HARVARD

UKRAINIAN STUDIES
EUCHARISTERION:
Essays presented to
OMELJAN PRITSAK
on his Sixtieth Birthday
by his Colleagues and Students
Edited by
IHOR EVENK0 and FRANK E.
with the assistance of
Uliana M. Pasicznyk

SYSYN

Volume III/IV 1979-1980

Part 1

,. .

Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts

The Khan and the Tribal Aristocracy:

The Crimean Khanate under Sahib Giray I
HALIL INALCIK

The history of the Crimean Khanate revolved around the tribal ruling
elite. Their constant maneuvering to maintain power in the khanate and
control over its policies is the central theme in Crimean history. Beginning
with the establishment of Ottoman suzerainty in the northern Black Sea
area in the 1470s, both sides attempted to use this new ebement in the
ensuing power struggles to their own advantage, while the Ottoman
government skillfully manipulated the rivals to further its own policies.

The khanate of Sahib Giray Sabib Giray,* as described in Remml

KhOdjas Trikh-i hib Gfray K/ian, vividly demonstrates this emerging

pattern of internal struggle. At the outset, Sahib Giray, khan from 1532 to
1551, achieved a strong centralized rule on the model of the Ottoman
sultans. Afterwards, the tribal elite, held in check and deeply resentful of
This article follows the transliteration system used by the Encyclopaedia of Islam,
second edition.
Ozalp Gokbilgin, "Quelques sources manuscrites sur lpoque de Sahib Giray ler,
Khan de Crime 1532-1551 a Istanbul, Paris, et Leningrad," Cahiers du monde russe
et soviCtique 111970: 462-69, describes two manuscripts of Remmls History of
Sahib Giray, one in the Bibliothque nationale Paris, Supplement turc no. 164, the
second in the library of Leningrad University, Oriental manuscripts no. 488. Zyg
munt Abrahamowicz informed me that there are two more manuscripts in Lenin
grad which we have not yet had the opportunity to use. Remmal indicates that he
completed the work at the end of Radjab in the Hidjra year 960/13 June-12 July 1553.
A critical edition based on all extant manuscripts is a first priority for systematic use of
this source, since even a superficial comparison of the two manuscripts of Paris and
Leningrad reveals important omissions and the ottomanizing of Tatar words the
latter occurs in the Paris manuscript. Remmals work was used by Abd al-Ghaffr,
Umdat al-Tawrikh, ed. by Necib Asim Istanbul, 1343 H./ 1924, pp. 100-Ill; and S.
Mehmed Rid, Al-Sab al-SayyarJiakhbar al-Mu/uk al- Tatar, ed. by A. K. Kazim Beg
Kazan, 1832, pp. 91-94. V. D. Smirnov, Krymskoe xanslvo pod verxovenslvom
Otomanskoj porty do naCala XVIII veka, vol. 1 St. Petersburg, 1887, pp. 412-22,
made use of Remmal, especially for the Ottoman influence on the khanate. O.
Gokbilgin published the text, Trt/j-i hib Giray Han Ankara, 1973, on the basis of
the Paris hereafter P and Leningrad hereafter L manuscripts.
*

446

HALIL INALCIK

the khans despotic power, profited from a split between the Ottoman

government and the khan, and eliminated the despotic khan to re-establish
their own hegemony in the state in 1551. The Crimean crisis of 1551, on
the other hand, was a turning point in the history of Eastern Europe, since
Muscovy, benefiting from the paralysis of the Crimean forces, made a
decisive move to annex the Khanate of Kazan in 1552.
Written by an intimate of Sahib Giray, the Tdrikh-i $ahib Gfray is a
work of unusual value for comprehending the internal structure and
power politics in the Crimean Khanate in this crucial period of its history.
It provides us a firsthand, detailed account of the fatal struggle between
Sahib Giray, the khan who tried to transform a typical steppe khanate
into a centralist autocratic state on the model of the Ottoman Empire, and
the Crimean tribal aristocracy, which struggled to maintain the tribal
"feudal" state structure of the khanate according to "the TOre or Yasa of
Genghis Khan."
The author, known to the Crimeans as Remmal meaning astrologer,
geomancer, was IaysUni-zade Mehmed Nidi,2 a well-known Ottoman
polymath. He wrote the history upon the request of the khans daughter
NUr-Subtn Khni after the khans tragic death in 1551. Remmab had
joined the service of Sahib Giray in 1532 when the latter was leaving
Istanbul to assume his appointment as khan. He became a personal
physician, astrologer, and intimate of Sahib Giray. The khan consulted
him in all important decisions P, 58a. He also confided in him about
financial matters such as the collection of taxes and the granting of
contributions to the Crimean ulema L, 6a. Remmls closeness to Sahib
Giray allowed him to provide information about the khans opinions and
to describe the background to his decisions. His observations and detailed
accounts of life and institutions in the Crimea add a special importance
and interest to his work. He meticulously incorporated local terminology
in his descriptions. Although he wrote the work as an apology for the
actions of his beloved lord, Remml skillfully disguised critical remarks
between the lines. All these facts make Trikh-i $ahib Giry a reliable
account of Sahib Girays reign.3
RemmAl is described as Sahib Girays physician. Upon the death of Sahib Giray, he
entered the service of Sultan Selim II and wrote several medical books for him see
F. E. Karatay, Topkapi Sarayi Muzesi Kutuphanesi Turkce Yazmalar Kataloju, 2 vols.
2

[Istanbul, 1961], index: Nidai. Remmal KhOdja or Iaysuni-zade Mehmed Nidi died
in A.H. 966/AD. 1568/69. For the family of physicians of Iaysuni-zade, see M.
Tahir, Osmanh Muelljfleri, vol. 3 Istanbul, 1342 H., pp. 239, 249; and M. Stireyya,
Sidjill-i O,tmni, vol. 4 Istanbul, 1893, pp. 107, 312.
3
O. GOkbilgin, 1532-1577 Yzilari arasinda Kirim Hanlijinin SiyasiDurumu Anka
ra, 1973, deals with the political history of Sahib Girays reign. I cannot agree with

THE KHAN AND THE TRIBAL ARISTOCRACY

447

THE STRUCTURE OF THE CRIMEAN TRIBAL ARISTOCRACY

The peace treaty concluded between Mel3med Giray 11514-1523 and

the king of Poland-Lithuania4 lists the Crimean aristocracy in the follow
ing hierarchical order: the khan himself, his eldest son Bahadur Giray
Sultan, the other sons of the khan, sultans with a commanding position,
oghians other members of the royal family, begs heads of the four
principal tribes, mirzas sons of begs, all nOkers or nOkOr, meaning
retainer serving the khan in the court and elsewhere. Remmals account
gives the same hierarchy: the khan, his sons, the four begs called ,caraCu,
and the iCki beg/en begs attached to the khans service.5 Like other
Mongol khanates, the Crimean Khanate rested on the support of the four
royal tribes called the karaCu or karaCi. Forming a kind of tribal con
federation under the bash-icaraCu chief larau of the leading clan, the
Shirins, the four clans acted as the main military force in the khanate and
directed state policies in their own collective interests. This organiza
tion, inherited from the steppe empires for the Crimean aristocracy, from
"the Yasa of Genghis Khan" and revered as sacred and immutable in
character, was considered the foundation of the khanate. In Remml L,

15, the order of precedence of the karau clans is given as the Shirins, the
Banns, the Arghins, the Iipal.s, and the Manghits.6 As we shall see, in
him on several points of chronology and interpretation. Our divergences are shown in
this paper.
Published by V. V. Zernov and H. Feydhan, Materialy dlja istorii Krymskogo
xanstva St. Petersburg, 1864, doc. 1, pp. 3-5, dated 9 Radjab 926/15 June 1520. The
oath on the treaty was sworn collectively: "Ant shart itarmUz."
On the basis of the reports by the Muscovite envoys to the Crimea, V. E. Syroekov
skij, "Muxammed-Giraj i ego vassaly," UCenye zapiski Moskovskogo gosudarstven
nogo universiteta 611940: 38-39, points out that the ruling elite in the Crimean
Khanate consisted, in hierarchical order, of the sons of the reigning khan, the sayyids,
or the descendants of the Prophet who were leaders of the ulema, ogh/ans, or relatives
of the khan, the begs, or leaders of the principal tribes, and the kki begleri, or begs and
servants in the service of the khan. For an original description of the ruling class in the
khanate, see Abd al-GhaffAr, Umdat al-Tawarikh, especially pp. 193-207. Written in
A.H. 1161, this compilation made use of native sources such as Otemish Iladjdji,
Trikh-i Dosl Suln see Z. V. Togan, Tarihte. Usul [Istanbul, 1969], p. 224, as well
as Trikh-i $/zib Giray. Abd al-GhaffEr was himself a member of the ruling class and
served under the Shirins. This important work has not attracted the attention of
modern scholars. The most recent work on the history of the khanate, A. Bennigsen,
P. N. Boratav, D. Desaive, and C. Lemercier-Quelquejay, Le Khanat de Crime dans
les archives du Muse du Palais de Topkapi Paris and The Hague, 1978, does not
even include it in the bibliography. A new edition of this important source on the
Crimea is needed, since that by N. Asim is very unsatisfactory.
6
Rija, Al-Sab al-Sayyar, pp. 92-93, gives the four karau as the Shirin, the Barin,
the Arghin, and the Iipak. S. von Herberstein, Noies upon Russia, vol. 2, trans. by

448

HALIL INALCIK

the first half of the sixteenth century there was an intense struggle for
precedence and power among the tribal aristocracy in the khanate.
Traditionally, the number of forces put into the field by the Shinins was
given as 20,000. However, in 1543, during the second Circassian cam
paign, when only a select group of the tribal forces was present, the
Shirins numbered only 5,000, the Arghins and Iipaks 3,000, and the
Manghits 2,000-that is, 10,000 altogether L, 80-81. I believe this was
the actual nucleus of the Crimean tribal aristocracys army.7
The karau commanded the main body of tribal forces in the khanate
and were its principal policy makers. Their leaders, the l.arau-begs, were
present at state council meetings kOrnish or kOnnsh to discuss and
decide important matters with the khan.8 To protest the khans policy on
a particular issue, a beg abstained from taking part in such meetings. The
khan was rendered totally powerless when the arau-begs collectively
abandoned him, in protest taking their forces to a sacred place called the
Iayalar-A It:, where the :amghas, or seals of the clans in the Crimea, were
imprinted on the rock. The allegiance and support of the larau-begs was
of crucial importance to the khan in remaining on the throne and enforcing
his authority in the realm. As we shall see, in 1551 Sahib Giray was totally
incapable of putting up any resistance when these begs changed their
allegiance to Devlet Dawlat Giray.

The observation that the khan himself was elected by the tribal elite
R. H. Major London, 1852, p. 81, gives the same names: "Schirni, Barni, Gargni, and
Tziptzan"; also see Syroe&ovskij, "Muxammed-Giraj," pp. 28-34, for the Manghits.
7
Cf. L. J. D. Collins, "The Military Organization and Tactics of the Crimean Tatars,
l6th-l7th Centuries," in War, Technology, and Society in the Middle East, ed. by V.3.
Parry and M. E. Yapp London, 1975, p. 260.
In 1744 Abd al-Ghaffhr Umdat al- Tawrikh. p. 193 made the following observa
tion: "Let it be known that the meeting of the state council and all the important state
affairs in the Crimean Khanate is placed absolutely in the hands of the four begs who
are as pillars of the state. It is a law not to undertake any important matter without
their vote and consent. The first of these four begs is the beg of the Shirins, the second
that of MansUr-oghlu, the third that of the Barin, the fourth that of the Sidjivut. They
are called in Tatar language the four IaraCis." Ilusayn Huseyin Hezarfen, "Talkhis
al-Bayan fi Iawnin-i Al-i OmAn" manuscript, Bibliothque nationale [Paris],
no. 40, fol. 106b, written in 1699, gave the order as the Shirin, the Arm Arghin, the
Barmn, or Sidjivut, and the Mankit. He added the note that the khan gives his
daughters in marriage only to these begs or to their sons. In The Secret History of the
Mongols, translated into Turkishby Ahmet Temir, Mojollarin Gizli Tan/si Ankara,
1948, p. 8, kharaCu meant "commoners" or "those outside the royal household." The
phrase harau bool ibid., p. 129 apparently corresponds to the Turkish-Ottoman
expression khsc nOker, or comrade attached to the person of the leader for noker or
nkOr, see below. For the sacred number four with the Turks and Mongols, see Z. V.
Togan, Umumi Turk Tarihine Giri, 2nd ed. Istanbul, 1970, pp. 108, 114; idem, Ibn
Fa1lans Reisebericht Leipzig, 1939, excursus nos. 94 and lOOa.

THE KHAN AND THE TRIBAL ARISTOCRACY

449

reflects only the factual situation.9 In the Turkish and Mongol states of
the Eurasian steppes, the supreme authority invested in the imperial
10 or in a particular khan from
house A/tan- Urugh, of heavenly
this house was always conceived as being derived from divine will, and no
human arrangement could alter it." However, in reality, the ulugh-beg or
karau-beg, in agreement with other leaders of the tribal confederation,
determined who became khan. It appears that even under Ottoman
suzerainty, the Crimean tribal confederation tried to continue this prac
tice. A confidential letter sent to Saadet Sadet Giray in Istanbul2just
before the elimination of Mehmed Giray I illustrates how a new khan was
actually chosen by the clan leaders. In it, the leader of the tribal aristoc
racy, who was apparently Bakhtiyar Beg of the Shirins, assured Saadet
Giray that the principal begs, mirzas, and oghlans agreed to have him as
their khan and "they all are united for this purpose and took an oath to die
for his cause."
United by the common interests of a predominantly pastoralist-tribal
society, the four "ruling" tribes of the Crimea acted as a corporate group
before the khan, who in turn represented the state framework super
imposed upon the tribal organization. The struggle between the khan and
the leader of the tribal aristocracy is a recurrent theme in the Eurasian
pastoralist nomadic society from earliest times. The particular nature of
this socio-political formation is defined in various ways, including "feudal"
Vladimircov and "corporate" Krader, referring to the precarious na
ture of the superimposed state structure which resulted from the pre
ponderant position of the tribal aristocracy.3 In this article I try to show
Martin Bronievski, Russia seu Moscovia item que Tartaria Leiden, 1630; Turkish
translation by Kemal Ortayli, Kirim Ankara, 1970, p. 42. Syroekovskij, "Muxam
med-Giraj," p. 39. For the election of a kan by the Iazak clans, see W. Radloff, Aus
Sibirien Lose Blauter aus meinem Tagebuche, 2 vols. Leipzig, 1893, trans. by A.
Temir, Sibiryadan. vol. 1 Ankara, 1954, p. 527.
lO
See 0. Pritsak, "Die sogenannte Bulgarische FUrstenliste und die Sprache der
Protobulgaren," Ural-Altaische JahrbQcher 26, nos. 3 / 4 1954: 217-20; Togan, Ibn
Fad/an, excursus nos. 99a and lOOa.
"
See H. Inalcik, "Osmanl,larda Saltanat Verseti Usl ye Turk Hakimiyet Telk
kisile Ilgisi," Siyasal Bilgiler Fakltesi Derigisi 14:69-94. Aghish Beg wrote to Vassilii
III that since God predestined that Mehmed Giray be khan, four 1arai made him
khan in Syroe&ovskij, "Muxammed Giraj," p. 39.
2
Bennigsen et al., Le Khanat de Crime, pp. 106-110; compare this letter with that
of Eminek Mirza, ibid., doc. E 669/11, pp. 70-75.
W. Radloff, Das Kudauku Bilik des Jusuf Chass-Hadschib aus Bdlasagun, pt. 1:
Der Text in Transscription St. Petersburg, 1891, pp. li-Ivi; Togan, Ibn Fad/an, pp.
291-92, 295-301; B. Ja. Vladimircov, Le rgime social des Mongols, trans. by M.
Carsow Paris, 1948; L. Krader, Social Organization of the Mongol-Turkic Pastoral
Nomads The Hague, 1963, pp. 326-35; idem, "Feudalism and the Tatar Polity of the

450

HALIL INALCIK

how the institution of nokor-ship, as manifested in the Crimean society,

was the basic social factor, frequently overriding tribal kinship ties and
giving the steppe pastoralist society its "feudal" character.
In the Crimea the leader of the tribal confederation was the beg of the
Shirins, the strongest tribe of the khanate who had as appanage the area
from Karasu to Kerch bordering the Ottoman Sandjak of Kaffa Kefe.
To ensure the support of the hereditary leaders of the Shirins, the Crimean
khans established kinship ties with them by giving their daughters in
marriage. During Sahib Girays reign the leader of the Shirins was Baba
Babay, son of Mamish Memesh and Mehmed Giray Is daughter.
Remml describes him as the most authoritative figure among the begs
L, 22. At difficult moments Sahib Giray always turned to Baba, who,
with his brothers and other relatives
Shikmamay, Akmamay, Iara
Mirza, Iutlu-Sat, and I.ay-Pulat Mirza controlled the larger military
forces in the khanate. It is known that the cooperation of the Shirins with
the Ottomans was decisive in bringing the Crimean Khanate under
Ottoman submission in 1475, and that in the subsequent period it was
usually the determining factor in the succession of the khans to the
Crimean throne.4 However, at times when their own authority and
interests were at stake, in particular when a proposed campaign did not
promise much booty or slaves, the Shirins did not hesitate to support
pretenders or khans who opposed the Ottomans. These conditions made
Crimean politics very complex. In 1538 Crimean begs participated en
thusiastically under Sahib Giray in the Ottoman campaign against Mol
davia Iara-Boghdan, hoping for abundant booty. However, the khan,
following Ottoman advice, forbade the enslavement of the Moldavians
during the campaign P, 13-14, since originally they were dhimmi
subjects of the Ottoman sultan. The Crimeans argued that many of them
had incurred debts in equipping themselves to participate in the campaign,
in anticipation of rich booty5 Thereupon the khan ordered that Cap icul,
or booty raids, be carried out only for livestock, but not for slaves. On the
other hand, when in 1547 SUleyman 11520-1566 called the Crimeans to
participate in the campaign against Iran, Sahib Giray, acting as spokes-

Middle Ages," Comparative Studies in Society and History, pp. 76-99. F. SUmer,
Oguzlar Ankara, 1967, p. 387, found that in Turkmen states, the Begler-begi, not the
khan, wielded the real political power.

See H. Inalcik, "Yeni vesikalara gore Kirim Hanliinin Osmanli tbiligine girmesi
ye ahidnme meselesi," Belleten 8: 185-229.
5
For those impoverished Crimeans who borrowed money to participate in the
booty raids, also see the translation of Bronievski by Ortayli, Kirim, p. 52; cf. Collins,
"Military Organization," p. 259.

THE KHAN AND THE TRIBAL ARISTOCRACY

451

man for the Crimean begs, demanded payment of five thousand akCa or
83 gold ducats for each Crimean soldier to be employed in this distant
campaign in a Muslim country. He argued that they were not paid as the
Ottoman soldiery was, but depended wholly on booty for their livelihood
P, 62a. In the end, the Crimeans did not take part in the Iranian
campaign, which was to be one of the main causes of the rift between the
khan and the Ottomans.
In Remmals account P, 4b, 55a the Crimean tribal elite included
alongside the begs of the four karau
the oghlans or ogh/an kiyun begs,
-

members of the Genghiskhanid dynasty who apparently commanded

their own independent forces, as did the larau-begs. Organized under a
leader of their own ranks, the oghlans appear to have had an important

part in the process of choosing a khan.6

In the internal structure of the tribal units under the begs, distinction
should be made between the nkOrs, or eme/desh, and the ordinary rank
and file. NOkOrs or emeldesh literally "comrades", sometimes with the
attribute khassa or sirdash "personally attached" or "intimate com
rade", formed a group of devotees or bodyguards who always accom
panied their master, a beg or khan, and were ready to make every sacrifice
for him.7 In one passage L, 164 Remml described the nkrs of the
See the letter to Saadet Giray in Bennigsen et al., Le Khanat de Crime, pp.
106-110. There two oghlans, Abdullah and Mamish, are mentioned as agreeing to
Saadet Girays khanship.
17
For the word nokr or nokur. see J. Nmeth, "Wanderungen des mongolischen
Wortes J,Tkr, Genosse," Ada Orientalia Budapest, 3 1953: 1-23; G. Doerfer,
Turkische und Mongo/ische Elemente im Neupersischen. vol. 1 Wiesbaden, 1963,
pp. 521-26; Vladimircov, Le rgime social, pt. I, chap. 3, showed for the first time how
nOkOrship became a lever for Genghis Khans creation of the army-state framework
over the Mongol tribal society. Genghis Khan put the newly formed military units
under his nOkors, thus bringing about a new feudal hierarchy dependent directly on his
own will. Nokorship appears to have been the basic institution in the steppe for
explaining not only the emergence of warbands around leaders and ultimately no
madic empires, but also the cause of internal fragmentation and struggle. Cf. E. L.
Keenan, "Muscovy and Kazan: Some Introductory Remarks on the Patterns of Steppe
Diplomacy," Slavic Review 26 1967: 552. Radloff, Das Kudatku Bi/ik, explains this
fragmentation under new leaders by the natural demographic growth within the tribe
itself. .caza/ Cz/cmaj was just the expression of this flight into the steppes of the leader,
either the Genghiskhanid prince or a clan chief with his nOkOrs. Usually the sons of a
deceased leader became lazak with his nOkors. Leadership and success depended on
the leaders personal valor and boldness, his skill in mustering the i/s tribes under his
command, but above all on the loyalty of his nokors. In Abd al-GhaffSrs Umdat al
Tawrikh, pp. 46-47, there is an interesting story about how Rektimur, the beg of the
Shirins, became a nOkor to Toktamish and his descendants. Remembering that his
ancestors were nokOrs of Toktamishs forefathers, he rescued him from a dangerous
situation and agreed to become his nOkOr. He swore to serve him faithfully until death.
16

452

HALIL INALCIK

karau as "attendants who never abandoned their begs threshold." In

most cases these nkrs came from Tatar tribes which were reduced to
dependency or enslaved by a powerful leader. In 1546 Sahib Giray told
the captured wives of the Astrakhan begs that if their husbands submitted
and became his nOkOrs, he would grant them each lands L, 130. The
leader, always a beg or somebody related to the Genghiskhanid dynasty,
retained his following of nkors even in defeat. Withdrawing to the
steppes, an action termed kaz4 C:kmak by the Tatars, he could wait for
an opportune moment to overcome his rivals and regain power. The
process of cazafc Czkmaic seems to have been the real dynamic in the
interminable fight for power and state formation in the Turco-Mongol
nomadic society.8 In fact, the Genghiskhanids themselves, along with
their nkrs, actively participated in this type of power struggle during
the period of the dissolution of the Golden Horde 1359-1502.
A letter apparently written by the bash-arau to the Ottoman sultan in
1533 speaks of the long period of internal struggle in the Crimea since the
murder of Mehmed Giray I by the Nogays in l523. According to the
letter, the constant fighting had resulted in the elimination of all the old
begs and mirzas of the Crimea, as well as the discontinuance of the raids
into the Christian lands which, the letter claimed, were the main source of
the Crimean peoples prosperity. In response to the sultans request for a
compromise between Sahib Giray Khan and Islam Giray that would
restore peace and unity in the country, the author of the letter complained
that compromise was impossible because Sahib Giray had not followed
his advice to reject the principal trouble makers from his court, namely,
Safa Giray, SelImshh Beg, and "Takhilday Mirza who had killed Yflnus,
Then, the four Iarau tribes - the Shirins, Banns, Arghins, and Impaks - also
agreed to become Toktamishs nokors Umdat al- Tawrikh, p. 48. Thus, through
their support, Toktamish became the khan of the Golden Horde and gave his daughter
to RektimUrs son Tekine ibid., pp.48-55. Among the Trkmens the same institution
was sometimes called yoldash Sumer, Oguzlar, pp. 39 1-92. For the importance of
nokorship in state formation among the Turkmens, see J. E. Woods, The Aqquyunlu
Minneapolis and Chicago, 1975, pp. 8-12; 46-54, fn. 17; 230. A Caferoglu, "Turk
Tarihinde NOker," in IV T. T. Kongresi Ankara, 1952, pp. 251-61. Nokorship is
obviously connected with the ancient Turco-Mongol institution of and/ant, antah or
andik; see Abdtilkadir man, "Eski TUrklerde ye Folklorda Ant," Dil ye Tarih
Corafya Fakultesi Dergisi Ankara, vol. 6, no. 4 1948.

Iazak-Tatar leaders with their sizable nokor retinues often sought refuge and
served as mercenaries under the rulers of Lithuania and Muscovy. G. Stokl, "Die
Entstehung des Kossakentums," Veroffentlichungen des Osteuropa-Institutes Munich,
vol. 31953, studied their part in the rise of Slavic Cossacks. Also see W. H. McNeill,
Europes Steppe Frontier, 1500-1800 Chicago and London, 1964, pp. 111-23.

Bennigsen et al., I.e Khanat de Crime. pp. 121-25. The translation of the docu
ment is not always reliable: in lines 8 and 9, the subject is not the begs, but the khan.

THE KHAN AND THE TRIBAL ARISTOCRACY

453

the beg of the Shirins." He also said that Sahib Giray, contrary to the
customs of the khanate and "their age-old lore," was enlisting a number of
ti4fenkdjis, or musketeers, from among "the rabble of the people." From
this letter it is evident that the karau-beg considered himself the supreme
spokesman of the aristocracy in the khanate. His idea of good order was
to follow faithfully the old traditions of the khanate so that the raids into
Christian countries could be organized and prosperity would return with
the acquisition of many slaves. The author of the letter asked the sultan
"in the name of the whole Crimean people" to send a new khan to achieve
peace and good order in the country.
We have to look back to the reign of Saadet Giray 1524-1532 for the
real background to this long struggle in the khanate. The murder of
Melmed Giray I in 1523 was followed by a massacre of the Crimean tribal
forces and a ruinous invasion of the Crimea by the Nogays.2 In despair,
the Crimeans turned for salvation to the Ottoman sultan. He sent to the
Crimea as khan Saadet Giray, accompanied by 500 Janissaries with
firearms, and promised him full Ottoman protection. Those favoring
Ottoman influence, led by Bakhtiyar Beg of the Shirins, thought to secure
power for themselves by supporting Saadet Giray.2 It should be noted
that this Ottoman faction was both pro-Muscovite and had been un
sympathetic to the murdered Mebmed Girays ambition to revive the
Golden Horde Empire under the Girays. Bakhtiyar, an irreconcilable op
ponent of Mebmed Giray I who had given the office of bash-larau to
Mamish, had long been in contact with Istanbul to bring to the Crimea
Himmet Giray as khan and Saadet Giray as alghay. In 1524, Bakhtiyar
welcomed the sultans appointee Saadet Giray as khan. When Saadet
Girays attempt to assert his absolute authority in the khanate led to open
warfare against the powerful Mamish, Bakhtiyar sided with the new khan.
Thus, the struggle was complicated by a conflict for power among the
Shirins, which caused a split in the ranks of this most powerful tribe of the
Crimea. Bakhtiyar replaced Mamish as chief larau. Mamish and the

other Shirin leaders were executed when they attempted to conspire

against the khan in 1528. Saadet Girays basic policy, however, inevitably
led to a rift between the new chief of the l.arau and the khan. Accusing
Bakhtiyar and his brother Evliyar Mirza of a conspiracy against his life,
Saadet Giray, surrounded by his Ottoman musketeers, came to Iirk-Yer,
the chief city of the Shirins, and massacred the conspirators and their

20
21

Synoekovskij, "Muxammed-Giraj," p. 57.

Synoekovskij, "Muxammed-Ginaj," p. 58.

454

HALIL INALCIK

children.22 The leadership of the Shirins was now given to Tokuzak in

Russian reports Tuzak? Mirza and his alghayship to Ytinus, which

resulted in a further split among the Shirins.23 The following genealogy

gives an idea of the struggle for succession among the Shirin mirzas
Roman numerals indicate succession order and Arabic numerals, the
number of years in begship, according to Abd al-Ghaffr.24
Rektimur 1, 24

Tekine Ill, 25

Mamak V, 19

Yakhshi-KhOdja II

Eminek VI

Temir-Khodja IV

Sinek Shidak? VII, 10

Aghish IX, 15 1508-1523

Mamish X, 7

daughter

Devletek VIII, 2

Mehmed Giray I

Aydishke Tokuzak Aghish Khudy-Yar Bakhtiyar Evliy Cihar-Yr

XII
Xl, 4

I-jadjdji
XVII

Icutlu-Giray

XIX

Sofu

YUnus
XIII

Aamet

Baghirghan
XIV

Akmamay
XVI, 12

Babay XV

lutluSat

Karakiz
?

Au xviii

Syroekovskij, "Muxammed-Giraj," pp. 58-59.

For this period of internal struggle, our principal source is the information sup
plied by the reports of the Muscovite envoys, summarized in Synoekovskij, "Muxam
med-Giraj." Abd al-GhaffAr, Umdat al-Tawrtkh, pp. 195-96, helps to clarify genea
logical problems. Remmal P, 7b tells us succinctly that "The Crimean begs were
divided into two camps, between Islam Giray and the khan. Watching each other, they
came to clashes three times."
24
This genealogy is based mainly on Abd al-Ghaffar, Umdat al- Tawartkh, pp. 195,
200. The genealogy arranged by Bennigsen et al., I.e Khanat de Crime, p.319, is based
on Muscovite sources. A letter published by Bennigsen et al., ibid., p. 108 E 6474,
contains some data for making corrections in the table given here. The author of the
letter Bakhtiyar? mentions as elder brothers Aghish Beg and Khuday-Yar, and as
22
23

THE KHAN AND THE TRIBAL ARISTOCRACY

455

As was true with Turkish and Mongol clans in general,25 seniority was
the basic customary rule in leadership among the Shirins. However, the
begs often attempted to secure the title for their own sons. Also, it should
be remembered that more energetic younger brothers, supported by
nkrs, often challenged their elder brothers in leadership, since personal
valor was of great functional importance in this military society. It was of
vital importance for the society to come by the leader most qualified to
unite and organize the tribal forces for booty raids.
As indicated in the Muscovite reports,26 those who endeavored to
assert Saadet Girays authority in the Crimea were actually his brother
Sahib Giray, the future khan, who was active in the Crimea until 1531,
and the iCki-begs, or tribal begs in the immediate service of the khan,
including Selimsha Selimshh in Remml and document E 6474 and his
brother or cousin Takhilday in Remml Taghiltay, L, 57, who probably
belonged to the Iipal clan. In their desperate fight against the khans
faction, the Shirins found a leader in Islam Giray, son of Mehmed Giray I,
who sought to become, with the support only of the Crimean tribal
aristocracy, a khan independent of Istanbul. Joined by most of the
Crimean tribal forces, Islam Giray finally inflicted a crushing defeat on
Saadet Giray in a decisive battle near Azak Azov.27 Saadet Giray took
refuge in Istanbul. A compromise, apparently reached through the kara
u-beg and the Ottoman Porte, defused the dangerous situation for both
sides. In 1532, the sultan appointed Sahib Giray khan of the Crimea28 and
Islam Giray his alghay, and this solution was accepted by both sides.
However, as the Topkapi document E 1308/3 mentioned above makes
clear, the beg of the Shirins soon showed his disappointment at Sahib
Girays conduct in the Crimea, which proved to be too independent and
younger brothers Evliya Mirza, Aydishke Mirza, Tokuzak Minza, and Cihr-Yar
Mirza. But the minzas Djiban Ginay, Baghirghan, and Caghirghan are mentioned
separately, and they are not included among Bakhtiyans brothers. Thus, according to
this document, Toghurak on Tokuzak was not the son, but the brother of Bakhtiyar
Bennigsen eta!., ibid., p. 109, give Tokuzak, son of Aghish, Baghirghan, son of Evliya,
and Aydishke, son of Mamak; Aghish, karau-beg in 1508, is another person.
Bakhtiyar was bash-karaau between 1526 and 1531; cf. Syroekovskij, "Muxammed
Giraj," p. 59.
25
Seniority in succession appears to be a general rule among Turkish and Mongol
pastoralist nomads; see Krader, Social Organization, pp. 129-30, 149, 182, 194-97.
For succession in khanship, however, a different concept became prevalent: see
Inalcik, "Osmanlilarda Saltanat Verseti."
26
Syroekovskij, "Muxammed-Giraj," p. 59; cf. doc. E 2365 in Bennigsen et al., I.e
Khanat de Crime, p. 128.
27
Abd al-GhaffEr, Umdat al-Tawdrtkh, p. 99; RidA, Al-Sab al-Sayyar, p. 89.
28
The date in A/-sab al-Sayyar, p. 89, is Rabi I, 939/October 1532.

456

HALIL INALCIK

assertive. Like Saadet, now Sahib Giray, using Ottoman support, tried to
establish the khans authority. However, the beg of the Shirins, represent
ing himself as the only power able to guarantee the peace and status quo in
the Crimea that were the principal concerns of the Ottomans, was deter
mined to keep his authority.
In his struggle against Islam Giray and his supporters, the Shirins,
Sahib Giray appears to have relied on the cooperation of the powerful
Nogay tribes in the Crimea. In addition, the Nogays located in the steppes
outside the Crimea were useful as allies against Islam Giray, who stayed in
the Or-Iapu Perekop isthmus area and could retreat to the steppes in
times of need.
The rise of the Manghit-Nogays influence in Crimean politics dates
back to Mengli Girays time.29 V. E. Syroe&ovskij, using the reports of
the Muscovite envoys, emphasizes their influence as being the most
important factor in Crimean tribal politics, because the Shirins saw it as a
challenge to their leadership over the Crimean aristocracy.30 In 1523, the
Shirins main complaint against Saadet Giray had been his protection of
the Manghit-Nogay Tenish, or Tinish Mirza, whom they accused of being
the principal conspirator in the murder of Mehmed Giray I and in the
Nogay invasion of the Crimea.3 In dealing with Islam Giray, Sahib Giray
Khan also favored the Manghit leaders, Bki Beg and his brothers Davay
and Ak-Bibi to whom he promised his daughter in marriage. But after
the death of Islam Giray at the hands of Bki, Sahib Giray found Bki
himself to be the most dangerous threat to his rule in the Crimea.
Remml gives a detailed account of the khans struggle against Bki
Beg.32 A nephew of Sahib Giray, distinguished among the Crimean elite
As it happened, some time in this period, Yankavut, leader of the Manghmts in the
Crimea, enjoyed equal status with the Shirins Syroekovskij, "Muxammed-Giraj,"
p. 32. In 1502, when Mengli Giray conquered the Ulugh-Orda Great Horde and the
tribes which composed it were dispersed, the leader of the Manghmts there, Azika or
Hadjike, took refuge with Ahmed Giray, son of Mengli in the Crimea, and apparently
in time became the new leader among the Crimean begs. While a part of the Manghits
remained on the Itil River under Tevekkel, son of Temir, Mengli removed some of
them to the steppes outside Or-lapu ibid., p. 33 in an attempt to establish the Crimea
as the new center of a revived Golden Horde. Using the title "Ulugh-Ordanin ulugh
khanm," the Crimean khan always claimed to be supreme over all the lands of the
Golden Horde. In this plan the cooperation of the Nogays was deemed essential.
30
Abd al-Ghaffr, Umdat al- Tawrikh, pp. 32-37. The important local evidence
about Nogay-Manghmts in this work, apparently drawn from Trtkh-i Dost Sultan,
was not used by Syroekovskij or, more recently, by A. Bennigsen and C. Lemercier
Quelquejay, "La Grande Horde Nogay et le problme des communications entre
lEmpire Ottoman et lAsie Centrale en 1552-1556," Turcica 8, no. 2 1976:203-2l2.

Syroekovskij, "Muxammed-Giraj," p. 58.

32
Baki Beg was descended from the famous Edigu or Edike Beg, the ancestral beg of
the Nogay tribes, and was himself the beg of the Manghmt or Mankit, a branch of the
29

THE KHAN AND THE TRIBAL ARISTOCRACY

457

for his personal bravery and boldness, Bki became the khans most
dreaded rival until he was killed in 1542. In his long struggle, Bki Beg was
always faithfully accompanied by his nOkrs, whose number Remml
gives as about two hundred. At the beginning of Sahib Girays khanate,
Bki left the Crimea and for some time stayed with the Nogays, and then
led a icazaics life in the steppe, always with his nkOrs beside him.
Eventually Bald returned,33 and in a surprise attack killed Islam Giray. At
that time, his retinue numbered five or six hundred horsemen. Apparently
Bald claimed to be the beg of the Manghits, one of the karau tribes in the
Crimea, whose leadership Sahib Giray gave to Hodja-Tay Beg. It was
Bkis association with the Nogays in the steppes that made him dan
gerous to the khan. The danger of a Nogay invasion of the Crimea was
thought to be so pressing by the khan that he felt compelled to build the
Farah-Kirman fortress at Or-Iapu to protect the peninsula while he was
away on the Moldavian campaign of 1538. Nonetheless, a force of four or
five hundred Nogays under Aksak Alt Mirza made a surprise attack at
night on Sahibs army while it was crossing the Ozti Dnieper River en
route to Moldavia P, lOa. Later, in the winter of 946/1539-40, Bki,
together with his brother Davay Mirza, pillaged the Crimean army while
returning from a raid on Muscovite territories. Later, Sahib Giray made
every effort to convince Bki to come into the Crimea and join him on a
campaign against Muscovy. He promised Bki the leadership of the
Manghits and even command over all the tribal forces in the Crimea,
saying that "no one could prosper in pursuing banditry in the steppes with
only a handful of lazaks." At this time, "Bki was together with the
Nogays. Bki was the son of Temir, U/ugh-beg or great emir of the Manghmts, who,

like the Shirins in the Crimea, constituted the most powerful tribe in the Ulugh-Orda.
BAkis mother was Mengli Giray Hans daughter, a sister of Sahib Giray Khan. On the
other hand, in 1485, Mengli Giray had married NOr Sultan, daughter of Temir and
widow of Ibrahim, khan of Kazan. In Tatar nomadic society, marriage ties played a
crucial role in forming alliances and defining power relations. Such bonds with the
khans family determined the privileged position of one tribe vis--yis others, as well as
secured the loyal support of a powerful tribe for the khan. As Mengli Giray, by his
marriage to Nur-SultAn, had planned to strengthen his influence over the tribes in the
Ulugh-Orda on the Itil River, the Manghit influence in the Crimea increased corres
pondingly. There were also marriage ties between the Nogays and Shirins see Abd a!
Ghaffr, Umdat al- Tawrikh, p. 81. For the importance of marital ties for political
relations in TUrkmen states, see Woods, The Aqquvun/u, p. 105.
3
Bennigsen et a!., I.e Khanat de Crime, pp. 327-28, citing Smirnovs statement
based on Al-Sab al-Savir, thought that Islam Giray wandered about for some time
in the land of"Qumuks." In Al-Sab a/-Say var, p. 91, this information concerns only
Bki Beg. Remml F, 7a-7b makes it clear that Baki Beg, who was not welcomed by
Islam Giray, went away and was employed by "the rulers of Persia and Khurasan" for
some time.

458

HALIL INALCIK

kazaks of Azak, who all followed him in his wanderings" R, 27a. When
he eventually came and submitted to the khan, BAld was always on guard
and suspicious of possible attempts on his life by Sahib. During the
campaign against Muscovy in 1541, their mutual suspicions delayed their
crossing of the Oka River, which gave the Muscovites a chance to organize
and block their passage. After their return to the Crimea, BAki soon
withdrew to the steppes along the OzU with his nkrs, this time on the
pretext of a hunt. Always awaiting any opportunity to eliminate his foe,
the khan, with a small force having cannons and musketeers, surprised
and killed BAld there.
The attempt of the beg of the Manghits to supplant the beg of the Shirins
as leader of the Crimean tribal confederation appears to have been one of
the underlying causes of the turmoil in the Crimea during the period
1523-1542. BAki Beg, the true leader of the Manghits, vigorously pursued
the struggle for supremacy. Actually, Mengli Giray I, as well as his sons
Mehmed Giray I and Sahib Giray I, were cautious about recognizing the
leadership of the Manghit begs, because of their connections with the
Nogays in the steppes. Sahib Giray, one of the most powerful exponents
of the idea of a centralized khanate in the Crimea, finally chose to
cooperate with the Shirins rather than with the threatening Manghits.
After Bald Begs defeat, Sahib Giray was able to establish his absolute
authority in the khanate as the Shirins hegemony over the tribal con
federation continued. Baba, beg of the Shirins under Sahib Giray, always
gave his full support to the khan in his struggle against Bki Beg and, as
Remmal emphasizes, loyally served him in his military campaigns.
The last major confrontation between the Nogays and Sahib Giray
occurred in 1546 or 1547, as the Nogays attempted to retaliate for the
khans capture of Astrakhan in 1546. Their defeat, recalled in Crimean
history as Nogay Iirgh:ni or "Massacre of the Nogays," was won by the
cannons and muskets of the khan. Remmal tells us that the sudden
concentrated fire of the muskets and cannons shocked and scattered the
Nogays, thus assuring a complete victory for the khan P, 57-61; L, 133145.
SAHIB GIRAYS ATTEMPT TO CENTRALIZE POWER ON THE OTTOMAN MODEL

While the opposing forces in the Crimea tried to employ the Ottomans for
their ends, the Ottoman government in turn exploited their rivalries to
achieve its own policy goals. These goals were: lto have on the Crimean
throne a vassal ruler from the dynasty of the Girays who would be fully

459

THE KHAN AND THE TRIBAL ARISTOCRACY

loyal to the Ottoman Empire; 2 to make use of Crimean troops as

auxiliary forces in Ottoman expeditions against Moldavia, Hungary, or

Iran; 3 to prevent the khanate from becoming a threat to Ottoman

possessions in the Crimea. The Ottoman government was concerned that,
by incorporating the heritage of the Golden Horde in the Itil region and

joining with the Nogays in the steppes, the Crimean khan might form a
rival empire in the north.
In the period between 1475 and 1484, the Ottomans managed to
establish their control over the Crimean Khanate chiefly through the
cooperation of Eminek Beg Iminek Bik, head of the Crimean tribal
elite. Eminek himself made use of his close relationship with the Ottoman
sultan to choose for the Crimean throne whomever he found most amen
able to the interests of the tribal elite. In 1524, it was the beg of the Shirins
who cooperated with the sultan to make Saadet Giray khan. As his
suzerain, the sultan conferred on him not only the usual symbols of
authority
a diploma manshr, a standard, and a drum
but also a
strong escort of Ottoman forces bearing firearms. Upon his appointment,
Sahib Giray was also provided with a strong escort of Ottoman capu
ku/u forces and artillery capable of imposing his authority.
Our sources give varying figures for the Ottoman capu-ulu escort,
which stayed in the Crimea and participated in the khans expeditions. As
an eye-witness, RemmAl gave the following figures:
-

in 1532, 600 P, 4b; but in the Moldavian and

second Circassian campaigns P, 9b, only 300 the
Janissaries were equipped with muskets and swords

Janissaries

artillery zarbuzan or
darbuzan, small cannons

-40 during the second Circassian campaign in 1543

and the expedition against the Nogays; 60 cannonwagons during the expedition against Muscovy in

1541 and Astrakhan Hadji-Tarkhan in 1546

ti4fenkdjis or musketeers

arabas or field wagons

over 1,000 during the Moldavian and Muscovite

campaigns, as well as during the expeditions into
Circassia in 1543 and Astrakhan Remmal distin
guishes three separate groups of musketeers: Tu
fenkdji-ku//ar, Janissaries, and Tat Tufenkdjis. The
latter came from the mixed population of Southern
Crimea which was known as Tat-i/i.
-

200 during the Moldavian campaign one for

each five musketeers
-

The escort forces assigned to Devlet Giray in 1551 at the time of his
appointment as khan of the Crimea were as follows: 300 Janissaries, 300
kul-karindashi recruits from outside the corps of the Janissaries, and

460

HALIL INALCIK

400 atlu- u/fife/u kul mounted soldiers on the payroll of the sultan, 60
small cannons zarbuzan, and an arsenal of ammunition and military
equipment appropriate to a force of this size as well as funds for their
payment. The forces previously assigned to the retinue of Sahib Giray
must have been very similar. RemmAl usually gives the total number of
musketeers in campaigns as 1,000. Remmal reported that Sahib Giray
was actively recruiting salaried musketeers u/uft/u luftnkdji from among
the Crimean populace, which is confirmed in the Topkapi document
E 1308/3 in Bennigsen, p. 122. Ottoman troops under the governors of
Azak and Kaffa reinforced the khans army only when the sultan ordered
them to interfere, for instance, during Saadet Girays fight against the
anti-Ottoman Islam Giray in 1532. However, the beg of Kaffa always
cooperated with the khan in his campaigns against the Circassians by
providing him with ships to transport troops.
The military support rendered by the Ottomans played a decisive role
in the khanate, not only in the internal power struggle as a balance to the
traditional Crimean tribal forces, but also as a major component of the
khans army in campaigns. Under Sahib Giray, the use of the capu-cu/u
forces with muskets and cannons changed traditional Crimean tactics.
The details supplied by RemmAl on the military tactics used by Sahib
Giray in his campaigns clearly illustrate that they were a crucial factor in
the khans military successes and were always relied on at critical moments.
In all his successful Circassian campaigns, Sahib Giray was able to
penetrate into mountainous country and pursue the Circassians by em
ploying a small force of musketeers and cannons. In 1546 he stormed and
easily took Astrakhan in an attack supported by simultaneous fire from
his 1,000 muskets and 40 cannons. In his campaign against Muscovy in
1541 he planned to cross the Oka River under the protection of the fire of
his cannons and muskets. Apart from using massive fire, Sahib Giray
employed his artillery and muskets by arranging them in a wagenburg
formation of the type used by the Hussites, Hungarians, and Ottomans,
that is, the ancient Turco-Mongol tactic of the fortified circular camp
made up of wagons chained to one another and known as kren or
kriyan, gflriyen.34 Remmal gave a detailed description of how the new

See B. Ja. V!adimircov, Obfestvennvj stroj Mongolov Leningrad, 1934, p. 37;

Turkish translation, Mogo/larin ItimaI Teskilti, by Abdulkadir man Ankara, 1944;
J. Nmeth, "Neuere Untersuchungen Uber das Wort Tabor-Lager," Acta Linguistica
3, nos. 3/4 1953:431-46; Collins, "Military Organization," pp. 273-74. About the
fortifications with wagons used by the Peenegs, see 0. Pritsak, "The Peaenegs: A Case
of Social and Economic Change," Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi 11975: 19; H.
3

THE KHAN AND THE TRIBAL ARISTOCRACY

461

kQren of Sahib Giray was prepared P, 69b-70a, L, 169-170. In his last

Circassian campaign in 1551 he ordered that each soldier make a sharpened

stake. A fence was then erected around a ditch with these stakes in three
rows with their pointed ends sticking outwards. Behind the fence he
positioned muskets and cannon. The kQren was so strong, Remmal
added, that it could not be captured by an army of 100,000 men. This was
the tactic to which the Ottomans owed their major victories against their
rivals in Iran and Egypt. Now Sahib Giray was using it successfully
against the Nogays and the Circassians.
When the army camped in the field, the capu-ku1u forces were de
ployed in the following manner: the first circle around the khans pavilion
was composed of the wagons of the artillery and arsenal chained to one
another, the second circle was composed of Janissaries, the third of court
dignitaries iCki beg/en, and last came the karau-begs karaCu ulu beg
/eni in order of rank. This lineup corresponded exactly to that used by the
Ottoman sultans in their campaigns. On marches the artillery wagons
came at the rear of the army, behind the wagons carrying cash and
valuables and protected on either side by the musket-bearing soldiers
liifenkdji cul/ar. The Janissaries were at the khans side beneath the
standard mounted with a gold ball, which the sultan had given Sahib
Giray upon his appointment as khan to symbolize delegated power and
authority. On occasion, as happened during the dangerous crossing of the
steppes on their return from the Moldavian campaign P, 14a, musketbearing Janissaries were employed to patrol around the army. Sahib
Girays use of divisions equipped with cannon and muskets was definitely
an innovation with profound implications for the khanate. However, the
tribal cavalry forces remained the mainstay of the Crimean army.
The extraordinary advantages which the firearms gave the khan in
overcoming his internal and external foes undoubtedly enhanced his
image as a ruler. As Remml emphatically underlines throughout his
account, Sahib Giray consciously sought to establish his absolute author
ity in the country over the tribal aristocracy, according to the model of the
Ottoman pdishh. Describing an incident during the Moldavian cam
paign when the khan ordered the tribal forces not to make booty raids,
RemmAl said P, 106: "No one could dare, at the risk of his life, to
gainsay his order or to take one step ahead of the khan. He was such an
awesome and unveering padishAh. In sum, they were all rendered power
Inalcik, "The Socio-Po!itical Effects of the Diffusion of Fire-arms in the Middle East,"
in War, Technology, and Society in the Middle East, ed. by V. J. Parry and M. E.
Yapp London, 1975, pp. 197-217; Woods, The Aqquvunlu. pp. 131, 134, 175.

462

HALIL INALCIK

less under his firm hand." In other places Remml refers to Sahib Giray as
pdishah, underlining his imperial stature with this title peculiar to the
Ottoman sultans. In keeping with the conception of pAdishh in the
Persian theory of kingship, he further interpreted the khans authority as
representing the "shadow of God on earth," or, in mystical terms, "pos
sessing the powers of saintliness," "a pole manifesting divine power,"
"infallible ruler among men," and so on. Once RemmAl himself was put in
charge of a cartload of 800,000 akCa to be distributed among the
Crimean ulema P, 146. He observed that "those who saw the cart with
the purses of money all kept at a distance. See then how firmly the khan
has established his authority in the country." Orders were accompanied
by threats of execution. During the threat of a Nogay invasion of the
Crimea, the khan declared to the defenders at Or-Iapu that he would
execute not only deserters but their whole clans, including children and
relatives. RemmAls remarks on the khans concern about protecting the
neav, or ordinary tax-paying subjects, against injustices committed by
the begs are noteworthy. RemmAl said that the khan forbade the begs and
their nkOrs from making tours among the redy to collect dues, and
encouraged them to make their livelihood solely from booty raids P,
15a. On the other hand, he assigned fixed monthly salaries to his own
nkrs, that is, the palace staff and his personal retinue.
The ulema formed the second most influential group in the Crimean
elite. Sahib Giray sought to ensure their support by generous and respect
ful treatment of them as a group favoring his centralist policies. The
ulema were part of the state council in the Crimea and were called upon to
approve the decisions taken by the khan in consultation with the begs.
RemmAl emphasized the khans preference for the ulema and his concern
for a strict observation of Islamic law P, 1 6a. In addition to their regular
stipends from the treasury, the ulema received a share of the booty at the
conclusion of each campaign. Our source also reports that Sahib Giray
met on alternate days with the ulema, shaykhs, ulu begs, his nkrs or

ishik Coralani, and the ladies of his court for discussion of their requests
and other matters P. 16a. On Fridays, after noon prayers, he convened
the state council and heard the petitions and complaints brought by the
common people
a practice typical of all Middle Eastern states that
adhered to the Persian tradition. In sum, Sahib Girays chancery prac
tices and conduct of state affairs were in accordance with what he had
seen in the Ottoman capital.
Some of the reforms and innovations Sahib Giray introduced into the
Crimean administration were aimed at building up a strong treasury with
-

THE KHAN AND THE TRIBAL ARISTOCRACY

463

extensive regular sources of revenue

a prerequisite for a centralized

government. Besides the public treasury, whose revenues came from
regular state and Islamic taxes and dues as well as from yearly tributes

extracted from neighbors Muscovy, Lithuania-Poland, Moldavia, and

the Circassian lord Iansavul
Sahib Giray apparently managed to
accumulate a large personal fortune of slaves, horses, cattle, sheep, jewel
ry, and furs. According to Remml L, 188, at the time of his death the
khan owned 3,000 able-bodied slaves, 10,000 horses, 36,000 sheep, and
5,000 to 6,000 cattle. The khan took his share of booty savgha, es
pecially slaves and cattle, at river crossings as his army returned from a
campaign. Remml reported that of 50,000 slaves captured during the
second Circassian campaign in 1543, the khans share was 2,000 L, 94.
When the Crimean army returned from a campaign with great numbers of
slaves, notice was sent out to local merchants and, as RemmAl put it, "a
great spate of transactions erupted."35 The fortune and power of the tribal
elite also depended on slaves and livestock. Slaves were sold at the slave
market or used to cultivate the extensive lands assigned by the khan as
fiefs to the begs.36
The huge herds of horses belonging to the tribes were pastured in the
area between the Ozil River, the Or-Iapu isthmus, and the Black Sea.
This area was extremely important for the Crimean elite, as was later
stated in Gazi Giray Khans letter to the king of Poland.37 The khan
complains that "the Cossacks capture and drive away herds of cattle and
horses on the OzU River and cause the Tatars to abandon their usual
summer and winter pastureland in the area." In Sahib Girays time,
however, it was the Nogay threat that was paramount in this pasture area
of the Crimean Tatars. On one occasion it was feared that Bki and the
Nogays might drive away 40,000 to 50,000 horses. Remml informs us
that to protect the herds, the Tatars stood guard there year round L, 98.
-

For the importance of the slave trade in the Crimean economy, see my "Servile
Labor in the Ottoman Empire," to be published in Mutual Effects of the Islamic
and the Judeo-Christian Worlds.
36
Syroe&ovskij, "Muxammed Giraj," pp. 9-14; Bronievski as translated by Ortayli,
Kirim. pp. 12, 28; Evliya Celebi, Seyahatname, vol. 7 Istanbul, 1928, pp. 51!, 601.
Zernov and Feydhan, Materialy, doe. 4, pp. 9-12, date Djumda 1, 1000/14 Feb
ruary-14 March 1592. He warned the king that the first condition for peace with
Poland was the expulsion of the Cossacks from the Ozu River. Bronievski, as trans
lated by Ortayli, Kirim, p. 11 Russian translation, p. 38, points out how the Tatars in
the steppes between the Ozu and Or-lapu were fearful of the Christian Cossacks and
withdrew to their winter quarters with their herds and families after harvesting their
crops. The cultivation of wheat for export to the Ottoman cities was an important
economic activity of the steppe Tatars by the sixteenth century. See my forthcoming
book, The Customs Register of Caffa.

.-

464

HALIL INALCIK

Like his predecessors Mengli Giray land Mehmed Giray I, Sahib Giray
was very concerned about the security of the caravan routes from Kazan,
Central Asia via Astrakhan, and Iran.38 According to RemmAl, Sahib
Giray initiated the campaigns against Astrakhan in 1546 and against the
Circassians in 1551 L, 120, 158, on the grounds that the caravans bound
for the Crimea had been attacked and plundered. RemmAl noted that in
1546 the caravan from Kazan carried goods valued at over l00,000flori
gold pieces, an indication of this trades importance L, 120. In 1551 a
caravan of Persian pilgrims returning from Mecca started out from Kaffa,
passed by Azak, and, while crossing the steppes north of the Caucasus,
was attacked by the Circassians. The khan promised the Iranians that he
would recover the stolen goods or recompensate for them from his
treasury.39
Remmal describes how Sahib Giray alienated the Crimean aristocracy
by his harsh and despotic treatment of them, especially during the last
Circassian campaign before his fall in 1551. They had always disliked
Sahibs authoritarian conduct and his total reliance on musketeers and
Janissaries. Finally they found their chance to overthrow the khan when
Sahibs mentor, the sultan, turned against him. Remml makes it clear
that after the capture of Astrakhan in 1546 and the victory over the
Nogays, the khan refused to send an auxiliary force to the sultans
campaign in Iran. According to Remml, the pashas at the Porte accused
the khan thus: "The khan now has a too powerful army and has become
too ambitious. He thinks that he is better than you in every way. The
proof of it is that he now dares to oppose your orders and to make excuses
for not sending auxiliary forces. The moment you pass away he thinks he
will gain possession of all the Ottoman territories in the Crimea. He does
not show the slightest respect to the envoys sent from the Porte. If he
unites his forces with the Nogays, no one can be a match for him and
resist." The khans treatment of the Ottoman authorities in Kaffa and
disputes over jurisdiction of the lands just outside the city of Kaffa see
L, 149-53 were cited as indications of his ambitiousness. As an intimate
of the khan, RemmAl assures us that he nurtured no such plans. Sahib did
have designs on Kazan and Astrakhan, however: on this issue, as before,
38

236.

See Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, "La Grande Horde Nogay," pp. 203-

For the customs and market dues in the Crimean Khanate, see the yar/igh of Sahib
Giray I, published and analyzed by several specialists. For a bibliography of these
studies, see J. Pelenski, Russia and Kazan The Hague and Paris, 1974, p. 14, fn. 9,
and pp. 59-60.

THE KHAN AND THE TRIBAL ARISTOCRACY

465

during the reign of Mehmed Giray I, Ottoman and Muscovite interests

coincided. In 1546, ShAh-Ali, a Muscovite protg in Kazan, overthrew
Safa Giray. Sahib Giray reacted by occupying Astrakhan and restoring
Safa Giray to the Khanate of Kazan.4 Remmal reported that upon Safa
Girays death in March 1549, envoys from Kazan came to the Crimea L,
155. Informing Sahib Giray of their resistance to a Muscovite army
obviously referring to Ivan IVs campaign against Kazan in 1549-1550,
the envoys asked for his help and the appointment of Bukay Giray, son of
as khan of Kazan. But Sahib Giray had a different plan: he asked the
Ottoman sultan to appoint Devlet Giray, then in Istanbul, as khan of
Kazan. The Ottoman Porte, which was more concerned with the Crimean
question, used this opportunity to replace Sahib on the Crimean throne
with Devlet Giray, and then to form a common front of the Khanates of
Crimea, Kazan, and Astrakhan, and the Nogays against Muscovy.4
Ostensibly Deviet Giray was appointed khan of Kazan by the sultan in
Istanbul. Feigning to be on his way to Kazan, he went to Akkerman and
waited there for Sahib Giray to pass through the Taman peninsula on his
campaign against the Circassians. Remmals story suggests that Sahib
Giray suspected the plot and that before he left his capital he placed an
army of 15,000 to 20,000 men at the Or-Iapu isthmus under the lalghay,
his son Emin Giray. Devlet Girays intelligence sources informed him that
this force was actually designed to eliminate him, and that Sahib intended

to make his own sons khans of Kazan and Astrakhan L, 179. Sahib
In the first years of his khanate, Sahib Giray considered SafE Giray a threat to his
rule in the Crimea; see doe. E 5434 in Bennigsen et a!., Le Khanat de Crime, p. 124.
This letter was sent by Sahib Giray to SUleyman I.
"
The first Ottoman envoy came to lsmEil, beg of the Great Nogay, in the spring of
1551. But already in 1449, the Ottomans, apparentlyon the advice ofSahib Giray, tried
to lure the Nogays into the Ottoman alliance: see Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay,
"La Grande Horde Nogay," pp. 213-18; at that time the Nogay leaders tried to procure
cannons and muskets from Muscovy or the Ottomans ibid., pp. 215, 220. Bennigsen
and Lemercier-Quelquejay p. 211 try to show that until the middle of the sixteenth
century, "Les Turcs Ottomans ne staient gure intresss a Ia Basse Volga et ig
noraient presque tous des Nogays." But I would suggest a different chronology. The
Ottomans were concerned with the political developments in the region, since the
submission of the Crimean Khanate in 1475 alerted them to the changes affecting their
position in the Crimea. That this concern did not lead to a direct involvement until the
mid-sixteenth century was due to the Ottoman Portes respect for the Crimean khans
wish to remain independent in their policy towards their northern neighbors. It
appears that the Crimeans themselves, realizing the urgent need for Ottoman support
in their struggle with Muscovy for Kazan, chose to involve the Ottomans directly in the
struggle. At any rate, the Ottoman policy toward the Khanates of Kazan and Astra
khan or Muscovy should be examined within general Ottoman Northern Policy, which
was determined largely by conditions in the Crimea.
4

466

HALIL INALCIK

Giray had taken most of the tribal forces with him to Circassia, but they
were uncooperative during the campaign and he reacted harshly against
them.
The tribal forces that Sahib Giray had stationed at the isthmus aban
doned Emin Giray and joined Devlet Giray as soon as he captured the
capital. Similarly, Sahib Girays tribal forces abandoned him when they
arrived at Taman. In the court, Sahib Girays infant sons and grandsons
were all murdered by the begs. Sahib Girays last hope was to go to
Istanbul and convince the sultan of his loyalty L, 188. But before he
could depart, the Janissaries and artillery forces also abandoned him at
Taman, enabling Blek Giray, son of Safa, who had been released from
prison by Devlet Giray, to find and kill him. RemmAl added that once his
position on the throne was secured, Devlet Giray executed seven of the
Shirin begs to avenge the blood of Sahib Giray and his sons L, 201. The
act was dictated by the vendetta rules of Turco-Mongol pastoralist soci
ety.

Following events closely, Ivan IV cleverly exploited the Crimean crisis

so as to impose his ally, Shh-Ali, for a second time on the throne of
Kazan in 1551. Then, in March 1552, he attempted, without success, to
place Kazan under a Muscovite governor. That spring, the Crimean
army under Devlet Giray I set out against Moscow; it was defeated
before the fortress of Tula on 22 June 1552. The tsar, who had left his
capital five days earlier, was en route to invade Kazan. The Muscovite
army, with an artillery corps having about 150 pieces under experts from
the West, captured the city of Kazan on 2 October 1552. This turn of
events was undoubtedly a surprise for the Ottomans.42

University of Chicago

About the fall of Kazan, see Hadi Atlasi, Kazan Hanlighi Kazan, 1920, pp. 13454; E. Keenan, "Muscovy and Kazan, 1445-1552: A Study in Steppe Politics" Ph.D.
diss., Harvard University, 1965; idem, "Muscovy and Kazan: Some Introductory
Remarks," pp. 548-58; Pelenski, Russia and Kazan; D. C. Matuszewski, "Peresvetov
and the Ottoman Empire" Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1972. For the Ottoman
and Crimean policies toward Russia after 1552, see H. Inalcik, "The Origin of the
Ottoman-Russian Rivalry and the Don-Volga Canal 1569," Annales de lUniversit
dAnkara 1 1947: 47-110; and Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, "La Grande
Horde Nogay," p. 222.
Unfortunately, I was not able to consult B. F. Manz, "The Clans of the Crimean
Khanate, 1466-1532," Harvard Ukrainian Studies 2, no.3 September 1978: 282-309,
which appeared after the completion of this article.
42