code adopted from
Switzerland.103
Both the Sunnis and the Bektashis severed their ties with Turkey and in 1922 an
assembly of 500 Bektashi clerics renounced allegiance to Turkey.104 As the Ottoman
Empire declined, the Bektashis grew stronger in the southern Albania. They continually increased their distance from the Turkish Bektashis and this distance became
more conspicuous after the Young Turk revolution. The strong Bektashi community,
which became a rival to the Sunni community in the twentieth century, now wanted
to become a distinct religious community, but the Bektashis and the Sunni Muslims
were still organized under a single Sunni grand mufti. The attempts of the Bektashis

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during the Sunni congress in April 1923 to gain religious autonomy failed and a few
months later they held their own second congress in Gjirokaster.105
Having become the king of Albania in 1928, Zogu asked the religious groups to
prepare their own statutes. In their third congress, in 1929, the Bektashis decided to
divide Albania into six regions. Every region would be ruled by a gjysh (in Turkish,
dede). There would be also a kryegjysh (grand dede) in Tirana as the spiritual leader
of the Bektashis in Albania.106 So far there was only one grand dede in Turkey as the
religious leader of all the Bektashis.107 After the recognition of their statute by the
state the Bektashi community gained autonomy. It constituted a distinct religious
community till 1905 though it was officially attached to the Sunni Islamic community.108 Bektashis were generally nationalist and supported King Zogu.109 There
were also some other Sufi tarikats that were active in Albania in the inter-war period.
The Kadiri, Rifai, Sadi and Tidjani tarikats established a unified organization in
Tirana in 1936.110
The authoritarian regime of Zogu tried to lay the foundations of an Albanian
nation state.111 The new Albanian leadership was convinced that unity could be
achieved only on a national, not a religious basis. In the inter-war period, Sunni
Islam was weakened in Albanian society. The major factors contributing to this
development seem to have been the large proportion of Christians, the efforts of the
Bektashi community to break away from the Islamic community and the secularist
trends among intellectuals of Muslim origin. In the 1930s there were various
intellectual trends among the Muslims concerning religion. The Elders tended to
be orientalists and attached to Islam, while the Young tended to be occidentalists
and inclined to reject religion altogether. Finally, the Neo-Albanians (Neoshiptaret) who stressed Albanian culture and identity were opposed to religious
divisions. However, the Neo-Albanians were sometimes in favor of Bektashism,
which was considered to be closely linked with Albanian nationalism.112

The Bosnian Muslims and Albanians in the Socialist Period

The Bosnian Muslims
During World War II Bosnia-Hercegovina became a part of the Independent Croatian
State that was established in 1941. Some of the former JMO leaders engaged in close
cooperation with the fascist Croatian regime. However, the majority of the Muslims
were politically indifferent and some Muslim leaders disassociated themselves as
early as 1941 from the atrocities committed by the Independent Croatian State
against the Serbs, Jews and Gypsies. The Muslim El-Hidaje Association113 and the
former leaders of JMO adopted resolutions to this effect.114 In this period the national
identity of the Muslims was not recognized by the Croatian regime and the Muslims
were considered Muslim Croats.115 Moreover, the Muslims were subject to genocides
committed by the Serbian Chetniks in 1941, 1942 and 1943 in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

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The nationality question was one of the most sensitive issues for the Partisans led
by Tito who wanted to win over different nationalities for the fight against the
occupation forces.116 The Communist policy towards the Slavic Sunni Muslims of
Bosnia shifted during the war. In the official documents, the Muslims were considered one of the Yugoslav nationalities, but the term muslimani (Muslims) was
used in a religious, not in an ethnic sense.117 The autonomy of Bosnia-Hercegovina
constituted the main political objective of the Muslims, as in the inter-war period.118
Some Muslim leaders cooperated with the Germans in the hope of achieving this
aim. The Mufti of Jerusalem, Husein, played an intermediary role between the
Bosnian Muslim leaders and the Germans. 119 On the other hand, Himmler supported
the formation of Schutzstaffel (SS) troops composed of Bosnian Muslims.
The establishment of the socialist regime in Yugoslavia had an immediate impact
on the Islamic Community. The religious hierarchy remained basically unchanged
while changes took place in the staff. In 1947, a new constitution for the Islamic
Community was adopted and a new Reis-ul-ulema120 was elected. Individuals loyal
to the new state were installed in the key positions. The socialist state introduced a
strict separation of church and state and took over the civil functions carried out
previously by the religious hierarchies. The new regime put an end to the Sharia
court system, to the obligatory religious surtax and to religious instruction in
elementary and secondary schools. The mektebs ceased to function as educational
institutions. The veil was outlawed in 19501951.121 The state claimed an important
part of the revenue of the vakufs (religious foundations), thus drastically reducing the
financial power of the Islamic Community. In the early years of the socialist regime,
mosques were converted into museums and cultural-historical monuments while
other religious institutions were simply closed down. In 1952 the tekkes of the Sufi
orders in Bosnia were banned.122 These measures were the results of the secularization and socialization policies of the socialist regime rather than a specific anti-Islamic campaign.The Islamic religious hierarchy was of less importance to the new
state than the Catholic and Orthodox churches, which were considered the potential
sources of political opposition.
In 1957 Hadzi Sulejman ef. Kemura became the new Reis-ul-ulema. He took
drastic measures to increase the influence of the Islamic hierarchy and reorganized
the Supreme Islamic Council and changed the staff. In 1958, four regional Islamic
Councils were established.123 This reorganization was also adopted by the new
constitution of the Islamic Community in 1969. One of the important decisions taken
by the new Reis-ul-ulema was the introduction of religious sermons in the national
language during the major holidays. This was to contribute to the awakening of the
Islamic consciousness among the Muslims. The Muslim believers began to give
active support to their religious Community during the 1960s. Meanwhile, mosques
damaged or destroyed during the war were restored and new ones built. In 1977 an
Islamic Theological Faculty was opened. By means of this institution the Yugoslav
state hoped to educate politically reliable and qualified clergy.124 The Islamic

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THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS AND ALBANIANS

Community also sent students to universities in various Islamic countries in the

Middle East and Asia. All these initiatives were helped by the foreign policy of
Socialist Yugoslavia, which had established, as one of the leading countries in the
non-alignment bloc, good relations with the Arabic countries.
The Islamic Community was dominated by the Slavic Muslims. Although the
Albanians constituted half of all Muslims in the former Yugoslavia, no Albanian ever
became Reis-ul-ulema.125 The anti-Albanian sentiments of the Islamic Community
grew in strength after the demonstrations in Kosovo in 1981 when the Albanians
demanded republic status for Kosovo. The Islamic Community officially distanced
itself from the Albanian demands.126 This was one of the reasons for the estrangement of many Albanian Muslim believers from the Islamic Community. The Islamic
Community in Kosovo (it had Albanian officials) and the medrese in Prishtina
enjoyed very low prestige among the Albanians.127 In the late 1980s, most representatives of the Islamic Community were opposed to the Albanian candidates for the
position of Reis-ul-ulema mainly because of claims that the Albanian clerics were
trying to Albanianize the Muslim Slavs in Macedonia.128
In 1962, the Islamic officials tried to extend the ban on the dervish orders in
Bosnia to Kosovo by describing them as reactionary and an obstacle to the
development of a proper religious life in these areas.129 However, this seems not to
have been approved by the socialist regime, which was playing the religious
Communities off against each other.130 In 1974, Albanian sheikhs from Kosovo
founded a Community of Dervish Orders (SIDRA; since 1978 ZIDRA).131 Three
years later this organization was recognized by the Yugoslav state despite the
protests of the Islamic leaders in Sarajevo and recruited many new members.
However, in 1977, another center, the Tarikat Center, was opened in Sarajevo and
the Bosnian sheikhs (mainly Naqsibendi), except the sheikh of a Rufai lodge in
Sarajevo, joined this new organization.132 The establishment of the Tarikat Center in
Sarajevo was perceived by the Albanian sheikhs as a threat to the Community of
Dervish Orders.133
Fierce polemics occured between the Islamic Community in Sarajevo and the
leaders of the Community of Dervish Orders in the 1970s and 80s. The leaders of
the Islamic Community in Sarajevo claimed that most of the dervish orders had
drifted away from the original Sufi ideals while the Albanian sheikhs believed that
they represented a version of Islam which was less corrupted by Communism and
more traditionally Albanian than the established Islam of the Muslims in Bosnia.134
The Albanian sheikhs evoked the image of an oppressed religious Community that
because of their profound otherness have suffered discrimination. The sheikhs
were using Shiite ideas and symbolism and as well as some Communist ideals such
as the equality of nations and ethnic groups.135
The Bosnian Muslims were more urbanized and more closely integrated into
Yugoslav society than the Albanians. The fact that, unlike the Albanians, the Bosnian
Muslims shared the same language with the Serbs and Croats was an

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important factor in their integration into Yugoslav society. There were more mixed
marriages in Bosnia-Hercegovina than AlbanianSlav marriages in Kosovo and
Macedonia.136 The Bosnian Muslims had a lifestyle similar to that of the Serbs and
Croats and preferred a spouse of Serbian or Croatian origin to one of Kosovar
Albanian extraction.137 In the mid 1980s, there was an increasing reliance on Islam
in some circles of Bosnian Muslim society, Islam being perceived as a moral system
rather than a body of practical rules and regulations.138 This trend was accompanied
by fairly widespread anti-Albanian feeling among the Bosnian Muslims.139 However,
with the collapse of the one-party system and increasing Serbian aggression in
Kosovo, anti-Albanianism dwindled, the Bosnian Muslims coming to understand that
the Serbian threat might be redirected towards themselves. In the early 1990s, the
Islamic Community tried to establish ties with the wider Islamic world, but its
primary focus was on Europe and the notion of democracy.140
Although, in the post-1945 years, the Bosnian Muslims were considered potential
Serbs, Croats or Yugoslavs, in the censuses of 1948, 1953 and 1961 the Bosnian
Muslims refused to declare themselves Serbs or Croats, thus indirectly stressing their
ethnic individuality.141 In 1968 they were recognized by the Bosnian party leadership
as Muslims in the national sense142 even though it was not compatible with the
official communist rhetoric to accept the existence of a nation on the basis of
religion. This change in the nationality policy of the League of Communists of
Yugoslavia was based not only on the willingness of the Bosnian Muslims to be
recognized as an independent nation but also on certain political factors. It was a
compromise between the interests of the Bosnian Muslims and the socialist regime.
The Communist leadership saw in the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the
Bosnian Muslims a buffer against the rising Serbian and Croatian nationalisms. On
the other hand, the recognition of the Bosnian Muslims as a separate nation
strengthened the position of the Bosnian Muslim elite in the communist party.143 One
section of the Muslim elite who wanted to strengthen their role in the political
decision-making process as the representatives of the Bosnian Muslims stressed the
national distinctiveness of the Bosnian Muslims.144 The federalization process of the
political system in general, the dismissal of the chief of the intelligence service,
Rankovic, in 1966 and the leading role of Yugoslavia in the non-aligned block145 are
additional factors contributing to the recognition of the Bosnian Muslims as a
separate nation.146 The recognition of the Bosnian Muslims as a nation seems to have
widened the gap between the Bosnians and the Albanians, since the Islamic
Community assumed more and more the role of guardian of the Bosnian Muslim
nation, which meant the neglect of the interests of the Albanian Muslims.147
In the five years after the recognition of the Bosnian Muslims as a nation a
remarkable increase occurred in their political consciousness. Actually, as early as
the 1960s, some Muslim intellectuals had pointed out the national distinctiveness of
the Bosnian Muslims. For the first time in 1967 one professor from Sarajevo,
Muhamed Filipovic, demanded national status for the Bosnian Muslims. Atif

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Purivatra, the most important proponent of the national recognition of the Muslims,
pointed out that the Bosnian Muslims were not only adherents of the Islamic religion
but also members of a separate nation.148 However, the nationalist Serbs and Croats
continued to reject the national distinctiveness of the Muslims.
The national identity of the Bosnian Muslims was also a matter of controversy
among the Bosnian Muslims themselves. Religion and the concept of Bosnjastvo
were the two alternatives competing for the national identity of the Bosnian Muslims.
There was a close relationship between the religious and national identities of the
Bosnian Muslims during the socialist period.149 Although the Bosnian Muslims were
not devout Muslims,150 Islam served as an ethnic border between them and the other
ethnic groups in Bosnia-Hercegovina. However, the national identity of the Bosnian
Muslims also had Bosnian roots.151 The Muslim historian Enver Redzic pointed out
that the concept of Bosnjastvo had two different meanings. One of them represented
the territorial-political conscioussnes of the different nationalities of Bosnia-Hercegovina regardless of their ethnic origins. This consciousness lay in the continuity of
Bosnia-Hercegovina as a political unity throughout history. As for the Muslims,
Bosnjastvo meant for them not only a territorial-political consciousness but also an
ethnic identity.152 This approach of Redzic met with criticism from some other
Muslim intellectuals.
In the first stage of Muslim nationalism, until the autumn of 1982, the Muslim
movement was considered a secular and progressive movement and there was no
mention in the Yugoslav media of the existence of an Islamic fundamentalism.
However, some of the Muslim leaders were gradually put under pressure. In 1983 11
Muslims, including Alija Izetbegovic, were arrested on the grounds that they were
trying to establish an Islamic state based on the Islamic Declaration written by
Alija Izetbegovic himself. These developments revealed the fact that the initial
leaders of the Muslim movement, who were mainly members of the official state
hierarchy, were gradually being replaced by non-communist intellectuals. Izetbegovic would become the president of Bosnia-Hercegovina after the first multi-party
elections in 1990 as a leader of the nationalist Muslim party, the Party of Democratic
Action (SDA).
The Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia
After World War II, Kosovo and Macedonia became parts of Socialist Yugoslavia.
A new Yugoslav republic was created in Macedonia while Kosovo was incorporated
into the Serbian Republic. In 1945 an autonomous region of Kosmet (Kosovo-Metohija) was established.153 The Albanians remained in conflict with the Yugoslav
socialist regime until 1948, during which period they were subjected to atrocities by
the new Yugoslav regime. However, the ethnic distinctiveness of the Albanians was
recognized by the Yugoslav authorities and Albanian-language schools were opened
in Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro.154 The Yugoslav rulers tried to turn the

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ethnic Albanians living in Yugoslavia into a separate nation by referring to them as

siptari and to their co-nationals in Albania as Albanci. However, from 1968 onwards,
the Yugoslav Albanians also began to be referred to as Albanci, like the Albanians
in Albania proper.155
The Albanians constituted the largest nationality in Yugoslavia with over 1.7
million or 7.7 per cent of the total population in 1981.156 The proportion of Albanians
in the total population of Kosovo increased rapidly between 1961 and 1981. On the
other hand, nationalism and regionalism were on the increase in the Yugoslav
republics as well as in Kosovo.157 During the demonstrations of 1968, the Kosovar
Albanians demanded republican status for Kosovo, an Albanian university and the
right to fly their national flag.158 The demonstrations in Kosovo were followed by
further Albanian demonstrations in Tetovo and other northwestern Macedonian
towns. With the 1974 constitution, Kosovo gained a high degree of autonomy and,
though it did not become a separate republic, Kosovo now had its own constitution
and its own representatives on the federal bodies. During the 1970s Kosovo enjoyed
a quite liberal regime as regards cultural and political rights, but little change took
place in Macedonia and Montenegro.159
The 1981 riots in Kosovo, which took place one year after the death of Tito, posed
the first serious threat to the federal structure of Yugoslavia. The economic deterioration and high inflation of the 1980s were more keenly felt in Kosovo than in the
other parts of Yugoslavia. In Kosovo, which was the least developed province of
Yugoslavia, unemployment among women was twice as high as in Bosnia-Hercegovina or in Macedonia. Unemployment in general was three times higher than in the
other regions of the country. Many Albanians did not know Serbo-Croatian and this
made it difficult for them to find jobs in the other republics except for some seasonal
work.160 In addition to mistaken economic policies there were some other factors that
contributed to the economic underdevelopment of Kosovo. The Geg Albanians of
Kosovo and Macedonia were able to preserve some elements of their patriarchal
culture during the socialist period.161 The high birth rate, a patriarchal family
structure and the influences of some religious communities also hampered the
economic development of Kosovo.162
In contrast to the Bosnian Muslims, who lived mixed with the other ethnic
groups in Bosnia-Hercegovina, in the 1980s the Albanians came to constitute
ethnically a relatively homogeneous society in Kosovo, which exacerbated
social unrest in the region. In 1981, the Albanians claimed not only republic
status for Kosovo but also some social and economic rights. Some of them
favored the idea of the unification of Kosovo and Albania.163 It has been officially
reported that not one imam (cleric), student or teacher at the religious schools
participated in the 1981 riots, which were centered in the University of Prishtina.
Although in the early 1980s the Albanian opposition was made up largely of some
Marxist-Leninist underground groups, in time it came to include all segments of
Albanian society.164

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After the riots of 1981, in which at least nine people were killed and hundreds
injured, the Serbian government increased its pressure in the region. Particularly after
1986 the Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic began to use the Kosovo question to
further his own political career. In 1988, several meetings were held in different parts
of Serbia in protest against the pressure on the Serbians and Montenegrins living in
Kosovo. These meetings increased the popularity of the Serbian leader. In 1989 the
rights given to Kosovo by the constitution of 1974 were restricted and the Kosovo
assembly was forced to accept these changes.165
The Albanian Sunni Muslim identity was stronger in Socialist Yugoslavia than it
was in Albania. The overwhelming majority of the Albanians in Kosovo and
Macedonia were Sunni Muslims with some 50,000 Catholics in Kosovo and a small
number of Orthodox and Catholics in Macedonia. Furthermore, Albanian nationalism
was increasing in Kosovo and Macedonia. In Macedonia, the state authorities were
complaining more and more bitterly of the assimilation of the smaller Muslim
minorities by the Albanians through Islam.166 After the events of 1981, some
Kosovar Albanian intellectuals increased their efforts to rehabilitate the role of Islam
in the Albanian identity. The issue of the conversion of the Albanians to Islam under
the Ottomans was central to this debate. In contrast to the official socialist interpretation of this conversion, according to which it took place by force and was
detrimental to the national unity of the Albanians, it was claimed that it was thanks
to the conversion to Islam that the Albanians were able to preserve their national
identity. In this way, the Albanians tried to support their territorial legitimacy in
Kosovo and strengthen their distinctiveness from the Serbs and Macedonians.167
It was not until the early 1990s that the Islamic Community abandoned its reserved
attitude towards the Kosovo question. In a conference organized by the Islamic
Community of Bosnia-Hercegovina in Sarajevo in 1990 under the title Religion and
Conflict in Kosovo it was stressed that religion was not the driving force of the
conflict in Kosovo as was being claimed by the Belgrade media.168 Under its first
ever non-Bosnian Reis-ul-Ulema, Jakup Selimoski, the Islamic Community began to
show solidarity with the Kosovar Muslims, while at the same time condemning
Albanian irredentism. Even though the Islamic Community placed increasing emphasis on supra-national Islamic identity, it supported individual national identities and
called on the Bosnian Muslims before the census of 1991 to declare their mother
tongue as Bosnian rather than Serbo-Croatian.169
Socialist Albania
In April 1939 Albania was occupied by fascist Italian troops and in 1941 a large part
of Kosovo and western Macedonia were united with the Kingdom of Albania under
Italian rule. The creation of Greater Albania was an aspect of Italian policy that
appealed to Albanian nationalism and irredentism to win over the support of the
Albanians. The Italian propaganda formulated by Foreign Minister Ciano also laid

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stress on religious and cultural issues.170 Under Italian rule an Albanian-language

administration and a network of Albanian-language elementary schools were established in Kosovo and western Macedonia.171
In the inter-war period Zogu had created politicaly loyal religious Communities.
After the occupation, the Italians had no serious trouble with them and were able to
win over the support of the Islamic Community or at least keep it neutral by force.
Furthermore, the leader of the Islamic Community, who had already recognized the
Italian regime, was replaced by a more easily controlled Muslim Committee.172
However, some Sunni Muslim clerics and many of the Bektashi leaders never fully
accepted Italian rule and preferred to remain in opposition.173 They joined various
resistance forces during World War II.
Following World War II, the victorious Albanian Communists had eliminated
most of their rivals by the end of 1946 and Enver Hoxha became the undisputed
leader of the new Albanian state. There were still important social differences
between Geg society in the northern part of Albania, which was based on a tribal
structure, and the Tosks living in southern Albania. The communists eventually tried
to destroy tribal life in Albania and to integrate the Gegs and Tosks, even though the
Tosks constituted the basis of the new regime. The clan system and the traditional
Geg way of life would largely disappear by the end of the 1980s.174
In 1945, 785,430 of a total population of 1,122,044 were Muslim.175 The socialist
regime formalized the split between the Sunni Muslim and Bektashi Communities
and both of them were allowed to accept their new statutes in their respective
congresses in 1945.176 In the immediate post-war years, when the new Albanian
regime had not yet been consolidated, Enver Hoxha, who was a dogmatic Stalinist,
followed a relatively moderate policy against the religious communities. In this early
period he used the Islamic Community for his own political purposes,177 but he later
gradually tightened his grip on the religious institutions even though the constitution
of 1944 had promised religious freedom in Albania.
The Agrarian Reform Law of 1945 nationalized most of the properties of the
religious institutions. On the other hand, many religious leaders were imprisoned and
executed mainly on charges of having collaborated with the fascists. The Roman
Catholic Jesuit order and the Franciscans were banned as early as 1946 and 1947.178
The Decree No. 743 on religion which was passed in 1949 stated that religious
practice could not be in contradiction with the laws of the state and that the religious
bodies had to disassociate themselves from foreign overseeing bodies. The religious
communities were expected to be national communities loyal to the political
regime.179 This decree was followed by some other decrees issued in 1950 and 1951
which put the religious bodies under the strict control of the state.180 The Sunni and
Bektashi leaders who refused to cooperate with the socialist regime were eliminated
or imprisoned.181
From 1953 onwards the Islamic Community, like the other religious institutions,
was to disappear more and more from the social life of Albania.182 Finally, in 1967,

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THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS AND ALBANIANS

Enver Hoxha declared Albania an atheist state. In his speech on 6 February 1967,
Enver Hoxha, who was inspired by Chinas cultural revolution, called for an
agressive campaign against religious superstition and entrusted this mission to the
students. The religions were banned183 and until May 1967 2,169 churches, mosques,
cloisters and shrines were closed down.184 The clergy were humiliated, many of them
were imprisoned and some of them executed. On 13 November 1967, Decree No.
4337 annulled the previous decrees that had sanctioned the existence of organized
religion. This contravened Article 18 of the 1946 constitution, then in force, which
guaranteed freedom of conscience and faith. However, the new 1976 constitution
banned religious propaganda and the penal code of 1977 imposed prison sentences
for religious propaganda and the dissemination of religious literature. Decree No.
5339 of 1975 forced particularly the Christians to change any names with religious
connotations. Individuals caught with religious objects faced long prison sentences.
Practicing Christians and Muslims were persecuted for the performance of religious
fasts. It has been estimated that 95% of all mosques and churches were razed or
gutted under socialist rule. The anti-religious campaign put an end to formal worship
but some Albanians continued to practice their faith in private.185
In the 1980s the anti-religious campaign began to be criticized. Some officials
asserted that it has proved to be counter-productive. According to one sociological
study, the overwhelming majority (more than 95%) of the countrys younger
generation preferred partners of the same religious background, which had not been
the case before the campaign. Ramiz Alia, who succeeded Hoxha in 1985, relaxed
somewhat the tight grip of the communist party on society.186 In this new period,
religious practice began to be seen as a personal and family matter.187 The refugee
clergymen were allowed to re-enter Albania in 1988. Mother Teresa was received by
the Albanian foreign minister and the widow of Hoxha during the formers visit to
Tirana in 1989. In 1990, the ban on religious observance was officially lifted. An
interim constitution, issued in 1991, defined Albania as a secular state that would
respect religious freedom. In 1991, diplomatic relations were established between
Albania and the Vatican and finally, in 1992, the Pope paid his first visit to
Albania.188
Enver Hoxha tried to create a communist Albanian nation free of religion. He
stressed on many occasions that the religion of Albanians was Albanianism.189 The
myths of Hoxhas qualities as the founding father of the nation served as a substitute
religion for the atheism officially imposed.190 The socialist regime also used Albanian national myths such as that of Skanderbeg. In this process there was no place
for a separate Albanian Muslim identity. In Socialist Albania there was no open
tension between the Muslims and Christians, such as existed in Kosovo and
Macedonia, which could have stimulated Muslim identity. Furthermore, the Toskdominated socialist leadership was reluctant to support the Geg Albanians in Kosovo
and Macedonia even though in the 1970s many Albanian publications were exported
to Kosovo and an exchange of teachers and cultural activities took place.191 On the

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A. BABUNA

other hand, the decades-old separation had increased the psychological and social
differences between the Albanian communities in Socialist Yugoslavia and isolated
Albania.192 Finally, the 45 years of the strict practice of atheism in Albania had
destroyed religious attitudes and identities in this country much more than in
Socialist Yugoslavia.
It was not until the death of Enver Hoxha that the official view on the role of
religion in Albanian identity was questioned. In the second half of the 1980s there
were two trends in the public sphere concerning the perception of the role of religion
in the Albanian national identity. The first and the most dominant one was the
official socialist and nationalist point of view, which tended to minimize or deny
religious identities, particularly the Muslim identity. The second, dissident trend,
which was exported from Kosovo to Albania, tried to relate Muslim identity to
Albanian national identity. As was the case in Kosovo, the issue of the conversion
of Albanians to Islam was central to this debate. The rapid socioeconomic changes
in Albania in the early 1990s would add new dimensions to this discussion.193
Conclusions
In contrast to the Christian nationalities in the Balkans the Bosnian Muslims and the
Muslim Albanians identified themselves with the state during the Ottoman period.
Within the framework of the millet system they enjoyed a privileged position as parts
of the Muslim millet. The fact that the Bosnian Muslims and the Muslim Albanians
represented the state in their respective regions contributed to the delay in the
realization of their nationalisms. The millet system, in which religion and nationality
were intertwined, was to play an important role particularly in the national development of the Bosnian Muslims.
The Congress of Berlin marked a turning point in the histories of the Bosnian and
Albanian Muslims. With the occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina by the AustroHungarian Empire the Bosnian Muslims lost their traditional privileges. The Muslims were considered by the Austro-Hungarian government the nucleus of a project
of a territorially based Bosnian nation. However, the Muslims, who were trying to
preserve their economic, cultural and religious interests, became involved in an
inevitable conflict with Austro-Hungarian rule. In this period, the Muslims founded
their first political party and for the first time put forward political demands in the
modern sense.
The foreign threat to the Albanian lands was the main reason for the emergence
of Albanian nationalism. The Albanians established the Prizren League to protect the
Albanian territory that had been assigned to neighboring countries by the Congress
of Berlin. Though the Ottomans originally supported the Prizren League, they
suppressed it as soon as it began to challenge Ottoman authority. However, the
Ottomans supported the Bosnian Muslims as an important ally against the AustroHungarian Empire as far as international conditions allowed them to do so.

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THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS AND ALBANIANS

The pan-Islamic policy of the Ottoman sultans, who were at the same time caliphs
of the Sunni Muslims, produced different results in different political frameworks.
This policy was quite effective in the Muslim movement against Austro-Hungarian
rule and played an important role in the emergence of a Bosnian-wide political
opposition. In contrast to the Bosnian case, the pan-Islamic policy tried to reduce the
nationalism of the Albanians who were living within the Ottoman Empire by
stressing Islamic brotherhood. However, it was too late to curb the nationalism of the
Albanians, which had already assumed considerable strength.
Albanian and Bosnian Muslim nationalisms emerged in different political frameworks. While the effectiveness of the Austro-Hungarian bureaucracy and the political
opportunities available in the dual monarchy encouraged the Bosnian Muslims to
form a legal opposition, Albanian nationalism emerged in a declining Ottoman
Empire under poor democratic conditions. The Albanians had no choice but to resort
to violence in order to protect their territory against foreign threat and against the
Ottomans who wanted to centralize the empire. These different imperial legacies
would also affect the course of the development of the Bosnian Muslim and Albanian
nationalisms in the coming decades.
International developments constituted another important factor that affected the
Bosnian Muslim and Albanian national movements. The diplomatic support of
Austria-Hungary and Italy played an important role in the establishment of the
independent Albanian state after the Balkan Wars. However, international conditions
were not so favorable to the Bosnian Muslims. They enjoyed only the limited support
of the Ottoman Empire, which, in any case, collapsed after World War I. The
Ottoman Empire became increasingly vulnerable to the reactions of the Austro-Hungarian administration as a result of the relations developing between the two empires.
In contrast to the Albanians, who had their own state during the inter-war period, the
Bosnian Muslims lived within the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in the
same period.
The Albanians in Albania on the one hand and the Bosnian Muslims on the other,
along with the Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia, had been subject in the past to
different secularization and religious policies. The secularization of the Muslim
community in Albania had already begun in the early inter-war years. On the other
hand, in the Cold War era the Albanian communists imposed a strict religious policy
incorporating the prohibition of all religious activity, while the League of Communists of Yugoslavia tolerated the existence of religious institutions and certain limited
activities on their part on condition that they remained loyal to the political regime.
These different religious policies also shaped the parameters of the activities of some
Muslim intellectuals who represented dissident views regarding the role of religion
in the national identities of their respective communities.
There are cultural, social and religious differences between the Muslim Slavs in
Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Albanians in Macedonia and Kosovo which have their
roots in the past. In addition to their different religious ways of life, Islam plays

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A. BABUNA

different roles in their national identities. In the inter-war period the Bosnian
Muslims and Albanians were unable to set up a unified political organization. The
differences between the two communities continued in the socialist period. The
leadership of the Bosnian Muslims was able to gain some important achievements by
making compromises with the state authorities while the Albanians engaged in open
conflicts with the Yugoslav state. The political aims of the Albanians were not
supported by the Bosnian Muslims.
Religion played a more important role in the national development of the Bosnian
Muslims than in that of the Albanians. The Bosnian Muslims were South Slavs like
the Serbs and the Croats and they shared the same language. Given these conditions,
religion was for the Bosnian Muslims the most important ethnic border. However,
the Albanians had a distinct ethnic background and their own language. In contrast
to its role among the Bosnian Muslims, religion played a divisive role among the
Albanians, who were divided into three different religions. Moreover, as Islam, the
most widespread religion among the Albanians, was represented by different sects,
in order to mobilize all the Albanians around the idea of an Albanian nation one
had to emphasize their common ethnic background and the Albanian language.
However, a comparison between Bosnian Muslim and Albanian nationalisms shows
that the imperial legacies, international developments, different political frameworks
and official religious policies as well as differences in the cultural, social and
religious life of the respective communities are also important factors shaping not
only the course of the Bosnian Muslim and Albanian nationalist movements but also
the relation between Islam and the national identities of these communities.
Bosnian Muslim nationalism took different forms in different political contexts. In
the inter-war period, the Bosnian Muslims placed their emphasis on the concept of
Yugoslavism. They continued to stress their distinctiveness during the socialist
period with the options offered to them by the Yugoslav state in several censuses,
until they were officially recognized as an independent nation in 1968. A comparative study of the developments of the Bosnian Muslim and Albanian nationalisms in
historical perspective shows clearly that the Bosnian Muslims developed a distinct
national identity far removed, since the Austro-Hungarian period, from religious
solidarity with the non-Slavic Muslims. Nevertheless, in 1968 they were recognized
by the Yugoslav state as Muslims in the national sense. Although Socialist
Yugoslavia thus became the first state to recognize the existence of a Bosnian
Muslim nation, the term Muslims in the national sense continued to cause
confusion concerning the existence of a distinct Bosnian Muslim nation.

NOTES
1. The author would like to thank Bogazici University Research Fund (project no. 04Z102)
for funding this project.

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THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS AND ALBANIANS

2. Leo Tindemans, Lloyd Cutler and Bronislaw Geremek, Unfinished Peace. Report of the
International Commission on the Balkans (Washington: Automatic Graphic Systems,
1996).
3. For the sake of simplicity, the Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina (Bosniaks) will be
referred to as Bosnian Muslims.
4. Bejlerbeylik was the largest administrative unit and included many sandzaks (districts).
5. Avdo Suceska, Neke specificnosti istorije Bosne pod Turcima, Prilozi, Vol. 4, No. 4,
1968, p. 47.
6. The reasons for the conversions among the South Slavs and the Albanians are beyond
the scope of this paper.
7. W. G. Lockwood, Living Legacy of the Ottoman Empire: The Serbo-Croatian Speaking Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina, in A. Ascher, T. Halasi-Kun and B. K. Kiraly,
eds, The Mutual Effects of the Islamic and Judeo-Christian Worlds: The East European
Pattern (Brooklyn: Brooklyn College Press, 1979), p. 209.
8. Millet means nation in Arabic and Turkish. In the beginning, there were officially only
the Orthodox and Armenian millets.
9. Bericht uber die Verwaltung Bosnien und der Hercegovina (Vienna: K. und k. Gemeinsame Finanzministerium, 1906), p. 119. This is not to say that the Bosnian Muslim
national development was constructed completely on a millet basis or on religion itself
but rather that religion could act as a badge or marker that could take on ethnic or
national connotations. Peter Mentzel, Conclusion: Millets, States, and National Identities, Nationalities Papers, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2000, p. 202; For the Islamic and Bosnian
aspects of the identity of the Bosnian Muslims in Socialist Yugoslavia see Tone Bringa,
Biti Musliman na Bosanski nacin. Identitet i zajednica u jednom srednjobosanskom selu
(Sarajevo: Dani, 1997).
10. The Archive of Bosnia-Hercegovina- Sarajevo ABH (Department of Bosnia-Hercegovina) ABH ZMF Pr BH 825/1901; ABH ZMF Pr BH 1670/1900, pp. 25.
11. ABH ZMF Pr BH 825/1901, p. 4, 6.
12. Landowners, who had military obligations to the state in case of war. They had a right
to cultivate the state-owned lands assigned to them.
13. There were also some other social classes in the cities. Suceska, Neke specificnosti
istorije Bosne, p. 49.
14. Ibid., p. 43.
15. Avdo Suceska, Ajani. Prilog izucavanju lokalne vlasti u nasim zemljama za vrijeme
Turaka (Sarajevo: Naucno Drustvo SR Bosne i Hercegovine, 1965), p. 169.
16. Avdo Suceska, O nasljedivanju odzakluk timara u Bosni i Hercegovini, Godisnjak
pravnog fakulteta u Sarajevu, Vol. 15, 1967, p. 503. However, in recent research, some
doubt has been expressed concerning the existence of these hereditary land holdings
(ocaklik timari). Michael Robert Hickok, Ottoman Military Administration in Eighteenth
Century Bosnia (Leiden: Brill, 1997), p. 53, cited in Fikret Adanir, The Formation of
a Muslim Nation in Bosnia-Hercegovina: A Historiographic Discussion, in Fikret
Adanir and Suraiya Faroqhi, eds, The Ottomans and the Balkans. A Discussion of
Historiography (Leiden: Brill, 2002), p. 297.
17. Suceska, Neke specificnosti istorije Bosne, p. 51.
18. Srecko Dzaja, Konfessionalitat und Nationalitat Bosniens und der Herzegowina.
Voremanzipatorische Phase 14631804 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1984),
p. 100.
19. Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire. The Classical Age 13001600 (London: Phoenix,
1997), p. 27.

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A. BABUNA

20. Stavro Skendi, The Albanian National Awakening 18781912 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1967), pp. 4, 5.
21. As warlike people the Albanians served the Ottoman Empire in different ways.
The Christian Albanian families provided the best janissaries (the Ottoman ground
troops) through the devshirme (child levy) system. The Albanian sipahis and the
mercenary troops were known for their effectiveness. Skendi, Albanian National
Awakening, p. 21.
22. Nathalie Clayer, Der Bektaschi-Orden in Albanien. Zwischen Kreuz und Halbmond
(Munich: Staatliches Museum fur Volkerkunde, 1998), p. 153.
23. The Bektashi order had strong links with the janissary troops.
24. Nathalie Clayer, The Myth of Ali Pasha and the Bektashis. The Construction of an
Albanian Bektashi National History, in Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers and Bernd J.
Fischer, eds, Albanian Identities. Myth and History (London: Hurst, 2002), pp. 130, 131.
Actually Ali Pasha gave greater support to the Halveti and Sadi orders than to the
Bektashi. Clayer, Bektaschi Orden, p. 153.
25. It was an eclectic sect composed of elements from different sources. Basically, it
revealed relicts of old Turkish folklore and customs, particularly relicts of shamanism.
Bektashism did not compel the observance of some Islamic rites like ritual prayer and
fasting and permitted wine drinking. It was not forbidden for women to mix socially
with men and to go unveiled. Inalcik, Ottoman Empire, p. 197.
26. Nathalie Clayer, LAlbanie, pays des derviches, pp. 5225, cited in Isa Blumi, The
Commodification of Otherness and the Ethnic Unit in the Balkans: How to Think about
the Albanians, East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1998, p. 555.
27. Skendi, Albanian National Awakening, pp. 12, 13.
28. For social life among the northern tribes see Edith Durham, High Albania. A Victorian
Travellers Balkan Odyssey (London: Phoenix Press, 2000). For Albanian customs see,
Renzo Falaschi, The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Vlora and His Work for the Independence
of Albania (Tirana: Toena, 1997), pp. 357360.
29. Among the Gegs urban/rural boundaries were more fluid while the Tosks were higly
stratified along class and production lines. This seems to be one of the important factors
that shaped the relations of these tribes with the Ottoman state. See Blumi,
Commodification of Otherness, pp. 547, 548.
30. Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans. Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 83.
31. Skendi, Albanian National Awakening, pp. 19, 21.
32. Jelavic, History of the Balkans, p. 84.
33. Steven L. Burg, The Political Integration of Yugoslavias Muslims: Determinants of
Success and Failure (Pittsburgh: Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European
Studies, 1983), pp. 6,7.
34. Aydin Babuna, Die nationale Entwicklung der bosnischen Muslime. Mit besonderer
Berucksichtigung der osterreichisch-ungarischen Periode (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1996),
p. 198. For the pan-Islamic policy of the Ottomans see also Aydin Babuna, The
Emergence of the First Muslim Party in Bosnia-Hercegovina, East European Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 2, 1996, pp. 133136.
35. ABH ZMF Pr BH 1085/1901, p. 42. This demand of the Muslims was to be accepted
by the Austro-Hungarian government with the recognition of the religious autonomy of
the Muslims in 1909 (after the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina by Austria-Hungary
in 1908).
36. Tenants were called kmets in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

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THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS AND ALBANIANS

37. Die Ergebnisse der Volkszahlung (Sarajevo: Landesregierung fur Bosnien und Hercegovina, 1910), p. LXVIII.
38. Inteligencija i nasi pokreti, Ogledalo, 7 June 1907, p. 1; ABH ZMF Pr. BH
1068/1900.
39. Kasim Suljevic, Nacionalnost Muslimana. Izmedu teorije i politike (Rijeka, Yugoslavia:
Otokar Kersovani, 1981), p. 15.
40. Burg, Political Integration, pp. 6, 11.
41. In 1907 the language of Bosnia-Hercegovina was officially referred to as Serbo-Croatian. It marked the end of the policy of Bosnjastvo of the Austro-Hungarian government.
Dzevad Juzbasic, Jezicko pitanje u austrougarskoj politici u Bosni i Hercegovini pred
prvi svjetski rat (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1973), p. 10.
42. Muhamed Hadzijahic, Od tradicije do identiteta: geneza nacionalnog pitanja bosanskih
Muslimana (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1974), p. 131; Mustafa Imamovic, O historiji
bosnjackog pokusaja, in Atif Purivatra, Mustafa Imamovic and Rusmir Mahmutcehayic, eds, Muslimani i Bosnjastvo (Sarajevo: Muslimanska bibliotheka, 1991),
p. 51.
43. Babuna, Nationale Entwicklung, p. 315.
44. Though this League was originally supported by the Ottomans and did not aim at an
independent Albania it marked an important step in the development of Albanian
nationalism.
45. Peter Bartl, Albanien. Vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart (Regensburg, Germany:
Sudosteuropa-Gesellschaft, 1995), p. 95; Skendi, Albanian National Awakening, p. 36.
46. Ibrahim Temo, Ibrahim Temonun Ittihad ve Terakki Anilari (Istanbul: Arba, 1997), p.
VIII. Mainly the Tosks were involved in the Young Turk activities. For the relations
between the Albanians and the Young Turks see M. Sukru Hanioglu, The Young Turks
in Opposition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); M. Sukru Hanioglu, Preparation for a RevolutionThe Young Turks, 19021908 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2001).
47. Bartl, Albanien, p. 111.
48. For the Albanian perception of the 1908 Ottoman constitution see Durham, High
Albania, pp. 223, 231; Edith Durham, Albania and the Albanians. Selected Articles and
Letters 19031944, ed. Bejtullah Destani (London: Center for Albanian Studies, 2001),
pp. 715.
49. Bartl, Albanien, p. 114.
50. Falashi, Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Vlora, p. 368.
51. The Ottomans had already made some important concessions regarding the Latin
alphabet, military recruitment and taxation issues after the visit of the Ottoman Sultan
to Kosovo in 1911. However, they did not accept the unification of the four vilayets
inhabited by the Albanians. Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans. Twentieth Century
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 88, 89.
52. Joseph Swire, Albania: The Rise of a Kingdom (New York: Richard R. Smith, 1930),
pp. 52, 53.
53. For a different view on the role of education during the early Albanian nation-building
process see Isa Blumi, The Role of Education in the Formation of Albanian Identity
and Its Myths, in Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers and Bernd J. Fischer, eds, Albanian
Identities. Myth and History (London: Hurst, 2002), pp. 4959.
54. Skendi, Albanian National Awakening, pp. 464 466, 469. The most important contribution was made by the Italo-Albanians. In time, the majority of the Italo-Albanians would
join the uniate church.
55. Skendi, Albanian National Awakening, p. 171.

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A. BABUNA

56. Wassa Effendi, The Truth on Albania and the Albanians. Historical and Critical Issues
(London: Centre for Albanian Studies, 1999 [1879]), p. 40.
57. Falaschi, Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Vlora, p. 369.
58. Ibid., pp. 361, 362.
59. Bartl, Albanien, p. 177.
60. Clayer, Bektaschi-Orden, p. 154
61. For the influence of this tribal structure on the political culture of the Albanians see
Blumi, Commodification of Otherness, pp. 527569.
62. Skendi, Albanian National Awakening, p. 464.
63. Ibid., p. 467.
64. T. Zavalani, Albanian Nationalism, in Peter Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer, eds, Nationalism in Eastern Europa (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), p. 67.
65. Jelavich, History of the Balkans (Twentieth Century), p. 85.
66. Skendi, Albanian National Awakening, p. 45.
67. Ibid., p. 186.
68. Jelavich, History of the Balkans (Twentieth Century), p. 84.
69. The importance of the sentiment of race for the Albanians at that time was also observed
by some foreign representatives in Albania. See for example the report of the Italian
Consul General at Corfu cited in Skendi, Albanian National Awakening, p. 470.
70. For example, Vasa Pasha, a Catholic from north Albania, advocate of the Latin alphabet,
had stressed that the faith of Albanians was Albaniandom.
71. Skendi, Albanian National Awakening, p. 468.
72. For the language question see Durham, Albania and the Albanians, pp. 7173.
73. During the Congress of Berlin the existence of the Albanian nation was rejected. The
Albanians were considered by the European statesmen to be Turks. Bartl, Albanien,
p. 94.
74. H. T. Norris, Islam in the Balkans. Religion and Society between Europe and the Arab
World (London: Hurst, 1993), p. 166. Naim Frasheri tried to promote Bektashism as the
national creed of Albania.
75. After the proclamation of the royal dictatorship by the Serbian King Alexander in 1929
the name of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was changed to
Yugoslavia.
76. Only 30 of the 2,492 officials were Bosnian Muslims. See Suljaga Salihagic, Mi
bosansko-hercegovacki Muslimani u krilu jugoslovenske zajednice (Banja Luka:
Stamparija Zvonimir Jovic i Co., 1940), p. 59.
77. For the violence committed upon the Muslims and the position of the Muslims in this
state see Salim Ceric, Muslimani srpskohrvatskog jezika (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1968),
pp. 184192; Atif Purivatra, Jugoslovenska muslimanska organizacija u politickom
zivotu kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1977), pp. 3447.
78. Alexander Popovic, Islamische Bewegungen in Jugoslawien, in Andreas Kappeler,
Gerhard Simon and Georg Brunner, eds, Die Muslime in der Sowjetunion und in
Jugoslawien (Cologne: Markus Verlag, 1989), p. 275.
79. Purivatra, Jugoslovenska muslimanska organizacija, pp. 383389.
80. Mehmed Spaho, Jugoslovenska muslimanska organizacija, Nova Evropa, Vol. 4, No.
17, 1923, p. 506.
81. Burg, Political Integration, pp. 18, 19.
82. For the Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia in the inter-war and socialist periods see
also Aydin Babuna, The Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia: Ethnic Identity Superseding Religion, Nationalities Papers, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2000, pp. 6873.

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THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS AND ALBANIANS

83. Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian. A History of Kosovo (London: Hurst,
1998), pp. 101102.
84. On Cemiyet see Ivo Banac, Nacionalno pitanje u Jugoslaviji. Porijeklo, povijest,
politika (Zagreb: Durieux, 1995), pp. 310311.
85. Noel Malcolm, Kosovo. A Short History (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), p. 269.
86. Ivan Muzic, Islamska vjerska zajednica u kraljevini Jugoslaviji, Islamsko Misao, May
1984, p. 21.
87. Fikret Karcic, Nastanak i oblikovanje savremene muslimanske vjerske administracije u
jugoslovenskim zemljama, Glasnik, Vol. 54, No. 4, 1991, p. 382.
88. Ferhat Seta, Vjersko-prosvjetne prilike Muslimana pred drugi svjetski rat, Glasnik,
Vol. 54, No. 4, 1991, p. 462.
89. Burg, Political Integration, pp. 1619.
90. Hugh Poulton and Miranda Vickers, The Kosovo Albanians: Ethnic Confrontation with
the Slav State, in Hugh Poulton and Suha Taji-Farouki, eds, Muslim Identity and the
Balkan State (London: Hurst, 1997), p. 145.
91. Malcolm, Kosovo, p. 268; Banac, Nationalno pitanje, p. 241.
92. Ibid., p. 244; Poulton and Vickers, Kosovo Albanians, pp. 146147.
93. Denisa Kostovicova, Shkolla Shqipe and Nationhood. Albanians in Pursuit of Education in the Native Language in Interwar (19181941) and Post-autonomy (198998)
Kosovo, in Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers and Bernd J. Fischer, eds, Albanian Identities. Myth and History (London: Hurst, 2002), pp. 160163.
94. Ibid., p. 171;
95. The last religious statistics of Albania date from 1942. Nathalie Clayer, Islam,
State and Society in Post-Communist Albania, in Hugh Poulton and Suha TajiFarouki, eds, Muslim Identity and the Balkan State (London: Hurst, 1997),
pp. 117, 118.
96. Raymond E. Zickel and Walter R. Iwaskiw, Albania: A Country Study (Washington:
Federal Research Division, 1994), p. 26.
97. Ibid.
98. Anton Logoreci, The Albanians. Europas Forgotten Survivors (London: Victor Gollancz, 1977), pp. 5458.
99. Swire, Albania, p. 413. The first Islamic journal after the independence of Albania, Zani
i Nalte (High Voice), was published in 1923. Ismail Ahmedi, Islamska publicistika kod
Albanaca, Glasnik, Vol. 5, 1990, p. 39.
100. Since it stopped the Hellenization process, this event marked the real end of the millet
system for the Orthodox Albanians. See Stavro Skendi, The Millet System and Its
Contribution to the Blurring of Orthodox National Identity in Albania, in Benjamin
Braude and Bernard Lewis, eds, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire. The
Functioning of a Plural Society (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1982), p. 255. The new
status of the Albanian Orthodox Church was recognized by the Istanbul Patriarchate in
1937.
101. Zickel and Iwaskiw, Albania, pp. 2627.
102. For the reorganization of the Sunni Islamic Community see Aleksandre Popovic,
Balkanlarda Islam (Istanbul: Insan yayinlari, 1995), pp. 2730.
103. Zachary T. Irwin, The Fate of Islam in the Balkans: A Comparison of Four State
Policies, in Pedro Ramet, ed., Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European
Politics (Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, 1989), p. 384.
104. Joseph Swire, Zogs Albania (London: Robert Hale, 1936), p. 244.
105. Clayer, Bektaschi Orden, pp. 154, 155.

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A. BABUNA

106. When the Turkish Republic closed down the Bektashi monastries in 1925 the orders
headquarters was moved to Tirana and the former grand dede Salih Niyazi took over the
same post in Tirana.
107. Clayer, Bektaschi Orden, p. 156.
108. Clayer, Islam, State and Society, pp. 118, 119.
109. Clayer, Bektaschi Orden, p. 157.
110. Popovic, Balkanlarda Islam, p. 32.
111. Logoreci, Albanians, p. 65.
112. Nathalie Clayer, The Issue of the Conversion to Islam in the Restructuring of Albanian
Politics and Identity, in Nathalie Clayer, ed., Religion Et Nation Chez Les Albanais.
XIXeXXe Siecles (Istanbul: Isis, 2002), pp. 399, 400.
113. El-Hidaje was dominated by members of the organization of Mladi Muslimani (Young
Muslims). This pan-Islamic organization, established in Sarajevo in 1941, gradually
developed a network throughout Bosnia-Hercegovina. They supported the activities of
the Muslims for the autonomy of Bosnia-Hercegovina during the war. Alija Izetbegovic,
the later president of Bosnia-Hercegovina, was also a former member of this organization. For the Mladi Muslimani see Sead Trhulj, Mladi Muslimani (Zagreb: Globus,
1992).
114. Xavier Bougarel, From Young Muslims to Party of Democratic Action: The Emergence of a pan-Islamist Trend in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Islamic Studies, Vol. 36, Nos 23,
1997, p. 537.
115. Ivo Banac, Bosnian Muslims: From Religious Community to Socialist Nationhood and
Postcommunist Statehood, 19181992, in Mark Pinson, ed., The Muslims of BosniaHerzegovina (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 141. The Croatian
propaganda stated that the Muslims were the flowers, the best part, of the Croatian
nation. Enver Redzic, Bosna i Hercegovina u drugom svjetskom ratu (Sarajevo:
Graficko-izdavacka kuca, 1998), p. 328.
116. Paul Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1968), p. 64.
117. Wolfgang Hopken, Die jugoslawischen Kommunisten und die bosnischen Muslime, in
Andreas Kappeler, Gerhard Simon and Georg Brunner, eds, Die Muslime in der
Sowjetunion und in Jugoslawien (Cologne: Markus Verlag, 1989), p. 192.
118. For the Muslim policy during World War II see Redzic, Bosna i Hercegovina,
pp. 299375.
119. For the Mufti of Jerusalem see Joseph B. Schechtman, The Mufti and the Fuehrer. The
Rise and Fall of Haj Amin el-Husseini (New York: A. S. Barnes, 1965).
120. The leader of the religious hierarchy.
121. For the position of the Bosnian Muslims in the federal structure of Socialist Yugoslavia
see Georg Brunner, Die Stellung der Muslime in den foderativen Systemen der
Sowjetunion und Jugoslawiens, in Andreas Kappeler, Gerhard Simon and Georg
Brunner, eds, Die Muslime in der Sowjetunion und in Jugoslawien (Cologne: Markus
Verlag, 1989), pp. 155179.
122. However, the orders remained active. Some of the tekkes were reopened during the
1960s as centers for religious instruction. The tekkes in Sarajevo were closed down
again in 1972 but their members went to Kosovo and Macedonia, where the tekkes had
been more numerous and had never been closed down by the Islamic authorities.
123. A headquarters was established in Sarajevo for Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia and
Slovenia, in Prishtina for Serbia (including Kosovo) and in Titograd for Macedonia.
124. Burg, Political Integration, pp. 29 32.

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THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS AND ALBANIANS

125. For the Reis-ul-ulemas of Bosnia-Hercegovina between 1882 and 1991 see Ferhat Seta,
Reis-ul-uleme u Bosni i Hercegovini i Jugoslaviji od 1882 do 1991 godine (Sarajevo:
PGD ISKRA:Visoko, 1991).
126. Ger Duijzings, Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo (London: Hurst, 2000),
p. 129.
127. Ibid.
128. Interview, 6 November 1987, p. 22, cited in ibid.
129. For the Sufi orders in Socialist Yugoslavia see Alexandre Popovic, The Contemporary
Situation of the Muslim Mystic Orders in Yugoslavia, in Ernest Gellner, ed., Islamic
Dilemmas: Reformers, Nationalists and Industrialization (Berlin: Mouton, 1985). By
1986 there were 70 monastries in southern Yugoslavia. Fifty-three of them were in
Kosovo, ten in Macedonia and seven in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Radio Free Europa
Research, 30 June 1986, p. 21, cited in Sabrina P. Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the War of Kosovo (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1999), p. 123; For the Sufi orders in Bosnia-Hercegovina see Mustafa Prljaca,
Razgovor sa hadzi Fejzulahom ef. Hadzibajricem. Tarikat kao zaboravljeni dragulj,
Islamsko Misao, Vol. 11, No. 129, 1989, p. 22. Though the majority of the tekkes were
in the small towns there were also many of them in the countryside. Popovic, Muslim
Mystic Orders, p. 247.
130. Duijzings, Religion and the Politics of Identity, p. 112.
131. For the establishment of the Community of Dervish Orders see Prljaca, Razgovor sa
hadzi Fejzulahom ef. Hadzibajricem, p. 22.
132. There are some important differences between the dervish orders in Bosnia and those in
Kosovo. The sheikhs in Kosovo enjoy greater social prestige. Their influence is not only
religious but can also be political or economical. Popovic, Muslim Mystic Orders,
p. 247.
133. Duijzings, Religion and the Politics of Identity, p. 118.
134. See for these polemics ibid., pp. 118120.
135. Ibid., p. 127.
136. See Hugh Poulton, The Muslim Experience in the Balkan States 19191991, Nationalities Papers, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2000, p. 55.
137. Marie-Paule Canapa, L islam et la question des nationalites en Yougoslavie, in
Olivier Carre and Paul Dumont, eds, Radicalismes islamiques (Paris: LHarmatta, 1986),
Vol. 2, pp. 102103, 123, cited in Duijzings, Religion and the Politics of Identity, p. 128.
138. This trend was very evident in the social circles of the white- and blue-collar workers
as well as among some young people in their teens and twenties. C. Sorabji, Islam and
Bosnias Muslim Nation, in F. W. Carter and H. T. Norris, eds, The Changing Shape
of the Balkans (London: UCL Press, 1996), p. 55.
139. Kosovar Muslims were considered by the Bosnian Muslims to be lazy, ungrateful and
undisciplined and therefore somehow not truly Muslim; Western Europe was civilized
and akin to the Muslims. Sorabji, Islam and Bosnias Muslim Nation, p. 56.
140. In the early 1990s, the majority of the Bosnian Muslims considered religious activities
and freedoms to be intimately associated with Western values. Ibid., pp. 5560.
141. Atif Purivatra, Nacionalni i politicki razvitak Muslimana (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1970),
p. 32.
142. Ibid., p. 30.
143. Hopken, Bosnischen Muslime, p. 199.
144. Mark Baskin, The Secular State as Ethnic Entrepreneur: Macedonians and Bosnian
Muslims in Socialist Yugoslavia, Michigan Discussions in Anthropology, Fall 1984,
p. 124.

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A. BABUNA

145. Tito wanted to show the open-mindedness of his regime to the other members of the
non-aligned bloc. Francine Friedman, The Muslim Slavs of Bosnia and Hercegovina
(with Reference to the Sandzak of Novi Pazar): Islam as National Identity, Nationalities Papers, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2000, p. 174.
146. For the rationale of the recognition of the Bosnian Muslims as an independent nation see
also Francine Friedman, The Bosnian Muslims. Denial of a Nation (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1996), pp. 164168.
147. Mojzes Paul, The Yugoslavian Inferno: Ethnoreligious Warfare in the Balkans (New
York: Continuum, 1995), p. 128, cited in Duijzings, Religion and the Politics of Identity,
p. 130.
148. Atif Purivatra, O nacionalnom fenomenu bosanskohercegovackih Muslimana, Pregled, Vol. 64, No. 10, 1974, p. 1019.
149. Ibrahim Bakic, Nacija i religija (Sarajevo: Bosna Public, 1994), p. 112; Mitja Velikonja,
Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Texas: Texas
A& M University Press, 2003), p. 232.
150. For example, in the late 1980s the Bosnian Croats seemed to be more religious than the
Bosnian Muslims. See Bakic, Nacija i religija, p. 72; Velikonja, Religious Separation
and Political Intolerance, p. 230.
151. Bringa, Biti Musliman na Bosanski nacin, p. 52.
152. Enver Redzic, O posebnosti bosanskih Muslimana, Pregled, Vol. 60, No. 4, 1970,
p. 488.
153. The 1963 constitution elevated Kosovo to the level of an autonomous province
(pokrajina) like Vojvodina but reduced its real autonomy by eliminating its constitutional status at the federal level.
154. Elez Biberaj, Albania. A Socialist Maverick (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 116
117.
155. Malcolm, Kosovo, p. 324
156. Hugh Poulton, The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict (London: Minority Rights
Group, 1993), p. 57.
157. The constitution of 1963 and the reforms of 1965 contributed to the increase of
nationalism and regionalism in the 1960s.
158. Branko Horvat, Kosovsko pitanje (Zagreb: Globus, 1988), pp. 100101.
159. Poulton and Vickers, Kosovo Albanians, p. 152.
160. Horvat, Kosovsko pitanje, p. 131.
161. Biberaj, Albania, p. 9
162. Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, pp. 110111, 186.
163. Horvat, Kosovsko pitanje, pp. 101103.
164. Some of the clandestine groups that were involved in the riots of 1981 were: the Group
of Marxist-Leninists in Kosovo, the Communist-Marxist-Leninist Party of Albanians in
Yugoslavia, and the Voice of Kosovo. George Joffe, Muslims in the Balkans, in F.
W.Carter and H. T. Norris, eds, The Changing Shape of the Balkans (London: UCL
Press, 1996), p. 92.
165. In the protests carried out in 1989 and 1990 against the abolition of the autonomy of
Kosovo more than ninety Albanians were killed and hundreds of them were wounded.
In the 1990s Kosovo witnessed the worst human rights violations in Europa. IHF press
release, Vienna, 12 April 1996, cited in Gazmend Pula, Modalities of Self-DeterminationThe Case of Kosovo as a Structural Issue for Lasting Stability in the Balkans,
Sudosteuropa, Vol. 45, Nos 45, 1996, p. 384.
166. Poulton, The Balkans, pp. 82, 83.

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THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS AND ALBANIANS

167. Clayer, The Issue of the Conversion to Islam, pp. 365369.

168. A. Novo, Razgovor sa direktorom medrese u Pristini Resulom Rexhepijem. Hvala
Islamskog Zajednici u Sarajevu, Preporod, Vol. 22, No. 2/489, 1991, p. 8.
169. Sorabji, Islam and Bosnias Muslim Nation, pp. 57, 58; Poulton, The Muslim
Experience in the Balkan States, p. 55.
170. Bernd J. Fischer, Albania at War 19391945 (London: Hurst, 1999), p. 71.
171. At least 173 Albanian-language elementary schools were established. Malcolm, Kosovo,
p. 292.
172. There was to be no drastic change in the organization of the Sunni Muslim and Bektashi
hierarchies during the German occupation after 1943. Popovic, Balkanlarda Islam,
p. 36.
173. Fischer, Albania at War, pp. 55, 56; Popovic, Balkanlarda Islam, p. 35.
174. Biberaj, Albania, p. 9
175. Popovic, Balkanlarda Islam, p. 39.
176. It even seems that some orders such as the Halvetis, Kadiris and Sadis were recognized
as independent religious communities. See ibid., p. 47.
177. Logoreci, Albanians, p. 154.
178. Albania: Political Imprisonment and the Law (London: Amnesty International, 1984),
p. 12.
179. James S. ODonnell, A Coming of Age: Albania under Enver Hoxha (Boulder: East
European Monographs, 1999), p. 140.
180. Albania: Political Imprisonment and the Law, p. 13.
181. Clayer, Bektaschi Orden, p. 157; Robert Elsie, A Dictionary of Albanian Religion,
Mythology, and Folk Culture (London: Hurst, 2001), p. 124.
182. Popovic, Balkanlarda Islam, p. 40.
183. After the dissolution of the Albanian Bektashi community there were two Bektashi
centers outside Albania. One of them was the Bektashi tekke in Djakovica (Kosovo) and
the other was in Taylor near Detroit, founded in 1954. See Elsie, Dictionary, p. 29.
184. Albania: Political Imprisonment and the Law, p. 13.
185. Zickel and Iwaskiw, Albania, p. 87. For the suppresssion of organized religion see
Albania: Political Imprisonment and the Law, pp. 1215. For the persecution of the
Muslim clergy see Bajro Perva, Islam i Muslimani u Albaniji: Zivot pun iskusenja,
Preporod, Vol. 22, No. 10/497, 1991, p. 12.
186. Biberaj, Albania, p. 43.
187. Zickel and Iwaskiw, Albania, pp. 82, 8587.
188. Wilma Lohner, Religiose Kultur in Albanien, in Hans Dieter Dopmann, ed., Religion
und Gesellschaft in Sudosteuropa (Munich: Sudosteuropa Gesellschaft, 1997), p. 177.
189. ODonnell, Albania under Enver Hoxha, p. 139.
190. Stephanie Schwandner Sievers, Narratives of Power. Capacities of Myth in Albania,
in Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers and Bernd J. Fischer, eds, Albanian Identities. Myth
and History (London: Hurst, 2002), p. 23.
191. In 1968, the mainly Tosk-based standard language of Albania was adopted as the official
language of the Geg-speaking Kosovars. This paved the way for the infiltration of
Albanian culture into Kosovo. Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, p. 182.
192. Miranda Vickers and James Pettifer, Albania. From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity (New
York: New York University Press, 1997), p. 144.
193. Clayer, The Issue of the Conversion to Islam, pp. 368, 369.

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