Suggested Practices

For Museum Security

As Adopted by
The Museum, Library, and Cultural Properties Council
of
ASIS International
AND
The Museum Association Security Committee
of the
American Association of Museums
(Revised May, 2006)

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.

List of Council Members

2.

Preface, Method of Revisions, Method for Adoption of Suggested

Practices

3.

Recommended Protection Practices Applicable to All Museums

1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
10.0
11.0
12.0
13.0
14.0
15.0
16.0
17.0

Duty to Protect the Collection

Foreseeability of Crime
Foreseeability of Crime Against the Collection
Adequacy of Protection of the Collection
Fire Protection
Burglar Alarms and Security Electronics
Key Control and Retrieval
Security Training
Security Officer Qualifications
Internal Security
Access Control
Parcel Control
Staffing
Collections Storage Room Security
Miscellaneous Recommended Practices
Suggested Security Officer Qualifications
Suggested Museum Employee Pre-Employment Screening

Appendix A Explanatory Material (Provided for sections within the

document marked with an asterisk.)
About Revisions: Revisions were approved in 1997, 2002, and 2006, and
are included in this version of the Suggested Practices.

Revised, May 2006

Museum, Library, and Cultural Properties Committee members at the time

of adoption of the initial document:
Steven R. Keller, CPP
President
Steven R. Keller & Associates, Inc.
Ormond Beach, Florida
Stevan P. Layne
Principal
Layne Consultants International
Denver, Colorado
Darrell Willson
Administrator
National Gallery of Art
Washington, D.C.
Edward G. Dolan, CPP
Former Assistant Chief NY Operations
The Smithsonian Institution
New York, New York
Ernest C. Lipple
Former Director, Office of Protection Services
The Childrens Museum of Indianapolis
Indianapolis, Indiana
Robert Burke
Former Director, Office of Protection Services
The Smithsonian Institution
Washington, D.C.
Barton Rinehart
Former Chief, Security Systems Division
The Smithsonian Institution
Washington, D.C.
Thomas P. Prevas, CPP
Consultant
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General Security Consultants

West Hartford, Connecticut
Other (and on-going) contributing Museum, Library, and Cultural Properties
Council members since the adoption of the initial document:
Thomas H. Bresson
Former Chief Security Services Division
Smithsonian Institution
Washington, D.C.
Danny L. McDaniel, CPP, CSP
Director Security & Safety
Colonial Williamsburg Foundation
Williamsburg, Virginia
Wilbur C. Faulk
Former Director of Security
The J. Paul Getty Trust
Santa Monica, California
Erroll G. Southers
Former Chief Protective Services
Los Angeles County Museum of Art
Los Angeles, California
Ronald A. Cundiff, CPP
Former Manager of Security Services
Field Museum
Chicago, Illinois
Robert B. Koverman, Chairman
Former Director of Protection Services
Art Institute of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois
Frank L. Duley
Director of Security
Mount Vernon Ladies Association
Mount Vernon, Virginia
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Michael J. Daly
Chief Security & Investigations
Queens Borough Public Library
Jamaica, New York
Luis A. Palau
Chief New York Security Operations
Smithsonian Institution/New York Operations
Cooper-Hewitt Museum
New York, New York
Douglas M. Emery
Former Director of Security
McNay Art Museum
San Antonio, Texas
James L. Banks
Former Deputy Chief of Operations
National Gallery of Art
Washington, D.C.
David Schott
Director of Security
Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts
Washington, D.C.
Andrew Turk
Principal
Andrew Turk Associates
Westbury, New York
James J. Davis
Principal Consultant
James J. Davis and Associates
Fort Washington, Maryland
Jeffrey A. Hawkins
Director, Museum Security Operations & Chief Security
Frazier Arms Museum
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Louisville, Kentucky
Steven R. Keller, CPP
President
Steven R. Keller & Associates, Inc.
Ormond Beach, Florida
Stevan P. Layne, CPP
Principal
Layne Consultants International
Denver, Colorado
Herbert J. Lottier, CPP
Director, Protection Services
Philadelphia Museum of Art
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
James F. Schenkel
Chief, Protective Services
Library of Congress
Washington, D.C.
Ronald Simoncini
Director of Security
The Museum of Modern Art
New York, New York
Bruce Segler
Security Operations Manager
J. Paul Getty Trust
Los Angeles, California
James Thompson
Director of Operations and Security
NEWSEUM
Arlington, Virginia
Ray Van Hook
Director of Protection Services
Art Institute of Chicago
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Chicago, Illinois
Scott Derby
Director of Protective Services
Museum of Fine Arts
Boston, Massachusetts

Revised, May 2006

Preface*
The Museum, Library, and Cultural Properties Council of ASIS International
has adopted the "Suggested Practices for Museum Security" described in
this document. "Suggested Practices" are not standards, and this
document does not attempt to establish standards. While some NFPA
industry standards are recommended, the use of the term standard in no
way implies that museums who do not adopt the recommendations are in
any way negligent.
Not all aspects of all recommendations will apply to all museums. But most
will apply or can be closely adapted by any museum institution calling itself
a museum or gallery. Smaller museums in particular may find it difficult to
comply with the recommendations herein. The Council recognizes that
museums are so diverse in nature that there will be those for which these
practices do not apply. While the recommendations as adopted are
voluntary, they represent the composite opinion of the leading experts in
the field of museum security as being appropriate for most, if not all,
institutions. In fact, there will be few exceptions. While they may apply to
historic houses or sites, libraries, and other cultural properties, they were
not specifically developed for these applications unless they function as
"museums" rather than simply architectural sites. We are hopeful that
suggested practices could be developed for these specific applications in
the future. It is also our hope that, in time, the Suggested Practices will be
used by accreditation personnel as guidelines for evaluating the security of
an institution.
The Council also recognizes that smaller institutions simply will not have
the staff necessary to comply with some guidelines. For example, a primary
and very important guideline (4.10) indicates that every museum will
designate one staff member as Chief Security Officer. The Council
recognizes the concept of "functional equivalents. Smaller institutions are
not obligated to hire a staff member specifically to serve as Chief Security
Officer. But in adopting the spirit of this document, the small institution will
designate one responsible person to hold this title and be responsible for
these duties in addition to his or her regular duties. Larger museums will
consider whether the security responsibilities in the institution are
sufficiently time consuming to necessitate the addition of a staff member in
this position.
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Revised, May 2006

Prior to adoption, this document was circulated to approximately 1000

members of museum and security communities for review. The single most
frequent comment received was that the Suggested Guidelines (its original
title) do not go far enough in establishing an aggressive security program,
particularly for larger institutions. There are certainly some more aggressive
measures that are appropriate for larger institutions or institutions with high
value assets than for smaller less vulnerable institutions. Therefore, these
practices do not constitute the total protection program for any institution
but serve as a basic foundation upon which a protection program
appropriate for the specific institution can be developed.
Revisions
This document is not intended to guide the total protection program for a
museum or cultural property. The Council has undertaken an ongoing
project to add to this body of suggested practices. This document,
therefore, is incomplete as compared with a comprehensive security
program. Revisions will be issued, as they are prepared. The clearinghouse
for the announcement of revisions and additions is the Museum, Library,
and Cultural Properties Council of the ASIS International. The most recent
revisions were approved by the Council in 2002 and 2006. This document
reflects those revisions.
Acknowledgment
In preparing sections 1.0 and 2.0 of these suggested practices, the Council
drew freely from a document, Protecting Customers From Crime, by
Lawrence W. Sherman, Esq., Crime Control Research Corporation, 1063
Thomas Jefferson Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20007, and
acknowledges his contribution.
Definitions
1. AAM: Refers to the American Association of Museums, 1575 Eye Street
NW, Suite 400, Washington D.C. 20005
2. ASIS: Refers to ASIS International, 1625 Prince Street, Alexandria,
Virginia 22314

Revised, May 2006

3. Authority Having Jurisdiction: The office, organization or individual

responsible for approving equipment, installation, policies or procedures.
This might include, but not be limited to, the local, state, or county
police, building code enforcement office, fire marshal, etc.
4. Crimes Against Strangers: Refers to crimes committed against
employees or visitors to your museum or its grounds by a person or
persons who are not known to the victim as compared to those crimes
committed by fellow employees against fellow employees, relatives
against relatives, visitors against companion visitors, etc.
5. IFAR: Refers to the International Foundation for Art Research, 500 Fifth
Avenue, Suite 935, New York, New York
6. Museum: A place, regardless of its exact name, where the public is
invited to view, handle, or study items that have been assembled into
collections. These might include art, coins, decorative arts, photographs,
curios, antiques, or similar items. Any facility calling itself a museum.
Due to the unique nature of historic buildings, they have been excluded
from this document's definition of a museum. Where buildings have
mixed use of space such as is found in a cultural center, these
suggested practices apply to the gallery portion of the facility.
7. Museum Operators: Persons, corporations, or bodies, governmental or
otherwise, which own, operate, maintain, or manage museums of any
type.
8. NFPA: Refers to the National Fire Protection Association. Refer to
NFPA National Fire Codes as indicated. Whenever a suggested
guideline contained in this document refers to an NFPA Recommended
Practice and that Recommended Practice conflicts with a Code or
Standard of the authority having jurisdiction, the code or standard of the
authority having jurisdiction should prevail.
9. Object: Any accessioned or non-accessioned item on display or in
storage as part of the collection in the museum, which can include art,
artifacts, specimens, etc. The term is used in this document to describe
the broad range of collection items found in the various types of
museums.

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10. Security: The protection of people and assets from various threats and
potential threats. The term is used interchangeably with the word
protection, which includes fire prevention and protection.
11. Search: Refers to an examination of objects or parcels coming into,
while on the premises, or leaving the premises of a museum. Searches
should be conducted only with the advice of legal counsel in order to
comply with all applicable laws and individual constitutional rights.
12. Suggested Practice: A suggested practice is a policy, procedure, or
system that is suggested as a minimum step toward providing proper
protection in a facility. For purposes of this document, they are common
to all museums. Suggested practices are only advisory provisions, they
are not "standards.
13. UL: Refers to Underwriters Laboratories. Refer to UL standards as
indicated.
NOTE:

11

When security terms are used and are not further defined, refer
to Security Dictionary by John I. Fay, August 2000, published
by ASIS International.

Revised, May 2006

Suggested Practices (Revised, May 2006)

1.0

Duty to Protect the Collection

1.1

It is the duty of all museum operators to take reasonable steps

to reduce the risk of a reasonably foreseeable type of loss from
occurring to any object in the collection while on the museum
property, on loan, or in transit, by the action of unknown third
parties, staff, or visiting scholars, or through fire, flood, or
similar natural disaster or other foreseeable forces of people or
nature.

1.2

The scope of this duty should not be limited as to the type, size
of museum, its ownership by private or governmental bodies, or
its collection.

1.3

If an object is worthy of being accessioned into a museum

collection or borrowed for display as a museum object, or when
it is worthy of having public or private funds spent for its
maintenance, display, preservation, or conservation, it is worth
protecting to the extent described in this document.

1.4

It is reasonable for museum managers to foresee "normal"

losses typical to museum collections and facilities, including
losses due to vandalism, accidental damage, theft, extortion, or
ransom, fire, or disaster, and these protection matters should
be addressed in protection policies adopted by each institution.

2.0

Foreseeability of Crime

2.1

It is reasonable to foresee "normal" crimes committed against

invitees' by strangers if there have been previous crimes
against strangers within a one-mile radius of the premises in
question, or minor crimes suggesting a problem with
maintenance of order on the premises within at least two years.

2.2

In order to determine whether crimes by strangers against

invitees are reasonably foreseeable, museum operators should
take affirmative steps to keep informed of local criminal activity,
including regularly requesting the police department to advise

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the museum operator whether there have been any stranger-tostranger crimes against persons within a one-mile radius of the
premises.
2.3

It is not generally reasonable to expect a museum operator to

foresee crimes against invitees to their premises if local police
cannot or do not provide local crime information.

2.4

It is reasonable to foresee crimes committed by premises

employees against invitees if the employee previously
committed any act of violence on the premises, or if the
employee is known to have committed acts of violence
elsewhere under similar circumstances.

2.5

It is the responsibility of museum operators to maintain a

reporting system to log crimes and serious incidents occurring
on the premises involving employees, invitees, their property, or
museum property. Where the reporting system evidences a
trend or pattern of serious incidents, corrective action to
preclude recurrence should be taken and documented.

2.6

It is the responsibility of museum operators to take steps to

ensure that employees whom they hire do not pose a risk to
staff, invitees, museum properties, or the collection.

3.0

Foreseeability of Crime Against the Collection

3.1

It should be assumed that threats to the collection, including

vandalism, accidental damage, theft, extortion, ransom, fire, or
disaster are foreseeable to any collection.

3.2

It is the responsibility of museum operators to report losses

truthfully, such as those cited above in 3.1, so that the full
extent of crimes against collections can be understood and
foreseen by other museum operators.

3.3

Museum operators should subscribe to publications or services

that report museum-related losses of the type pertinent to their
institution. "IFAR Reports" and the FBI crime bulletins report on
thefts of art.

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3.4

When objects are placed in transit, it is reasonable to assume

that they are under greater risk than they are while secured in
the museum. Therefore, the Chief Security Officer should be
notified and consulted prior to the object leaving the museum
so that adequate security can be provided during transit.

4.0* Adequacy of Protection of the Collection

4.1

The term "protection" is best thought of as an overall program in

effect in a museum to safeguard its collection. "Protection" is a
concept that integrates "security" and "fire prevention" with
disaster and strategic planning and post-theft recovery.

4.2

Every museum should view protection of the collection from

potential threats as one of the important objectives of the
institution.

4.3

It is recognized that the display of valuable and important

objects, such as in a museum setting, often results in a risk
which might not be acceptable for other valuable or important
commodities. Therefore, protective steps should be taken to
safeguard the collection from threats and to overcome the
inherent risks of display and exhibition.

4.4.

Every museum should have a written protection program and

written policies and procedures. Where a specific issue is
addressed in these Suggested Practices, a formal policy should
be included in the policy manual that addresses the
implementation of that practice.

4.5

The goals and objectives of the security function should be

documented and defined. It is appropriate for this to be done in
the Employee Handbook and signed by the Chief Executive
Officer.

4.6

There should be a written manual to be followed by the

protection officer and defining how he or she is to react to
various situations. The manual should be endorsed by the
museum's Chief Executive Officer.

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4.7

Every museum should assign ultimate responsibility for its

protection program to one individual at the management level.

4.8

The protection program should be funded as an identifiable line

item in the budget so its adequacy in relation to other
expenditures can be judged by management and accreditation
bodies.

4.9*

Every museum should have individuals present at all times who

perform a security function. While it is most desirable and
appropriate to have on-site protection personnel full-time, in
some cases it may be acceptable or necessary to assign
gallery and perimeter security duties to properly trained and
screened non-security personnel such as receptionists,
docents, gallery attendants, or other museum staff. The
decision to use non-security personnel should depend upon the
risk involved, the value or importance of the collection, its
vulnerability, display methods, and other factors.

4.10*

One person should be designated as being in charge of and

responsible for security. When the museum is of the size to
warrant a protection department, the individual in charge should
be titled as the Chief Security Officer and should be above the
level of "Chief Guard. When there is no protection department,
the individual to whom ultimate protection responsibility has
been assigned (4.7) should be designated in this role.

4.11

The Chief Security Officer should report to a high-ranking

official in the organization. While it is not necessary for the
Chief Security Officer to report directly to the Chief Executive
Officer, he or she needs to have direct access to that level of
management and should be invited to use that access as
desired. Ideally, the person responsible for security should
report directly to a Deputy Director or higher. Smaller
institutions without a formal rank structure should observe the
spirit of these suggested practices.

4.12

There should be management support for the security program

and there should be one person at the highest management

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levels at the rank of Deputy Director or higher responsible for

security and for the success of the program. The assignment of
this person as the person ultimately responsible for the security
program should be stated in an official written policy or position
description.
4.13*

There should be a commitment by museum management that

the security program is applicable to everyone and that no one,
because of his or her position, rank, title, status or for any other
reason, is exempt from compliance with the policies and rules
that are designed to protect the collection, visitors, and staff.

4.14*

It is inappropriate and inadvisable for management to cave in to

criticisms about security rules or their impact. It is irrelevant that
the security program is not popular with employees.

4.15

There should be communication between the security

management and the remainder of museum management.
Inclusion of the Chief Security Officer in department head level
staff meetings is important to the success of the program.

5.0

Fire Protection

5.1

Every museum should be protected by a modern, electronic,

fire detection system that complies with NFPA 72, National Fire
Alarm Code, and is listed by Underwriters Laboratories (UL) or
a similarly acceptable testing laboratory.

5.2

All fire detection systems should be annunciated within the

facility both visually and audibly. Signals should be clear,
distinguishable from other signals, and easily understood by all
occupants of the building, including people who are disabled.

5.3

In addition to local annunciation, fire detection systems should

be monitored at a second location that is staffed 24 hours per
day, 7 days per week. These monitoring stations may be
municipal police, fire, or emergency dispatch centers or they
may be commercial central monitoring stations. Commercial
central monitoring stations should be UL-listed and periodically

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inspected and recertified by UL. These systems should comply

with NFPA 72, National Fire Alarm Code.
5.4

When a decision is made to use the services of an uncertified

central station, the decision should not be economic in nature
and should be with the advice of competent authority. An
uncertified central station should not be used without, as a
minimum, an on-site inspection of its facilities by a person
capable of assessing the ability of the uncertified central station
to operate appropriately and with reasonable competence and
security.

5.5

All museums should have fire suppression systems. At a

minimum there should be portable fire extinguishers placed in
strategic locations throughout the building in accordance with
NFPA 10, Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers. Fire
extinguishers should be checked daily and inspected for proper
maintenance monthly.

5.6

Automatic fire suppression systems should be used. These

systems may consist of water sprinkler systems, water mist,
clean agent fire extinguishing systems, or other automatic
suppression systems. The most reliable system is the water
sprinkler system. While a wet pipe system is the least
expensive and most reliable, dry pipe or pre-action systems
also can be used. It is best to install suppression systems
throughout the museum, but at a minimum, sprinkler systems
should be installed in all non-public areas of the buildings,
especially offices, shops and other work spaces, kitchens,
storage rooms, loading docks, heating plants, wash and rest
rooms, etc. Installation of automatic suppression systems
should conform to one of the following applicable standards:
NFPA-11A Standard for Medium and High Expansion
Foam Systems
NFPA-12 Standard for Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing
Systems
NFPA-12A Standard for Halon 1302 Fire Extinguishing
Systems
NFPA-13 Standard for Installation of Sprinkler Systems

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NFPA-17 Standard for Dry Chemical Extinguishing

Systems
NFPA-750 Standard for Water Mist Fire Protection
Systems
NFPA-2001 Standard for Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing
Systems
5.7*

It is recommended that only water sprinklers and clean agent

fire extinguishing systems be used.

5.8

Where hose systems or standpipes are used, they should be

installed in accordance with NFPA-14, Standard for the
Installation of Standpipe and Hose Systems.

5.9

All fire suppression systems should be inspected on a regular

basis for operability. Water systems should be inspected in
accordance with NFPA 25, Standard for the Inspection, Testing,
and Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection Systems.
Other systems should be inspected, tested, and maintained in
accordance with their applicable NFPA standard and the
manufacturer's recommendations.

5.10

Fire detection systems should be inspected regularly in

accordance with their applicable NFPA standards or prevailing
local codes, if more stringent.

5.11

The building should be examined frequently to verify that it

meets local and state fire codes and good practices.

5.12

Fire exits should be installed throughout the facility to facilitate

egress from the building in emergencies. Proper signs should
indicate where it is impossible for people with disabilities to exit.
Where local jurisdictions permit, the exit doors should be locked
in accordance with NFPA-101, Life Safety Code. At no time
when the building is occupied should exits be otherwise
obstructed.

5.13

HVAC Systems should be installed in accordance with NFPA90A, Standard for the Installation of Air Conditioning and
Ventilating Systems. There should be automatic fire dampers

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and fan shutoffs in all ducts to prevent the spread of fire and
smoke throughout the building, which would further damage
collections in areas not directly affected by the fire.
5.14

All museums should publish and implement an evacuation plan

involving employees and visitors that addresses the need for
additional security during evacuations. A minimum of one fullscale drill per year should be implemented and all staff should
be required to participate fully. The needs of the disabled
should be addressed.

5.15

NFPA 909, Code for the Protection of Cultural Resource

Properties Museums, Libraries, and Places of Worship should
be adopted for museums and libraries.

5.16

Personnel from the fire department serving the museum should

be invited into the facility on a regular basis for tours and to
update tactical plans for fire response.

6.0

Burglar Alarms and Security Electronics

6.1

All museums should have intrusion detection and signaling

systems. These systems should be monitored 24 hours per
day, 7 days per week. Alarm annunciation should be both
audible and visual. There should be an annunciation on the
local premises and a back-up annunciation at a commercial
central station, or, where jurisdiction permits, at the police or
emergency dispatch station.

6.2

Museums with highly trained and adequately equipped full-time

professional security staffs may establish a proprietary central
station within a secure portion of their building but, as a
minimum, a UL-listed panic device should link the control room
to an outside central station. The level of line supervision for the
communications link should meet or exceed "Standard Line
Security" as defined by Underwriters Laboratories 827,
Standard for Central Station Alarm Service.

6.3

All exterior doors should have magnetic switches to alert the

monitoring station when there is an unauthorized opening of the

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door. Contacts should, when practical, be concealed in the

door. When surface-mounted, they should be on the protected
side of the door. Exceptions may be made when contacts are
not practical due to potential damage to historic fabric. In such
cases, motion detection should be provided.
6.4

All exterior windows which open should have magnetic

switches or other sensing devices that alert the monitor when a
window is opened or left open. When windows are locked or
otherwise secured, this provision may be waived.

6.5

All exterior doors which have glass, and all exterior windows,
should have glass break detecting devices that alarm when the
glass is broken, or interior volumetric motion detection to sense
intrusion. When practical, combining both methods is
encouraged.

6.6

At strategic places throughout the building there should be

motion detection to detect the unauthorized movement of
people through the building or area, and to detect persons
staying behind after hours.

6.7

Collection storage rooms will remain locked at all times and

should be alarmed when not occupied. As a minimum, there
should be magnetic switches on the doors. Other sensors
should be installed in the room or on the interior walls of the
room to detect forced entry through the walls. Ducts and other
possible points of entry necessitate motion detection or equal
protection.

6.8

The use of programmable access control systems employing

digital keypads or cards or biometric readers on collection
storage is encouraged.

6.9

Safes and vaults which contain collections, money, or other

valuables should be alarmed or should be located inside secure
storage rooms or rooms which are protected by motion
detection.

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6.10

Exhibition halls should have intrusion detection systems to

signal an intrusion into the hall if it is not open. Where possible,
exhibition halls should have lockable doors that are alarmed
when the hall is closed.

6.11

Selected items on exhibit or in cases may need the additional

protection of detection devices that are active 24 hours per day.
The determination of which items should be alarmed will
depend on value, replacement ability, sensitivity to controversy
(such as political and social considerations), ease of sale by a
thief, vulnerability to damage by vandalism or unintentional
curiosity such as visitor touching. Items that can be secreted on
the person, under a coat, or in a briefcase, purse, or box should
be displayed in exhibit cases. The following items should
always be displayed in exhibit cases or permanently affixed to
the building so that they cannot be removed: items made of
precious metals, gems, firearms, edged weapons, currency,
coins, jewelry, and stamps.

6.12

Selected paintings hung in exhibitions should be alarmed so

that they signal the monitoring station and/or the local security
officer when they are touched or moved. The device should
alarm if the painting is removed from the wall or when it is
lightly touched either by the hand or by a knife blade or similar
tool. The criterion for selecting which paintings to alarm is the
responsibility of the museum director after consultation with the
person ultimately responsible for security or a competent
security advisor. Criteria for deciding which paintings require
alarms are similar to the criteria outlined in 6.11.

6.13*

Whenever there is an activated alarm there should be a

response to the alarm by a trained security officer or other
person with security training. Alarms should not be ignored nor
should assumptions be made about their origin. Building alarm
systems, designed or configured so as to permit a person in a
proprietary or off-site central station to make decisions as to
whether or not an alarm requires full response, are not
encouraged and should be carefully considered before being
installed.

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6.14

Whenever a museum conducts its exhibition by tours only, such

as in historical houses, there needs to be some means for the
docents or tour guides to surreptitiously summon help if they
notice items missing, if a visitor becomes unruly or otherwise
disobeys the rules, or if an emergency occurs.

6.15

There should be police call buttons at cash registers that permit

the calling of the police in case of a hold-up. These devices
should be installed in such a way that the clerk may activate the
alarm without the knowledge of the criminal. The alarm should
be silent locally, though it may annunciate in a proprietary or
off-site control room.

6.16

Whenever practical, alarm systems should be hard-wired. They

should be electrically supervised so that attempts to cut the
wires, damage or remove the detection device, ground the
system, or short out the circuit will send a signal to the
monitoring station.

6.17

Where hard-wired burglar alarm systems are not practical,

wireless systems can be used. These systems also should be
supervised so that, at a minimum, they will 1) signal when their
batteries become discharged below a minimum power level and
2) require the control panel to poll the detectors at least once
per hour, or more frequently as UL standards require.

6.18

There should be a regular inspection program for all alarm

systems. Each system should be activated to ensure that it is
working. Motion detectors should be walk-tested to ensure that
they are still covering the area they originally intended to cover,
etc. Testing should be continuous and ongoing.

6.19

Alarm systems should be fully supervised against tampering.

The system should signal tampering not only between the
control and the multiplexer or data-gathering panel but also
between the multiplexer or data-gathering panel and the
detector. Tampering with signaling devices on the circuit
connecting them to controls also should be detected.

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6.20

Alarm systems should be capable of operating during a power

failure for a minimum of 24 hours on batteries, power supplies,
generators or by other means, and longer if local conditions
require.

6.21

For buildings that are unoccupied for part of the time and where
it is necessary to shunt the alarms upon arrival for the day, a
duress signal capability should be provided. This should be
accomplished by way of a keypad with a confidential, silent
duress code or by similar means.

6.22

The method of electronic communications between the

premises alarm system and the remote monitoring facility
should comply with Underwriters Laboratories 827, Standard for
Central Station Alarm Service, and meet the equipment listing
requirements for at least the "Standard Line Security" level of
protection service against compromise. A compromise is the
disconnection of the protected premises from the connecting
line or communications channel in a manner that does not
cause a signal at the central station and therefore allows entry
into the protected premises without initiating a signal at the
central station or blocks the transmission of an emergency
signal, request for assistance, or burglar alarm signal.

6.22.1

Where the communications link is less than UL "Standard Line

Security," it is considered to be unprotected, and the decision to
utilize an unprotected communications link should be made with
the full knowledge of the highest levels of museum
management.

6.22.2

The decision to use a communications link that is not protected

against compromise should not be based solely on
technological considerations.

6.22.3

The decision to use a communications link that is not protected

against compromise should not be based solely on economic
considerations, such as the extensive costs of providing secure
communications due to the distance from the central station,
without a full understanding of the risks of such unprotected
communications.

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Revised, May 2006

6.22.4

When an institution's highest authority makes a decision to

operate with an unprotected communications link to the central
station, it should be after consultation with the museum's
insurer or an independent, non-product-affiliated protection
consultant who should offer alternate acceptable means and
technological alternatives. A report should be provided which
clearly defines the reason for not providing a protected
communications link. The report needs to define the alarm
system in sufficient detail to enable a lending individual or
institution, insurer, or other party with an interest in the security
of the institution to evaluate the level of security that exists. This
enables lenders and insurers to evaluate the risks and request
other appropriate safeguards such as extra security officer
protection during loans or special exhibits, etc.

6.23

There should be a program to regularly inspect alarm systems

to ensure their continued effectiveness. Museums are in a state
of change. Hanging walls, cases, and other changes to interior
spaces reduce burglar and fire alarm effectiveness by blocking
detector views, etc. After each renovation, installation, or
redecoration, alarm and detection systems should be inspected
for obstructions and other related problems, and corrections
should be made immediately. Every effort should be made to
prevent such problems by involving the Chief Security Officer in
construction, installation, or redecoration plans.

6.24

Museums should make every reasonable effort to comply with

at least Underwriters Laboratories "Extent of Protection Level 4
Coverage" protection with regard to their burglar alarm
systems. Individuals advising the institution on adequacy of
interior protection need to be fully conversant on museum
security and the requirements of a changing museum
environment as well as electronic security as it relates to
museums.

6.25

Museum burglar alarm systems should avoid integration with

the institution's computer network where possible. Systems
such as, but not limited to, Ethernet-based point monitoring,
access control systems, and in some cases digital video should

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Revised, May 2006

use their own dedicated network(s). Although most proprietary

networks appear secure, threat from public hacking or virus
attack still exists and has successfully occurred in museums.
There are situations where museum security systems must
share the building's computer network due to infrastructure
and/or extraordinary budget limitations. In this event, steps
need to be taken to ensure the integrity and survivability of
critical security functions. In all cases, direct involvement of the
museum's professional information technology department
head is mandated and the information technology professional
charged with the responsibility for assuring the security of the
security system. Practical application of "VLAN, segmented
firewalls, data encryption, limited trusts, and other advanced
technologies should be carefully considered.
6.26

Museum burglar alarm systems should not be connected to any

phone line on a continuous basis except for the purpose of
transmitting an alarm signal off site. The burglar alarm system
phone line should not be used for internet access and it should
not be constantly connected via modem to facilitate diagnostics.
When diagnostics or programming are required, the service
personnel should call in and request that the modem be
temporarily connected to facilitate the diagnostics. The
connection should be made after proper verification. The
museum should establish a formal written policy that defines
the steps to be taken to verify the caller's identity and need for
modem connection and assures that the phone line is
disconnected immediately following the procedure, service, or
programming. This document recognizes the need for "dial up
mode" connections between physically separated buildings.
When dial up mode is necessary and a direct connection is not
practical, steps should be taken to prevent and detect hacking
including, but not limited to, firewall protection.

6.27

Museums with PC based point monitoring and access control

systems should have a written policy that forbids any security
officer or other employee from using the computer for any
purpose other than its intended purpose. Specifically, the policy
should prohibit insertion of any disk or other media into the
computer or downloading any file from the Internet. When the

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Revised, May 2006

system is used for departmental administration, it should be

equipped with virus software that automatically checks for
viruses on a scheduled basis and whenever media is inserted.
The museum should have a written policy that requires that
virus definitions be updated on a regular basis, no less
frequently than every 14 days. Responsibility for this task
should be assigned to one individual.
6.28*

When a museum is part of another corporate or institutional

entity, such as a university, and the museum's card access
system is shared with the other entity, control of the
programming of the museum's access cards should be under
the control of the museum and not delegated to others. When
this is not acceptable, it is mandatory that museum collection
rooms with accessioned items be equipped with high security
dead bolt locks that are not on the other entity's keyway or
under the control of others. It is not acceptable for both the key
cards and the mechanical keys to be on a system beyond the
direct control of the museum.

6.29

When a museum is part of another corporate or institutional

entity, such as a university, and services are provided to the
museum by the other entity, such as engineering services by
campus facilities personnel, rapid or unrestricted access to all
parts of the museum may be required by those providing the
services. When this condition occurs and service providers
must have keys, the service provider should not also have the
ability to turn off alarms. Any non-emergency access to
collection storage or other high security areas such as, but not
limited to, galleries under installation should be obtained after
coordinating the visit with security. Emergency access requiring
rapid entry by the service provider can occur using the
assigned key but only when an alarm is activated. Rapid entry
keys to collection storage deadbolt locks can be provided using
alarmed armored rapid entry key boxes such as a Knox box or
equally secure product. Every effort should be made not to
provide service providers from other entities codes to the alarm
system.

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Revised, May 2006

6.30

7.0

When a museum is part of another corporate or institutional

entity, and the other entity mandates a "one card fits all" policy,
meaning that they require that the same employee or student
ID card serve multiple functions, such as card access campus
wide or serve as a student debit card, and that all card readers
on campus use the same card key, every effort should be made
to prevent this policy from reducing security of the collection.
When practical, a card reader with a PIN pad should be used
on collection storage doors.
Key Control and Retrieval

7.1

All museums should practice sound key control and retrieval

and should have a written policy.

7.2

Only those persons needing a key or needing access to a key

should be given that access.

7.3

There should be good-quality, pick-resistant locks on all exterior

doors and hatches, whether they are at or below ground, one or
more stories above ground, or on the roof. Windows should be
locked with a pin or a lock that cannot be opened easily by
breaking a small pane of glass. Cam locks should not be the
only devices used to secure windows. Doors with windows in
them or along side of them should be locked with double
cylinder locks. Exceptions may be made for protection of
historic fabric.

7.4

Doors to collection storage areas and other areas where

collections might be stored temporarily should be locked with a
good-quality deadbolt lock or equal.

7.5

All keys that are issued should be signed for on a register.

Keying systems should be of the types that are difficult to
reproduce except by a bonded locksmith.

7.6

A proprietary or regionally proprietary keyway should be used

when possible. As a minimum, exterior doors, doors to high
value storage, and doors to other high security areas should be
secured with high security locks of the type that use key blanks,

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Revised, May 2006

which are not available through local locksmiths, hardware

stores, or other suppliers without, at least, a signature
authorization.
7.7

Key blanks should be carefully controlled.

7.8

Locks should be re-keyed whenever a key cannot be accounted

for or keys are known to have been lost or stolen.

7.9

There should be a key retrieval system to ensure that all keys

are turned in when an employee leaves the museum's employ.

7.10

Keys should be stored in a secure space or container where

they cannot be removed without authorization.

7.11

One person should be responsible for key control, issuance,

and retrieval.

7.12

Key control and retrieval should be under the control of the

security department when possible.

7.13

Cam locks, except high security types, should not be used for
display cases.

7.14

Bitting codes and un-coded room numbers should not be

stamped or embossed on keys.

7.15

Paintings should be firmly fixed to the wall so that they cannot

be easily removed. The use of security screws and brackets,
hangers with locking devices, or other similar methods that
require knowledge of the attachment system and time to
remove them should be used.

8.0
8.1

28

Security Training
Every museum should have a training program for its security
personnel or personnel who serve in a security capacity, or
should obtain training for them from outside agencies.
Museums with security supervisory staff should provide special

Revised, May 2006

training to the supervisory staff to ensure that they are capable

of performing their duties.
8.2*

Larger regional museums of notable reputation and small

museums with valuable or important collections should adopt a
more extensive formal training curriculum for its personnel than
might be required in smaller institutions. These suggested
practices encourage the use of a comprehensive training
program. The extent and type of training to be provided should
depend upon the individual circumstances of the museum, its
setting, collection, and other factors including local, state, or
national licensing laws.

8.3*

Smaller institutions with lower value, replaceable, or less

important assets should provide a formal training program for
its security personnel or those who perform a security function.
As a minimum, training should include classroom instruction
prior to reporting to duties and sufficient on-job training under
the direction of a competent and experienced supervisory
employee to ensure the proper performance of the security
duties.

8.4

The museum should provide an ongoing training program to

keep protection personnel in tune with museum operations and
needs and to expand security, fire prevention, safety, first aid,
and related skills.

8.5

There should be a comprehensive training manual outlining all

basic and advanced topics covered in regular protection staff
training.

8.6

Records should be maintained showing the training materials

presented, the date, time, instructor, and employees trained.

9.0
9.1

29

Security Officer Qualifications

All persons assigned to serve in a security capacity should be
physically, mentally, and otherwise fit to perform in that capacity
(See Section 17.0). Where armed security officers are used,
they should comply with all state and local requirements.
Revised, May 2006

9.2

All persons who serve in a security capacity for a museum

should be subjected to a background check consisting of the
elements described in Section 17.0, Museum Employee PreEmployment Screening.

9.3*

Museum operators should provide extensive training and preemployment screening to all armed personnel, and they are
encouraged to seek the advice and counsel of their legal
advisor, their protection consultant, and local police agency
before arming officers or developing a training curriculum for
them. Officers who are armed should be held to a higher
standard of physical and mental fitness than unarmed officers
should.

10.0 Internal Security

10.1

All museums should have a written policy outlining their internal

or personnel security program.

10.2

All people working in the museum, including volunteers, should

complete a full job application and should authorize the
museum to conduct a background check as appropriate.

10.3

All employees, volunteers, and docents hired for work in the

museum should be subject to a comprehensive reference
check and review of their personnel application as a condition
of employment.

10.4

All employees who have access to the collection, master keys,

collection storage or exhibit space keys, large amounts of cash,
or other valuable assets or materials should be subject to a
background check as a prerequisite for employment.

10.5

Background checks for employees requiring a "clearance"

should include, at a minimum, those elements outlined in
Section 17.0, Museum Employee Pre-Employment Screening.

11.0 Access Control

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Revised, May 2006

11.1

All museums should adopt a policy on access control that

regulates access of all persons including: all staff at all levels,
contractors, visitors, scholars, and others. This policy should
define who may enter the facility, and, as appropriate, high
security areas of the facility, and the hours of the day and days
of the week they may enter or be denied entry.

11.2

Access to non-public portions of the museum should be limited

to those persons needing access to carry out their duties.

11.3

Employees should not be permitted to work or to remain in the

museum after hours if doing so results in diminished security.
This might occur if their presence prevents the alarm system
from being activated and when supplementary security officer
presence cannot be provided in unprotected spaces.

11.4

Visitors to non-public portions of a museum should sign in and

be announced.

11.5

Access to collection storage should be limited to staff with a

need to visit storage. Scholars and students who require
access to the collection materials should be accompanied at all
times by qualified professional or protection staff personnel.

11.6*

Tours, members of the public, and the press should not

normally be permitted in storage areas. Educational tours or
classes in storage, when undertaken, should be accompanied
by security or security trained personnel on a ratio of at least
one security officer for each 10 visitors, plus appropriate
curatorial staff. Picture taking, including photos by members of
the press, are not advisable in collection storage.

11.7

Employees and administrative visitors should be required to

enter and leave the museum via designated entrances,
controlled by security personnel.

11.8

Members of the public, contractors, and others should be

required to enter and leave via entrances under the control of
security personnel. All entrances and exits to and from the

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Revised, May 2006

museum through which objects may be removed should be

protected by locks, alarms, and/or security officers.
11.9

Access to storage and other areas with high value assets

should be controlled by appropriate means such as, but not
limited to, locks, alarms, and/or security officers.

11.10

All visitors to non-public areas and all contractors should be

issued an ID card which they should be required to wear on an
outer garment at all times when in the building. The card should
be color-coded and numbered so that the identity of the visitor
can be easily ascertained by comparing the number with the
visitor sign-in log.

11.11

In any museum where the total number of staff members,

including volunteers, docents, and unpaid personnel of any
category, exceeds 30 people, a photo ID card should be worn
on an outer garment at all times when in the non-public portions
of the building, or in the public portions of the building or
grounds after hours. All persons should display their ID card to
the security officer when entering the building.

11.12

Photo ID cards should be no smaller than 2 inches by 3 1/4

inches in size and should be laminated or otherwise secured to
make forgery or tampering unlikely. The card should include the
photo, name, and number of the employee, the name of the
institution, date of expiration, and other data that management
deems appropriate.

12.0 Parcel Control

12.1

All museums should control the flow of property in and out of

the premises.

12.2

All parcels larger than 11 inches by 15 inches in either

dimension should be prohibited from entry into the museum
except by approval of security personnel.

12.3

All parcels larger than the above should be subject to search by

protection officers upon leaving the museum.

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Revised, May 2006

12.4

A parcel pass system should be used to control property

entering or leaving the institution.

12.5

All collection materials removed from the building should be

documented through both the Protection Department and the
Registrar. A counter signature should be required for any pass
or receipt authorizing the removal of material from the
collection.

13.0 Staffing
13.1

All museum security personnel should be assigned full-time to

their security duties when guarding and should not also be
assigned to sell tickets, perform cleaning duties, give lectures,
guide tours, etc.

13.2

Security staff levels, once established, should remain constant

and should not be diminished by breaks or absences. Sufficient
relief personnel should be provided.

13.3

Protection supervisory personnel and the Chief Security Officer

should not be assigned to stand post or conduct nonsupervisory patrols. All museums should recognize that
supervisory and managerial duties are full-time functions and
that they are necessary to the success of the program.

13.4

Security personnel should be adequately supervised by welltrained supervisors. Security officers cannot supervise
themselves no matter how small the institution. It should be
recognized that, without first-line supervision, a security
program is doomed to failure. Supervisors should not normally
be assigned to stand post, perform non-supervisory patrols,
provide security officer reliefs, or perform other duties more
properly assigned to non-supervisory personnel. There should
be no more than ten security officers to one security supervisor
with seven security officers to one supervisor being the
optimum ratio.

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Revised, May 2006

13.5*

All museums containing high value assets or collections which

are of great importance should be staffed by trained security
personnel 24 hours per day, 7 days per week, including
holidays. Security staffing should not be diminished for
holidays.

13.6

When the building is to be unoccupied after hours, a thorough

fire and security patrol will be conducted prior to closing and
immediately after opening.

13.7

Protection staff shifts should overlap as required so as to

ensure full security on the site during shift change times. It is
recommended that protection staff attend a roll call training
session of approximately 30 minutes prior to starting their shift.
This program should include announcements of importance to
protection staff.

13.8*

Security personnel may be proprietary (employed by the

institution) or contract (employed by a contract security officer
agency). Museums should recognize that no matter how well
trained, security officers provided by a contract agency need
specific training pertinent to museum security. The use of
contract security officers does not relieve the museum of
responsibility for providing or specifying proper and adequate
training and supervision or verifying the background and
suitability for employment of the contract employee in the
cultural institution environment.

14.0 Collection Storage Room Security

14.1

34

The term "Collection Storage Room" refers to any room within a

museum that contains accessioned items not on display, such
as but not limited to traditional storage rooms, holding area for
art at Receiving, acclimatization rooms, fumigation rooms,
photo studios, mount making rooms, conservation labs, packing
and crating areas, Registrars' work rooms, clean rooms,
laboratories, etc. "Primary Collection Storage Rooms" refers
specifically to the high concentration, more traditional room or
vault used for storage but not for other purposes.
"Storage/Study Room" refers to a room used to store
Revised, May 2006

accessioned items but also used as an office, research

workstation, or public or semi-public viewing or study area of
the collection.
14.2

Accessioned items should not be left in collection storage

rooms of any type unless they are under the immediate control
of someone responsible for their security such as the employee
working with or processing them, or they are secured physically
or electronically.

14.3

Collection storage rooms should be physically secure.

Deficiencies in their perimeters should be compensated for by
electronic security. It should not be possible to climb over a wall
either due to the low wall height or by climbing over a
suspended ceiling into the space. Walls should be built to the
slab above. Perimeter walls should be masonry when practical.

14.4

Collection storage room doors should be at least hollow metal.

Where wooden doors are used, the doors should be solid core
of sufficient strength to accommodate the lock hardware
required. Collection storage door hinges should be on the
protected side of the door (interior) or should be equipped with
hardware or devices that prevent the removal of the hinge pin
and removal of the door. Primary Collection Storage Room
doors should be windowless. Any door to any collection storage
room with glass should be equipped with UL listed, burglar
resistant glass or window film, with window film rated for small
missile impact being the most desirable method of protecting
the glass. Exterior windows to collection storage, where they
exist, should be secured by grills or burglar resistant film or
burglar resistant glazing.

14.5

Collection storage rooms should be windowless except for

conservation labs and storage/study rooms which may have
windows or skylights if proper safeguards are provided as
compensation although windows or skylights into any collection
storage facility are highly undesirable and are not
recommended. This document recognizes the need for natural
light in the study and conservation of some accessioned items.

35

Revised, May 2006

14.6

Where windows or skylights are present in collection storage

rooms, appropriate and effective early warning glass break
detection should be provided. Impact sensors on the glass is
the most desirable means. Acoustic detection properly selected
for the type of glass is an acceptable but less desirable
alternative due to the changing nature of some storage rooms
where acoustic characteristics may be altered by movement of
items in storage. Where collection storage rooms have
windows, items should not be stored or shelved near the glass
where a smash and grab theft may occur before effective
response can occur. Window's should be securely blocked and
equipped with alarms when collections are stored near interior
or exterior windows.

14.7

Collection storage rooms should be relatively free of

mechanical and plumbing systems that pose a risk of water
damage. Water detection should be used when such a risk
exists due to the presence of pipes.

14.8

All exterior penetrations to the collection storage room should

be protected by alarms. This includes, but is not limited to,
detection of glass breakage, opening of doors, and penetration
via skylights.

14.9

In addition to perimeter protection, collection storage rooms

should also be protected by volumetric motion detection that
meets or exceeds UL Extent of Protection Level 2. Care should
be taken to over design the motion detection system so that
shelving or large objects added to the room do not block or
diminish detection. Motion detection should also detect against
penetration of the space via ducts.

14.10

Collection storage rooms with double doors should be equipped

with a high security drop bolt lock and those with single leaf
doors should be equipped with high security deadbolt locks.
When the museum lacks a building wide restricted or
proprietary keyway, systems such as, but not limited to,
Medeco High Security Locks should be used to assure key
control. Where card or biometric readers are used, a high
security mechanical lock is also required. Electric locks are no

36

Revised, May 2006

substitute for a high security mechanical lock.

14.11

Collection storage rooms should be equipped with card or

biometric access control devices.

14.12

Electric locks on collection storage doors should be self locking.

Fail-secure electric locks or strikes and hardware on the interior
of the room should permit staff inside to turn the knob or lever
and exit without being locked in. Magnetic locks should not be
used on collection storage room doors under normal
circumstances although this document recognizes the need to
use them on some retrofits and certain specialty doors. Local
fire codes should prevail on issues involving fail-safe and failsecure locks.

14.13

It should not be possible to break collection storage room

window glass, reach in, and open a door either by turning the
thumb turn or by activating the request to exit device.

14.14

Collection storage should be segmented by department or type

of material stored. This more readily enables the museum to
limit access to specific collections by curatorial department or
specific need to use that collection and reduces unnecessary
access to the space.

14.15

Small, pilferable, high risk or especially valuable items like

jewelry, precious metals, etc. should be compartmented within
the collection storage room in safes or other secure lockable
containers.

14.16

Some collections in some museums use museum quality or

other storage lockers or cabinets. These are especially useful
to security by placing collections out of ready reach of persons
who may have access to the room but may not need access to
a large number of items. This includes escorted contractors,
interns, patrolling security officers, or other support staff.
Cabinets should be keyed with unique keys so that access to
an individual cabinet can be given to a specific person but
access to all cabinets is not also necessary. Keys to storage
cabinets should be stored in a locked key cabinet under the

37

Revised, May 2006

control of senior staff. It should not be possible for a person

who is authorized to be in collection storage but not to have
access to cabinet stored collections to enter the cabinet without
supervision. Locks for collection cabinets should be of high
quality and should be pick resistant.
14.17

Collection storage rooms should be equipped with fire

extinguishers of the type approved by the institution's
conservator AND the person responsible for security. In any
case, the extinguisher must be of the type suitable for
controlling a fire in the environment.

14.18

Primary Collection Storage rooms should not be used as

workrooms. Primary Storage Rooms, and Storage/Study
Rooms, photo labs, and similar areas where collections are
stored but work also occurs, should not accommodate heatproducing appliances such as coffee makers. Coffee makers
and other heat producing appliances should be located outside
the fire separation from the collection and in an area regularly
patrolled by security officers. Conservation and related labs
where collections are held over night but where heat producing
appliances are used as a regular part of the conservation,
mount making, or other process should be carefully patrolled by
security officers to assure that appliances are safe. Written
procedures should be in effect for staff in those areas to make
the appliances safe and for security officers to verify during
patrols that they are turned off.

14.19

Use of sprinklers in collection storage will be a well studied

decision involving the person responsible for security, a fire
protection engineer with experience in using suppression
technology in a museum environment, and curatorial or
conservation staff. Where pressurized gas suppression
systems are used, items should be stored in a manner that
minimizes damage from the violent discharge of the gas in a
fire condition.

14.20

Tours should not occur in collection storage. Where educational

tours are necessary, the museum should have in effect a
written policy defining the safeguards to be taken and the

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Revised, May 2006

responsibility of each person assigned to the tour. The policy

should limit the size of the tour to no more than 25 maximum for
large rooms and fewer for smaller rooms or rooms with smaller
or more valuable items. Tours should not be conducted in
rooms where small, pilferable or highly valuable or important
items are not compartmented and stored in secure containers.
There should be at least one person who actually conducts the
tour and at least one representative of the security department
who remains with the tour at all times. The policy should
address allowing members of the tour or class to leave to go to
the restroom without an escort and what to do if someone
becomes ill and needs to be escorted out of the room. Further,
the policy should prohibit the use of cameras in collection
storage where security equipment or procedures might be
photographed. Parcels carried by members of a tour should not
be permitted in collection storage.
14.21

The museum should address the issue of security officer patrol

access to collection storage areas in a written policy. When
electronics are deemed adequate to protect Primary Collection
Storage areas, it may not be necessary for security officers to
actually enter the collection storage room except to check
alarms. When practical, entry into collection storage by security
officers should be a two-person assignment. Work areas with
heat producing appliances should be checked on fire patrols.

14.22

Collection storage rooms should not contain mechanical,

electrical, or other equipment that necessitates access by
contractors, building engineers, or others who do not normally
have access to collection storage. When access is necessary,
these individuals, as other individuals not normally given
collection storage access, should be escorted.

14.23

Key, card, or biometric access to collection storage should be

on a "must have" basis. Collection storage rooms should not be
on the building master or grand master key. Access should be
granted only to those needing access as part of their job.
Interns, volunteers, adjuncts, and other non-employees should
not be given unescorted access. Scholars should not be left
unattended in collection storage to do research.

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Revised, May 2006

14.24

This document recognizes that existing museums may have

difficulty complying with some of the above collection storage
requirements and that they should make a good faith effort to
comply. New museums, however, should be so designed and
constructed to meet the above requirements.

15.0 Miscellaneous Suggested Guidelines

15.1

All museums should adopt and publish or post a formal list of

Rules of Decorum, which outline to the public the rules of the
museum.

15.2

All museums should adopt a formal list of protection-related

rules for employees, docents, volunteers and others who work
in the institution. The rules, which can be in the form of a
manual for employees, should include a statement requiring all
personnel to refrain from theft or other dishonest acts and
observe standards of ethics in their business and personal
lives.

15.3

The security program in a museum should apply to everyone.

Once a policy is established regarding access or parcel control
or other measures of accountability, no one, including the
museum director, trustees, donors, etc., should be exempt. No
one should be excluded from rules or safeguards due to rank,
education, job function, etc.

15.4

The museum director, trustees, donors, and professional staff

need to recognize the importance of their compliance with all of
the rules in a manner that reinforces the need for and the
support of security.

15.5

All museums should undergo a periodic audit of their security

and fire protection programs and an inspection of their alarm
systems by an outside, neutral, non-product-affiliated museum
protection consultant or protection professional on loan from
another institution. If the latter is used, he or she should be
neutral and should not be closely associated with the museum's
management or protection personnel.

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15.6

There should be an active emergency plan that enables

protection personnel to contact off-duty, on-call professional
staff members to respond to the museum in an emergency.
This program should be administered by the Chief Security
Officer.

15.7

All museums should prepare a disaster plan dealing with

foreseeable disasters. The plan should include, but not be
limited to, the development of secure off-site storage for
collections.

15.8

Smoking should be prohibited or limited to designated areas

outside the museum.

15.9

Coffee pots and heat-producing appliances should be

prohibited in storage and other areas where they cannot easily
be monitored. They should never be timer-activated or timercontrolled.

15.10

The Chief Security Officer should be consulted prior to all

movement of collection materials of significant value or
importance outside the facility.

15.11

The Chief Security Officer should complete all pertinent

protection-related portions of all loan forms for objects coming
in or going out of the building and should be promptly advised
of all security requirements of any contracts for loans or
exhibitions.

15.12

The Chief Security Officer should enhance his or her skills by

participating in educational activities promoting professional
development. Efforts to this end should be funded to the extent
that similar skill enhancement programs are funded for other
professional staff members in the museum.

16.0 Suggested Security Officer Qualifications

16.1

41

The following qualifications are presented as a guide only.

While every effort should be made to recruit security officers
Revised, May 2006

who meet the qualifications provided, museums must be aware

of the various local, federal, and state laws which may limit their
ability to utilize all of these suggested practices. Discuss this
matter with your attorney.
Qualification

Level of Importance

16.2 Physical Capability

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Able to walk a patrol 8 hours a day

Hold a heavy door open for minutes at a time
Place a person at least 100 pounds in a wheelchair
Climb steep stairs or a ladder
20/20 vision (or corrected to 20/40 with glasses)

f.
g.
h.

Hear normal conversation (prosthetic acceptable)

Bend, stoop, or work with hands above shoulder level
Talk intelligently over a telephone or 2-way radio and
be understood by other members of the force
No amputations, deformities, or disabilities that would
prevent satisfactory performance of duties
Present a neat, clean appearance
Lift and operate safely 50 pound fire extinguisher
Lift a small child (50 pounds) and carry in a rescue

i.*
j.
k.
l.

Mandatory
Mandatory
Desirable
Mandatory
Desirable
(Mandatory
if armed)
Mandatory
Mandatory
Mandatory
Mandatory
Mandatory
Mandatory
Mandatory

16.3 Mental/Educational Capability

a.
b.
c.
d.

High school diploma or equivalent

Read and understand written material in language
of the security force
No history or presence of any significant psychiatric
disorder
Emotionally stable

Mandatory
Mandatory
Mandatory
Mandatory

16.4. Other Capabilities

a.
b.

42

No criminal conviction record indicating moral turpitude

No history of violent acts that would indicate the
candidate would harm a visitor or employee

Mandatory
Mandatory

Revised, May 2006

c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.

No history of child abuse/sexual abuse

Valid Driver's License/safe record
(If driving is required)
CPR qualified
First Aid Qualified
Local or State Guard/Security Officer
License or Certificate
Pre-employment polygraph where permitted or pencil
and paper test
Physical examination by physician
Drug Screen
Desirable
At least 18 years of age

Mandatory
Desirable
Mandatory
Desirable
Desirable
Desirable
Desirable
Desirable

Mandatory

17.0 Museum Employee Pre-Employment Screening

17.1

The following suggested practices apply, in principal, to all

museums. It is recommended that individual museums consult
their legal counsel prior to implementation of these practices as
laws vary between various countries, states, and local entities.
For purposes of this section, "employee" also refers to
volunteers who serve in the capacity of an employee as well as
to members of affiliated groups, boards, etc. which have access
to the building or the collection on a level equal to that of
employees.

17.2

For purposes of determining the depth of the background

investigation to be performed, museum employees should be
divided into three basic categories. The extent of the
background check for any given employee may vary with the
level of access the employee has to 1) the collection, 2) other
valuable or important assets, and 3) the level of contact that the
employee has with the public.

17.3

Levels of Vulnerability

a.

Level 1: Employees with little or no access to the collection

including those with no access to the galleries alone or during
non-public hours. This might include the gardeners who work
outside the building, move freely in the office spaces, but do not

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have access in the galleries to any greater degree than the

general public.
b.

Level 2: General Administrative Employees with "typical"

access to the museum building during public and office hours
and non-employees in a similar capacity. They may move
through the galleries unattended before public hours or in the
early evening before offices close. They do not have access to
storage. They do not handle collection materials or valuables.
They do not have important keys. They do not have after hour
access. They are not assigned in a public contact role that
might place a member of the public in jeopardy.

c.

Level 3: Employees with a level of access that poses a higher

potential risk, including all employees of the security
department, all employees with access to collection storage,
those with permission to handle the collection as part of their
jobs, such as but not limited to preparators, installers, curators,
interns, the registrar and registration staff, the conservators,
etc. Level 3 also includes employees with building master
keys, exterior building keys, collection storage keys or
programming capability on the facility alarm system. Level 3
also includes all cash handling employees, accounting and
purchasing department employees, mail room employees,
employees who work the loading dock or shipping and
receiving, or employees who work with visitor-owned property
such as coat room attendants. This category also includes
employees or volunteers who work with visitors who might be
harmed by the employee in any foreseeable way, especially
those working with children.

17.4

Background Investigation

17.4.1

The job title is not important in determining the level of

background investigation required. It is the level of vulnerability
that should determine the amount of time, effort, and resources
expended to protect the museum facility, its assets, and
visitors. Smaller museums with few employees may well
subject every employee to the Level 3 background

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investigation. Larger museums with many employees may find

it necessary to adhere to the suggested practices more strictly.
17.4.2

Reasonable Background Investigation for Each Level of

Vulnerability

a.

ALL museum employee applicants, including volunteers, prior

to acceptance should:

1.

Complete a formal written job application, which contains a

release form and permission to conduct a background
investigation.

2.

Be interviewed in person by a responsible interviewer at the

professional level.

3.

Provide several personal and, as appropriate, professional

references. These references should be contacted, and
questions regarding the character and integrity of the applicant
should be asked.

4.

References should be verified. The person doing the

background investigation should make sure that the reference
is indeed who he or she says they are and not an accomplice of
the applicant. Verification might be made by looking the
reference up in the phone book and verifying that the number
provided by the applicant is correct and that the person being
called is not simply posing as the reference.

5.

A responsible employee should verify all information provided

on the application form. This should include accounting for all
periods of employment for the past five years, and all gaps
between employment, to ensure that the applicant is not hiding
incarceration, hospitalization, termination, or other relevant
conditions.

6.

Verification of pertinent license data. Example: An employee

requiring a guard/security officer certification by a city or state
should be subject to verification as to that license. An employee
with a responsibility for driving a vehicle should be subject to a

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Revised, May 2006

thorough check as to his or her suitability for such a task

including inquiry of any extent to determine if the applicant has
any health problem, including drug or alcohol abuse history,
that might prevent the safe operation of the vehicle.
7.

Verify educational background where it is relevant to the job.

b.

Level 1 Employees: Those elements that apply to everyone

(17.4.2a above).

c.

Level 2 Employees: 17.4.2a above plus,

1.

A criminal conviction history check for a period of no less than

five years prior to the date of application, or as far back as is
legal in the jurisdiction. This check should be conducted for all
areas where the applicant is likely to have committed a crime,
such as in his home city, county, state, etc., as well as in the
county in which the museum is located.

2.

Make contact with references at previous places of employment

for at least the past five years.

d.

Level 3 Employees: 17.4.2a above plus,

1.

A criminal conviction history check for a period of no less than

five years prior to the date of application or as far back as is
legal in the jurisdiction.

2.

A consumer credit check to determine the applicant's credit

background, reveal data about his or her character, suggest a
potential motive for theft, and provide investigative leads such
as the identification of discrepancies regarding prior
employment, places of residence, etc.

3.

A civil records check to reveal civil actions that may be an

appropriate concern.

4.

Develop a minimum of three references not provided by the

applicant, and obtain from them a reference on the applicant.

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Revised, May 2006

5.

Verify the educational background of the applicant.

6.

Obtain a reference from all previous employers in the past 10

years. Question the reference carefully, and be aware that the
reference will not always provide straightforward information
and that you will have to ask specific questions to bring out the
negative information.

7.

Photograph the employee and obtain a set of properly inked

fingerprints. It is not necessary to submit the prints for review by
a law enforcement agency. Retain the prints for future use in
the employee's file. Typical use would be to identify the
employee's real identity should he or she commit a crime while
working under an assumed name.

17.4.3

Optional Steps That Are Encouraged

a.

Where legal, state of the art, validated, pencil and paper

personality profile tests are generally considered to be an
effective and fair way of determining with some degree of
accuracy an applicant's attitude toward honesty, drug use, and
similar matters.

b.

A physical examination, including a drug use test, is

encouraged, where legal, but only where properly administered.

c.

A Worker's Compensation check, where legal, may be effective

in identifying applicants who have left previous employees after
committing insurance fraud.

17.4.4

Chief Security Officer Positions

The Chief Security Officer is a "Level 3" employee, but
museums are encouraged to hire a professional "full-field" type
investigation where the above information is gathered by a
skilled private investigator and analyzed by the investigator, the
museum's security consultant, local police officials, or others
with experience in the detection of deception and conducting
complete background investigations.

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Revised, May 2006

17.4.5

Exemptions

a.

No employee should be exempt from the requirement to

prepare a formal job application. If a resume is submitted, a job
application should also be prepared and submitted for inclusion
in the employees file. All applications need to contain a release
form authorizing the museum to conduct the appropriate level
of background check.

b.

No employee should be exempt from the appropriate level of

background check. Museums should resist the widespread
practice of exempting well-known scholars, management level
employees, curatorial employees, or others with high rank,
reputation, or standing from the process.

17.4.6

Use of Information

a.

All information should be gathered and maintained in a

confidential manner. Museums should refrain from gathering,
and should refuse to record, report, or store information that is
irrelevant to the business of determining the ability of the
applicant or employee in gaining the necessary security
clearance. Prohibited information should include, but not be
limited to, information pertaining to the employee or applicant's
religion, political convictions including criminal record for civil
disobedience not indicating moral turpitude, sexual preference,
or similarly irrelevant data. Information that is developed should
become part of an employee's confidential personnel file and
should be maintained in the most confidential manner, when
practical, sealed in an envelope within the file so that it is
available for future reference, but not readily available to those
in the personnel management or administrative capacity without
a need to know.

b.*

The Chief Security Officer, or person responsible for security,

should report the facts pertaining to an applicant's or
employee's background to the Museum Director and to his or
her designee.

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Revised, May 2006

c.

d.

There are no clear-cut criteria for being denied a clearance. It is

best that the museum define its criteria, then make exceptions
judiciously, recognizing the facts pertaining to the individual
involved. The background history of the individual should not be
the sole criteria for denying employment or promotion but
should be one important factor.
The museum operator should consult an attorney in developing
a policy.

APPENDIX A
Preface

Explanatory Material

A careful reading of this document will reveal that the

Council has used the word "should" rather than shall, will or
must to express the implementation of these Suggested
Practices. This change was imposed in 2005 by ASIS
International to more clearly convey the intent of this document
as Suggested Practices and not Standards. Notwithstanding,
the Council strongly encourages all museums to fully comply
with these Suggested Practices and to seek the advice of
protection experts when electing to do otherwise defining their
specific needs.
Chief Security Officer is used throughout this document in lieu
of other designations such as Director, Manager, or Chief of
Security to describe an organizations senior security executive.
The ASIS International Chief Security Officer Guideline
contains additional information addressing key responsibilities
and accountabilities, skills and competencies, and qualifications
for this position.

A4.0

49

A common note of dissent from several of those who

commented, including a museum director and a government
museum security expert, was that the Suggested Practices
impose an impossible economic burden on small museums.
The Council saw its role as one of "calling it like it is," since
small museums are more often victimized than large museums
and carry an equal responsibility to their collections and to their
guardianship role as do large museums. Many small museums
Revised, May 2006

have extraordinary collections and some contain such important

collections as the historical records of entire counties or
regions.
A4.9

While the Council felt that it was acceptable to use non-security

people to perform the security function in smaller institutions,
most agreed to this provision as an economic reality. But the
aspect of this provision that caused the most comment was the
statement that persons who perform the security function
should be present "at all times" (See 13.5).

A4.10

Chief Security Officer is used throughout this document in lieu

of other designations such as Director, Manager or Chief of
Security to describe an organizations senior security executive.
The ASIS International Chief Security Officer Guideline
contains additional information addressing key responsibilities
and accountabilities, skills and competencies, and qualifications
for this position.

A4.13

The Council has identified the tendency of museums to make

exceptions to the security rules for trustees, volunteers, VIP's,
donors, key staff, board members, members of affiliated
groups, and others as a primary reason for the breakdown of
security operational procedures and discipline.

A4.14

The Council has identified the tendency of museums to avoid

sound security procedures because of their lack of popularity
with staff, or their impact on the operational status quo, as a
serious problem to be avoided.

A5.7

The Council recognizes the physical and economic impossibility

of retrofitting some facilities with fire suppression. They also
gave extensive consideration to the public comment by
museum administrators that water sprinklers are unsafe and
inappropriate in a museum. The Council members felt that
sprinkler technology had advanced to the point that waterbased sprinklers are, in themselves, less of a risk than a fire
would be in a building that lacks sprinklers. Some Council
members felt strongly that water based sprinklers pose an
insignificant risk. The Council also strongly advises museums to

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Revised, May 2006

consider the environmental impact of halogenated gas systems

on the atmosphere.
A6.13

Building alarm systems, designed or configured so as to permit

a person in a proprietary or off-site central station to make
decisions as to whether or not an alarm requires full response
include, but are not limited to, those systems in which the
monitoring security officer is permitted to listen in to activity in
the museum or observe television monitors, and then decide if
a response is necessary. While UL approved systems
employing this technology are not in themselves unacceptable,
the Council expresses its serious concern that any system that
allows a security officer or system operator to make decisions
regarding response to the site of the alarm are not always
appropriate for use in museums.

A6.22.3

These Suggested Practices recognize that some cultural

properties, like log cabins and Indian ruins, may be remotely
located, far from central stations, or in areas without phone
service, making a secure communications link economically
impossible. It is a more difficult decision for larger, less remote
institutions to operate with an unprotected communications link
solely due to the cost of the service.

A6.28

This document recognizes that in a university or corporate

environment it is not always possible to carefully enough control
who is assigned to program card keys. In universities, student
employees often are assigned to this task even when campus
police are officially responsible. This may be acceptable for
campus buildings in general but not for high security storage in
museums.

A8.2
A8.3
A13.8

51

ASIS International publishes a Guideline for Private Security

Officer Selection and Training. The Council acknowledges this
document and recommends that museums seek the advice of
protection experts when electing to do otherwise defining their
specific needs.

Revised, May 2006

A9.3

The Council recognizes the need, in some cases, for armed

security in the museum. These situations might include
museums in high crime areas or with highly vulnerable assets.
Armed officers are not normally required or advisable in most
institutions.

A11.6

The Council recognizes the widespread practice of permitting

tours in collection storage areas and has expressed its opinion
that these tours, while sometimes educationally desirable, have
a significant, negative impact on security. No other practice
drew more response from the museum administrators who
reviewed this document than this provision. Security
professionals almost universally agreed with this practice and
endorsed it. General administrators in museums such as
business managers who are responsible for security and
registration professionals also generally agreed. Museum
directors and curators were loud in their dissent. The Council is
aware that tours of storage are important to the museum's
educational mission and is important to fund raising efforts. But
the Council feels strongly that this type of tour poses a threat to
security. For that reason, the Council did not recommend
against tours as they originally felt they should do but instead
recommended that security staffing be provided as noted so
that tours can be conducted with a reduced risk to the
collection.

A13.5

Many museum administrators, and one prominent security

professional, felt that it is unrealistic that smaller museums
provide 24-hour security officer presence. The Council stood
firm in its conviction that having a person on-site is better than
not having a person on-site, even when modern electronics are
used for protection. There is no substitute for a good security
and fire patrol being conducted periodically. The Council
recognizes that this recommendation will be an economic
hardship on many institutions, particularly many small, remote
sites. The Council requests that the museum administrators
make decisions regarding 24 hour staffing on a non-economic
basis when possible, and when making "hard" decisions that
are economic in nature, adequate security staffing should be

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Revised, May 2006

given equal or greater importance to other staffing needs, as

appropriate.
A16.2i

There was considerable comment by non-security persons who

reviewed this document that every effort be made to avoid
discrimination against persons with disabilities. The Council
was sensitive to this and agrees. One Council member recalled
a museum that hired a man with one arm for a midnight shift
security officer position. The man could not carry both a
flashlight and a radio at the same time. Another museum hired
a man for a night security position who could not respond to a
fire or emergency as he was not ambulatory, then made him
night supervisor. The Council cautions that while it is necessary
to provide equal opportunity to persons with disabilities, there
are operational concerns that the Personnel Administrator may
not be fully aware of. And, when someone is placed in a job he
or she cannot perform adequately, and lives or irreplaceable
assets are endangered, the matter is serious. The Council
endorses the use of individuals with disabilities in dispatch,
reception/fixed post, or similar positions when appropriate. It
noted the large volume of letters regarding discrimination
against persons with disabilities and finds the points well taken.
The Council advises museums to make employment
opportunities for disabled persons but to consider the impact
this may have on security. One Council member indicated that
the frequent use of persons who may not be physically able to
meet the stringent demands of security work results from the
fact that many institutions make no demands on security
officers, expect little of them, and assume that there is no real
need for security. As these Suggested Practices begin to
change perceptions of the museum security function, museums
must make certain that their security officers are appropriate in
every way for the tasks they face.

A17.4.6b

This document does not attempt to define what elements of an

applicant's or employee's background render him unsuitable for
a position. It is recognized that individuals "reform" and that
certain civil information such as a bad credit history or a
criminal history involving civil disobedience, while indicating
potential risk, do not necessarily indicate dishonesty. It is

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generally felt that individuals with felony records within the

recent past or individuals with arrests for use of any drug or
narcotic should be denied a clearance for work in Level 2 and 3
positions. Exceptions should be made on a case-by-case basis
and responsibility for such decisions rests with the Museum
Director. The role of the Chief Security Officer is that of
advocate for the best possible security, and he or she should
not be expected to unilaterally, and without the advice and
authority of the Director, make exceptions or relax security
clearance rules or criteria.

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