Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80961

January 1996

Vol. 9, No. 1

From the Commandant

Special Warfare

With the proliferation of sophisticated

weapons systems and the increased efficiency of intelligence-gathering and information
processing, technology offers a variety of
options in dealing with our current ambiguous operations spectrum.
Special-operations forces place a high premium on technology the nature of our
operations demands that we take advantage of every means to provide an immediate, effective response. In this issue, Steven
Metz and Lieutenant Colonel James Kievit
discuss how emerging technology and the
ensuing revolution in military affairs can be
applied to conflict short of war, an area in
which SOF are often involved. But through
a hypothetical scenario, they also show the
hidden costs that such an application of
technology might entail.
While we consider the importance of technology and the need to stay abreast of it, we
must not become so enamored of technology
that we forget the reason behind our need
for it: soldiers. We have always said that
humans are more important than hardware.
We must never allow this human emphasis to diminish. Soldiers are the strength of
our special-operations force. As Larry Cable
points out in his article, the intercultural
skills of our Special Forces continue to be an
important factor in the indirect-action roles
we face. Around the globe, whether on the
Pacific Rim or in Latin America, the personto-person contact of our special-operations
forces allows the U.S. to protect its interests
with a minimum of involvement. It also
builds friendships and earns host-nation
respect. Special Forces soldiers such as the
late Dick Meadows, who is profiled in this
issue, exemplify the self-effacing performance of duty summed up in the term quiet
professional.
As we consider ways of dealing with our
current and future conflict spectrum and
what Metz and Kievit call its frustration
and indecisiveness, we may be lured by the

siren song of technology, but we must

remember that the main thing is to keep the
main thing the main thing.
The main thing is best stated by General
Dennis Reimer, when he says, The idea of
war in the Information Age will conjure up
images of bloodless conflict, more like a computer game than the bloody wars weve
known in the past. Nothing could be further
from the truth. Warfare may change its
impact on nations, armies and soldiers will
not. The fates of nations and armies will
still be decided by war, perhaps more rapidly than in the past. Losers may still spend
generations recovering from the consequences of defeat. Soldiers will always be
the key to victory. Technology and the ability to handle it may be increasingly important, but soldiers will always win or lose
wars. The battlefield will always be a dangerous, frightening and lonely place. Only
soldiers of character and courage, welltrained, ably led, and properly equipped,
will survive there and win tomorrow, as
they have in the past.

Major General William F. Garrison

Contents

PB 80961
January 1996

Special Warfare

Commander & Commandant

Major General William F. Garrison

Vol. 9, No. 1

Features

Editor
Jerry D. Steelman

Associate Editor
Sylvia McCarley

11

Straddling the Cultural Gaps: Special Forces in

the Indirect Action Environment
by Larry Cable

18

Army Special Operations Forces and the Pacific Century

by Colonel Russell D. Howard and Major Mark A. Nelson

28

Civil-Military Operations: Staff Support to Army Corps

and Divisions

36

Joint Task Force Support Hope: The Role of the CMOC

in Humanitarian Operations
by Lieutenant Colonel Stephen O. Wallace

42

Dick Meadows: A Quiet Professional

by Captain Jay Ashburner

45

USACAPOCs FOCUS Project: Waging the War

for Information
by Brigadier General Joel G. Blanchette

50

Civil-Military Seminars: 361st CA Builds Understanding

Between the Americas
by Captain Bethany L. Lenderman

Graphics & Design

Bruce S. Barfield
Automation Clerk
Debra Thomas

VE R

IT

AS

ET

LI B

ER

TAS

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the

United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare
Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission
is to promote the professional development of specialoperations forces by providing a forum for the examination
of established doctrine and new ideas.
Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do
not necessarily reflect official Army position. This
publication does not supersede any information presented
in other official Army publications.
Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and
should be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare,
USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone:
DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147.
Special Warfare reserves the right to edit all material.
Published works may be reprinted, except where
copyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare
and the authors.
Official distribution is limited to active and reserve
special-operations units. Individuals desiring private
subscriptions should forward their requests to:
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

Dennis J. Reimer
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
Yvonne M. Harrison
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
00686

Headquarters, Department of the Army

The Siren Song of Technology and Conflict Short of War

by Steven Metz and Lieutenant Colonel James Kievit

Departments
54

Letters

57

Officer Career Notes

58

Enlisted Career Notes

60

Foreign SOF

62

Update

64

Book Reviews

The Siren Song of Technology

and Conflict Short of War
by Steven Metz and Lieutenant Colonel James Kievit

mericans perceive conflict

short of war as a difficult
state of affairs, whether it
involves crisis response, peace
enforcement, counterinsurgency,
antiterrorism or counternarcotrafficking.1 In this environment of violent, shadowy grays and endless
complexity, immense military
advantage does not automatically
bring strategic success. Soft skills
such as psychological astuteness
and political subtlety often have
greater utility than do traditional
warfighting virtues. Such a concept
is counter to our nature: Americans
prefer the direct, the simple, the
conclusive and the decisive. As a
result, we search desperately for
some way to transcend the frustrations of conflict short of war.
Often, technology seems to offer
just such a solution. The Gulf War
provided shimmering evidence of
the power and potential of modern
technology, renewing American
trust in the ability of military
power to achieve strategically decisive results at an acceptable
human cost. Today, many military
strategists believe we are in the
initial stages of a historic revolution in military affairs, or RMA,
centered on the fusion of sophisticated remote-sensing systems with
2

extremely lethal, usually standoff,

precision-strike weapons systems
and automation-assisted systems
of command, control and communications, or C3.2 This fusion is
expected to allow smaller military
forces to produce rapid, decisive
results through synchronized,
near-simultaneous
operations
throughout the breadth and depth
of a theater of war.3
The implications and possible
impacts of the RMA are important
to conventional and special-operations forces alike. Although most
thinking about the RMA is focused
on conventional, combined-arms
warfare, the technology, the organization, and the techniques spawned
by the RMA may also apply to conflict short of war, thus offering us
the opportunity to transcend past
frustrations and indecisiveness.
Feasibility is always a prime factor
in strategic decision-making, and
the RMA appears to greatly expand
the realm of feasibility.
Applying new technology as
rapidly as possible is thus alluring,
but silver bullets should always
be approached with caution. It is
easy to be awed by the potential of
the RMA and to overlook its hidden
costs and unintended side effects.
Unlike the architects of the Man-

hattan Project, current American

strategists are not forced to rush
headlong into the development and
the application of new military
technology. No immediate strategic
threat is forcing haste, so we can
carefully weigh the benefits and
the risks of applying the RMA to
conflict short of war. Once this is
done, hidden costs and unintended
side effects will become stark.

Benefits
At first glance, the benefits of
applying emerging technology to
conflict short of war seem
immense. For example, when used
for attacks or raids during crises,
future autonomous, wide-ranging,
high-speed information-collecting
devices capable of on-board processing will identify precise targets.
Interactive simulations and virtual-reality devices will be used to
train the forces and to rehearse
strikes. Automation-assisted C3
systems will synchronize and control lethal, standoff, precision-guided weapons systems in near-simultaneous attacks.4 In fact, information technology may conceal an
intent to strike and, later, provide
evidence of a successful strike.5
In noncombatant evacuation
Special Warfare

operations, or NEOs, every American at risk could be equipped with

an electronic individual positionlocator device, or IPLD. The IPLD
could also act as a form of identification, provided U.S. military personnel are equipped with appropriate challenge-and-response devices.
Such a device might permit NEO
notification to be performed covertly. Unmanned aerial vehicles, or
UAVs, would be able to conduct
rapid reconnaissance of possible
evacuation routes and identify
threats during the evacuation. Via
scrambled TV and radio signals,
high-altitude, long-endurance UAVs
could provide NEO notification to
Americans on the ground.6 When an
NEO requires combat action, standoff, precision-strike weapons systems could allow small military
teams to accomplish missions which
today require companies or even
battalions.7
Emerging technology may also
improve antiterrorism operations.
Cutting-edge sensors and robotic
guard systems may make both military and commercial installations
more difficult to penetrate.
Advances in electronics and sensors and, even more importantly,
the ability to fuse data through
automation and improved organization may provide quick, precise
intelligence. New computer software, according to Alvin and Heidi
Toffler, could discover and expose
critical associations that would
otherwise go undetected.8 If the
Army develops an aerial capability
of broadcasting and altering television signals, a key and essential
weapon media coverage could
be removed from the terrorist arsenal.9 Finally, nonlethal weapons
may make it possible to disable
and capture terrorists or to glue
incoming car bombs to the street.
At least one analyst has noted
the feasibility of using soft kill
weapons (specifically, high-energy,
January 1996

radio-frequency guns and electromagnetic-pulse transformer bombs)

to interdict narcotrafficking flights
by damaging or destroying their
avionics equipment.10 Narcotraffickers tend to rely on radios, cellular telephones, fax machines and
computers, all of which are vulnerable to electronic intelligence-gathering and disruption. For example,
remote intrusive monitoring of
financial computer networks of offshore banks could identify deposits
associated with money laundering.

Although most thinking

about the RMA is focused on conventional,
combined-arms warfare,
the technology, the
organization, and the
techniques spawned by
the RMA may also apply
to conflict short of war,
thus offering us the
opportunity to transcend past frustrations
and indecisiveness.
Then such accounts could be electronically emptied.
Because interdicting narcotrafficking is similar to locating a military opponents reconnaissance
platforms, a military that has the
capability of collecting more and
more data about a battlefield, knitting a finer and finer mesh to catch
smaller and stealthier objects,
could pinpoint intruders inside U.S.
territory.11 Because existing radar
nets can identify aircraft attempting low-altitude entry into the U.S.,
a favored technique of drug smugglers is to transfer their contraband
from planes to speedboats offshore.

Tracking and stopping high-speed

small craft in coastal waters is difficult today, but it could become
routine with projected advances in
electronic sensors, directed-energy
weapons and standoff, precision
conventional munitions. Drugs
smuggled aboard commercial carriers might be interdicted by hosts of
miniaturized, remote-controlled,
robotic detectors capable of rapid
stem-to-stern searches.12
Destroying narcotics at the
source is currently a resourceintensive activity involving searchand-destroy operations or largescale spraying of ecologically damaging herbicides. In the future, it
might be performed by miniature,
self-mobile, biomechanical bugs,
delivered by aerial dispensers, that
would seek out and kill or modify
narcotic-producing plants.13 Alternatively, information-warfare systems might influence the behavior
of populations by convincing citizens to stop buying drugs and to
turn in traffickers.
Such behavior modification is a
key component of both peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Softkill systems also can play a key
role. For example, according to one
assessment, biotechnical antimaterial agents could disable
propulsion systems (by attacking
fuel and lubricants or clogging airways and critical passages), change
the characteristics of soil or vegetation (to deny terrain to vehicles
and troops), or degrade warfighting
material (particularly those with
organic components).14
Advances in electronics and
robotics could also prove useful in
peace operations. Commanders
would be able to separate forces by
means of a no-mans land populated by either remote-sensing
devices or robotic patrols and
enforced with standoff, precisionstrike weapons. Such technology
would reduce peacekeeper casual3

ties and improve the chances that

the peacekeeping force would
remain long enough for a political
resolution of the conflict.
Emerging technologies can also
assist in insurgency and counterinsurgency. Simulator training
devices can contribute to force
development and partially compensate for the difficulties insurgents
face in performing field training.
UAVs could be used for psychological operations aimed at mobilizing
support and enhancing the legitimacy of the insurgents. Stealth
vehicles could be used for insertions. Biotechnical antimaterial
agents could be used for sabotage.
And the U.S.s extensive sensor and
collector network can provide intelligence support.
Greatly improved intelligencegathering and fusion is a primary
component of the RMA, and proposed information-warfare capabilities might be ideally suited for
insurgency and counterinsurgency in developing desired emotions, attitudes or behavior. 15
Standoff weapons could interdict
outside support to insurgents
without requiring a U.S. presence.
Such interdiction could help a
beleaguered regime maintain
legitimacy.

Hidden costs
The image of decisive, relatively
low-cost American engagement in
conflict short of war, brought about
by technology, is alluring. It is also
unrealistic. Before embarking on
any attempts to apply the RMA to
conflict short of war, American policy-makers and strategists must
consider the dark side of technology: the hidden costs and the unintended side effects. What follows is
a hypothetical scenario a history of the application of the RMA to
conflict short of war, written in the
year 2010. It is not a prediction. It
4

is certainly not a preference. But it

is a possibility.
The first question is, What led
American leaders and nationalsecurity professionals to apply the
revolution in military affairs to
conflict short of war?
Most often, a revolution in military affairs occurs in response to
defeat or to a perception of rising
threat. Napoleon led an undrilled
army stripped of most of its veteran
officers against a host of enemies;
the architects of the blitzkrieg all

The image of decisive,

relatively low-cost American engagement in conflict short of war, brought
about by technology, is
alluring. It is also unrealistic. Before embarking
on any attempts to apply
the RMA to conflict short
of war, American policymakers and strategists
must consider the dark
side of technology: the
hidden costs and the
unintended side effects.
had first-hand experience of bitter
military defeat. Likewise, the RMA
of the 2000s was sparked by a series
of fiascoes in the mid-1990s.
First was the emergence of what
became known as third-wave terrorism. Recognizing the strategic
bankruptcy of old-fashioned hijacking, kidnapping, assassination
and bombing, terrorists rapidly
adapted state-of-the-art technology
to their sinister ends. Within Third
World countries, they developed
the means of identifying and

killing American businessmen,

diplomats and military advisers
at will, and of disrupting international air traffic and electronic
communications in and out of
their countries. Even more damaging was the ability of the terrorists
to carry the war to its source in
the U.S. Biotechnology and information warfare, especially sabotage of communications and computer networks, replaced AK-47s
and SEMTEX as the preferred
tools of terrorism. The new postMafia generation of silicon criminals provided models and even
mentors for third-wave terrorists.
At about the same time, the U.S.
military became embroiled in several horrific ethnic struggles. Our
involvement usually began as a
multinational peacekeeping or
peace-enforcement operation, but it
rapidly turned violent when American forces were killed or held
hostage. The usual response to the
first few attacks on Americans was
to send in reinforcements, thus
placing U.S. prestige on the line.
Since our strategy was contingent
on global leadership, we were
aware of the political damage that
would result from our being
forcibly expelled from a Third
World country, and we thus doggedly stayed the course until domestic
pressure forced withdrawal. On the
ground, enemies would not fight
our magnificent military forces
directly, but relied instead on
mines, assassinations and terror
bombings.
The costs of these imbroglios were
immense. In the U.S., a bitter dispute
broke out between isolationists and
supporters of multinational peace
operations. Domestic political acrimony was not the only long-term cost
of these operations: Many of our
troops assigned to operations in tropical areas came home with new
resilient diseases that gained a
foothold in the U.S. Debate was fierce
Special Warfare

over the new law requiring long-term

quarantine of troops returning from
Third World operations.
American efforts at counterinsurgency during the mid-1990s were
no more successful. Whether facing
commercial insurgents, such as
narcotraffickers, or spiritual insurgents attempting to forge new systems of identity and personal
meaning in their nations, we found
that our allies were corrupt, penetrated by enemy agents, and unable
to ameliorate the severe political,
economic and social problems that
had given rise to insurgency. When
a number of these allied governments collapsed, we were privately
relieved but nonetheless aware of
the precipitous decline in our prestige. At times, the U.S. tottered dangerously close to being the poor,
pitiful giant Richard Nixon had
warned against.
In areas where the U.S. was not
militarily involved, the major
trends of the 1990s were the disintegration of nations, ungovernability, ecological decay and persistent
conflict. Much of this had a direct
impact on the U.S., whether by generating waves of desperate immigrants, by inspiring terrorists frustrated by our failure to solve their
nations problems, by creating
health and ecological problems
which infiltrated the continental
U.S., or by increasing divisiveness
in the robustly multicultural American polity.
This series of fiascoes led a small
number of American political leaders, senior military officers and
national-security experts to conclude that a revolution was needed
in our approach to conflict short of
war. They held the Vietnaminspired doctrine of the 1980s and
1990s directly responsible for these
disasters. Only radical innovation,
they concluded, could renew U.S.
strategy and avoid a slide into global irrelevance. Nearly everyone
January 1996

agreed that the old strategic framework that coalesced in the 1960s
was bankrupt. This thinking,
derived from the Marshall Plan,
sought to use American aid and
advice to ameliorate the root causes of conflict in the Third World
and to build effective, legitimate
governments. By the 1990s this was
impossible or, at least, not worth the
costs. Few, if any, Third World governments had the inherent capability to become stable and legitimate,
even with outside assistance.

Dynamic defense
The revolutionaries first task
was to recruit proselytes throughout the government and the national-security community. Initially the
revolutionaries, who called their
new strategic concept dynamic
defense, were opposed by isolationists who felt that new technology
should be used simply to build an
impenetrable electronic and physical barrier around the U.S. Following the presidential election of
2000, the revolutionaries convinced
the president-elect that dynamic
defense was both feasible and effective a task made easier by the
president-elects background as a
pioneering entrepreneur in the computer-generated,
computer-controlled perception-molding systems developed by the advertising
industry. The president was thus
amenable to the use of the sort of
psychotechnology that formed the
core of the RMA in conflict short of
war.

Reorganization
The first step in implementing
dynamic defense was to reshape
the national-security organization
and its underlying attitudes and
values. Technology provided opportunity; only intellectual change
could consolidate it. With the full
and active support of the presi-

dent, the revolutionaries reorganized the American national-security system to make maximum use of
emerging technology and new
ideas. This process loosely reflected
the earlier revolution in the world
of business and sought to make the
U.S. national-security organization more flexible and capable of a
quicker reaction to shifts in the
global security environment.
The old Cold War structures
Department of Defense, Department
of State, Central Intelligence
Agency, National Security Council,
and others were replaced by two
organizations. The Conflict Preemption Agency controlled all U.S.
actions designed to prevent conflict,
including economic-assistance programs and peacetime diplomacy.
The Conflict Containment Agency
was responsible for containing conflict by orchestrating sanctions,
quarantines and embargoes and by
building multinational coalitions
and dealing with conflict short of
war. It integrated the military, the
civilian law enforcement, the diplomatic corps, and the organizations
responsible for gathering and analyzing intelligence.
Because so many of the conflicts
faced by the U.S. were gray area
threats falling somewhere between
traditional military problems and
traditional law-enforcement problems, the organizational division
between the military and lawenforcement was abolished. Moreover, many aspects of national security were civilianized or subcontracted to save costs.16
One of the most difficult dimensions of the reorganization was
altering the dominant ethos of the
armed forces. As technology
changed the way force was applied,
traits such as personal courage,
face-to-face
leadership
and
warfighter mentality became
irrelevant. Technological proficiency became the prime criterion for
5

advancement within the military.

Meanwhile, the officer corps began
to consider research universities
such as Cal Tech and MIT as its
breeding ground rather than the
increasingly archaic institutions
such as West Point and Annapolis.
The most common military
career track alternated assignments in national security with
ones in business and science. Since
physical endurance was not particularly important, military careers
no longer ended after 20 or 30
years. In fact, soldiers and officers
were given few responsibilities
until the 20th year of their careers.
As proposed by Carl Builder, the
Army was organized into highly
specialized units permanently associated with a territorial franchise.17
Careers were within one of these
units, thus allowing all soldiers
and officers to develop the sort of
language and cultural abilities previously limited to Special Forces
and foreign-area officers.

New values
One of the turning points of the
revolution came when its leaders
convinced the president and key
members of Congress that traditional American ethics were a
major hindrance to the RMA. This
was crucial the revolutionaries
and their allies then crafted the
appropriate attitudinal vessel for
the RMA. Through persistent
efforts and sophisticated domestic
consciousness-raising, old-fashioned notions of personal privacy
and national sovereignty changed.
This change came relatively easily,
since frustration with domestic
crime had already begun to alter
attitudes and values. In fact, the
RMA in conflict short of war was,
in many ways, a spinoff of the
domestic war on drugs and crime
of the late 1990s, when the military, as predicted by William
6

Mendel in 1994, became heavily

involved in supporting domestic
law enforcement.18 The changes in
American values which accompanied that struggle were easily
translated to the national-security
arena. Once the norms concerning
personal privacy changed, law
soon followed.
Old-fashioned ideas about
information control and scientific
inquiry also changed. Preventing
enemies (or potential enemies)
from responding to our technolog-

One of the turning points

of the revolution came
when its leaders convinced the president and
key members of Congress that traditional
American ethics were a
major hindrance to the
RMA. Through persistent
efforts
and
sophisticated domestic
consciousness-raising,
old-fashioned notions of
personal privacy and
national
sovereignty
changed.
ical advantages became a prime
objective of U.S. national-security
strategy. The government monitored and controlled the number
of foreign students attending
American universities. It also
monitored and controlled exchanges of information within the
global scientific and business
communities and, when necessary,
protected valuable information
through outright deception. The
national-security community co-

operated with business on counterespionage, providing training,

advice and equipment.

Improved technology
Once values had changed, technology then opened the door to profound innovation. Vast improvements in surveillance systems and
information processing made it
possible to monitor a large number
of enemies and potential enemies.
In the pre-RMA days, psychological
operations and psychological warfare were primitive. As PSYOP and
PSYWAR advanced into the electronic and bioelectronic era, we had
to rethink our ethical prohibitions
against manipulating the minds of
enemies and potential enemies,
both international and domestic.
Sometimes the revolutionaries
found it necessary to stoke the
development of technology designed
specifically for conflict short of war.
Whenever possible, profitability
was used to encourage private and
quasi-private enterprises to develop
appropriate technology. For example, much of the lucrative technology of surveillance, intelligence-collection and attitude manipulation
used to solve the domestic crime
problem was easily adapted to conflict short of war. The same held for
new weapons, especially nonlethal
biological ones, and advanced psychotechnology. Only when there
was absolutely no expectation of
profit did the government directly
sponsor the research of cutting-edge
technology, often with funds freed
by disbanding what were seen as
increasingly irrelevant conventional military forces.
All of this reorganization and
technological development was
simply the preface to the full flowering of the RMA. American leaders
popularized a new, more inclusive
concept of national security. No distinction legal or otherwise
Special Warfare

was drawn between internal and

external threats. In the interdependent 21st-century world, such a
differentiation was dangerously
nostalgic. The new concept of security also included ecological, public-health, electronic, psychological
and economic threats. Illegal immigrants carrying resistant strains of
disease were considered every bit as
dangerous as enemy soldiers.
Actions that damaged the global
ecology, even if they occurred outside the nominal borders of the
U.S., were seen as security threats
that should be stopped, by force if
necessary. Computer hackers were
enemies. Finally, external manipulation of the American public psychology was defined as a security
threat.

Security strategy
The actual strategy built on the
RMA was divided into three tracks:
The first track sought to perpetuate
the revolution. Internally, it institutionalized the organizational and
attitudinal changes that made the
revolution possible, and it pursued
future breakthroughs in conjunction with business, the scientific
community and local law-enforcement agencies the troika of 21stcentury security. Externally, it
actively sought to delay or prevent
counterresponses by controlling
information and by using wellorchestrated deception.
The second track consisted of
offensive action. Our preference was
pre-emption: In a dangerous world,
we preferred to kill terrorists before
they could damage the ecology or
strike at the U.S. While Americans
had long supported this idea in theory, the RMA allowed us to actually
do it with minimal risk, just as the
Industrial Revolution allowed 19thcentury strategists to build the massive militaries they had long
desired. If regional conflicts
January 1996

whether ethnic, racial, religious or

economic did not damage the
global ecology or appear likely to
bring disease or violence to the U.S.,
they were ignored. When conflicts
seemed likely to generate direct
challenges, the U.S. did not attempt
ultimate resolution, but rather only
to pre-empt and disrupt whatever
aspect of the conflict seemed likely
to endanger us. In the quest for
strategic economy, pre-emption was
the byword.
Since the RMA made pre-emption quick, covert, usually successful and politically acceptable, the
U.S. gradually abandoned collective efforts. Nearly all of our allies,
with their old-fashioned, pre-RMA
militaries, proved more an encumbrance than a help. When pre-emption failed, the U.S. sought passive
containment, which included isolation and quarantines, or active containment, in which strikes (electronic, psychological or physical)
were used to limit the spread of the
deleterious effects of a conflict. If
opponents had the ability to harm
the U.S., the military pre-emptively
destroyed their capabilities.
The third track of the strategy
was defensive, and it included
missile defense, cyberspace defense
and rigid immigration control.

Operation Cerberus
By 2010, the RMA had accomplished its desired objectives. Most
of the time, we prevented Third
World conflict from directly touching our shores. Probably the finest
hour of the new warriors was the
Cuban pre-emption of 2005
Operation Cerberus. This was so
smooth, so effective, that it warrants explanation. Following the
overthrow of Fidel Castro in the
late 1990s by a popular revolt, an
elected government of national
unity quickly proved unable to
engineer massive economic and eco-

logical reconstruction of the country or to build a stable democracy.

Frequent seizures of emergency
powers and fraudulent elections
were the rule. Within a few years,
nostalgia for the stability of the old
regime gave rise to an armed insurgency; most of the front-line rebels
were former members of Castros
military and security forces. The
U.S. refused to support the corrupt
and inept regime directly, but it recognized that the conflict required
our attention.
The operation officially began
when the president transferred the
Cuban portfolio from the Conflict
Pre-emption Agency to the Conflict
Containment Agency. An existing
contingency plan, along with its
implementing software, provided
the framework for quick action.
Immediately, all electronic communication in and out of Cuba was
surreptitiously transferred to the
national security filter at Fort
Meade, which could monitor, control and, when necessary, manipulate private, commercial and government signals. Potential or possible supporters of the insurgency
around the world were identified
through the Comprehensive Interagency Integrated Database. Supporters were categorized as potential or active, and sophisticated,
computerized personality simulations were used to develop, tailor
and focus psychological campaigns
for each category.
Individuals and organizations
with active predilections to support
the insurgency were targets of an
elaborate global ruse using computer communications networks and
appeals by a computer-generated
insurgent leader. Real insurgent
leaders who could be identified
were left in place in order to develop a sophisticated computer analysis of their contacts. Internecine
conflict within the insurgent elite
was engineered using psychotech7

nology. Psychological operations

included traditional propaganda
as well as more aggressive steps
such as drug-assisted subliminal
conditioning. At the same time,
Cubans in the U.S. and around the
world were assigned maximumsurveillance status, and their physical presence and communications
webs were monitored. As a result,
several attempts to establish terrorist cells in the U.S. were thwarted.
Within Cuba, fighting was widespread. Several acts of industrial
and ecological terrorism led to the
outbreak of disease. U.S. forces
under the command of the Conflict
Containment Agency helped control
the spread of the diseases. They
lowered their own chances of
becoming infected by providing
standoff and robotic medical and
humanitarian relief. Virtually all
food supplies contained long-lasting sedatives that calmed local passions and led to an immediate
decline in anti-regime activity.
Where there were no direct U.S.
relief efforts, cruise missiles were
used to disperse sedatives. In areas
thought to have high instances of
insurgent activity, the inhabitants
received increased dosages.
Since all Americans in Cuba had
been bioelectrically tagged and
monitored during the initial stages
of the conflict, the NEO went
smoothly, including the mandatory
health screening of all those returning to the U.S. Coast Guard aircraft
and hovercraft stanched the flow of
illegal refugees. The attitude-shaping campaigns aimed at the American public, the global public and
the Cuban people went quite well,
including those which featured
computer-generated broadcasts by
insurgent leaders morphing
in which the leaders were shown as
disoriented and psychotic. Subliminal messages surreptitiously integrated into Cuban television transmissions were also helpful.19 In
8

fact, the efforts were so successful

that there were only a few instances
of the need for covert, standoff military strikes when insurgent targets
arose and government forces
seemed on the verge of defeat. U.S.
strike forces also attacked neutral
targets in support of the psychological campaign, while computer-generated insurgent leaders claimed
credit for the raids. At times, even
the raids themselves were computer-invented re-creations. (These

Information warfare and

precise, standoff strikes
might allow non-SOF
military units to take on
SOF political and strategic characteristics. If so,
the nation might no
longer require separate
and distinct specialoperations forces. Like
the horse cavalry, SOF
could become an honored but obsolete legacy of the past.
were a specialty of the Armys elite
Sun Tzu Battalion.)
Eventually it all worked. The
insurgents were discredited, and
their war faded to a simmering
conflict unlikely to threaten the
U.S. directly. Even the relatively
unimportant criticism from domestic political groups was stilled
when the president temporarily
raised the quota of Cuban orphans
eligible for adoption in the U.S.
Unfortunately, there are growing
signs in 2010 that the great advantages brought by the RMA might be
eroding. With a decade in which to
adapt, many opponents of the U.S.

both state and nonstate actors are

themselves bending technology to
their ends. While none of our enemies
can match the prowess of American
forces across the board, indications
are that they intend to concentrate on
one potential weakness of our forces.
The RMA has amplified our distaste
for death, a liability our enemies initially disdained but now are learning to manipulate in simple, low-tech
ways. Even if they do not defeat us,
our enemies might deny us success
by increasing the human costs of
U.S. intervention.
In 2010, a decade of constant
success in counterterrorism was
marred by several dramatic failures. The post-attack environmental cleanup and reconstruction of
St. Louis will take decades. Many of
the difficult-to-detect drugs and
psychotechnology that were developed for use in conflict short of war
have appeared on the domestic
black market and, increasingly, in
American schools and workplaces.
Perhaps most important, Americans are beginning to question the
economic, human and ethical costs
of our new strategy. A political
movement called the New Humanitarianism is growing, especially
among Americans of non-European
descent, and it seems likely to play a
major role in the presidential election of 2012. There are even rumblings of discontent within the
national-security community as the
full meaning of the revolution
becomes clear. Since the distinction
between the military and nonmilitary components of our national
security community has eroded,
many of those notionally in the military service have come to feel
unbound by traditional concepts of
civil-military relations. This group
has founded a new political party
the Eagle Movement which is
beginning to exert great pressure on
the traditional political parties for
inclusion in national policy-makSpecial Warfare

ing. The traditional parties are, to

put it lightly, intimidated by the
Eagle Movement and seem inclined
to accept its demands.
It will be up to the historians and
the philosophers of the future to
assess the consequences of applying
the RMA to conflict short of war. No
one can predict whether they will
laud or condemn it.

Implications
The RMA will force all segments
of the U.S. Army to re-examine
their organization, methods, ethos
and purpose. The Army must both
shape the RMA and respond to it.
This certainly holds true for special-operations forces. So far, the
RMA has had the greatest impact
on conventional forces; the major
changes for SOF are still to come.
In the broadest sense, the RMA
will hold three alternatives for special-operations forces. In the first
and least radical alternative, SOF
missions and techniques will
remain constant while new technology improves mobility, communications and sustainability. In this
scenario, SOF would essentially
continue to do what they are doing
now, with incremental improvements in capabilities. Training and
organization would thus need little
change.
A second alternative entails
more fundamental change. Some
SOF missions such as direct action,
special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare and psychological
operations would continue along
their present trajectories, with new
technology grafted on. The
required skills would not change
much, but they would expand. For
instance, as computers become
weapons, Special Forces would
need expertise in a range of computer types just as they currently
master an array of traditional
small arms. By contrast, missions
January 1996

such as foreign internal defense

could undergo substantial transformation: Instead of training
friendly forces in basic military
skills, Special Forces would train
them in information warfare. The
laptop computer, rather than the
AK-47, M-16 or RPG, could become
the first-line weapon for both
insurgents and counterinsurgents.
Special Forces would have to develop methods for teaching information warfare across cultural obstacles just as they currently do to
bridge those obstacles in teaching
basic military skills.
The third alternative would be
the most radical. One of the reasons SOF exist is to allow the U.S.
to affect the outcome of crises or
conflicts with minimum political
risks and costs. SOF have strategic
value because they can operate
with less physical and political
damage than conventional Army
units can. But if the prophets of the
RMA prove accurate, technology
might allow the U.S. to shape crises
and conflicts from far away, using
information warfare and standoff,
precision strikes. If this comes to
pass, there may be no need to have
SOF on the ground. In the hypothetical Operation Cerberus, U.S.
national interests were promoted
without the deployment of forces to
Cuba. Information warfare and
standoff, precision strikes might
thus allow non-SOF military units
to take on SOF political and strategic characteristics. If so, the nation
might no longer require separate
and distinct special-operations
forces. Like the horse cavalry, SOF
could become an honored but obsolete legacy of the past.
It is not clear whether the revolution in military affairs will
advance to that point. Certainly no
one would argue that the RMA in
its current state suggests that
Army SOF should prepare to close
shop in the current security

environment, they are more necessary than ever before. But the fact
remains that the RMA will have a
tremendous impact on SOF. For
this reason, it is important that
SOF use their immense intellectual resources to understand the
process and to master the challenges of the revolutionary change
in military affairs.

Steven Metz is the

Henry L. Stimson
Professor of Military
Studies at the U.S.
Army War College. A
faculty member of the
colleges
Strategic
Studies Institute since 1993, he has
also served on the faculty of the Air
War College, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
and several universities. He is the
author of more than 50 articles and
monographs on world politics,
national security affairs and military science. He holds a B.A. and an
M.A. in international studies from
the University of South Carolina
and a Ph.D. in political science
from the Johns Hopkins University.
Lieutenant Colonel
James Kievit is a
strategic
research
analyst at the Strategic Studies Institute,
U.S. Army War College. Commissioned
in the Corps of Engineers, Kievit
has served in the 1st Cavalry Division, the 7th Engineer Brigade and
the 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized). He has also served as an
assistant professor of history at the
U.S. Military Academy and as a
force-structure analyst and study
director at the U.S. Army Concepts
Analysis Agency. He holds a B.S.
from the U.S. Military Academy, an
M.M.A.S. from the School of
Advanced Military Studies of the
9

U.S. Army Command and General

Staff College, and an M.A. in history and an M.S.E. in construction
management from the University of
Michigan.
Notes:
1 This essay is based on Steven Metz and
James Kievit, The Revolution in Military
Affairs and Conflict Short of War (Carlisle
Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College,
Strategic Studies Institute, 1994).
2 See, for example, reports of the roundtables on the revolution in military affairs
held for the Army, Air Force and Navy by
Science Applications International Corporation of McLean, Va.; Michael J. Mazarr et
al., The Military Technical Revolution, Final
Report of a CSIS Study, Washington, D.C.:
CSIS, March 1993; and Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment, a report
prepared for the Office of the Secretary of
Defense/Net Assessment, July 1992.
3 See, for example, Gordon R. Sullivan
and James M. Dubik, Land Warfare in the
21st Century (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S.
Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1993).
4 These are the capabilities identified as
essential to future reconnaissance, surveillance and target-acquisition technologies in
the final draft of Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-xx, Concept
for Information Operations (Fort Monroe,
Va.: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 5 May 1994), p. 4-7.
5 The Armys most recent proposed doctrine in regard to information operations
merely states: The Army supports the timely and accurate release of information to the
media as well as open and independent
reporting as the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations. TRADOC
Pamphlet 525-xx, p. 2-9.
6 National Research Council, STAR 21
(Strategic Technologies for the Army of the
Twenty-First Century), Airborne Systems
(Washington, D.C.: National Academy
Press, 1993), pp. 49-55. Also Chuck de Caro,
Sats, Lies, and Video-Rape: The Soft War
Handbook, unpublished paper, Aerobureau
Corporation, 1994.
7 See, for example, the discussion in
National Research Council, STAR 21, Airborne Systems, p. 19.
8 Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and AntiWar: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1993),
p. 157.
9 De Caro, Sats, Lies, and Video-Rape,
pp. 32-34.

10

10 Winn Schwartau, Information Warfare:

Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway
(New York: Thunders Mouth, 1994), pp.
171-76. Note that de Caro defines soft war
as the hostile utilization of global television.
Soft kill is used here in a more generic
sense of any system designed to achieve its
effect without causing harm to human
beings. See National Research Council,
STAR 21, Technology Forecast Assessments
(Washington, D.C.: National Academy
Press, 1993), p. 314.
11 Martin C. Libicki, The Mesh and the
Net: Speculations on Armed Conflict in a
Time of Free Silicon (Washington, D.C.:
National Defense University, Institute for
National Strategic Studies, March 1994),
p. 24. The utility of Libickis very interesting
analysis is limited by his failure to provide
supporting references.
12 For a brief description of very small
autonomous systems, see Richard O. Hundley and Eugene C. Gritton, Future Technology-Driven Revolutions in Military Operations. Results of a Workshop (Santa Monica,
Calif.: RAND Corporation, November 1993),
pp. 12-37.
13 Possible advances in biotechnology are
outlined in STAR 21, Technology Forecast
Assessments, pp. 314-46.
14 National Research Council, STAR 21,
Technology Forecast Assessment, p. 346.
15 Army Field Manual 100-20/Air Force
Pamphlet 3-20, Military Operations in Low
Intensity Conflict (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Departments of the Army and the
Air Force, 5 December 1990), p. 2-22.
16 Michael Mazarr, an early analyst of the
revolution in military affairs, considered
civilianization of war one of the principles
of the RMA. See The Revolution in Military
Affairs: A Framework for Defense Planning, a paper presented at the U.S. Army
War College Fifth Annual Conference on
Strategy, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., April 1994,
pp. 31-34.
17 Carl Builder, Information Technologies
and the Future of Conflict, briefing to the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations and Low Intensity
Conflict, 23 March 1994.
18 William W. Mendel, The Cold War
Returns, Military Review, 74, 5 (May 1994):
69-71.
19 This is described in Rod Paschall, LIC
2010: Special Operations and Unconventional Warfare in the Next Century (Washington, D.C.: Brasseys, 1990), pp. 56-57.

Special Warfare

Straddling the Cultural Gaps: Special Forces

in the Indirect Action Environment
by Larry Cable

uring their nearly 45 years of existence, U.S. Army Special Forces have
successfully undertaken a number of
missions for which they were never originally intended, while never executing the
mission for which they were designed. Paradoxically, the requirements of the original
mission have made them successful in all
others. Considering that Special Forces
comprise one of the most competent assets
available to U.S. decision-makers contemplating intervention in operations other
than war, it is critical that we understand
this apparent contradiction.
Special Forces were created in 1952 to
serve as a cadre for World War II-style
partisan forces operating in an area occupied by a conventional opponent the
classic unconventional-warfare mission.
SF have never executed the UW mission,
and they never could have, given the
politico-military realities that have surrounded conventional, interstate warfare
since 1945. SF continue to train for UW,
even though UW remains a politico-military mission impossible, a fact underscored by the decision during the Persian
Gulf War not to provide unconventionalwarfare assistance to the Kuwaiti resistance movement.
One reason for our continued emphasis
on UW is that a UW capability also provides the capability for indirect action,
which allows policy-makers to pursue
American interests using indigenous

January 1996

assets as a multiplier of American forces.

As expressed in Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than
War, contemporary American politico-military doctrine envisions and describes a
wide variety of missions in military operations other than war, or MOOTW. These
missions include support to counterinsurgency, peacekeeping and humanitarianrelief operations. Many of these missions
are conditional, at least implicitly, upon the
use of American troops in indirect-action
roles.
Implicit, although unfortunately not
explicit in contemporary doctrine, is the context surrounding and joining many of these
MOOTW missions: domestic political turbulence involving an armed component or
more precisely, insurgency, which we can
define as the armed expression of organic,
internal and political disaffiliation. Insurgency may be either offensive (revolutionary
in nature) or defensive (a separatist or
autonomous movement).

Insurgency
An examination of the several hundred
insurgencies that have occurred over the
past 250 years demonstrates a number of
crucial lessons regarding the nature of
insurgency and the relationship between
the indigenous contestants and any external interveners a relationship of particular concern to American forces, no matter
11

what their specific mission or size.

First and most important, the internal
contestants establish the political goals and
define victory and defeat. They also establish the theory of victory, which includes the
political and military components that are
relevant to the cultural, social, political and
historical specifics that have resulted in
war. The intervening force never defines the
crucial rules of the game, but rather must
accept those which have already been established by the indigenous belligerents.
Second, while all warfare is political,
insurgency is purely a contest of political
will. Military operations are relevant only
insofar as they have a direct, substantial
and measurable impact upon the political
will of the contestants and upon the
uncommitted majority of the population.
Thus, while the clich firepower kills is
true, it is impossible to kill ones way to victory in an insurgent environment.
Third, the terrain that matters in internal war is the human terrain; specifically,
the mind of every individual member of the
society involved in the turbulence.
Fourth, every player, including any
external intervener, has the same two tools
at his disposal in the pursuit of authority

over the population: the enhanced popular

perception of legitimacy and the credible
capacity to coerce.
The popular perception of legitimacy can
be used to change the beliefs, affiliations
and loyalties of a people. In this context,
legitimacy simply means the generally
acknowledged right to exercise authority.
Legitimacy has two forms: existential and
functional. Existential legitimacy is based
on ethnolinguistic, religious, class or historical relationships that grant the right to
exercise authority over an individual or a
constituency. Functional legitimacy comes
from the capacity to address the fears,
needs, hopes and aspirations of a people.
Mechanisms that seek to enhance popular
perceptions of legitimacy should be the
first resort of all contestants.
The second tool of authority is the credible capacity to coerce. The nature of coercion is never defined or established by the
doctrine or the intention of the inflictor,
but by the perceptions and the culturally
established standards of the recipient.
Contestants, particularly interveners, who
overlook this reality discover that their
intended coercion is both provocative and
counterproductive.

Special Forces soldiers at a

checkpoint during Operation Desert Storm. Although
they are trained in unconventional warfare, Special
Forces were not used in
that role during the Gulf
War.

Photo by Doug Wisnioski

12

Special Warfare

Insofar as the mechanisms by which

popular perceptions of legitimacy become
more effective, a contestant will need to
rely less upon a credible capacity to coerce,
and vice versa. Obviously, the specific
nature and the application of each of these
tools is defined culturally and historically
by the society undergoing turbulence. In
an internal war, the winner will be the
contestant with the better cultural and
historical appreciation of the nature and
the character of the two tools. This is no
less true for an intervener than for an
indigenous belligerent.

Intervention
The most effective and most efficient
interventionary actions occur before
social and political institutions have been
totally disrupted, or before so many people have died that the dead are dictating
policy. Fortunately, there is no such thing
as a surprise insurgency: Each one is preceded by years or decades (and occasionally, generations) of evolution along a welldelineated continuum. The development
process begins with latent political discontent and proceeds through clearly
identifiable stages of political movement,
political organization and organizational
radicalization. No great powers intelligence service will fail to recognize the
development of preinsurgent conditions,
nor will the fundamental driving force
behind the evolutionary process be
improperly appreciated. As a result, the
U.S. should never be unprepared for early
intervention in a developing insurgency.
The best intervention is undertaken by
the smallest possible forces. Small forces
are less likely to contribute to further disruption and turbulence. They are less likely to reinforce the insurgents message that
the status quo is illegitimate and dependent upon foreign support for its existence.
Small forces are also less likely to bring
political embarrassment to a presidential
administration or to the U.S. itself.
The forces of greatest utility to the U.S.
are those capable of indirect action of
guiding a host government or a host entity
in the development of mechanisms that
January 1996

enhance the popular perceptions of legitimacy as well as the mechanisms that are
credibly coercive. Such indirect action is
the key to timely and effective action, and
here lies the strength of Special Forces.

Cultural gaps
What does it take to become a specialist
in indirect action? Quite simply, it takes
the capability to effectively cross two major
cultural gaps. One of these gaps is obvious:
the gap that exists between the culture of
the U.S. and the culture of the host country.
The other gap is less obvious but more critical: the chasm that exists between a regu-

The forces of greatest utility to the U.S. are

those capable of indirect action of guiding
a host government or a host entity in the
development of mechanisms that enhance the
popular perceptions of legitimacy as well as
the mechanisms that are credibly coercive.
Such indirect action is the key to timely and
effective action, and here lies the strength of
Special Forces.
lar military force and irregular forces,
whether they are guerrillas, paramilitary
counterinsurgents or the standing armed
force of a developing nation.
Crossing the first cultural gap requires
more than simple linguistic familiarity.
As our Special Forces theorized in the
1950s and confirmed explicitly in Vietnam in the 1960s, crossing the cultural
gap requires a line of departure and a
point of arrival. The line of departure is
an understanding of what defines an
American not simply ones actions,
behaviors, belief structures or values, but
rather the bases for all the symptoms of
the fundamental American identity. People in all societies ultimately define
themselves not so much by language, ethnicity, religion, behavior, customs or values, as by something more basic and more
irrational: myths. Objectively, myths are
untrue, but subjectively, they are real and
13

A Special Forces sergeant

inspects the weapons of a
platoon of Mobile Strike
Force troops during the
Vietnam War.

Photo by James L. Ensign

powerful, having been passed from generation to generation through the process of
enculturation.
It is therefore basic that we understand
the fundamental defining mythology of
Americans. Portions of our mythology have
existed unchanged for more than 300
years: the shining city on the hill developing a perfect society and a government to
be emulated by all mankind; the requirement, established by God, that we sally
forth in a moral crusade to redeem
mankind from evil; and the view that time
is a commodity. However, some of our concepts have emerged during the last quarter
century for example, our concept of
14

death as an option that need not be exercised, provided that we jog, drink only mineral water and avoid cholesterol.
It is essential that we identify our American defining mythology; the mythology
that exists in involuntary constituencies,
such as those of a racial, gender or ethnoreligious nature, within the larger society;
and the mythology associated with membership in voluntary constituencies such as
the Army or Special Forces. American personnel became aware of this while working
in indirect-action advisory roles in the
Republic of Vietnam between 1956 and
1965.
After we have established the line of
Special Warfare

departure who we are and the concepts

that motivate us we establish the point
of arrival: the defining mythologies of our
counterparts and the society in which
they operate. Formal and informal
research, ranging from the study of
anthropological texts to hoisting a few
drinks with a counterpart, will enable
American advisers to understand the
defining mythologies of their counterparts
and adversaries. As a result, advisers will
be able to understand the precise nature
of the two tools of authority, their tactical
employment and their psychological and
political effectiveness.
Such thorough comprehension provides
the basis by which we can creatively
exploit differences and translate American ideas, techniques and tactics into
forms which are effective and appropriate
in the cultural and politico-psychological
contexts of the target audiences, whether
friendly, hostile or uncommitted. Only
through our creative understanding of
ourselves and of the human terrain upon
which we operate will we be able to harmonize U.S. policy dictates and interests
with the political imperatives that have
driven the host country to or over the
brink of insurgent warfare.
The second cultural gap exists between
members of a regular military service, as
perceived by Americans, and irregular
counterparts, whether they are guerrillas,
counterinsurgent paramilitary forces, or
members of a regular national force. From
an American perspective, regular military
forces have three salient characteristics:
They are rigorously apolitical, with a
total separation between political policy
formulation and nonpolitical policy
implementation.
Chains of command are fixed, rigid and
genuinely hierarchical, with well-understood, specified and firm areas of authority,
responsibility and accountability.
The actions of military personnel are
governed and controlled by external,
enforceable legal codes of conduct and
behavior.
Although we expect counterpart forces to
reflect these three characteristics, the reality may be quite different. The overwhelmJanuary 1996

ing majority of counterparts with whom

Americans have functioned do not reflect
or accept these characteristics. Irregulars,
including national forces in new or developing nations, are predominantly political
in nature. Insurgents and paramilitary
forces are politicians first, psychological
operators second, and fighters only as a
distant third. The active-duty regular
armies of many new or developing nations
are pre-eminently political institutions
with their own agendas, which may or may
not be connected with the political imperatives of the overall status quo.
Chains of command, especially those in
guerrilla forces and in irregular paramilitary forces, are loose, flexible and dynamic.
They are driven solely by the political relationships within their organization. This is
also often true when a country has a new
or developing national force, to the extent
that a nominal subordinate may in fact be
the superior because of the political relationships within and surrounding the
countrys army. Finally, external legal
codes that are enforceable without regard
to political imperatives or dynamics are
conspicuously absent within guerrilla
forces, irregular paramilitary forces and
regular military forces.
The fact that American forces rarely
work with counterparts who match our
expectations of regular military forces
presents a cultural gap of extraordinary
dimensions. In order to be mission-effective and successful, American forces may
have to ignore seemingly wholesale violations of the basic values of the American
military such as civilian supremacy,
apolitical soldiers and the majesty of the
law.
Special Forces personnel operating in
Tibet in the late 1950s and in Vietnam a
few years later recognized this basic cultural schism and suggested various ways
by which it might effectively be overcome.
One suggestion was that Americans resist
imposing their ideas of chain-of-command
integrity and legal accountability upon
counterpart forces, regardless of the
potential political embarrassment in the
event of inappropriate host-force behavior. Another suggestion was that Ameri15

cans should understand and manipulate

the fundamentally political nature of host
forces.

Capabilities
To achieve success in an indirect-action
environment, Special Forces must therefore be able to do all of the following:
Understand the fundamental American mythology.
Understand the defining mythologies
of the target society.
Recognize the fundamentally political
nature of the conflict and of the combatant
forces.
Refrain from imposing American

From the Special Forces Qualification

Course forward, SF training should focus
more upon cultural, political, psychological
and manipulative skills than upon small-unit
tactics, MOS qualification and advanced
technical skills. Training and doctrine must
reject the traditional, conventional American
understanding of war in favor of terms
more relevant to the environment presence, persistence and patience.
expectations of appropriate military organizations and behavior upon the counterpart forces.
Manipulate the cultural, political,
social and military myths and realities of
the human terrain, in the pursuit of U.S.
policy goals.
Straddle a set of cultural gaps in order
to think and understand within an indigenous cultural context, while never forgetting their American character and goals.
To achieve these capabilities, Special
Forces training and doctrine must recognize the nature of the indirect-action environment. Such recognition implies several
distinct requirements: First, we should
exploit the most potent intellectual force
multiplier available to Americans our
history.
16

SF soldiers should study the extensive

American experience in insurgency, counterinsurgency and peacekeeping, particularly those aspects which have involved
indirect-action forces. During the War of
Independence, the War Between the
States, the numerous Indian wars of the
19th century, the acquisition of the Philippines, the decades of intervention in the
Caribbean, and the several successful Cold
War interventionary operations, our nation
developed all the fundamental concepts,
principles and tactics of insurgency as well
as every major successful counterinsurgent
strategy. We wrote the book on the insurgent environment on five different occasions between the 1750s and the 1960s.
During the 20th century, the U.S. has had
extensive success using indirect-action
forces in nation-building, in foreign internal defense and in peacekeeping. Even during the Vietnam War, U.S. counterinsurgent and indirect-action activities enjoyed
significant successes, a fact often overlooked by those who dismiss Vietnam as a
morass of failure.
Special Forces soldiers should be taught
the importance of understand their own
defining mythologies as Americans, as
members of involuntary constituencies
within the heterogeneous American society, and as members of a voluntary constituency the Army. In the process, they
will understand the defining mythologies
of the host country in which they will be
operating.
Special Forces training must concentrate
on the nature of insurgency and indirect
action, both of which emphasize the political and psychological aspects while deemphasizing the purely military aspect. It
may be difficult for soldiers with conventional skills to understand this shift in
emphasis. But to develop an understanding of actions in an insurgent environment,
whether we are countering the insurgent,
assisting the insurgent or keeping peace in
a society wracked by insurgency, our soldiers must think like criminals, con men
and politicians.
Although these terms are not normally
thought of with approval by American Army
personnel, they best describe the mindset of
Special Warfare

the successful unconventional warrior.

From the Special Forces Qualification
Course forward, SF training should focus
more upon cultural, political, psychological
and manipulative skills than upon smallunit tactics, MOS qualification and
advanced technical skills. Training and doctrine must reject the traditional, conventional American understanding of war
which emphasizes high lethality, high fire
power, high mobility, and technological
sophistication in favor of terms more relevant to the environment presence, persistence and patience.
Presence. The nature of the environment, the nature of the forces and the
nature of the tools of legitimacy and coercion all require that Special Forces be present on the ground.
Persistence. Special Forces must also be
present over time, to develop not only the
requisite intelligence and rapport but also
the utterly essential perceived legitimacy.
Patience. Finally, Special Forces must be
patient with the inherent ambiguity, the
frustrations and the contradictions between
our cultural and military concepts and
those of our counterparts and of the human
terrain upon which we must operate.
SF senior leadership must be able to
provide appropriate guidance to unified
commands and to the national command
authority regarding the strengths and the
limitations of indirect action. The
strengths of indirect action are low visibility and a high likelihood of success; its
limitations are the requirements for
patience, the acceptance of the ambiguity
of the end state, and an understanding of
the process leading to the end state.
SF success in future indirect actions
will not require increased firepower or the
promise of technology, but a reliance on
the strengths of the past: SF doctrine,
selection and training that emphasize a
capacity to operate across cultural divides
in an unconventional environment. Ironically, the success that Special Forces have
enjoyed in the pursuit of missions that
were never originally envisioned, at the
expense of originally envisioned missions
that could never have been executed, has
been the flexibility, adaptability and ingeJanuary 1996

nuity of men who saw themselves as

unconventional warriors. These were warriors who could simultaneously exist in
two cultures and who could harmonize the
necessity of being con men, diplomats and
politicians with the necessity of being
elite military forces in the most challenging missions of the Cold War.

Larry Cable is an associate

professor of history at the
University of North Carolina-Wilmington. Prior to his
teaching career, he served 17
years with military and civilian components of the
national-security community, including 63
months in a variety of unconventional-warfare assignments in Southeast Asia. Cable
is also an adjunct professor of history at the
U.S. Air Force Special Operations School,
where he received the 1995 General James
Doolittle Award as educator of the year.
Cable regularly lectures at the JFK Special
Warfare Center and School; the Marine
Corps Amphibious Warfare School; the
Marine Corps Command and Staff College;
and the Marine War College, where he was
the 1995 visiting professor of military
affairs. He completed a Ph.D. with distinction at the University of Houston in 1984.
Cable is the author of three books: Conflict
of Myths: The Development of U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam
War; Unholy Grail: The U.S. and the Wars
in Vietnam, 1965-1968; and Self-Inflicted
Wound: The U.S., Indochina and Global
Policy, 1940-1975.

17

Army Special Operations Forces

and the Pacific Century
by Colonel Russell D. Howard and Major Mark A. Nelson

or nearly five decades, U.S. security

interests in the Asia-Pacific region
were a subset of the greater EastWest confrontation. Now that bipolar politics and Cold War tensions are a distant
memory, the U.S. still has a vital economic
interest in the region.
While the stability of Asia-Pacific states
and the drawdown of U.S. forces worldwide
have brought about a reduction of U.S. military forces in the region, U.S. Army specialoperations forces, or ARSOF, which include
Special Forces, Psychological Operations
and Civil Affairs, offer capabilities that are
ideally suited to current and future AsiaPacific operations. ARSOF missions in the
region may actually be increasing.
That the region is vitally important to
U.S. interests is clear. The region now
accounts for nearly a quarter of the gross
world product, or GWP. By the end of the
century, it will account for almost as much
of the GWP as Europe and North America
combined.1 U.S. trade with the Asia-Pacific
region was $344 billion in 1992, 51 percent
greater than our trade with Western
This article was originally presented at a
1994 conference hosted by Tufts Universitys Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
and USSOCOM. Papers from that conference have been collected and published by
the Fletcher School and USSOCOM as
Roles and Missions of Special Operations
Forces in the Aftermath of the Cold War.

18

Europe ($228 billion) and three times

greater than our trade with Latin America.2 In fact, more than 40 percent of all U.S.
trade is with Pacific Rim nations.

Concerns
Still, it may be too soon to feel confident that a Pacific Century is truly
under way.3 Of some concern is the fact
that defense spending in the region has
increased several nations are using
increased revenues to upgrade their
existing arms systems with new and second-hand arms that are being aggressively marketed by the U.S. and former Eastern-bloc states.4 Flash points remain, and
the resolution of long-standing rivalries,
territorial disputes and mutual suspicions may be a long time in coming.5 And
while the recent landmark agreement
between the U.S. and North Korea on the
future of Pyongyangs nuclear program
gives hope, optimists concede that North
Korea will pose a risk for much of the
next decade.
Possibly the major uncertainty in the
region is the Peoples Republic of China.
Home to one-fifth of the worlds population and second only to Russia in territory, the PRC could have the worlds largest
economy within a generation.6 Increased
defense spending, large military-force levels (three million) and saber rattling over
the Spratly Islands have Chinas neighSpecial Warfare

bors understandably nervous.7

Other threats negatively affecting the
Pacific Century include nuclear proliferation (India, Pakistan, North Korea) and
combinations of political, ethnic, economic
and religious strife in Myanmar, Cambodia, Papua New Guinea and Indonesia.8 A
flourishing drug trade also has regional
implications that bode ill for the U.S.
Grown and processed in the Golden Triangle countries of Myanmar, Laos and Thailand, a new form of potent, smokable heroin called China White is being transshipped via Thailand, India, China and
Hong Kong to the United States.9 Other
potential destabilizing factors include
rampant AIDS proliferation, pollution and
rapid resource depletion in the form of
poaching and strip harvesting.
In the absence of a viable regional security architecture like NATO, the U.S. has
worked bilaterally with individual countries in the Asia-Pacific region to address
security and stability issues. While some
movement toward regional security
arrangements is ongoing, notably among
the states of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations, or ASEAN, bilateral security relationships will be the norm in the

future. A forward-deployed military presence throughout the Asia-Pacific theater

has been key to our ability to positively
influence bilateral relationships. Unfortunately, as evidenced by the closing of U.S.
bases in the Philippines, our ability to
influence events in the region will decline
as a result of the drawdown of U.S. forces
worldwide.

Doctrinal missions
The capabilities of ARSOF are ideally
suited to doctrinal, emerging and new missions in the Asia-Pacific region.
While ARSOF can operate throughout
the spectrum of conflict, their most important doctrinal mission is that of force multiplier. ARSOF will continue to execute doctrinal force-multiplier missions in support
of the Commander in Chief, Pacific, or
CINCPAC, and for deployed conventional
forces. During the current period of
retrenchment, language-qualified, regionally oriented and culturally aware ARSOF
can also contribute to regional stability by
amplifying their traditional doctrinal roles.
At relatively low cost and with low force
levels, ARSOF can continue a U.S. presence,
Captain (Dr.) Mark Nelson,
surgeon for the 1st Battalion, 1st SF Group, prepares to give medical
examinations to monks at
Tonle Bati, Cambodia, as
part of a medical civicaction program.

Photo by Mark Martello

January 1996

19

A U.S. Army veterinarian

treats an animal during
Exercise Cobra Gold in
Thailand.
Photo by Keith Butler

maintain military-to-military contacts and

help develop professional military forces in
emerging democracies.
Special Forces plan, conduct and support
special operations in all operational environments in peace, conflict and war. They
perform five primary missions worldwide:
unconventional warfare, or UW; foreign
internal defense, or FID; direct action, or
DA; special reconnaissance, or SR; and
counterterrorism, or CT. Special Forces
also perform collateral activities that
include, but are not limited to, security
assistance, humanitarian assistance, combat search and rescue, and counterdrug
operations.10
Civil Affairs supports the commanders
relationship with civil authorities and with
the civilian populace; promotes mission
legitimacy; enhances military effectiveness;
and supports other special-operations forces
during UW, FID, civil administration and
civil-military operations. Civil administration, or CIVADMIN, is the direct involvement of the military in the executive, legislative or judicial areas of civilian government. A government or host nation can
20

request CIVADMIN assistance to provide

basic services until normal operations can
be resumed or, in the absence of a legitimate
government, until a temporary civil administration can be established. Civil-military
operations are primarily designed to reduce
the adverse impact of military operations on
civilian personnel and to reduce civilian
interference with military operations.11
Psychological Operations units derive
their mission from the unit they are supporting. They can function in peace, conflict and war. PSYOP units use various
forms of persuasion to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes and behavior of
selected audiences. PSYOP products are
designed to convince audiences to cease
resistance or to take actions favorable to
friendly forces. PSYOP activities serve as
a major force multiplier for the supported
commander.12
ARSOF units continually participate in
joint and combined exercises to refine their
ability to accomplish doctrinal missions.
Annual exercises such as Cobra Gold in
Thailand and Foal Eagle in Korea are but
two of these. ARSOF units also train, especially for FID, in events known as jointcombined exercise training, or JCET. In
1993 alone, JCET events were conducted
in 27 Asia-Pacific nations and territories.
In 1994, the JCET program was expanded
to include Russia. China may soon be an
additional venue.

Emerging missions
ARSOF could expand into a number of
less traditional or emerging missions in
support of CINCPAC taskings. These missions include coalition-support-team operations, humanitarian/civil assistance,
humanitarian mine clearance,13 counterdrug operations and peace-support operations. While not specifically trained to
undertake these operations, ARSOF could
support them by using the capabilities
inherent in their doctrinal missions. These
inherent capabilities may make ARSOF,
especially integrated ARSOF, the possible
force of choice to preclude future economicand resource-related threats.
Coalition-support teams, or CSTs, proSpecial Warfare

vide a direct liaison and establish a vital

communications link among U.S., allied
and coalition forces. These teams work to
deconflict joint and combined operations
and to ensure the smooth integration of
available combat support (close air support, indirect fire and naval gunfire) to U.S.
and coalition forces. The CST concept has
special utility in peace-support operations,
as was demonstrated by successes in
Desert Shield/Storm, Somalia and Haiti. In
Haiti, elements of the 1st Special Forces
Group deployed as CSTs in support of a
1,000-man force from Bangladesh. Given
the number of Asia-Pacific nations that
participate in U.N.-sponsored peace-support operations, it is likely that the CST
concept will expand in the future.

Humanitarian/civil assistance
Humanitarian/civil assistance, or H/CA,
programs often employ military personnel,
but they are principally designed to promote nonmilitary objectives within a foreign civilian community. These objectives
include disaster relief; medical, veterinary
and dental assistance; limited construction; water and sanitation assistance; and
expedient communications. By definition,
disasters may be natural (flood, drought,
hurricane, earthquake or epidemic) or
man-made (riot, coup or civil strife). Assistance may or may not be associated with
larger military operations, depending upon
which agency has the lead.
Owing to the geophysical characteristics
of the Asia-Pacific region, natural disasters
are more common there than in other
regions. Typical examples include the yearly flooding of the deltaic plains in
Bangladesh and India, and the devastation
throughout Asia from earthquakes and
seasonal typhoons.
While the Department of State has overall responsibility for foreign disaster relief
(the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance are the lead U.S. agencies), the
U.S. military plays a vital and expanding
role.14 Because of their language capability,
their regional expertise and their ability to
respond quickly to a disaster area, ARSOF
January 1996

have been in the forefront of recent

humanitarian operations. By deploying tailored force packages (communications,
medical and logistics) and disaster-assistance response teams on short notice, SF
can assist U.S.-sponsored H/CA operations
in those countries unable to marshal sufficient internal resources.
Historically, SF disaster-relief missions in
the Asia-Pacific region have assessed and
reported on the magnitude of the disaster,
provided immediate relief for disaster victims and assisted in establishing remote-site
distribution points. CA objectives in H/CA
operations are to determine and re-establish, where possible, the basic economic and
social needs of the people. PSYOP units, in
conjunction with SF and CA, further
enhance H/CA missions by conveying important lifesaving information to indigenous
populations. On-the-shelf PSYOP studies
and CA assessments can also offer expedient, area-related databases for personnel
involved in H/CA missions.
Recent H/CA actions in which SOF
assisted include Operation Sea Angel, in
response to massive floods that paralyzed
Bangladesh; and Operation Fiery Vigil, following the volcanic eruption of Mount
Pinatubo in the Philippines.

Mine clearance
According to the U.S. State Department,
there are more than 85 million uncleared
land mines in 62 countries around the
world.15 These uncleared mines pose a serious and enduring problem not only to local
civilian populations but also to international relief workers and peace-support
forces. Because land mines are cheap, easy
to manufacture and use, difficult to detect,
and expensive and dangerous to remove,
they have become the weapon of choice for
many governments and insurgent groups.
Further complicating the problem is that
they are used indiscriminately often,
there are no records, maps or warning
signs and they are left behind after hostilities end.16
The impact of these uncleared minefields
both on human lives and on developing
economies is staggering. Worldwide, there
21

Photo by Mark Martello

Co-ministers of defense for

Cambodia view a mineawareness display set up
by the 4th PSYOP Group.

22

are more than 150 deaths or injuries each

week from mines. In Cambodia alone,
injuries from mines have been responsible
for 30,000 amputations. Equally high are
the costs associated with mine removal,
estimated to be between $300 and $1,000
per mine. In Cambodia, the estimated total
cost of mine removal is equivalent to every
dollar of income to be earned by Cambodians for the next 5-7 years.17
Fortunately, many nations, including Australia, Bangladesh, France, India, the
Netherlands, Pakistan, Thailand, the
United Kingdom and the United States, are
providing money, equipment and demining
expertise in support of Cambodian relief
efforts.18 The West is also developing new
methods of detection and neutralization,
and it has even proposed a moratorium on
new mine production. Experts agree, however, that the problem is likely to become
worse unless bold steps are taken.19
Since 1993, U.S. Army PSYOP units have
complemented Cambodian demining operations by waging an awareness campaign to
inform the indigenous population about the
dangers of unexploded land mines and
munitions. PSYOP units researched Cambodian cultural aspects and produced posters,
stickers, schoolbooks, and even skits choreographed in conjunction with their Cambodian counterparts to ensure the widest possible dissemination of information on the location of mines, minefields and other hazardous areas, thereby saving life and limb.20

PSYOP products also directed the people

to government and nongovernment agencies that provided medical assistance and
other humanitarian-relief support. By
highlighting the success of demining activities, PSYOP efforts also helped promote
the host nations civilian government.
Since July 1994, Special Forces soldiers
from the 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces
Group, have assisted PSYOP personnel in
the demining effort. Capitalizing on their
language training, cultural awareness and
new expertise in demining operations, the
SF soldiers instructed Cambodian military
personnel in mine clearing. Until new technologies can be developed to reliably
counter hidden mines, ARSOF offer one of
the best and most cost-effective solutions
to an otherwise hopeless situation.

Counterdrug operations
More than 25 million Americans buy and
use illicit drugs. Illicit drugs degrade our
nations health and productivity, account for
an increasing crime rate, and require billions of dollars each year for the counterdrug effort. At least four-fifths of all illicit
drugs consumed in the U.S. are of foreign
origin, including virtually all cocaine, opium
and heroin. The Golden Triangle, located in
Asia along the borders of Burma, Thailand
and Laos, accounts for 60 percent of the
worlds supply of illegal opiates and for 88
percent of the worlds heroin supply. Seventy-five percent of the world heroin supply
ultimately makes its way to the U.S.21
While the economic future of the AsiaPacific region is quite promising, the economic disparity between the developed and
lesser-developed countries of Southeast Asia
is increasing. If this gap is not closed legitimately, illegal drug trafficking may provide
the covert revenues needed to fill the void of
the economically deprived. The cash generated by illegal trafficking often provides the
means for lesser-developed nations and
insurgent groups to purchase arms and
modern high-tech weapon systems, increasing the possibility of regional instability.22
Currently, developed nations focus their
counterdrug efforts on attempts to make
the governments of drug-producing
Special Warfare

nations enforce accepted international

laws. This approach ignores the fact that
the basic impetus for drug trafficking is
the lure of enormous profits, based on a
continuously increasing world demand.
Though their current involvement is not
significant, ARSOF could become an integral
part of the expanding counterdrug effort in
the Asia-Pacific region. While any single
ARSOF asset could help in the fight against
illicit drugs, integrated ARSOF are a symbiotic alternative to singular, stovepiped
actions. SF are organized to work with
indigenous personnel, regardless of the
indigenous populations level of economic
development or geographic location. SF
could also support counterdrug efforts
through short-term, unit-oriented operations designed to advise, train and assist
host-nation military and paramilitary
forces.23
CA and PSYOP assets could be part of an
attack on illegal drug trafficking while
reinforcing ongoing humanitarian and
civic-action programs. CA support could
evaluate the political, economic, social-cultural and ideological development of the
nation, and could provide technical assistance aimed at developing the local infrastructure in remote areas. PSYOP campaigns could illustrate the dangers of drug
use, undermining the traffickers credibility and minimizing their successes. PSYOP
could also build support for the host
nations institutions and programs and
could analyze the propaganda used by
drug traffickers. PSYOP could then provide
the host nation with insight into the traffickers thoughts, reasoning and perception
of government counteractions.
All of the emerging missions just
described are ongoing in the Asia-Pacific theater. As other military assets decline because
of the drawdown, the likelihood of ARSOF
performing these missions will increase.

Future missions
There is an old Chinese saying, A rising
tide floats all boats. As long as the rising
economic tide in the Asia-Pacific region
continues, opportunities for conflict will
probably decline. But resources are finite,
January 1996

and the unparalleled growth in the region,

especially in China, coupled with explosive
population growth rates, will eventually
focus attention on the regions endangered
resources. Poaching, air pollution, water
pollution, overmining and deforestation
pose clear, long-term threats to future economic expansion and regional security. As
Pacific Rim resources become more scarce
and pollution becomes more prevalent,
opportunities for economic terrorism and
general conflict could increase as nations
in the region try to protect their resources.
In 15-20 years, it may be appropriate for
ARSOF to assist in promoting regional
environmental policies that support U.S.
foreign-policy objectives. In theory, SF
units could develop and train government
forces to enforce local, regional and international environmental laws and to protect
valuable natural resources. PSYOP assets
could develop, implement and sustain environmental-awareness programs. These
programs might inspire current and future
generations to adopt a more eco-conscious
attitude. CA assets could reinforce SF and
PSYOP efforts by providing technical
assistance from a pool of reserve-component soldiers who have compatible civilian
experience.
Advocating the use of ARSOF in an environmental police role may seem to be
pushing the envelope. However, if environmental degradation causes economic
instability in the Asia-Pacific region and if
U.S. interests are at risk, ARSOF may have
a role. ARSOF-led counterpoaching and
remote-site environmental assessment
teams are two new concepts that may
prove useful in reducing resource-related
economic problems.

Counterpoaching
In an attempt to restore endangered
animal populations and to halt the wholesale slaughter of wild animals for profit,
industrialized nations are increasing the
pressure on some Asia-Pacific countries to
take control. On April 11, 1994, White
House Press Secretary Dee Dee Myers
explained that the Clinton administration
recognizes that threats to endangered
23

The rhinoceros is one of

many animals in jeopardy
of extinction in Asia. Over
the last 23 years, the
worlds rhino population
has declined by 90 percent.
File photo

species are of critical importance. The

administration authorized placing trade
sanctions against Taiwan until its government enforces international laws and
stops condoning the killing of endangered
species and the importation of their
byproducts.24
In Asia the tiger, panda, pangolin, gibbon
and Indian rhinoceros are among the animals in jeopardy of extinction. Over the
last 23 years, the worlds rhino population
has declined by 90 percent; the tiger population by 95 percent.25 This dramatic
decline is largely the result of poachers
who have become more aggressive and who
have modernized their techniques.
Poaching thrives partly because of the
popularity of folk medicine in Asia. Remedies often call for the use of expensive body
parts from many of the endangered animals. This demand, coupled with the nominal local enforcement of laws designed to
protect wildlife, makes poaching an attractive livelihood. While international laws
have been promulgated to protect wildlife,
critics charge that the laws dont impose
harsh enough penalties to stop or even
slow illegal poaching. Moreover, the potential profits from selling rare animal skins,
meat or parts attract new criminals to
replace those who are caught. For example,
just 10 grams of rhino horn sells for $900
(U.S. currency). A mixture that includes 70
grams of tiger shinbone, thought to cure
pain, brings $410.26
Although the situation presents a rather
gloomy picture, there have been successful
counterpoaching efforts. In 1993, the 3rd
Special Forces Group sent detachments to
Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe to instruct counterpoaching units in
24

light-infantry tactics, reconnaissance and

tracking. The methods and practices that
SF used are natural extensions of FID, SR
and DA missions. The success of this training has positively affected the political and
economic conditions within all the assisted
countries. Increased law enforcement and
a campaign of aggressive prosecution
against poachers have inspired confidence
in the governments ability to maintain law
and order, while the subsequent increase in
tourism has provided additional revenues.
SF units could be employed throughout
Asia to teach the same tactics, techniques
and procedures that worked for the 3rd SF
Group in Africa. PSYOP and CA assets
could complement SF efforts by educating
indigenous populations on the impact of
continued uncontrolled poaching and by
helping to promote national policies.

Environmental assessment
Asias phenomenal economic growth has
focused attention on an escalating environmental crisis. Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia
and Thailand are rapidly cutting down their
forests, both legally and illegally, with
no perceptible management or re-growth
plan. Also at risk is their most important
resource water. Several Asian states show
little or no concern about dumping industrial, human and animal waste into the
regions water supplies. If allowed to continue at the present rate, this environmental
damage will undercut regional economic
growth. Unfortunately, no one country or
international body has a clear understanding of the extent of the damage or of the ramifications of continued deterioration.
To minimize the cost and impact of
potential environmental damage, nations
need access to accurate and timely information on the status of threatened areas.
Alternatives should be developed to alter
the behavior of those who are creating the
problem. In the future, ARSOF, in the form
of remote-site environmental assessment
teams, or RSEAT, could assist local and
international authorities in correcting the
problem.
Taking the lead role, CA and PSYOP
units could assist emerging nations in the
Special Warfare

development of environmentally friendly

policies. After a preliminary assessment,
CA units could provide governments with a
critical analysis of selected sectors of the
economy, identify problem areas, and recommend eco-friendly alternatives. CA could
also assist in the implementation of government-adopted alternatives. They could
provide instruction on the following: measuring the impact of continued deforestation; assessing the impact of acid rain on
crops and vegetation; evaluating the impact
of strip-mining techniques; reporting the
improper use of fertilizers and pesticides;
and monitoring water resources at the
point of origin and along the waters route
into populated areas. CA teams could educate people in remote areas on viable, government-supported alternatives to traditional agricultural practices that damage
the environment.
PSYOP assets could develop multimedia
products by which to target the population
with necessary information on environmental damage and approved alternatives.
SF teams could train host-nation military
and paramilitary forces how to protect
valuable resources and to enforce laws,
especially in remote and contested areas.

plan. Although volunteers often fill out the

force during operations other than war,
civilian employers are reluctant to release
reservists for extended periods. This limits
the availability of reservists for deployments of long duration.
Legal constraints. Current laws and
defense policies restrict ARSOF from working with civilian police agencies in many
instances. In the U.S., the Posse Comitatus
Act prohibits direct military involvement
in law-enforcement activities. Policies are
less restrictive outside the U.S.; however,
there are limitations regarding ARSOFs
ability to train civilian police. In many
Asia-Pacific countries, there is no clear line
of demarcation between military and civilian law-enforcement agencies, which
severely restricts ARSOFs ability to train
indigenous assets.
Fiscal constraints. Every year Congress
appropriates funds to DoD in five categories. The largest appropriation goes to
operational and maintenance, or O&M,
accounts. O&M funds may be expended
only on training and operations conducted
by U.S. forces; they may not be used in supAsian-Pacific crops, vegetation and water resources
are threatened by an escalating environmental crisis.
ARSOF could assist local
and international authorities in correcting environmental problems.

Constraints
Although ARSOF will frequently be the
organization of choice for a variety of traditional, emerging, and new missions,
there are a number of constraints that
limit their ability to participate.
Limited resources. ARSOFs funding and
manpower resources are limited. To maintain their special skills and to prepare for
their primary missions, ARSOF require
extensive, uninterrupted training time.
With a full schedule of training exercises
and worldwide contingency operations,
their operations tempo is already high.
Whether ARSOF could absorb many new
undertakings is questionable.
Current force structure. The majority of
CA (96 percent) and PSYOP (78 percent)
forces are in the reserve components.
Reserve units can be called to active duty
only by presidential order, usually during
the execution of a war or a contingency
File photo

January 1996

25

port of foreign forces. However, Congress

has provided a few exceptions to this rule.
The first exception is commonly referred to
as the Special Forces exception. Recognizing that one of the primary missions of
ARSOF is to train foreign forces in alien
environments, Congress has authorized
SOF to spend O&M funds on the training
of foreign forces if U.S. forces are to receive
the primary benefit of such training.
Another exception allows O&M funds to be
expended on H/CA projects overseas. These
include medical and veterinary assistance,
limited engineering projects and disaster
assistance. However, using these funds on
military or paramilitary organizations is
strictly prohibited.
These limitations, coupled with the fact
that military budgets are developed five
years in advance, create a system that
often is not flexible enough to keep up with
changing world events. New, unforecast
missions may require canceling other
planned operations or identifying alternative sources of funding.
Political constraints. While ARSOF has
tried to establish its identity within the
military and with the public, many false
perceptions still exist. Misconceptions have
isolated ARSOF in the past and continue to
hinder their appropriate use today.

Conclusion
In a recent speech, Secretary of State
Warren Christopher said the Asia-Pacific
region is characterized by a growing network of constructive relations among
most of the regions key states; explosive
growth; expanding human freedom; and
new efforts to foster cooperation on economic and security issues.27 The AsiaPacific region is important to U.S. interests for a number of economic, political
and security reasons. One of four nongovernmental jobs in the U.S. is tied to the
Pacific Rim.
Despite the current calm and the promise
of a Pacific Century, opportunities for conflict remain. Situations in Korea, China and
other countries have been articulated, but
there is another facet that needs to be analyzed the long-term effect of the U.S.
26

drawdown. Which countries might attempt

to fill the power vacuum? When?
As the drawdown of U.S. forces continues, opportunities for using ARSOF will
increase. However, despite opportunities to
perform doctrinal, emerging and new missions, there are constraints that limit
ARSOF. Lack of available forces and a
robust operations tempo are immediate
limitations. Legal, political and fiscal constraints must also be considered.
The U.S. must pursue innovative ways
by which to secure its national security
interests in the post-Cold War world.
ARSOF, out of all proportion to their size
and cost, can and will be a useful instrument in protecting U.S. interests in the
Asia-Pacific region.

Colonel Russell D. Howard

is commander of the 1st SF
Group. His previous assignments include service as
assistant to the special representative to the Secretary
General during UNOSOM II
in Somalia; as deputy chief of staff for I
Corps; as chief of staff and deputy commander for the Combined Joint Task Force,
Haiti/Haitian Advisory Group; and as
commander of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, JFK Special
Warfare Center and School. He holds a
bachelors degree from San Jose State University, a bachelor of arts in Asian studies
from the University of Maryland, a master
of arts in international management from
the Monterey Institute of International
Studies and a masters in public administration from Harvard University.
Major Mark A. Nelson is
adjutant for the 1st SF
Group. In previous Special
Forces assignments he served
with the 1st SF Group as the
group Civil Affairs officer, as
a company executive officer
and as commander of a combat-dive
detachment; and with the 5th SF Group as
commander of a combat-dive detachment.

Special Warfare

Notes:
1 Richard H. Holomon, Asian Architecture The
U.S. in the Asia-Pacific Community, Harvard International Review, Spring 1994, p. 27.
2 Ibid.
3 Russell D. Howard and Kelly Hicks, U.S. Security Interests in the Pacific Rim, Military Review, September 1994, p. 42.
4 Power Game, Asia - 1994 Yearbook, December
1993, pp. 18, 19.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 William C. Triplett II, Time to Wake Up to the
Real Threat That China Presents, Army Times, 21
November 1994, p. 39.
8 Howard and Hicks, pp. 43, 45.
9 Ibid., pp. 46, 47.
10 FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations
(Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the
Army, April 1990), pp. 3-1 to 3-7.
11 FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations (Washington,
D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 11 January 1993), p. 8-4.
12 FM 33-1, Psychological Operations (Washington,
D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 5 May
1994), pp. 2-1, 1-5.
13 Humanitarian mine clearance is the term used
by the U.N., the largest agency involved in demining
activities. Other names used for demining are
humanitarian demining assistance and demining
operations.
14 USCINCPAC Command Center (J323), Smart
Book on Disaster Relief, 13 August 1990, p. 4.
15 Fact Sheet: U.S. Initiatives for Demining and
Landmine Control, 30 May 1994, p. 362. The International Committee of the Red Cross estimates that
there are more than 30,000 amputees in Cambodia, of
which most are victims of land mines. The ICRC provided nearly 8,000 artificial limbs and 11,000 orthopedic appliances to mine victims in 14 countries.
16 Paul Jefferson, An Overview of Demining
Including Mine Detection Equipment in ICRC, Montreal Symposium, 1993, p. 125.
17 Fact Sheet: U.S. Initiatives for Demining and
Landmine Control, p. 362.
18 Human Rights Watch, Land mines: A Deadly
Legacy, 1993, p. 252.
19 Ibid., pp. 236-37. Unlike wartime military mine
clearing (breaching) in which a clearance rate of 80
percent is considered acceptable, humanitarian mine
clearing requires a clearance rate of 99.9 percent,
with the ultimate goal of removing every land mine.
To achieve this rate, almost all humanitarian mine
clearing must be performed by hand because mechanical clearance equipment is not capable of clearing
such a high percentage of land mines. Obviously, hand
clearance is extremely dangerous, very slow and very
expensive. Deminers maintain, however, that when
carried out by experienced, well-trained and wellequipped operators, this technique will usually prove
to be the most efficient and most reliable.
20 Phone interview with Major Wayne Deneff, 8th
PSYOP Battalion, 4th PSYOP Group, Fort Bragg,

January 1996

N.C., 24 October 1994. Because of the extent of human

suffering, the U.N. and the U.S., through the U.S.
Embassy in Cambodia, agreed to provide support to
the Cambodian government in its demining operations. The initial support was a 12-man team from B
Company, 8th PSYOP Bn. The PSYOP team instructed the Cambodian Mine Action Center on how to produce a product that would warn Cambodians of the
dangers of unexploded mines and other munitions.
Because of the success of that mission, in 1994, the
8th PSYOP sent a follow-on team to conduct a similar
mission but also included the training of selected personnel from the Royal Cambodian Armys G-5 section.
The PSYOP team produced more than 30 products,
including posters, warning signs, T-shirts, stickers,
schoolbooks, videos and skits put on by the Royal
Cambodian Army.
21 Bertil Lintner, Opium War, Far East Economic
Review, 20 January 1994, p. 22.
22 Lintner, pp. 12-13.
23 FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations
Forces (Washington, D. C.: Headquarters, Department
of the Army, 12 December 1991), pp. 3-20, 3-21.
24 Dee Dee Myers, Sanctions Announced Against
Taiwan for Trade in Endangered Species, U.S.
Department of State Dispatch, 18 April 1994, 222.
This is the first time trade sanctions have been placed
on a country to protect an endangered species under
the authority of the Pelly Amendment to the Fishermens Protective Act of 1967. The trade sanctions are
to be reviewed at the end of every year.
25 Nancy Nash, The Horns Dilemma, Far East
Economic Review, 19 August 1993, p. 27. Currently,
rhinos are in 14 African countries, India and Southeast Asia. The one-horned Indian rhino population is
down to 1,600 and its cousin in Nepal numbers only
400. The Sumatran and Javan rhinos are estimated to
be 800 and 250, respectively.
26 Julian Baum and Carl Goldstein, Asias
Untamed Business, Far East Economic Review, 19
August 1993, pp. 22-25.
27 Warren Christopher, America and the AsiaPacific Future, U.S. Department of State Dispatch,
pp. 348-50. Excerpt from Secretary Christophers
address to the Asia Society in New York City on 27
May 1994.

27

Civil-Military Operations: Staff Support

to Army Corps and Divisions

n the late 1970s and early 1980s, the

U.S. Army underwent many conceptual
and structural changes in preparation
for a European contingency or war. One
major change that occurred was the reduction of the Armys key corps- and divisionlevel tactical, main and rear command
posts, or CPs.
With the European theater as the priority, the Army focused on civil-military cooperation and its inherent and implied combat-service-support, or CSS, relationships
with other allied armies. As a result, the
assistant chief of staff G5, the civil-military operations officer, became a part of the
rear CP. This arrangement worked well,
since emerging Army doctrine continued to
anticipate a fast-paced armor and mechanized infantry confrontation with Warsaw
Pact forces.
With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and
the Soviet Union, however, the perspectives
of the U.S. armed forces and of the unified
command plan have changed. An East-West
confrontation of armor and mechanized
forces on the central plains of Europe no
longer seems likely. Much more likely is U.S.
involvement in small-scale, regional conflicts
and humanitarian-assistance operations.

This is one of a series of white papers to

be published by the JFK Special Warfare
Center and School. The series is intended to
stimulate thought and discussion on SOF
doctrinal issues. Editor.
28

Army doctrine writers continue to develop new doctrine to keep pace with the
many perceived contingencies. Among the
most significant proposed changes to corps
and division FMs, such as FM 100-15,
Corps Operations, and FM 71-100, Division
Operations, are the manning and structure
of the G5 civil-military operations section,
or CMO section, and the field-operating
locations of its subelements.
For the most part, the G5 still plans for
and orchestrates activities that support
the commanders intent, in accordance
with FM 101-5, Staff Organization and
Operations. This officers main concern,
however, is with the civilians within the
commanders area of responsibility, or
AOR. The G5, like operations and intelligence officers, focuses outward on the operational area; like personnel and logistics
officers, he focuses inward on combat-support and CSS issues, particularly in regard
to foreign nation support, or FNS, and the
care of dislocated civilians.
In order to plan for and orchestrate unit
operations, whether in war or in military
operations other than war, the operations
officer must rely heavily on both the intelligence officer and the G5 for the following:
Situational and planning maps.
Overlays of movement routes of dislocated civilians; sources of FNS; national,
religious and cultural monuments; hospitals; and power plants.
The intent and views of the commander.
Special Warfare

Civil-Military Operations Cell at Corps and Division TOCs

CMO Cell
(CTOC/DTOC)

CMO
Section

CMOC

(Main)
In turn, because the unit operations officer is responsible for planning and integrating the overall operations effort, the
unit G5 plans, coordinates and provides
staff oversight of civil-military activities
and issues only through direct coordination with the unit operations officer.
The G5, like other coordinating staff
officers, is authorized personnel according
to a table of organization and equipment.
However, current corps and division
authorization documents do not provide
the G5 with sufficient personnel and
equipment to adequately perform all
assigned functions. For this reason, augmentation from regionally aligned activeand reserve-component Army Civil Affairs
units has become the modus operandi.1
This augmentation, which originated during World War II, provides the unit G5
with enough personnel to perform the
assigned tasks and plays an integral part
in the execution of the G5s duties.
Augmentation by Civil Affairs units also
provides the G5 the needed manpower,
equipment and flexibility to establish and
sustain a key presence at the main CP, at
the rear CP and at the civil-military operations center, or CMOC. Operating from
the CMO cell within the corps or division
tactical operations center, or CTOC/DTOC,
the G5 usually task-organizes his section
to support 24-hour operations at the main
CP, rear CP and CMOC locations.
January 1996

CMO Cell
(Rear)

At the main CP, the G5 provides, when

needed:
A tailored CMO cell to the CTOC/DTOC.
This cell also provides representatives
to the plans, current operations, intelligence and CSS cells to help monitor the
operations effects on the civilian populace and to assist in developing courses
of action.
The remainder of the task-organized
and tailored CMO section, located outside the CTOC/DTOC but within the
main CP area.
At the rear CP, the G5 provides a tailored CMO cell to monitor main-battle and
rear-area activities. This cell also plans for
and coordinates any required FNS, as well
as the flow and disposition of dislocated
civilians. This cell includes representatives
to both the operations and CSS cells.
At the CMOC, the G5 section provides
the nucleus for a tailored cell that gives the
unit commander a 24-hour capability to
handle requests for assistance, or RFAs,
from participating or interested government, international, nongovernment and
private volunteer organizations, or GOs,
IOs, NGOs and PVOs.

CMO section
The CMO section, when sufficiently augmented, performs the area assessment and
the day-to-day, detailed analysis of the
29

Civil-Military Operations Section

CMO
Section

Admin/Log

Current
Ops

Ops

Technical
Support*

Plans
*Specialists from required functional areas, e.g.,
public health, legal, dislocated civilians, etc.
CMO situation. This section also provides
the CMO officer with sufficient data to
plan for and monitor all unit operations
that may affect civilians.
In addition, the CMO section is tailored
to provide support to CMO cells at the
main CP, rear CP and CMOC. Generally,
the CMO section includes at least an
administrative and logistics section and an
operations section. These sections help to
plan, coordinate and execute civil-military
operations and to monitor civil-administration support directed by the national command authority.
The administrative and logistics section
provides general and specific support to
the elements and cells of the CMO section.
General support includes:
Maintaining the staff journal.
Maintaining the document-control
register.
Maintaining key files and records.
Providing required interpreter and
translator support.
Monitoring and maintaining section
equipment.
Specific support includes:
Collating and maintaining detailed

30

CMO-related data obtained from assessments and CMO activities.

Capturing CMO-related data for historical purposes.
Providing clerical support for briefings,
charts and CMO-related documents.
The operations section provides operations-related support to the CMO officer.
This section usually comprises at least a
current-operations subsection, a plans
subsection and a technical-support subsection.
The current-operations subsection:
Monitors the current operational and
CMO situations.
Maintains the CMO estimate.
Prepares either the CMO (Army) or CA
(Joint) annexes to contingency plans,
operation plans and operation orders.
Recommends CA force-allocation changes.
Develops the CMO periodic report.
Maintains and updates overlays and
data for use by the operations, intelligence, fire-support and CSS cells. The
overlays and data depict locations of foreign-nation resources, key public facilities, key monuments, and cultural and
religious shrines that need protection.
Special Warfare

 Provides background data and input for

fragmentary orders, or FRAGOs, in conjunction with the CMO cell at the main
CP. The subsection also recommends
and prepares CA force-allocation
changes in the form of FRAGOs.
Develops required reports and receives,
analyzes, coordinates, disseminates and
monitors CA-related reports from subordinate corps and division units.
Coordinates with the CMOC to oversee
both the validation of CMOC-coordinated RFAs and the staff coordination
needed to support those requests.
Coordinates with the CMOC to disseminate data on the planned activities of
the various GOs, IOs, NGOs and PVOs
operating either within the corps and
division AORs or within their areas of
interest.
The plans subsection:
Works closely with corps or division
plans officers and sections. It analyzes
data and the commanders intent, forecasts requirements, and integrates all
CMO into both corps and division plans.
Although the CMO plans officer may
operate from the main CP, he continually coordinates with his counterparts at

the rear CP, the CMOC, and the American Embassy, as required.
Closely monitors progress toward the
desired CMO-related end state.
The technical-support subsection:
Provides CA functional experts who
advise the CMO officer.
Provides contracted civilians when operations require expertise beyond the scope
of the military force.

Civil-military cells
As previously mentioned, the G5 taskorganizes his section to provide support
cells at the main and rear CPs. The CMO
cell (main) provides interface with corps
and division staff officers within the
CTOC/DTOC. Because the CTOC/DTOC
is generally restricted in size, space and
mobility, the G5 provides a CMO cell with
an immediate operations and plans capability. He may also provide representatives to the plans, current operations,
intelligence and CSS cells of the
CTOC/DTOC. The CMO cell (main),
which maintains a 24-hour capability,
consists of a minimum of five personnel
per shift: the G5, a CMO officer, a CMO

Civil-Military Operations Cell (Main)

CMO Cell
(Main)

CMO
Off

G5

CMO Plans
Off

CMO
NCO

CTOC/DTOC
Cell Reps*

Admin
Specialist

*Current operations, intelligence, plans and CSS.

January 1996

31

Civil-Military Operations Cell (Rear)

CMO Cell
(Rear)

CMO
Off

CMO
NCO

Admin
Specialist

plans officer, a CMO NCO and an administrative specialist.

After conducting their mission analysis, corps and division commanders will
decide where to place the CMO cell
(main). The G5 should be placed where he
can coordinate all CMO and be appropriately responsive to the commanders
guidance and to the need for staff integration. If CMO is central to the mission,
the G5 will be close to plans, intelligence
and current operations. Higher-intensity
combat operations may not require the
G5s immediate presence.
The G5 also task-organizes his section
to provide a CMO cell (rear) to monitor
and plan for CMO activities and to integrate them into all aspects of the rear
operations. Similar to the CMO cell
(main) in duties and functions, the CMO
cell (rear) focuses on rear operations,
FNS issues and CSS issues that do not
occur within the main battle area. A CA
unit could be allocated as a commandand-control headquarters for uncommitted CA assets. If that happens, the G5
may recommend that the CA unit be
tasked to man and operate the CMO cell
(rear). The CMO cell (rear) requires a
24-hour capability whether it is taskorganized and supported from the G5
section or from the allocated CA unit.
This cell should consist of at least five
personnel: the chief of the CMO cell
(rear), a CMO officer, a CMO logistics
32

CMO
Log Plans Off

plans officer, a CMO NCO and an administrative specialist.

CMOC
For nearly 20 years, the term CMOC,
although not promulgated in Army doctrine, has been widely, though somewhat
indiscriminately, used throughout the CA
community and the Army. The term has
posed no dilemmas to commanders and
staffs of either general-purpose or specialoperations forces. Sometimes the term has
been used to refer to the fully augmented
unit G5 section. In other instances the
term has been used to refer to the tactical
operations centers of supporting CA units,
whether commands, brigades or battalions.
The roles and functions of a CMOC,
whether or not the term was applied correctly, remained the same: To assist the G5
in anticipating, coordinating and orchestrating those CMO functions pertaining to
the civil population, government and economy in areas where armed forces are
employed.
After-action reports from recent contingency operations worldwide have prompted a review of the roles and functions of the
CMO officer from every perspective.
Reports from Operation Provide Comfort
emphasized and validated the requirement
for a regionally aligned augmentation
detachment and a CMOC. As the operation
matured, many GOs, IOs, NGOs and PVOs
Special Warfare

participated independently in both relief

and humanitarian efforts. Eventually,
those organizations, hoping to coordinate
their efforts and to reduce the possibility of
redundancy within the AOR, sought access
to the joint task forces CMOC. The CMOC,
composed of an augmentation element
from the Armys 353rd CA Command, operated under the staff supervision of the
JTFs CMO officer, Brigadier General Don
Campbell, who was also the commanding
general of the 353rd. To develop CMOrelated plans in support of JTF objectives,
the JTF CMOC received data from the
JTFs joint operations center, GOs, IOs,
NGOs and PVOs.
In Somalia, Operation Restore/Continue
Hope brought about the establishment of
more than one location where GOs, IOs,
NGOs and PVOs operating throughout the
country could coordinate their activities.
These coordination centers, or miniCMOCs as they were called, served as focal
points for CMO priorities within Somalia.
Until Operation Support Hope in Rwanda, the use of an augmentation detachment
and the roles and functions of the CMOC
were thought to have been well-understood
by the conventional and SOF commanders

who habitually used such assets in their

operations and training. Military operations had generally been of a combative
nature the unit G3 planned and directed the defeat of the enemy; the G5 planned
and directed CMO activities as they
applied to the terms of surrender. However,
the CMO nature of Operation Support
Hope changed that notion. U.S. forces were
not sent to Rwanda to conduct combat
operations. From the outset, Operation
Support Hope was deemed an HA operation, leading to a twofold review:
General-purpose and special-operations
forces reviewed their way of tailoring
staff sections for specific CMO.
The JFK Special Warfare Center and
School reviewed SOF-related CMOC
doctrine and terminology.
Even though the Army had been ambivalent about the term CMOC, the need for a
new doctrinal analysis was evident. For all
operations, there should be only one staff
officer responsible for the unit operations
the operations officer and there should be
only one operations center.
The G5 and his section will continue to
perform those tasks and functions
assigned in FM 101-5. There is no need to

Civil-Military Operations Center

CMOC

Director

Ops Off

Admin/Log
NCO

Reps*

*Participating or interested representatives from both

military (e.g., PSYOP) and nonmilitary organizations
(e.g., GO, IO, NGO and PVO).

January 1996

33

declare a name or term for this staff section. The hundreds of GOs, IOs, NGOs and
PVOs operating worldwide understand
that their interface with a military unit
engaged in an operation is through the
CMOC. The term itself implies that civilian
and military agencies work together; it
sends a clear message that this is the focal
point for requesting and coordinating military support.
But the lessons learned from Operations
Provide Comfort, Restore Hope, Support
Hope and Uphold Democracy do need to be
developed into doctrine. Now the CMOC
can be defined as a coordination center

Whether the operations are Army or joint, the

commanders obligation to consider civilians
within the area of operations will never
diminish. Also undiminished will be the need
for a trained CMO officer skilled in the tactics, techniques and procedures required to
execute national objectives successfully as
they apply to civilians.
established and tailored to assist the G5 in
anticipating, facilitating, coordinating and
orchestrating those civil-military functions
and activities pertaining to the civil population, government and economy in areas
where armed forces, GOs, IOs, NGOs and
PVOs are employed.
The CMOC is neither a unit nor an organization. Its purpose is to coordinate the
operations of U.S. and multinational forces
with those of GOs, IOs, NGOs, PVOs and
host-nation agencies and authorities. The
CMOC allows nonmilitary agencies to seek
help and coordination from the military
force. It is an extension of the CMO cell that
provides CA-related information from and
to nonmilitary agencies operating away
from the military headquarters.
The major functions of the CMOC
include:
Providing GOs, IOs, NGOs, PVOs and
other relief agencies with a focal point for
activities and matters relating to the
civilian populace. It serves as a coordina34

tion center for processing agencies

requests for military assistance. Thus,
the CMOC serves as a de facto clearinghouse for coordinating distribution;
exchanging information; identifying GO-,
IO-, NGO- and PVO-related problems;
and developing synergy among the combined assets of the relief agencies.
Coordinating relief efforts with U.S. and
allied commands.
Coordinating with GOs, IOs, NGOs and
PVOs.
Providing interface with the U.S. Information Service, U.S. Agency for International Development and the American
Embassy.
Assisting in the transfer of authority
and handoff of operations from military
forces to host nations, GOs, IOs, NGOs,
PVOs, U.N. agencies or other agencies.
As the commanders focal point for nonmilitary organizations and agencies, the
CMOC should also be used when the synergy of these organizations is required to
enhance planned military activities. In this
capacity, the CMOC would assume a more
active role and process requests for assistance from the military commander to
interested and participating GOs, IOs,
NGOs and PVOs.
CMOCs should be flexible in size and
composition. They may be composed of, or
augmented by, military or civilian representatives from many different agencies.
The CMOC should, at a minimum, consist
of a director, an operations officer, an
administrative and logistics NCO, and
organizational representatives. Mission
requirements, command directives, operational security, workload and accessibility
to nonmilitary agencies will affect the specific organization of a CMOC.
The number of CMOCs supporting a
given operation will depend on the mission
analysis and the distance to the headquarters serving the particular geographic or
tactical area. CMOCs may be established:
In operations where the joint-force
commanders headquarters and the
majority of subordinate units are located close to the civilian or host-nation
diplomatic center and the GO, IO, NGO
and PVO representatives.
Special Warfare

 In operations where the joint-force

headquarters is located in one locale and
the subordinate units are spread
throughout the AOR.
At every level of command, from unified
down to brigade, depending on the tactical control measures and the geographic
area.
Thus, it is conceivable, based on mission,
enemy, terrain, troops, time available and
civilians, or METT-T-C,2 to have more than
one CMOC in an AOR. Commanders will
usually establish a CMOC after an initial
situation assessment shows that coordination with various agencies is needed, or
when operational security requirements
prohibit those agencies access to the main
headquarters.
The security situation and the force-protection posture will dictate the general
location of the CMOC. In a permissive
environment,3 where hostilities are unlikely and the operation is purely civil-military
in nature, the CMOC may be located near
the military-force operations center. In a
semipermissive or nonpermissive environment,4 where the possibility for hostilities
is unknown and the nature of operations
will require limited access to the military
unit, the military-force commander may
locate the CMOC away from the unit in
order not to impede GO, IO, NGO and PVO
coordination.

procedures required to execute national

objectives successfully as they apply to
civilians. Future contingency operations
may also draw the participation of numerous nonmilitary organizations. The need to
coordinate and meet with these organizations is obvious.
Emerging doctrine will inevitably stimulate the research and analysis of more
efficient means of supporting the multifaceted requirements of civil-military
operations, while reshaping our force
structure to support Force XXI, the Army
in the 21st century.

Notes:
1 All CONUS-based Army CA units, both activeand reserve-component, are under the command of
the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C. The U.S. Marine
Corps Reserve maintains two CA units, the 3rd Civil
Affairs Group and the 4th Civil Affairs Group.
2 The JFK Special Warfare Center and School has
proposed to the Army Training and Doctrine Command that the Army term METT-T be amended to
read METT-T-C to incorporate civilians as a planning consideration during mission analysis.
3 No hostilities; host nation can generally guarantee the safety of employed forces.
4 Possible hostilities; host nation cannot guarantee
safety of employed forces.

Conclusion
As Army and joint-level doctrine writers
continue to analyze anticipated requirements for the military and to develop supporting doctrine to keep pace with the
many perceived contingencies, the services
will eventually undergo close scrutiny. For
the most part, the corps and division G5
still plans for and orchestrates activities
that support the commanders intent. His
main concern, however, is with the civilians within the commanders AOR.
Whether the operations are Army or
joint, the commanders obligation to consider civilians within the area of operations will never diminish. Also undiminished will be the need for a trained CMO
officer skilled in the tactics, techniques and
January 1996

35

Joint Task Force Support Hope: The Role

of the CMOC in Humanitarian Operations
by Lieutenant Colonel Stephen O. Wallace

uring the summer of 1994, U.S.

Joint Task Force Support Hope
assisted the United Nations and
world-relief agencies in aiding the victims
of ethnic violence in Rwanda. The operation set new standards for U.S. humanitarian operations, particularly in the role of
the civil-military operations center.
Although the concept of a civil-military
operations center, or CMOC, is not new, very
little doctrine exists concerning CMOC
establishment and operations. The experience of Joint Task Force Support Hope
shows that the CMOC can be the key to successful humanitarian-assistance operations.

Background
On April 6, 1994, Rwandas President
Juvenal Habyarimana died in an airplane
crash, the cause of which remains a mystery. This crash also claimed the life of
Burundis President Cyprian Ntaryamira.
Both Habyarimana and Ntaryamira were
members of the Hutu majority ethnic group.
Some Hutus blamed the minority Tutsi population for the crash, and many Hutus
feared that the Tutsis would take advantage of the civil turmoil following Habyarimanas death to seize control of the nation.
Through state-controlled radio broadcasts, the Hutu government exploited ethnic
hatred against the Tutsis. These broadcasts
led to unrestrained violence and genocide
against the Tutsi population. What resulted
36

struck even the most hardened observers as

horrendous. During the three weeks following the plane crash, more than 200,000 people were believed killed. By the end of June
1994, an estimated 500,000 Rwandans had
been killed, eclipsing the three-year death
toll in the former Yugoslavia.1
These massacres did not go unavenged.
The Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front, or
RPF, under the leadership of Major General
Paul Kagame, moved into the Rwandan capital city of Kigali from positions in northern
Rwanda. By mid-July, the RPF had effectively seized control of the country, driving Hutu
forces into exile in neighboring Zaire and
Burundi. The fighting did not end until late
July, when a fragile cease-fire emerged. Of
Rwandas 8 million people, between 500,000
and 1 million were dead, most of them Tutsis.
More than 2 million other people, mostly
Hutus, were left homeless. Fearing Tutsi
retribution, they fled Rwanda, moving
toward Zaire in a wretched procession that
extended for several miles. Large numbers
of these refugees died en route of starvation and disease. Once the refugees
reached camps around Goma, Zaire, the
death toll continued to climb as a result of
epidemic cholera and dysentery.

JTF Support Hope

On July 22, 1994, President Bill Clinton
directed the commander in chief of the U.S.
European Command to assist humanitariSpecial Warfare

an efforts in Zaire and Rwanda. In

response, USEUCOM activated Joint Task
Force Support Hope, or JTF SH, to aid the
U.N. and the world relief community in
providing humanitarian assistance to the
Rwandan refugees.
The stated USEUCOM mission was to
provide assistance to humanitarian agencies and third-nation forces conducting
theater relief operations intended to alleviate the suffering of Rwandan refugees.
The JTFs priority mission tasks were: provide water purification and water distribution; establish an air bridge and a
materiel-distribution
capability
at
Entebbe, Uganda; provide 24-hour airfieldsupport services to Goma, Kigali, and other
airfields as necessary; and above all,
ensure protection of the force. In effect, the
JTF was chartered to establish overall
management of logistics for humanitarian
assistance, or HA, in support of the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees, or
UNHCR, and other relief organizations.2
To accomplish its tasks, the JTF SH would
have to coordinate military and civilian
efforts throughout the crisis area. This
meant establishing and maintaining coordination with the following:
Other governmental agencies and
organizations; for example, the Disaster
Assistance Response Team, or DART, from
the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance,
or OFDA, which is part of the U.S. Agency
for International Development.
U.N. agencies and organizations, such
as the UNHCR, the U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda, the U.N. Rwanda Emergency Office, or UNREO, the U.N. Development Program, the World Food Program,
and the World Health Organization.
International relief organizations, such
as the International Committee of the Red
Cross.
More than 80 nongovernmental organizations, or NGOs, and private voluntary
organizations, or PVOs. These were registered with the U.N. and were operating in
Rwanda and Zaire.
The tasks for which JTF SH was organized were complex and involved a wide
geographic area. The organizational structure of the JTF was tailored accordingly
January 1996

in addition to the JTF Main, two sub-task

forces were formed: JTF A to conduct operations in Goma, Zaire; and JTF B to conduct operations in Rwanda. The complexity of the operations was compounded by
the demands of establishing and maintaining coordination with the diverse
relief organizations. The civil-military
operations center, or CMOC, was the primary organization used by JTF SH to
coordinate and synchronize the humanitarian-relief operations.3
The CMOC receives, validates and coordinates support requests; identifies available resources; and monitors the status of
ongoing relief operations. The CMOC concept evolved during Operation Provide
Relief, when support requests from the
international relief community were initially presented directly to the military
commander, who juggled those requests
with other missions. The CMOC was developed as a staff element that would serve as
the primary interface between the JTF and
relief agencies.

Command and control

JTF Support Hopes operations were
divided into five phases:
Phase 1: Stabilize the situation in
Goma.
Phase 2: Move refugees back toward
Rwanda.
Phase 3: Support stability in Rwanda.

An aircraft delivers relief

supplies to the airport at
Entebbe, Uganda.

Photo by Stephen Wallace

37

Command and Control of JTF SUPPORT HOPE CMOCs

JTF SUPPORT
HOPE

JTF A
GOMA

CMOC
ENTEBBE

CMOC
KIGALI

CMOC
GOMA

Phase 4: Turn operations over to the

UNHCR.
Phase 5: Redeploy the force.
The JTF SH commander divided the
operational area into four geographic support areas: Entebbe, Uganda; Goma, Zaire;
Kigali, Rwanda; and Mombassa, Kenya.4 A
CMOC was established at each location
except Mombassa U.S. forces there did
not need a CMOC, since their operations
were essentially restricted to airlift and
port activities. JTF SH used its mission
analysis to configure the CMOCs into the
command-and-control structure depicted
above.5
CMOC Entebbe coordinated with the
international relief community throughout
the JTF SH operational area. It provided
interface between the other CMOCs and
the JTF, assisting the CMOCs in coordinating JTF support. The JTF commander
provided direct oversight for each CMOC
except the one in Goma, which he assigned
to the commander of JTF A. The JTF B
commander organized a separate Civil
Affairs cell to maintain liaison with local
officials and to coordinate projects in
Kigali. The chiefs of CMOC Entebbe and
CMOC Kigali were colonels, and the chief
38

JTF B
KIGALI

CIVIL AFFAIRS
CELL

of CMOC Goma was a major. The primary

mission for each CMOC, regardless of its
location, was the same: Ensure effective
coordination of military and civilian efforts
in HA operations by providing a forum for
cooperation between all the principal agencies involved.

Structure and operations

There is no precise formula or method
used in determining the size and the structure of a CMOC; these are entirely mission-dependent. In JTF Support Hope, the
size and the capabilities of each CMOC
varied according to its mission. Dynamic
changes enabled the commanders to meet
varying mission demands. A thorough mission analysis and a needs assessment of
each operational area served as the basis
for the structural development and the
personnel assignment process for each
CMOC. The JTF commander then tailored
each CMOC according to specific mission
requirements.
The following tasks were common to all
the CMOCs:
Promulgate and explain JTF policies to
U.N. agencies, NGOs and PVOs.
Special Warfare

 Provide information to U.N. agencies,

NGOs and PVOs regarding JTF operations and general security operations.
Receive and process requests for military support from U.N. agencies, NGOs
and PVOs.
Convene and host mission-planning
groups for complex military-support
requests involving multiple military elements and groups of NGOs and PVOs.
Represent the JTF in various meetings
and forums hosted by the U.N.
Maintain coordination with lateral
CMOCs.6
The international airport at Entebbe
served as the theaters transportation hub.
Accordingly, it served as the intermediate
staging base for logistics delivery and as
the entry point for all U.S. military personnel as well as the majority of U.N., NGO
and PVO personnel. CMOC Entebbe
assumed responsibility for transportation
and remained a primary focal point
throughout the operation.

ed for Kigali and Goma was handled as priority cargo and that it was expedited on
inter-theater aircraft. CMOC Entebbe also
assumed responsibility for many currentoperations functions, including data tracking and analysis, that were essential to the
JTF commanders decision-making.7

CMOC Kigali
CMOC Kigali, consisting of two military
members and one OFDA/DART representative, commenced operations on Aug. 7.
This CMOC conducted a major portion of
its operations in coordination with the On
Site Operations Coordination Center, or

CMOC Entebbe
CMOC Entebbe began operations on
July 28, 1994, and initially functioned with
four military personnel and one
OFDA/DART civilian. By Aug. 25, CMOC
Entebbe had expanded its staff to eight
military personnel and three OFDA/DART
representatives to meet ongoing taskings.
Placing the DART reps and CMOC
Entebbe personnel in the same location
allowed them to better orchestrate the
movement of aid from U.S. government
civilian agencies. Their proximity and coordination proved essential to CMOC
Entebbes success.
CMOC Entebbes most important function was to coordinate and prioritize movement of relief aircraft into the humanitarian-crisis areas of Kigali and Goma. To
increase the effectiveness of relief airlift
operations, CMOC Entebbe and the
UNHCR cell established a combined logistics cell. This cell processed and screened
in-theater requests for air support and provided prioritized lists to the UNHCR movements cell in Geneva, Switzerland. It also
ensured that critical relief materiel allocatJanuary 1996

Photo by Stephen Wallace

OSOCC, created by the UNREO to help

coordinate the international response to
the crisis in Rwanda.
Modeled after the CMOC structure, the
OSOCC evolved into the focal point for
U.N.-led operations in Rwanda and Zaire.
Personnel from CMOC Kigali attended all
OSOCC meetings and worked within a
special logistics cell in the OSOCC, primarily preparing contingency plans to support
anticipated refugee movements.
To assist the World Food Program in
Kigali, CMOC Kigali obtained additional
personnel from CMOC Entebbe and a sixperson movements control team from
EUCOM. These additional personnel provided expertise in logistics management,
inventory control and movements control.

Soldiers from CMOC Kigali

examine a map at the On
Site Operations Coordination Center in Kigali.

39

tion of both water and relief supplies.

Although the humanitarian conditions
remained tragic by any standard, estimated deaths in the Goma camps decreased
from 3,000 per day at the end of July to
fewer than 500 per day by mid-August.
CMOC Goma ceased operations on Aug. 23;
its civil-military responsibilities were
assumed by CMOC Entebbe.9

Future challenges

Photo by Stephen Wallace

Rwandan refugees in
Goma, Zaire. Water distribution and sanitation in the
refugee camps were the
greatest priorities for members of CMOC Goma.

They helped establish efficient warehouse

management and put into service more
than 400 trucks belonging to the U.N. and
assorted NGOs and PVOs. As the focus
shifted from Entebbe to Kigali in late
August, the CMOC senior officer moved
from Entebbe to Kigali to better direct
operations. Charged with coordinating all
CMOC activities with the U.S. Embassy in
Kigali, this officer also served as a member
of the ambassadors country team.8

CMOC Goma
CMOC Goma began operations on July
30, with three military members assigned.
Its primary function was to coordinate
water distribution to the refugee camps
around Goma. The U.N. baseline water
standard for each refugee was five liters
per day for survival and 10 liters per day
for health maintenance. According to the
estimated refugee population in the Goma
area, the daily water requirement was 3.2
million liters. By Aug. 13, the UNHCR
reported that the U.S., U.N., French and
German efforts were providing enough
water to support between 600,000 and
800,000 refugees.
CMOC Goma also coordinated and prioritized engineer projects within its operational area. Initially, CMOC Gomas priority was sanitation and burial services. This
priority later shifted to road repair, which
was essential for improving the distribu40

Other than Civil Affairs personnel, there

are few DoD military and civilian personnel who have the training and experience
necessary to establish and operate a
CMOC. The increasing number of humanitarian-assistance operations in which DoD
is involved highlights the need for an
extensive understanding of the CMOC, its
organization and the problems likely to be
encountered by the force.
The CMOC can be the key to successful
humanitarian-assistance operations, providing open interface and coordination
with all host-nation and U.N. agencies,
NGOs and PVOs. Its objective is to achieve
a thorough understanding of each organizations particular culture. Emerging
joint and service doctrine is making significant strides in promoting this understanding; however, we should place a high premium on practical experience. Valuable
experience and understanding can be
acquired from a number of sources:
Interagency, NGO and PVO training
incorporated into service training
programs.
NGO, PVO and U.N. personnel invited to
participate in collective training programs, training-center rotations and
exercises.
HA symposiums sponsored as part of a
larger effort to exchange knowledge of
U.N. and interagency operations and
procedures.
Utilization of Civil Affairs personnel in
selected U.N. billets.
A key CMOC function in any HA operation is that it serves as the central clearinghouse for humanitarian-relief information and coordination. Such a service is
essential in using military resources effecSpecial Warfare

tively to support relief agencies and in

reducing duplication of effort between military and nonmilitary resources.
While most NGOs and PVOs willingly
accept guidance from the UNHCR as the
lead coordinating agency, some do not. The
CMOC offers those organizations unwilling or unable to follow the UNHCRs lead a
forum through which they can coordinate
their efforts with military support operations. A training program between the military and the civilian relief community
offers a significant potential for developing
and refining the operating procedures and
the databases that are essential in coordinated operations.
Selection of personnel for the CMOC
staff presents another challenge to HA
planners and force commanders. During
JTF Support Hope, the JTF commander
selected an ad hoc team of personnel based
on their experience in peace operations
and on their expertise as regional foreignarea officers. This group performed
superbly until Civil Affairs personnel from
the 353rd Civil Affairs Command and the
96th Civil Affairs Battalion could be
deployed into theater. However, personnel
of that caliber and experience may not
always be available for a given mission.
Civil Affairs personnel are likely to be
the best choice for the core staff of a
CMOC. Their unique training and mission
orientation enable them to provide a clear
focus on the organizations tasks. The integration of CA direct-support teams, civicaction teams and other support teams provides a combination of skills essential in
assessing and conducting core CMOC
tasks during an HA operation.10 Delayed
deployment of these key CA players can
significantly inhibit the militarys contribution to HA efforts.

Success
JTF Support Hope can be considered a
successful HA operation by any measure.
Innumerable lives were saved because of
EUCOMs quick response to the crisis. JTF
Support Hope also demonstrated that the
U.S. can remain strategically engaged in
world affairs without the unnecessary cost
January 1996

and mission creep that have previously

hindered the success of similar operations.
In an operation that spanned 77 days,
JTF Support Hope set a new standard for
future U.S. humanitarian operations. Its
actions incorporated every essential element associated with successful HA operations: a quick humanitarian response;
assistance to the relief community in
developing a long-term capability; an effective transition of operations without degradation of support; and a rapid redeployment of the force.11

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen

O. Wallace is chief of the Doctrine and Education Division
of the Army-Air Force Center
for Low-Intensity Conflict,
Langley AFB, Va. An Engineer
officer, he has held command
positions in both Engineer and Psychological
Operations units. His previous assignments
include tours in Germany and in the South
Pacific. Wallace holds a masters degree from
the University of Oklahoma.
Notes:
1 John Garabedian, Terrorism Kills Over 500,000 in
Rwanda: Violence and Combatting Terrorism Update
(Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College, September 1994), p. 1.
2 Joint Task Force Support Hope, Operations Plan
94-004 (U), Stuttgart, Germany, 6 August 1994, pp. 7-8.
3 Colonel Karl Farris, Operation SUPPORT HOPE
CMOC Operations, After-Action Report, 1 September
1994, p. 2.
4 JTF SH, OPLAN 94-004. pp. 9-11.
5 Farris, JTF SH CMOC Operations AAR, p. 2.
6 Ibid., p. 3.
7 Colonel Paul R. Monacelli, After-Action Report,
Operation Support Hope, 23 September 1994, p. 10.
8 Colonel Paul R. Monacelli, CMOC Summary, Operation Support Hope, Mission Highlights, 12 September
1994, pp. 2-3.
9 Farris, JTF SH, CMOC Operations AAR, p. 6.
10 Monacelli, After-Action Report, Operation Support Hope, p. 19.
11 USCINCEUR Message, Subj: CINCEUR Assessment of Humanitarian Operations in Rwanda,
Remarks 18-19.

41

Dick Meadows: A Quiet Professional

by Captain Jay Ashburner

Captain Dick Meadows

receiving the Silver Star.

n July 29, 1995, the special-operations community lost a true legend

with the passing of retired Major
Richard J. Dick Meadows. His extraordinary exploits spanned more than three
decades and included the most widely
known and defining missions in the history of U.S. special operations. Dick Meadows
exemplified devotion to duty, serving as a
noncommissioned officer, as a commissioned officer, and after his retirement, as a
civilian special consultant (read operator)
to U.S. Army Special Forces and the joint
SOF community.
Meadows was born June 16, 1931, in
rural Virginia, and enlisted in the Army in
August 1947, at the age of 16. His first

Photo courtesy Mark Meadows

42

service was with the 456th Field Artillery

Battalion of the 82nd Airborne Division.
In early 1951 Meadows volunteered for
assignment to the 674th Field Artillery Battalion, 187th Regimental Combat Team,
Korea. There he served with distinction and
become the youngest master sergeant in the
war, at age 20. After serving in Korea,
Meadows volunteered for Special Forces,
and in March of 1953 he was assigned to the
10th Special Forces Group. For the next 24
years, Meadows served in the SOF community, with assignments to both Ranger and
Special Forces units.
In 1960, Meadows was selected to participate in an exchange program between the
7th Special Forces Group and the British 22
Special Air Service Regiment, or SAS. He
was the first NCO to be selected for the program, and his performance with the SAS
was distinguished by several milestones: He
completed the SAS selection course; he was
the first of two foreign soldiers to be awarded SAS wings; and he served for 12 months
as a troop commander, a position normally
held by a British captain. While serving with
the SAS, Meadows was selected to participate in a real-world mission in Oman
against terrorists and gun smugglers.
Meadows first experience in the Southeast Asian theater came with an assignment
to Operation White Star in Laos. White Star
was a foreign-internal-defense mission, conducted to advise, assist, equip and train
Laotian government forces in counterinsurSpecial Warfare

gency operations against the North Vietnamese-backed Pathet Lao forces. The
intent of White Star was to secure the sovereignty of Laos and to provide a buffer
between friendly Thailand and communist
North Vietnam. Meadows not only assisted
in establishing and organizing Royal Lao
Army regular forces but also participated in
an unconventional-warfare mission with
tribal guerrilla fighters. It was while he was
in Laos that Meadows met Lieutenant
Colonel Arthur D. Bull Simons and worked
with him on a program to organize and arm
the Kha tribal groups.
After returning from Laos, Meadows
spent the next three years in Panama,
where he helped establish the 8th Special
Forces Group in the Canal Zone. There, he
was a standout in Operation Black Palm, a
training exercise using U.S. Special Forces
and members of the Panamanian Defense
Force to test the existing security of the
Panama Canal. During one 48-hour period
in the operation, Meadows and his team,
playing the part of soldiers captured by the
PDF, escaped from jail and, without being
detected, planted simulated demolition
charges on one the Canals most heavily
guarded locks.
In 1965 Meadows volunteered for a second tour in Southeast Asia. This tour took
him to Vietnam and to one of the most secretive and elite units of the war, the Military
Assistance Command Vietnam/Studies and
Observation Group, or MACV/SOG. Operational detachments of this unit conducted
what were arguably the most dangerous
missions of the Vietnam War. SOG personnel operated beyond the constraints of territorial borders, performing a myriad of
covert missions throughout Southeast Asia.
They specialized in intelligence-gathering
and direct action in the heart of areas either
controlled or dominated by the enemy. Once
again, Meadows excelled.
During one of Meadows first cross-border reconnaissance missions into Laos, his
team captured a battery of Russian-made
75 mm howitzers, still packed in Cosmoline, being shipped south from North Vietnam. As proof of their find, Meadows team
returned from the mission with the Russian-made fire-control equipment. This
January 1996

Captain Dick Meadows

(right) on the radio directing
operations somewhere in
Southeast Asia during the
Vietnam War.
Photo courtesy Mark Meadows

was the first concrete evidence to support

President Lyndon Johnsons claim that the
Vietnam conflict was more than an internal revolutionary war. This proof of external sponsorship was of such importance
that General William C. Westmoreland, the
senior U.S. commander in Vietnam, personally debriefed Meadows and his team.
Meadows completed more than two dozen
missions into North Vietnam and Laos.
Westmoreland recommended him for a battlefield commission, the first of the Vietnam
War and one of only two that Westmoreland
would make during his four years as commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam.
Upon completion of this tour, Meadows
was assigned to Fort Benning, Ga., where
on April 14, 1967, he received a direct
appointment to captain.
Meadows subsequently returned to Vietnam, for a second MACV/SOG tour, and
once again returned to Fort Benning, where
he served with the Ranger Department.
In 1970, Meadows was chosen by two of
his former commanders to participate in
perhaps the most famous mission of the
Vietnam War, Operation Ivory Coast.
Brigadier General Donald Blackburn, the
former commanding officer of MACV/SOG,
43

and now-Colonel Bull Simons, who had

served under Blackburn in SOG, selected
Meadows as the assault-element leader for
the raid on the Son Tay prison camp, 23
miles from Hanoi. Meadows 14-man team
intentionally crash-landed its helicopter
inside the camp walls, and seized and held
the compound for 27 minutes in an attempt
to rescue approximately 70 U.S. POWs.
No POWs were found in the camp they
had been moved several months earlier
and controversy still surrounds the Son Tay
mission. Some have called the effort futile,
yet the meticulous planning and preparation; the monumental efforts to coordinate
Army, Air Force and Navy assets; and the
almost total secrecy protecting the operation have become a model for strategic surgical-strike missions. What has never been
disputed is the degree of dedication and
valor exhibited by those men who volunteered for the mission. Also beyond dispute
is the missions impact on the world and on
North Vietnam in particular, demonstrating
the national resolve and the determination
of the United States to recover its POWs.
Following the raid at Son Tay, Meadows
was promoted to major and served a tour in
the 10th Special Forces Group. He concluded his military career in 1977 as the training officer and deputy commander for the
jungle phase of Ranger School at Camp
Rudder, Eglin Air Force Base, Fla.
Having retired with 30 years of service,
24 of them in special operations, Meadows
continued to serve U.S. national interests
as a special consultant for the organization
and the establishment of the 1st Special
Forces Operational Detachment-Delta,
which was under the command of Colonel
Charlie Beckwith.
Again, Dick Meadows was the right man,
in the right place, at exactly the right time.
He was instrumental in the planning, the
preparation and the execution of Operation
Eagle Claw. On April 24, 1980, nearly 200
members of a U.S. joint special-operations
task force infiltrated Iran by air in an
attempt to rescue 53 Americans held
hostage in the American Embassy in
Tehran. For more than a week prior to the
rescue attempt, Dick Meadows had been on
the ground, conducting clandestine mission44

support activities in and around Tehran.

Again a volunteer, he was operating undercover as an Irish citizen working for a European auto company.
At the time, Eagle Claw was the largest
and most audacious response by any world
power to the emerging threat of terrorism.
Regrettably, a disastrous aircraft collision
at Desert One claimed the lives of eight
U.S. personnel, forcing the mission to be
aborted. Although the mission failed, the
courage and the commitment of Meadows
and his fellow rescuers did not.
After the aborted hostage-rescue mission,
Meadows broke off official employment with
the military, but he continued to help organize other special-mission units and served
as a consultant in U.S. efforts to thwart
criminal drug trafficking. He worked for a
short period for H. Ross Perot, advising and
assisting him on security matters.
More recently, Meadows had worked in
Central and South American countries,
training security personnel in everything
from basic security procedures to antiterrorist precautions.
The resum of Dick Meadows remarkable
career captures the highlights of recent special-operations history. But what it cannot
capture are his depth and strength of character: Despite his consummate achievements, Meadows remained a modest individual who was more interested in his next
mission than in his past accomplishments.
While others in the special-operations community sought fame, Dick Meadows, who
contributed greatly to the legacy of U.S. special operations, religiously maintained a low
profile and avoided the press. Because of his
humbleness, his dedication and his accomplishments, Dick Meadows will endure as a
personification of the Quiet Professional.

Captain Jay Ashburner is assigned to the

Special Forces Doctrine Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, JFK Special Warfare Center and School. A graduate
of the University of Alaska-Fairbanks, he
has served in the 5th Infantry Division
(Mechanized) and in the 10th SF Group as
a detachment commander.
Special Warfare

USACAPOCs FOCUS Project:

Waging the War for Information
by Brigadier General Joel G. Blanchette

rom World War II-era barracks on

distant Army posts to the carpeted
headquarters of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, an information
war is being waged daily in Army administration sections. It involves every
administrative clerk, every unit and every
command. At stake are readiness, efficient
training plans, soldier development,
school allocations, and assignment opportunities. Although this information war
may never end, one command the Army
Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations
Command won a silent but impressive
battle in 1995.
The Army has made numerous advances
in information management over the last
few years with the creation of diverse databases that provide vast amounts of information. The problem, however, has been
the Armys inability to bring the various
databases together to maximize the use of
that information.
Information on soldiers exists at each
unit level and in several forms: Some information is stored in manual systems, such
as DA 201 files and medical records. Other
data, such as SOF certification information, exists in automated databases. Personnel information is contained in both
manual and computerized versions of the
Standard Installation/Division Personnel
System, or SIDPERS. Some personnel
information is also maintained at intermediate and higher headquarters and at each

January 1996

major subordinate unit.

Because there is no central data bank in
which to store personnel information, higher headquarters inundate subordinate
units with phone and fax inquiries and
requests for recurring and one-time
reports. Recipients may have two hours or
less to respond to these requests. It is
impossible for any one individual to know
all of the military and civilian skills of the
soldiers in a unit. Rather than searching
through hundreds of DA 201 files, medical
files, mobilization files and several databases, the person responsible for answering the
queries might guess at the answers, causing subsequent decisions to be based on
inaccurate information and creating an
administrative fog of war.

Challenges
For any command to be able to make
well-informed decisions, it must have upto-date information on all its soldiers. The
U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological
Operations Command, or USACAPOC,
comprises 69 active- and reserve-component units, spread among 26 states and
the District of Columbia. Approximately
85 percent of USACAPOCs soldiers are in
the Army Reserve.
USACAPOC units are continually barraged by requests for information: How
many of your soldiers can speak French at
the 3/3 level? Of those, who can deploy?
45

How many have passed the PT test? Do

they all meet height and weight standards? When did they take their last physical? Are they MOS-qualified? How many
electrical engineers, city planners, farmers
or veterinarians are there in your unit? To
obtain the answers, commanders and staffs
must struggle to collect information from a
variety of sources.
Because of the operations tempo of our
Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations
units, leaders need to be able to ask questions about their personnel inventory and
receive correct answers in seconds rather
than days. In May 1994, USACAPOC
established the FOCUS project, bringing
together a team of information-management specialists to develop a means that
would link together all the necessary databases in order to provide immediate data.
The project derived its name from the commercial software application FOCUS,
which the Army uses to access various
databases, and from the idea that the project would merge information from a variety of databases into one resource.

Merging databases
Over the last few decades, the Army has
developed a number of databases that
operate using FOCUS. The three most
commonly used by USACAPOC and the
Army Reserve are the Center Level Applications System, or CLAS; the Daily Orders
and Ledgers Finance System, or
DOLFINS; and the Army Training
Resource Requirement System, or ATRRS.
The personnel module within the CLAS is
used to update the current SIDPERS database. The CLAS database also has the
request for orders (DA Form 1058) system
and the pay system for Army Reserve soldiers, both of which are critical in routine
administrative operations. The DOLFINS
database is used to publish orders for every
tour of duty a reservist performs; it is also
used for managing funds. The ATRRS
database is used to reserve school slots in
most of the Armys training courses.
Together, these three databases contain
the data needed to meet peacetime and
wartime information requirements.
46

Prior to 1994, CLAS and DOLFINS

were the only command-wide centralized
databases in USACAPOC. Since requests
for orders and the orders themselves contain substantial data on each soldier, certain types of information about the soldier
inventory could be requested and
retrieved from the two systems. For example, a list of all the soldiers who had
requested a Civil Affairs course could be
obtained from the CLAS database prior to
the start date shown on DA Form 1058,
Request for Orders. A list of soldiers who
had received orders to attend the course
could be generated from the DOLFINS
database. However, by merging the two
systems, we could get a printout showing
soldiers who had orders to attend and soldiers for whom orders had not yet been
cut. A staff officer or a commander could
then use the list to ensure that those soldiers who had not received their orders
would do so in time to attend the course.
This capability was developed by the
FOCUS project team during the summer
of 1994.
Because the ATRRS database was not
integrated with the other two systems,
one unknown remained: We could not
determine whether all the soldiers who
had a reserved slot in ATRRS had
requested orders or whether they had
received them. For that information, we
had to link ATRRS to the FOCUS database already containing CLAS and
DOLFINS information. The newly created
database, which merged all three systems,
enabled USAR units to better manage the
entire school-request and order-generating process.
Even after the CLAS, DOLFINS and
ATRRS databases had been centralized,
vital personnel information was still missing. Unless a soldier had requested or
received orders via DA Form 1058 or had
requested a school slot, none of the three
systems was aware of his existence. The
entry-level information is located in the
SIDPERS database. This database comprises 211 separate fields on each soldier
and is the only system with all the
required personnel information. In January 1995, SIDPERS information from all
Special Warfare

USACAPOC subordinate units was linked

to the master FOCUS database. With the
addition of SIDPERS, the current database
contains crucial information, as it exists in
each units CLAS computer, on all
USACAPOC reserve soldiers.

Examples
The information in the chart below was
extracted from a report generated by the
FOCUS database. The purpose of the
report was to identify USACAPOC soldiers who had school slots reserved
between 1 April 1995 and 30 September
1995 in the ATRRS database and to identify those who had submitted a request for
orders but had not received them. The
report is sorted into categories by MSU
and subordinate-unit designation. Names
are listed alphabetically. The unit name,
soldiers name, rank and SSN come from
the personnel file within the CLAS database, which is used to update the SIDPERS database. The 1058 report date and
the control number come from the centralized 1058 (request for orders) database in the USASOC resource-management section. The information on the
ATRRS course, ATRRS report date and

ATRRS residence status come from the

ATRRS database in the Pentagons mainframe computer. The DOLFINS order
number comes from the DOLFINS
(orders) database in the USASOC
resource-management section. If there is
a control number, there is also a DA Form
1058. The example indicates that orders
have been requested on all the soldiers,
but that orders have been published for
only the first seven; the last five soldiers
have no orders. With a slight modification
to the program, a report could be produced listing only those soldiers who are
without orders or who have not yet
requested them via CLAS.
Upon receiving a heads up to identify
15 military lawyers for deployment to Haiti
for Operation Uphold Democracy, the commander of USACAPOC, Major General
Donald Campbell, asked for a list of all the
lawyers in the command. The database was
queried for soldiers with 55A as their primary specialty, and within two minutes, it
generated an alphabetical list of 61
lawyers, along with their ranks, Social
Security numbers, units of assignment and
home and work phone numbers. During an
earlier test to retrieve data on all medical
doctors in USACAPOC, the computer

USASOC Sample Report of Combined Databases

UNIT
NAME:

SIDPERS
NAME:

SIDPERS
RANK:

SIDPERS
SSN:

1058
RPTDTE:

ATRRS
CRS:

1058
CONTROL NO:

DOLFINS ATRRS
ATRRS
ORDER#: RPTDTE: RES. STAT:

1ST POC (TSC)

ZIMMERMAN THOMAS Z.

SSG

000-00-0000

362ND POC (TSC)

SMITH JOHNATHON

SGT

000-00-0000

95/06/29

243-37F40-RC

WTLSAA9S0001

047007

950629

95/07/16

331-37F10

WSQWAA950018

080722

950730

362ND POC (TSC)

TAYLOR DANIEL A.

SPC

000-00-0000

95/07/30

331-37F10

WSQWAA950049

091024

950730

39TH POC (EPW)

SMITH SAMUEL B.

SGT

000-00-0000

95/07/16

331-37F30

WRV4AA950016

061032

950716

39TH POC (EPW)

TAYLOR MARK

SGT

000-00-0000

95/07/16

331-37F10

WRV4AA950005

061027

950716

305 POC

SMITH JOHN R.

SSG

000-00-0000

HHC 7TH PSYOP

95/06/29

243-37F40-RC

WSQZAA950025

061059

950629

MASON DANIEL P.

SGT

000-00-0000

95/08/05

331-37F30

WTMFAA950039

087044

950805

2ND PSYOP GROUP

7TH PSYOP GROUP

351ST CA CMD
351ST CA CMD

SMALL DAN T.

SSG

000-00-0000

95/07/22

331-38A10

WYBKAA950031

950722

364TH CA BDE

MILES STEVEN M.

MSG

000-00-0000

95/07/22

331-38A10

WYBSAA950034

950722

364TH CA BDE

RUDOLPH ANTHONY D.

SSG

000-00-0000

95/07/22

331-38A10

WYBSAA950030

950722

364TH CA BDE

TURNER CAROL N.

SSG

000-00-0000

95/07/09

331-38A40

WYBSAA95011 I

950729

331-38A10

WRTEA0950015

950729

353RD CA CMD
404 CA BN GP DET

January 1996

SPERRY RANDAL P.

MSG

000-00-0000

95/07/09

47

Soldiers may carry records

embedded in ID cards
It is conceivable that in the future, every soldier will have
an ID card with an embedded microchip containing all of his
or her personal, medical, training and finance information.
Upon deployment, the soldier would insert the ID card into a
home-station computer, and the computer would download all
mobilization-related information. Once the soldier arrived at
the maneuver unit of assignment in theater, he would insert
his card into a computer there for an instant update of all relevant information. Upon demobilization, the soldier would
follow the same procedures, in reverse.
This system, or a similar one, could be in place within the
next decade the technology is already available. In order to
help establish such a system, commanders and leaders at all
levels must ensure that the information in their unit computers is complete, current and accurate. Brigadier General Joel G. Blanchette

researched the master FOCUS database

and printed the requested list in 45 seconds. These examples demonstrate the
information power that unit commanders
and staffs in USACAPOC now have at their
fingertips.

Future
While an enormous amount of work has
been completed on the FOCUS database,
more remains. USACAPOC is working to
add data regarding the civilian skills of our
reserve-component soldiers (especially
those in Civil Affairs) and data on our
active-component soldiers from both the
4th PSYOP Group and the 96th Civil
Affairs Battalion. Information on activeduty soldiers will be obtained from the
active-component SIDPERS databases and
downloaded as ASCII files to the FOCUS
database. The FOCUS software will easily
allow importation of these files.
The civilian-skills database will include
the professional and unique qualifications
of the soldier and will list civilian education and degrees. Unlike the SIDPERS
database, which limits the number of
entries for languages a soldier has mastered, the new system will handle an
48

unlimited number of entries. It will contain

all foreign travel and all overseas experience for each soldier. It will also include a
list of any articles a soldier has published.
The civilian-skills database will be stored
in the CLAS, and as CLAS information
moves up the chain nightly, the civilianskills database will be included.
With the addition of the civilian skills
and the active-component information, the
FOCUS project will be complete, and the
master FOCUS database will be available
in each USACAPOC unit headquarters.
Each night, computers in the higher headquarters will automatically call subordinate-unit computers to exchange information. By daybreak, computers from company level through USACAPOC headquarters will have received updated information available through the CLAS,
DOLFINS, ATRRS, SIDPERS and Active
Army databases.
Any questions pertaining to personnel
and training across the command will be
answered instantaneously with near-realtime information. The information can be
formatted into any style the requester
prefers. Columns of information can be
generated from any of the several hundred
data fields within the master FOCUS database. If a specific field does not exist, one
can be created and automatically passed
down the chain for each units input. From
that point, this fields information will be
rolled up, along with all the other fields, to
the master FOCUS database. Fields could
be created to include the date a soldier
received his last DNA test, or to name soldiers who can deploy on short notice and
how long they can be deployed without creating undue hardship or losing their civilian employment. Although such fields have
not existed in previous databases used by
the command, they could prove extremely
valuable.
To maximize the potential of this information power, it is critical that units
maintain current and accurate databases.
Outdated or incomplete databases will
degrade the systems otherwise potent
capabilities. Maintaining the databases is
not as difficult as it may seem. Once all
the fields in a soldiers records have been
Special Warfare

completed, approximately 20 fields will

require annual or occasional updating.
Fields that will require updating include
scores on the Army Physical Fitness Test,
the latest physical-exam dates, promotion
data, and weapons-firing dates with
scores. Units that successfully manage
these changes will contribute to their own
effectiveness and to that of USACAPOC
as a whole. Any questions or suggestions
on how to improve this process should be
directed to members of the FOCUS Project Team at DSN 239-3022 or commercial
(910) 432-3022.

Brigadier General Joel G.

Blanchette is deputy commander of the Army Civil
Affairs and Psychological
Operations Command. His
previous assignment was
commander of the 354th
Civil Affairs Brigade. Since 1972 he has
held a variety of command and staff
assignments in the Army Reserve, including commander of the 5th PSYOP Group;
commander of the 428th Military Intelligence Detachment (Strategic); deputy chief
of staff for operations with the headquarters, 97th Army Reserve Command; and
various staff positions in the 462nd Military Intelligence Detachment (Strategic).
He is a graduate of the National War College and has completed the Symposium of
Strategic Intelligence at the Defense Intelligence College, the Foreign Area Officer
Course and the Civil Affairs Officer Course
(Phase II). He holds a bachelors degree in
French from the University of Maine and a
masters degree in business management
from Central Michigan University, Washington, D.C.

January 1996

49

Civil-Military Seminars: 361st CA Builds

Understanding Between the Americas
by Captain Bethany L. Lenderman

hile the world focuses on contingency operations in areas like

Bosnia and Haiti, the 361st Civil
Affairs Brigade has an ongoing program in
Latin America that allows soldiers to foster
professional relationships with our neighbors to the south.
The 361sts Professional Development
Program, or PDP, is making great strides
in its efforts to promote the value of civilmilitary operations to Central and South
American militaries. At the same time, the
program provides real-world training
opportunities for reserve- and active-component personnel.
The PDP is actually a series of seminars tailored to various Latin American
countries. Officers and NCOs travel to
host nations to discuss Civil Affairs topics
with foreign military officers and government officials. During conferences that
average five days, participants exchange
information on topics such as public service, military professionalism and community relations.
According to Lieutenant Colonel Winston Cover, chief of the Plans Division at
U.S. Army South, the PDPs roots can be
traced to 1983, when Colonel Charles
Stone, commander of the U.S. Military
Group in Panama, sought to enhance rapport with the Panamanian National
Guard. In March of that year, reservists
from the 361st conducted Civil Affairs seminars in Panama. Attendees included mili-

50

tary and government officials from the U.S.

and from Panama. Discussions centered on
military civic actions in areas such as education, agriculture and health. The initial
seminars were well-attended and resulted
in the creation of two significant activities.
In 1983, the first medical, dental, veterinary and engineering exercise, or
MEDRETE, was conducted in Panama as a
joint and combined humanitarian/civicaction mission. U.S. and Panamanian Navy
vessels transported U.S. military medical
personnel and Panamanian military and
government medical and dental personnel
to the Veraguas Province. During the exercise, more than 500 patients received treatment, proving that a MEDRETE exercise
could be performed in a Latin American
country not known for its cooperative attitude toward the U.S.
The second offshoot of the initial seminars was the engineering readiness training exercise, or ENRETE. The first
ENRETE, Blazing Trails, began in Panama
in 1984. Between January and May, 80
kilometers of road were built in the Azuero
Peninsula, which opened markets for farmers and merchants. Thousands of Army
Reserve and National Guard troops now
deploy to Latin America each year to participate in similar projects.
In the same way that the MEDRETE and
the ENRETE took on lives of their own, the
seminar program itself grew. Word of the
seminars success spread swiftly throughout
Special Warfare

the region. Soon Ecuador, El Salvador,

Guatemala and Honduras requested civicaction seminars. By 1985, the attempt to
increase rapport with the Panamanian
National Guard had expanded into a program that reached across Latin America.
The 361sts PDP, known in other units
as military-to-military operations, has
been requested by 15 Latin American
countries. U.S. Embassies and their military groups make nations aware of the
program and emphasize that the seminars are available. Through the U.S.
Embassy, countries request seminars and
specify topics. Once a request goes
through the chain of command and reaches the 361st, it is reviewed by officers who
write a mission concept to cover the topic,
tailoring it to the host nation. Once the
concept has been completed and reviewed,
a seminar is scheduled. Basic PDP topics
include CA organization and training; CA
in support of combat operations; reservecomponent concepts, force structure and
development; CA support in a peacekeeping-operations environment; and disaster
preparedness and CA support.
The 361st has about 20 officers and NCOs
who are active in the program, including

some active-duty soldiers from the 96th CA

Battalion. Colonel Dan Dull, 361st PDP program manager, insists on several qualities
in PDP candidates. They must be Civil
Affairs subject-matter experts, fluent in
Spanish, personable and flexible. Language
is important, but without the other characteristics, the person is not qualified, Dull
said. Individuals must also be positive role
models, since theyll be representing the
U.S. government.
The biggest stressor for me is the language, said Colonel Reid Jaffe, a long-time
member of the PDP pool. The key is not
only speaking the language, but to be comfortable speaking the language, he
explains. Every day, soldiers are immersed
in situations in which they must be able to
speak Spanish. Preparing for a seminar
can also be intense. Besides gathering and
creating presentation materials, soldiers
must complete research into the history,
the geography and the current events of
the host country. Prep time is expanded
considerably if its the first time weve been
to a country, Jaffe added.
Being well-versed in the subject matter
aids flexibility and helps eliminate potential stress for those involved. Schedules
U.S. and Uruguayan soldiers work together on a
peacekeeping-operations
exercise during a seminar
presented through the
361st PDP.

U.S. Army photo

January 1996

51

Sergeant First Class

Stephen Wilshire of Co. A,
96th Civil Affairs Battalion,
works with Uruguayan officers during a civil-military
seminar.
U.S. Army photo

can be grueling: Teams typically leave the

U.S. on a Friday-night flight and arrive in
country on Saturday, only to find that new
topics have been added to their agenda.
The teams spend the remainder of the
weekend preparing presentation materials. Seminars are scheduled to begin on
Mondays; sessions start early each morning and generally end between 2 p.m. and
4:30 p.m. Teams typically spend their
evenings preparing and rehearsing for the
next days sessions. Seminars last 4-5 days,
and teams may depart the host country a
few hours after the final session.
While some of the seminar topics may be
the same, no two trips are alike. Paraguay
recently joined the program, requesting a
seminar on military support to civilian
agencies during disasters. Comparable in
size to New Jersey, Paraguay is plagued
annually by floods from the worlds largest
watershed, which is located to the north in
Brazil.
Two annual seminars were planned for
Paraguay, with the goal of having a disaster operations order completed by the end
of the second seminar. The 361sts team
brought various disaster-related plans, but
decided to use the State of Floridas Mili52

tary Response to Disaster Plan. The seminar fostered a meeting between

Paraguayan military forces and civiliangovernment agencies. The National Emergency Committee (similar to the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency) and
operations officers from all the Paraguayan
military services cooperated in a joint
effort. This was significant, since the country elected its first civilian government in
1989, and the military is still learning to
work with civilian leadership.
After identifying the flood hazard, the
group set to work. During the first seminar, the team was able to get only three
paragraphs of the operations order written, but that was to be a springboard for
the following years seminar, said Lieutenant Colonel Howard Stillwell, a member of the PDP team. Upon the teams
arrival for the second seminar, Stillwell
saw few familiar faces. Officers in Latin
America are commonly reassigned every
year, Stillwell said, but there were so few
present from the first meeting that a new
operations order had to be conceived. With
a dedicated effort, the group was able to
put together the basic annex to the national plan before the second seminar ended.
Special Warfare

There are many measures of the PDPs

success. After receiving a briefing on the
U.S. Army Reserve in 1989, the Venezuelan
Army formed a reserve force based on U.S.
reserve-force structure. Subsequently, one
reserve battalion triumphed over activeduty Venezuelan units in 1992, rescuing
the state governor from rebel hands.
Venezuela believes so strongly in the value
of civil-affairs concepts (concepts which
aided them in defeating the communists in
the 1960s) that they requested U.S. Civil
Affairs concepts be added to the curriculum of their version of the Command and
General Staff College. In Argentina, following a disaster-preparedness seminar
attended by members of various civilian
agencies, the governments response to
floods from the annual southeastern
storms was much more effective.
There are benefits to the U.S. as well. In
two separate PDP seminars on peacekeeping operations, officers from Honduras and
Venezuela told members of the 361st about
their experiences while serving as members
of U.N. missions in North Africa and Bosnia.
The biggest benefit we gain is the experienced, trained officer or NCO, Dull said.
Readiness is a another benefit. Should a
contingency operation arise, even if it occurs
in a country that has not hosted a seminar,

January 1996

the 361st officers are fully trained to deal

with foreign governments.
It is difficult to discern the direction the
PDP will take in the future. The 361st has
received several requests for seminars in
FY96. The brigade already has environmental engineers collecting information
and preparing presentation materials for a
new area of interest that has been requested: environmental concerns.
Each year, themes change and countries
either join or quit the program. But there
is one certainty: The PDP will continue to
provide a forum for developing a better
understanding between the Americas.

Captain Bethany I. Lenderman is adjutant for the

445th Civil Affairs Battalion,
Mountain View, Calif. In previous
assignments,
she
served as the public affairs
officer for the 361st Civil
Affairs Brigade, and as the intelligence officer and the Civil Affairs officer for Troop
Command (SF), Rhode Island Army
National Guard. During Operation Desert
Storm, she served as port-security officer
for the port of Dammam, Saudi Arabia.

53

Letters
Special Warfare

Crossed-arrows article
deserves comment
The article on the crossed-arrows
insignia by Lieutenant Colonel
Charles King (July 1995) was
informative and enjoyable. The
author found considerably more
reference material on the Indian
Scouts than I have previously
encountered. I would like to add a
couple of comments for the amusement of any readers who have a
fixation with military trivia.
A hasty reading of the article
might suggest a clear and continuous migration of the crossed
arrows from the Indian Scouts to
Special Forces. It was neither; it
was pretty irregular. Prior to 1960
the crossed arrows were probably
rarely, if ever, thought of in connection with Special Forces. SF members probably thought of themselves as belonging to a completely
new type of unit consisting of an
amalgam of the OSS OG, Jedburgh
and Philippine guerrilla experiences, with possibly some admixture of experience from the U.N.
Partisan Forces Korea. These were
the backgrounds of a number of the
founding and early members.
When unit flags and guidons were
authorized, they were teal blue, the
color the Army used to designate
branch immaterial organizations:
the military-insignia equivalent of
miscellaneous. The color lives on
in the shoulder patch. There was
no evidence of the crossed arrows,
which continued to exist almost
exclusively within the First Special
Service Force Association.
When the Army established the
Combat Arms Regimental System
54

in 1960, it listed Special Forces as

one of the Armys 60 permanent
regiments and included the World
War II 1st Special Service Force in
the SF lineage. The crossed arrows
soon appeared as an element in the
new SF crest, which replaced the
separate insignia of the three existing groups. The fact that the
crossed arrows had been worn as a
collar insignia soon had its impact.
At an indeterminate date (about
1963), the crossed arrows appeared
at Fort Bragg as unauthorized officers collar insignia. As SF officers
of the time came from all branches,
this may have been instituted as a
unifying morale element. It is at
least equally likely that it was SF
bravado. Senior commanders
apparently tolerated it or, with
Nelsonian vision, did not see it as
long as it stayed in the Fort Bragg
area. Not only were metal insignia
worn, but embroidered gold-on-OD
insignia were worn on fatigues.
Although it is unprovable at this
late date, it is believed that some
exceptionally courageous or misguided soul wore the insignia when
visiting the Pentagon. The
inevitable stern prohibition followed. The crossed arrows disappeared for more than 20 years. At
least one of the banned pairs reappeared in 1987 when an officer who
had given most of his career to SF
wore his 1963 crossed arrows on
his mess jacket as the insignia of
his new branch.
In 1981 two officers were about
to brief the Army Chief of Staff,
General E.C. Shy Meyer, on their
proposals for an SF enlisted career
management field, an SF officer
specialty code and, most revolu-

tionary, the creation of an SF warrant-officer specialty. Their briefing charts, hand-lettered butcher
paper, were covered with a blank
sheet. One of the officers grabbed a
felt-tip pen and drew large crossed
arrows on the cover sheet. When
the briefing started, the CSA
smiled for a second at the cover, but
he said nothing.
When the branch was established in 1987, retired General P.D.
Adams, who had been a 1st Special
Service Force officer, sent kind
words and a pair of his crossed
arrows to the ceremony at Fort
Bragg. Although the famously outspoken Adams had often cited his
1st SSF experience when speaking
against the Armys having elite or
specialized units, he apparently
recognized that a Special Forces
branch represented continuity and
professionalism not maintainable
in a single unit over an extended
period.
COL Scot Crerar
U.S. Army (ret.)
Vienna, Va.

Taking the O out of SOF

I am writing to endorse the comments of retired Lieutenant General William Yarborough in the July
1995 issue of Special Warfare,
which took issue with Christopher
Lambs article Perspectives on
Emerging SOF Roles and Missions. The fact that the two articles were published in the aftermath of the Commission on Roles
and Missions report to Congress is
probably not coincidental. The
CORM studied a number of issues
Special Warfare

involving all services, including

whether the U.S. Special Operations Command should be dissolved. In an era of uncertainty
about the nature of future threats
to the nations security and continued pressure on defense budgets,
this will probably not be the last
time SOFs viability will be questioned. It is for these reasons that
Yarboroughs comments should be
heeded.
He made one point that I refer to
as taking the O out of SOF. He
opposes submerging the identity
of the U.S. Armys Special Forces
within the general category of special-operations forces. Army Special Forces represent a combination of skills and experience configured in an organizational structure
that provides capabilities unique
among the services. It is the job of
SFs thinkers to carve out the roles
and missions that best utilize those
capabilities and not just settle for
being another direct-action force.
The process of carving out proper
roles and missions for Special
Forces can be called strategic positioning. It requires an accurate
assessment of SFs core competencies combined with a little bit of
luck, gazing into the crystal ball to
anticipate threats and then taking
proactive measures to prepare the
force to meet those threats. The
process is not an easy one, but it
can be done.
How do you know when youve
done it right? Apply the Ghostbusters test. Just ask the question
Who ya gonna call? If the only
answer is you, then youve gotten
yourself strategically positioned.
In fact, SF already gets the call
for some missions that it is in our
best interests to keep. The MTT
program properly positions SF as
the military instrument of peacetime foreign policy. The coalition
support teams of Desert Shield/
Desert Storm opened a door that
January 1996

SF should keep open. Coordination

of combined forces will be a challenging and essential job when
American leadership, and limitations on ground troops, are called
for something like a SOCOORD
operating with foreign corps. These
are but a few of the possibilities.
The bottom line is that in order
to be ready for the next round of
the roles and missions debate,
and there will be one, SF must
take the O out of SOF and start
strategically positioning the force.
SF cannot afford to settle for
Christopher Lambs simple definition that SOF are what conventional forces are not. When the
question Who we gonna call? is
asked, the only answer should be
SF.
COL Page Duffy
U.S. Army Reserve (ret.)
Andover, Md.

CMF 18 NCOs need degree

program
As the role of Special Forces
NCOs expands, consideration must
be given to a degree-completion
program that prepares them for
the future.
Although our Army does not
have a requirement for its enlisted
force to possess any post-high
school education, the future of Special Forces demands a highly educated NCO.
In the AUSAs 1995 Green Book,
Sergeant Major of the Army McKinney states, The goal of every
enlisted soldier should be a college
degree, while maintaining his or
her primary focus of mission
accomplishment, and leading and
caring for soldiers. Currently all
soldiers are encouraged to further
their education by attending college courses at night with the help
of tuition assistance and with guidance from education counselors.

This is great for those stabilized at

home station for a full semester
who have the time to attend. The
operations tempo of a Special
Forces group makes it very hard
for our soldiers to take advantage
of this course of action.
I propose we develop a degree
program for all CMF 18 NCOs that
would guarantee them a bachelors
degree upon graduation from the
Army Sergeants Major Academy.
The program would start upon
completion of the SFQC and would
require some help from our NCO
Education System and an accredited university.
Lets look at some possibilities,
using the New York State Regents
external degree program as the
model. A bachelor of science degree
requires 120 credit hours. Sixty of
these may be electives and 60 may
be in the arts and sciences. Assuming he gets credit for military
schools as recommended by the
American Council on Education, an
18C NCO who completes the
SFQC, ANCOC and the Sergeants
Major Course could get 43 elective
credits and 34 credits in the arts
and sciences, based on his military
experience. This would leave him
43 credits short of a degree, without him ever sitting in a college
classroom.
How can he complete the remaining 43 hours, and what should he
study? I suggest we make some
minor schedule changes in the SF
ANCOC and allow the students to
attend college courses during duty
hours twice a week. This is already
the standard in the Sergeants
Major Course. Assuming the SF
NCO takes two courses during
ANCOC (12 quarter hours) and
enrolls in two courses each quarter
(18 quarter hours possible) at the
Sergeants Major Academy, he has
put himself within striking distance of the degree. By taking
CLEP/DANTES subject examina55

tions and enrolling in DANTES

independent-study courses, the
NCO could easily rack up the
remaining 13 credits and would fulfill the requirements. Independent
study is ideal for Special Forces soldiers because it allows them to
complete assignments on their own
schedule. After completing his studies, the soldier takes a test at the
education center on post. If he passes, he receives a transcript identical
to the one he would have received
had he attended class.
Courses that will enhance the SF
soldiers capabilities should include
the history of his groups geographical area of responsibility, political
science, international politics,
international law, sociology, psychology, cultural anthropology,
English,
geography,
biology,
mechanical engineering, communications, information management
and human-resource management.
He can also use vocational courses
that directly affect his MOS skills
such as gunsmithing, radio operation, carpentry, plumbing, electrician and paramedic courses.
College courses thrown into an
SF NCOs rucksack will not deter
the NCO from focusing on
warfighting. They are enhancers of
warfighting skills, not distractors.
There is enough down-time
between and during deployments
to accommodate study. We must
remain mission-oriented, but with
a little effort, we can train to fight
while we complete a degree.
Finally, imagine the recruitment

and retention incentive a guaranteed degree would have for Special

Forces. We could get and keep
those highly skilled soldiers who
leave the service every year to pursue their education. After retirement, our NCOs would hit the
streets with an unbelievable life
experience and a degree. This
would allow them to be more competitive for the better-paying jobs
and would increase the number of
friends to SF in positions of power
and policy-making.
No one can deny the benefits of
an education; it pays for itself
many times over, especially in our
business. The opportunity to implement this program should not be
wasted. How can we lose?
CSM Michael W. Jefferson
3rd SF Group
Fort Bragg, N.C.

Special Warfare is interested in receiving letters from its readers who would like to comment on articles
they have read in Special Warfare and elsewhere, or who would like to discuss issues that may not require
a magazine article. With more input from the field, the Letters section could become a true forum for new
ideas and for the discussion of SOF doctrinal issues. Letters should be approximately 250 words long, but
we may have to edit them for length. Please include your full name, rank, address and phone number. We
will withhold the authors name upon request, but we will not print anonymous letters. Address letters to
Editor, Special Warfare; Attn: AOJK-DT-PBM; JFK Special Warfare Center and School; Fort Bragg, NC
28307-5000.

56

Special Warfare

Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

Senior warrant advisers

provide valuable assistance

Through the Special Forces senior warrant-officer adviser program, SF

senior warrant officers serve as subject-matter experts to advise and assist
their commanders on the professional development, assignments, utilization, mentorship, training and recruiting of SF warrant officers. An excellent source of sound advice and experience, SF senior warrant-officer
advisers, or SWOAs, can assist commanders at all levels from major command to company.
In the SF group, the senior warrant officer is responsible for implementing
and managing the SWOA program. He is the point of contact for warrantofficer information, serves as a member of Department of the Army warrant-officer selection boards and represents the SF group at SWOA functions. The group-, battalion- and company-level SWOAs advise their commanders on warrant-officer professional development, or WOPD. They provide WOPD briefings, recommend intra-unit assignments, recommend and
prioritize warrant-officer training requirements and serve as mentors to
newly assigned warrant officers. SWOAs also identify, groom and recruit
prospective warrant-officer candidates. They interview prospective applicants, facilitate interviews between applicants and their unit commanders, and assist applicants with their WO applications.
The intent of the SWOA program is to provide a means by which commanders can better manage the selection, quality control and utilization of
SF warrant officers. Unit commanders should formally appoint SWOAs to
make their additional duties official. The information presented here can
be used as a guide in establishing a SWOA program. For additional information, contact CW3 Wayne Searcy, 180A Manager at the SWCS Proponency Office, at DSN 239-2415/8423 or commercial (910) 432-2415/8423.

SF promotion rates
compare favorably with
Army averages

The chart below depicts 1995 DA board selection rates for the SF Branch,
compared to overall Army selection rates. The figures show that SF officers
continue to be highly competitive for promotion and professional military
education.
Board

SF Selection
Rate*

Army Selection
Rate

MAJ Promotion
LTC Promotion
COL Promotion

78.4%
65.9%
40.9%

73.2%
60.9%
44.4%

CSC
SSC

18.7%
8.6%

17.1%
6.4%

* Promotion board figures are for primary zone only.

January 1996

57

Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

PERSCOM makes it easier

to communicate
with career managers

The U.S. Total Army Personnel Command has implemented new procedures
to increase soldiers participation in managing their careers. To help soldiers
better communicate with their career managers, PERSCOMs Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate, or EPMD, has developed the following: an
interactive voice-response telephone system, or IVRS; expanded E-mail capabilities; high-speed fax machines; mailgrams; and a pocket reference information card.
The cornerstone system is the IVRS, an automated telephone system that
provides soldiers with career information 24 hours a day. To use the IVRS,
soldiers must enter their Social Security number to access menu options
that will allow them to find out if they are on assignment or are scheduled
to attend an Army school. They can also obtain information on retention;
compassionate reassignments; the exceptional family member program;
separations; or volunteering for recruiting, drill sergeant, Rangers and
Special Forces. Soldiers can activate the IVRS by dialing DSN 221-EPMD
or commercial 1-800-FYI-EPMD.
EPMD also encourages the use of E-mail. E-mail exchanges can be conducted 24 hours a day to inquire about the status of personnel actions, future
schooling or assignments. Soldiers can also correspond with their career
managers by faxing communications directly to their EPMD career branch.
Another new development is the DA PERSGRAM, a mailgram designed to
supplement the chain of command in keeping soldiers informed of career or
assignment information.
To communicate with the SF Enlisted Branch, soldiers may use the E-mail
address epsf@hoffman-emh1.army.mil or phone DSN 221-8899 or commercial (703) 325-8899, fax -4510.

SF Enlisted Branch
develops ANCOC
Management System

The SF Enlisted Branch has developed a new system to give SF units flexibility in scheduling their soldiers for attendance in the SF Advanced NCO
Course. Under the new ANCOC management system, promotion boards will
select soldiers for promotion and ANCOC attendance, developing an alternate ANCOC list from the soldiers considered but not promoted. The SF
Enlisted Branch will first screen the promotion list for soldiers who are on
assignment and place them in a TDY status to attend ANCOC en route to
their gaining units. Soldiers on assignment from OCONUS units will have
their date eligible to return from overseas adjusted. The SF Enlisted Branch
will then allocate ANCOC slots to units based on the number each unit
needs per MOS. Branch will fax ANCOC schedules and lists of promotable
and alternate soldiers to each command. Units will screen the lists and,
based on their mission requirements, submit names for specific classes
throughout the fiscal year. As a rule, priority will go to soldiers who are in a
promotable status, with no alternates placed in class until the primary list
has been exhausted. Units may, however, submit alternates before primaries
if they can provide appropriate justification for approval. The SF Enlisted
Branch will resolve any problems and place the soldiers in the ATRRS sys-

58

Special Warfare

tem for ANOC. Class rosters will be sent to the schools NCO in each SF
group. Soldiers who are assigned outside normal group command lines will
be notified by phone. In the past, operational demands and deployments
have made it difficult to notify soldiers as to when they will attend ANCOC.
By giving units the responsibility to select personnel for ANCOC courses,
the new system is expected to reduce the number of no shows and cancellations and to allow soldiers more time to prepare for ANCOC.

45 SF E-8s selected
for promotion

Forty-five SF master sergeants were recently selected for promotion to

sergeant major (MOS 18Z), and 10 more were selected for appointment to
command sergeant major (MOS 00Z). Most of those NCOs selected had
served at least one tour of duty at the JFK Special Warfare Center and
School, indicating that varied assignments are important in order to
enhance soldiers promotion potential.

NCOs need basic duty

positions to be competitive

SF NCOs must perform satisfactorily in each of four basic NCO leadership

assignments to be competitive for the next level of responsibility. The basic
assignments are team member (junior, senior or assistant operations
sergeant); team sergeant; company sergeant major; and battalion command sergeant major. Enhancing duty assignments include, but are not
limited to, serving on staff at company, battalion and group level or above;
and assignment at USAJFKSWCS, JRTC, JOTB or School of the Americas. First-sergeant duty is viewed as an enhancing duty assignment when
a soldier is being considered for appointment to command sergeant major.
First-sergeant duty is not a substitute for duty as a company sergeant
major. Drill-sergeant duty and detailed recruiting duty are viewed as
excellent NCO leadership-development assignments. Two key points to
remember are that soldiers should always return to a basic assignment
after completing an enhancing duty assignment; and that from a realistic
standpoint, an NCO may be able to serve only one or two enhancing duty
assignments during his career. It is vitally important that an NCO serve
as a company sergeant major prior to being selected for appointment to
CSM. Similar basic and enhancing duty assignments are available for
NCOs assigned to special-mission units.

Recruiting, drill-sergeant
assignments build essential
SF skills

CMF 18 currently has 30 authorizations for drill sergeant duty and 20 for
recruiting duty. Drill-sergeant duty is one of the best leadership-development assignments in the Army; recruiting duty is an ideal assignment for
developing interpersonal skills. SF soldiers normally do well in these
assignments and return to their units with enhanced skills that are good
for the CMF. By increasing soldiers promotion potential, drill-sergeant
and recruiting assignments also increase the SF promotion base.

SRBs reinstated for 18B,

18C and 18E

Selective re-enlistment bonuses have recently been reinstated for MOSs

18B, 18C and 18E. Reinstatement occurred at a time when the Army has
reduced its SRB budget by 40 percent and is $400 million short in its overall FY 96 personnel budget. For information on eligibility, soldiers should
consult MilPer Message No. 96-057 or contact their unit re-enlistment NCO.

January 1996

59

Foreign SOF
Special Warfare

Reorganization of Mexican
army emphasizes special
operations forces

Mexican army force-modernization programs that were outlined in 1995

envision highly mobile units, including special forces components, based in
each of the countrys 10 military regions. According to Mexican military and
media reporting, a coordinating headquarters for these Ranger-like, company-sized units is to be established, as are special forces schools, with the
Grupo Aerotransportado de Fuerzas Especiales (Airborne Group of the Special Forces), or GAFE, and with the First Army Corps special-operations unit.
Special-operations training programs in desert, mountain and jungle environments will also be developed, with some units receiving training in urban
operations. A particularly heavy emphasis is being placed on those forces that
will be located in the states of Chiapas and Guerrero, where special regional airborne forces will be set up. The Mexican army largely destroyed insurgent groups in Guerrero in the mid-1970s, though the violence attributed variously to guerrillas, drug traffickers and criminals has recently become more
visible there. The current Mexican Defense Secretary-General, Enrique Cervantes Aguirre, was chief of staff of the 27th Military Zone (Acapulco, Guerrero) during the 1970s, and his counterinsurgency experiences will no doubt
influence the development of contemporary special-forces programs. In addition, the establishment of a regular military intelligence service also envisioned in the overall force-development efforts outlined in 1995 is expected to enhance special-operations capabilities. Concurrent with these and
broader Mexican force-modernization programs, some Mexican and foreign
critics have attacked what they assert to be the growing direct U.S. support
for Mexican military development plans. Other observers have hailed the
professional-development process and what they hope will be an open and
closer U.S.-Mexican military relationship that promotes cooperation in dealing with common security problems.

Internal critics emphasize

Russian lack of UW
preparedness

The Russian war in Chechnya has generated familiar internal military

criticism regarding Russian preparations and training for counterguerrilla operations. Internal critics have said that if Russian plans for dealing
with counterinsurgency exist, they are the exclusive province of intelligence specialists who do not share their knowledge. This lack of Russian
unconventional-warfare preparation has been judged to be a major contributor to continuing Chechen rebel successes. The Russian-described
success of Chechen mining and explosive devices has been particularly
noteworthy. By the summer of 1995, the Chechen mining of transportation
routes, buildings and other targets was said to be acquiring a massive
character, that left no one safe. The use of mines and ambushes in combination is exploited effectively by Chechen fighters, as is the use of mines
and explosives to target leaders and facilities. In the fall of 1995, the Russian commander in Chechnya, General Anatoliy Romanov, was critically
injured by a Chechen bomb. A subsequent bomb detonation near a Russian
administrative headquarters in Grozny killed at least 11 people and
injured scores more.

60

Special Warfare

Guatemalan military forces

target crime wave

During the last year, intensifying criminal activity in a number of countries

has led to the unconventional employment of military forces aimed at curbing violent crime by armed and organized groups. In Brazil, rising crime in
urban areas brought about a joint military-police action called Operation
Rio under the control of a Brazilian army general and involving the heavy
use of airborne and special-operations forces. The operation spanned a
three-month period during 1994-1995 and was aimed at halting the growing links between drug-traffickers and other criminal groups in Rio and the
surrounding area. More recently, in Central America, Guatemalan army
forces were deployed in Guatemala City and other areas to deal with the
violent crime. Rising crime has alarmed Guatemalan security officials for
some time, as the country has sought to end, through peace accords, the
35-year-old insurgency of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity. A
1994 Guatemalan military intelligence assessment of current and developing security problems identified narco-trafficking, extortion, kidnapping
and other crimes as growing threats to the Guatemalan state. The December 1995 surge in these kinds of activities and a growing number of fatalities resulted in deployment of military units to conduct patrols in centers of urban and rural criminal activity and to set up checkpoints along
major roads. It was hoped that Army units supported by Air Force helicopters for mobility could reduce the number of murders and kidnappings, break up armed criminal groups, and offset the alleged inefficiencies
and corruption of Guatemalan police by supporting and reinforcing them.
The use of Guatemalan military forces in this role is clearly controversial,
given the continuing allegations of human-rights abuses committed by the
military in internal-security roles. However, it reflects the kind of unconventional security challenges being posed by armed criminal groups in
many areas of the world, and the difficult decisions that states must make
to deal with them.

Russian officer admits

concerns over nuclear theft

Russian military and civilian leaders have generally minimized the threat of
nuclear weapons theft or diversion. Colonel General Yevgeniy P. Maslin, chief
of the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, or 12th GUMO,
which is responsible for nuclear munitions, similarly characterized theft
from 12th GUMO nuclear-weapons facilities as impossible. However, he
qualified that reassurance when he identified vulnerabilities posed by criminal and terrorist groups, principally the theft of nuclear weapons during
transport. In addition, he indicated that exercises conducted to assess the
potential theft of nuclear weapons from 12th GUMO facilities identified a
particular concern that had not been considered before: namely, What if such
acts were to be undertaken by people who have worked with nuclear weapons
in the past? For example, by people dismissed from our structures, social malcontents, embittered individuals? The results unspecified but evidently
alarming to the general were delivered in a special report to the Russian
Security Council. In a country filled with embittered, desperate active-duty
and former servicemen some of them veterans of Soviet/Russian nuclearweapons programs Maslins concerns seem well-considered and suggest
enduring future proliferation dangers.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr of the Foreign Military Studies Office, U.S. Army
DCSOPS, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.
January 1996

61

Update
Special Warfare

Special Service Force. The unit

earned six battle streamers during
World War II and four campaign
streamers in Vietnam. Returning
from Vietnam, the unit was inactivated in 1971. On May 16, 1987,
the battalion was activated and
redesignated as the 528th Special
Operations Support Battalion (Airborne). It was awarded additional
streamers for its role in Desert
Shield/Desert Storm, including the
Valorous Unit Award. SFC Mike
Brantley, USASOC PAO

Army Special Operations

Support Command activated
The U.S. Army Special Operations Support Command unfurled
its colors during an activation ceremony held at Fort Bragg Dec. 8.
Lieutenant General J.T. Scott,
commander of the Army Special
Operations Command, assisted as
Colonel Laney M. Pankey, commander of SOSCOM, uncased the
colors.
The newly activated command
realigns the command-and-control
organizational structure of the
112th Signal Battalion, 528th Support Battalion and the USASOC
Material Management Center.
One of the organizational deficiencies discovered when we
reviewed who and what we were in
1993 was that we did not have an
entity to coordinate support for our
deployed special-operations forces,
Scott said. We had two great battalions, equally good at providing
all aspects of signal and combatservice support to our units, but we
had no overarching headquarters
to plan, coordinate and determine
what our priorities might be for
that support.
What we hope to gain by this
organization today is a coordinated
effort worldwide, prioritizing our
limited assets, and most importantly, supporting our special-operations soldiers wherever they are
deployed, Scott said.
Our mission focus will always
be the special-operations-forces
soldiers and their mission, Pankey
said following the activation.
The 112th Signal Battalion was
originally created during World
62

Five SF soldiers earn

Soldiers Medal
Photo by Mike Brantley

LTG J.T. Scott passes the colors of the U.S. Army

SOSCOM to COL Laney M. Pankey.

War II and later participated in the

Battle of the Bulge, the defense of
Bastogne and the Rhine Campaign. By the time of its deactivation at the end of the war, the
112th had earned five battle
streamers. The unit was reactivated in 1986 as the 112th Signal Battalion (Airborne) and later was
awarded the Meritorious Unit
Commendation (Army) for its
actions in Southwest Asia. In
August 1995, the 112th received
the Army Superior Unit Award for
its actions in 1994 during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti.
The 528th Special Operations
Support Battalion was activated
Dec. 15, 1942, at Camp McCain,
Miss., as the 528th Quartermaster
Service Battalion. During World
War II, the battalion provided combat-service support to European
theater forces, including the First

Five U.S. Army Special Forces

soldiers received the Soldiers
Medal on Dec. 1 for their actions in
subduing a man suspected of firing
on other Fort Bragg soldiers.
Lieutenant General J.T. Scott,
commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, presented the awards to Sergeants
First Class Elwood Johnson, Paul
Rogers and Edward Mongold; and
Staff Sergeants Anthony Minor
and Robert Howes. The ceremony
took place at the Army Special
Operations Memorial Plaza at
Fort Bragg. The Soldiers Medal is
the Armys highest award for
peacetime heroism.
The soldiers actions occurred
Oct. 27, 1995, when a gunman fired
on soldiers taking physical training in Fort Braggs 82nd Airborne
Division area. One soldier was
killed and 19 others were wounded
in the attack. The SF NCOs, conducting a squad run nearby, subdued and disarmed the suspect and
provided medical treatment to solSpecial Warfare

diers who were wounded during

the incident. Howes was wounded
while subduing the suspect.
The five soldiers were attending
the SF Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course at the John
F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center
and School. Johnson is assigned to
the SWCS 1st Special Warfare
Training Group; Rogers and Mongold are assigned to the 10th Special Forces Group at Fort Carson,
Colo.; and Minor and Howes are
assigned to the 3rd Special Forces
Group at Fort Bragg.

SF group commanders have

authority to revoke SF Tab
The commanding general of the
JFK Special Warfare Center and
School, as chief of the Special
Forces Branch, recently signed a
memorandum authorizing Special
Forces group-level commanders
the authority to revoke the SF tab
from soldiers within their units.
The SF Tab may now be removed
from soldiers who fail to meet or
maintain the standards outlined in
Army regulations. Army Regulation 600-8-22 is being updated to
reflect the change. For more information, contact Master Sergeant
Michael Lawler in the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office
at DSN 239-8423/9002 or commercial (910) 432-8423/9002.

Videotape teaches use

of recovery devices
A new videotape titled Helicopter Recovery Devices-Personnel provides instructional techniques in the use of several basic
and
field-expedient
recovery
devices, recovery systems and a
universal point of attachment (the
Navy hook) that may be used with
numerous other devices.
Produced by the JFK Special
Warfare Center and School, the
videotape teaches the correct proJanuary 1996

cedure for preparation and use of

several basic recovery systems and
devices: the Fast Rope Infiltration/Exfiltration
System,
or
FRIES; stabilized body operations,
or STABO; the Special Patrol Infiltration/Exfiltration System, or
SPIES; forest or jungle penetrator
(with and without floatation collar); horse collar; and troop ladder.
Field expedients such as the
Hansen, Palmer and McGuire rigs
are also discussed, as is the Navy
(or rescue) hook.
Although these devices can be
simple to use, the new videotape
urges soldiers to become familiar
with them, advising that As a survivor, in a passive low- to mediumthreat environment, you would
most likely be rescued with one of
these helicopter-recovery devices.
Soldiers may request the videotape through their local Training
Audiovisual Support Center by
using the title: Helicopter Recovery Devices-Personnel, TVT Number 31-7, and product-identification number 70976DA.

Air Force 2025 study needs

input from soldiers
The Air Force is looking for information or ideas from all the services to help Air Force operations
in the future.
The Chief of Staff of the Air
Force has directed the Air University to undertake a study, called
2025, on air and space capabilities required to support national
and international security in the
future. As part of 2025, the Air University is seeking ideas on new
capabilities, systems, concepts of
operation and uses of high-leverage emerging technology.
The Air University has set up a
home page on the Worldwide Web to
take suggestions. The home page
has an in-depth explanation of the
study and allows anyone to submit

an idea as either a concept or a

technology. The home page
address is: http.//www.au.af.mil/
2025/2025home.html.
Soldiers who do not have access
to the Worldwide Web or who need
more information may contact Air
Force Captain Matthew B. Ash at
DSN 579-2402 or commercial (904)
884-2402.

SOMTC slated to begin

classes in July 1996
The Special Operations Medical
Training Center, designed to train
both the special-operations combat
medic and the Special Forces medical sergeant, is scheduled to begin
its first classes in July 1996.
The special-operations combat
medic will attend the first 24
weeks of training to learn
advanced trauma lifesaving and to
attain EMT-paramedic qualification. The SF-medical-sergeant
candidates will continue for 20
more weeks of training in SFunique medical skills. All training
will be conducted at Fort Bragg in
a state-of-the-art medical training
facility that is currently under
construction.

USASOC gets new deputy

commander
Brigadier General Kenneth R.
Bowra assumed the position of
deputy commander of the Army
Special Operations Command
Jan. 30.
Bowra, former commander of
Special Operations Command
(South), U.S. Army Southern Command, Panama, replaced Maj.
Gen. William P. Tangney, who
assumed command of the Army
Special Forces Command Nov. 1.

63

Book Reviews
Special Warfare

Treatise on Partisan Warfare. By

Johann Ewald. Translated by
Robert A. Selig and David C. Skaggs.
Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press,
1991. ISBN: 0-313-27350-2 (cloth).
178 pages. $45.
Johann Ewald was an 18th-century Hessian officer who served in
professional military service from
the age of 16 until his death. From
1776 until the end of the American
Revolutionary War, Ewald served
as a officer of one of two jager companies, the Hessian elite. He and
his men participated in every
major battle from New York to
Yorktown, as well as in countless
minor engagements and skirmishes. Eventually joining the service of
Denmark, he rose to the rank of
lieutenant general and the position
of commanding general of the
Duchy of Holstein.
Johann Ewald wrote of his experience, publishing a classic manual
on the employment of light forces
against other light or irregular
forces. It is a well-written and
enlightening work, and the editors
have produced a translation that is
highly readable and impressive for
its scholarship. More than two
years in the writing and exceedingly well-documented, this relatively
short volume is a welcome addition
to the body of literature concerning
light infantry and its employment.
This translation is divided into
three sections. The first, eight pages
long, contains a biography of Ewald,
background information on his original writings and the editors apologia regarding their translation of
Ewalds original term kleiner krieg
as partisan warfare. The editors
64

have clearly wrestled with the

semantics of the term partisan
and argue that it is contextually
consistent with usage from the 17th
through the 20th centuries. The use
of partisan here will be disagreeable to some readers, incorporating
as it does both the more familiar
modern connotation of an irregular
force operating against a larger, regular force (usually invaders) and
one describing formations of special
but regular, well-trained light
infantry or cavalry.
A literal English translation of
kleiner krieg into small wars
would have more accurately captured the operational environment
familiar to both Ewald and the modern reader, an environment characterized by vast, unforgiving terrain
and climate favorable to the defender. Eighteenth-century America, for
example, often comprised a hostile
population within which were hid-

den sympathizers who assisted an

enemy force that included guerrillas
and regular formations.
Ewalds treatise also incorporated his experience with operations
that ranged from protecting friendly indigenous populations to conducting unilateral, almost special
operations on his own, to operating with the larger, more conventional forces of his day.
The second portion of the book is
the editors introductory essay, a
30-page history and analysis of the
small-wars concept in the 18th century. The editors have superbly
placed Ewalds thought in both historical and modern military context. They highlight the fact that
Ewald recognized that he was posing few new ideas and that he
acknowledged the earlier writings
of other military writers.
Nevertheless, against a dominant military predisposition for
regimentation, Ewald and likeminded leaders were formulating a
new chemistry for waging war.
They were also beginning to recognize a political component of warfare that was different from feudal
and peasant uprisings. The population was now an integral part of
the war-winning equation, a fact
that Ewald did not believe his
British counterparts recognized, to
their misfortune.
The third portion is the translated
treatise. It is very much a how-to
piece, illustrated throughout with
telling examples to make the point in
each particular chapter. Ewald is
clearly trying to impart the benefit of
hard-earned lessons, and the reader
is reminded of a well-written Fort
Benning student text on patrolling.
Special Warfare

Throughout the treatise, the

American soldier-reader will sense
an immediate familiarity. Ewald
hews to the same principles that
guide our tactical thought and
leadership today. In the field of
combat leadership, Ewald appears
to have been at the leading and
lonely edge of his time. Leadership
by example and shared hardships
could not have been popular in an
era marked for its class distinctions. Ewalds recognition of the
impact of situational dynamics,
what we now call the analysis of
METT-T, and his encouragement of
initiative are taken for granted as
leadership traits today.
Selig and Skaggs translation
and commentary of Ewalds Treatise on Partisan Warfare were done
to add to the history and to the
understanding of the American
Revolutionary War. Their work
completely satisfies that objective
with a broader collateral benefit. It
is an exemplary resource for anyone interested in the development
and history of light infantry and
irregular warfare. Every light
infantryman, Ranger and Special
Forces soldier who reads it will be
nodding his head in agreement
with Ewalds concepts, thoughts
and standards. The editors have
done a masterful job of bringing to
life the historical figure and the
ideas of Johann Ewald.
LTC John F. Mulholland
Fort Bragg, N.C.
Losing Mogadishu Testing
U.S. Policy in Somalia. By
Jonathan Stevenson. Annapolis,
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995.
ISBN 1-55750-788-0. 183 pages.
$24.95.
Soldiers and politicians are still
talking about it it seems that
nearly everyone has a different
perspective on what went wrong.
January 1996

Forty-three Americans died in

Somalia 18 of them in one nowfamous combat action for which
two special-operations soldiers
were
posthumously
awarded
Medals of Honor.
While there may be much to criticize about U.S. and U.N. operations
in Somalia, Jonathan Stevenson
seems to forget that President
George Bush, a politician, made the
ill-advised decision to enter the
quicksand that was Somalia. After
that, the American military was
stuck with a tar baby that it had
never wanted and had advised
against.
Stevensons primary background
is in journalism. When he discusses military operations, he is clearly
out of his depth. He does not fully
understand the American military
nor the inherent difficulty of military operations conducted under
the auspices of the U.N. What
Stevenson fails to comprehend is
that the American military is a
very blunt instrument of national
policy. Marines are not diplomats,
nor should they be confused with
diplomats. We would never ask a
foreign-service officer to conduct a
ground assault on an enemy posi-

tion, but American policy-makers

appear more than willing to ask a
19-year-old Marine to act the role
of
cross-cultural
facilitator
between feuding Somali factions in
the streets of Mogadishu.
This reviewer would even take
the author to task over the title of
the book, Losing Mogadishu
Testing U.S. Policy in Somalia, for
two reasons. First, Mogadishu was
never Americas to win or lose. It is
not worthwhile to think of postCold War issues in this light.
Mogadishu gratefully belongs to
Somalis alone. Second, our actions
in Somalia reflect no U.S. policy of
which I am aware. What test is
the author speaking about?
Fortunately, Stevensons book is
more focused on the politics surrounding the Somalia debacle, and
he provides a very credible chronology of significant events throughout
his narrative. But I am at odds with
Stevensons view of the world. He
finds endless fault with American
policies, views the U.N. as an American puppet, and concerns himself
with the image of the U.N.
Despite these many criticisms,
Stevensons work is enjoyable reading. Stevenson apparently spent
much time in Somalia, and his
insights into Somali clan warfare
are excellent. The fact that he
knows many of the major players
in the region also gives his analysis
greater credibility.
If you will view this book for
what it is one idealistic journalists attempt to capture the truth of
Somalia, the book is worth reading.
If you expect a trenchant, in-depth
and objective military-political
analysis, look elsewhere.
LTC Robert B. Adolph Jr.
Joint Special Operations Cmd.
Fort Bragg, N.C.

65

Special Warfare

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