Into Africa:

September-October 2008 | Volume 21 | Issue 5

Articles

12 Analytic Support to Intelligence

in Counterinsurgencies

This article examines the nature of the contemporary insurgent threat

and provides insights on the need for better analysis of insurgency,
while focusing on the security portion of a counterinsurgency effort.

18 Into Africa

Between March 2007 and January 2008, Civil Affairs teams

from the 96th CA Battalion deployed to Africa in support of

12

Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahel as a civil-military

support element.

26 Training for Uncertainty

For the past 16 years, the Naval Postgraduate School has offered
the Special Operations Masters Degree Program. Army SOF officers can now receive full ILE/JPME 1/MEL 4 credit for attendance at the course.

18

Departments
4

From the Commandant

Update

28

Career Notes

30

Book Reviews

ON THE COVER
A Civil Affairs team
travels through Chad
as part of a growing
mission of civil-military engagements
on the African continent. Photo copyright
C. Brian McCartney,
used with permission.

Into Africa:

Special Warfare
Commander & Commandant
Major General Thomas R. Csrnko
Editor
Jerry D. Steelman
Associate Editor
Janice Burton
Graphics & Design
Jennifer Martin
Webmaster
Eva Herrera

18
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By order of the Secretary of the Army:

General George W. Casey Jr.
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:

Joyce E. Morrow
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0819705
Headquarters, Department of the Army

For more than 50 years, the JFK Special Warfare Center

and School has been training the Soldiers at the tip of the
spear. Over the past seven years, our instruction in counterinsurgency has been honed and refined by operations on the
battlefields of Afghanistan, Iraq and other places, such as
the Philippines and Colombia.
The lessons we take from those operations are put into
practice here at the Armys premier training center, not only to
train new Soldiers to fill the force, but also to improve the skills
of the men and women already filling the force. These Soldiers
carry an enormous responsibility. Their missions are demanding
and require a high degree of professionalism, and yet they succeed, day after day, on battlefield after battlefield. They are why
we are here. They are the reason we continually seek to improve
our training, to learn more about insurgency and to improve our
understanding of this ancient form of conflict.
Our special-operations Soldiers have many weapons at their
disposal, but perhaps the most important is their diplomacy and
their ability establish trust and win friends in villages and towns
in remote corners of the world.
In this issue of Special Warfare, Major Danford Bryant discusses an increasingly nonlethal approach to insurgency and
says that Civil Affairs Soldiers can be at the center of that approach. His article details how elements of the 96th
Civil Affairs Battalion deployed to Chad last year to support operations in the Trans-Sahel region. There, they not
only supported the operations of other special-operations forces, or SOF, but also traveled to remote regions to
conduct operations of their own. Their work in those remote areas established trust and opened doors for subsequent SOF operations, and the good will they established will provide beneficial effects for some time to come.
Major Bryants article gives us a good example of the importance of Civil Affairs Soldiers and reminds us
that CA must be a part of all ARSOF planning and must be active in our operations. But as Major Bryant points
out, as a civil-military support element, CA forces are not acting solely as a slice element sent in to support
other SOF but may often serve as the main effort in achieving the desired long-term effects. In that capacity, CA
Soldiers must also be capable of operating on their own, with minimal guidance, and with an appreciation of the
cultural and political situation in which they are immersed. Recent changes to the Civil Affairs training pipeline
at the Special Warfare Center and School have been designed to give Soldiers additional training in cultural
awareness and adaptive thinking, and we are continuing to modify the pipeline.
In another article, retired Lieutenant Colonels Walter Perry and John Gordon IV examine the way that intelligence contributes to counterinsurgency, or COIN. The authors examine the unique role of intelligence in COIN
and discuss analytic tools and methods that can provide useful information for COIN planning and operations.
What our force learns in the field is only one aspect of its education. Advanced schooling at both the officer
and NCO levels helps Soldiers see situations analytically. One such program is the Special Operations Masters
Degree Program, or SOMDP, available at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif. Since 1992, SOMDP
has trained officers to be the critical thinkers and capable operators that are essential in SOF staff and leadership positions. As a sign of the importance of SOMDP graduates, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command
has recently increased its quota of NPS slots. The article in this issue by Colonel Brian Greenshields and retired
Colonel Pete Gustaitis describes the programs origins and content, and I urge all eligible officers to learn more
about the program and to apply.
As operations take a more indirect and nonlethal approach, the role of ARSOF will probably increase. The
ongoing growth in the size of our Special Forces groups and our CA brigades is designed to handle the demand.
At SWCS, we will continue to modify our training and doctrine by adapting them to incorporate lessons from the
battlefield. It is our mission to make sure the tip of the spear remains sharp.

Major General Thomas R. Csrnko

Special Warfare

U P D A T E

160th SOAR aviator receives Distinguished Service Cross

During a ceremony on July 11 at
Fort Campbell, Ky., Chief Warrant
Officer 5 David F. Cooper, 160th
Special Operations Aviation Regiment, became the first Night Stalker
in the units history, and the only
living aviator, to receive the Distinguished Service Cross in support of
the war on terror.
We stand here today in awe of
Mr. Cooper, said Admiral Eric T. Olson, commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, who presented the
medal. His actions read like adventure fiction, but they are real. Others
live because of his selfless courage.
Cooper led an AH-6 Little Bird
flight on a mission against a foreign
fighter facilitator in central Iraq on
Nov. 27, 2006. While moving between waiting locations on this mission, his wingman was shot down by
enemy fire. The helicopter-assault
force immediately landed and, along
with the special-operations ground
forces on board, set up a small perimeter around the crashed aircraft.
Although there were no serious injuries, the aircraft was not flyable.
After confirming that there was
no immediate threat to the assaultforce position, the two Black Hawk
helicopters of the formation, carrying
the pilots from the downed aircraft, returned to their base to get a
downed-aircraft recovery team.
That left the force of about 20
special-operations forces at the
crash site with one mission-capable
AH-6 and two MH-6 helicopters. The
crash site was flat desert ground,
leaving the troops without cover
while they defended the area.
About 40 minutes after the
crash, enemy personnel suddenly
appeared and began firing on their

receiving honors Admiral Eric T. Olson, commander, U.S. Special Operations Command,
pins the Distinguished Service Cross on Chief Warrant Officer 5 David F. Cooper, 160th Special
Operations Aviation Regiment, during a ceremony July 11 at Fort Campbell, Ky. Colonel Clayton M.
Hutmacher, the 160th commander, assists. 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment PAO.

position. Cooper and his co-pi-

Imagine what would have hap-

lot were already starting up their

pened had (Cooper) not defied all

engines to get an aerial view of the

odds and heroically flown into a

situation. Immediately upon tak-

heavily armed gauntlet attracting

ing off, Coopers aircraft became

fire to himself in order to divert

the target for enemy fire. Cooper

deadly enemy fire from his team-

flew his helicopter directly into the

mates and then, most courageous

enemy fire, attacking the enemy po-

and heroically, rearming and refuel-

sitions and diverting fire away from

ing on-site to continue the fight, he

the ground forces.

said. Unbelievable courage, bril-

He landed his helicopter near the

liant presence of mind, selfless sav-

crash site twice during the engage-

ing acts under the most demanding

ment, where his fellow pilots down-

combat conditions (he is) a true

loaded ammunition and fuel from

hero in every sense of the word.

the crashed Little Bird and trans-

Operating most often as mem-

ferred it to his. These actions kept

bers of an aircraft joint team, you

Coopers aircraft in the fight for

are the ideal teammates, Wagner

as along as possible. After a third

said. Many of your casualties have

series of aerial gunnery attacks, the

been suffered after making the

enemy personnel finally ceased fir-

conscious and deliberate decision to

ing and fled the area.

fly into a hot landing zone to save

Lieutenant General Robert W.

troops on the ground who have no

Wagner, commander of the U.S.

other hope. To this unit, the loyalty

Army Special Operations Command,

of the ground and maritime forces

described Coopers actions that day

is deep and forever. 160th

as seemingly impossible.

SOAR PAO.
September-October 2008

U P D A T E

3rd SF Group welcomes new commander

Colonel Gus Benton II took the reins
of the 3rd Special Forces Group from
Colonel Christopher K. Haas during a
change-of-command ceremony July 10
on Fort Braggs Meadows Field.
After having served with the 3rd SF
Group for two years and two combat
tours to Afghanistan, Haas passed
command of the group to Benton in
front of the group, its families and several distinguished guests.
Benton, who received his degree
from Fort Valley State University as an
ROTC distinguished military graduate,
comes to the group from being the chief
of staff for the U.S. Army Special Forces
Command. Prior to that, he was the
commander of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd
SF Group which he led through two
combat tours in Afghanistan.
It is a great pleasure to pass the
group colors to Colonel Gus Benton,
said Brigadier General Michael S. Repass, commanding general, U.S. Army
Special Forces Command, who spoke at
the ceremony.
Benton said it was good to be back
in the 3rd SF Group, and that he plans
to lead by example.
To the Soldiers and families of
the 3rd Special Forces Group, I will
serve with and lead you with all that
God puts in me, of mind, body and
soul, said Benton, as he addressed
the troops after the passing of the
colors, which symbolizes the initiation of his command.
Bentons career in the Army began
as a Signal officer. He served in that
branch for several years before joining
the Special Forces community in 1993.
Over the past 15 years, he and his wife,
Carmel, and their son, Corey, have
enjoyed a successful career.
First and foremost, where would I
be without God, as Im eternally grateful for his many blessings, Benton
said, as he addressed the troops as
their commander.
Benton also thanked Major General
Thomas R. Csrnko, commanding general of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy
Special Warfare Center and School,

Special Warfare

command performance Colonel Gus Benton II assumed command of the 3rd Special
Forces Group from Colonel Christopher K. Haas on July 10. U.S. Army photo.

as well as Repass, for their trust and

confidence in placing him in command
of such a highly decorated and formidable unit.
For his part, Haas remarks were
heartfelt and personal. He spoke of the
achievements of the group under his
command and recognized those fallen
warriors who have given their lives in
service over the years.
I will carry the memory of the fallen
of this group with me for the rest of my
life, said Haas.
All gave the last full measure of
devotion, and I will do all I can to honor
their sacrifice.
He went on to note the achievements of the group, including the 13
Silver Star Medals, the numerous
Bronze Star Medals, Purple Hearts and
many other awards.
The rich history of 3rd Group is a
direct reflection of their heroism, Haas
said, regarding those who have earned
and been awarded these medals.
While Haas gave all accolades to

the men in the group, Repass looked

to him, as their commander and
gave praise.
Chris, your leadership over the
past 25 months has been nothing short
of outstanding, Repass said. As I look
at the totality of where youve been and
what youve done over the past seven
years, I know of no other senior leader
in Special Forces that has spent as
much time in combat as you.
Repass continued by noting that
Benton was inheriting a remarkable
force in the 3rd SF Group.
In Afghanistan, you and your Soldiers served up equal parts of tenacity,
lead and steel, compassion and professionalism, Repass said.
He went on to mention the achievements of the groups Soldiers in Iraq,
where they have an independent Iraqi
counterterrorist force.
That force is the pre-eminent
Iraqi Army unit and probably the best
Middle Eastern counterterrorism force,
Repass said. USASOC PAO.

U P D A T E

Binford takes command of 1st SF Group

Hundreds of Green Berets and
support Soldiers from the 1st Special
Forces Group assembled in formation
at Watkins Field, Fort Lewis, Wash.,
July 16 as two veteran Special Forces
officers conducted the groups changeof-command ceremony.
Colonel Randolph R. Binford
accepted command of the group
from Colonel Eric P. Wendt during
the ceremony.
Binford, a native of Texas, comes
to the 1st SF Group after serving at
the Pentagon in the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
since July 2007. Binford was previously a battalion commander in 3rd
SF Group.
Wendt has served multiple previous tours in the 1st SF Group, and
commanded the group since 2006
as 1st SF Group troops deployed to
Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines and
numerous other countries throughout
the Pacific.
In keeping with Army tradition,
Wendt handed the group colors and
their symbolic responsibility for the
units Soldiers to Brigadier General Michael S. Repass, commanding general
of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command. With a few private words of encouragement, the general then passed
the colors to Binford, who ceremonially
passed them back to the group Command Sergeant Major Jeffrey Stigall.
During his remarks at the ceremony, Wendt thanked the groups
Soldiers for their accomplishments
during his command.
I want to thank each and every
one of you standing in formation,
as well as those from previous generations of the 1st Group, because
without you, none of the things this
group has accomplished would have
occurred, Wendt said.
I am proud to have been of service
to our great country as a member of
your ranks.
Binford lauded the men and women
of 1st SF Group and stated how eager
he is to take the reins of the unit.

Passing the Guidon Brigadier General Michael Repass passes the guidon to Colonel Randolph R. Bindford during the change-of-command ceremony for the 1st SF Group on July 16
at Fort Lewis, Wash. Binford replaces Colonel Eric P. Wendt as commander of the group. U.S.
Army photo.

I know you will do great things,

and Im ready to be a part of this great
organization, Binford said.
Binfords previous assignments include the Pentagon and multiple tours
with the 5th SF Group. Binford also
served in Afghanistan and Iraq with
the 3rd SF Group.
Binford graduated from Sam
Houston State University in 1984 with
a bachelors in sociology and in 1999
graduated from the Naval War College
with a masters in national security
and strategic studies.
In his next assignment, Wendt will

deploy to Iraq again with Multi National Corps-Iraq.

The 1st SF Group, formed in 1957,
traces its lineage from Detachment
101 of the Office of Strategic Services,
as well as the 1st Special Service
Force, a combined World War II U.S.
and Canadian unit known as the
Devils Brigade.
The group has called Fort
Lewis home since 1984 and has its
headquarters and three battalions.
One other battalion is forward-stationed at Torii Station, Okinawa.
USASOC PAO.

September-October 2008

U P D A T E

Fallen SF Soldier receives

posthumous Silver Star Medal
The family of a 3rd Special Forces
Group Soldier received his posthumous Silver Star Medal during a ceremony at Fort Bragg, N.C., July 14.
Members of Company B, 2nd Battalion, 3rd SF Group, honored their
fallen comrade, memorialized his
memory and thanked his wife for
her sacrifice.
Sergeant 1st Class Justin S.
Monschke, an SF weapons sergeant,
was killed in action Oct, 14, 2007,
just days before his 29th birthday. He
was killed by an improvised explosive
device during a dismounted movement to a suspected enemy position
in the south Baghdad region of Arab
Jabour, Iraq.
Prior to his death, Monschke
distinguished himself on the field of
battle by killing 10 enemy combatants
and saving the lives of his fellow Soldiers, as well as the lives of the Iraqi
soldiers with them, during an Aug. 1,
2007, battle.
This is an incredible award, given only to those who have displayed
the highest degree of gallantry in
service and honor, said Lieutenant
General Robert W. Wagner, commanding general, U.S. Army Special
Operations Command, who spoke at
the award ceremony.
Monschke was serving as the point
man during the Aug. 1, 2007, operation with the Iraqi Counterterrorism
Force. When the assault force, led by
Monschke, received small-arms fire
from four terrorists, he immediately
returned fire, aggressively charged
forward and closed the distance killing
three terrorists and wounding a fourth
by accurately firing while on the move.
Monschke rallied the ICTF element
with him to assault the target building.
As his group entered the building, they
were fired upon, and Monschke returned fire, killing two more terrorists.
Monschke then led the assault

Special Warfare

force of Iraqis into the fourth target

building. As the assault force was
entering the building, a vehicle stopped
just short of them. Two terrorists exited the vehicle and began firing on the
Iraqi assault force, which was outside
without cover. Through the open doorway, Monschke killed the two terrorists
and their driver, who was also attempting to shoot at them.
A second vehicle, containing four
terrorists with weapons poised to kill,
approached their position. Monschke
again fired his M-249 Squad Automatic Weapon, effectively stopping the
vehicle and killing all four terrorists
before they were able to harm any of
his team.
When I see these awards, I look
at how many times did a person make
conscious acts of valor, to influence the
situation, when somebody else might
not have done that and might not have
been able to figure out what to do,
said Wagner, who noted Monschkes
continued, unhesitating response to

the repeated enemy assaults.

Brigadier General Michael S. Repass, commanding general, U.S. Army
Special Forces Command, spoke of
Monschkes selfless acts of courage.
Our exploits as Special Forces
operators are rarely known to the
public, and somewhat tragically, I
would say, its relatively unknown to
our own families, Repass said. Its
only on occasions like this that the
curtain is pulled back, and the bright
light is shined on our operators, what
they have done and what they mean to
other people. Its perhaps the downside
of being a quiet professional, but we
have shined the light, none the less on
a great operator.
I think we can all find a great degree of satisfaction knowing that Justin knew he was going to receive this
award, said Wagner about Monschkes
knowledge regarding his potential Silver Star Medal.
Its reassuring to know that he
knew that. USASOC PAO.

Paying Tribute Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner, commanding general, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, presents a posthumous Silver Star Medal to the family of Sergeant First
Class Justin S. Monschke, 3rd SF Group. U.S. Army photo.

U P D A T E

1st SF Group awards Silver Star Medals

Members of the 1st Special Forces
Group, Fort Lewis, Wash., gathered
July 16 for the awarding of Silver Star
Medals to two Soldiers, honoring each
for bravery during Operation Iraqi
Freedom last year.
Sergeant 1st Class Chad M. Kite
and Staff Sergeant Christopher L.
Federmann were presented the medals by Lieutenant General Robert W.
Wagner, commanding general of the
U.S. Army Special Operations Command, and Brgadier General Michael
S. Repass, commanding general of the
U.S. Special Forces Command. Kite
and Federmann were both awarded
the nations third highest medal for
valor for their part of an operation to
capture a suspected terrorist leader
in the city of Ad Diwaniyah, Iraq, on

shining stars Lieutenant General Robert Wagner, commander, United States Army Special
Operations Command pins a Silver Star Medal on Sergeant First Class Chad M. Kite during an
awards ceremony on July 16 at Fort Lewis, Wash. Also honored was Staff Sergeant Christopher L.
Federmann, who was also awarded the Silver Star Medal. U.S. Army photo.

June 3, 2007.
Both were part of the primary assault force, consisting of 17 soldiers
a mixture of U.S., coalition and

again moved under heavy enemy fire

out of the enemy stronghold. Under

to engage the enemy.

heavy fire, the assault force withdrew

Kite fired at the enemy, enabling

from the area, returning fire from the

Iraqi soldiers. A second assault force,

Federmann to fire multiple high ex-

sides of their vehicles. During with-

consisting of nearly 30 U.S. and coali-

plosive rounds from his M-79 grenade

drawal from the target area, Feder-

tion soldiers, was staged in another

launcher. Federmann then launched

mann was wounded in the arm from

part of the city waiting as the quick-

a smoke grenade onto the rooftop,

a bullet fragment.

reaction force.

marking the building for coalition he-

The assault force came under

Sergeants Kite and Federmann

licopters to place precise machine-gun

displayed exceptional teamwork and

heavy enemy sniper fire from mul-

fire into the building, destroying the

uncommon valor over the course of

tiple directions.

remaining enemy presence.

a four-hour engagement, while out-

As it unfolded, it was chaotic,

said Kite. We were surrounded.
Kite and Federmann, along with

After moving back to the assault

numbered by enemy insurgents, said

force, Kite and Federmann recognized

Colonel Eric P. Wendt, the former 1st

that insurgent forces had moved again

SF Group commander.

two other coalition soldiers, moved

and taken positions on the rooftop of

100 meters under hostile fire. Kite

a building less than 15 meters away.

suppressed the enemy, while Feder-

The surrounding insurgent forces

mann threw multiple hand grenades,

moved to close the distance with the

360-degree fight, they say the number-

neutralizing the enemy threat. They

coalition forces. Realizing the deadly

one priority for them was making sure

called the second assault force forward

threat developing, Kite suppressed the

everyone made it home.

to their location and immediately be-

rooftops and intersection, while Feder-

gan taking fire.

man fired his M-4 carbine and threw

their turf, Federmann explained. Ev-

multiple grenades at both locations,

eryone did what they were supposed

again neutralizing the threat.

to do to make it out alive thats the

Despite multiple attempts to neutralize the enemy, the threat could not
be eliminated, so Kite and Federmann

The force later was able to pull

Their actions define the spirit of

the Silver Star.
Even though both men were in a

We disrupted the terrorists on

best part. USASOC PAO.

September-October 2008

U P D A T E

Warmack to lead 95th CA Brigade

Colonel Ferdinand Irizzary II
passed command of the 95th Civil
Affairs Brigade to Colonel Michael J.
Warmack during a change-of-command ceremony at Meadows Memorial
Field Aug. 1. The 95th CA Brigade is
the Armys only active-duty Civil Affairs unit.
Ferd, youve done an absolutely
brilliant job, said Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner, commanding
general, U.S. Army Special Operations
Command. I think when you look at
Ferd, you see a guy who has energy,
enthusiasm, knowledge and a bright
mind. He never slows down, and he always has another good idea. He thinks
out of the box, makes things happen,
and enjoys it each and every day.
Irizzary became the first commander of the 95th CA Brigade in 2006,
when the unit was re-designated from
the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion.
The last two years have been a
period of extraordinary growth, turbulence and operational tempo, Irizzary
said. It has also been a period of
fantastic accomplishments.
Since 2006, the brigade has added
a headquarters and three new battalions, he said. It has doubled in
personnel, had a 10-fold increase in
facilities, tripled its budget and quadrupled the number of missions.
Through all of this, two things
have remained consistent: the tremendous devotion to duty for the Soldiers
and their families, and the command
climate, he said. The Soldiers represent the point of the spear for our
nations foreign policy. They take the
risk and put their talents on the line
in the name of our great nation every
day. They have the discipline and
skills to destroy an unconventional
enemy or nurture a struggling ally.
Its a proud day for all of you for
what youve accomplished, Wagner
said, which is far more than we could
ever order you to do. Youve gone far
beyond anyones expectations, and
I know youll continue to do that. I
would like to welcome your new com-

10

Special Warfare

In command Lieutenant General Robert W. Wagner, commanding general, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, passes the 95th Civil Affairs Guidon to Colonel Michal J. Warmack.
Warmack took command of the unit from Colonel Ferdinand Irizzary II. U.S. Army photo.

mander, Colonel Mike Warmack, who

is no stranger to the community and is
extraordinarily well-qualified for this.
Warmack comes to the 95th CA
Brigade from his previous assignment
at the U.S. Special Operations Command, serving as the senior military
representative to the U.S. Agency for
International Development.
To the Soldiers, civilians and
families of the 95th, I cannot think of
a more capable commander to lead
you through the next chapter in the
brigades history, Irizzary said.
Women and men of the 95th CA
Brigade, its an honor to serve with
you, said Warmack. What you have
accomplished, and what you will accomplish, is strategic and vital within
this nation and within this war. While
your numbers are small, your contribution is disproportionately large.
You are the warrior-diplomats for this
special-operations forces team.
Warmack attended the University of Maryland and was commissioned as an Infantry officer in 1986.
In that role, he has served with the

82nd Airborne Division, 1st Armored

Division and 3rd Infantry Division.
After attending Civil Affairs training
in 1996, Warmack served in various
positions in the 96th Civil Affairs
Battalion, from team leader to commander of the battalion.
Warmack received a bachelors in
political science from the University
of Maryland, a masters in international relations from Troy State
University, a masters in national
policy and strategic studies from the
Naval War College, and a masters
in national security and strategic
resources from the Industrial College
of the Armed Forces.
His awards and decorations include a Bronze Star Medal with Oak
Leaf Cluster, Defense Meritorious
Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster,
Global War on Terror Expeditionary
Medal, Iraq Campaign Medal, Kuwaiti
Liberation Medal, Ranger Tab, Master
Parachutist Badge, Combat Infantry
Badge, Expert Infantry Badge and
USAID Meritorious Honor Award.
USASOC PAO.

U P D A T E

SF Soldier earns Frederick Award

Sergeant 1st Class Sean Howie, 10th
Special Forces Group, was awarded the
2008 First Special Service Force Frederick Award for his professional excellence
and courage under fire during a deployment to Samarra, Iraq, in 2007.
The Special Forces medical sergeant
conducted 215 consecutive days of continuous combat operations as the operations sergeant in an area deemed one of
the most hostile in Iraq at the time.
The Frederick Award is presented
by the First Special Service Force to a
Special Forces operator who exhibits the
highest degree of professionalism. The
FSSF was a one-of-a-kind joint Canadian and American unit that fought side
by side throughout the Italian Campaign
and southern France during World War
II. The award is named after Lieutenant
Colonel Robert T. Frederick, the first
commander of the FSSF.
Sean Howie is like the vast majority of Green Berets in that they do not
seek the spotlight, said Sergeant Major
Gregory Hayes. Sean just comes to
work every day and tries to do his best.
He loves what he does, and he takes
enormous pride in his medical duties.
At any given time during his deployment, Howie could be found manning the .50-caliber machine gun in
the turret of a tactical vehicle, leading
assault elements, establishing casu-

alty-collection points, treating patients

in the compound clinic, supervising
mass-casualty events, conducting
tribal engagements and training Iraqi
counterparts in close- quarters battle
and combat-casualty care.
Howie, a 17-year veteran of Special
Forces, said, Ive worked with top-notch
guys my entire career. They strive to be
the best. Danger is inherent with our
jobs. You hope for the best and prepare
for the worst.
His deployment had its share of danger. Howie and his team were returning
from a mission when his vehicle was
struck by an improvised explosive device. Exposed to the elements and sitting
in the gunners turret of the lead vehicle
on the convoy, the medical sergeant took
shrapnel to the face.
Samarra further tested his teams resilience and his medical expertise during
four mass-casualty events involving IED
attacks on the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi
National Police. During his eight months,
he made more than 200 medical contacts
with coalition and Iraqi casualties.
With the attacks happening around
them, Howie and his team were not immune to attacks during their missions.
During an operation, his team came
under intense enemy fire, and three
members of the team were hit during
the exchange. Being the only medic on

Howie
the team, he immediately assessed and
called for a medical evacuation. While
en route to the medical facility, Howie
treated his wounded teammates, saving
their lives.
During an attack on the Askariya
Shrine, Howie and his team stepped
into action without orders and were the
first to arrive on scene. They secured
the site and established a casualty-collection point, preventing a follow-on
attack at the mosque. USASOC PAO.

USASOC Soldier/NCO of the Year honored

The U.S. Army Special Operations
Command announced the winners of
its 2008 Noncommissioned Officer and
Soldier of the Year competition in a
ceremony July 17.
Sergeant 1st Class Steven J. Kroll,
a Special Forces instructor from the
4th Battalion, 1st Special Warfare
Training Group, U.S. Army John F.
Kennedy Special Warfare Center and
School, was named the USASOC NCO
of the Year.
Specialist Barrett E. Kauling, a
radio and communications security
technician from the 3rd Battalion, 75th

Kroll
Ranger Regiment, was selected as the
USASOC Soldier of the Year.
Both will represent USASOC

Kauling
in the Department of the Army
2008 NCO and Soldier of the
Year competition. USASOC PAO.

September-October 2008

11

Analytic Support to Intelligence

in Counterinsurgencies
by Lieutenant Colonel Walter L. Perry, U.S. Army (ret.) and Lieutenant Colonel John Gordon IV, U.S. Army (ret.)
Copyright 2008 The RAND Corpora-

does not necessarily gauge emphasis.

and provides insights on the need

tion. This article is actually the summary

However, when we couple the money

for better analysis of insurgency. It

from Walter L. Perry and John Gordons

spent with the relative ability of na-

focuses on the security portion of a

longer monograph, Analytic Support to

tions to conduct conventional and

counterinsurgency effort. Other ele-

Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies. It is

counterinsurgency operations, it is

ments of counterinsurgency, such

reprinted with permission.

clear that the emphasis is on conven-

as efforts to improve governance in

tional forces.

countries threatened by insurgency,

Insurgency is one of the oldest

What is the reality that faces West-

are also critically important. However,

forms of conflict. Records of ancient

ern militaries today? Iraq provides a

those nonsecurity portions of coun-

regimes show how their rulers were

useful example. Whereas the major-

terinsurgency are beyond the scope of

frequently faced with revolts and in-

combat-operations phase in Iraq lasted

this analysis.

surrection. The reality that insurgency

some 23 days (from the time U.S. and

is a continual problem has persisted

UK forces crossed the border from Ku-

into the modern era. The United

wait into Iraq to the last major battle in

States Army spent decades conduct-

Baghdad on April 10, 2003) the coun-

ing what was, essentially, a counterin-

terinsurgency period has lasted more

surgency in the American West during

than 1,700 days as of this writing. This

the period after the Civil War; the Brit-

is consistent with the norm of post-

ish Army was faced with multiple in-

World War II insurgencies.

surgencies during the period of empire

Although Iraq and Afghanistan

in the 19th and early 20th centuries;

will probably reduce the appetite of

and as the colonial era came to an end

Western nations to engage in simi-

in the post-World War II period, the

lar events without vigorous domestic

Western militaries especially their

debate, a strong case can be made that

armies continued to face this chal-

the Western militaries simply cannot

lenge. Today, the problem of combat-

turn their back on the study of and

ing insurgencies continues to loom

preparation for counterinsurgency in a

large for the armed forces of several

manner similar to the way the conven-

Western nations.

tional U.S. military turned its back on

Yet despite this, the preference of

the study of low-intensity operations

most Western militaries has been to fo-

in the aftermath of the unfortunate

cus on conventional combat operations

experience in Vietnam. A major part

against the armed forces of another

of enhancing our ability to conduct

nation-state. That focus is reflected in

counterinsurgency is improving our

the spending patterns of the NATO na-

ability to analyze how insurgencies get

tions today. Compared with the money

started, the different nature of each

devoted to new systems for high-inten-

individual insurgency and the actions

sity combat, the amount invested in

required by the security forces that are

the preparation for irregular warfare

attempting to counter the movement.

pales. Of course, quality does not equal

quantity, and a strict resource metric

12

Special Warfare

This article examines the nature

of the contemporary insurgent threat

Nature of modern
insurgency
Today, theorists and doctrine writers, those in charge of training and
equipment purchases and the political
leaders of the nations faced with insurgencies and other nations considering
coming to their assistance must all
consider the nature of modern insurgency. This is a profoundly important
issue, since how nations view insurgencies will have significant influence
on how their militaries and governments prepare for future counterinsurgency missions.
There is considerable discussion
today about what has changed. Does
the modern, interconnected, networked, cable-television world obviate
the lessons from past counterinsurgency campaigns? Or is the nature of
insurgency so enduring as to render
the recent phenomena of jihad just
another chapter in what is a rather
consistent story of how insurgencies
develop and how they are countered?
The reality is that there are important
elements of truth in both views.
Whereas, in some respects, insur-

 War Zone Members of Karbalas Emergency Response Unit receive training from U.S. Special Forces on close-quarters battle tactics, urban movement and combat drills. The Soldiers are the quick-reaction force when dealing with insurgents. U.S. Army photo.

gencies have become slicker, quicker

proto-insurgency phase. In this early

become a large-scale insurgency. At

and enabled by modern information

phase, the most effective government

this point, major portions of the coun-

technology, many of the principles of

counters to the insurgents are gener-

try could be under insurgent control,

counterinsurgency operations remain

ally intelligence services and the police.

and a large portion of the population

fundamentally the same. This reality

There may be little, if any, role for the

will have sided with the rebels. If the

should strongly influence how todays

military at this point. If an insurgency

problem has reached such proportions,

Western militaries prepare them-

survives past this initial stage, it can

the insurgents stand a good chance of

selves for the challenge. In all of this,

evolve into a small-scale insurgency.

prevailing. On the government side, the

we see the need for sound analysis

Now the insurgents start to make their

military has by now probably taken the

in order to determine what capabili-

presence felt with more open pro-

lead, since the insurgency is so strong

ties and what mixture of new and old

pagandizing and occasional attacks

that it is now beyond the ability of the

techniques are most appropriate for a

against government forces and facili-

police to control.

particular insurgency.

ties. While the police and intelligence

Most insurgencies evolve over time.

agencies remain in the lead to combat

While occasionally an insurgency

the insurgents, at this point there may

suddenly springs forth in a matter of

be a need to involve the military in the

months (this is essentially what hap-

effort, since the police may need help

pened in Iraq), in most cases insurgen-

in some areas.

cies gradually gather strength assuming they survive their initial, weak,

Should the rebels continue to grow

in numbers and capability, it could

Intel dominance
Although there are some similarities, the role of intelligence in conventional combat operations differs
considerably from its role in support
of irregular warfare, including insurgencies. Because the enemy in an
September-October 2008

13

Analytic Support to Intel

Financing event: Includes the funding

of insurgent attacks. The event can
describe either funding-related
activities taking place, or that a
financier was involved.

Assembly event: Includes the assembly of makeshift weapons.

The event can describe assembly-related activities,a location
at which assembly takes place, or that a bombmaker was
involved.

Material event: Includes

finding completed
weapons, or materiel
involved in producing
makeshift weapons.
Materiel events are
subdivided by the type
of materiel found:
ordnance, electronic
components, chemicals,
or a combination of
the above.

Financing
and
logistics

Gathering
recruiting
materials

Attack event: Includes selecting the

target and conducting the attack.

Postattack event: Any

event that is the result
of the attack, e.g.,
casualties, damage,
collateral damage,
vehicle damage.

Transport event:
Includes the
transportation
of weapons.

Assembly

Transport

Attack

Postattack

Planning

Planning event: Includes planning, meeting, command and control, monitoring,

surveillanceand/orinformation operationsrelated to carrying out insurgent attacks.
The event can describe either planning-related activities taking place, or that a
planner, leader, or a high value individual was involved.

Figure S.1
RAND MG682-S.1

insurgency is elusive, unknown and

applying systems-analysis techniques

tions against these insurgent cells

most likely indistinguishable from the

to the process of selecting the best

must depend upon the development

general population, intelligence opera-

course of action.

of intelligence aimed at identify-

tions are crucial.

Support to conventional
combat
In conventional combat operations,

Support to
counterinsurgency
Insurgent groups rarely resemble
conventional-force formations until

the intelligence mission is primarily to

they have wrested control of large

respond to the requirements imposed

amounts of territory from the govern-

by the campaign plan in essence,

ment. They are usually made up of

military intelligence. In this case, intel-

clandestine groups operating in the

ligence tends to support operations.

shadow world, disrupting activities of

Commanders decide what objectives

the government in ways that resemble

they will seek to attain, and intelli-

criminal gangs. Little, if anything, is

gence supports both the decision-mak-

generally known about their order of

ing process and additional information

battle, equipment, strategic goals or

needed to support the selected course

tactics. In fact, their disruptive be-

of action.

havior can resemble the activities of

Analysis in support of conventional

operations is generally well-under-

ordinary criminals.
Successful intelligence opera-

stood. For example, operational analy-

tions in support of counterinsur-

sis can help commanders sift through

gencies therefore resemble those of

the intelligence data by systematically

law-enforcement agencies. Opera-

14

Special Warfare

ing cell members and their location.

Insurgent command structures are
also likely to be unconventional, and
much effort must be expended on understanding the relationships among
the members of the various groups
involved in the insurgency.
Insurgents generally conduct acts
of violence against the established
government. Assassinations, bombings, kidnappings and other forms
of violence are common. Seemingly
random acts against innocent civilians are conducted by insurgent
gangs to intimidate and underscore
the governments inability to protect
the population. In investigating these
incidents, considerable emphasis
is placed on crime-scene analysis,
social-network analysis, interrogation

of detainees, forensics and biometrics.

insurgency in terms of actions, pro-

friendly nations to come to the aid of

Military intelligence begins to resem-

nouncements and so on?

a neighbor threatened by insurgents,

ble police intelligence.

Leadership and membership. Who

it is important to answer these ques-

Analysis in support of these

are the leaders and principal depu-

tions. To do so, we turn to intelligence

police-like operations is likely to be

ties of each insurgent group? Where

analysis, using some of the traditional

considerably different than analysis

are they located? What is the relation

tools of operational analysis and add-

in support of conventional military

among the group members and be-

ing a few new tools.

operations. In supporting counterin-

tween groups?

surgency operations, we need to apply

Insurgent goals. Are the insurgents

In the process of applying these

techniques, it is important to keep in

existing, and perhaps new, analytic

striving to overthrow the existing

mind two distinguishing characteris-

techniques to answer such questions

government or to gain autonomy for a

tics of insurgencies: (1) When carrying

as the following: Who are the insur-

region? How can the government take

out operations, insurgents are likely to

gents? What are their objectives?

advantage of each goal?

subordinate global objectives to local

Where will they strike next? How are

The nature of insurgent attacks.

objectives, and (2) Any attempts by the

they organized? Notice that answers

Where are the weapons caches used

friendly forces to counter insurgent at-

to most of these questions are al-

by the insurgents? Where are the next

tacks are generally met with counters

ready known in conventional military

attacks likely to occur? What is the

to the counters that is, insurgents

operations. The law-enforcement com-

nature of the attack event chain?

are adaptive.

munity often employs pattern-analy-

What foreign entities (governments or

sis techniques, such as geographic

groups) are assisting in the attacks in

profiling, to understand past criminal

some way?

behavior and to predict where criminals are likely to strike next.

Analytic questions
Analysis in support of counterinsurgencies (indeed, in support of
most unconventional wars) centers on
contributing to intelligence production
by focusing on required information
elements. Because this is a unifying
theme, we refer to analytic support in
these cases as intelligence analysis.
It is therefore important that we fully
understand the anatomy of insurgent
attacks. Figure S.1 depicts a typical
sequence, from financing operations to
conducting the attack. At each event in
the chain, the insurgents are vulnerable to government detection and attack, but to varying degrees.
The analytic questions at each
stage in an insurgency therefore center
on understanding what is needed to
interrupt insurgent attacks at each
point in the event chain. Some of these
questions are the following:
Signs of a nascent insurgency. What
is the typical signature of a nascent

Intelligence sources. How can we

best leverage information obtained
from detainees? How can we use forensic and biometric evidence to locate
insurgents?
Financing and recruitment. Who is
financing the insurgency? How are the
insurgent groups recruiting members?
What part of the population is susceptible to recruitment? What are the
inducements to join?
Weapons. What types of weapons
are being used? Where do they come
from? Where are they cached? Where
are the assembly facilities for makeshift weapons? How are weapons delivered to attackers? Which groups are
conducting the attacks?
Friendly-enemy interactions. What
operational patterns are friendly forces
exhibiting? How is this behavior being
exploited by the enemy? How can a
friendly force alter its behavior to make
its patterns more difficult to discern?
If its patterns are discerned, how can a
friendly force make it more difficult for
the enemy to exploit?
For the United States and other

Analysis
The analytic tools needed for
answering the research questions
will be a mix of existing methods of
analysis, some new approaches and
perhaps different ways of applying
existing methods. We suggest several
analytic techniques, based on our
experience supporting operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Not all have
proven successful, but in some cases
that may be because they have not
yet been applied.
All analysis depends on data, and
analytic support to counterinsurgency
operations is no exception. The major
source of information on enemy activities is generally a report that records
significant activities. A significant activity can be any incident deemed important. For example, locating a weapons cache is a significant activity, as is
an enemy attack on a friendly convoy.
In many cases, the most important
pieces of information are recorded in
narrative remarks sections and not
in the more structured data entries.
Reports therefore are dependent upon
the diligence of the individual Soldier
preparing the entry. In addition, there
September-October 2008

15

analytic support to intel

are other issues relevant to the usefulness of the data:

Data collection. Most data are col-

Discerning patterns. Some of the

attacks are not random, (2) provide

research questions can be answered

a mechanism for grouping historical

only in terms of what we refer to as

events, (3) account for an adapting en-

lected to support operations not to

indicators that is, what friendly

emy, (4) benefit from input from local

inform analysis.

units should look for when searching

commands, (5) recognize that analysis

Unevenness in reporting. Which

for enemy activity. The methods most

is local, like the insurgency, and (6) be

incidents are considered significant

frequently used to develop indicators

better than what the command is cur-

can vary with the experience of the

are pattern-classification methods,

rently using.

reporting unit.

hierarchical decision trees and lin-

Multiple databases. In Iraq, and to

Analyzing insurgent networks.

ear-discriminant analysis. All these

Much of what commanders face across

some degree, Afghanistan, the several

methods examine factors associated

all phases of an insurgency consists

databases are not linked or cross-refer-

with the occurrence of an event and

of clandestine groups of loosely con-

enced. Many are stored locally and not

then examine evidence in the form of

nected individuals carrying out crimi-

easily accessed.

training vectors to narrow the factors

nal acts against the government and

to a few strong indicators.

the friendly forces supporting it. In

Lack of a standard lexicon. A criti-

Predictive analyses. Predictive

Iraq, commanders at all levels devote

is that the terms used be consistent.

analyses aim at forecasting where

considerable time understanding the

Unfortunately, only recently have stan-

(and sometimes when) the enemy will

relationships among key people in the

dard definitions begun to be applied to

strike next. In the absence of data on

cities, towns and villages within their

data entries in Iraq.

friendly behavior, these techniques

areas of operation. For insurgents to

cal requirement for database searches

Successful intelligence operations in support of counterinsurgencies therefore

resemble those of law enforcement agencies. Operations against these
insurgent cells must depend upon the development of intelligence aimed at
identifying cell members and their location.

Friendly data generally not cap-

invariably depend upon statistical

successfully carry out the activities

tured. Most of the data collected in Iraq

analysis of past insurgent behavior

depicted in Figure S.1, they must be in

and Afghanistan are associated with

under the assumption that the past

contact through some form of network.

enemy activities little information is

is prologue. The predictions therefore

Understanding the structure of these

recorded about friendly operations.

are based solely on what the enemy

networks is therefore a primary goal

forces have done in the past not on

of counterinsurgency operations. A

agencies. All too often, bureaucratic

any interaction between friendly and

possible solution is the development of

procedures inhibit or prohibit the shar-

enemy forces. Most predictions assume

an intelligence-based common pic-

ing of information much of which

an underlying randomness associated

ture of the insurgent networks that

may be time-sensitive between the

with enemy behavior. Although several

(1) uses the most current intelligence

organizations that are attempting to

of these predictive methods exist, very

estimates, (2) is automated so as to

deal with the insurgency. Sharing

few are currently being used in Iraq or

provide access to multiple commands,

intelligence information among allied

Afghanistan. Local commanders there-

and (3) can be easily updated.

nations is also difficult. This is particu-

fore resort to heuristic methods that

larly problematic for analysis.

rely on the location and timing of past

general, friendly forces are attacked

insurgent attacks plotted on maps. To

because they are exposed in some way.

appear to show some promise of being

be effective (and accepted by com-

In an insurgency, unlike conventional

useful to intelligence analysis in sup-

manders in the field), predictive meth-

combat, there are no lines of con-

port of counterinsurgencies:

ods should (1) recognize that insurgent

tact behind which friendly forces are

Sharing intelligence data among

Finally, there are techniques that

16

Special Warfare

Friendly-enemy interactions. In

secure. Typically, friendly forces create

ties than with fewer. The assumption

examine how operational analysis can

safe enclaves from which to mount

is merely that the payoffs could be

be used to support the security por-

operations. Once out of the enclave,

evaluated on some ordinal scale.

tion of counterinsurgency operations.

friendly forces are exposed and there-

Response detection. A study cur-

Insurgencies evolve over time. Nor-

fore vulnerable to enemy attack. Be-

rently being led by the Center for Naval

mally starting as a small, clandestine

cause friendly forces cannot hide their

Analyses examines a units historical

movement of true believers, insur-

activities, the enemy is free to attack

movement patterns using archived Blue

gent movements are usually very weak

provided it has the resources and

Force Tracker, or BFT, data.1 This is

and vulnerable in their early stages.

sufficient time to plan. There are two

generally a graphical process whereby

If the movement survives and begins

closely connected methods for examin-

BFT data are plotted on a map of the

to grow, it can become a large-scale

ing the research question associated

units area of operation outside its

insurgency that has a reasonable

with friendly-enemy interactions: game

forward operating base. This is repeated

chance of succeeding.

theory and response detection.

for a subsequent time period of equal

Game theory approach. One advantage of using game theory is that the

length, and the difference is calculated.

In areas where significant change

Our understanding of modern

insurgency is evolving and improving.
In some respects, the lessons and tech-

mental process involved in determin-

is observed, the analysis focuses on

niques used in past counterinsurgency

ing the payoffs forces us to assess

enemy activity to see how the enemy

efforts remain valid today. In other

enemy objectives: a favorable payoff

has exploited (responded to) the change

areas, important changes have taken

to the enemy (Red) implies that it has

in friendly behavior. Next, area density

place, especially in the ability of insur-

achieved some part of its objectives.

changes are computed within grids

gents to use modern global informa-

overlaid on the area of operations, and

tion and communications networks to

forces (Blue) make many decisions

In a counterinsurgency, friendly

along road segments within those grids,

recruit, spread propaganda, organize

when planning and executing mis-

if more resolution is needed.

and control their operations.

sions. They choose routes, times,

An important aspect of this type of

As analysts engaged in trying to

travel speeds and so forth. The set

analysis is the development of suitable

understand and assess modern insur-

of Blue strategies corresponds to

measures and metrics that reflect the

gencies, we must realize that this is a

the set of possible realizations of

level of Red-Blue interaction from one

different form of conflict from what we

these choices.

time period to the next. For the friendly

grew accustomed to during the Cold

forces, operational density is appropri-

War and the 1990s, when most of us

their own decisions about attacking

Insurgent elements (Red) make

ate, i.e., the levels of Blue-force activity

focused on the interaction of conven-

Blue. In general, the success of a Blue

per unit area or per unit kilometer.

tional military forces. Instead of merely

mission and the outcome of a Red

For Red, the metrics are simply the

conducting operational analysis, we

attack depend on how well-matched

activity of interest for the analysis being

are really engaged in using opera-

Reds strategy is to Blues strategy.

conducted: the number of friendly-force

tional-analysis techniques to support

Red must attack when and where

casualties per time period, the number

intelligence operations.

Blue will travel, and it may need to

of attacks of specific types or all types

adjust its tactics in a way that is

per time period, the number of weap-

tuned to the given Blue mission.

ons caches found and cleared per time

We assume that the outcome of

the game for Red can be measured

period, and so forth.

The goal of the response-detection

in terms of the expected payoff to be

analysis is to focus on areas where

derived from the consequences of

(1) a significant change in Blue-force

Red propaganda, friendly casualties,

activity has been observed, and (2)

etc. Crucially, the analysis does not

insurgents have either successfully

depend on actually measuring the

taken advantage of the change or have

payoffs. One approach is to examine

failed to do so.

relative payoffs. For example, Red may

Conclusion

conclude that it has achieved its objective better with more Blue casual-

Notes:
1

The work presented here summarizes research

conducted by Dr. Caryl Catarious, a research analyst

at CNA.

Lieutenant Colonel John Gordon IV,

U.S. Army, (ret.) is a defense analyst
with RAND.
Lieutenant Colonel Walter L. Perry, U.S.
Army (ret.) is a defense analyst with
RAND.

Our goal in this article has been to

September-October 2008

17

Into Africa:

CA teams expand
Operation Enduring Freedom into Chad

by Major Danford W. Bryant II

Into africa

During the six years of the war

and to extend the embassy country

on terror, the most significant

teams reach and effectiveness by,

evolution has been the transition

with and through partners and surro-

of operations from the direct to the

gates in order to build, replace, repair

indirect approach.

and sustain indigenous civil capabili-

Many Americans are familiar with

Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom,
operations that have highlighted the
direct approach of the Department of
Defense and U.S. special-operations
forces, or SOF. Fewer Americans are
familiar with the details of Operation
Enduring Freedom-Philippines, and
Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans
Sahel, or OEF-TS, and their focus on
the indirect approach.
This article will briefly examine
recent operations in OEF-TS, specifically the experiences of one Civil Affairs team from Company F, 96th CA
Battalion, 95th CA Brigade, to demonstrate the effectiveness of focused
operations in civil-military engagement, or CME, in achieving indirect
lines of operation in OEF-TS. It will
also highlight some of the implications of the indirect approach for current and future operations.

Introduction
Between March 2007 and January

ties and capacities.

Command relationships
While deployed, Company F was
under the operational control of
the newly established Joint Special
Operations Task Force-Trans Sahel,
under Special Operations CommandEurope, or SOCEUR, which was the
theater special-operations command
responsible for campaign planning
in OEF-TS. The companys CA teams
were divided between the Army and
Navy SOF ground components and,
once in country, each team fell under
the control of a special-operations
command and control element, or
SOCCE. The SOCCE acted as the
go-to man for the U.S. ambassador
and defense attach, to whom they
could address all issues related to
SOF operations in-country.
The SOCCE in Chad had tactical
control of the CA team, of a military
information support team, and of a
joint planning and analysis team,
which lives with and trains daily

2008, elements of the 96th CA Bat-

with select members the host-nation

talion deployed to Africa in support

military. Other SOF elements rotated

of OEF-TS. CA teams supported the

through Chad, including Air Force

elements of the 10th Special Forces

and Marine SOF elements, and they

Group and Naval special-warfare

too, were task-organized under the

units in a joint campaign. The cam-

control of the Chad SOCCE.

paign focused upon applying the

For reporting purposes in Chad,

indirect approach in order to achieve

each element was allowed to send

long-term positive influence and self-

reports to its parent organization after

sustaining stability in the Sahel, the

the country team, the SOCCE, and

semi-arid, 2,400-mile belt that runs

Navy SOF approved the release of the

south of the Sahara.

information. It is important

During its deployment to Chad,

to note that at no time was any report

one CA team from Company F, 96th

censored. Each report was read to

CA Battalion, assumed duties as a

make sure that no one in the chain of

civil-military support element, or

command would be surprised if ques-

CMSE, to support the U.S. Embassy

tioned about any of the teams reports.

20

Special Warfare

Establishing a foothold
Once the CA team established
itself as part of the SOF team in
Chad, it immediately began planning
how it would support the defense
attachs humanitarian-assistance,
or HA, program. In prior planning
and coordination with SOCEUR, the
CA company element of OEF-TS was
delegated mission-planning authority
for all HA.
The Navy SOF element in charge
had developed a list of named areas
of interest, or NAIs geographic
areas in which information that will
satisfy a specific information requirement can be collected. Using the list
of NAIs, the CA team developed a
plan that would focus HA projects in
those locations. The goal was to gain
additional information and confirm
or deny suspected indigenous civil
vulnerabilities. Subsequent plans for
projects and civil reconnaissance, or
CR, were synchronized with the country mission strategic plan, the OEFTS country and campaign plans, and
ongoing activities of the U.S. Embassy
and SOF.
CR and projects served as the access for developing relationships and
gaining influence in areas that the
CA team and the embassy deemed to
be of operational or strategic interest. CR missions to assess potential
activities, programs and projects
allowed the CA team and other SOF
elements to travel into areas where
they lacked visibility and gave them
an opportunity to assess the need
for future actions that might achieve
specific effects.
Areas of initial focus were under-governed areas in which violent
extremists were suspected or known
to have traveled, lived or recruited.
The CR missions accomplished two
objectives: They allowed identification

 In country The Civil Affairs teams used air assets to get them into the region; however, once in country, they traveled to remote, under-governed areas. Photo copyright C. Brian McCartney, used with permission.

of, initial contact with, and establish-

or cities without sitting down with

the CA team and the key tribal and

ment of rapport with key leaders and

the political and tribal leaders. The

governmental leaders of the Lake

influencers, both formal and infor-

meetings could last minutes, hours or

Chad region and the Borkou-Ennedi-

mal, in the focus areas. They also al-

three to five days. In all engagements,

Tibesti, Chads most northern region.

lowed the team to more fully map the

the focus was not What can we give

In three missions to the Lake Chad

physical and civil terrain in support

you?, but on determining the under-

region, conducted over a five-month

of military and civil objectives of the

lying issues, grievances and problems

period, the CA team sergeant became

U.S. Embassy and the host nation.

within the civil component. With that

close with the governor of this critical

The establishment and development

determined, the team could then

prefecture (state) and also a friend of

of personal relationships during

work toward developing the necessary

the Sultan of the Kanem. The gov-

the interaction with the populace

capability and capacity solutions in

ernor, by virtue of his political posi-

made the activities of the CA team

coordination with indigenous part-

tion, was a formal influencer. He also

indispensible to the embassy and its

ners and the embassy country team

possessed significant real power and

country team in achieving influence

in order to shape and influence the

respect among the regional popula-

in these areas.

civil environment and achieve the end

tion. In addition, the sultan was

state of self-sustainment, peace and

determined to be a significant power

came the face of the United States

stability.

broker formally as a tribal leader and

and served as a representative of the

Building relationships

informally through his associations

In each region, the CA team be-

U.S. government, specifically, the U.S.

mission to Chad. The team leaders
would not pass through key villages

The two most important relationships established were those between

with the political hierarchy of Chad.

The team soon learned that the sultan
was considered to be the second most

September-October 2008

21

into africa

Clinical trials Civil Affairs teams were given unprecedented access to facilities in Chad. That access was won by the development of
relationships with local leaders in the region. Photo copyright C. Brian McCartney, used with permission.

powerful man in Chad, second only to

tained is critical to determining who

understanding of the human terrain

Chads President Deby.

these key players are and what the

of Chad for the CA team, the U.S.

basis of their power and influence is.

Embassy and SOCEUR. That under-

Accomplishments

standing, in the long term, facilitates

Another important part of building relationships with these and

other key players, spheres of influence and centers of gravity was that
the relationships gave the CA team
legitimacy with local and regional
populations. That legitimacy opened
doors in otherwise closed areas and
gave the Chadians confidence to report their concerns about economic,
security and political issues. They
opened the doors to their hospitals,
clinics, schools, power facilities, sewage facilities, radio stations and any
other location the CA team wished to
assess. It cannot be stressed enough
how important it is to establish strong
relationships with the key players.
Collecting information, performing CR
and analyzing the information ob-

22

Special Warfare

During their time in country, the

CA team conducted numerous CR
operations to the southern border
with the Central African Republic, the
eastern border with Sudan (Darfur
region), the Lake Chad region, the
central regions, and the northernmost
regions that border Sudan, Libya,
Niger and Nigeria.
The information gathered during
these CR missions assisted the CA
team, the U.S. Embassy, the SOCCE
and other SOF elements with targeting-development programs for specific
nonlethal effects. The information
gleaned during these CR missions
formed the basis for a much greater

a better long-term solution to the

country-specific challenges of winning
the war on terrorism.
Of the various missions conducted
by the CA team, the most important
was a joint SOF CR mission in northern Chad, conducted in conjunction
with the U.S. Embassy and specialoperations forces of the Navy and Air
Force. The mission allowed the CA
team to enter areas of Chad in which
few U.S. military or government elements had ever traveled.
In addition to performing coordination and synchronization with
U.S. military and civilian agencies,
the CA team also met with the leaders of the French garrison in Chad.

 water woes The Civil Affairs team found that rather than wanting schools built or wells dug, the villagers were more interested in restoring
the gardens around the oasis. The gardens and the oasis were destroyed during a period of political unrest. Photo copyright C. Brian McCartney, used with permission.

Coordination with the French was

access to, contacts in and information

that SOF operations are nested with

not required, but it was done in the

about Chads most under-governed

the U.S. governments foreign-policy

interest of understanding the human

regions. The CA team succeeded in

objectives for the region.

terrain. The French are an influential

opening doors for follow-on activities

element in Chad, having maintained a

by a Navy SOF element that needed

Conclusion

presence there since the early 1900s.

to plan future joint and combined

In this situation, the CA team, in

conjunction with the U.S. Embassy,
determined that not to meet with the

exercises for training with host-nation

military forces in the north.
It is important to note that the

French would have been a breach

Department of State participated by

of protocol and an impediment to

sending a representative who assisted

mobility. Informing the leaders of the

with protocol issues in that sensitive

French garrison, in general terms,

region. The DoS representative was

of what the team was doing and

present only on the days of insertion

where it would be traveling paid great

and extraction for meetings with the

dividends. In fact, the French made

regional governor and leaders, but his

it clear that if the CA team had any

presence reinforced the significance

difficulties or needed medevac assis-

of interagency synchronization and

tance, they would gladly help.

coordination for all operations. In the

The joint CR mission in northern

Chad provided the U.S. Embassy with

CME environment, synchronization

and coordination are critical to ensure

An 11- month mission to a

country as austere as Chad is never
easy. As a proof of concept for CME,
specifically for the deployment of civilmilitary support elements, or CMSEs,
the CA teams accomplishments
during the deployment raised the bar
for nonlethal operations in support
of U.S. SOFs objectives in the war
on terror in Africa. Some of the CA
teams accomplishments were:
- Provided proof of concept for the
CMSE mission.
- Conducted numerous CR missions; gained significant human-terrain information for both SOF and the
September-October 2008

23

into africa

Business District Villagers visit the market in this rural area of Chad. Photo copyright C. Brian McCartney, used with permission.

U.S. Embassys country team.

unique nature of the deployment and

tors: CA forces are more often than

operations yielded numerous lessons

not the main effort for realization of

centers of gravity in operationally and

learned. During the relief in place

long-term nonlethal effects implied

strategically critical regions.

with follow-on CA forces, the outgo-

and specified in a campaign or opera-

ing and follow-on teams discussed

tions indirect lines of operation.

- Established relationships with

- Performed 31 precisely focused

and effective projects valued at ap-

the lessons learned in detail so that

2) Because CA Soldiers conduct-

proximately $400,000 (FY 2007); all

the follow-on team could benefit from

ing CME missions must be comfort-

linked and/or nested with the country

the CA teams experience. Some of the

able operating with a small team in

teams mission strategic plan and the

more significant lessons learned were:

foreign and austere environments

1) A CA team must be flexible,

and with little or no supervision or

competent and open to working with

guidance, they should go through a

all indigenous, SOF and interagency

physical and psychological assess-

tive way of tailoring a CA team to a

elements available. For the CMSE

ment similar to that of other Soldiers

specific mission, country and embas-

mission, CA is not just another slice

currently being assessed and selected

sy. The length of the mission and the

element sent to support the opera-

for Army SOF. Currently, there is no

specified effects of Joint Special Operations Task Force-Trans-Sahel.

The CMSE proved to be an effec-

24

Special Warfare

 Road Trip The Civil Affairs team operated on its own in very remote areas of Chad. They were often days away from any other forces or support. Photo copyright C. Brian McCartney, used with permission.

physical and psychological assess-

organizations and others. But, as

would greatly improve the effective-

ment process for the accession of

has been evidenced in Chad, a team

ness of our CA elements. There is no

active-component CA Soldiers. These

must be ready to strike out on its

better way to gain immediate legiti-

are the Soldiers who will be expected

own when no other organizations

macy with an important individual or

to conduct CME missions.

are present in its region.

community than being able to solve

3) CA personnel must go into

4) Pre-mission training must

CMSE missions with a proactive,

include realistic scenarios that

self-supporting mindset and an

reinforce basic CA skills, as well as

expectation that they will be alone

advanced training in negotiations,

and conducting reconnaissance

off-road navigation and off-road

where no one else has gone. CA

driving of nontactical four-wheel-

is used to working by, with and

drive vehicles.

through the U.S. Agency for Inter-

5) Access to deminimus funding

national Development, host-na-

would allow CA teams quick ac-

tion organizations, nongovernment

cess to cash or reimbursements and

an important issue on the spot.

Major Dan Bryant has served at company, battalion and brigade level and
is currently a company commander
within the 91st Civil Affairs Battalion.
His operational experience includes
Desert Storm, Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom - Trans-Sahel.

September-October 2008

25

Naval Postgraduate School:

Training special operations personnel
for certainty; educating for uncertainty
by Colonel Brian Greenshields and Peter Gustaitis

Since its inception in 1992, the

Special Operations Masters Degree
Program, or SOMDP, has trained
more than 550 officers to fill key
staff and leadership positions in the
Department of Defense. While the
curriculum has evolved over time, the
programs mission to develop critical
thinkers and capable operators, planners and commanders has steadfastly
adhered to General Peter Schoomakers admonition, Train for certainty;
educate for uncertainty.
SOMDP, taught at the Naval
Postgraduate School in Monterey,
Calif., began when a group of 13 Navy
SEALs doing their graduate work at
NPS saw the need for a curriculum
that would focus on the unconventional problems encountered by personnel assigned to the U.S. Special
Operations Command, or USSOCOM.
Under the guidance of Dr. Gordon McCormick, a visiting professor
from the RAND Corporation, NPS
built a course of instruction around
operational and strategic issues and
the use of special-operations forces.
The proposed course of instruction
was so well-received by the students,
including Commander Bill McRaven,
now commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, that the
NPS superintendent arranged for the
curriculum to be briefed to the commander of the Naval Special Warfare
Command, who immediately decided
to sponsor the unique program.
Over the years, SOMDP has
undergone many changes. In 1994,

26

Special Warfare

sponsorship of the program switched

to USSOCOM to reflect the growing
demand of the joint curriculum. In
1995, the special-operations curriculum added two senior service schoolequivalent fellowships. In 2001, it
became its own academic department,
the Department of Defense Analysis.
In 2003, it began receiving students from the International Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program.
In 2004, it was designated a developmental course for Civil Affairs and
Psychological Operations officers.
Today, the program hosts more than
140 joint SOF, conventional and
international officers each year, and
students are awarded a master of science degree in defense analysis upon
completion of the program.
SOMDP is the only education program in DoD in which 100 percent of
the instruction is dedicated, directly
or indirectly, to the study of irregular
warfare, or IW. In fact, the Joint Staff
has recognized SOMDP as a center
of gravity in the education of IW
strategists and campaign planners,
and USSOCOM has named NPS as a
top-tier school in its plan to build its
own IW expertise, as mandated by the
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
and the subsequent IW Roadmap.
The 18-month program comprises
21 courses, a thesis requirement,
mandatory attendance at numerous symposia and roundtables, and
a robust series of guest speakers.
The SOMDP curriculum revolves
around a core set of courses that all

students are required to take. After

the second quarter, each student
picks a major track that entails a
host of specialty courses. Examples
of these tracks include: IW, terrorist
operations and financing, regional
area studies, information operations,
stabilization and reconstruction, and
operations research.
Examples of the courses offered
include seminars on guerrilla warfare, warfare in the information age,
the anthropology of conflict, culture
and influence, the rise of religious
violence, the history of special operations, jihadi information strategy,
psychological operations and public
diplomacy, models for military decision-making, critical thinking and
ethical decision-making. Students
also have the opportunity to attend
courses at the Monterey Institute of
International Students and to attend
language-maintenance courses with
the aid of instructors from the nearby
Defense Language Institute.
Besides the unique curriculum,
SOMDP stands out for many other
reasons. One of these is the highquality and interdisciplinary nature
of the Defense Analysis Departments
faculty. The faculty comprises political
scientists, historians, anthropologists,
social scientists, mathematicians,
computer scientists and even a published poet. Its members have Ph.D.s
from institutions such as Stanford,
Johns Hopkins, the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology and Berkeley,
to name only a few. A number of them

are retired or prior military with special-operations experience.

Another reason why the SOMDP
stands out from other programs is
that funding provided by USSOCOM
allows students to travel in support of
their thesis research. Finally, in addition to the robust academic program,
SOMDP gives students the opportunity to engage in activities that
support the SOF community at large.
In the past, SOMDP students have
played key roles in efforts such as the
Iraq Study Group, development of the
IW joint-operations concept, special
seminars for the Office of Net Assessment, mobile training teams from the
Joint Special Operations University,
and several projects sponsored by the
geographic combatant commands.
In July, the Army deputy chief of
staff G3/5/7 granted full ILE/JPME
1/MEL 4 credit for Army SF, CA and
PSYOP officers attending the SOMDP,
provided that they complete four
PME courses offered at the Naval War
Colleges Monterey satellite campus,
conveniently located at NPS, and that
they attend the two-week ILE Prep
Course prior to reporting to NPS. DA

is considering a request to grant the

same credit to Rangers, special-operations aviators and special-management officers. In addition, the U.S.
Army Special Operations Command
has recently increased its yearly quota
of NPS students from 40 to 50.
Until this year, selection of Army officers to attend SOMDP was performed
by an Army board internal to the
ARSOF Group at the U.S. Army Human
Resources Command. In January, the
director of the JFK Special Warfare
Center and Schools Directorate of Special Operations Proponency was added
to the selection board. The board meets
annually in January to consider the applications of officers in Special Forces,
Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs,
Ranger units, special-operations aviation and special-management units for
SOMDPs July and January starts.
The January 2009 board will select
officers to begin SOMDP in July 2009
and January 2010. The boards target
group will be branch-qualified captains
in year group 1998. Officers in YG
1999 may also apply, but priority will
be given to senior year groups. Applications consist of a DA 1618 signed and

endorsed by the applicants battalion

commander, certified college transcripts, a current officer record brief
and a current official photo. NPS has
waived the requirement for officers to
take the Graduate Record Examination.
Officers should contact their branch
representative for further information.
The quality that makes SOF special,
according to Admiral Eric Olson, the
commander of USSOCOM, is
their wisdom. That wisdom is the product of experience and education. Melding the concepts, theories and models
taught at NPS with the unmatched
combat experience of todays SOF officers will produce leaders who are wellprepared to operate in the uncertain
global environment of the future.

Colonel Brian Greenshields is the

chair of special operations, Defense
Analysis Department, at the Naval
Postgraduate School.
Colonel Peter Gustaitis, U.S. Army
(ret.) is a senior lecturer in the Defense
Analysis Department at the Naval
Postgraduate School.

September-October 2008

27

cAREER nOTES

Enlisted
Selection board set
The Fiscal Year 2009 Sergeant First Class
Selection Board will convene in February 2009.
With the continuing increased OPTEMPO,
Soldiers should keep their Official Military Personnel Folder, DA photo and Enlisted Record Brief
updated as part of a continuous process.
Finding the time to take care of personnel
records while not deployed will pay dividends
by ensuring that the file the selection board sees
paints a full and accurate picture of the candidate
as a Special Forces NCO.
For more information on the current selection board schedule, visit the HRC Enlisted Selections and Promotions home page at https://www.
hrc.army.mil/site/Active/select/Enlisted.htm.
For additional information, telephone SGM
J.C. Crenshaw at DSN 239-7594 or commercial
(910) 432-7594, or send e-mail to john.crenshaw1@us.army.mil.

CMF 18 poised to support

growth of SF groups

Special Forces selected for pilot

of Army Career Tracker

The strength of CMF 18 is at an all-time

high because of the unprecedented growth the
force has experienced in the last two years.
The production of new Special Forces
Qualification Course graduates from the
JFK Special Warfare Center and School and
the high retention rates of the NCOs in CMF
18 will keep the force healthy and increase
positions at the Special Forces company and
higher levels in Fiscal Year 2009.
The addition of one battalion to every
Special Forces Group, starting with 4th Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group, in FY 2008
and continuing with 4th Battalion, 3rd Special
Forces Group, in FY 2009 is well under way,
and force numbers are expected to support
adding one battalion per group per year
through FY 2012.

CMF 18 has been designated as one of two

CMFs to pilot the new Army Career Tracker, or
ACT. ACT will allow Soldiers to gather information about career choices available to them and
to map out goals for their careers. Leaders will
be able to use the ACT as a counseling tool to
inform and develop their subordinates with
counseling and interaction on opportunities,
key decisions and requirements for career
progression. ACT will give Soldiers access to
their administrative and training history and
accomplishments via the professional-development module.
The system pilot, in development, is now
scheduled to begin in 2009 with selected individuals from Fort Bragg, N.C. Full implementation of ACT, previously scheduled for 2009, has
been postponed until a date to be determined.

Warrant Officer
SF warrant officer recruiting
mission approved
The recruiting mission for Special
Forces warrant officer, MOS 180A,
has been approved for FY 2009.
The mission is determined each
year for subsequent fiscal years
through an analytical process that
considers all impacts on the force, both
current and projected. The FY 2009
recruiting mission is 70 active-duty
accessions and 20 National Guard
WO accessions, to meet planned force
growth requirements.

Instructors needed for SF

Warrant Officer Institute
The newly formed Warrant Officer
Institute is looking for qualified SF
warrant officers to serve as instructors
at both the Warrant Officer Technical and Tactical Certification Course,
or WOTTC, and the Warrant Officer
Advanced Course, or WOAC.
To become a WOTTC instructor,
at a minimum, a Soldier must be a
CW 3, SF WOAC graduate and have
operational experience within the
previous six months. Highly qualified

28

Special Warfare

applicants will also have 60 semester/

quarter hours or more of college, ASO
III and have a Force Protection Level
II certification.
In order to meet the minimum
qualifications to become an instructor at the WOAC a Soldier must be
a CW 4, a graduate of the Warrant
Officer Staff Course, have operational experience within the previous
six months and have experience as
a member of an SF battalion staff.
Highly qualified applicants will also
have 60 semester/quarter hours or
more of college, ASO III and Force
Protection Level II certification.
Soldiers in 180A seeking a challenging and rewarding position as either a WOTTC or WOAC instructor and
who meet the minimum qualifications
should contact their group senior warrant officer and CWO 4(P) Tony Fox,
HRC 180A assignment manager, to
request assignment as an SF Warrant
Officer Institute instructor. CWO 4 Fox
can be reached by calling commercial
(703) 325-5231 or DSN 221-5231, or
via e-mail at tony.l.fox@conus.army.mil
or tony.l.fox@us.army.mil .

Warrant officer accession board

scheduled
The U.S. Army Recruiting Command will conduct three active-duty
warrant officer accession-selection
boards for potential 180As in FY 2009.
Accession-selection board dates are
Nov. 17 - 21, Jan. 12-16, 2009, and
July 13-17, 2009. For more information,
interested SF NCOs should visit the
USAREC home page at www.usarec.
army.mil/hq/warrantofficer/warrant.html,
or telephone DSN 239-7597/1879.

National Guard seeking SF

warrant officer candidates
Army National Guard recruiting
efforts remain high for SF warrant
officers. If you are a CMF 18 NCO in
the ARNG and are ready to take on
a challenging and rewarding career
as a SF warrant officer, contact your
state CCWO or the 180A proponent
manager at the Special Warfare Center
and School to see if you meet the
prerequisites. The 180A Proponent
Manager can be reached at commercial (910) 432-1879/7597 or DSN
239-1879/7597.

Training team commands are

now key developmental positions
Currently, there are more than
2,000 officers serving on transition
teams advising, training and supporting
the Iraqi and Afghan security forces.
To ensure that the best possible officers are selected to serve on
these teams, the Chief of Staff of the
Army has designated the captain and
major positions on these teams as key
developmental positions, thus placing
those positions on par with company
commands, S3 and executive-officer
positions in other units.
Additionally, there are 38 positions
for lieutenant colonels who have been
designated to receive battalion-command credit. These positions are the
team-chief positions on teams that are
directly aligned with brigade-sized Iraqi
and Afghan units of the army, police
and border guards. The team chief is
responsible for the training, employment and support of an Iraqi or Afghan
brigade directly involved in combat
operations.
The selection of these 38 officers
will be a competitive process. Officers
who are selected for transition-team positions will receive credit for 16 months
of battalion command as a DA centrally
selected commander in the operations

category. These positions will be open

to all eligible officers in the maneuver,
fires and effects, or MFE, branches,
including Special Forces, Psychological
Operations and Civil Affairs.
For the training team commands
that are available in 2009, each branch
within MFE will be allocated a number
of commands based on the size of the
population. HRC will activate officers
off the most recent CSL alternate list.
ARSOF branch does not know yet how
many commands it will receive.
For the training team commands
that are available in 2010, there will
be a new command category established.The category will be called
combat-arms operations, and it will
be open to all eligible officers in MFE
branches (including PSYOP and CA),
and foreign-area officers, who wish to
compete. With the command-preference designation window open, officers
have the option to compete in the new
category as well as in the traditional
categories (PO and CA operations,
garrison, recruiting, etc.). The board will
select the 38 best officers from across
the MFE branches.
SF, PSYOP and CA operations and
combat-arms operations will be linked,
so that an officer who competes in one
category will automatically compete in

the other, which means that they will

automatically compete for a transitionteam command position.
If an officer does not want to command a transition team, he will be giving up his opportunity to command an
ARSOF battalion. The garrison, recruiting and strategic-support categories
remain independent choices, and an
officer may choose to compete in each
category individually.

ILE credit available for NPS

On July 13, the Department of Army
G3/5/7, Lieutenant General James D.
Thurman, approved the granting of
credit for intermediate level education,
or ILE, to Army officers who attend the
Naval Postgraduate School, or NPS.
To receive ILE credit, an officer must
attend a two-week preparatory course
en route to NPS, complete four Navy
command and staff distance-education
courses while at NPS, and complete
the graduate-studies program at NPS
within 18 months.
ARSOF has up to 50 new start
allocations for NPS beginning in fiscal
year 2009. The next NPS selection
board will be held in January 2009. For
information, visit the ARSOF branches
site on the Human Resources Command Web site.

WE WANT TO HEAR FROM YOU...

The Special Warfare staff needs your help to make this the best publication it can be. Drop us a line and let us
know your ideas and opinions about the concept and design of the magazine.
What do you like or dislike?
What would you like to see in future issues?
Are the articles addressing issues that are pertinent to the force?
Are there any issues you want to discuss that may not require a magazine article?
Just tell us whats on your mind.

Send Letters To:

Editor, Special Warfare;

Attn: AOJK-DTD-MP;
JFK Special Warfare
Center and School
Fort Bragg, NC 28310

E-mail:

steelman@soc.mil
Include your full name, rank, address and phone number with all submissions.
Articles dealing with a specific operation should be reviewed for security
through the authors chain of command.

September-October 2008

Career Notes

Officer

The saints
The Rhodesian Light Infantry
Their Army cannot be defeated in the field, either by terrorists or even a more sophisticated enemy. In my professional
judgment, based on more than
20 years experience of counterinsurgency and guerrilla-type
operations, there is no doubt
that Rhodesia now has the most
professional and battle worthy
army in the world today for this
particular type of warfare.
Former NATO commander
Sir Walter Walkers quote in
the London Times from Alexandre Bindas The Saints speaks
volumes to the quality of the
Rhodesian Army in the Bush
War. The Rhodesian Bush
War, which lasted from 1965 to
1980, pitted Rhodesias minority-rule government and its
security forces against several
numerically superior, externally-based and internationally-supported communist
insurgent forces. Ignored by
the contemporary international
community and all but forgotten by professional historians
and students of counterinsurgency, the Bush War is a fascinating period in the study of
modern counterinsurgency.
Declaring independence
unilaterally from Britain in
1965, Rhodesia was soon after
embroiled in a growing conflict
with a communist based insurgency. Vilified and embargoed
internationally for its independent stance and its minor-

30

Special Warfare

ity-rule government, Rhodesia

nonetheless fought with tenacity, endurance and innovation,
all the while outnumbered by
its insurgent enemies.
Despite crippling international economic sanctions
and materiel embargoes, the
Rhodesian military developed
and validated new tactics,
techniques and equipment
to effectively battle the growing insurgency. Starting with
the lessons of other Commonwealth counterinsurgency
wars, such as Malaya and the
Mau Mau rebellion, the Rhodesian security forces rapidly
inculcated lessons learned in
the field. The Rhodesian joint
combined arms approach to
the insurgent battle was to
prove devastatingly effective
during the Bush War, the
Rhodesian Army remained undefeated in combat.
No unit fought more valiantly in this struggle than the
1st Battalion, Rhodesian Light
Infantry Regiment, or RLI. Perhaps less well-known than the
Rhodesian Special Air Service
Regiment, or Selous Scouts, the
RLI was one of the most effective counterinsurgency units
of the Rhodesian military. The
Saints is a tremendous contribution to the history of this
conflict, filling a gap in the
record of the Bush War. The
history of the 1st Battalion,
RLI is one of courage, adapt-

Details
By Alexandre Binda and Chris Cocks
United Kingdom:
30 Degrees South Publishing, 2007.
ISBN: 978-1-920143-07-7.
544 pages. $90.
Reviewed by:
Lieutenant Colonel Peter J. Benson
U.S. Army Special Forces Command
ability and combat effectiveness
throughout the conflict. Initially, the battalion was formed as
a standard light-infantry formation, but the progression of the
insurgency war prompted it to
reorganize to a commando role
and to adopt new tactics.
The development and fielding of fireforce elements was
a sentinel development in the
Bush War tactics. These airand heliborne quick-reaction
forces, backed by ground reinforcement, were highly mobile
and aggressive squad- and
platoon-sized rapid-reaction
elements. Deployed in reaction
to terrorist sightings or to track
terrorist spoor when found,
the fireforces were often called

out two or three times daily. Relentlessly pursuing the enemy

with trackers, these aggressive
forces, backed by helicopter
gunships and close air support,
found, fixed and eliminated the
enemy. The fireforces were a key
feature of the Bush War.
The 1st Battalion, RLI became central to the deployment
of the fireforces. These potent
combat elements were based
at intermediate staging bases
throughout Rhodesia, where
they were controlled and employed by joint sub-headquarters and the joint operations
centers, or JOCS.
The JOCs had operational
control over all security forces
within the district. When actionable intelligence, such as
terrorist sightings or fresh
tracks, was reported, the fireforce was called in. The immediate employment of these combat
forces on near-real-time intelligence-driven missions was key
to the success of the Rhodesian
security forces.
Terrorist forces were rapidly
surrounded by ground forces or
through vertical envelopment,
or they were pursued until contact was made. The fireforces
rapid employment produced
an incredible number of enemy
contacts, with the superiorly
trained RLI troopers emerging
victorious time and again. During the war, the 1st Battalion,
RLI, is credited with killing an
estimated 12,000 to 15,000 enemy guerrillas, while losing only
135 of its own men.
Binda has created an incredible record of the RLI in The

Saints. The book is a large-format edition and is organized

chronologically to follow the
development of the 1st Battalion of the RLI from its inception
in 1961 through its disbanding
in 1980.
The book is not strictly a
comprehensive history of the
RLI but is a compilation of
individual troopers narratives
that weave the story of the battalion. The individual sections
are divided up into years or
groups of years, based on the
development of the battalion
or its operations. Beginning in
1961 with the formation of the
unit, the book tracks the training of the battalion, including its transformation into a
commando unit in 1965. The
prelude to the Bush War begins in with the first contacts
with the communist insurgents
in 1966. Operations Nickel in
1967 and Cauldron in 1968
heralded the maturation of the
battalion as a dedicated counterinsurgency force.
In 1973, the fireforce mission
became part of the RLIs core
employment tactics. In 1977,
the 1st Battalion began to take
part in external operations
in partnership with the SAS or
Selous Scouts. Several of these
high profile, large-scale, directaction, cross-border raids on
insurgent bases in Mozambique
and Zambia were conducted
during the Bush War with extraordinary results.
The unit cohesion and impressive combat power projected
by this one battalion during the
Bush War is evident throughout

the book. The unit continued to

refine and develop its structure,
staffing, weaponry and tactics
throughout the Bush War. It
was able to deploy via ground
vehicle, helicopter or parachute
in varying roles, both internally
or for cross-border strikes into
neighboring countries.
One of the greatest strengths
of The Saints is the use of personal narratives of members
of the 1st Battalion, RLI that
make up the book. Supported
by descriptions of the development of the unit, the narrative
of the soldiers themselves tells
the story of the unit, its training and combat operations.
These give the text a gritty
feeling of the troops eye view
of the RLIs history. Rather than
sounding like an analytical history of the battalion, the real,
on the ground history of the
unit in the counterinsurgency
war comes though.
The Bush War was, in essence, a campaign of small-unit
actions. It was fought by the
RLI in section- and troop-sized
elements led by junior leaders. By telling the story of the
1st Battalion using the troops
own words, The Saints has a
personal and realistic texture.
Accompanied by a fantastic array of personal contemporary
photographs, most never before
published, this book becomes
a vivid testament to the fitting
pride and outstanding valor of
this fighting unit.
If you are interested in writing a book review, please e-mail
steelman@soc.mil for books or
criteria.

May-June 2008

31

Copyright photo C. Brian McCartney, used with permission

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