Suggested Answers in Quiz

1. Pedro is not correct. The premises occupied by the Chinese Embassy

do not constitute territory of China but of the Philippines. Crimes
committed within the Chinese Embassy in Cebu City are subject to the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. Since Pedro committed a
crime, the Philippines can prosecute him under Philippine law (Reagan
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 30 SCRA 968)
2. NO. Artificial islands do no generate maritime entitlements.
According to UNCLOS, an island is: a naturally formed area of land,
surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide. Reclamation
is obviously not a mode of acquiring territory under international law
because reclaimed land cannot be considered a naturally formed area
of land.
The reefs reclaimed by China are considered as Low-tide elevations.
The UNCLOS defines these maritime features as landmass above water
only at low tide. Outside an existing territorial sea it is not entitled to a
separate maritime zone. It is unable to sustain human habitation or
economic life on its own. It is therefore NOT entitled to a territorial sea
and contiguous zone or other maritime rights.
When the government takes any property for public use, which is
conditional upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially
ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of the
court. The Solicitor Generals motion to dismiss should, therefore, be
denied.
3. As counsel of Abad, I shall argue that the contract is not a sovereign
function and that the stipulation that any suit arising under the
contract shall be filed with the proper courts of the City of Manila is a
waiver of the sovereign immunity from suit of Italy. I shall also argue
that the ambassador does not enjoy diplomatic immunity because the
suit relates to a commercial activity.
The court should reject the defenses. Since the establishment of a
diplomatic mission requires the maintenance and upkeep of the
embassy and the residence of the ambassador, Italy was acting in
pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into the contract. The
provision in the contract regarding the venue of lawsuits is not
necessarily a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit. It should be
interpreted to apply only where Italy elects to sue in the Philippine
courts or waives its immunity by a subsequent act. The contract does
not involve a commercial activity of the ambassador, because it is

connected with his official functions. [Republic of Indonesia v. Vinzon,

405 SCRA 126 (2003)]
4. The law dividing the Philippines into three regions, each constituting
an independent state and vesting in a central government matters of
foreign relations, national defense, and national taxation, is
unconstitutional. First, it violates Article 1, which guarantees the
integrity of the national territory of the Philippines because it divided
the Philippines into three states. Second, it violates Section 1.
Article II of the Constitution, which provides for the establishment of
democratic and republic States by replacing it with three States
organized as a confederation. Third, it violates Section 22, Article II of
the Constitution, which, while recognizing and promoting the rights of
indigenous cultural communities, provides for national unity and
development. Fourth, it violates Section 15, Article X of the
Constitution, which, provides for autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras within the framework of national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines. Fifth, it violates the sovereignty of the Republic of the
Philippines.
5. KABAKA and Rudy are not qualified as a party list and as a nominee,
respectively, since KABAKA is receiving a subsidy from the Dutch
Foreign Ministry. Under Section 2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution, a
political party which is supported by any foreign government cannot be
registered with the Commission on Elections.
Continuation of Consti Lecture 2
1

A: Note that the language of the law clearly states that any
augmentation must be:
a) for an item in the general appropriations law
b) must be for their offices. Consequently, any augmentation
from savings from the OP can only be spent by the OP and cannot be
given to lawmakers. Furthermore, it must be to augment particular
expenses in the appropriations law and not for any and all other
purposes.
The SC cited the case of Demetria v. Alba, when it ruled: The
leeway granted (to the President et al) was thus limited. The
purpose and condition for which funds may be transferred
were specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed for the purpose of
1 The question have been encoded on Consti Lecture 2 together with the first slide of
its answer

augmenting an item and such transfer may be made only if

there are savings from another item in the appropriation of the
government branch or constitutional body.
The SC cited the case of Sanchez, et al., vs. COA [April 23, 2008],
the Supreme Court ruled that the President cannot indiscriminately
transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the
Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any
department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations
Act (GAA) or approved after its enactment, without regard to whether
the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which
the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the
purpose of augmenting the item to which the transfer is to be made.
(IBP/PHILCONSA vs. DBM, July 1, 2014)
Q: What specific features of the DAP render it
unconstitutional?
A: The SC declared as illegal:
(i). Cross border transfers of the savings of the Executive to
augment appropriation of other offices outside the Executive
(ii).
Funding of projects, activities and programs that were not
covered by any appropriation in the GAA
(iii).
Withdrawal of unobligated allotment from the
implementing agencies and the declaration of the withdrawn,
unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as
savings prior to the end of the fiscal year and without complying
with the statutory definition of savings contained in the GAA
(IBP/PHILCONSA vs. DBM, July 1, 2014)
Q: Motion for Reconsideration?
A: The SC in a Decision dated 3 February 2015 affirmed the
unconstitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP)
while partially granting the governments motion for reconsideration.
The magistrates affirmed that a significant portion of the
administrations DAP, supposedly created to speed-up public spending,
violates Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the
doctrine of separation powers of the executive and legislative
branches. The high court still considered unconstitutional the following:
(1)The creating of savings from un-obligated allotments prior to the
end of the fiscal year without complying with the statutory
definition of savings under the GAA
(2)The executive departments cross-border transfer of savings to
another branch of government.

The court further declares void the use of unprogrammed funds

despite the absence of a certification by the national treasure for noncompliance.
Citing the operative fact doctrine, the high court, however, heeded the
Aquino administrations motion and ruled that there is no constitutional
requirement for Congress to create allotment classes within an item.
The constitution does not require the augmentation of funds to be
under the expense category or allotment class of the GAA. Accordingly,
so long as there is an item in the GAA that Congress has set aside a
specified amount of public funds, savings may be transferred thereto
for augmentation purposes. (IBP/PHILCONSA v. DBM, February 3,
2015)
Q: Inhibitions & Disqualification
A: The Constitution provides in Section 14, Article VI the grounds of
inhibitions and disqualifications for members of Congress, as follows:
No Senator or member of the HoR may personally appear as
counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or
quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he,
directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract
with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its
subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any
matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary
benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his
office.
Q: Can lawyer-legislators still practice law?
A: YES. The purpose of the disqualification is to prevent the legislator
from exerting undue influence, deliberately or not, upon the body
where he is appearing.
The pressure may not be intended; normally, the appearance is
enough, considering the powers available to the legislator, which he
can exercise to reward or punish a judge deciding his case, or, in the
case of the Electoral Tribunal, his close association with its members.
This is the reason the prohibited appearance must be personal. The
lawyer-legislator may still engage in the practice of his
profession except that when it comes to trials and hearings
before the bodies above-mentioned, appearance may be made
not by him but by other members of his law office.
PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITIES

Q: What is immunity from arrest?

A: Legislators are privileged from arrest while Congress is in session
with respect to offenses punishable by up to 6 years of imprisonment.
Hence, the commission of serious crimes, i.e., crimes punishable by
afflictive penalties or with capital punishment, does not fall within the
scope of the constitutional privilege.
A member of Congress could only invoke the immunity from arrests for
relatively minor offenses, punishable at most by correctional penalties.
(People v. Romeo Jalosjos, February 3, 2000)
Q: May a congressman convicted of rape be allowed to attend
session in Congress pending his appeal?
A: NO. To allow accused-appellant to attend legislative sessions would
constitute an unjustified broadening of the privilege from arrest
bestowed by the Constitution upon members of Congress.
The trial courts judgment of conviction imports that the evidence of
guilt of the crime charged is strong. Unquestionably, the continued
incarceration of accused-appellant is a valid and constitutionally
mandated curtailment of his rights to provisional liberty pending
appeal of his conviction. (People v. Romeo Jalosjos, February 3,
2000)
Q: What is legislative privilege?
A: No member shall be questioned or held liable in any forum other
than his/her respective Congressional body for any debate or speech in
Congress or in any committee thereof
Q: What are the limitations on legislative privilege?
A: Protection is only against forum other that Congress itself. Thus, for
inflammatory remarks, which are otherwise privileged, a member may
be sanctioned by either the Senate of the House as the case may be.
The speech or debate must be made in performance of their duties
as members of Congress.
Congress need not be in session when the utterance is made, as long
as it forms part of legislative action i.e. part of the deliberative and
communicative process used to participate in legislative proceedings in
consideration of proposed legislation with respect to other matters with
Congress jurisdiction
Q: Can a senator-lawyer be disbarred or disciplined by the
Supreme Court for statements made during a privilege speech?
A: NO. The plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint
for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege
speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding

under the Rules of Court. (Pobre v. Sen. Defensor-Santiago, A.C. No.

7399, Aug. 25, 2009)
Q: Is it ok for a senator to criticize the SC in a privilege
speech?
A: NO. The Senators offensive and disrespectful language definitely
tended to denigrate the institution. It is imperative on the Courts part
to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of
justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that
parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of
Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own
benefit, but to enable them, as the peoples representatives, to
perform the functions of their office without fear of being made
responsible before the courts or other forums outside the congressional
hall. (Pobre v. Sen. Defensor-Santiago, A.C. No. 7399, Aug. 25, 2009)
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS
What is the composition of the electoral tribunal?
1. 3 SC Justices designated by the Chief Justice
2. 6 members of the Chamber concerned (Senate or Hor) chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties
and parties registered under the party-list system
Note: The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its chairman.
Members chosen enjoy security of tenure and cannot be removed by
mere change of party affiliation
What is the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals?
Each electoral tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members
(Sec. 17, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)
HRETs jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins
only after a candidate has become a member of the HoR
[Marcos v. COMELEC, 318 Phil. 329, 397 (1995)]
When will a winning candidate be considered a member of
Congress?
To be considered a Member of the HoR, there must be a concurrence of
the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and
(3) assumption of office.
The term of office of a Member of the HoR begins only at noon on
the thirtieth day of June next following their election. Thus,

until such time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction. [REYES v.

COMELEC, GR No. 207264, June 25, 2013]
How should the oath of office be taken by a winning candidate
to be considered a member of Congress?
Section 6, Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the HoR provides:
Section 6. Oath or Affirmation of Members. Members shall take their
oath or affirmation either collectively or individually before the Speaker
in open session.
Consequently, before there is a valid or official taking of the
oath it must be made (1) before the Speaker of the Hor, and (2)
in open session.
[REYES v. COMELEC, GR No. 207264, June 25, 2013]
Q: Does the HRET have jurisdiction over the question of
qualifications of a party-list congressman after his
proclamation and assumption to office as a member of the
HoR?
A: YES. The HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of
party-list nominees after their proclamation and assumption of office;
they are, for all intents and purposes, elected members of the HoR
although the entity directly voted upon was their party. [Walden Bello
and Etta Rosales v. COMELEC, December 7, 2010]
What is an Election Contest?
Where a defeated candidate challenges the qualification and claims for
himself the seat of the proclaimed winner.
Note: In the absence of an election contest, ET is without jurisdiction.
However, the power of each House to expel its members or ever to
defer their oath taking until their qualifications are determined may
still be exercised even without an election contest.
What are the valid grounds or just causes for termination of
membership to the tribunal?
1. Expiration of Congressional term of Office
2. Death or permanent disability
3. Resignation from political party which one represents in the
tribunal
4. Removal from the office for other valid reasons
Q: Does the HRET have authority to pass upon the eligibilities
of the nominees of the party-list groups that won in the lower
house of Congress?

A: YES. Party-list nominees are elected members of the HoR no less

that the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear
and pass upon their qualifications.
By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or
organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the
nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the HoR,
the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
qualifications ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. [Abayon v.
HRET, GR No. 189466, February 11, 2010]
Q: Can the COMELEC pass upon the question of the residency
qualification of a congressional that has already been
proclaimed winner in the election and has assumed the
discharge of that office?
A: NO. The Constitution vests the resolution of contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of members of the HoR and the
Senate solely upon its appropriate Electoral Tribunal
The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of
the COMELEC ends and when that of the HRET begins
The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election
divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed Representatives in favor
of the HRET.
[Jalosjos v. COMELEC, GR No. 193566, June 26, 2012]
SAMPLE PROBLEM
Q: Rep. Camasura was a member of the HRET. There was an electoral
contest involving his party-mate and Bondoc.
The party instructed him to vote for his party-mate. However, Rep.
Camasura cast a conscience vote in Bondocs favor.
Thus, the party expelled him from HRET on the grounds of disloyalty to
the party and breach of party discipline
Was the expulsion valid?
A: The expulsion is VOID. SET/HRET members are entitled to security of
tenure to ensure their impartially and independence.
As judge-members of the tribunal, they must be non-partisan, they
must discharge their functions with complete detachment;
independence and impartiality, even from the party to which they
belong.
Thus, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid
grounds for expelling a tribunals member.
The members are not supposed to vote along party lines-once
appointed. (Bondoc v. Pineda, GR No. 97710, Sept 26, 1991)

QUESTION:
Beauty was proclaimed as the winning candidate for the position of
Representative in the HoR three days after the elections in May.
She then immediately took her oath of office. However, there was a
pending disqualification case against her, which case was eventually
decided by the COMELEC against her 10 days after the election.
Since she has already been proclaimed, she ignored that decision and
did not bother appealing it. The COMELEC then declared in the first
week of June that its decision holding that Beauty was not validly
elected had become final.
Beauty then went to the SC questioning the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC claiming that since she had already been proclaimed and
had taken her oath of office, such election body had no more right to
come up with a decision that the jurisdiction had already been
transferred to the HoR Electoral Tribunal. Is she correct?
ANSWER:
Beauty is wrong.
For the HoR Electoral Tribunal to acquire jurisdiction over the
disqualification case, she must be a Member of the HoR.
Although she had been proclaimed and had taken her oath of office,
she had not yet assumed office.
To be considered a Member of the HoR, there must be a concurrence of
the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and
(3) assumption of office.
The term of office of a Member of the HoR begins only at noon on
the thirtieth day of June next following their election. Thus,
until such time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction. [REYES v.
COMELEC. 699 SCRA 522 (2012)]
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
What is the composition of the CA?
1. Senate president as ex-officio chairman
2. 12 Senators
3. 12 Members of the HoR
How are the 12 Senators and 12 Representatives chosen?
They are elected on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and party-list organizations.
Note: The authority of the HoR to change its representation in the CA
to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political
alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes in
membership must be permanent and do not include the temporary
alliances or fractional divisions not involving severance of political

loyalties or formal disqualification and permanent shifts of allegiance

from one political party to another [Daza v. Singson, GR No. 86344,
December 12, 1989]
What are the rules on voting?
1. The CA shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members
2. The Chairman shall only vote in case of tie
3. The CA shall act on all appointments within 30 session days from
their submission to Congress
What is the jurisdiction of the CA?
CA shall confirm the appointments by the President with respect to the
following positions: HAPCOO
1. Heads of the Executive Department (except if it is the VicePresident who is appointed to the post)
2. Ambassador. Other Public ministers or Consuls
3. Officers of the AFP from the rank of Colonel or Naval Captain
4. Other officers whose appointments are vested in him by the
Constitution (i.e. COMELEC members)
What are the limitations on confirmation?
1. Congress cannot by law prescribe that the appointment of a
person to an office created by such law be subject to
confirmation by the CA
2. Appointments extended by the President to the above-mentioned
positions while Congress is not in session shall only be effective
until disapproval by the CA or until the next adjournment of
Congress
POWERS OF CONGRESS
What are the legislative powers of Congress?
1. General plenary power (Section 1, Article VI)
2. Specific power of appropriation
3. Taxation and expropriation
4. Legislative investigation
5. Question Hour
Q: Who has the authority to create municipal corporations?
How is a public corporation created?
A: A Local Government Unit (LGU) may be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundaries substantially altered either by:
Law enacted by Congress in case of province, city, municipality
or any other political subdivision
By any ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or
Sangguniang Panlungsod concerned in the case of a barangay

located within its territorial jurisdiction, subject to such

limitations and requirements prescribed in the LGC. [Sec. 6, RA
7160]
Q: What are the requisites or limitations imposed on the
creation or conversion of municipal corporations?
A: Plebiscite requirement must be approved by majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite called for such purpose in the political unit or
units directly affected.
Note: The plebiscite must be participated in by the residents of the
mother UNIT in order to conform to the constitutional requirement
Q: May Congress validly delegate to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, and
municipalities within the ARMM, pursuant to Congresss
plenary legislative powers?
A: NO. There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the
delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create
municipalities and barangays.
However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Only
Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation
of the same necessarily includes the creation of legislative
districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Art. VI
of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to it. [Bai
Sandra S.A. Sema v. COMELEC, et al. GR No. 178628, July 18, 2008]
Q: Considering the legislative power validly delegated to the
ARMM Regional Assembly, what is the limitation of such that
prevents the same to create legislative districts?
A: The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a
national office like the office of a district representative of
Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional
Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in
Section 20, Art. X of the Constitution. [Bai Sandra S.A. Sema v.
COMELEC, et al. GR No. 178628, July 18, 2008]
CREATION OR CONVERSION OF LGUS

Income Requirement must be sufficient on acceptable

standards to provide for all essential government facilities and
services and special functions commensurate with the size of its
population as expected of the local government unit concerned.
Average annual income for the last two consecutive years should
be at least:

o
o
o
o

Province P 20M
Highly Urbanized City P 50M
City P 100M (as amended by RA 9009)
Municipality P 2.5M

Q: In determining the total INCOME of an LGU, for purposes of

conversion to a higher LGU, should IRA be included?
A: YES. The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the
gross accretion of the funds of the LGU
The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury
without need of any further action on the part of the LGU. They thus
constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon
as the source of much needed funds.
Department of Finance Order No. 35-93 defined ANNUAL INCOME to be
revenues and receipts realized by provinces, cities and municipalities
from regular sources of the LGU including the internal revenue
allotment and other shares provided for in Sections 284, 290, and 291
of the Code. [Alvarez v. Guingona, 252 SCRA 695 (1996)]
QUESTION:
At the end of the 11th Congress, several bills aiming to convert
certain municipalities into cities were pending. The same were
not entered into law.
The 12th Congress enacted RA No. 9009, amending the LGU by
increasing to P100M the income requirement for conversion of
municipalities into cities
The municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors,
individual cityhood bills containing a common proviso exempting
them from the new income requirement. Congress and the
President approved the same.
The League of Cities of the Philippines challenged the
constitutionality of such law for violating the equal protection
clause and the LGC
LEAGUE OF CITIES V. COMELEC

On November 18, 2008, the SC ruled the cityhood laws

unconstitutional. The COMELEC filed the first motion for
reconsideration, which was denied on March 31, 2009
On April 28, 2009, the SC en banc, by a split vote, denied a
second motion for reconsideration. The decision then became
final and executory.
However, on December 21, 2009, the SC ruled on a 3rd MR and
reversed its own final judgment. The 16 cities were allowed to
hold elections in 2010.

Then again, on a 4th MR, the SC in a decision dated August 24,

2010, reversed its decision and ruled that the 16 cityhood laws
were unconstitutional. The decision then became final and
executor (AGAIN).
Surprisingly, on a 5th MR, last April 12, 2011 the SC again
reversed itself and upheld the constitutionality of the creation of
the 16 new cities.

The SC justified it by saying:

The 16 municipalities not only had conversion bills pending
during 11th Congress, but have also complied with the
requirements of the LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by RA
9009
Congress undeniably gave these cities a special consideration by
exempting them from the P100M income requirement under RA
9009. The exemption clauses found in the individual Cityhood
Laws are the express articulation of the intent of Congress to
exempt these 16 municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009
Hence, this court do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the
clear and unmistakable legislative intent and by duly recognizing
the collective wisdom of Congress. [League of Cities of the
Philippines (LCP) v. COMELEC, GR No. 176951, April 12, 2011]

CREATION OR CONVERSION OF LGUS

Population requirement to be determined as the total
number of inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction of the LGU
concerned. The required minimum population shall be:
Barangay 2K
But 5K in:
o Metro Manila
o Highly Urbanized Cities
Municipality 25K
City 150K
Province 250K
Q: Congress enacted a law creating the legislative district of
Malolos based in a certification of the demographic projection
from NSO stating that by 2010, Malolos is expected to reach
the population of 250,000, hence entitling it to one legislative
district. Is the law valid?
A: NO. Congress cannot establish a new legislative district based on a
projected population of the NSO to meet the population requirement of
the Constitution in the reapportionment of legislative districts.

A city that has attained a population of 250,000, is entitled to a

legislative district only in the immediately following election. In short,
a city must first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter,
in the immediately following election, such city shall have a
district representative. [Aldaba v. COMELEC, GR No. 188078, Jan.
25, 2010]
Q: Congress enacted a law reapportioning the composition of
the Province of Camarines Sur and created a new legislative
district with only 180,000 population from non-adjacent
municipalities. COMELEC argued that the 250,000 population
standard requirement does not apply to provinces. Is COMELEC
correct?
A: YES. Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which requires
250,000 minimum population requirement apply only for a city to be
entitled to a representative but not for a province
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the
entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a
province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at
least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city
must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be
similarly situated. [Aquino & Robredo v. COMELEC, GR No. 189793,
April 7, 2010]
Q: Congress passed a law providing for the apportionment of a
new legislative district in CDO City. The COMELEC implemented
said law but without any plebiscite. This was challenged as
unconstitutional. Is a plebiscite required in the creation of a
new district?
A: NO. The apportionment of a new district is NOT a conversion and
division of CDO City, falling under Section 10, Art X of the Constitution
does not come into play. [Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, GR No.
17690, Dec 8, 2008]
CREATION OR CONVERSION OF LGUS
Land requirement must be contiguous, unless it comprises
two or more islands or is separated by a LGU; properly identified
by metes and bounds; and sufficient to provide for such basic
services and facilities
Area requirements are:
Municipality 50 sq. km.
City 100 sq. km.
Province 2,000 sq. km.
The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more
islands

NAVARRO V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Congress passed a law on December 3, 2006 proclaiming the

Dinagat Islands as a new province. It had an approximate land
area of 802.12 sq. km.
This was challenged as unconstitutional because the law requires
at least 2000 sq. km. more or less in land area for provinces
On 12 May 2010, the SC held that the law is void because
Section 461 of the LGC states that the only exemption granted to
islands is on territorial contiguity and not on land area
However, in a decision dated 20 May 2011, the SC reversed itself
and ruled that the creation of Dinagat Island Province is
constitutional because a province, which is composed of
more than one island, is exempted from the land area
requirement pursuant to paragraph 2, Article 9 of the IRR
of the LGC
LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES

What is the scope of subject matter of the power to conduct

inquiries in aid of legislation?
Indefinite. The field of legislation is very wide as compared to that of
the American Congress. And because of such, the field of inquiry is also
very broad. It may cover administrative inquiries, social, economic,
political problem (inquiries), discipline of members, etc. Suffice it to
say that it is co-extensive with legislative power. [Arnault v. Nazareno,
GR L-3820, July 18, 1950]
The following limitations, however, should be taken into consideration:
a. Constitutional rights to counsel and against self incrimination
even if the investigation is not a criminal investigation, the
information divulge therein may be used in criminal prosecution
(Under Sec. 21, Art. VI, it is provided that the rights of 1987
Constitution, the persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected]
b. The rules of procedures to be followed in such inquiries shall be
published for the guidance of those who will be summoned. This
must be strictly followed so that the inquiries are confined only
to the legislative purpose. This is also to avoid abuses.
c. The investigation must be in aid of legislation

d. Congress may not summon the President as witness or

investigate the latter in view of the doctrine of separation of
powers except in impeachment cases.
Note: It is the Presidents prerogative to divulge or not the information
which he deems confidential or prudent/in the public interest
e. Congress may no longer punish the witness in contempt after its
final adjournment. The basis of the power to impose such penalty
is the right to self-preservation. And such right is enforceable
only during the existence of the legislature [Lopez v. Delos
Reyes, GR L-34361, Nov. 5, 1930]
f. Congress may no longer inquire into the same justiciable
controversy already before the court [Bengzon v. Blue Ribbon
Committee, GR No. 89914, Nov. 20, 1991]
QUESTION:
Senator Enrile accused the Vice Chairman of the Standard Chartered
Bank of violating the Securities Regulation Code for selling
unregistered foreign securities. This has led the Senate to conduct
investigation in aid of legislations. SCB refused to attend the
investigation proceedings on the ground that criminal and civil cases
involving the same issues were pending in courts. Decide. (2009 Bar
Question)
Answer:
The mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a
court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct
of legislative investigation.
Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry
by congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an
administrative complaint.
Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the
power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, can not be
made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.
[Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate, GR No. 167173, December 27,
2007]
How do we distinguish the Standard Charter Case with the
Bengzon case?
In the Courts ruling in Bengzon - the intended inquiry was not in aid
of legislation. The Court found that the speech of Senator Enrile in the
Bengzon case, contained no suggestion of any contemplated
legislation; it merely called upon the Senate to look into possible
violations of Sec. 5, RA 3019. Thus, the Court held that the requested
probe failed to comply with a fundamental requirement of Sec 21, Art.
VI of the Constitution.

While in the Standard Charter case, Sen. Enrile specifically proposed

legislation on the regulation of the sale of unregistered foreign
securities. [Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate, GR No. 167173,
December 27, 2007]
What is the so-called Question Hour?
The heads of departments may upon their own initiative with the
consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the
rules of each house shall provide, appear before and be heard by such
House on any matter pertaining to their departments.
Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or
the Speaker of the HoR at least 3 days before their scheduled
appearance.
Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but it may
cover matters related thereto [Sec. 22, Art. VI]
Distinguish Question Hour from Legislative Investigation
(!!!)
Section 22 (QH) Congress oversight function limited to information
gathering attendance of executive officials subject to the presidents
consent
Section 21 (LI) is plenary objective is to elicit information that may be
used for legislation. The president cannot prohibit the attendance of
witnesses.
[Senate v. Ermita, GR no 169888, April 20, 2006]
QUESTION:
RA 9335 was enacted to encourage BIR and BOC officials and
employee to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of
rewards and sanctions
The IRR of RA 9335 was to be approved by a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee created for such purpose.
Does the creation of a congressional oversight committee violate the
doctrine of separation of powers?
ANSWER:
YES. Congress may not vest itself, any of its committees or its
members with either executive or judicial power.
This amounts to a LEGISLATIVE VETO that is unconstitutional.
Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure should be limited to
scrutiny and investigation.
[ABAKADA GURO v. Purisima, GR No. 166715, August 14, 2008]

What is legislative veto? Is it valid in the Philippines?

It is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative
agency to present the proposed IRR of a law to Congress, which, by
itself or through a committee formed by it, retains the right to approve
or disapprove such regulations before they take effect.
Legislative veto is not allowed in the Philippines.
[ABAKADA GURO v. Purisima, GR No. 166715, August 14, 2008]
Can Congress exercise discretion to approve or disapprove an
IRR based on a determination of whether or not it conformed
to the law?
No. In exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on
a determination of whether or not it conformed to the law, Congress
arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in the
SC by the Constitution. Hence, it violates the doctrine of separation of
powers [ABAKADA GURO v. Purisima, GR No. 166715, August 14,
2008]
What is Executive Privilege?
Executive privilege exempts the executive from disclosure
requirements applicable to the ordinary citizen or organization where
such exemption is necessary to the discharge of highly important
executive responsibilities involved in maintaining governmental
operations.
Note: Executive privilege is invoked in relation to specific categories of
information and not to categories of persons.
Neri v. Senate, GR No. 180643, 25 March 2008
Who may invoke executive privilege?
It is only the President who has the power to invoke the privilege.
She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the
privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must
state that the authority is By order of the President.
How is the claim of executive privilege properly invoked?
There must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the Head of the
department which has control over the matter.
A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a precise
and certain reason for preserving their confidentiality.
Neri v. Senate, GR No. 180643, 25 March 2008
Can Congress require the executive to state the reasons for
the claim with particularity?

No. Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for
the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the
information, which the privilege is meant to protect
[Senate v. Ermita, GR No. 169777, 20 April 2006]
What are the elements of presidential communications
privilege?
1. The protected communication must relate to a quintessential
and non-delegable presidential power
2. The communication must be authored or solicited and received
by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The
judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational proximity
with the President
3. The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified
privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need,
such the information sought likely contains important evidence
and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority. [Neri v. Senate, GR No.
180643, 25 March 2008]
Q: The HoR House Committee conducted an inquiry on the JapanPhilippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA), then being
negotiated by the Philippine Government. The House Committee
requested DTI Usec. Aquino to furnish it with a copy of the latest draft
of the JPEPA. Aquino replied that he shall provide a copy thereof once
the negotiations are completed.
A petition was filed with the SC which seeks to obtain a copy of the
Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation
process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. Aquino, et
al. invoked executive privilege based on the ground that the
information sought pertains to diplomatic negotiations then in
progress. On the other hand, Akbayan, et al. for their part invoke their
right to information on matters of public concern.
Are matters involving diplomatic negotiations covered by
executive privilege?
Yes. It is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept
perpetually confidential, the offers exchanged by the parties during the
negotiations continue to be privilege even after the JPEPA is published.
Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal
not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future
negotiations [AKBAYAN Citizens Action Party v. Aquino et al., GR No.
170516, 16 July 2008]
May the Senate be allowed to continue the conduct of a
legislative inquiry without a duly published rules of procedure?

The phrase duly published rules of procedures requires the Senate of

every Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in
aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the on before it
or after it. [Garcillano v. HoR Committee on Public Information, et al.,
GR No. 170338, 23 December 2008]
Is the present Senate a continuing legislative body?
The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a
continuing legislative body. The present Senate has 24 members, 12 of
whom are elected every 3 years for a term of 6 years each. Thus, the
term of 12 senators expires every 3 years, leaving less than a majority
of Senators to continue into the next Congress.
Note: There is no debate that the Senate as an institution is
continuing, as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national
election or change in the composition of its members. However, in the
conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts
separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it.
When is there a Pocket Veto?
Occurs when:
1. The President fails to act on a bill
2. The reason he does not return the bill to the Congress is that
Congress is not in session
Note: Pocket veto is not applicable in the Philippines because
inaction by the President for 30 days never produces a veto
even if Congress is in recess. The President must still act to veto
the bill and communicate his veto to Congress without need of
returning the vetoed bill with his veto message.