SEPARATE OPINION

Art.

III,

Sec.

10

Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of

contracts
shall
be
passed.
CARPIO, J.:

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by

respondents must be denied for lack of merit.
I. Statutorily-defined savings does not make
the issues raised in the petitions less
constitutional.
In their Motion for Reconsideration,
respondents contend, among others, that the
issues [in these consolidated cases] were
mischaracterized and unnecessarily
constitutionalized. Respondents argue that
[w]hile savings is a constitutional term, its
meaning is entirely legislatively determined. x
x x. Respondents assert that the question of
whether the Executive properly accumulated
savings is a matter of statutory interpretation
involving the question of administrative
compliance with the parameters set by the
GAA, not by the Constitution.
Indeed, the term savings, as used in Section
25(5), Article VI of the Constitution, is defined
by law, the General Appropriations Act (GAA).
However, the definition of the term savings
by statute does not make the threshold issue
in these petitions purely a question of statutory
interpretation. Whether respondents violated
the prohibition in Section 25(5), Article VI of
the Constitution, regarding savings and
augmentation, falls squarely within the
category of a constitutional issue which in turn
necessarily demands a careful examination of
the definition of these terms under the relevant
GAAs in relation to the use of these terms in
the Constitution.
Significantly, aside from the term savings,
there are other words found in several
provisions of the Constitution which are
defined by law. The terms contract, capital
and political dynasty, found in the following
provisions of the Constitution, are defined or to
be defined either by law or jurisprudence. 1

Article

XII,

Sec.

11

Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any

other form of authorization for the operation of
a public utility shall be granted except to
citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations organized under the laws of the
Philippines, at least sixty per centum of
whosecapital is owned by such citizens; nor
shall
such
franchise,
certificate,
or
authorization be exclusive in character or for a
longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any
such franchise or right be granted except
under the condition that it shall be subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal by the
Congress when the common good so requires.
The State shall encourage equity participation
in public utilities by the general public. The
participation of foreign investors in the
governing body of any public utility enterprise
shall be limited to their proportionate share in
its capital, and all the executive and managing
officers of such corporation or association must
be citizens of the Philippines.
Article II, Sec. 26
Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal
access to opportunities for public service and
prohibitpolitical dynasties as may be defined by
law.
While these terms in the Constitution are
statutorily defined, a case involving their usage
does not automatically reduce the case into
one of mere statutory interpretation. On the
contrary, it highlights the dynamic process of
scrutinizing the statutory definition of certain
terms and determining whether such definition
conforms to the intent and language of the
Constitution.
II. The definition of the term savings has
been consistent. Any redefinition of the term
must not violate the Constitution.
Prior to 2003, the term savings has been
consistently defined in the GAAs as portions
or balances of any programmed appropriation

x x x free of any obligation or encumbrance

still available after the completion or final
discontinuance or abandonment of the work,
activity or purpose for which the appropriation
is authorized, or arising from unpaid
compensation and related costs pertaining to
vacant positions and leaves of absence without
pay.
Beginning 2003, a third source of savings was
added. Thus, savings has been defined in the
GAAs as portions or balances of any
programmed appropriation x x x free from any
obligation or encumbrance which are: (i) still
available after the completion or final
discontinuance or abandonment of the work,
activity or purpose for which the appropriation
is authorized; (ii) from appropriations balances
arising from unpaid compensation and related
costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves
of absence without pay; and (iii) from
appropriations balances realized from the
implementation of collective negotiation
agreements which resulted in improved
systems and efficiencies and thus enabled an
agency to meet and deliver the required or
planned targets, programs and services x x x
at a lesser cost.
Assuming redefining the term savings is
deemed necessary by Congress, such
redefinition must be consistent with the
Constitution. For example, savings cannot be
declared at anytime, like on the first day of the
fiscal year, since it will negate or render
useless the power of Congress to appropriate.
Savings cannot also be declared out
of future Maintenance and Other Operating
Expenses (MOOE) since such declaration will
deprive a government agency of operating
funds during the rest of the fiscal year,
effectively abolishing the agency or paralyzing
its operations. Any declaration of savings
must be reasonable, that is, there must be
appropriations that are no longer needed or
can no longer be used for the purpose for
which the appropriations were made by
Congress.
III. Respondents consistent argument of
mootness defeats their newly-raised
contention of adverse effects as a result of the
decision in this case.

In their Motion for Reconsideration,

respondents allege that the DAP was a
response to a fiscal emergency2 and DAP had
already become operationally dead.3
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

During the Oral Arguments, respondents

asserted that the present petitions be
dismissed on the ground of mootness.
Respondents maintained that the DAP has
become functus officio.
(1)

Presentation

of

Secretary

Abad

In conclusion, Your Honors, may I inform the

Court that because the DAP has already fully
served its purpose, the Administrations
economic managers have recommended its
termination to the President. Thank you and
good
afternoon.4

chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

(2)

Presentation

of

the

Solicitor

General

Your Honors, what we have shown you is how

the DAP was used as a mechanism for building
the
DREAM
and
other
projects.
This
constitutional exercise, repeated 115 times, is
the story of the DAP. As Secretary Abad
showed you, the circumstances that
justified the creation of DAP no longer
obtained. The systematic issues that
slowed down public spending have been
resolved, and line agencies now have
normal levels of budget utilization. This is
indicated by the diminishing use of DAP,
which lapsed into complete disuse in the
second half of 2013, and thus became
legally functus officio. The President no
longer has any use for DAP in 2014. This is
a compelling fact and development that we
respectfully submit undermines the viability of
the present petitions and puts in issue the
necessity of deciding these cases in the first
place. The same constitutional authority used
by the President to pump-rise the economy in
the first half of his Administration has not
transitioned
to
providing
relief
and
rehabilitation in areas of our country struck by
destructive calamities. This only emphasized
our point that generic constitutional tools can
take on different purposes depending on the
exigencies
of
the
moment.
DAP as a program, no longer exists,
thereby mooting these present cases
2

brought to challenge its constitutionality.

Any constitutional challenge should no
longer be at the level of the program,
which is now extinct, but at the level of its
prior
applications
or
the
specific
disbursements under the now defunct
policy.5 x
x
x.
(Emphasis
supplied)
(3)

Justice

Leonens

JUSTICE

questions
LEONEN:

Ok, you are now saying... Alright, I heard it

twice: Once, by the DBM Secretary and
second, by your representations that DAP is no
longer
there.
SOLICITOR

GENERAL

JARDELEZA:

Thats

right.

JUSTICE
Did

LEONEN:
I

SOLICITOR
Thats

hear

you

GENERAL
correct,

JUSTICE

correctly?
JARDELEZA:

Your

Honor.
LEONEN:

Is there an amendatory.... is there a

document, an officially released document that
would clearly say that there is no longer DAP?
SOLICITOR

GENERAL

JARDELEZA:

I do not
Secretary
have, in
President

believe so, Your Honor, but as the

has said the economic managers
fact, already recommended to the
that there is no need for DAP.

JUSTICE

LEONEN:

So it was not applicable in fiscal year 2013,

there
was
no
DAP
in
2013?
SOLICITOR

GENERAL

JARDELEZA:

There was still some diminishing DAP

application up to the middle of 2013 but none
in
the
second
half,
Your
Honor.
JUSTICE

LEONEN:

Again, can
diminishing

you enlighten us
means,
what

SOLICITOR

GENERAL

what is
project?

JARDELEZA:

For 2013, the DAP application was only.... in

the first half of 2013, it was only 16.03 Billion,
Your
Honor.
JUSTICE
Still
SOLICITOR

LEONEN:
a

large
GENERAL

amount.
JARDELEZA:

Still a large amount but if we have given the

total applications approved was a Hundred and
Forty-Nine
Million,
Your
Honor.
JUSTICE

LEONEN:

Okay. The good Secretary mentioned the

Disbursement Acceleration Program is more
that just savings and more that just
unprogrammed funds containing the GAA that
it was a package of reforms meant to
accelerate the spending of government so as to
expand the economy by saying that the DAP is
no longer there, do you mean the entire thing
or only the portion that mean savings and the
unprogrammed
funds?
SOLICITOR

GENERAL

JARDELEZA:

Is it because the case has been filed, or

because
of
another
reason?

By that we mean, Circular 51, Your Honor.

SOLICITOR

JUSTICE

GENERAL

JARDELEZA:

No, Your Honor, because the DAP 541 has

become functus
officio.
JUSTICE

LEONEN:

LEONEN:

Circular 541, therefore, is no longer existing.

SOLICITOR

GENERAL

Yes,

Your

JARDELEZA:
Honor.6

chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

(4)

Justice

Abads

questions

JUSTICE

SOLICITOR

GENERAL

JARDELEZA:

ABAD:

It has stopped because it worked, Your Honor.8

Yes. So, can we not presume from this, that

this government know its departments and
agencies whether it has capability to spend so
much money before proposing it to Congress
and that in five months you are going to say, I
just discovered they cannot do it and Im going
to abandon some of these projects and use the
money for other things. Is that.... that seems
logical for a government that proposes budget
to be spent for a specific purpose and then
within five months abandon them. How can
you
explain
that?

Likewise, in their Memorandum, respondents

averred that [t]he termination of the DAP has
rendered these cases moot, leaving any
question concerning the constitutionality of its
prior applications a matter for lower courts to
decide. Respondents alleged:

SOLICITOR

GENERAL

JARDELEZA:

Again, my explanation. Your Honor, is that logic

and our wish may not be reality. The reality
was: on 2010 the administration comes in,
they have managers, the orders given, use it
or lose it; there is slippage, there is delay. By
the middle of 2013, they have gotten their act
together, they are now spending to the tune, to
the clip because the president wants them to
do. Therefore, there is no more DAP.7

chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

JUSTICE
It

ABAD:
worked

SOLICITOR
It

for

GENERAL

worked,

you?
JARDELEZA:

Your

Honor.

JUSTICE
But why
when....

ABAD:
are

SOLICITOR
Because
JUSTICE

you

abandoning

GENERAL
it

worked,

it

already

JARDELEZA:
Your

Honor.
ABAD:

...in the future such problems as calamities,

etc., can take place, if its not an admission
that
something
is
wrong
with
it?

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

1. DAP, as a program, no longer exists.

82. As respondents manifested before this
Honorable Court during the second hearing,
the DAP no longer exists. The Presidents
economic advisers have reported to him that
the systemic issues that had slowed down
public spending have been resolved, and line
agencies now had normal levels of budget
utilization. This is indicated by the diminishing
use of DAP, which downward shift continued in
2012 and 2013, and its total disuse by the last
quarter of 2013. Thus, even before the various
present petitions were filed, DAP had already
become operationally dead. Contrary to what
some have intimated, DAP was not stopped or
withdrawn because there was something
wrong with it - rather, it became functus
officio because
it
had
already
worked.
Petitioners are challenging the ghost of a
program.
83. The President no longer has any use for
DAP in 2014 and its total disuse means that []
there is no longer an ongoing program that the
Honorable Court can enjoin. This is a
compelling fact that undermines the viability of
the present cases, and puts in issue the
necessity of deciding these cases in the first
place. Moreover, the same constitutional
authority used by the President to pump-prime
the economy in the first half of his
administration
has
now
transitioned
to
providing relief and rehabilitation to areas of
our country struck by destructive calamities.
This only emphasizes respondents point that
generic constitutional tools can take on
different purposes depending on the exigencies
of the moment.9
Clearly, respondents argument of mootness on
the ground that the DAP had served its

purpose negates the governments fears of the

chilling effect of the Decision to the economy
and the rest of the country. If the DAP had
already achieved its goal of stimulating the
economy, as respondents repeatedly and
consistently argued before the Court, then no
adverse economic effects could possibly result
in the declaration of unconstitutionality of the
DAP and the practices undertaken under the
DAP.
Hence, the grim scenario of prolonging
assistance to victims in case of calamities due
to this Courts decision has no basis precisely
because to repeat, according to respondents,
the DAP had already served its purpose.
Significantly, the President has an almost
unlimited resources that he can tap and juggle
for reconstruction and rehabilitation of affected
areas in cases of emergencies and calamities.
For these unforeseen tragic natural events, the
President can certainly utilize the Calamity
Fund or the Contingent Fund in the GAA, as
well as his Discretionary Fund and Presidential
Social Fund.
In the 2011 GAA, the Calamity Fund amounted
to P5,000,000,000 while the Contingent Fund
amounted to P1,000,000,000. In the 2012
GAA, the Calamity Fund amounted to
P7,500,000,000 while the Contingent Fund
amounted to P1,000,000,000. For 2013, the
Calamity Fund amounted to P7,500,000,000
while the Contingent Fund amounted to
P1,000,000,000. For 2014, the National
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund
amounted to P13,000,000,000 while the
Contingent Fund amounted to P1,000,000,000.
In addition, the 2014 GAA provided for
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Program (for
rehabilitation, repair and reconstruction works
and activities of areas affected by disasters
and calamities, both natural and man-made
including the areas devastated by typhoons
Yolanda, Santi, Odette, Pablo,
Sendong, Vinta and Labuyo, the 7.2
magnitude earthquake in Bohol and Cebu and
the siege and unrest in Zamboanga City)
amounting to P20,000,000,000.
Moreover, the President has more than enough
time to observe and comply with the law and
request for a supplemental budget from

Congress. In the PDAF cases, I pointed out:

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

x x x. When the Gulf Coast of the United

States was severely damaged by Hurricane
Katrina on 29 August 2005, the U.S. President
submitted to the U.S. Congress a request for
an emergency supplemental budget on 1
September 2005. The Senate passed the
request on 1 September 2005 while the House
approved the bill on 2 September 2005, and
the U.S. President signed it into law on the
same day. It took only two days for the
emergency supplemental appropriations to be
approved and passed into law. There is nothing
that prevents President Benigno S. Aquino III
from submitting an emergency supplemental
appropriation bill that could be approved on
the same day by the Congress of the
Philippines. x x x.
IV. The earmarking of judiciary savings for the
construction of the Manila Hall of Justice is not
a cross-border transfer of funds.
In their Motion for Reconsideration,
respondents point out that this Court itself
committed a cross-border transfer of funds,
citing the Courts 17 July 2012 Resolution that
approved the earmarking of P1,865,000,000
for the construction of the Manila Hall of
Justice. Respondents allege that the
construction of the Manila Hall of Justice was
an item in the appropriations for Department
of Justice in the 2012 GAA. Respondents
assumed, obviously incorrectly, that this Court
transferred the amount of P1,865,000,000 to
augment the items appropriated to the DOJ for
the construction of the Manila Hall of Justice.
Pursuant to its fiscal automony10 under the
Constitution, the Court on 17 July 2012
adopted a Resolution setting aside and
earmarking from its savings P1,865,000,000
for the construction costs of the Manila Hall of
Justice. The amount was earmarked for a
particular purpose, specifically the construction
of the Manila Hall of Justice. However, contrary
to respondents allegation, the amount for this
purpose was never transferred to the
Department of Justice or to any agency under
the Executive branch. In fact, the Court kept
the entire amount in its own account because
it intends to construct the Manila Hall of Justice
by itself. There is nothing in the language of

the 17 July 2012 Resolution transferring the

amount to the DOJ.
Notably, under the 2013 GAA, the
Construction/Repair/Rehabilitation of Halls of
Justice was already placed under the budget of
the Judiciary. Under the 2014 GAA, the
provision on Capital Outlays (Buildings and
Other Structures) remains under the Judiciary
(Annex A of the 2014 GAA). There is no
provision in the 2013 and 2014 GAAs for the
construction of any Hall of Justice under the
DOJ.
The construction and maintenance of the Halls
of Justice are essentially among the
responsibilities of the Judiciary. As such, they
should necessarily be included in the annual
appropriations for the Judiciary. However,
before 2013, Congress placed the construction
and maintenance of the Halls of Justice under
the DOJ. The inclusion of such item in the DOJ
budget clearly creates an anomaly where the
Judiciary will have to request the DOJ, an
Executive department, to construct a Hall of
Justice for the Judiciary. Not only does this
undermine the independence of the Judiciary, it
also violates ultimately the constitutional
separation of powers because one branch is
made to beg for the appropriations of another
branch to be used in the operations of the
former.
V. Various other local projects (VOLP) is not an
item in the GAA.
As I stated in my Separate Concurring Opinion,
[a]ttached to DBM Secretary Abads
Memorandum for the President, dated 12
October 2011, is a Project List for FY 2011
DAP. The last item on the list, item no. 22, is
for PDAF augmentation in the amount of P6.5
billion, also listed as various other local
projects.11
chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

Savings can augment any existing item in

the GAA, provided such item is in the
respective appropriations of the same branch
or constitutional body. As defined in Section
60, Section 54, and Section 53 of the General
Provisions of the 2011, 2012 and 2013 GAAs,
respectively, augmentation implies
the existence x x x of a program, activity,
or project with an appropriation, which

upon implementation or subsequent evaluation

of needed resources, is determined to be
deficient. In no case shall a non-existent
program, activity, or project, be funded by
augmentation from savings x x x.
It must be noted that the item various other
local projects in the DBMs Memoradum to
the President is not an existing item in the
2011, 2012 and 2013 GAAs. In respondents
Seventh Evidence Packet, the term other
various local projects refers not to a specific
item in the GAAs since no such term or item
appears in the relevant GAAs. Rather, such
term refers to various soft and hard projects to
be implemented by various government offices
or local government units. Therefore, to
augment various other local projects, a nonexisting item in the GAA, violates the
Constitution which requires the existence of an
item in the general appropriations law.
Likewise, it defies the express provision of the
GAA which states that [i]n no case shall a
non-existent program, activity, or project, be
funded by augmentation from savings x x x.
VI. Release of the Unprogrammed Fund
One of the sources of the DAP is the
Unprogrammed Fund under the GAA. The
2011, 2012, and 2013 GAAs have a common
condition on the Release of the
[Unprogrammed] Fund: that the amounts
authorized herein shall be
released only when the revenue
collections exceed the original revenue
targets submitted by the President of the
Philippines to Congress pursuant to
Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution
x x x. The condition in these provisions is
clear and thus needs no interpretation, but
only application. In other words, this express
condition, that actual revenue collections must
exceed the original revenue targets for the
release of the Unprogrammed Fund, must be
strictly observed. It is not for this Court to
interpret or lift this condition. To do so is
tantamount to repealing these provisions in the
GAA and giving the President unbridled
discretion in the disbursement of the
Unprogrammed Fund.
The disbursement of the Unprogrammed Fund
is determined on a quarterly basis. The

revenue targets are set by the Development

Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) for
each quarter of a specific fiscal year. The DBCC
bases its quarterly fiscal targets on historical
cumulative revenue collections. For instance, in
FY 2013, the quarterly fiscal targets are as
follows:
2013 QUARTERLY FISCAL PROGRAM12

%
PARTIC LEVELS (in billion
DISTRIBUTIO
ULARS
pesos)
N
Tot Q Q Q Q To
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
al 1 2 3 4 tal
1,7 2 2 2 2
Revenue 37 48 43 45
10
45. 1. 7. 4. 5.
s
8.8 2.2 4.2 0.6
0
9 7 6 9 8
1,9 2 2 2 2
Disburs 45 49 49 54
10
83. 2. 4. 4. 7.
ements 2.7 3.0 4.0 4.2
0
9 8 9 9 4
(7 (1 (5 (9 (23 3
2 3
Surplus/
4.
10
3.9 0.8 9.8 3.6 8.0 1.
5. 9.
(Deficit)
5
0
) ) ) )
) 0
1 3
Considering that revenue targets are
determined quarterly, revenue collections are
ascertained on a quarterly basis as well.
Therefore, if the government determines that
revenue collections for a certain quarter
exceed the revenue target for the same
quarter, the government can lawfully release
the appropriations under the Unprogrammed
Fund. In other words, the government need
not wait for the end of the fiscal year to
release and spend such funds if at the end of
each quarter, it has already determined an
excess in revenue collections.
There are two kinds of funds under the GAA
the programmed fund and the unprogrammed
fund. Under the programmed fund, there is a
definite amount of spending authorized in the
GAA, regardless of whether the government
collects the full amount of its revenue targets
for the fiscal year. Any deficit can be funded
from borrowings. Such deficit spending from
the programmed fund is acceptable and is
carefully calculated not to trigger excessive
inflation. On the other hand, under the
unprogrammed fund, the government can only
spend what it collects; otherwise, it may

trigger excessive inflation. That is why the GAA

prohibits spending from the unprogrammed
fund unless the corresponding amounts are
actually collected. To allow the disbursement of
the unprogrammed fund without complying
with the express condition imposed under the
GAA will send a negative signal to businessmen
and creditors because the government will be
spending beyond its means in effect
borrowing or printing money. This will
adversely affect investments and interest
rates. Compliance or non-compliance with the
express condition reflects the governments
fiscal discipline or lack of it.
VII. The applicability of the doctrine of
operative fact
I reiterate my position that the operative fact
doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes
an unconstitutional law.13
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

An unconstitutional act confers no rights,

imposes no duties, and affords no
protection.14 An unconstitutional act is
inoperative as if it has not been passed at
all.15 The exception to this rule is the doctrine
of operative fact. Under this doctrine, the law
or administrative issuance is recognized as
unconstitutional but the effects of the
unconstitutional law or administrative issuance,
prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left
undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair
play.16
chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

As a rule of equity, the doctrine of operative

fact can be invoked only by those who relied in
good faith on the law or the administrative
issuance, prior to its declaration of nullity.
Those who acted in bad faith or with gross
negligence cannot invoke the doctrine.
Likewise, those directly responsible for an
illegal or unconstitutional act cannot invoke the
doctrine. He who comes to equity must come
with clean hands,17 and he who seeks equity
must do equity.18Only those who merely
relied in good faith on the illegal or
unconstitutional act, without any direct
participation in the commission of the
illegal or unconstitutional act, can invoke
the doctrine.
To repeat, the power to realign savings is

vested in the President with respect to the

executive branch, the Speaker for the House of
Representatives, the Senate President for the
Senate, the Chief Justice for the Judiciary, and
the Heads of the Constitutional Commissions.
In these cases, it was the President who
approved NBC 541, and it was the DBM
Secretary who issued and implemented it. NBC
541 directed the withdrawal of unobligated
allotments of agencies with low level of
obligations as of June 30, 2012 to augment or
fund priority and/or fast moving
programs/projects of the national
government. As discussed, unobligated
allotments are not savings, which term has a
specific and technical definition in the GAAs.
Further, paragraph 5.7.3 of NBC 541
authorizing the augmentation of projects not
considered in the 2012 budget is
unconstitutional because under Section 25(5),
Article VI of the Constitution, what is
authorized is to augment any item in the
general appropriations law for their respective
offices.

of the unconstitutional act and merely relied in

good faith that such funds were validly
appropriated or realigned for the projects,
cannot be held liable for the unconstitutional
act, unless they themselves committed an
illegal act, like pocketing the funds.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the
respondents Motion for Reconsideration.

Endnotes:

Other terms in the Constitution that are

defined or to be defined by statute or by
jurisprudence:
1

1. social justice (Article II, Sec. 10

and Art. XIII)
2. due process and equal protection
(Art. III, Sec. 1)
3. taking of private property (Article
III, Sec. 9)

Since the President and the DBM Secretary

approved and issued NBC 541, they are
considered the authors of the unconstitutional
act. As a consequence, neither the President
nor the DBM Secretary can invoke the
equitable doctrine of operative fact although
they may raise other defenses. As authors of
the unconstitutional act, they have to answer
for such act.
The proponents and implementors of the
projects under the DAP are presumed to have
relied in good faith that the source, or
realignment, of the funds is valid. To illustrate,
a governor, who proposes to the President or
DBM to build a school house and receives
funds for such project, simply accepts and
spends the funds, and would have no idea if
the funds were validly realigned or not by the
President. Another example is a district
engineer, who receives instructions to
construct a bridge and receives funds for such
project. The engineer is solely concerned with
the implementation of the project, and thus
would also have no idea whether the funds
were validly realigned or not by the President.
Clearly, the proponents and implementors, who
had no direct participation in the commission

4. writ of habeas corpus (Article III,

Sec. 15)
5. ex-post facto law and bill of
attainder (Article III, Sec. 22)
6. naturalized
Sec. 1)

citizen

(Article

IV,

7. martial law (Article VII, Sec. 18)

8. reprieve,
commutation
and
pardon (Article VII, Sec. 19)
9. engaged in the practice of law
(Article IX, Sec. 1)
10.academic freedom (Article XIV,
Sec. 5[2])
2

Motion

for

Motion

for

TSN,

28

Reconsideration,
Reconsideration,
January

2014,

p.

9.

p.

11.

p.

14.
8

TSN,

28

TSN,

TSN,

28

January

2014,

p.

103.

TSN,

28

January

2014,

p.

105.

28

January
January

2014,
2014,

p.
pp.

23.
81-83.

League of Cities of the Philippines v.

Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 176951, et
al., 24 August 2010, 628 SCRA 819.
13

Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No.

202242, 16 April 2013, 696 SCRA 496, 516.
14

15
9

Memorandum,

p.

30.

Id.

League of Cities of the Philippines v.

Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 176951, et
al., 24 August 2010, 628 SCRA 819,
832; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San
Roque Power Corporation, G.R. No. 187485, 8
October
2013,
707
SCRA
66.
16

SECTION 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal

autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may
not be reduced by the legislature below the
amount appropriated for the previous year
and, after approval, shall be automatically and
regularly
released.
10

Rollo (G.R. No. 209287), p. 536.

11

http://www.dbm.gov.ph/wpcontent/uploads/DBCC_MATTERS/Fiscal_Progra
m/FiscalProgramOfNGFy_2013.pdf (visited on
20 January 2015).
12

Chemplex (Phils.), Inc. v. Pamatian, 156 Phil.

408 (1974); Spouses Alvendia v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 260 Phil. 265 (1990).
17

Arcenas v. Cinco, 165 Phil. 741 (1976).

18