Gabriel v. CA
Gabriel v. CA
Gabriel v. CA
of the deceased; and (2) there is no proof to show that the person who was appointed
administrator is unworthy, incapacitated or unsuitable to perform the trust as to make his
appointment inadvisable under these circumstances. The motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners was likewise denied.
The petitioners thereafter filed a special civil action for certiorari before the CA. The CA
rendered judgment dismissing that petition for certiorari on the ground that the appointment of
an administrator is left entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court which may not be
interfered with unless abused; that the fact that there was no personal notice served on
petitioners is not a denial of due process as such service is not a jurisdictional requisite and
petitioners were heard on their opposition; and that the alleged violation of the order of
preference, if any, is an error of fact or law which is a mistake of judgment, correctible by appeal
and not by the special civil action of certiorari.
In the petition for review on certiorari at bar, petitioners aver that (1) under Section 6, Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court, it is the surviving spouse who is first in the order of preference for the
appointment of an administrator. Petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel is the widow and legal
surviving spouse of the deceased Domingo Gabriel and should, therefore, be preferred over
private respondent who is one of the illegitimate children of the decedent by claimant, Aida
Valencia. (2) Assuming that the widow is incompetent, the next of kin must be appointed. As
between a legitimate and an illegitimate child, the former is preferred, hence petitioner Nilda
Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter, must be preferred over private respondent who is an
illegitimate son. (3) The non-observance or violation per se of the order of preference already
constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
On the other hand, private respondent contends that the court did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion in not following the order of preference because the same is not absolute and the
choice of who to appoint rests in the sound discretion of the court. He calls attention to the fact
that petitioners Nilda Gabriel and Felicitas Jose-Gabriel never applied for appointment despite
the lapse of more than nine (9) months from the death of Domingo Gabriel, hence it was not
possible for the probate court to have considered them for appointment. Besides, it is not denied
that several properties of the deceased have already been relinquished to herein petitioners,
hence they would have no interest in applying for letters of administration. Lastly, private
respondent submits that it has not been shown that he is incompetent nor is he disqualified from
being appointed or serving as administrator.
Issue: WON the appointment of Roberto as administrator of the estate of Domingo Gabriel
should be revoked.
Held: The Supreme Court held that there was no sufficient ground to revoke the appointment of
Roberto but nevertheless appointed Felicitas as co-administrator of the estate.
The principal consideration in the appointment of an administrator is the interest in said estate of
the one sought to be appointed. This is the same consideration behind the order of preference
in the appointment of administrators for the estate. The underlying assumption is that those who
will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, on the
other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the
highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly.
The widow has the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent,
aside from her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as much, if
not more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. On this
ground alone, petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel, the widow of the deceased Domingo Gabriel,
has every right and is very much entitled to the administration of the estate of her husband since
one who has greater interest in the estate is preferred to another who has less.
While it is true that Section 6(b) of Rule 78 provides that the preference may be disregarded by
the court where said persons neglect to apply for letters of administration for 30 days after the
decedent's death, such failure is not sufficient to exclude the widow from the administration of
the estate of her husband. There must be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the
widow from the administration.
In the case at bar, there is no compelling reason sufficient to disqualify Felicitas Jose-Gabriel
from appointment as administratrix of the estate. Just as the order of preference is not absolute
and may be disregarded for valid cause, so may the 30-day period be likewise waived since the
rule merely provides that said letters, as an alternative, "may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors."
On the other hand, the appointment of Roberto as administrator should not be nullified. The
determination of a person's suitability as administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound
judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and said judgment is not to be
interfered with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in error. Administrators can only be
removed for just cause. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 82 provides the legal and specific causes
authorizing the probate court to remove an administrator. While the court has ample discretion
in the removal of an administrator, it must, however, have some fact legally before it in order to
justify such removal. A mere importunity by some of the heirs of the deceased, there being no
factual and substantial bases therefor, is not adequate ratiocination for the removal of private
respondent.
Under the circumstances obtaining herein, we deem it just, equitable and advisable that there
be a co-administration of the estate of the deceased by petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel and
private respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel. The purpose of having co-administrators is to have
the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented,
especially considering that in this proceeding they will respectively represent the legitimate and
illegitimate groups of heirs to the estate. Thereby, it may reasonably be expected that all
interested persons will be satisfied, with the representatives working in harmony under the
direction and supervision of the probate court.
The appointment of co-administrators has been upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to have the
benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented; (2)
where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the
management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an
intricate and perplexing one to settle; (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the
representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate; and (5) when a person
entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have another competent person associated
with him in the office.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is MODIFIED by AFFIRMING the
validity of the appointment of respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel as judicial administrator and
ORDERING the appointment of petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel as co-administratrix in Special
Proceeding No. 88-4458 of Branch XI, Regional Trial Court of Manila.