STRUGGLE FOR EAST-EUROPEAN EMPIRE: 1400-1700 The Crimean Khanate, Ottomans and the Rise of the Russian Empire'

ALIL lXerClX

The empire of the Golden Horde, built by Baur, son of Djodji and the grand son of Genghis Khan, around 1240, was an empire which united the

whole East-Europe under ia dominat.ion. The Golden Horde empire comprised all of tle remnans of the earlier nomadic peoples of Turkic language in the steppe area which were then known under the common name of Tatar within this new political framework. The Golden Horde ruled directly over the Eurasian steppe from Khwarezm to the Danube and over the Russian principalities in the forest zone indirectly as tribute-paying sures. Already in the second half of the l3th cent.ury the western part of the stcppe from the Don river to the Danube tended to become a spararc political entity under the powerful emir Noghay. In the second half of the 14th century rival branches of the Djodjid dynasty, each supported by a group of the dissident clans, stancd a long struggle for the Ulugh-Yurd, the core of tlre empire in the lower Itil (Volga) river, and for the title of Ulugh Khan which meant
the supreme ruler

of the empire.

Toktamish Khan restored, for a short priod, the unity of the empire. When defeated by Tarnerlane, his sons and dependent clans rcsumcd the struggle for the Ulugh-Khan-ship in the western steppe area. During all this period, the Crimean peninsula, separated from the steppe by a narrow isthmus, became a refuge arca for the defeated in the steppc. Around 1440 onc

of the grandsons of Tokumish HaXi Gerey or Ciray, enrrenching himsclf in this rich peninsula, succeeded in esrablishing an independent khanatc. Hc
tRead at the intcrnational conference on "The Crimea: Past and hesent', Kicv.
l"l

l2-13

ay

1994.

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minted silver coins in his name which was an indication of independence and assumed the title of Ulugh Khan. Descending from Tokramish Khan, he and his successors never gave up thek right to the imperial patrimony on rhc whole Golden Horde empire, including suzerainty over the Russian principalities. In actual fact, by,,rhis time the Colden Horde was splir inro tluee independent khanates, in the Crimea, Kazan, and the Saray region in the

the seat of an Ottoman sandjak-bey, the Crimean Khanate became a vassal state o[ the Ottoman empire. This new situadon would create totally new conditions in the struggle for domination in East-Europe. The Ottoman presence resultcd in consequences decisive for the balance of power in tlre
region. srruggle First, tie Crimean-Moscovite axis got the upper hand in against the Lithuanian-Colden Horde coalition, and prepared the way for the final fall of the Golden Horde and the rise of the Moscovite power.

lower volga. The latter, ruling over the Ulugh-Yurd, claimed ro be rlre only legitimate successor to the great khan-ship. Like t}e secessionist
khanates, the Grand Duke o[ Muscovy, once the Ulugh-Khan's deputy over

ir

other Russian principalities, began to acI independenrly, challenging rhe Golden Horde overlordship. At the same t.ime, in the western part of rhe

region, Lithuania undcr Jagellons rose as a powerful slate, claiming sovereignty on the parimony of the Golden Horde in the area and challenging
which eventually came to compete for supremacy over the whole region. Because of their relation to once powerful rokumish Khan, ciray dynasty in

the rising Giray dynasty. Thus, by the middle of the l5ri cenrury, in Eastern Europe instead o[ one dominant imperial power there were newly rising slates

Secondly, it guaranteed the existence of the Crimean Khanate, lirst against the atucks of the Golden Horde Ulugh-Khans, in t-he period l41G 1774. 1502 and then of Russia as late

Thirdly, the Crimea became an integral part of the Ottoman empire, po_litically, econom ical I y and c ulturall y.
Fourthly, Ottoman-Polish rivalry in Moldavia and Ukraine resulted first in the rise of Cossack power and laer in the formation of the Ukrainian
Cossack state.

the Crimea seemed to have the best chance to revive the Golden Horde empire under their rule. The khans from another branch of Djodji, in control of rhe saray region, embarked upon a long srruggle against the Girays. The former

made an alliance wirh the Jagellons while Girays in rheir turn allied themselves with the Grand Duke of Muscovy to resist the powerful rival coalition. At this junctue the Ottoman power came to support the CrimeaMuscovy axis against the powerful Lithuania-Golden Horde coalirion. 1454 the Ottoman sultan Mehmed t}e Conqueror, immediately after his conquest of Istanbul, sending his fleet into the Black Sea, had the allegiance as tribute-paylng vassals of the local rulers such as the voyvode of Moldavia as well as of the Genoese colonies. Hajji Giray rhen cooperated with the Ottomans to claim his sovereignty over Caffa and other Genoese cities on the southern coasls of the Crimea. But when later on another ottoman fleet threatened Caffa, he asserted that "Caffa was his patrimony". Mehmed the Conqueror knew well rhar he could not rake the Genoese colonies of Caffa without cooperating with the Crimean Khan. In their turn the Genoese tried to protect their colonies by supporting on the Crimean throne a friendly khan among the sons of Hajji Giray and cooperared with the powerful chief of the Crimean aristocracy, the Beg of the principal Shirin clan. The conqueror's diplomacy, however, managed to make Eminek, the Shirin Beg, collaborate to put on the Crimean throne a pro-otroman Khan. In 1475, confident of Crimean cooperarion, lhe Conqueror immediately sent a powerful fleet ro subdue all the Genoese colonies in the Crimea. Later 0n, always in cooperation wirh Eminek Beg, he brought to the crimean throne Mengli Giray who was captured in catfa during the orroman occupation. Mengli Giray recognized the Conqueror as his suzerain and described his rclation to him as his "tikme" (appointee). Thus, while an orroman province was organized on the southern shores of the peninsula with Caffa as

Of coune, tle most important development in East-Europe following fall of the Golden Horde was the emergence of the Moscovite state as the dominant power in the region. The main facors leading to this siu:ation can
the be summarized as follows:

In

First, Ottoman-Crimean cooperation in the years 1492-1532 is a period crucial for the rise of the Moscovite power, which is understandably
ignored in Russian historiography. Secondly, in rhe period l47O-1550, Russian "westernization', which made available to this originally Byzantine-Tatar state the tools of westerrt warfare technology with fire arms, ensured its supremacy over the nomadic peoples of the Eurasian stepps.

Thirdly, in the emergencc of the Russian empiie, the role of a central bureaucratic system and skillful diplomacy cannot be underesdmaed. During the rise of their empire the Russian rulers avoided direct confrontation with the Ottoman empire which was the other great power in the region having lhe same western warfare technology. It is to be remembered that the
Ouomans supplied the Crimean Khans with a soldiery with fire arms only

the extent to which the Khanare was not acquiring too much power to become a threat to the Ottoman domination in the Crimea. Ironically, then no one could anticipate future developm'ens which were bound to make Russia a major threat to the Ouoman n:le over the Crimea and the Btack Sea. In is efforu to inherit the Golden Horde heritage, Moscow gave rcfuge to the

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dissident Genghiskhanids and Tat:ar clans in

them for
FIorde.

is

claim to the succession of

and later on used the Ulugh Khans of rhe Golden

is territory

Sahib Giray achieved his imperial ambition in the Volga basin, the Ottoman

Sulun became suspicious. S{ileyman took acrion against him when Sahib Ciray then put forth his claims also on the Ottoman province of Caffa. Ottoman viziers then forged a plan to get rid of the ambitious Khan, not
forgetting, however, the Czar's claims on the Khanate of Kazan. The Sultan then ostensibly appointed Devlet Giny, the Khan o[ Kazan, actually as Khan of the Crimea in lieu of Sahib Giray. Devlet Giray would first eliminate Sahib and then move immediately to aid Kazan against the Russians. Ivan IV, who had declared himself Czar or Ulugh Khan (the Colden Horde title

Fourthly, it shoUd be addcd thar Moscow flourished as an economic power by becoming the principal market place of the furs of Siberia and the norl.h, as well as of European exports, mainly woolen cloth. After the annexation of Kazan and Asrakhan @jderhan), Crand Dukes encouraged the English to establish a route to Asia for tlre spice and silk trade via MoscowCaucasus or Astrakhan.
Perhaps an equally imporrant development was that Muscovy offered an attractive rnarket place for Tarar ribes, in particular the Noghays in the Astrakhan-Kazan region for horses in exchange lor western luxury tcxtiles. Ulu-Noghay tribes were to play a crucial role as allies of Muscovy against the Crimeans in the Muscovite expansion in the Volga basin in the pcriod

l52l-1554.

Incidenully, starting from the reign of Ivan III in 1496 rhe Grand Dukes succeeded in obtaining from the Ottoman sultans rade privileges in the Ottornan territories including Azak (Azov) and Caffa. From 1496 onwards, with the exchange of embassies between Istanbul and Moscow, the raffic between the two countries substantially increased, the main irems of exchange being Russian furs and Bursa silk brocades.
Mengli Giray, architect of the Crimean-Muscovire alliance against the Li thuania-Poland com monweal t h, stron g l y supported o ttoman -Moscov i te
rapprochement in the period 1492-1512. In their rivalry wirh Poland over Moldavia, ouoman Sultans Selim I (1512-1520) and Srileyman I (15201566) continued good relations with the Russian rulers rill the Khanate under Sahib Gitay (1532-1551) could eventually convince the Ottoman governmenr of the Moscovite threat of invasion of the heritage of the Colden Hordc in the Itil (Volga) basin.
Developments during the crucial pcriod 1532- 1552 consirurc a turning

used by lvan IV in his letters to the Taws), in 1547 watching the developments in Kazarr, Crimea and Istanbul, saw hat the right moment had come to invade t}e Ulugh Yurd, the Colden Horde's imperial domain in the Volga basin. Devlet Giray succeeded in eliminating Sahib Giray in the Crimea but was too late to march to Kazan before Ivan IV, moving with his huge army, strengthened witlr powerful artillery, captured Kazan (1552). Taking a strategically masterful decision, the Czar had profited from the disogders in the Crimea. Devlet Giray's subsequent campaigns againsl Moscow did not change the state of affairs and two years later Ivan IV, always supported by the Noghay clans put an end to the Khanate of Asrrakhan, invading the Ulugh-Yurd. Assuming the titles of Tsar Kazanskii and Tsar Astrakhanskii, or Ulugh Khan of Kazan and Astrakhan, Ivan IV asserted his ambition to inherit tlre Golden Horde empire. The Crimean Khan and the Ottoman Sulun were caught by a faitaccompli although they would never accept Moscow's invasion of the Ulugh-Yurd. Then, the Crimean Khan started a series of campaigns against the Russians. Already in 1563 Devlet Giray warned Russia, saying to the Czar's ambassador Nagoy: "The Sulran has mobilized all Muslims against
the Czar who invaded the land of the Muslims; he will conquer Astrakhan and enthrone me as khan there. It is better if you would give Asrakhan to me now so that there will be no war" (Solovyev, IV, 219). However, lhe Ottoman-Crimean campaign to recover Asrakhan had to be postponed for six years. The Khanate and the Ottoman govemment neither recognized nor used dde of "Car" (Tsar') or Ulugh Khan for the Russian ruler as late as the year l&3. The srategic goal of the campaign of 1569 was to expel the lvloscovites from the lower Itil (Volga) basin where Saray and Asrrakhan stood. An Ottoman army and fleet went up the Don River, reaching the Perevolok (later Stalingrad, now Volgagrad) ar&? near the ruined city of YeniSaray and began to dig out a canal in order to take the ships to the Itil and go against the Russians in Astrakhan. In Astrakhan t}e Russians had built a strong forress on an island threatening the caravan road from Central Asia and the traffic from the Caspian Sca. Czw lvan had alrudy bcgun

point in the history of East-Europe, a dominant power, emerging again to rchieve the political unity of the whole region. The decisive struggle for the
Golden Horde heritage now was betwecn Muscovy and rhe Crimean Khanare.

Afier the final blow o ore Golden Horde by Mengli Giray in 1502 rhe Cirays twice esublished their control in Kazan and Astrakhan, ffust under tie ulugh Khan Mehmed ciray (1512- l5z4) and then under sahib Giray (1532l55l). Mehmed ciray had even succeederj in re-imposing rribure on Muscovy as in the time of Toktamish Khan. In both cases, the Crimeans did not receive full approval of the Ottomans although rhe larrer expressed at rhe sarne time irs concern against Moscow's aggressive policy. When by l55l

negotiations with the Shah of lran, sending him a much needed artillery unit to be used against the Ottomans. The Shah was warned rhat once Astrakhan came under Ouoman control, Iran was to be exposed to auacks from the ranr, which in fact was one of the Ottoman goals in this campaign.

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These details should illustrate well t}e strategical and ideological in tiis first direct confrontation between the Russian and Ottoman empires. Ivan IV already had the control of the Volga basin witl ride of rsar' or Ulugh Khan. In his rurn, declaring himself fre protecror of Muslims in the arpa and of pilgrims and merchanu from Cenral Asia, tlre Ouoman Sultan wanted to assert'his own supremacy in the region against the Czar's ambition to regenerate the Golden Horde empire under his ru16. In fact. the war of 1569 was the lirst confrontation of the Ottoman and Russian empires for dominarion in trast-Europe, the scene of srruggle being at rhis suge the lower volga basin. The Russian advance in larer periodi would move the main front. to the western pan of tre steppe or Desht, including Azak, ukraine, the cnmea and tinally the Black Sea. Now dwarfed by the tremendous growth of the Moscovite power, the Crimean Khanate iself was under the threat of a Russian invasion if the Ottoman empire was not behind it. The question is asked why the ottoman empire, then at the peak of is lilitary might, gave up the srruggle and allowed Muscovy ro ieptace rie Golden Horde empire in Kazan and Asrakhan.
issues involved

in East-Europe, the Ottoman-Crimean block, Poland, and Russia ino a decisive confrontation. Again, rhe Khanale, under the protection of the Oltomans, played a major role in developments in the region during this
period. The Cossacks of Dnieper, equipped with fire a.rms, a replica of the Ottoman uE (frontier) organization of akrndjrs (raiders), were now making devastating sea raids to the settled areas all along the Black Sea coasts, including the Bosphorus. In he face of this growing threat, the Ottomans had to organize a general command with a Beylerbeylik on the wesern Black Sea coast from Ozii ro Ttuace, build new foruesses on the mouth of Dnieper, ard make several major campaigns against Poland and Cossacks in the century. With the creation of the Ottoman province of Kamenige (Podolski Kaminiec) andthe &cupation of western Ukraine, the Ottoman empire was then vitally involved in alldevelopments in the region.

The Cossack question dominated East-European politics in the seventeentr cenury. Then, for the Ottomans, the Cossack threat became one of tre most ugent problems and in the second half of the century atempts co control Ukraine and the Cossacks of Dnieper brought the three major powers

the end make the Crimean Khan too powerful while vital issucs for rt,e empire in the Meditenanean and central Europe, they argued, required immediate action. Vizier Lala Mustafa, a rival of the grandlizier Sokoilu Mehmed, who was supporting an aclive poticy in the north, made the council eventually decide for rhe invasion of Cyprus in 1570. Then, the defear at l,epanto the next year kept the empire critically busy in the Medirerranean.

In the otroman supreme council there was a srong faction arguing that campaigns in the north were too expensive, an adventure which mignt in

when Peter rhe Grear decided ro join the Holy League. when in 1637 rhe cossacks caprured Azak and offered the foriress io the Czar, rre wiserf declined rhe offer and the cossacks had to evacuare thc place in 1642.

Also, the crimean tribal aristocracy, mirzas, embodying the TurcoMongol steppe tradition, opposed growing ottoman influence-and control over the Khanate and often joined the dissident pretenders to the rlrone in the Crimea. Russia tried to profit from such a resislance o reinforce its influence over the Khanate (incidens of Mehmed and Shahin Cirays). Consequenrly, seeing the reaction against too much involvement in rhe North the Cj[omin government chose to leave decisions on norlhern afiairs to the discretion of the Crimeans. It is o be noted that" from a tradirion esublished under Mengli Giray I, Russian envoys and ambassadors could not proceed to Istanbul unless they first visited tlre Khan in Bahqesaray and explained the purpose of their visit ro Isranbul. well aware of rhis siruarion, Russian oiptbmacy encouraged the Ortoman non-involvemenr policy in the north by-a subtll diplomacy, at once solemnly denying Crimean accusations rhai Russians were converting mosques into churches while harassing Muslim populations in thc Kazan and Astrakhan areas. Also, the czais carefuliy avoided participating in the anti-Ottoman coalitions formed in rhe west unril l6g6

It is rightly underlined thu he developments in the period l&7-l6Y constituted a new turning point in the history of East Europe. Under Islam Giray III (1644-1654) Khmelniski, the leader of the Dnieper Cossacks approached the Crimean Khanate and the Ottomans in the hope of establishing a Cossack state in tlre Ukraine which could have been organized as an Ottoman vassal state like Moldavia or Transylvania. But Islam Giray did not receive full support for his policy at the Ottoman Porte. The Ouomans were unable to take advantage of these favorable conditions in the north mainly because of the crisis in Transylvania and the protracted Creran war against the Venetians in the Mediten'anean (1645-1659).
Another signi{icant development, was the Polish-Rusian agreement of 1647 which terminated the long rivalry between the two Christian-Slavic stiates and led to the formarion of a common front against the Crimea and the Otrcmans. This rapprochement was a direct result of the growing CrimeanOttoman pressure on Poland, from which eventually Russia profited. In

1654, Khmelnitski chose union with Russia under the agreement of

Pereiaslav. This was a decisive historic developmenL similar to the Russian invasion of the Khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan, now making the Moscovite state a dominanl, power, not only in the eastern but also in the wesern part of East-Europe. In 0re face of tre change in the balance of power the Crimean governmenl, however, denounced the Czar's new title of "Tsar'

of

ourselves rely on God... lf which you captured, we are determined to fall upon you and the Dnieper Cossacks." These words meant actually. the confession of the hopeless

"if you iue conceited by relying on your .guns and cannons,

the West and tlre East"

(Magrib ve Magnk Padigahr) and added

that we you do not givo back to Poland the fortresses

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situation of the Crimea in the face of the fire power of the Russian armies. Anyhow, in the end, God did not help rhe Crimeans. It may be said rhat unril 1654 Russia had been an easrern power (Nlaqnk Padigahr) and only after that date it became a dominant power all over East-Europe, prepared to play a significant role in Quropean politics. For Russia two areils were left to be penetrated, the Baltic and the Black Sea regions, to make Russia full member of the European state system. As far as the ottomans were concerned, the Russian empire now becarne a neighbor to the otroman empire in the Ukraine and the irnmediate threat to the Crimea and the Black Sea. The Porte and the Crimean Khanate did not recognize the subjecrion of the Cossacks to the Czar and always claimed suzerainry rights over the Ukraine. Becoming aware of the vital threat to is northern Black Sea possessions and the Crimea represented by the union of the Dnieper Cossacks with Russia, the Ouoman Sovemment, which was now steered by the energetic K0priilil viziers, decided to drive the Russians out of Ukraine. In 1678 Grand Vizier Kara Musufa and Crimean Khan Murad Ciray invaded Ukraine and laid siege to rhe straregic

countries. Later Mehmed Gitay I (1514-1523),claiming o be the heir o the Colden Horde Ulugh Khans, re-imposed the tribute on the Grand Dukc. The Otloman sulnns always respected this Crimean claim and carried on their relations with Russia through Bahgesaray when lhe Ueaty of Istanbul of 170 abolished the rule.

efforts to include Russia in the alliance from the beginning. Tsarist

diplomacy tried to exploit is position to elicit maximum profiu from botlt tlre Ottomans and the Holy League, particularly at the expense of Poland. Hoping to prrevent the opening of a new front in the north, the OUomans and

The Holy League, concluded between the Holy Roman Emperor, thc King of Poland, and Venice with the Pope's consecration in 1684, made great

city of Qihrin. The Russian army came to the aid of the besieged city, and fierce battles were fought in front of the fortress. This was rhe first full-fledged confrontation between the armies of the t.wo empires. Now, the issue of Russian domination of East-Europe was to be decided by the result of this struggle in the heart of Ukraine. Despite the ottoman-Crimean temporary success (Murad Giray Khan's driving back four Russian attacks to relieve the besieged city and the capure of Qihrin), the Ottoman invasion of the Ukraine did not have lasting resuls. Then, concerned with the developments in Hungary, the Porte realized that it could not sustain a long war against Russia for Ukraine. The ottoman invasion of ukraine was all the same a warning to Russia not to dare to exploit its new position against the Ottoman-Crimean possessions. The new balance of power following the Ottoman campaign of 1678 in East-Europe would drasrically change only when rhe orroman miliury might would totally collapse at the hands of the Austrian-Gerrnan armies in the years 1683-1686. In l68l the peace treaty signed afrer rhe fall
of Qihrin had not basically altered the tradidonal patrcrn of relations between the Khanate and Russia. Negotiations started in Bahgesaray and the pnovisions reached lhere were first ratified by the Khan who reported it in a memorandum tJo the sultan. Only after that ratification did the ambass.rdors leave for Istanbul to finalize and obtain the sultan's ratillcation. In a letter to the czar rhe ouoman sulhn said: "The Khan Murad Giray is my agent and intermediary." As noted above it was an ancient custom that no Russian embassy left for Isranbul before he first visited the Khan's palace at qahqesryy and received his pcrmission. This pracrice originated from Mengli Giray's time when rhe Khan mediated between his ally lvan III and liis $zerian Bayezid II for the eshblishment of friendly relarions between rlre two

the Crimeans were ready to negodate Russian proposals. These included trade privileges, and the delivery of the satt beds on the Crimean border which were badly needed by rhe Cossacks. Interestingly, a special request for the prayers for rlre Czar at the Greek Orthodox Parriarchate in Istanbul was among the Russian demands. The sensitive isue of the Cossacks was never brought up by the Ottomans in the course of these negotiations, which meant Ottoman recognition of the sute of affain in tlre Ukraine.

In the Crimea, the Czar was particularly ac[ive at BahEesaray to prevent a pace setdement between the Khanate and Poland. The latrcr had
achieved nothing against the Ottoman-Crimean forces in the yean 16&41686. On the other side, Russia, exploiting the allies'concern to open a new front against the Ottomans in the north, demanded the final conFrmacion of

the Andrussovo treaty with Poland, which meant to confirm the final surrender of Smolensk and Kiev to Russia. Pressed by its allies, Poland finally yielded to the Russian demands. Thus, by skillful diplomatic
maneuvers Russia had succeeded in having the Ottoman Empirc and Poland recognize its sovercignty over the Ukraine. We shall sce that in 1686 Russia's joining the Holy League would result in the collapse of the Ottoman power in East-Europe and initiatc Russian penctration ino the Black Sea zone.

In this game Poland was one of the principal losers. The Polislt
government now abandoned a.ll hopes of recovering the [Jkraine only with thc anticipation that to compensate its loss it would take back Kaminiec, and annex Moldavia and the Ottoman Black Sea port o[ Akkerman. In a message to the Voyvode of Moldavia, John Sobieski could say: "While the Czar was

going to invade the Crimea, the Polish umy would join that of the Holy

Roman Empror in Adrianople and the n they would march toSether to capturc

Consuntinople.' The lrst result of Russia's joining the League was that rhe Crimean Khan, awaiting a Russian invasion, could not leave the Crimea to join Ottoman forces in Hungary. In 1687 an ar.my of one-hundred-thousand

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Russians and fifty-thousand Cossacks undcr V. Galiuin headed for the Crimea, and John Sobicski camc to lay siege to Kaminiec. The Ottoman-

Crimean army forced the Polish King to reueat while the hugc Russian army, unable lo cross the steppe which was burnt by the Tatars, also had to retreaL The CossacR Hetrnan Sqmoylovic, accused of treason, was replaced
by Mazeppa.

In the years 1686-1689 the northern borders of rhe empire were successfully defended whereas on the Hungarian front the Austrian-Cerrnan armies invaded the whole of Hungary, rcok Belgrade, and penetrated as far as Usttip (Skopje) in the heart of the Bal.kans. The Crimean forces under SeLim Giray (1670- 1611 , 1684- l69l and l69l - 1698) joined rhe Ouoman forces
there, and the Ottoman-Crimean forces won their first significant victory
against the Ausrian armies at the suaregic Balkan pass of Kachanack near Usktip, and the enemy was driven back to the other side of the Sava River (1689). Selim Giray was greeted in Isunbul as the savior of rhe "slare and religion. " When fre Crimean troops were away in tlre Balkans and Transylvania Moscow was ordcring Cossacks to capture the Tat;ar defenses on the border. In 1695 the Cossacks under Pani made a daring raid to the region berween Akkerman and Oz{i on the Black Sea coast. However, all t}re Polish aremprs to capture Kaminiec and to invade Moldavia were unsuccessful. Now with French silpport, the Porte made attempts to achieve a separate peace with Poland. In 1692 the new Khan Safa Ciray told tre King that Kaminiec could be evacuated and the Crimean sovercignty righu over the Ukraine given up if the King agreed to a separate pace. The Khan and the Orromans said they would even join the Poles in their fight against Russia r.o recover rhe

In the following year it was the Talars' turn to attack. They raided

as

far as Lw6w and forced Sobieski to retreat from Kaminiec once

more. Russians would come back only in the spring 1689 after long preparations. This time the Russian army, including fifty-thousand Cossacks under Mazeppa, was reinforced with a formidable artillery of 350 cannons. The Crimean intelligence reported to the Sultrn that Russian plans were to invade the Crimea and march against Istanbul. During the four days' battle in front of the isthmus of Or-Kapr, the Talars blocked the way into the peninsula and their light cavalry at large harassed the enemy. They could not penetrate the Russian defenses reinforced by the rows of war chariots and heavy arrillery. In the end the Russian army, suffering from lack of water and provisions, had to retreat. again. Although the Russian plan for the invasion of the Crimea was a failure, the Taurs were shocked and found their position hopeless before the Russian armies, all the more so because the Ottomans, engaged in a difficult war against Ausrian-German armies in Hungary, were totally incapable of
sending aid.

It is to bc emphasizcd that, because of the lack of water supply and fodder for the animals coupled with the harassment of the Tanr cavalry, the retreat of the Russian army turned out to be a very ditficult operation. After that the Russians delayed a new campaign for six years. It became evident that unless an appropriate logistics enabling the huge armies to cross the steppe zone was created, there was no chance for Russian as well as Polish armies to realize their invasion plans in the south. This situation is a key point to understand one-thousand years of the East-European history. It explains why only the Euro-Asian pastoralist tribes with their light cavalry and mobility adapted to tlre steppe conditions and held a continuous control of the steppe zone in the face of the foot soldiery of the settled peoples of the forest zone. It was the formation of the cossacktum on the border zone, adopting a similar life style and organization as nomads, that was destincd to
bring about a revolutionary change in the struggle. What made
them

Ukraine, Smolensk, and Chernigov. Later, during the negotiations at Karloveu in 1699, Sobieski would say in a letrer ro his people that acquisition of a few places in Moldavia could never be considered a
compensation for the losses to Russia.

Thus, sovereignty over Ukraine conrinued to be one of fre principal issues during tie war years. It is interesting that Setim Giray, in his riird khanship, old the Poles that the Khanare would never give up is righs over the Ukraine.
Czar Peter I, now changing Russian sratcgy, decided to capture
the Ottoman Azak which would ensure his communication

frst

with the bases in his home country. To intercept aid to Azak, Cossack ships were already cruising in the Sea of Azak in the spring oi 1695.
During all along the long war, Crimeans and Ouomans had the luck to have in Selim Giray a wise and brave leader. In 1695 his inrelligence showed the bitter reality that Azak and Crimea were under rhe imminent danger of a Russian invasion and Ottoman military aid was now absolutely necessary on rhis fronr. Insread, torally unaware of thc Rusian plans and ignoring the Khan's warnings, rhe Porte was insisring that rhe Khan should immediately leave the Crimea to join rhe Sulun's army on the Hungarian front In July 1695 while the Czar ciune to besiege the forrress of Azak, rhe
Cossacks under the Russian commander Sheremetiev attacked the Crimean defenses on tlre border in the west. After uking Gazi-Kerman, *resc forces

particularly capable of successfully fighting against the Tatars was their adopdon of the fire arms and the support they received in materials from the Polish and Moscovite sates from the mid-sixteenth century onward. Their union with Russia to which they provided an experienced military force of key irnportance should not be minimized in rhe final supremacy of the
Russian Empirc.

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l3

advanced as far as Ferah-Kerman on tlre Crimean isthmus, thus tireatcning to invade rhe Crimea iself. The Crimean troops under Kaplan Giray and $ahin

Giray (the Khan Selim Giray was then on the Danube wirh the Ortoman army) foiled the Russian attacks under a heavy Russian artillery fire against Az*. After a siegevf six daysrthe Czar decided to retreat afier building a
fortress facing

Even after Karloweu, thc Crimeans were in fear of a renewed Russian attack. Ingoring the Crimean Khan, the Czar now scnt his ambassador for peace negotiations directly to Istanbul on a galleon construcEd at Azov.

Az*.

In the peace ueaty concluded in Istanbul in 1700, demiliurized zones were defined around the Crimea for tre safety of the Khanae and on the banks
Perhaps the most important provisions of the ueaty abrogation of all kinds of practices reminiscent of the Khan's suzerainty over Russia, thal is annual "tribute" and the obligation to obrain the Khan's permission for the Russian ambassadors to go to Isunbul. A separare provision stipulated that a peaceful solution of the disputes arising betwecn the Crimeans and the Cossacks was til be negotiated directly between the Ottoman and Russian governments. Thus, under these provisions t}re Khan and the Hetman were losing the freedom of action in favor of a closer control of the two imperial governments. The Czar's claim to the great power smtus was also manifest in the provis ion stipulating that Russian ambassaiors to the Suluan should be ueated in the same way as those of the other European states. The Sulun a.lso accepted the responsibility of making Taurs apply and respect the provisions regulating Crimean-Russian relations.

The Russian retreat was explained both by the delay

in

of the Dnieper River.

the

were

tie

constnrction of the river fleet and tlre Tatar atacks on rhe supply lines of rhe Russian army. However, in the meandme Cossacks and Russian troops under Sheremetiev had succeeded in capturing the Crimean fortresses of NusretKerman, $ah-Kerman, and Mubarek-Kerman on fre border.

ln May

1696, employing engineers lrom Ausrria, Holland, Prussia,

and Venice, the Czar succeeded in putting a srrong fleet on the Don River and

now in full trust marched against Azak. While Sheremetiev and Zaporojian in the direction of the lower Dnieper and the Crimea, rhe Russian army was able to encircle Azak. On the sea side the Cossack fleet had intercepted Ottoman relief convoys to the fortress. Cossacks were also active on the land trying to foil rhe Crimean arr^emps ro bring aid ro Az^k. Although the Porte realized now the grave situation in the north, the time was overdue for the netessary measures to reinforce the foruess against the powerful Russian army. In an emergency meering the Grand Vizier admined that if Azak fell, not only the Black Sea coasts but Isranbul itself would come under Russian threat. Azak surrendered on August 17 , 1696. Before he returned home the Czar converted it into a Russian suonghold on the shores of the Black Sea. Now the Crimea found iself surrounded on two sides since the Dnieper Cossacks coming from the west continued rheir raids on the Crimean coasts. After the fall of Azak the Crimeans senl messengers to Istanbul saying that unless a srong otroman defense was provided the Crimea could not resist long in the face of tlre Russian armies equipped wirh a fonnidable artillery. In the last years of the war Crimean artemp$ to take back the lost fortresses on the tikrainian border were not successful.
Cossacks advanced

Drastically changing the balance of power in East-Europe, the ueaty

of Istanbul ushered in a new period as fiar as the Khanate and the Ottoman Empire were concerned. Now the Crimean Khanate was no more in a position to be a threat to the Russian tenitories including the Ukraine. In fact, weakened and reduccd in sLatus, it was itself opcn to Russian invasions,
and the Crimeans werc bitterly aware of the drastic change in their position vis-a-vis the Russians. Azak provided the Czar a stronghold to reach the Crimea at any momcnt and threaten even the Ottoman capital. Perhaps the most impornnt devclopmen! was Russia's joining the European concert of sLares which it fully exploited to partition and invade the Ottoman tenitories

At the peace negotiations in Karlowetz, the ottoman deregation demanded the surrender of the foruess of Azak, and asserted that the final peace would be considered concluded only after the approval of rhe Crimean Khan. The Russian delegation not only categorically refuscd such condirions but demanded the surrender of Kerch, thc gate to rhe Black Sea. Since no progress was possible, only an armistice of two years was agreed between Russia and thc Porte at Karlowetz. In the pcace treaty concluded with Potand
the Porre agreed to the surrender of Kaminiec and Ottoman sovereignty
claims over the Ulsaine.

in the l8th and l9th centurics. For the following period the Porte, nking advannge of the'new conflict in the north between Sweden and Russia, declarcd war aga.inst Russia and recovered Azak in l7l l. Then, the Ottoman sute and the Crimean Khanate emerged as the staunch defenders of the indepcndence and tenitorial integrity of Poland against Russia.
To sum up, historically thc Muscovian state is o be considered as the heir to the Golden Horde empire. With this historical perspective we can better understand the origin and formation of the Russian empire in EastEurope. Actually, the first step was the Russian invasion of the whole Volga basin down t0 Astrakhan, including fie quasi-sacred region of fie two Sarays of he UlughJ(hans. It was after this development that the Russian state was able to challenge the power of the Commonwealth of Lithuania-Poland in the west and to annex the remaining Russian principalities and Ukraine. Claiming rights as t-he legitimate heirs to the lcgacy of the Golden Horde, the Crimean Khans came up against Russian e.rpansion in the east as well as in

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1400-1700 l5

Ukraine. They had lost the contention in tlre east already in mid- l6th century. fn rhe following cenrury, Ukraine becarne the principal scene of rivalry now involving the Ottoman Empire directly. It was to ensure lhe autonomy of t]re area rhat the ortomans fought their f rrst major war against the Russian Empire in ukrainein 1678. Holvever, the Long war (t6g3-1699) againsr the Holy L-eague which the Czar joined in 1686 gave him rlre golden opportuniry o descend to the Black Sea by capturing Azak as well as ro consolidate iu gnp on the territories raken from poland, Smolensk, and ukraine. In the treaty of Isranbul of 1700, both rhe Khanare and the orroman Empire had to recognize the full control of Easr-Europe by thc Czar. At rhe same time, Russia became a full member of the European star.e system while the Ottoman Empire was now considered an area lor further conquests by Russia and Ausria. By capruring Azak, Russia had gained a posirion to invade rhe Crimean Khanate, the last rcmnant of fre Goldcn Hordc Empire.
expansion, throughout their partnership the Crimcans and Ottomans were not, in harmony in their reacrion to the developmenrs in Easr-Europe. {wlrs While direcdy under the threat of the Cossacks ahd rhen of the Russian armies, the Crimeans wanted the Onoman Empire to give fult suppon ro the

a cynical policy to force hundreds of thousands of Tatars to lcave their homes to migrate to Turkey, and a sysrcmadc policy 1q endicate Turkish-Tatar culture in the land.

of the Crimean TaLars,

Bibliography
The following are the author's publications on East-Europe:

"Yeni Vesikalara COre Krnm HanlrIrnrn Osmanlr TabiliIine Girmesi ve

Ahidname Mcsclesi," Belleten,

VIII (1944),

185-229.

"Yaq Muihedesindcn Sonra Osmanlr-Rus Mtinasebetleri," Dil ve TarihCo{rafya Faktiltesi Dergisi,IV ( 1916)' 195-201.

As for the Ottoman-Crimean cooperation in the face of the Russian

"Th9 Ori3ins o[ the Ottoman-Russian Rivalry and the Don-Volga Canal, 1569", Lzs Annales de l'Universitd d'Ankara,l (1947), 47'106. "Krnm Hanltft," lsl6m Ansi&opedisi, VI (1955), 746-756,
"Ahmed Pasha, Gedik," Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed., I (1956) 292-293.

Khanate and to mobilize the Ottoman forces againsi tiem. Thi'Ottomans themselves, having to concenrate their forces against the more pressing tasks in Hungary or the Mediterranean, always posttoned acdon in the noih and what is more rhey pressed the Crimeans to join the imperial campaigns in the western fronts. This innate conflict not infrequentty rlsulrcd in alienarion of the mirzas from the ottomans, or even to rebel against the Khans who subserviently followed orders from Istanbul. whilJ ottomans reminded Islamic solidarity and the fact that the ultimare safery and well-bcing of borh countries depended on close cooperation on all fronts, crimean mirzas argued that their own homes and familics were in immediate danger when they left Crimea to be defenseless in front of a possible Cossack oiRussian
invasion.

"Azak (Azov)," Encyclopedia of Islam,2nd ed., I (1958)' 808.

"Knm Ttirk Yurdunun Yok Edili;i," Errcl,lV (1964)'

"Hadjiji Giray," Encyclopedia of Islatn, 2nd ed., III (1965)' 4345.

"L'Empire Ot[oman,"

Acres du Premier Congris International des Erudes Balkaniques et Sud-Est Europdennes,26 Aofit- Septembre, 1966, Sofia, 1969, III, 75-104.

The danger became imminenr when during the Long war Russian armies came to invade rhe crimea twice and occupied Azak. In the lgth century the peninsula was, in fact, invaded three dmes and bccame the scene of massacres and deliberate destruction by Russian armies. During the disastrous war of 1768-1774 the mirzas, seeing the ottomans riraly incapable of defending the crimea, soughr to compro-mise with the czar. The Russians first appeared to supporr crimean independence againsr rhe ottomans in l1'14 which proved to be only a srahgem to invade 6e crimea and all the terriucries bclonging to the Khanate from Dniester to Circassia in 1783. The Russian gorernmens adopted a systematic policy to drive out and annihilate the Tatar'Turkish Muslim popuiarion in rire Ciimea in ordcr ro transform the peninsula into a Russian base for further expansion in the south- Russian rule over the Crimea saw the shameless plundcr of the lancls

"The Socio-Political Eflccs of the Diffusion of Fire-Arms in the Middle East," War,Technology and Society in the Middle Easr, London, Oxford University hess, 197 5, 195-211 .

"The Question of the Closing of the Black Sea under the Ottomans,'

Symposium on the Black Sea, Birmingham, March 18-20, 1978, Arkheion Pontu,35 (Athens, 1979), 74-l 10.

"The Khan and Tribal fuistocracy: the Crimean Khanate under Sahib Giray I

(1532-1551)," Essays Presented to Orrclian Pritsak, Harvard Ukninian Studies, X ( I 98 l), 445-446.

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THE TURKISH

YEARBOOK

[VOL. XXI

?ower Relationship Between Russia, Ottoman Empire

as Reflected in Titulature," Benni gsen, Paris, I 986.

and Crimean Khanate

Milanges en [' honneur de Alexander

"Chazi Ciray, I, IL III," Encyclopedia of Islam,2nd ed.,

ru7.

II (1965),

1046-

"Ciray," Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed., ll (1965), I I l2-l "Giray," Islam Ansiklopedisi, IV, 783-789.

I 14.