NOTICE OF PUBLIC MONTHLY MEETING AGENDA

Thursday, March 14, 2024 - 6:00 PM

Location: West Wing Classroom (W212) of Albany Law School's 1928 Building
80 New Scotland Avenue, Albany, NY 12208 (Parking Lot Entrance on Holland Ave.)

Meeting Information if Participating via Online Zoom:

Meeting ID # 812 8068 0884 Passcode: 880330

I. Call to Order & Roll Call (N. Vives)

II. Approval of March 14, 2024, Agenda (N. Vives)
III. Opening Remarks by Chair (N. Vives)
IV. Guest: Albany Police Department Chief of Police Eric Hawkins
V. Case Review & Presentation
A. T&M Report on Administrative Investigation of South Station Arch Street Protests (SSTA)
AD2021-054, and Complaint Nos. CC2021-010, CC2021-011, CC2021-012, and CC2021-020
Incident arising out of a protest march on April 14, 2021, that ended at the Albany Police Department
(“APD”) South Station, and the subsequent encampment of protesters outside the South Station which
was terminated by the APD on April 22, 2021. The CPRB received four civilian complaints related to
the incidents at South Station in Albany on April 14 and April 22, 2021:
1. CC2021-020 alleged excessive force on April 14 which resulted in a lacerated lip and chipped
teeth;
2. CC2021-010 alleged police removed badges and/or name tags on April 14 and April 22; “thin
blue line” insignia present on April 22; and excessive force on April 22;
3. CC2021-011 alleged officers obscured or removed nametags and/or badges; that officers
refused to provide their name; that officer used excessive force; and that officer wore Blue
Lives Matter or “thin blue line” insignia on their riot gear on April 22, and;
4. CC2021-012 alleged force on April 22, and refusal to share information with a parent about a
child’s whereabouts, and failed to properly secure her daughter’s property.
B. Public Comment on T&M’s Independent Investigation and Findings
C. Approval of T&M’s Findings of Administrative Investigation of SSTA Protests (J. Levendosky)
VI. Discussion on CPRB’s Policy and Practice Recommendations to Chief (J. Levendosky)
A. Public Comment on CPRB’s Policy and Practice Recommendations to Chief
VII. Approval of CPRB’s Policy and Practice Recommendations to Chief
VIII. Remarks from the Chair (N. Vives)
IX. Executive Session (N. Vives)
X. Adjournment (N. Vives)

Public Comment is an opportunity for members of the public to address the Community Police Review Board on matters
under their jurisdiction. Public comment is limited to three (3) minutes per person out of courtesy to all community members
who wish to speak. If you would like to submit written comment on an upcoming agenda item, please fill out the public
comment form here on website at or email cprb@albanylaw.edu.
Accommodations: CPRB provides accommodations upon request to persons with disabilities and individuals who are
limited English proficient who wish to address CPRB Board/Committee matters. A request must be made within 48 hours
in advance of a Board or Committee meeting, depending on the service requested. Please contact the CPRB’s Office by
phone at (518) 445-2383 for information.
 INVESTIGATION
SUMMARY

South Station
Arch Street Protest

Prepared for the

Albany Community
Police Review Board

T&M USA, LLC

PRIVILEGED &
CONFIDENTIAL

March 7, 2024
230 Park Avenue / Suite 440 / New York, NY 10169 DRAFT
Tel: 212.422.0000 / www.tmusallc.com INVESTIGATION
SUMMARY

SOUTH STATION/

ARCH STREET

PREPARED FOR
1
ALBANY COMMUNITY POLICE REVIEW
BOARD
Table of Contents
List of Figures .................................................................................................................................. 3

Executive Summary......................................................................................................................... 4
I. Background ........................................................................................................................... 4
II. Investigation Scope and Methodology................................................................................. 4
III. Investigation Findings ........................................................................................................... 5

Investigation Summary ................................................................................................................... 7

I. Investigation Overview ......................................................................................................... 7
II. Summary of Events............................................................................................................... 7
III. CPRB Complaints ................................................................................................................ 10
IV. Investigation Methodology ................................................................................................ 12
V. Summary of Findings .......................................................................................................... 12
Table 1. Comparison Between OPS Findings and T&M Findings ....................................... 19
VI. Summary of Interviews ...................................................................................................... 22
VII. Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 44

Exhibit 1: Uniforms and Grooming Standards, Albany Police Department General Order No.
3.2.00 ............................................................................................................................................ 52

2
List of Figures
Figure 1. Photograph of the encampment. .................................................................................... 9

Figure 2. Photograph of the encampment. .................................................................................... 9

Figure 3. APD officer covering name and badge number on April 22, 2021. ............................... 14

Figure 4. APD officer covering badge number on April 22, 2021. ................................................ 14

Figure 5. APD officer holding polymer shield with “Thin Blue Line” insignia on April 22, 2021. . 15

Figure 6. APD officers holding polymer shields with “Thin Blue Line” insignia on April 22, 2021.
....................................................................................................................................................... 15

Figure 7. An APD officer wearing a “Thin Blue Line” version of the U.S. flag on their uniform and
three APD officers holding polymer shields with the “Thin Blue Line” insignia on April 22, 2021.
....................................................................................................................................................... 16

Figure 8. APD officers wearing blue masks and neck gaiters on April 22, 2021. .......................... 16

Figure 9. APD officer wearing a bracelet with the “Thin Blue Line” insignia on April 22, 2021. .. 17

Figure 10. A “Blue Lives Matter”/“Thin Blue Line” version of the U.S. flag displayed on the wall
in the Albany Police Department South Station on April 14, 2022. ............................................. 17

Figure 11. A photograph of DGS removal equipment outside of South Station on April 22, 2021.
....................................................................................................................................................... 44

Figure 12. An APD officer is pictured wearing a neck gaiter in the “Proud Boys” colors while
arresting a protester on April 22, 2021. ....................................................................................... 47

3
Executive Summary

I. BACKGROUND

On or about April 14, 2021, in Albany, New York, there was a protest march that started
at Townsend Park and ended at the Albany Police Department (APD) South Station. When
protestors arrived at the South Station, they were greeted by uniformed APD officers standing
on the access ramp in the front of the station. The APD officers instructed the protesters to leave
the area, the protesters refused to leave and tried to enter the precinct, where one protester
broke a window. The protesters remained on the access ramp in front of the precinct. The APD
officers, using OC Spray,1 forcibly removed the protesters from the ramp. The lead Lieutenant,
Devin Anderson, forcibly removed a megaphone from a female protester and in doing so hit her
in the mouth with the megaphone, resulting in the protester suffering a lacerated lip and chipped
tooth. The protesters decided to camp out in front of the South Station. The protesters had
multiple tents in an area across from the South Station. The encampment lasted until April 22,
2021, when the APD gave the protesters fifteen minutes to break down the encampment and
leave. When the protesters failed to comply the APD forcibly removed the protesters and took
down the camp.

II. INVESTIGATION SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

The Albany Community Police Review Board (“CPRB”) assigned T&M USA, LLC (“T&M”) to
investigate the South Station Arch Street incident, No. AD2021-054 and complaints No. CC2021-
010, CC2021-011, CC2021-012 and CC2021-020. Specifically, T&M was engaged to investigate
allegations arising out of a protest march on April 14, 2021, that ended at the Albany Police
Department (“APD”) South Station, and the subsequent encampment of protesters outside the
South Station which was terminated by the APD on April 22, 2021.
T&M’s investigation included a reviewed of over 365 materials from the APD, as well as
complainants, witnesses and independent research, including APD police reports, APD General
Orders, Police Officer interview summaries, the APD Office of Professional Standards (“OPS”)
Confidential Report,2 thousands of hours of Police Officer body-worn cameras (“BWCs”) and
station cameras, photos, personnel files, emails, social media videos, and recordings. From May

1
OC Spray stands for Oleoresin Capsicum and is a pepper spray, a natural substance derived from the resin of chili
peppers that causes inflammation to the eyes, skin, and nose, and can be sprayed from a distance to deter attackers.
2
While the report was labeled OPS Confidential Report, it was published in the Times Union. See Robert Gavin, Steve
Hughes, & Mike Goodwin, Report: Police violated policy by covering badges before breaking up protester camp,
Times Union (Feb. 25, 2022), https://timesunion.com/news/article/Report-Police-violated-policy-by-covering-
badges-16946814.php.

4
31, 2023, through October 16, 2023, T&M also interviewed ten (10) individuals in person, by
video conferencing or by telephone.
To reach its findings, T&M evaluated the credibility of witnesses, including the details of
the account provided, the circumstances of the disclosure, the consistency or inconsistency of an
account of events given over time when available, the demeanor of a witness during an interview,
the presence of an interest, bias or motive to lie, whether other corroborative or contradictory
evidence existed, and whether the witness account comported with common sense and/or was
plausible.3

III. INVESTIGATION FINDINGS

T&M made the following findings:

• On April 14, 2021, Lieutenant Devin Anderson violated the department’s policy, Use of
Force, General Order No. 1.3.00, by forcibly removing a megaphone from a female
protester, the officer failed to attempt to de-escalate and gave no verbal instructions to
the protester, and in doing so, he pushed the megaphone into the protester’s face,
lacerating her lip and chipping her teeth.
• On April 14, 2021, an APD officer released Oleoresin Capsicum (“OC”) Spray in a manner
which did not conform with the department’s policy, Use of Force General Order No.
1.3.00.
• On April 14, 2021, a version of the U.S. flag with the “Blue Lives Matter”/ “Thin Blue Line”
insignia was observed hanging in South Station, which is “inappropriate and against
guidelines,” per a statement made by Chief of Police Eric Hawkins.4
• T&M could not substantiate that on April 14, 2021, APD Officers removed their name tags
and/or badges, but did observe that some officers obscured parts of their name tags with
their body-worn cameras.
• After April 14, 2021, APD failed to investigate or refer for investigation allegations that
Lieutenant Anderson’s or any other APD Officer’s personal information was shared online
(known as doxing) and/or that any APD Officers and/or their families were threatened.
T&M was unable to confirm that any APD Officers were doxed after April 14, 2021.

3
Under Albany City Code § 42-343 (7) Powers and Duties: Statements made by complainants, APD officers or
employees, or witnesses are subject to the CPRB's determinations of weight and credibility. Participation or lack of
participation in the hearing process may be considered by the CPRB as one factor in their determination of credibility.
4
For Chief Hawkins’s statement, see page 45. “Thin Blue Line” imagery is linked to the “Blue Lives Matter”
movement, which emerged as a countermovement to Black Lives Matter, a movement formed in protest of alleged
and founded police misconduct. Such imagery has been associated, at times, with white supremacist organizations
and law enforcement agencies across the U.S. have prohibited its use, citing its potential divisiveness. “Thin Blue
Line” imagery is characterized by a thin blue line encased with black lines.

5
 • After April 14, 2021, through April 22, 2021, APD failed to adequately monitor activity at
the South Station encampment.
• On April 22, 2021, some APD Officers covered or removed their name tags and/or badges
and some APD Officers failed to provide their name and/or badge number when
requested to do so by civilians at the encampment.
• On April 22, 2021, some APD Officers displayed “Blue Lives Matter”/ “Thin Blue Line”
paraphernalia on their polymer shields and uniforms, and APD Supervisors failed to visibly
inspect officers to ensure that their uniforms and gear were within APD guidelines and
that their name and badge numbers were visible in violation of policy.5
• On April 22, 2021, APD did not have a thorough plan for arrest processing, including but
not limited to, a central repository to inform the public who was arrested and what was
charged, and criteria for which arrestees would be eligible for Desk Appearance Tickets.
• On April 22, 2021, lead operational Lieutenant Josiah Jones failed to wear a body-worn
camera in violation of the department’s policy, Body-Worn Cameras General Order
No.3.2.15 II.A.
• On April 22, 2021, APD failed to safeguard an arrestee’s personal cell phone.
• On April 22, 2021, APD failed to plan for the breakdown of the encampment and the
safeguarding of personal property. In addition, APD failed to follow their own internal
operational order regarding the takedown of the encampment.
• APD investigated and reported the OPS Confidential Report separately from its
investigation of CC2021-010, CC2021-011, CC2021-012 and CC2021-020. Additionally,
APD failed to thoroughly investigate CC2021-010, CC2021-011, CC2021-012 and CC2021-
20 in a timely manner in that their individual case findings were completed over two years
after first being reported and well past the sixty (60) days designated in General Order
2.4.05 II B. APD failed to interview civilians when investigating for the OPS Confidential
Report6 and individual cases.
• APD Officers failed to understand that displaying “Blue Lives Matter” / “Thin Blue Line”
paraphernalia on uniforms and in the station can undermine the public’s trust.
• After April 22, 2021, APD failed to conduct an After-Action Report of the takedown of the
encampment in accordance with Emergency Operations Plan Critical Incidents General
Order No. 3.9.00.

5
See Exhibit 2, Uniform and Grooming Standards, APD General Order No 3.2.00, IV.
6
While the report was labeled OPS Confidential Report, it was published in the Times Union. See Robert Gavin, Steve
Hughes, Mike Goodwin, Report: Police violated policy by covering badges before breaking up protester camp, Times
Union (Feb. 25, 2022), https://timesunion.com/news/article/Report-Police-violated-policy-by-covering-badges-
16946814.php.

6
Investigation Summary

I. INVESTIGATION OVERVIEW

On May 15, 2023, the Albany Community Police Review Board (“CPRB”) assigned T&M
USA, LLC (“T&M”) investigations CC2021-010, CC2021-011, CC2021-012 and CC2021-020.
Specifically, T&M was engaged to investigate allegations arising out of a protest march on April
14, 2021, that ended at the Albany Police Department (“APD”) South Station, and the subsequent
encampment of protesters outside the South Station which was terminated by the APD on April
22, 2021.
T&M immediately commenced its investigation and requested and ultimately reviewed a
series of materials from the APD, as well as complainants, witnesses and independent research,
including APD police reports, APD General Orders, Police Officer interview summaries, the APD
Office of Professional Standards (“OPS”) Confidential Report, Police Officer body-worn cameras
(“BWCs”), station cameras, photos, personnel files, emails, social media video, and recordings.
From May 31, 2023, through October 16, 2023, T&M also interviewed ten (10) individuals in
person, by teleconferencing or by telephone.
Based on the interviews conducted and materials examined during the investigation,
T&M found that some of the allegations raised by the complaints to the CPRB were substantiated
while others were unfounded. The allegations and T&M’s findings are discussed in more detail
below.
To reach its findings, T&M evaluated the credibility of witnesses, including the details of
the account provided, the circumstances of the disclosure, the consistency or inconsistency of an
account of events given over time when available, the demeanor of a witness during an interview,
the presence of an interest, bias or motive to lie, whether other corroborative or contradictory
evidence existed, and whether the witness account comported with common sense and/or was
plausible.7

II. SUMMARY OF EVENTS

T&M Investigators were informed that on or about April 14, 2021, in Albany, New York,
there was a march to protest the killing of Daunte Wright on April 11, 2021, in Minnesota by a
police officer during a traffic stop. The protest started at Townsend Park and ended at the APD

7
Under Albany Code § 42-343 (7) Powers and Duties: Statements made by complainants, APD officers or employees,
or witnesses are subject to the CPRB's determinations of weight and credibility. Participation or lack of participation
in the hearing process may be considered by the CPRB as one factor in their determination of credibility.

7
South Station. The protesters interviewed by T&M stated that the South Station was the end of
the route. The protesters told T&M that when they arrived at the South Station, they were
greeted by uniformed APD officers standing on the access ramp in front of the station.
Some of the protesters interviewed told T&M that it was a congenial atmosphere where
they were playing music and smoking cannabis.8 Other protesters told T&M that some of the
protesters gathered on the outer portion of the access ramp and were saying “nasty things” to
the officers. Some of the protesters were using chalk to write graffiti on the sidewalk area in front
of the station. The officers told the protesters to leave the area.
The officers went back into the precinct and used handcuffs to lock the doors that led to
the station. The protesters tried to enter the station and one protester threw an object at the
glass, breaking it. The police came back out of the station, this time carrying OC Spray cannisters.9
The protesters stayed; one protester was holding a bright light and aiming it towards the officers.
Another protester, Complainant #4 (“Complainant #4”) was using a megaphone and shouting
“people over property.” Lieutenant Devin Anderson (“Anderson”) grabbed the megaphone from
Complainant #4 and threw it behind her. While removing the megaphone from Complainant #4,
Anderson hit Complainant #4 in the face with the megaphone causing her to receive a laceration
on her lip, chipped teeth and to fall backwards into the crowd. The officers ordered the protesters
to get off the ramp, and when they refused, they were sprayed with the OC Spray. The protesters
got off the ramp and left the area in front of the station.
Later that evening, a few protesters came back and sat in folding chairs in front of the
station. During the next six (6) days, the number of protesters in front of the station grew to an
encampment, where the protesters maintained a twenty-four (24) hour presence. They set up
tents, had portable heaters and generators and had food and clothing delivered to the location.
Mayor Katherine Sheehan (“Sheehan”) and the APD Chief Eric Hawkins (“Hawkins”) allowed the
protesters to stay as long as they remained peaceful.

8
Governor Andrew Cuomo signed the Marijuana Regulation and Tax Act (“MRTA”) into law on April 1, 2021. The law
legalized recreational use of marijuana.
9
OC Spray stands for Oleoresin Capsicum and is a pepper spray, a natural substance derived from the resin of chili
peppers that causes inflammation to the eyes, skin, and nose, and can be sprayed from a distance to deter attackers.

8
Figure 1. Photograph of the encampment.

.
Figure 2. Photograph of the encampment.

9
 On April 22, 2021, the APD told the protesters that they had to leave the encampment,
or they would be arrested. The APD plan was to have a conversation with one of the protest
leaders and explain that it was time to take down the encampment and give the protesters fifteen
(15) minutes to comply; however, APD Lieutenant Josiah Jones (“Jones”) was unable to speak
with a leader so he got on his megaphone and announced that the protesters had fifteen (15)
minutes to leave, or they would be arrested. There was a small group of protesters at the
location, and a few of the protesters started to move some dumpsters to function as barricades,
and a few donned gas masks.
The APD came back in full riot gear and forcibly pushed the protesters off the site and
arrested any protesters who did not comply with orders to disperse. Some of the APD officers
removed their name tags and badges before they participated in taking down the encampment.
Thirteen (13) individuals were arrested. The Albany Department of General Services (“DGS”)
came to the station and removed the property that remained at the encampment.
On both dates, APD officers failed to provide their names and badge numbers when
requested by the protesters.

III. CPRB COMPLAINTS

The CPRB and OPS received four complaints: CC2021-010, CC2021-011, CC2021-012, and
CC2021-020. These complaints were investigated separately by OPS and by T&M on behalf of the
CPRB. While the complaints were reported separately, they are similar in nature. The complaints
begin with the incidents outside the South Station on April 14, 2021, through the takedown of
the encampment at that location on April 22, 2021. Many of the witnesses interviewed were able
to provide information on multiple CPRB complaints. Therefore, for the purposes of describing
the investigatory steps, materials reviewed, and interviews, T&M is treating the complaints
together. Many of the witnesses’ interviews and documents overlap with more than one of the
complaints. This section will address these complaints and the investigatory steps and analysis
provided by T&M. The complaints were as follows:

Complaint: #CC2021-010
Date Received: April 29, 2021
Complainant’s Name: Complainant #1 (“Complainant #1”)
Subject: APD Officers
Dates: April 14 and 22, 2021
Allegations: APD officers removed their name tags and badges on April 14 and 22, 2021. On April
22, 2021, officers used excessive force when clearing the encampment on Arch Street. On April
22, 2021, officers had “Thin Blue Line” insignias on their uniforms and equipment.

10
Complaint: #CC2021-011
Date Received: April 29, 2021
Complainant’s Name: Complainant #2 (“Complainant #2”)
Subject: APD Officers
Date: April 22, 2021
Allegations: According to Complainant #2, on April 22, 2021, she was protesting and witnessed
APD officers in full riot gear not wearing name tags or badges. Complainant #2 asked officers their
names and they refused to provide their names. Complainant #2 said officers were wearing “Blue
Lives Matter” masks and had similar “Blue Lives Matter” decorations on their riot gear.

Complaint: #CC2021-012
Complainant’s Name: Complainant #3 (“Complainant #3”)
Subject: APD Officers
Date: April 22, 2021
Allegations: According to Complainant #3, her daughter Samira was protesting on April 22, 2021,
and called her to tell her that the protesters were told that they had fifteen (15) minutes to
remove their belongings and leave the location. Complainant #3 got to the location and was told
by other protesters her daughter was dragged away by her legs by an APD officer. Complainant #3
asked multiple officers where her daughter was, the officers were not wearing badges or name
tags and refused to answer her. Complainant #3 received a number for central booking but could
not get an answer as to where her daughter was. Eventually she was told by an officer that her
daughter was being booked at Albany jail, but that information was not accurate. Her daughter
was released from South Station. She believes the officers were trying to terrorize the families of
the protesters.

Complaint: #CC2021-020
Complainant: Complainant #4 (“Complainant #4”)
Subject: Lieutenant Devin Anderson
Date: April 14, 2021
Allegations: Complainant #4 was protesting at South Station. She was on the ramp opposite the
entrance using a megaphone. She said that Anderson grabbed her megaphone and smashed her
in her mouth with the megaphone. Complainant #4 says that her two front teeth went through
her upper lip and chin, resulting in a lacerated lip and chipped tooth. Complainant #4 said that she
had to go to a dentist to have her teeth shaved, and that she had no insurance. Complainant #4
said Anderson ordered his officers to attack the rest of the protesters. She said they were sprayed
with expired bear mace, beaten with Billy clubs (batons), and subjected to excessive force. She
said they retreated but came out and attacked two more times. Complainant #4 says she suffers
from PTSD from the event.

11
 IV. INVESTIGATION METHODOLOGY

During this investigation T&M interviewed ten (10) witnesses in person, telephonically
and virtually. T&M interviewed three (3) members of the APD, including Chief Hawkins,
Commanders Darrell Gipson (“Gipson”) and Christopher Cornell (“Cornell”). Lieutenants
Anderson and Jones were subpoenaed to appear but failed to appear for their interviews. T&M
was advised by counsel for the Lieutenants that they were not appearing for their interviews.
T&M did not subpoena any other officers but reviewed the summaries of their interviews with
OPS. T&M interviewed Complainant #1, Complainant #2, Complainant #3, Witness #1,
Complainant #4, Witness #2 and Witness #3.
T&M viewed APD officers’ body-worn cameras, station cameras, videos and pictures
provided by witnesses, social media postings, and media coverage of the incidents. T&M
reviewed Hawkins’s Executive Summary, the OPS Confidential Report,10 OPS Case Summaries,
APD Disciplinary Histories, APD General Orders, APD Intra-Departmental Correspondences and
APD emails.

V. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Based on the interviews conducted and materials examined during the investigation,
T&M finds that some of the issues raised by the complainants to CPRB did occur, in that on April
14, 2021, Anderson caused injury to Complainant #4 when he removed the megaphone from
her, and OC Spray was used on some of the protesters who refused to leave the ramp in the front
of South Station.11 T&M found that APD failed to follow their internal guidelines for the use of
OC Spray. T&M found that APD failed to provide proof that an officer was “doxed,”12 nor did they
open or refer an investigation into the alleged doxing.
T&M found that on April 22, 2021, some officers removed their name tags and/or badges
(see figs. 3–4), refused to provide their names to civilians, wore “Blue Lives Matter”/ “Thin Blue
Line” paraphernalia (see figs. 7 and 9), had thin blue lines surrounded by blacklines on their
polymer shields (see figs. 5–7 and 9), failed to provide accurate information regarding arrestees,
and failed to safeguard arrestees’ personal property.

10
The report contained summaries of individual officer’s interviews.
11
T&M could not corroborate the protesters’ claim that the APD officers used bear spray.
12
“Dox” means “to publicly identify or publish private information about (someone) especially as a form of
punishment or revenge.” See https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dox.

12
 Additionally, T&M found that the APD failed to follow its own internal operational order
for the takedown of the encampment, did not visually inspect the officers to ensure that their
uniforms and gear were within guidelines, did not follow APD General Orders regarding badge
and name placement on uniforms,13 did not have a thorough plan for arrests including but not
limited to a central repository to inform the public who was arrested and what they were charged
with, failed to make upfront decisions on what would be charged and criteria for receiving Desk
Appearance Tickets (“DATs”), did not have intelligence regarding the physical make-up of the
encampment, did not ensure that the lead Lieutenant activated his body-worn camera, did not
have a plan for the breakdown of the encampment and the safeguarding of personal property
and did not conduct a post-operative review of the takedown and failed to create an After Action
Report.
APD OPS investigated the four (4) civilian complaints that were also investigated by T&M
on behalf of CPRB. OPS did not appear to conduct in-person interviews of any of the civilian
complainants but nonetheless delivered findings in response to the four allegations.14 OPS found
that the APD officers were given permission to remove their nametags but not their badge
numbers. However, OPS found that some APD officers removed both name tags and badges. OPS
excused this behavior on the part of the officers because they determined that Hawkins’s
directive was not clearly conveyed to the officers on April 22, 2021. OPS did not find that the
officers failed to provide their names and/or badge numbers when asked by multiple civilians.
OPS did not find that the officers were wearing “Blue Lives Matter” paraphernalia or were
carrying polymer shields with thin blue lines encased in black lines (“Thin Blue Line”). However,
T&M observed that polymer shields bearing the “Thin Blue Line” insignia were clear from viewing
the officers’ body-worn camera and social media (see figs. 5–7 and 9).
T&M could not confirm that APD officers were wearing “Blue Lives Matter” face masks
but observed a “Blue Lives Matter / “Thin Blue Line” flag on the wall in South Station (see fig. 10)
and a “Blue Lives Matter/Thin Blue Line” patch or sticker on an APD officer’s vest (see fig. 7). T&M
observed a number of APD officers wearing blue neck garters with an image of the American flag.

13
See Exhibit 1 Uniform and Grooming Standards, APD General Order No 3.2.00, IV.
14
OPS spoke with at least two of the complainants but there is nothing in the material provided by the APD that
memorializes the complainants’ statements.

13
Figure 3. APD officer covering name and badge number on April 22, 2021.

Figure 4. APD officer covering badge number on April 22, 2021.

14
 Figure 5. APD officer holding polymer shield with “Thin Blue Line” insignia on April 22, 2021.15

Figure 6. APD officers holding polymer shields with “Thin Blue Line” insignia on April 22, 2021.16

15
Fig. 5 image source: Screenshot of video footage recorded and posted on Vimeo by Bhawin Suchak (Apr. 23, 2021),
https://vimeo.com/540571411.
16
Fig. 6 image source: Screenshot of video footage recorded and posted on Vimeo by Bhawin Suchak (Apr. 23, 2021),
https://vimeo.com/540571411.

15
Figure 7. An APD officer wearing a “Thin Blue Line” version of the U.S. flag on their uniform and three APD officers
holding polymer shields with the “Thin Blue Line” insignia on April 22, 2021.17

Figure 8. APD officers wearing blue masks and neck gaiters on April 22, 2021.

17
Fig. 6 image source: Screenshot of video footage recorded and posted on Vimeo by Bhawin Suchak (Apr. 23, 2021),
https://vimeo.com/540571411.

16
 Figure 9. APD officer wearing a bracelet what appears to be the “Thin Blue Line” insignia on April 22, 2021.

Figure 10. A “Blue Lives Matter”/ “Thin Blue Line” version of the U.S. flag displayed on the wall in the Albany Police
Department South Station on April 14, 2022.

OPS did not find that Anderson used excessive force when he removed the megaphone
from Complainant #4 on April 14, 2021. The OPS report did not address whether she was injured
as a result of the incident, despite the fact that Complainant #4 provided APD with her physical
and dental records. OPS did not find that the officers used excessive force despite officers’ body-
worn cameras showing an officer using his baton on a protester who was laying on the ground.
OPS did find that Witness #1’s cell phone was not safeguarded but blamed that on Witness #1
failing to comply with a lawful order.
To reach its findings, T&M examined all the witness accounts, APD body-worn cameras,
and documents provided, as well as a media review. T&M used various factors to evaluate the
credibility of the witnesses interviewed by T&M and the credibility of the witnesses interviewed
by APD based on the summaries utilized for its Confidential Report. T&M reviewed the

17
consistency or inconsistency of their various accounts of events over time, the witnesses’
demeanor during their interviews, the witnesses’ motive to lie, and whether other information
corroborated or contradicted their accounts.
After applying these tests to each witness’s account, T&M found that most of the
witnesses agreed as to the basic facts surrounding the events in question, but their description
of the events was colored by their personal interests. For example, some of the protesters
described their actions in front of the South Station on April 14, 2021, as a “great big party,” “we
were just hanging out, listening to music and smoking some joints.” The APD officers in their
interviews to OPS described the same event as “a mob riot of about 30 to 50 people screaming
into multiple megaphones.” T&M’s investigation found that there were about ten (10) to fifteen
(15) protesters in front of the station, with one (1) or two (2) megaphones and one (1) LED light.
The descriptions of events by the protesters and the officers continued to differ throughout the
subsequent encampment and the takedown on April 22, 2021. T&M did find that some of the
protesters yelled racial slurs at the officers. T&M found that some protesters failed to comply
with a lawful order on April 14, 2021, to leave the ramp in front of the station. T&M found that
while some protesters failed to comply with an order to vacate the encampment on April 22,
2021, the order to vacate was made via a megaphone, not directly to a leader and the fifteen (15)
minute time frame to disband the encampment was unrealistic.

The chart on the following pages displays OPS findings alongside T&M findings for all four
(4) CPRB cases investigated, as well as additional findings by T&M.

18
 Table 1. Comparison Between OPS Findings and T&M Findings

OPS Case No. & Case Synopsis OPS Finding T&M Finding
CC2021-010 OPS made the following findings as to the conduct of the T&M made the following findings as to the conduct of the
The complainant alleged that officer(s) involved: officer(s) involved:
officers obscured or removed
nametags and/or badges, that i. With regards to 1 count of allegation of improper Conduct i. With regards to 1 count of the alleged improper Conduct
officers used excessive force, Standards that occurred on April 14, 2021, OPS reached a Standards of removing APD identification that occurred
and that officers wore Blue finding of Not Sustained – where the review fails to on April 14, 2021, T&M reached a finding of Not
Lives Matter or “Thin Blue disclose sufficient facts to prove or disprove the allegation Sustained.
Line” insignia on their riot gear made in the complaint. ii. With regards to the 1 count of allegation of improper
on April 22, 2021. ii. With regards to the 1 count of allegation of improper Conduct Standards of removing APD identification that
Conduct Standards that occurred on April 22, 2021, OPS occurred on April 22, 2021, T&M reached a finding of
Allegation(s): reached a finding of Exonerated – where the acts which Sustained.
Conduct Standards (3 counts) provide the basis for the complaint occurred, but the iii. With regards to the 1 count of allegation of improper Use
Use of Force (1 count) review shows that such acts were proper. of Force that occurred on April 22, 2021, T&M reached a
iii. With regards to the 1 count of allegation of improper Use finding of Not Sustained.
of Force that occurred on April 22, 2021, OPS reached a iv. With regards to 1 count of the alleged improper Conduct
finding of Unfounded – where the review shows that the Standards of having thin blue lines on their uniforms and
act or acts complained of did not occur or were equipment that occurred on April 22, 2021, T&M reached
misconstrued. a finding of Sustained.
iv. With regards to 1 count of the alleged improper Conduct
Standards that occurred on April 22, 2021, OPS reached a
finding of Unfounded.

19
OPS Case No. & Case Synopsis OPS Finding T&M Finding
CC2021-011 OPS made the following findings as to the conduct of the T&M made the following findings as to the conduct of the
The complainant alleged that officer(s) involved: officer(s) involved:
police removed badges and/or
name tags on April 14 and April i. With regards to the 1 count of alleged of improper i. With regards to the 1 count of alleged improper Conduct
22, 2021, “Thin Blue Line” Conduct Standards, OPS reached a finding of Exonerated. Standards of removing APD identification, T&M reached
insignia was present on April ii. With regards to the 1 count of the alleged improper a finding of Sustained.
22, and excessive force on Conduct Standards, OPS reached a finding of Unfounded. ii. With regards to the 1 count of alleged improper Conduct
April 22. iii. With regards to the 1 count of alleged improper Use of Standards in multiple APD Officers failing to provide their
Force, OPS reached a finding of Unfounded. names or badge numbers, T&M reached a finding of
Allegation(s): Sustained.
Conduct Standards (2 counts) iii. With regards to the 1 count of alleged improper Use of
Use of Force (1 count) Force, T&M reached a finding of Not Sustained.
CC2021-012 OPS made the following findings as to the conduct of the T&M made the following findings as to the conduct of the
The complainant alleged that officer involved: officer(s) involved:
police used excessive force and
failed to safeguard personal i. With regards to the 1 count of alleged improper Excessive i. With regards to 1 count of alleged improper Excessive
property when arresting her Force, OPS reached a finding of Exonerated. Force, T&M reached a finding of Not Sustained.
daughter on April 22, 2021. ii. With regards to 1 count of Conduct Standards, the OPS ii. With regards to 1 count of Conduct Standards, T&M
reached a finding of Sustained. * The complainant did reached finding of Sustained. * The complainant did not
Allegation(s): not make this allegation; this involves Commander make this allegation; this involves Commander Joseph
Use of Force (1 count) Joseph McDade who gave the order to give officers McDade who gave the order to give officers permission
Conduct Standards (2 counts) permission to cover and remove their name tags. to cover and remove their name tags.
Call Handling (1 count) iii. With regards to 1 count of Conduct Standards, OPS iii. With regards to 1 Count of Conduct Standards, T&M
Evidence &Property Handling reached a finding of Exonerated. reached a finding of Sustained.
(1 count) iv. With regards to 1 count of Call Handling, the OPS reached iv. With regards to 1 count of Call Handling, T&M reached a
a finding of Exonerated. finding of Sustained.
v. With regards to 1 count of Evidence & Property Handling v. With regards to 1 count of Evidence and Property
is Sustained. Handling, T&M reached a finding of Sustained.
vi. With regards to 1 count of Conduct Standards, the OPS vi. With regards to 1 count of Conduct Standards, T&M
reached a finding of Sustained. * The complainant did reached a finding of Sustained. * The complainant did
not make this allegation; this involves Lieutenant Josiah not make this allegation; this involves the Lieutenant
Jones who failed to wear a body-worn camera. Josiah Jones who failed to wear a body-worn camera.

20
OPS Case No. & Case Synopsis OPS Finding T&M Finding
CC2021-020 OPS made the following findings as to the conduct of the The T&M made the following findings as to the conduct of the
officer involved: officer involved:
The complainant alleged
experiencing excessive force i. With regards to 1 count of the alleged improper Use of i. With regards to 1 count of the alleged improper Use of
on April 14, 2021. Force, on April 14, 2021, by Lieutenant Devin Andersen Force, on April 14, 2021, by Lieutenant Devin Anderson
towards a person known to APD, OPS reached a finding of towards a person known to APD, the T&M reached a
Allegation(s): Unfounded. finding of Sustained.
Use of Force (3 counts) ii. With regards to 1 count of alleged improper Use of Force, ii. With regards to 1 count of the alleged Use of Force, on
on April 14, 2021, OPS reached a finding of Unfounded. April 14, 2021, T&M reached a finding of Unfounded.
iii. With regards to 1 count of alleged improper Use of Force, iii. With regards to 1 count of the alleged Use of Force, on
on April 14, 2021, OPS reached a finding of Unfounded. April 14, 2021, T&M reached a finding of Not Sustained.
Additional T&M Findings
With regards to the allegations that APD officer(s) were “doxed,” T&M did not find any evidence that any officer(s) were “doxed.”

With regards to the allegation that APD failed to monitor activity at the encampment from April 14, 2021, through April 22, 2021, T&M did find that because of
a lack of intelligence, APD was unprepared to remove the encampment on April 22, 2021.

Other misconduct noted:

i. On April 14, 2021, Sergeant Anthony DiGiuseppe released OC Spray and failed to follow APD Guidelines.
ii. On April 14, 2021, a “Blue Lives Matter”/ “Thin Blue Line” flag was observed hanging in South Station.
iii. After April 14, 2021, APD failed to investigate or refer for investigation allegations that APD officers were threatened on-line and/or “doxed.”
iv. After April 14, 2021, APD ordered that officers could cover or remove their name tags after claims of officers being “doxed.”
v. From April 14, 2021, through April 22, 2021, APD failed to monitor the protesters’ activities at the South Station encampment.
i. On April 22, 2021, APD failed to follow their own operational order regarding the takedown of the encampment.
ii. On April 22, 2021, APD Supervisors failed to visibly inspect officers to ensure that their uniforms and equipment met APD Guidelines.
iii. On April 22, 2021, APD failed to follow APD General Orders Uniform Guidelines regarding badge and name placement on uniforms.
iv. On April 22, 2021, APD did not have a thorough plan for processing and charging arrestees.
v. After April 22, 2021, APD failed to conduct a post-operative review and After-Action Report of the takedown of the encampment.
vi. APD failed to understand that officers displaying “Blue Lives Matter”/ “Thin Blue Lives” paraphernalia on uniforms and equipment undermined the
protestors’ trust.
vii. APD investigated the individual cases separately from the OPS Confidential Report and failed to conduct a thorough and timely investigation.

21
 VI. SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWS

T&M interviewed seven (7) civilian witnesses and three (3) uniform members of the
APD.18 The summaries of the interviews are below.

1. Chief of Police Eric Hawkins

Hawkins was interviewed regarding the events of April 14, 2021, at South Station through
the encampment and takedown on April 22, 2021, on August 24, 2023, at Albany Police
Headquarters and via Zoom on August 28, 2023. Hawkins has been the Chief of Police at APD
since September of 2018. Prior to coming to Albany as the Chief, he was the Chief of Police for
Southfield, Michigan. He started there as a cadet and rose through the ranks to become the Chief.
He oversees a force that is budgeted for approximately 450 members, including sworn and
unsworn members. Presently he has 55 vacancies in the rank of officer. Hawkins’s executive team
consists of two Deputy Chiefs and five Commanders. He believed that Deputy Chief Brian Hogan
was one of the Deputy Chiefs in April 2021 but could not remember if Deputy Chief Donohue was
the second Deputy Chief. Hawkins told T&M that one Deputy Chief handles the administrative
side of the department and the other oversees the operational side of the department. In April
of 2021, Gipson was the Commander of Central Station and Joseph McDade (“McDade”) was the
Commander of South Station.19
Hawkins told T&M that there was some protest on April 14, 2021, but he did not
specifically remember what it was about. T&M asked him if he read his Executive Summary
and/or the OPS Confidential Report. Hawkins indicated that he read it when it was first released
but did not read it again prior to this interview. Hawkins said he was told that protesters were
outside of South Station but could not remember who told him but said that it was probably one
of the Deputy Chiefs. Hawkins said that he was told Anderson was at the station and “the station
was attacked.” He said he was told that windows were broken, and that protesters were trying
to get access to the station and the officers had to use force to remove the protesters from the
station. Hawkins was not aware if the Commander of South Station was present at the time of
the unrest. Hawkins did not know what, if anything, the officers who accompanied the protesters
on their march towards South Station were doing at the time the protesters were trying to enter
the station. He said that it was possible they were maintaining the perimeter, but he had no
independent knowledge of what was happening.

18
Chief Hawkins and Commanders Gipson and Cornell cooperated with T&M’s requests for an interview. Lieutenants
Jones and Anderson failed to appear after being duly served with subpoenas.
19
Hawkins told T&M that he could not remember who the Commander in charge of South Station in April 2021 was,
T&M informed him that it was McDade.

22
 Hawkins was asked about Anderson removing the megaphone from Complainant #4 and
her claim that Anderson hit her with the megaphone, lacerating her lip and chipping and
scratching her teeth. He acknowledged being aware that she made a forced allegation against a
member of his department. He said he did not know if Complainant #4 was interviewed about
her allegations by OPS but told T&M that it is reasonable to interview the complainant to obtain
both sides of the story. Hawkins said he viewed the video and while he cannot remember what
Complainant #4 was saying into the megaphone, Anderson was justified in removing it from her.
Hawkins said it was a chaotic scene and the officers were trying to gain control. However,
Hawkins told T&M that he did not perceive Complainant #4’s use of a megaphone as a threat in
and of itself but rather combined with the other actions of the protesters it rose to the level of a
threat to the officers.
Hawkins was asked if the protesters were sprayed with a substance to get them to leave
the ramp in front of the station. He told T&M that for an operation such as this the officers would
use “regular OC Spray.” The following is an excerpt from Hawkins’ interview with T&M.

T&M: “a lot of the protesters told us that the department was using expired bear spray.
Do you know why they would say that?”
Hawkins: “I do not know.”
T&M: “Does the APD ever use expired bear spray?”
Hawkins: “As a practice we do not use expired chemicals or sprays.”
T&M: “Specifically do you use bear sprays?’
Hawkins: “We use OC gas.”
T&M: “Pepper spray?”
Hawkins: “Pepper spray, yes.”
T&M: “Does the APD use spray that is specified to be used on bears? Does the APD do
that to protesters?”
Hawkins: “We haven’t had bears in the City of Albany.”20
T&M: “We know that there were allegations that expired bear spray was used. They look
like the foggers or pepper spray that were there. You say they didn’t have it, or you do
not know?”
Hawkins: “Not to my knowledge.”

Hawkins told T&M that after the incident at South Station he was advised that there was a
possibility that a group of individuals may attempt to set up an encampment on the roadway

20
In July 2023, a black bear was spotted near New Scotland Avenue and Ontario Street in the City of Albany,
according to the state Department of Environmental Conservation. Patrick Tine, Black Bear Spotted in Albany, Times
Union (Jul. 3, 2023), https://www.timesunion.com/news/article/black-bear-spotted-near-albany-s-new-scotland-
18182522.php.

23
outside South Station. Hawkins said the community response to the encampment was mixed,
some positive and some negative. T&M asked Hawkins if he and the Mayor came out and said as
long as the encampment remains peaceful, that he wouldn’t ask them to move. Hawkins told
T&M he didn’t recall his exact statement and added that he made a lot of public statements.
Hawkins told T&M that he was communicating with community activist Person #1 (“Person
#1”),21 but denied texting her that he would let her know ahead of time if the encampment was
going to be taken down. Hawkins told T&M that between April 14, 2021, and April 22, 2021, he
did not meet with any of the protesters, nor was he aware if any of his staff met with them.
Hawkins told T&M he did not remember the list of demands that the protesters compiled
including that they wanted Anderson fired.
T&M asked Hawkins if he assigned anyone of his staff members to monitor the situation
at South Station and report back to him. Hawkins said his Deputy Chief of Operations would have
been reporting to him, however Hawkins did not remember who his Deputy Chief was at the
time. Hawkins told T&M he was meeting with the Deputy Chiefs and his executive staff daily.
Hawkins told T&M that he appointed an APD officer to liaison with the protesters at the
encampment, however he could not remember who it was.22 Hawkins told T&M that the location
of the encampment was interfering with the traffic flow of downtown. Hawkins was asked if he
offered the protesters an alternate location and he told T&M he couldn’t recall. Hawkins told
T&M that after a few days the dynamic of the encampment changed. Hawkins told T&M that
they learned of emergent threats to sensitive security systems that could affect the Capital
Region. Hawkins would not disclose what the threats were or how they would affect the region
but said that is why he decided to take down the encampment.
Hawkins told T&M that some officers including Anderson were being “doxed.”23 He didn’t
know who the other officers were, nor did he remember if he saw any examples of these threats
that were on social media. He didn’t remember who told him but opined that it was probably
one of his Deputy Chiefs, but since he didn’t remember who his Deputy Chiefs were two years
ago, he could not identify which Chief may have told him. Hawkins was asked if the APD Detective
Bureau investigated these threats to his officers and their families. Hawkins could not recall what
response if any the APD had to these threats.24 Hawkins told T&M that on April 21, 2021, he
decided that he would shut down the encampment the next day. Hawkins told T&M that he
decided to allow APD officers who were going to assist in the takedown to remove their name
tags but not their badges. He said he gave this direction to his Deputy Chiefs and Commanders

21
T&M attempted to interview Amy Jones, but she did not cooperate with T&M.
22
None of the civilians interviewed told T&M that there was an assigned APD liaison.
23
“Dox” means “to publicly identify or publish private information about (someone) especially as a form of
punishment or revenge.” See https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dox.
24
APD informed T&M that no cases were opened by the Detective Bureau regarding online threats to APD officers,
nor were any allegations referred to any other law enforcement agencies.

24
but could not recall which ones. He told T&M that this directive was not in writing, nor did it go
out via email to APD officers. He said, “this was an oral direction for a special operation.”
Hawkins told T&M that that there was a pre-operational order for the takedown of the
encampment. Hawkins told T&M that he didn’t recall exactly what was in the order nor did he
remember who the incident commander was but knew that there was an incident commander.
T&M asked Hawkins if he was aware that Jones took charge at the scene and Hawkins told T&M
“that if [it] was in the report. Yes. I just don’t recall. It’s been a while. I just haven’t seen the report
in a while.” T&M asked Hawkins if he decided not to read it again, “even though you knew we
were going to talk about it.” Hawkins said, “yes, correct.”25 Hawkins said that there were no
outside agencies involved in the planning process, but the DGS was on standby for cleaning.26
T&M asked Hawkins if Jones was supposed to talk with the leaders at the encampment and tell
them they had fifteen (15) minutes to leave or be arrested, but when Jones got to the
encampment there were no leaders there, so he just told the protesters to leave. Hawkins said
he didn’t know if there were leaders there but said that the protesters were not responsive and
actively hostile, therefore the arrest team was sent out. He said the protesters were aggressive
and in his mind that meant they were likely to incite a riot.
Hawkins was asked if there were places on the uniforms for name tags and badges.
Hawkins told T&M “that the badge is on left breast and name tag is on the right.” He said the
same applies to outerwear such as jackets. T&M asked him about vests, and he said that he has
since learned that the name tags and badges were together, and it has been corrected. Hawkins
said the station commanders are responsible for ensuring that officers are wearing uniforms and
gear that comply with Department policy and he expects the officers’ immediate supervisors to
inspect what the officers are wearing. Hawkins told T&M that they supplied face masks for
officers during Covid, but officers were allowed to wear their own masks. When asked if it was
appropriate for officers to wear face masks with the “Blue Lives Matter” logos, Hawkins said it
was not endorsed. Hawkins told T&M that the thin blue lines on the polymer shields were not in
compliance with APD equipment standards. Hawkins told T&M he doesn’t know now what the
standard polymer shield should look like. Hawkins told T&M that he is confident now that officers
are following uniform standards. Hawkins told T&M that he was at South Station between April
14, 2021, and for the takedown on April 22, 2021. T&M asked him if he saw a “Blue Lives Matter”
flag in the lobby of South Station. Hawkins said he did not see it, nor was it allowed. Hawkins told
T&M that there was no formal post-operative report prepared after the takedown.

25
Hawkins was interviewed on two separate occasions and did not review the OPS report before either of his
interviews.
26
Neither the Albany Fire Department nor Emergency Medical Services were part of the planning of the takedown
of the encampment nor were they on site on April 22, 2021, when the takedown occurred.

25
 2. Commander Darrell Gipson

Gipson was interviewed via Zoom on September 13, 2023. Gipson has worked at the APD
for almost thirty (30) years and has been the Commander of Central Station since 2015. He said
he reports to Deputy Chief Vincent Foley. He said that in April 2021, McDade was the Commander
in charge of South Station. He said if he is not at the station then a Lieutenant will be in charge.
Gipson told T&M that he is the APD representative on the Special Permits Committee. He said
after the George Floyd incident that some of the protest marches had permits while others did
not. He said that sometimes the department would be contacted by someone in the group to let
them know there was a march, other times they would learn about it from social media.
T&M asked Gipson about the march on April 14, 2021. Gipson told T&M he didn’t
remember much about it since it was not his station. He said he remembered that a Lieutenant
took a bullhorn and that sparked the second one which he was at. He said the protesters were
upset with Anderson.
Gipson told T&M that he was familiar with the OPS Confidential Report. He said it was not
distributed to the command staff.27 He read it in the paper. He did read his interview summary
prior to meeting with T&M. Gipson told T&M that the command staff meets on Monday,
Wednesday, and Friday, but he thinks during the encampment they may have met every day.
Gipson said that Hawkins’s original position on the encampment was to leave it there.
Gipson told T&M that in April 2021 the Crime Analysis Resource Center was at South
Station, and presently it is in APD headquarters. Gipson said it is a multi-jurisdictional unit and he
believed they were monitoring the situation at the encampment. He did not know if there were
cameras on the protesters throughout their time at the encampment but said on the day of the
takedown there was an officer on the roof with a camera.
Gipson told T&M on the original day of the encampment he approached some of the
protesters and asked them to move and put out their fires. Gipson said they responded
negatively. He said he is African American, and they called him all kinds of names and used racial
slurs. He told T&M, “Yeah, more or less told me to go fuck off.”
Gipson said that he was aware that there were allegations that Anderson was being
“doxed.” Gipson told T&M that while he heard about it, he never saw any proof of the threats.
Gipson told T&M that Police Officer Michael Delano (“Delano”)28 approached him and told him
that APD officers were concerned that their families could be targeted on social media by wearing
their name tags. Delano asked Gipson if he would talk to the Chief about their concerns. Gipson
relayed Delano’s concerns to Hawkins. Gipson said that Hawkins said he had no issues with that

27
In April 2021, the command staff consisted of Chief Hawkins, Deputy Chiefs Hogan and Edward Donahue,
Commanders Foley, McDade, Anthony Battuello and Gipson.
28
Delano is presently president of Police Benevolent Association.

26
since the officers could be identified by their badges. Gipson said that Hawkins told the command
staff that under certain circumstances APD officers were authorized to remove or cover their
name tags but not their badges. Gipson said that there were no formal communications regarding
Hawkins’s policy change.
Gipson told T&M that Hawkins made the decision to take down the encampment one or
two days before the actual takedown. Gipson said once Hawkins made the decision, Hogan had
a meeting with APD Emergency Services, and some other APD units. The mission was to open the
street to let traffic flow and give the protesters an area to continue their protest. Gipson told
T&M he wasn’t told why Hawkins changed his position. Gipson said that he met with Jones and
McDade on April 22, 2021, before the takedown, to review the plan. Gipson said they then met
with the officers involved in the patrolman garage. Jones read off the plan from what appeared
to be notes on his phone. Gipson told T&M he was in the garage checking morale and equipment.
Gipson wasn’t clear if the incident commander was Hogan or McDade. Gipson said it was McDade
who told officers they could cover their name tags. He said he wasn’t there when McDade issued
the order but heard about it from other members of the Department.
Gipson told T&M that he thought Jones was going to speak with whomever was in charge
and tell them it was time to take down the encampment. Gipson said that Jones went out and
told the protesters they had fifteen (15) minutes to leave. He said they waited a few minutes to
see if the protesters would leave and once they saw the protesters were not leaving and starting
to set up barricades, they lined up and proceeded to move to take down the encampment.
Gipson told T&M that he wouldn’t describe the crowd as hostile, just non-compliant.
Gipson said there was no plan to safeguard the protesters’ property such as tents and
personal belongings. He said DGS was on standby to come clean up once the encampment was
taken down. Gipson said that they were not prepared for stuff that was there. He said the tents
were difficult to move and they ended up having to walk around them.
T&M asked Gipson about the uniforms for the APD. Gipson said there are different
uniforms depending on the season and/or assignment. He said all uniforms have a place for name
tags and badges. Gipson said that he was not aware that officers were wearing “Blue Lives
Matter” facemasks and while he did not have an issue with it, he understood that it may not have
been well received. Gipson said that the polymer shields should be clear with nothing on them.
He stated that supervisors such as Sergeants should check that officers have the right equipment,
but they do not ensure everyone is in the right uniform. Gipson said that is the job of OPS. Gipson
was not aware that some officers also covered their badge numbers until he read it in the paper.
He did not cover his name or his badge number. Gipson thought McDade may have received
some discipline regarding the issue with the covering of the badges. Gipson told T&M that there
was no post-operative report or analysis.

27
 3. Commander Christopher Cornell

Cornell was interviewed via Zoom on September 13, 2023. Cornell is the Commander of
Investigations. He currently supervises the Criminal investigations Unit, Child and Family Services
Unit, Community Response Unit, Forensic Investigations Unit, and Information Coordination
Unit.29 Cornell was hired in 2005 and became a Commander in May 2022. In April 2021, Cornell
was assigned as a Detective Sergeant in the Criminal Investigations Unit and Deputy Chief Foley
was the Commander of Investigations.
T&M asked Cornell about the protest that ended at South Station. He was not sure if he
was at the station or got called to come back. He said he does remember reviewing a video with
a couple of detectives. He told T&M the purpose of the review was to attempt to identify the
protesters who threw bottles or did damage to the station.
Cornell told T&M that he had heard that Anderson was “doxed.” Cornell told T&M that
he thinks Anderson’s address, as well as some other pertinent information, was put on social
media. Cornell did not remember if he actually saw the postings. Cornell told T&M that the APD
has a unit that can investigate cyberstalking, but he cannot remember if there was an
investigation into the source of the “doxing.” Additionally, Cornell was not aware if there was an
investigation into “doxing” or cyberstalking for any other members of the APD.
Cornell told T&M that after the first incident the protesters started to camp out in front
of the station. Cornell told T&M he does not think there was 24/7-hour surveillance in front of
the station during the encampment, although he thought there was some monitoring for the
encampment. Cornell told T&M that he does not remember Hawkins’s or the mayor’s positions
regarding the encampment.
Cornell did not personally walk through the encampment, and anything he observed
came from video review. Cornell told T&M that the number of the protesters fluctuated but he
didn’t know if the APD was monitoring the head count. Cornell was aware that the encampment
did grow over the course of six days.
Cornell told T&M that on April 22, 2021, he learned the encampment was going to be
taken down. He thinks it was probably in the morning. He told T&M that Jones developed an
Operational Order and reviewed it with him. During this meeting Cornell told T&M that Jones
told him that officers could cover their name tags, he does not remember anything about badges.
Cornell said he wasn’t in the garage for most of Jones’s briefing to the APD regarding the
takedown. He told T&M that McDade was the incident commander for the operation.
Cornell told T&M that the plan was for Jones to make an announcement that APD was
taking down the encampment, allow a certain amount of time for the individuals to pack up and

29
This unit works out of the Crime Analysis Center. The Center is a multi-jurisdictional task force that among other
responsibilities gathers intelligence for the Capital Region.

28
leave, then go in and move the group. Afterwards, DGS would remove the property left behind
in the encampment. Cornell told T&M that his role was to oversee the arrest teams if any of the
protesters were arrested. Cornell said that some of the protesters started to fortify the site. He
said some individuals were cooperative and others were not. Those were the individuals who
were arrested.
T&M asked Cornell how many individuals were arrested, but he wasn’t sure since he
believed some may have been arrested for other incidents. He was not sure what they were
arrested for but knew that some were for riot arrests. He told T&M that he was aware that not
all individuals arrested would have to be booked and arraigned. He told T&M that based on the
individual’s record and charges they could receive a Desk Appearance Ticket (“DAT”).30 T&M
asked Cornell if a family member wanted to know the status of an arrestee was there a procedure
in place to provide that information and he said they were directed to the county jail. T&M asked
Cornell if he specifically remembered a mother asking him how to find her daughter who was
arrested. He said he didn’t recall but T&M pointed out that on his BWC about five hours after the
takedown near the station he was observed having that conversation with a mother and he
directed the mother to the county jail. T&M pointed out that his BWC does not show him calling
anyone or looking at his phone or documents to ascertain the whereabouts of the arrestee. He
agreed he didn’t inquire with anyone before he provided that information. Cornell agreed his
role was to oversee the arrest processing for the takedown.31
Cornell told T&M he did not observe any member of the APD wearing masks with the
“Blue Lives Matter” logo. He told T&M that if he did, he didn’t think there was anything wrong
about that. He told T&M that he did not see any officers wearing black and gold masks.
Cornell told T&M that the full OPS report was distributed to him, but he only read the
portions that pertained to him.
Cornell conferred with Albany County District Attorney David Soares (“Soares”) about
appropriate charges for those who used a megaphone or high beam light to distract officers. He
told T&M that Soares was supportive of the idea but in the end no protesters were charged.

4. Complainant #1

Complainant #1 (“Complainant #1”) was interviewed via Zoom on May 31, 2023. Complainant
#1 told T&M that she is on leave from her position as the Assistant Director at the Center for Law

30
If an individual receives a DAT, they are released from the police station and provided with a date to appear in
court.
31
T&M confirmed that the mother was Teresa Sangare, and that her daughter, Samira Sangare, was arrested for
Disorderly Conduct and received a DAT at the police station.

29
and Justice.32 Complainant #1 was present at the protest march on April 14, 2021. Complainant
#1 said that the march ended at the APD South Station. She said that at the end of the march
there were about twenty (20) protesters remaining. The protesters were met by APD officers
standing on the entrance ramp to the station.
Complainant #1 told T&M that some of the protesters were writing with chalk on the
ground in front of the station, others were on the opposite side of the ramp yelling racial remarks
to the Black officers. Complainant #1 said that some of the protesters were calling them “coons.”
Complainant #1 said things did not get contentious until the officers told the protesters to leave.
Complainant #1 told T&M that some officers had taken off their badges which could be used to
identify them. Complainant #1 saw a young woman using a megaphone. Complainant #1 said
that an officer hit the woman in the face with the megaphone. Complainant #1 said a person that
she did not know threw a rock and broke a window at the station. The officers pepper sprayed
the protesters and they dispersed.
Complainant #1 said members of Black Lives Matter Saratoga were upset and they went
back to the station. They sat outside of the station with folding chairs and made a fire in a metal
bin to keep warm. Complainant #1 told T&M that the number of protesters outside the station
grew. People from the community donated food and tents. Complainant #1 said that Person #1
was acting as a liaison between the protesters and Hawkins. Complainant #1 said the City Mission
(“Mission”) was near the encampment and the Reverend who oversaw the Mission was not
happy about the encampment. He complained that the encampment was blocking access to the
Mission, which Complainant #1 said was not true. Complainant #1 told T&M that APD put fences
around the station. Complainant #1 said that she heard both Hawkins and Sheehan on television
say that the protesters could stay.
. Complainant #1 told T&M that she got a call on April 22, 2021, that APD stormed the
encampment. Complainant #1 told T&M that she got there around 3:30 - 4:00 p.m. and saw that
APD officers were not wearing name tags or badges. Complainant #1 said officers were using their
batons and hitting both protesters and tents. Complainant #1 told T&M that APD officers had
face masks which said “Blue Lives Matter “and had blue lines on their protective shields. She said
she saw a Proud Boy mask. Complainant #1 said Hawkins was in contact with Person #1 and
could have arranged for a peaceful removal of the encampment.

32
According to its website, the mission of the Center for Law and Justice is “to reform the criminal justice system
and dismantle its oppressive elements.” See https://cflj.org.

30
 5. Complainant #2

T&M interviewed Complainant #2 (“Complainant #2”) via Zoom on June 5, 2023.

Complainant #2 said she was born and raised in Queens, New York. She worked in advertising in
the past at Facebook and NBC. Complainant #2 told T&M that she moved to Saratoga, New York
during Covid. She became active in the Black Lives Matter movement after the Darryl Mount Jr.
case.33 Complainant #2 said she worked with Person #2 (“Person #2”)34 to assist with media and
press releases. Complainant #2 told T&M she released information about Anderson’s prior
lawsuits on Twitter. She said she only released public information and did not post his address or
make any threats. Complainant #2 said that there were allegations that Anderson abused Black
men and did improper strip searches.
Complainant #2 said that she was at the encampment on April 22, 2021, and witnessed
the APD in riot gear. Complainant #2 said that most of the officers had their name tags and badges
covered or removed. Complainant #2 told T&M that the officers were wearing facial masks that
said, “Blue Lives Matter” and had blue lines on their shields. Complainant #2 told T&M that she
saw officers with the “Punisher logo” on their masks. She said that this was the logo of a white
supremacist group.

6. Complainant #3

T&M interviewed Complainant #3 (“Complainant #3”) via Zoom on July 1, 2023.

Complainant #3 told T&M she and her husband are teachers and live in Clifton Park, New York.
Complainant #3 lives with her husband and two children, daughter Witness #1 (“Witness #1”)
and her son. Complainant #3 said that her daughter Witness #1and her son were members of
Black Lives Matter Saratoga. She said her son was away at college and her daughter was at South
Station on April 14, 2021, and was at the encampment from the beginning until April 22, 2021.
Complainant #3 said that her daughter stayed at the encampment throughout the sit-in.
Complainant #3 said that she and her husband would go there after work and bring food or other
items. Complainant #3 said that while it was uncomfortable being across from a police station,
the general atmosphere was relaxed. The protesters would play music, and community members
donated food and clothing. She told T&M that the Mission was across the street. She said it was
a Christian organization and the Reverend refused to help homeless people who were not

33
On August 31, 2013, Mount was pursued by the Saratoga police and found in an alley with multiple injuries that
left him disabled. Mount died from his injuries in 2014. The officers said Mount died from falling from a scaffold,
while his family said he was beaten by the police. The officers were cleared of misconduct by a civil jury on October
17, 2023.
34
Complainant #2 said she was one of the founders of Black Lives Matter Saratoga.

31
Christian and refused to help LGBQT+ individuals. Complainant #3 said the protestors gave them
leftover food and clothing.
Complainant #3 said that she was at the encampment on April 20, 2021, because it was
her daughter and Complainant #4’s birthdays. She said it was also the same day that Derek
Chauvin was convicted for the murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Complainant
#3 said those at the encampment were pleased that justice was served. Complainant #3 said
while some of the protesters wanted Anderson fired, she knew that her daughter felt that was
unrealistic. Complainant #3 said that Witness #1 was looking for some dialogue with APD to
discuss what happened at South Station on April 14, 2021.
Complainant #3 told T&M that she got a call from her daughter on April 22, 2021. She said
that Witness #1said “Mom they are coming to arrest us, they are in riot gear.” Complainant #3
told T&M she learned that the APD came and said that the protestors had fifteen (15) minutes to
pack up their belongings or be arrested. Complainant #3 said she drove to the encampment as
quickly as she could. Complainant #3 said that when she got to the encampment, she was told
by another protester that her daughter was arrested and dragged away by her legs. Complainant
#3 told T&M that she was trying to find out where her daughter was being held. She said that she
asked multiple officers to help her find her daughter, but no one would help. Complainant #3 said
that none of the officers were wearing name tags or badges. Complainant #3 told T&M that she
was able to get a number for Central Booking, but no one was answering the phone. That evening
she approached an officer35 and asked for help finding her daughter. The officer told her to go to
the jail because that was where all the arrestees would be released from. Complainant #3 went
to the jail only to learn later that her daughter Witness #1 was released from South Station with
a DAT. Complainant #3 told T&M that she thought the officers were being purposely difficult.
Complainant #3 told T&M that when her daughter was arrested the APD officers lost her
cell phone. Complainant #3 said the officer kept telling her daughter that the phone was kept for
safekeeping but when they came to the station the next day to pick it up, it could not be found.
Complainant #3 said that all her daughter’s personal belongings were at the encampment when
she was arrested. She told T&M that DGS told them they could come to a warehouse to retrieve
her belongings, but when they got there it was just a big pile of garbage.

35
T&M reviewed then Sergeant Christopher Cornell’s body-worn camera footage for April 22 and 23, 2021. At
approximately 0023 hours (12:23 a.m.) he was approached by a female (later determined to be Complainant #3)
who tells him that her daughter was arrested and asks if he knows where she is. Cornell tells her she is going to
Albany County jail and will be arraigned and that she will not be released from South Station. He tells her that the
arrestee is not hurt, is being watched by two female officers and will be transported in an hour or so. He directs her
to wait outside of Albany County jail. Cornell never asked her for her name, or the arrestee’s name, nor does he
inquire with anyone else about the arrestee’s status.

32
 Complainant #3 told T&M that after she filed her CPRB complaint she received a call from
an APD detective. She said that she told him about the issue with Witness #1’s phone and he
became “extremely abusive,” saying something like “if Witness #1 wasn’t resisting arrest maybe
she would still have her phone.”36 Complainant #3 told T&M that she thinks that the actions of
APD keep citizens from filing complaints.

7. Witness #1

(“Witness #1”) was interviewed by T&M via Zoom on June 16, 2023. Witness #1 told T&M
she graduated from college and has been working as a substitute teacher at the same school
where her parents are teachers. Witness #1 was living in Clifton Park, New York, at this time.
Witness #1 is a founding member of Black Lives Matter Saratoga. Witness #1 is familiar with
Complainant #4 and Person #2 from Black Lives Matter Saratoga.
Witness #1 told T&M that she was at the protest march on April 14, 2021. Sangare told
T&M that Black Lives Matter Saratoga did not sponsor this march, but they joined in support. She
said the march started at Townsend Park and ended at South Station. She said she joined
somewhere in the middle of the route. Witness #1 said that when the group got to South Station
it was like a big party. People were playing music and lighting up joints. Witness #1 said marijuana
had just become legal in New York. Witness #1 told T&M that they were minding their own
business when APD officers came out and stood in front of the station. Witness #1 said this
escalated the situation.
Witness #1 said the officers went back inside and a male who was not known to any of
the protestors started kicking the door to the station. Witness #1 said that there was a ramp in
front of the station with a railing. She said some protesters were on the ramp in front of the
railing and others were standing on the concrete behind the railing. She told T&M she was on the
railing and Complainant #4 was behind the railing chanting on the megaphone. Witness #1 said
that the officers came back out and Anderson grabbed the megaphone from Complainant #4 and
pushed it into her face busting her lip and chipping her tooth. Witness #1 told T&M she didn’t
see what happened between Complainant #4 and Anderson, but that she saw Complainant #4
later that night and observed that Complainant #4 had a laceration on her lip and a chipped tooth.
Witness #1 told T&M she saw an officer remove his name tag and other officers had their name
tags and badges either covered or removed. She told T&M that the officers started spraying the
protesters with OC Spray. She added they were not warned before the officers began to spray
the group.

36
The OPS report has similar language, where Witness #1’s actions are blamed for the loss of her phone, not the
failure of APD to retrieve and secure it.

33
 Witness #1 said after the incident at South Station the protesters got together and
decided they were going to sit in front of the station until some of their demands were met. She
said that she thought some of the demands were unrealistic but one she remembered was that
the protesters wanted to know about Anderson’s prior disciplinary history. She said that on their
own they learned Anderson had some serious complaints against him. Witness #1 thinks some
members posted about his lawsuits, but no one posted his address or made online threats to him
or his family.
Witness #1 said she knows Person #1. Witness #1 said that Person #1 took it upon herself
to function as a liaison between the protestors and Hawkins. She said Person #1 rented an Airbnb
which the protestors used to shower or go to the bathroom. Witness #1 told T&M that in the
morning of April 22, 2021, Person #1 told the protesters that Hawkins was going to send his
officers to take down the encampment. Witness #1 said she went to the Department of Motor
Vehicles (“DMV”) to see if there were any extra officers. She told T&M that she thought if the
takedown was happening there would be extra officers in that location. When she didn’t see any
activity, she called Person #2 to tell him she didn’t think it was happening.
Witness #1 said that on April 22, 2021, there were about thirteen (13) protestors at the
location. She added that there were no leaders at the site, nor did they have a plan in place if
APD decided to take down the encampment. She told T&M some people, upon learning that APD
may take down the camp, started doing some “stupid stuff” like moving the dumpsters.
Witness #1 told T&M that an APD officer approached the encampment with a megaphone
and said, “you have fifteen (15) minutes to gather your stuff and leave or you will be arrested.”
She said that the person never spoke with anyone individually in the group nor did he offer an
alternate place to move their belongings. Witness #1 said it was unrealistic to take down the
tents and move everything within 15 minutes, so she got a gas mask from her tent and waited to
be arrested. She told T&M that within a couple of minutes APD officers in riot gear appeared at
the camp. She had her phone and started livestreaming on Instagram.37 She told T&M she was
standing peacefully and was shoved down to the ground. She said the officers dragged her by her
legs about ten (10) feet. She told T&M she was screaming “don’t hurt me.”
Witness #1 said she was arrested for Disorderly Conduct. She was brought into a room to
be processed but added she was not fingerprinted. She said after about four (4) or five (5) hours
she was released with a DAT. While in custody she kept asking for her phone and APD provided
her with inconsistent answers. She told T&M she was told she could get it later, then told a
homeless person probably has it. She told T&M it fell out of her hands while she was live

37
The Instagram livestream shows officers approaching Witness #1in a line wearing riot gear, a person purported to
be Witness #1 is yelling into a megaphone “I will not move.” The officers form a line and yell “move,” “move.” Then
the person purported to be Witness #1 is pushed to the ground, and it sounds as though she is being hit and she
screams “do not hurt me.”

34
streaming and she never got it back. Witness #1 said she had personal property in her tent,
including her wallet with her identification and five hundred (500) dollars. She said she received
an email that DGS had her property but when she went there to get it, all that was there was a
pile of trash.
Witness #1 added that the takedown was very disorganized, “kind of a free for all.” She
said she cannot identify who knocked her to the ground because the officers’ badges and/or
name tags were covered.

8. Complainant #4

Complainant #4 (“Complainant #4”) was interviewed by T&M via Zoom on July 5, 2023.
Complainant #4 told T&M that in April 2021 she lived in Ballston Spa, New York. Complainant #4
said she is affiliated with Black Lives Matter Saratoga.
Complainant #4 said that on April 14, 2021, she joined a protest march that started at
Townsend Park and ended at South Station. Complainant #4 told T&M that Anderson was waiting
for them outside the station. She said he was joined by fifteen (15) uniformed officers. She said
the cops went back inside.
Complainant #4 said that the protestors were listening to music and smoking cannabis.
Some of the protesters were leaning against the ramp outside the station. Complainant #4 told
T&M the cops came back out and were laughing at the protesters. She thought they were doing
this to make the protesters uncomfortable. Complainant #4 said that the officers went back into
the station and locked the doors. Complainant #4 told T&M a person who was not part of the
group jumped over the ramp and slammed into the door. She said this person may have been a
plant. Complainant #4 told T&M that the cops started spraying everyone, she thinks Witness #2
may have been sprayed. She told T&M that one of the protestors had a camera with a bright
light. She thought his name was Brandon or Bambino. Complainant #4 said that she was saying
things to APD Officer Marcus Felten because as a Black officer she takes issue with his actions.
She told T&M she was using a megaphone, and that it was pointed at the officers. She said she
was yelling “people over property.” She said Anderson grabbed the megaphone and pushed it
into her face, causing her to fall backward off the ramp. Complainant #4 said that she received a
busted lip and she needed to have her teeth shaved.38

38
Complainant #4 provided dental and medical records which indicated that she had injury to her mouth and teeth.
She went to see a doctor on April 16, 2021, and a dentist on April 22, 2021. The doctor’s notes indicated she
presented a complaint of a facial injury two days prior caused by a megaphone pushed into her face. She developed
epistaxis (nosebleed), a chipped tooth, and pain to mouth. The doctor made no acute findings and advised her that
it might be temporary. The primary impression was facial contusion. The doctor advised her to use ice, Tylenol, or
Ibuprofen. Dentist’s notes talk of tooth sensitivity. The initial exam includes “smoothed edge #10.” In her interview,
Complainant #4 mentioned her front teeth were “shaved.” The records show her continuing to experience pain until
September 16, 2022.

35
 Complainant #4 told T&M that she was part of the group that participated in the sit-in at
the encampment. She said after the attack by Anderson everyone was very angry and wanted
him to face some repercussions for his actions. She told T&M that the encampment grew over
time, with the community providing food and clothes.
Complainant #4 told T&M that she was not at the encampment on April 22, 2021, because
she was at the dentist dealing with issues involving her mouth and teeth caused by Anderson.
She said that Person #1 got word that they were taking down the encampment. She got there
about ten (10) minutes after and observed the cops taking tents and throwing them into the fire.
She said when the cops got to her tent they were laughing because they knew it was hers.
Complainant #4 told T&M they grabbed the heaters and threw them into the trash. She said her
brother was wrongfully arrested. Complainant #4 told T&M the whole experience from being
attacked at South Station to the takedown and arrest of her brother was very traumatizing. She
said for six (6) months she found it hard to leave the house.

9. Witness #2

Witness #2 was interviewed by T&M on June 16, 2023, via Zoom.39 Witness #2(“Witness
#2”) said that in April 2021, he was part of a group called “All of Us.” He said that group split up,
some are now part of Black Lives Matter Saratoga and others are part of his group Black
Abolitionist Directive. He said that he now lives in Albany, New York, but in 2021 he lived in
Schenectady, New York. He told T&M that he is a transgender man and uses he/him pronouns.
Witness #2 told T&M that there was a march on April 14, 2021, in Albany. He said his
group was not the organizer but joined in solidarity to protest the killing of Daunte Wright in
police custody. The march ended at South Station and as they were getting ready to go home,
five (5) to six (6) police officers and one (1) “white shirt” came out and started to antagonize the
crowd. Witness #2 said he can’t remember verbatim what they were saying, but it was something
like “back up and move along.” Witness #2 told T&M that what the officers were saying wasn’t
necessary because they were already leaving. He told T&M that some protesters were on the
wheelchair ramp leading to South Station on Arch Street. Some were on the ramp in front of the
railing and others were on the ledge behind the railing. They were making speeches and wrapping
things up, but the officers were very aggressive, ordering them to go home. The officers went
back inside the building.
Witness #2 told T&M while the officers were inside the building, a person in black who
was unfamiliar and not a member of the group started kicking the door and window and broke
the window. The officers came back outside, this time with bear spray and batons. Witness #2
stated that Complainant #4 was on the megaphone yelling “people over property,” meaning they

39
Witness #2 did not turn his camera on for the interview.

36
didn’t need to be so aggressive. He said a “white shirt,” who he later learned was Anderson,
pushed the megaphone towards Complainant #4’s face and pushed her backward off the ramp.
He said after that “all hell broke loose.” The cops started hitting the protesters and spraying them
with bear spray. He said Felten punched him in the face, and he was sprayed with mace two times
by another officer. Witness #2 told T&M that he was not doing anything wrong when he was
punched and sprayed, but after viewing multiple officers’ BWCs from April 14, 2021, at South
Station, a person believed to be Witness #2 is seen refusing to leave the ramp and heard telling
the officers to make him leave. Witness #2 told T&M that the first time the officers were outside
the station they had name tags, but when they came out the second time, they removed them.
Witness #2 said his partner was sprayed, and that they have epilepsy and asthma, and he was
afraid they might have a seizure.
Witness #2 said he left to shower and removed the spray. He said a bunch of people got
together about an hour later to discuss the next steps. He said someone had the idea of occupying
the space and everyone agreed. They brought out chairs and someone brought a fire pit, and
they stayed the night. Witness #2 told T&M that over time, the community donated food and
clothes.
Witness #2 told T&M that neither Anderson nor his family were ever threatened on social
media. He said that some group members posted Anderson’s disciplinary history but that was it.
Witness #2 told T&M that Person #1 functioned as a liaison between the protestors and
Hawkins. Witness #2 said that Person #1 told them Hawkins was not going to do anything as long
as it remains peaceful. They did not have any contact with the APD, he said the Fire Department
came once to check the height of the fire and told them: “As long as it doesn’t get higher than
five (5) feet you are okay.”
Witness #2 told T&M that he was at the encampment on April 22, 2021. He was doing an
interview with a news outlet, and he was asked if the police were coming to break down the
encampment. He told T&M he said something along the lines of, “If Kathy does that, she will have
a big lawsuit,” referring to the Mayor Kathy Sheehan.
Witness #2 said soon after an APD officer in a white shirt with a megaphone told the group
that they had fifteen (15) minutes to take down the encampment or be arrested. Witness #2 told
T&M it was difficult to hear what the officer was saying, and it was impossible to vacate in fifteen
(15) minutes, since there were a lot of tents and property and only a few protestors at the site.
Witness #2 told T&M they all said to each other, “Okay we are getting arrested.”
Witness #2 said that after a few minutes, APD officers came to the site and started tearing
things apart. He said he stood at the edge, put his hands in the air, and said, “I am not armed,
please do not gas me.” He said the officers pulled him down to the ground, removed his glasses
and brought him into the bay area where they had brought the others who were arrested.

37
 Witness #2 said that he told the male APD officer that he has asthma and was having
difficulty breathing. He said he told them he was a trans man and was wearing a binder, which
was making his breathing worse. He told APD he wanted a female officer to search him, not a
male officer. He said that after some time a female APD officer came, lifted his shirt, and cut off
the binder in front of everyone. He asked if he could do it himself, but he was told no.
Witness #2 said he was taken to the hospital by ambulance but after waiting in the ER he
was able to get his breathing under control and told the officers he didn’t want to wait anymore.
Witness #2 was taken to Schenectady because he had an open arrest warrant for writing in chalk
on a police station. He said both cases were Adjournments in Contemplation of Dismissal.
Witness #2 told T&M he never got his glasses or personal belongings back.
Witness #2 told T&M that after the April 14, 2021, incident, he and approximately fifty
(50) others wrote out complaints about what happened. He does not remember where the forms
came from. He said that he and others tried to drop the complaints off at the station but were
told they were banned from coming in.
Witness #2 said that they gave the complaints to an ally to bring them into the station.
Witness #2 told T&M he doesn’t remember the name of the person who brought them inside.
On April 23, 2021, the group wrote new complaints and followed the same process. He said he
was never contacted by APD or the CPRB.40
Witness #2 told T&M that on April 22, 2021, the APD officers had covered both their
names and badge numbers. He said when they would ask the officer what their name was, they
did not answer. Witness #2 told T&M that the APD officers were wearing face masks that said
“Blue Lives Matter” or had “Proud Boys” emblems on them. He told T&M that when he was in
police custody, the officers kept “misgendering him and using his dead name.”41

10. Witness #3

Witness #3 (“Witness #3”) with T&M on October 14, 2023, via telephone. Witness #3 told
T&M that when he went to a protest he would function as security. Witness #3 said he was at
the protest on April 14, 2021, and that the protesters were shot with rubber bullets42 and sprayed
with bear mace. Witness #3 told T&M that he was at the encampment after the incident on April
14. He said he brought his own tent and chairs. He said he was at the encampment takedown on
April 22, 2021, and provided T&M with some photos and YouTube videos. Witness #3 told T&M
that the police came out of nowhere and were wearing SWAT gear. Witness #3 said the officers

40
T&M could not corroborate if these complaints were ever received by APD, as they told T&M they had no record
of these complaints.
41
A “dead name” is a former name (often assigned at birth) of a transgender, non-binary, or gender non-conforming
individual who has changed their name to align with their gender identity. Using an individual’s “dead name” when
their current name is known is a form of misgendering.
42
T&M was unable to corroborate this claim made by Witness #3.

38
pushed the protesters. He said after the takedown he went to get his stuff from DGS, and it was
all rotted food. There were no tents or personal property at the warehouse. He told T&M he
thinks his phone was hacked and his Facebook account was taken down. He doesn’t know who
did that but thinks it has to do with him being involved with the protests.

Lieutenants Anderson and Jones failed to comply with lawful subpoenas and did not
appear for scheduled interviews with T&M on behalf of the CPRB.43 Therefore, the sections of
this report regarding Anderson and Jones are based on the statements provided to OPS for
their report and T&M’s review of BWCs, station cameras and social media video.

11. Lieutenant Devin Anderson (OPS Interview)

Anderson was interviewed on July 1, 2021, by OPS regarding the incident at South Station
on April 14, 2021. Anderson told OPS that on that date, he was the patrol lieutenant in charge of
Division Two (2). Anderson stated that APD officers and he were outside, in front of South Station,
when the protesters arrived. He indicated in hindsight that he would not take that approach
again. He stated that there were multiple people with megaphones and bright lights that were
shining in everybody’s faces. Anderson claimed they were trying to “bait” the officers and were
using racial slurs. Anderson then decided they should go back in the building and then used
handcuffs to secure and lock the interior door.
At that point, Anderson stated that the protesters were in the foyer, blowing cannabis
smoke in the lobby, and screaming and yelling on megaphones. Anderson said that they also
kicked and rattled the doors. The officers were able to secure the exterior door and then secured
and locked it. Anderson said that the crowd grew hostile, kicking the door, trying to force their
way in and a window was broken.
Anderson then stated that intelligence from Cornell and an FBI informant was that there
could be Molotov cocktails used to set the building on fire and one (1) of the individuals outside
could be armed.44
Anderson stated that protesters were standing on the wheelchair ramp in front of the
station, some were directly on the ramp and some behind the railing. Anderson said that he
decided to clear the ramp. He stated he told the officers they would go out but to not wear
helmets, nor riot gear. He stated he didn’t want to instigate them.

43
The CPRB is in the process of litigating the refusal of multiple police officers and a sergeant to appear in response
to subpoenas ad testificandum lawfully issued and served by the CPRB with the APD and APBA and APSA on another
investigation.
44
Cornell told T&M he doesn’t remember receiving and/or relaying any information that someone was planning on
firebombing South Station.

39
 Anderson told OPS the APD pushed and cleared the ramp. Anderson said one large
gentleman refused to move. He also stated that people were throwing rocks and bottles and
swatting at officers. He stated it was a very violent encounter. It only lasted a couple of minutes,
but they successfully pushed everyone back. After a couple of minutes, things calmed down, and
ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes later the officers were back in the building.
Anderson was asked about his use of force, and he said: “I didn’t use any force.” He said
he successfully grabbed a megaphone used to distract the officers. He claimed that the only force
he saw was pushing people and Sgt. D45 used the “Fogger.”46 When asked if the “Fogger” use was
successful he stated that the protesters were prepared for it with goggles and masks.
Anderson claimed he thought the protesters’ intentions were to elicit a response from
APD. Anderson said he thought that they didn’t get the response at first and they escalated and
“forced our hand.” Anderson stated: “We had to clear them off the ramp for officer safety and
building safety issues.” Anderson stated that Officer Felten47 was subjected to name calling like
ni**er, cracker, and Uncle Tom, but he never over-reacted.
Anderson described the lights that were shined in the officers’ faces as blinding, like a
highlight in high beam. Anderson further stated that he was looking to de-escalate the situation
as much as possible by using minimum force. He stated he was not looking to be on national
news. He told OPS the protesters were there to elicit a response and he was not going to have
APD give them that response. Anderson stated that after Tony48 gave them “a couple of spritzes
with the Fogger,” he told him to stop.
Anderson also stated that there were six (6) or seven (7) APD officers on the ramp and
probably fifty (50) protesters.49 Anderson added that he sent civilian employees of South Station
home.
Regarding use of force, Anderson stated it was the absolute minimum necessary to
control the situation. He told OPS it was within APD Standard Operating Procedures.
Anderson was asked about “doxing” and claimed he was told about it but never personally
saw anything. He told OPS he didn’t work on April 22, 2021.

12. Review of Lt. Devin Anderson’s Body-Worn Camera Footage from April 14, 2021

45
The investigation indicates that Sgt. D is Sergeant Anthony DiGiuseppe, who was on the scene at South Station on
April 14, 2021.
46
The term “fogger” refers to a canister of pepper spray that creates a pepper ‘fog’ when discharged.
47
The investigation indicates that Officer Felten is Marcus Felten, an African-American APD Officer, who was on the
scene at South Station on April 14, 2021.
48
The investigation indicates that this is a reference to Sergeant Anthony DiGiuseppe.
49
T&M viewed Anderson’s BWC footage and it appears that there were approximately eight (8) protesters on both
sides of the ramp.

40
 Throughout the encounter, body-worn camera footage shows that Anderson was advising
the APD officers to show restraint and to try not to escalate the situation. However, once a
window was broken and officers had forcibly cleared the ramp, he directed the officers to use a
significant amount of OC Spray, and he injured a woman using a megaphone.
On the BWC, Anderson is observed grabbing a megaphone from a woman later learned
to be Complainant #4, pushing it into her face and pushing her backwards. It appears from the
BWC that Anderson throws the megaphone behind him. No one was arrested at the scene.
Anderson told OPS he was confronted with angry protesters who were loud and active.
He took initial steps to de-escalate the situation such as removing APD officers from the ramp
and placing handcuffs to securely lock the interior front door. He said to the other officers “We
should not have been out there. Let them scream and yell.”
As the incident progressed, he would add potential actions to be taken. “If they keep that
up, we’re clearing the steps. They are not breaking in. That’s fine.” “Everyone just wants to hold
it down. It’s painful to walk away but…”
When a window was broken, he decided to act. “We’re taking it outside. I can’t deal with
that.” He told the officers to use “Foggers – don’t use shields, not yet. Have shields ready. If we
need to get it, we can come back and get it.” His words would contradict his actions and vice
versa.
Despite putting his officers on the ramp with OC Spray and directing them to clear the ramp,
he is heard saying “We’re not going to escalate this.” Later, inside the station, when giving a
recap, he stated: “I think we’re good now. We pepper-sprayed the shit out of them.”

13. Lieutenant Josiah Jones (OPS Interview)

Jones was interviewed by OPS on May 11, 2021, regarding the takedown of the
encampment on April 22, 2021. Jones told OPS that he believed Deputy Chief Hogan was the
incident commander. He said that Commanders McDade and Gipson were there too. Jones told
OPD he was the operational level commander below McDade. He said he was tasked to put
together a quick verbal Operational Order and design for logistics and execution of the tasks that
day. He told OPS he was not sure if there was a written Operational Order.
Jones told OPS he held a briefing in the detective garage. He gave directives regarding the
logistics of the operation, reminding the officers to operate on a secure channel, to activate their
BWCs before they left the garage and overall directions on how to execute the operation. Jones
told OPS he informed the officers that they could remove their name tags, not their badges. He
then opined to OPS on how his direction could have been misconstrued, stating “I did not say
‘you can remove your name tags but not your badges,’ and some officers’ vests have a Velcro
patch where the name tag and badge are combined. This may have been confusing to the officers
since this was the first time we did something like this on a formal level.”

41
 He told OPS his plan was to attempt to contact an organizer or group leader. He said that
he had spoken with one of the organizers and a friendly woman a week earlier when they had
redesigned the street barricades and was hoping for a similar receptive response. He went out
to try and develop a quick dialogue, but it was not received well. Since he was unable to speak
with any of the protesters, he got into the bullhorn and told them they had fifteen (15) minutes
to disperse because this was being declared an unlawful assembly. Jones told OPS that the
protesters got on a bullhorn and started yelling insults. He said the protesters’ response was to
barricade themselves with dumpsters, start open fires in the street, and arm themselves with
rocks being stuffed into their vests. He told OPS that he was receiving information from Detective
Sergeant Zimmer who was monitoring the encampment. Jones told OPS he called a “fraggo” (a
fragmented order, adjusting on the fly to unforeseen circumstances) with the acquiescence of
McDade, and maybe Hogan and/or Hawkins.
Jones told OPS that he had heard Anderson was “doxed,” but he did not have any direct
knowledge of it. Jones cannot remember if he saw a written Operations Order but had on his
phone what he read to the officers in the garage. He then read to OPS what was on his phone.
Jones described the back-up plan if the protesters failed to disperse which accounted for three
(3) teams of officers, a primary force with the arrest team behind and a tactical team behind
them if the protesters started throwing rocks or other violent actions. Jones told OPS once the
protesters were moved from the location, DGS was to come to the location to clear debris,
sanitize, and erect barriers.
OPS Commander Battuello asked Jones, “if McDade was present shouldn’t he have
participated in some? (sic).” Battuello then told Jones, “If I was present in that room and heard
your briefing of what the expectations were of me to participate in the action especially that I am
not allowed to cover my badge but I am allowed to take off my name tag if I choose, do you still
think that it is a possibility to misconstrue the two? Do you think it was a miscommunication”?
Jones told Battuello, “100%, I don’t feel it was malicious at all or people were intentionally
overstepping, I think that this is the first time we’ve done this and the way the badges are set up
on the uniform it is one continuous patch, so it is confusing.”

14. Review of Jones’s actions on April 22, 2021, at the South Station encampment

Jones was not equipped with a body-worn camera although he was required to have one.
Jones was assigned Police Officer Michael Adams (“Adams”) to assist him that day, and Adams
does have a BWC. It is noted that although Adams was Jones’s assistant that day, Adams, and
Jones are not with each other the entire time, and some conversations or orders Jones gave are
either not recorded or are inaudible. Had Jones worn his own BWC, these would be available for
review.

42
 At about 1514 hours (3:14 p.m.), Jones leaves the garage, which is on the side of the
station house on Clinton Street and walks out with Adams and a Sergeant to the protest area
which is on Arch Street. There is a group of about twenty (20) people on the other side of the
barriers in the protest area, and they appear to be vocal and agitated. Jones asked the group who
is in charge of the group and asked to speak to them. Several members of the group begin
screaming at Jones that “they are all in charge.” There are also numerous people yelling and
cursing at the officers. Jones then tells them that they will have to disperse, and that they have
fifteen (15) minutes to do so. A member of the group who came the closest to Jones
(approximately twenty (20) feet away) responds to Jones, “have fun, enjoy yourself,” before
turning and returning to the group of protesters. After this encounter, Jones returns to the garage
area. No individual during this time ever approaches Jones and claims to represent the group or
engages Jones in conversation. No officer from APD is observed walking on the other side of the
barriers to where the protesters are.
At about 1522 hours (3:22 p.m.), Jones and several officers leave the garage area behind
the station house and begin walking towards the barriers which are in front of the station. People
in the crowd can be heard yelling, “here they come.” Jones then gives several orders to disperse,
and he gives the unlawful assembly regulations. He is using a bullhorn to make these
announcements. From the protesters, loud chants of “ACAB all cops are bastards” can be heard.
It takes approximately three (3) minutes for officers to get through the barriers. Some of
the metal barriers have been locked together (presumably by the APD50). In addition, there
appears to be some ropes and tarps that are also holding the barriers together. It is unclear who
added the ropes and tarps, although some of the ropes seem to be attached to tents, and that
protesters had erected these in the protest area. It can be presumed that these ropes and tarps
were added to the barriers by the protesters.
A few minutes later Adams’s BWC catches some of the dumpsters that had been in the
area being moved around in the street. Also, smoke from a street fire can be observed on the
street. At this point, no officers are viewed wearing helmets, or carrying any disorder control
equipment, such as polymer shields.
Then the officers formed a line at Jones’s direction and began walking forward. Adams is
behind this line, so the view going forward from his BWC is unclear. There are several other fires
also lit and smoke can be seen in the street.
Adams’ video does not capture any instances of misconduct nor any instances of
excessive force. Jones is heard giving the unlawful assembly instructions to disperse several times
while using a bullhorn. After the street is cleared of protesters, the officers retain their position
behind the barriers at the corner of Grand Street. Several people can be heard inquiring why

50
A review of the APD officers BWCs showed the barriers were from the APD and they were attached with white
plastic cuffs.

43
officers don’t have name tags on, and several protesters are heard cursing and insulting the
officers.
At about 1620 hours (4:20 p.m.), Jones is observed speaking with an unidentified
commander (no name tag but appears to be Gipson). The commander notices that Adams, who
is close by, has his BWC activated, and directs him to shut it off. Adams mutes the audio, but the
video continues recording. No conversations are heard for thirty-four (34) minutes until Adams
reactivates the sound. There does not appear to be any physical incident video recorded that
would require an activation of the BWC, but any conversation by supervisor officers regarding
tactics, arrest intentions, and APD policing plans regarding the protest are not captured during
this period.
While Adams is walking towards the front of the South Street Station, some of the
removal equipment is visible. DGS had an open-top dump truck, as well as a regular garbage truck
for removal of items. A trash-removing claw was observed attached to a tractor, although it was
not in use at the time.

Figure 11. A photograph of DGS removal equipment outside of South Station on April 22, 2021. 51

VII. CONCLUSION

Based on interviews conducted and materials examined during the investigation, T&M
found that the allegations that APD officers removed their name tags and/or badges on April 14,
2021, is unsubstantiated. While a few of the witnesses told us that when the officers came out a
second time, some removed their name tags and/or badges, T&M was unable to corroborate if

51
Fig. 11 image source: Patrick Dodson, Albany Police Storm South Station Protest, Dismantle Activist Camp, Albany
Proper (Apr. 23, 2021), https://www.albanyproper.com/albany-police-storm-south-station-protest-camp. T&M
found no evidence that any emergency medical equipment or personnel were on scene to treat anyone who may
have been injured during the department’s takedown operation.

44
the name tags were removed but could corroborate that some officers’ names were partially
obscured by the placement of their BWCs. They did this by placing the BWC over the part of their
uniform which contained their names.
T&M found that Anderson forcibly removed the megaphone from Complainant #4
causing injury to her face and teeth. In his OPS interview, Anderson said the megaphone was
distracting to officers without providing any other details as to why it was immediately necessary
to forcibly remove the megaphone from Complainant #4 in a manner in which the device was
pushed into her face. Moreover, there is no evidence Anderson used any de-escalation tactics
before employing physical force against Complainant #4.52 T&M corroborated that the removal
was forceful by the statements of numerous witnesses as well as the review of Anderson’s BWC.
Complainant #4 provided copies of her medical and dental records which corroborated injuries
to her mouth and teeth. The injury to Complainant #4 was also corroborated by numerous
witnesses who observed Complainant #4 with a lacerated lip immediately after having her
megaphone pushed into her mouth by Anderson. OPS closed its investigation into Complainant
#4’s force complaint as unfounded. OPS did not explain this finding in its closing report, even
though Complainant #4 had provided dental and medical records. They also failed to interview
Complainant #4 on her complaint. Since Anderson refused to be interviewed by T&M, T&M is
permitted to consider Anderson’s lack of participation as a factor when making determinations
of credibility, therefore, T&M finds the force used by Anderson towards Complainant #4 was
unjustified under Article 35 of the New York State Penal Law and not within APD guidelines on
use of force.
T&M found that APD officer(s) used OC Spray on April 14, 2021, and failed to follow APD
guidelines. General Order 1.3.00 5. a. authorizes the use of OC Spray when an individual is actively
resisting a lawful arrest. The protesters on the ramp were told if they did not move, they could
be arrested. However, no one was arrested on April 14, 2021. Accordingly, it does not appear
that OC Spray was deployed for arrest purposes. Furthermore, General Order 1.3.00 5. d.
provides that OC Spray may not be used during “[c]ivil demonstrations in which the subjects are
passively resisting.” It is questionable whether the resistance offered by some of the protesters
on April 14, 2021, amounted to more than refusal to obey orders to clear the ramp.
Notwithstanding, the issue is that once the OC Spray was used, the officers failed to follow
guidelines. General Order 1.3.00, 5.c. I. directs that the subject shall be provided with an
opportunity to wash the affected area within twenty (20) minutes of application and IV. directs

52
Persons in the City of Albany need to possess a permit to use a sound device (see Albany City Code § 255-29,
“Sound-producing devices”). Anderson never told OPS that lack of a permit justified his forcible removal of the
megaphone from Complainant #4. Additionally, Anderson never instructed Complainant #4 to stop using the
megaphone, surrender the megaphone voluntarily or to move to a location that was less distracting. Notably,
enforcement of Code § 255-29 requires that a violator “first be issued a verbal or written warning of violation” and
a request that the violator cease the conduct. See Albany City Code § 255-34(A).

45
that Officers shall summon Emergency Medical Services (“EMS”) and arrange to have the subject
transported to a local medical facility for treatment when subjects indicate that they have a pe-
existing medical condition that may be aggravated by the OC Spray. Witness #2 told T&M that
after he and his partner were sprayed, he was concerned because they both suffered from pre-
existing conditions and had difficulty breathing. Witness #2 and others had to leave the area to
be treated and were never provided with any medical attention. Additionally, the APD Officers
never checked on any of the protesters after dispersing the OC Spray, even though the protesters
remained in the area.
T&M found that on April 22, 2021, APD officers removed their name tags and/or badges.
Hawkins told T&M that Anderson and another officer were “doxed.” He didn’t remember who
told him that but thought it was a Deputy Chief or a Commander. Hawkins stated that because
of the alleged “doxing,” he decided that officers could remove their name tags but not their
badges. He said this way the officers could be identified if there was an issue afterwards. Hawkins
told T&M he relayed this decision to either a Deputy Chief or a Commander, he could not
remember who. Hawkins told T&M he did not send a communication to the officers, nor is it
included in the Operation Order for the takedown of the encampment. Hawkins told T&M that
his order was not conveyed correctly and that resulted in some officers removing their badges.
Hawkins did not believe that the officers intentionally did it.
T&M found no evidence that Anderson or any other officers were “doxed.” T&M found
no evidence that Anderson or any other officers or their families were threatened on social
media. The civilian witnesses that were interviewed by T&M all denied threatening Anderson or
his family but admitted to posting public documents regarding prior lawsuits against Anderson.
Additionally, Anderson told OPS that he did not see anything online against him or his family, he
said he was told about it by others. The APD did not investigate Anderson’s or any other officers’
allegations of “doxing” or threats, nor did the APD refer the allegations to any other law
enforcement agency. T&M finds that Hawkins’s decision to allow the officers to remove their
name tags was not based on any credible evidence.
T&M corroborated that both name tags and badges were either covered or removed by
some APD officers by viewing BWCs, station cameras, witnesses’ photos and videos, and social
media. T&M found that multiple civilians asked the officers for their names and/or badge
numbers and no officers responded, instead they simply ignored the civilians. OPS reported that
the allegations against APD officers failing to provide their names and/or badge number was
unfounded. The OPS report referenced that some officers had uniforms that had the name tag
and badges together on the same plate and that made it difficult to remove the name tag only.
APD General Order No. 3.20 issue date November 28, 2018, addresses Uniforms and Grooming
Standards, and states that APD officers shall wear their name tag over the right pocket of the

46
outermost pocket and their shield shall be worn on the left outermost pocket.53 A Uniform
Committee was established after the takedown of the encampment to address issues of
inconsistencies between the orders and actual uniforms, however T&M found that APD officers
wear a multitude of different uniforms and to date have not made any significant changes to the
APD uniform policy.
T&M found that on April 22, 2021, some of the APD officers involved in taking down the
encampment carried polymer shields that were emblazoned with the “Thin Blue Line” insignia, a
thin blue line surrounded by two black lines (see figs. 5–10). T&M did not observe APD officers
wearing face masks with “Blue Lives Matter,” “Thin Blue Line,” or “Proud Boys” logos but did
observe that a couple of officers wore neck gaiters in the colors of the “Proud Boys” or with blue
stars and flags (see figs. 8 and 12).

Figure 12. An APD officer is pictured wearing a neck gaiter in the “Proud Boys” colors while arresting a protester on
April 22, 2021.

Additionally, T&M found that a “Blue Lives Matter”/ “Thin Blue Line” flag was hanging at
South Station on April 14, 2021 (see fig. 10). T&M found that, on April 22, 2021, officers were
wearing “Blue Lives Matter” / “Thin Blue Line” paraphernalia and had a sticker on an APD-issued
vest (see figs. 5–9). T&M made these findings after speaking with multiple witnesses, viewing
officers BWCs and reviewing news and social media posts. The OPS failed to address these civilian
complaints and the report made no mention of whether the APD observed the masks or shields

53
See Exhibit 1, APD General Order 3.2.00.

47
with the “Thin Blue Line” insignia. Hawkins told T&M that it was not endorsed by the APD for
officers to wear face masks with “Blue Lives Matter” logos. Gipson and Cornell did not think it
was inappropriate for APD officers to wear “Blue Lives Matter” logos on their face masks but
acknowledged that it may not be well-received by the public. Hawkins was not aware of the thin
blue lines on the polymer shields but told T&M that they should be clear with nothing on them.
Hawkins told T&M that a “Blue Lives Matter”/ “Thin Blue Line” flag hanging in the lobby of South
Station was inappropriate and against guidelines. The investigation revealed that leaders of the
APD failed to understand that if officers are displaying “Blue Lives Matter”/ “Thin Blue Line”
insignias they are acting in a manner that can undermine the public’s trust. The purpose of
establishing uniform guidelines is so that all officers dress the same and do not endorse any
political or social messages. If it is against guidelines to display a “Blue Lives Matter”/ “Thin Blue
Line” flag within an APD facility and on APD equipment, then it is also against those same
guidelines for officers to display that imagery when conducting their official duties in APD-issued
uniform.
T&M found that the APD arrested thirteen (13) individuals on April 22, 2021, but failed to
maintain a central repository for information regarding the arrestees. T&M found that APD did
not have a predetermined arrest plan regarding what criminal charges and conditions were
eligible for DATs. Cornell was a supervisor overseeing the arrest team and when asked simple
questions by Complainant #3 he provided inaccurate information by telling Complainant #3 that
her daughter was being arraigned and she should wait outside the courthouse. While T&M could
not confirm that Cornell was purposefully providing wrong information to “terrorize” families as
Complainant #3 alleged, Cornell could have called the desk to find out Witness #1’s location. T&M
found that, since he oversaw arrest processing, he should have been aware that some arrestees
would be eligible for DATs. The OPS report exonerated the allegation that the APD improperly
handled Complainant #3’s request for information regarding her daughter. The OPS report
references that it was a chaotic time, but that Complainant #3 was told after calling South Station
desk that her daughter would most likely receive a DAT. There is no indication in the OPS report
of how this information was gathered.
T&M found that the APD failed to secure Witness #1’s personal property, namely her
phone. Both Complainant #3 and Witness #1told T&M that they received conflicting information
regarding the location of Witness #1’s phone. They were told it was being held at the station,
which was not true. While OPS sustained this allegation that Witness #1’s phone was not secured,
the report added “In such a chaotic situation officers (sic) are not thinking about property in the
heat of the moment. If the CO’s daughter had followed lawful orders she would’ve been at Grand
Street, with her cell phone.” Blaming the complainant for the officer’s failure to follow
procedures corroborates Complainant #3’s allegation that the investigating detective was rude
and confrontational when speaking with her. It further illustrates her claim that the APD’s

48
behavior limits civilians from trusting the process and will encourage them to not report
misconduct.
T&M did not sustain Complainant #3’s allegation that the officers used excessive force in
the arrest of her daughter, Witness #1. After reviewing officers’ body-worn camera footage and
Witness #1’s livestream on Instagram. Witness #1 can be heard saying repeatedly “I am not
moving,” therefore T&M found that the minimal force used to arrest Witness #1 was within
guidelines. While there is no evidence that Witness #1 resisted arrest, she did not cooperate.
T&M Witness #1 reviewed officers’ BWCs and observed some officers using their batons and
hitting arrestees that were on the ground. However, T&M, without the ability to interview APD
officers, could not evaluate whether their actions were justified or within APD guidelines.
In addition to investigating the four (4) civilian complaints, T&M found other misconduct,
namely, that the APD failed to follow its own internal operation order, failed to gather sufficient
intelligence to plan for the takedown of the encampment, failed to ensure that the lead
Lieutenant had activated his body-worn camera, failed to develop a plan for the breakdown of
the encampment, including a plan to safeguard protesters’ personal property, failed to do a
thorough and timely investigation and failed to do a post-operative review.
Operational Order 21-01 directed the on-duty supervisor to contact the people in charge
(abbreviated in the order as “POC”) of the protest and inform them that the street was to be
cleared for sanitation and health concerns. The supervisor was to inform the people in charge
that the APD intended to re-open a protest area after sanitation operations by DGS. After that
notification, the supervisor was to make an announcement that the protestors should
disassemble the area and vacate. The supervisor should give them sufficient time to disassemble
the area and vacate.
The supervisor in charge was Lieutenant Jones. He did attempt to identify the people in
charge and try to speak with any individual protestor, but he reported that protesters did not
cooperate. Hawkins had been in contact with Person #1, but Lieutenant Jones was not made
aware that he should speak with her or someone in charge. Just sending Lieutenant Jones out
there with no knowledge about who to speak with was a recipe for failure. At the time Lieutenant
Jones approached the group there were approximately thirteen (13) people at the site. The pre-
plan discussed by Jones with other supervisors and officers was to give the protesters fifteen (15)
minutes to vacate. The encampment had multiple tents that were secured to the ground. These
tents contained personal property and food stuffs. Considering the number of people at the site,
fifteen (15) minutes was insufficient time to take down the encampment. Jones never advised
the protesters of any alternate site. While it is difficult to predict what the outcome would have
been if Jones had followed the operational order, it is reasonable to say that if he tried to speak
with the actual persons in charge and explain the situation there could have been less arrests and
personal property may not have been destroyed.

49
 T&M interviewed Hawkins and Gipson, who were part of command staff in April 2021.
Both told T&M that there was not twenty-four (24) hour surveillance on the site. Gipson told
T&M that he went to the encampment on the first day and was not well received. The protesters
said no one from APD went into the encampment. Gipson said that the site was discussed at staff
meetings, but they did not get updates on who was at the site, what they were doing, so when
they went to do the takedown, they were not aware that the tents were secured to the ground
or the amount of property at the site. Hawkins told T&M that he had information that was critical
to the safety of the Capital Region and that was why he made the decision to take down the
encampment. Hawkins refused to share this information citing confidentiality reasons.
Therefore, knowing that there was limited surveillance on the site and not being provided with
the reasons behind Hawkins ordering the takedown of the encampment, T&M has focused on
the failure of APD to engage in meaningful pre-negotiation regarding the take down of the
encampment, the failure to provide sufficient time for the protesters to breakdown the
encampment, the failure to safeguard the protesters property and the failure to do a post-
operative review of the takedown.
T&M and OPS found that Jones failed to activate his body-worn camera during the
takedown of the encampment.54 He was the lead operational officer on the ground and failed to
activate his BWC. While T&M was not provided with an explanation as to why he chose to not
activate his BWC, since he failed to cooperate with a legal subpoena and be interviewed, it is
noted that the OPS report cites him for failing to activate his BWC. In the report there is an
indication that he may have an underlying medical condition that he believed would allow him
to not activate his BWC but did not have pre-approval from the APD.
T&M found that the APD did not have a plan to safeguard personal property of the
protesters. The APD Operational Order fails to address the issue of the personal property that
was at the encampment. The Operational Order only addresses the need for DGS to come and
sanitize the area once the protesters have been removed. T&M reviewed officers’ BWCs and the
officers can be seen slicing down the tents and moving heavy objects such as large quantities of
water to the side as they moved through the site. The protesters who were interviewed told T&M
that when they went to DGS to retrieve their property, their property was not there.
T&M found that the APD failed to conduct a post-operative review of the takedown of
the encampment and failed to prepare an After-Action Report. After reviewing the OPS report
and the interviews of Hawkins, Gipson, and Cornell, T&M found that a police action of this nature
was atypical for the APD. The failure of the APD to do a post-operative review does not comport
with industry “best practices” and the failure to prepare an After-Action Report is not within APD
Guidelines.

54
T&M cannot confirm if Jones was wearing a body-worn camera because he failed to cooperate with this
investigation. The report clearly states he did not have a BWC. OPS recommended he be retrained on BWC policy.

50
 T&M found that APD investigated the individual cases separately from the OPS
Confidential Report and failed to conduct a thorough and timely investigation. OPS’ findings on
the four referenced complaints were forwarded to the CPRB over two years after they were
originally filed and well past the sixty (60) days outlined in General Order 2.4.05 II. B.
The removal of name tags and/or badges by the officers sends the message to the
community that the APD is not accountable for its actions, and the APD’s response to label it as
miscommunication fails to take account of the community’s perception of a lack of transparency
and accountability of the APD. The failure of the APD to conduct a post-operative review sends
the unfortunate message that they are not willing to learn from this incident and see what they
can do better going forward.
Hawkins in his interview with T&M stated that he thought his officers did a good job under
the circumstances, and while T&M agrees that the majority of APD officers did not appear to use
excessive force55 or engage with the protesters in verbal discord, complex situations such as this
require more than “just doing a good job.” T&M credits the APD officers for not responding to
the inappropriate name calling and taunting by the protesters, including the use of racial slurs.
Protesters justified their language as part of the protesting process and protected speech.
In conclusion, T&M finds that the actions by the APD to engage with the protesters on
April 14, 2021, led to the encampment at South Station. Additionally, T&M finds that there were
no efforts by the APD to resolve the situation amicably with the protesters even though Hawkins
was communicating with Person #1 who was acting as a liaison between the APD and the
protesters. T&M finds that the failure to follow their own operation order and attempt to
negotiate a peaceful removal of the protesters, coupled with the removal by APD officers of their
nametags and/or badges, resulted in the CPRB complaints that were investigated as well as some
overall community mistrust. While T&M cannot corroborate the fifty (50) plus complaints that
Witness #2 told T&M were filed with the APD, the review of the four (4) complaints, BWCs, and
social and news media demonstrate that many in the community were disappointed with the
handling of the situation especially the takedown of the encampment.

55
Chief Hawkins was asked about APD’s Use of Force forms, and that one officer fills out a report that includes other
officers’ use of force. He stated that this matter was corrected and that each officer who uses force must file their
own form. Additionally, T&M viewed some APD officers using their batons but without the ability to interview those
officers T&M was unable to evaluate whether their actions were justified.

51
 Exhibit 1: Uniforms and Grooming Standards,
Albany Police Department General Order No. 3.2.00

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 Albany Community Police Review Board

Policy and Practice Recommendations

March 14, 2024
Table of Contents
I. Recommended Procedure and Practice Changes ............................................................... 2
A. APD General Order: Office of Professional Standards - Complaint Procedures, General
Order No. 2.4.05 .......................................................................................................................... 2
B. APD General Order: Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, General Order No. 1.3.00 ...... 3
C. APD General Order: Property and Evidence Control, General Order No. 2.1.00 ............... 3
D. APD General Order(s): Public Information, General Order No. 2.5.00 .............................. 3
II. Recommended Policy Changes ............................................................................................. 4
A. APD General Order: Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, General Order No. 1.3.00 ...... 4
B. APD General Order: Body-Worn Cameras, General Order No. 3.2.15 .............................. 5
C. APD General Order: Emergency Operations Plan Critical Incidents, General Order No.
3.9.00 ........................................................................................................................................... 5
III. Recommended Training/Education Changes ..................................................................... 6
A. APD General Order: Body Worn Cameras, General Order No. 3.2.15 ............................... 6
B. APD General Order(s): Emergency Operations Plan Critical Incidents, General Order No.
3.9.00 ........................................................................................................................................... 7
C. APD General Order(s): Uniforms & Grooming Standards, General Order No. 3.2.00;
Conduct Standards, General Order No. 2.2.00. ........................................................................... 7
D. APD General Order(s): Conduct Standards, General Order No. 2.2.00 .............................. 7

1
I. Recommended Procedure and Practice Changes
A. APD General Order: Office of Professional Standards - Complaint Procedures,
General Order No. 2.4.05

1. APD should utilize the IAPro database to better monitor its cases for statute-of-
limitation compliance.

APD investigated and reported the OPS Confidential Report separately from its investigation of
CC2021-010, CC2021-011, CC2021,012, and CC2021-020. OPS did not complete its
investigations within one year in compliance with the applicable statute of limitations (SOL): APD
failed to thoroughly investigate CC2021-010, CC2021-011, CC2021-012, and CC 2021-020 in a
timely manner in that their individual case findings were completed almost twenty-four months
from being reported. The CPRB did not learn that OPS had sustained misconduct allegations until
it received OPS’s Confidential Report almost two years after the initial complaints were reported.
However, those sustained findings by OPS were More effective use of the IAPro database can
help OPS comply with General Order 2.4.05(II)(B)’s mandate that “[i]nvestigation of complaints
shall generally be completed within sixty (60) days of the complaint investigation being assigned
to an OPS detective.”

2. OPS should conduct its investigations in a timely manner.

The U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) has
provided a comprehensive list of recommended effective practices for police internal affairs units,
noting that “[c]ompletion of Internal Affairs investigations should occur as rapidly as is reasonably
necessary to fulfill the investigative mission. In all instances, however, an internal investigation
should be completed within a reasonable time before any applicable statute of limitations or other
bar to officer discipline has run out. It is preferable to conclude investigations within 180 days.”1
As the South Station and other cases have revealed, OPS has allowed the statute to lapse in 43 out
of 69 active cases. The CPRB appreciates that OPS has worked to reduce its case backlog, but the
CPRB believes that the statute of limitations issue should be made explicit.

3. OPS should conduct its investigations in a thorough manner.

The CPRB’s South Station investigation also revealed significant investigative deficiencies
regarding APD’s failure to interview non-police witnesses when investigating the OPS
Confidential Report and individual cases. Per the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)
recommendations for department investigations, OPS should complete thorough and timely
investigations, including contacting and interviewing all complainants.2

1
Comm. Oriented Policing Servs. U.S. Dept. Just., Standards and Guidelines for Internal Affairs: Recommendations
from a Community of Practice 33 (2009).
2
Id. at 29, 33–34.

2
 4. Proposed language for General Order 2.4.05(II)(B)(3)

Investigations should be both timely and thorough to ensure the preservation of evidence and
witness information and compliance with relevant statutes of limitation. Investigations shall
include documented attempts to contact and interview all complainants.

B. APD General Order: Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, General Order No. 1.3.00

T&M found that on April 14, 2021, an APD officer released Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) spray in a
manner that did not conform with the department’s policy, Use of Force General Order No. 1.3.00.

The Training Unit shall re-train officers with regard to their authority to use “less lethal weapons,”
including OC Spray, and documentation of completion shall be included and maintained in the
officer’s personnel file within the Office of Professional Standards.

C. APD General Order: Property and Evidence Control, General Order No. 2.1.00

OPS and T&M investigators determined that on April 22, 2021, APD failed to safeguard an
arrestee’s personal cell phone, and APD did not have a thorough plan for processing and charging
arrestees.

When a property is found or voluntarily surrendered, it must be secured and handled in accordance
with General Order 2.1.00, which provides that the property should be returned expeditiously, if
possible. Further, if the owner cannot immediately retrieve the property, the property must be
submitted to the Evidence Room, and the owner should be advised to contact the Evidence
Detective.

D. APD General Order(s): Public Information, General Order No. 2.5.00

General Order No. 2.5.00(3)(C) mandates that APD personnel ensure that any information that is
released to the news media is accurate.

3
In connection with allegations that APD officer(s)’ personal information was exposed online
(“doxed”). T&M investigators did not find any evidence that any officer(s) were “doxed.” T&M
also found that after April 14, 2021, APD failed to investigate or refer for investigation allegations
that officers’ personal information was shared online and/or that any APD officers and/or their
families were threatened. Nor did APD take practical cautionary steps to secure any officers’ or
officers’ families’ safety or initiate an actual investigation.

The Chief of Police or personnel of APD should not make unsubstantiated statements against its
citizens.

II. Recommended Policy Changes

A. APD General Order: Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, General Order No. 1.3.00

1. Police officers should actively seek to avoid using force whenever possible and
appropriate by employing techniques such as de-escalation if the safety of the
situation allows it, and APD should reinforce this principle through written policies,
training, supervision, and reporting and review of use-of-force incidents.

T&M investigators determined that on April 14, 2021, Lieutenant Devin Anderson violated the
department’s Use of Force policy (General Order No. 1.3.00) by forcibly removing a megaphone
from a protester. The officer failed to attempt to de-escalate and gave no verbal instructions to the
protester. The protester suffered a lacerated lip and chipped teeth.

2. Proposed language for General Order No. 1.3.00(I)(B)(1)

“Officers shall, when feasible, employ de-escalation techniques to decrease the likelihood of the
need to use force during an incident and to increase the likelihood of voluntary compliance.
Officers shall, when feasible, attempt to understand and consider the possible reasons that a subject
may be non-compliant or resisting arrest. De-escalation may enable officers to calm the subject
and allow officers to use de-escalation techniques while maintaining public and officer safety. ”

4
 B. APD General Order: Body-Worn Cameras, General Order No. 3.2.15

T&M investigators did not substantiate that on April 14, 2021, APD officers removed their name
tags and/or badges, but the investigation did reveal that some officers obscured parts of their name
tags with their body-worn cameras.

1. APD policy should specify the mounting position for name tags, badges, and body-
worn cameras and provide training on such requirements.

An officer’s BWC placement should not block name tags and badges. The current APD policy,
General Order No. 3.2.15(I)(F), requires that the BWC be mounted to allow a recording, but the
policy does not specify the mounting position. OPS recommended that Lt. Jones be re-trained on
the BWC policy and that the General Order be revised.

2. Proposed Language for General Order No. 3.2.15 (I)(G)

“Prior to going into service, each uniformed employee equipped with a department-issued BWC
will be responsible for making sure that the BWC is in good working order. The BWC shall be
conspicuously placed on the employee's person and worn in such a way as to provide an
unobstructed camera view of employee/citizen contacts. The camera shall be considered mounted
correctly if it is mounted using an AXON-approved mounting accessory.”

C. APD General Order: Emergency Operations Plan Critical Incidents, General Order
No. 3.9.00

T&M investigators determined that APD failed to monitor activity at the encampment from April
14, 2021, through April 22, 2021, and because of a lack of intelligence, APD was unprepared to
remove the encampment on April 22, 2021. T&M also found that after April 22, 2021, APD failed
to conduct a post-operative review and report of the takedown of the encampment and lack of
coordination of services (EMS and fire) with agencies outside of the Department of General
Services (DGS).

5
 1. APD policy should specify a deadline by which the Incident Commander shall
complete an After-Action Report.

Pursuant to General Order No. 3.9.00 (III)(I)(3), the Incident Commander shall complete a detailed
After-Action Report, which includes a summary of the department's actions and recommendations
for the handling of future incidents of the Incident but not specify a date to complete such After
Action Report.

2. Proposed language for General Order No. 3.9.00(I)(3)

The Incident Commander shall complete a detailed After Action Report of the Incident, which will
include a summary of the department's actions and recommendations for the handling of future
incidents within sixty (60) days.

III. Recommended Training/Education Changes

A. APD General Order: Body Worn Cameras, General Order No. 3.2.15

T&M found that on April 22, 2021, lead operational Lieutenant Josiah Jones failed to wear a
body-worn camera in violation of the department’s policy, Body-Worn Cameras General Order
No.3.2.15 II.A.

The Training Unit shall train officers in how and where body-worn cameras should be worn on
uniform, and a copy of the certification of completion shall be included in the officer’s personnel
file within the Office of Professional Standards.

Members of the Department that are assigned a body-worn camera shall receive mobile video
training prior to deployment of the device in an operational setting. At this training, each employee
will be provided a standard checklist of steps they are required to complete in order to ensure their
body-worn camera and mounting systems are in good working order.

6
 B. APD General Order(s): Emergency Operations Plan Critical Incidents, General
Order No. 3.9.00

The Training Unit shall schedule regular training for Supervisors regarding dealing with critical
incidents (including civil unrest), and documentation of completion shall be included and
maintained in the officer’s personnel file within the Office of Professional Standards.

C. APD General Order(s): Uniforms & Grooming Standards, General Order No. 3.2.00;
Conduct Standards, General Order No. 2.2.00.

Officers should strictly follow Uniforms & Grooming Standards, General Order No. 3.2.00 and
Conduct Standards, General Order 2.2.00 (I)(A)(22).

T&M found that on April 22, 2021, some APD Officers covered or removed their name tags and/or
badges, and some APD Officers failed to provide their name and/or badge number when requested
to do so by civilians at the encampment.

The Training Unit shall train officers on name tags and badge placement on officers' uniforms and
provision of officers' name and badge information upon request, and documentation of completion
shall be included and maintained in the officer’s personnel file within the Office of Professional
Standards.

D. APD General Order(s): Conduct Standards, General Order No. 2.2.00

T&M found that on April 14, 2021, a version of the U.S. flag with the “Blue Lives Matter”/“Thin
Blue Line” insignia was observed hanging in South Station, which is “inappropriate and against
guidelines,” per a statement made by Chief of Police Eric Hawkins.3

T&M also found that on April 22, 2021, some APD Officers displayed controversial “Blue Lives
Matter” and “Thin Blue Line” paraphernalia on their polymer shields and uniforms, and APD
Supervisors failed to visibly inspect officers to ensure that their uniforms and gear were within
APD guidelines and that their name and badge numbers were visible in violation of policy, General
Order No. 3.2.00.

The Training Unit shall train officers regarding the potential impact of imagery within a policing
context, and a documentation copy of the certification of completion shall be included and
maintained in the officer’s personnel file within the Office of Professional Standards.

3
For Chief Hawkins’s statement, see page 45 of the South Station Arch Street report. “Thin Blue Line” imagery is
linked to the “Blue Lives Matter” movement, which emerged as a counter-movement to Black Lives Matter, a
movement formed in protest of alleged and founded police misconduct. Such imagery has been associated, at times,
with white supremacist organizations, and law enforcement agencies across the U.S. have prohibited its use, citing its
potential divisiveness. The “Thin Blue Line” is characterized by a thin blue line encased with black lines.

7
 ALBANY, NEW YORK
POLICE DEPARTMENT
165 HENRY JOHNSON BOULEVARD
ALBANY, NEW YORK 12210
1789
Eric Hawkins
Chief of Police USE OF FORCE - LESS LETHAL WEAPONS
GENERAL ORDER NO: 1.3.00
Issue Date: June 14, 2022 Effective Date: March 1998
Revision Date: June 14, 2022 CALEA: 1.2.2, 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.1.4, 4.1.5, 4.2.1,
4.2.2, 4.2.4, 4.2.5 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.3, 4.3.4,
Volume 1: Organizational Structure Chapter 3: Use of Force
Distribution: Sworn Personnel NYSLEAP: 6.2, 20.1, 20.6, 21.2, 32.4
Issuing Authority: Chief Eric Hawkins Page: 1 of 28

SANCTITY OF LIFE:

The sanctity of life is a central principle of policing and must guide all
interactions between members of the Albany Police Department and
members of the general public. All members of the Albany Police
Department must commit themselves to ensuring the preservation of life
and liberty by using the least amount of force necessary to achieve
lawful objectives. When safe and reasonable, officers should attempt to
continually de-escalate and reassess the situation, recognizing that force
may be appropriate at one moment but inappropriate moments later
because of the changing nature of a situation, as outline in section X
below.

PURPOSE: The purpose of this policy is to establish policies and procedures governing the
use of physical force by sworn officers of this department and to establish
procedures for investigating and reporting the use of such force.

POLICY: It is the policy of the Albany Police Department that sworn officers of this
department officers shall only employ only the degree of physical force that is
reasonable and necessary, based on the totality of the circumstances, to
accomplish lawful objectives, as set forth herein established by Article 35 of the
New York StatePenal Law and the policies and procedures set forth by this
department.

DEFINITIONS: Reasonable Cause to Believe/Reasonable Belief – Reasonable belief means

those facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the individual which would
make a reasonable and prudent person tend to believe that the facts and
circumstances are true.

Physical Force – Physical force means force that is used upon, or directed
 toward the body of, another person that does not amount to deadly physical
force.

Less Lethal Force – Less lethal force means response options that are not
designed or used with the intention of causing (and have less potential for
causing) death or serious bodily injury, including but not limited to: chemical
agents, impact weapons, or Conducted Energy Weapons (CEW).

Physical Injury – Physical injury means the impairment of physical condition or

substantial pain, as defined in Article 10 of the New York State Penal Law.

Serious Physical Injury – Serious physical injury means a physical injury which
creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes death or serious and
protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health or protracted loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily organ, as defined in Article 10 of the New
York State Penal Law.

Deadly Physical Force – Deadly physical force means force which, under the

Page 1 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00

 circumstances in which it is used, is readily capable of causing death or other
serious physical injury, as defined in Article 10 of the New York State Penal Law.

Less Lethal Weapons – Less lethal weapons are primarily designed to

temporarily disable or stop non-compliant persons without killing, thereby
providing law enforcement personnel with an alternative to lethal force when
appropriate. This department currently authorizes the following less lethal
weapons: Conducted Energy Weapons (Taser X26 and X26P),
Cocobolo/Composite Wood Baton, Expandable Baton, O.C. Spray, and less
lethal weapons listed in the Emergency Services Team General Order.

Conducted Energy Weapon (CEW) – A Conducted Energy Weapon means a

weapon designed primarily to discharge electrical charges into a subject that will
cause involuntarily muscle contractions and override the subject’s voluntary
motor responses. A CEW delivers approximately 50,000 volts but that is only to
make the initial contact between the CEW probes and the skin. Once contact is
made, the voltage drops to approximately 1,200 volts at about 19 pulses per
second.

Arcing – Arcing means pulling the trigger to activate CEW without discharging
the probes. This may be done as a warning to the subject or to test the CEW
prior to deployment (also referred to as a spark test).

Drive Stun – A drive stun mode is possible whether or not the cartridge has
been expended or removed from the CEW. (If the cartridge is not removed, the
probes will enter the body.) This action requires pulling the trigger and placing
the CEW in direct contact with the subject, causing the electric energy to enter
the subject directly. Drive stun is frequently used as a non-incapacitating
persuasive compliance technique. It may also be used to incapacitate the subject
where at least one probe is attached to the subject’s body and the CEW contact
will complete the circuit.

Laser Painting – Laser painting is the act of un-holstering and pointing a CEW
at a subject and activating the CEWs laser to show that the weapon is aimed at
the subject.

Support Hand Side – A support side hand is the opposite side of a person’s
strong hand and firearm.

Impact Weapon – An impact weapon is a device used to apply force against a

non-compliant or assaultive subject, or to affect a blocking or defensive
technique. This shall include cocobolo/composite wood batons and expandable
batons.

Capsicum – Capsicum means a genus of plants, the ripe fruit of the capsicum
mimum (or frutescans), contains the active principal capsaicin.

Capsaicin – Capsaicin means a colorless, pungent crystalline compound that is

derived from capsicum and is a strong irritant to skin and mucous membranes.

Oleoresin – Oleoresin means a naturally occurring mixture of oil and a resin

Page 2 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00
 extract from various plants.

Orthoclorobenzal Malononitrile (CS) – CS is a gas causing tears, salivation,

and painful breathing, C6H4ClCH:C(CN)2.

Decontamination – Decontamination means the removal of hazardous

substances (bacteria, chemicals, radioactive materials) from the person, clothing,
equipment, tools, and/or site to the extent necessary to prevent the occurrence of
adverse health and/or environmental effects.

Weapon of Opportunity – A weapon of opportunity consists of any object, other

than a department approved less lethal or lethal weapon (e.g., flashlight, portable
radio, etc.).

I. AUTHORIZED USE OF FORCE

A. Use of Reasonable Force:

1. While in the performance of official duties, officers shall only employ the
degree of physical force that is reasonable and necessary, based on the
totality of the circumstances, to accomplish lawful objectives, as
established by Article 35 of the New York State Penal Law and the
policies and procedures set forth by this department.

a. Lawful objectives include, but are not limited to the following:

i. Detentions;
ii. Frisks;
iii. Arrests;
iv. Self defense;
v. Defense of others;
vi. Defense of property;
vii. Preventing a person(s) from self-injury or protective custody
commitments;
viii. Preventing a person(s) from destroying evidence;
ix. Stopping a riot; or
x. Preventing prisoner escapes.

b. Factors that determine reasonableness for the totality of

circumstances include:

i. The severity of the crime;

ii. Whether the suspect is an immediate threat to the safety of
the officer or others;
iii. Actively resisting arrest; or
iv. Attempting to evade by flight.

c. Other factors that determine the necessity to use force include, but
are not be limited to the following:

i. The number of suspects versus the number officers

Page 3 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00
 involved;
ii. Pre-assault indicators (e.g., actions, statements, etc.);
iii. Size, age, and physical condition of the officer and suspect;
iv. Known or perceived physical abilities of the suspect;
v. Previous violent or mental history;
vi. Perception of the use of alcohol or drugs by the subject;
vii. Perception of the suspect’s mental or psychiatric history
based on specific actions;
viii. The availability and proximity to weapons;
ix. Environmental factors (e.g., night/day, snow/ice, terrain, etc);
x. Injury to the officer or prolonged duration of the incident;
xi. Officer on the ground or other unfavorable position; and
xii. Characteristics of being armed (e.g., bulges, adjustment of
clothing, “security touches”).

2. Less lethal weapons shall be carried and/or utilized only as issued and
authorized, and shall be deployed in compliance with Article 35 of the New
York State Penal Law.

a. Under no circumstances shall changes, alterations, modifications,

or substitutions be made without prior written consent from the
Chief of Police or his/her designee.

3. Officers may only employ less lethal weapons within the guidelines of
department training, policies, and procedures.

a. Officers must be able to articulate a compelling need to use a

weapon of opportunity, to inflict physical injury, serious physical
injury, and/or death.

B. When safe and reasonable, officers shall attempt to use de-escalation tactics.

1. De-escalation tactics and techniques are actions used by officers, when

safe and without compromising the mission of the Albany Police
Department, which seek to achieve conflict resolution during an incident,
and increase the likelihood of voluntary compliance.

2. Mitigating conflict gives officers time to utilize extra resources and

increases time available to resolve the incident in a safe manner.

3. Officers shall balance de-escalation techniques against the facts of the

incident facing them when deciding which tactical options are the most
appropriate to bring the situation to a safe resolution.

II. AUTHORIZED USE OF DEADLY FORCE

A. The Department’s general order regarding authorized use of deadly force

reflects the Department’s focus on the sanctity of life as set forth in the first
paragraph of this general order. As a result of the Department’s focus on
the sanctity of life, this general order more narrowly defines an officer’s

Page 4 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00

 authorized use of deadly force than what may be authorized by Article 35 of
the New York State Penal Law.
B. An officer may NOT use or threaten to use deadly physical force:
1. Based on bias against a person’s race, ethnicity, nationality, religion,
disability, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, or any other protected
characteristic;
2. To punish a person or to retaliate against them for past conduct or to
impose punishment; or
3. To resolve a situation quicker or force compliance with an officer’s request
when it can otherwise be handled through de-escalation tactics,
communication or any other form of less-lethal force.
C. An officer an officer may use deadly force only when the officer reasonably
believes that the action is in defense of human life, including the officer’s own life,
or in defense of any person in imminent danger of serious physical injury
or death to:
1. To prevent or terminate the imminent danger of serious physical injury
and/or death to the officer or others when the suspect is imminently acting
or imminently threatening to cause death or serious physical injury to the
officer or others; or
2. To effect the arrest of a person whom the officer has reasonable cause to
believe the person has the means or instrumentalities to use deadly
physical force against an officer or others; or
3. To end the commission of a violent felony against others including Rape,
Criminal Sexual Act and/or Kidnapping.
D. An officer’s use of deadly physical force will be reviewed based upon the totality of
the circumstances using an objective reasonableness standard. This directive
does not require an officer to sustain an injury before applying authorized force.
E. No distinction shall be made relative to the age of the intended target of deadly
physical force. Self-defense and imminent threat shall be the only procedural
guidelines for employing deadly physical force.

Page 5 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00

 4. IN Officers may use deadly physical force, in accordance with Article 35 of
the New York State Penal Law, officers may use deadly physical force
when there is reasonable cause to believe that such force is necessary in
order to:

a. Prevent or terminate the imminent danger of serious physical injury

and/or death against the officer or a third person;;; AND/OR
b. To affect the arrest of a person whom the officer has reasonable
cause to believe :

i. Has committed, or is attempting to commit, a felony

offense involving the use or attempted use or threatened
imminent use of [deadly?] physical force against the
officer or a third person; or committed, or is attempting to
commit, a kidnapping, arson, escape in the first degree,
or burglary in the first degree.The suspect has the
means or instrumentalities to use deadly physical force
against an officer or others to cause death or serious
physical injury.

To prevent the escape, or the attempted escape, of a person(s) in custody, or while in the course of
resisting arrest, whom the officer has reasonable cause to believe has committed a felony offense, such
person is armed with a firearm or other deadly
5.F. An officer’s use of deadly physical force will be reviewed based upon the
totality of the circumstances using an objective reasonableness standard. This
directive does not require an officer to sustain an injury before applying
authorized force.
G. No distinction shall be made relative to the age of the intended target of deadly
physical force. Self-defense and imminent threat shall be the onlyprocedural
guidelines for employing deadly physical force.
6.

II.III. ADMINISTRATION

A. Legal Authority to Carry/Use Weapons:

1. The legal authority for sworn officers of the Albany Police Department to
carry and use weapons in the performance of their duties is defined in
Section 2.20 of the New York State Criminal Procedure Law.
2. Sworn officers are authorized by the Chief of Police to carry and use
department approved less lethal weapons and munitions in the
performance of their official duties, in accordance with the following:

a. Sworn personnel of this department are not authorized or permitted

to carry or use a department approved less lethal weapon(s), in
which the officer did not specifically receive training in while
completing the Basic Course for Police Officers, until the officer
successfully completes an initial training course in the proper use of
such less lethal weapon.

Page 6 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00

 i. Certificates of completion shall be maintained by the
Training Unit and a copy shall be included in the individual
officer’s personnel file within the Office of Professional

Page 7 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00

 Standards.

b. Only department personnel demonstrating proficiency in the use of

department authorized weapons shall be approved to carry such
weapons.

3. Non-sworn personnel are not authorized to possess any type of less lethal
weapon or ammunition in the performance of their official duties, including
while in a vehicle, building, or any other facility that is owned/leased by the
City of Albany.

B. Authorized Less Lethal Weapons and Use of Force:

1. In the performance of official duties, sworn officers of this department shall

only carry and use department authorized less lethal weapons and
ammunition unless specifically authorized by the Chief of Police.

a. Sworn officers may exercise control over a subject through their

visible presence or verbal commands.
b. Sworn officers may use guiding techniques and department
approved restraining devices to physically control the movements
of a subject that exhibits no resistance.

i. Department approved restraining devices consist of the

following:

a) Handcuffs;
b) Zip-tie restraints; and
c) Handcuffs and restraining belts.

ii. Alternative restraints, such as shackles, are also an

approved restraining device, which are available through the
Central Booking supervisor and may only be utilized with
prior approval.

c. Sworn officers may use department approved open hand control

tactics as a response option in the application of physical force.

i. Soft open hand control tactics include, but are not limited to
the following:

a) Escort holds;
b) Joint locks; and
c) Pressure point control techniques that generally
involve the application of pain compliance.

ii. Hard open hand control techniques include, but are not
limited to the following:

a) Striking techniques; and

b) Take down measures that consist of the forceful
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 direction of the subject to the ground.

1) All strikes, kicks, punches, etc. shall be

targeted at a subject’s major muscle mass
areas and muscle structures.

d. Sworn officers may use department approved less lethal weapons

and ammunition as a response option in the application of physical
force.
e. The Training Unit shall maintain a record of the types and
specifications of all less lethal weapons approved for use.

i. Department issued and/or authorized less lethal weapons

and ammunition, which shall only be utilized in accordance
with this policy and current department directives, include
the following:

a) Conducted Energy Weapon (CEW) - Taser X26 and

X26P;
b) Cocobolo Police Baton - Up to 26";
c) Composite Wood Police Baton - Up to 26";
d) ASP Expandable Baton - Up to 26";
e) Peacekeeper Rapid Containment Baton - Up to 26”;
f) Cocobolo Riot Batons - 36”;
g) Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) 1.8 Ounce Aerosol Spray;
h) Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) Sixteen (16) Ounce Crowd
Control Spray;
i) Orthoclorobenzal Malononitrile (CS); and
j) Department Issued/Approved Less Lethal Weapons
and Ammunition, as defined in the Emergency
Services Team General Order.

ii. The following less lethal weapons are strictly prohibited:

a) Slapjacks; and
b) Blackjacks.

f. Authorized members assigned to the K-9 Unit may use a police K-9
as a response option in the application of physical force, as per
current directives.
g. The department does not authorize any other less lethal weapons
or ammunition to be carried while on-duty.
h. The department does not authorize any department approved less
lethal weapons or ammunition to be carried while off-duty.

C. Review and Inspection:

1. Prior to being issued, or approved to carry, a less lethal weapon or

ammunition in the performance of official duties, all less lethal weapons and
ammunition intended for use by an officer of this department shall be
Page 9 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00
 reviewed, inspected, and approved by a qualified weapons instructor to
ensure that the weapon is safe, functional, and operational before use.

a. Training Unit personnel shall complete a Less Lethal Weapon/Riot

Gear Assignment Report, APD Form # 282 shown on page 25 of this
order, documenting each less lethal weapon that has been
inspected, authorized, and approved for use by a qualified weapons
instructor.

i. A copy of the Less Lethal Weapon/Riot Gear Assignment

Report shall be placed in the applicable officer’s training file.
ii. If a less lethal weapon is issued to a station/unit a copy of
the Less Lethal Weapon/Riot Gear Assignment Report shall
be maintained in the applicable station/unit file maintained by
the Training Unit.
iii. Each CEW issued shall also be entered in the department’s
master weapon index, which shall be maintained by the
Training Unit.

2. Less lethal weapons that are found to be defective, expired, or otherwise

unsafe (either during initial inspection or upon daily officer inspection) shall
be removed from service and brought to the Training Center for repair or
replacement, according to the following procedures:

a. The officer requesting the repair shall complete an Intra-

Departmental Correspondence documenting the repair needed.
b. The officer’s supervisor shall email a copy of the IDC to the Training
Unit at Training_Unit@albany-ny.org.
c. A member of the Training Unit will make arrangements for the less
lethal weapon to be turned into the Training Unit for repair or
replacement.
d. All repairs or replacements shall be completed by a qualified
weapons instructor or licensed dealer/manufacturer. The repairsshall
be documented on an IDC by a member of the Training Unit.
e. When the repairs are complete or the less lethal weapon is replaced,
a member of the Training Unit will make arrangements to return the
less lethal weapon to the appropriate user or unit/station.

D. Training:

1. Prior to being authorized to carry a less lethal weapon, sworn personnel of

this department shall be issued copies and receive instruction on the
following:

a. GO 1.3.00 – Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons.

i. Instruction shall focus on the following topics:

a) Use of Reasonable Force;

b) Use of Deadly Force;
c) Use of Authorized Less Lethal Weapons;
Page 10 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00
 d) Rendering Aid After Use of Weapons; and
e) Pertinent Sections of Article 35 of the New York State
Penal Law.

b. The Training Unit shall retain documented records of the issuance

of such policies and the instruction pertinent to those policies via
department training records and/or PowerDMS.

2. At least annually, all officers who are authorized to carry weapons shall
receive in-service training on the department’s use of force policies.

a. This training may be done in conjunction with weapons training or

by means of on-line training through PowerDMS.

3. Only those officers, who have successfully completed a department

approved CEW training course taught by a certified CEW instructor and
who have successfully demonstrated proficiency in the use of a CEW,
shall be authorized to carry and utilize a CEW. Proficiency training for
CEWs shall include successfully loading, unloading, deploying, and
discharging the prongs of the CEW.

a. Officers shall complete an initial eight (8) hour block of in-service

training in the proper use of the CEW, which may include the
following topics:

i. New York State Penal Law Article 35, use of force

requirements;
ii. Departmental policies and procedures relating to use of
force;
iii. Approved and accepted techniques and strategies for non-
deadly use of force options (not limited to those involving a
CEW);
iv. Approved CEW target zones;
v. Legal updates;
vi. Justification for CEW deployment and usage;
vii. De-escalation techniques;
viii. Departmental reporting requirements;
ix. CEW unit maintenance and safe storage;
x. CEW unit inspection;
xi. Medical treatment and decontamination protocols following
CEW exposure;
xii. Probe removal requirements; and
xiii. Drive-stun techniques.

b. At least annually, agency personnel who are currently authorized to

carry a CEW shall attend in-service training on the department’s
use of force policies and shall successfully demonstrate proficiency
with authorized CEWs.
c. A CEW may only be carried by on-duty personnel who have been
certified in its use. If carried, the CEW shall be immediately
accessible on the person and contained within the department
Page 11 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00
 approved holster on the support hand side.

4. In-service training for other less lethal weapons and weaponless control
techniques shall occur annually.

a. All qualifications and proficiency training must be monitored by a

certified weapons or tactics instructor.
b. The Training Unit shall document and maintain records of all
training and proficiency ratings.

5. Any officer who does not demonstrate proficiency with an authorized less
lethal weapon or weaponless control techniques will be instructed to
complete remedial training in the proper use of that weapon prior to
resuming official duties.

a. Officers who fail to demonstrate a satisfactory level of proficiency

will not be permitted to carry that particular weapon in the
performance of official duties until the officer successfully
completes remedial training.
b. Remedial training shall be documented on an Intra-Departmental
Correspondence to the Chief of Police and maintained in the
officer’s training file and personnel file.

6. Officers, who were provided training for any less lethal weapon from an
outside agency, shall submit certificates of completion to the Training Unit.
A certified weapons instructor, in conjunction with Training Unit
supervisors, shall determine if the training meets the standards set forth in
this policy.

a. If the training meets or exceeds the standards set forth in this

policy, the weapons instructor shall complete an IDC to the Chief of
Police detailing their findings.
b. A copy of the approved IDC and training certificate shall be placed
in the officer’s training file and copies shall be sent to the Office of
Professional Standards.
c. The officer shall receive notification from the Training Unit that
he/she is now authorized to carry such weapons, as well as a copy
of the approved IDC.

7. Officers may only employ lethal and less-lethal weapons within guidelines
of training and current department directives.

E. Security, Safety, and Storage:

1. All department weapons that are in the custody of the department shall be
under the control of the Training Unit. The Training Unit shall maintain the
department weapon inventory regarding the acquisition, distribution,
maintenance, sale, and disposal of departmental weapons.

a. Department weapons and ammunitions shall be safeguarded and

stored in the department’s secure armory.
Page 12 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00
 b. Weapon acquisition, transfer, and disposal by and for the Albany
Police Department shall be performed by the Training Unit with the
expressed written consent of the Chief of Police.
c. All weapon acquisition, transfer, and disposal shall be performed in
compliance with all federal, state, and local laws, as well as
department policies and procedures.
d. Less lethal weapons shall be purchased from a licensed dealer or
manufacturer, and in accordance with the City of Albany purchasing
policies and procedures.
e. The department’s weapons shall be inventoried on a continual
basis.

2. Officers are responsible for the care, cleaning, and maximum security of
departmental weapons issued to them.

a. Officers shall provide maximum security for all less lethal weapons
they possess and shall exercise the necessary control for its
security to prevent its theft, loss, or misuse.
b. Weapons shall not be left in unsecured areas of the department.
c. Weapons shall not be left in an unsecured, in plain view in the
passenger compartment of any vehicle, for any length of time, at any
location when the officer is not in the vehicle. If available, the weapon
shall be locked in the trunk.
d. Except during authorized training or for maintenance and
inspection, officers shall only draw, exhibit, or point a less lethal
weapon when they reasonably believe that it may be necessary to
use the weapon in the performance of their duty.
e. OC Spray and Batons are prohibited from entering the booking
room or any cell block or cell, except for exigent circumstances.
f. Officers shall never lend their weapon(s) to unauthorized persons.

III.IV. LESS LETHAL WEAPON OPERATING PROCEDURES

A. Conducted Energy Weapons (CEWs):

1. CEWs shall be carried and/or utilized only as authorized and in

accordance with department policies and procedures.

a. The Albany Police Department currently authorizes the Taser X26

and the Taser X26P.
b. The Albany Police Department does not permit the use of
personally owned CEWs while on-duty.

2. Pre-Deployment and Storage of CEWs:

a. CEWs shall be assigned to designated units/stations and stored in

a secure area when not in use.
b. After removing a CEW from its secure storage area, personnel shall
complete the following:

i. Turn the CEW to the “on” position;

Page 13 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00
 ii. Verify that the battery life percentage of the Taser X26 is
above 20%, or that the battery life percentage of the Taser
X26P has a minimum of two (2) battery life bars;

a) One (1) battery life bar on the Taser X26P indicates

that the CEW is at 20% and the battery needs to be
replaced.

iii. Spark test CEW for a full five (5) second cycle;
iv. If the CEW meets this requirement, turn the CEW to the “off”
position;
v. Attach the cartridge to the front of the CEW;
vi. Holster the weapon; and
vii. Report the following information to the desk officer, which
shall be documented in the unit/station personnel blotter:

a) CEW serial number;

b) Department holster utilized;
c) The officer’s name who is utilizing the CEW; and
d) The shift/detail and the duration it will be utilized.

c. It shall be the desk officer’s responsibility to account for all CEWs

and CEW related equipment at the beginning and end of each tour
of duty, which shall be documented in the unit/station blotter.
d. Personnel shall return all CEWs and CEW related equipment at the
end of their shift or detail. CEWs and CEW related equipment shall
not be stored in any locations other than the designated station/unit
storage area.

3. Deployment:

a. The CEW is a defensive operation weapon and shall be used in

accordance with Article 35 of the New York State Penal and Albany
Police Department policies and procedures.

i. A fleeing subject shall not be the sole justification for using a

CEW against a subject. Officers shall also consider, and be
able to clearly articulate, the following factors:

a) The severity of the offense;

b) The subject’s threat level to others; and
c) The risk of injury to the subject.

b. Prior to deploying a CEW, personnel shall consider the following:

i. The level of force exhibited by the subject;

ii. Proximity and/or access of the subject; and
iii. Safety of involved individuals, to include:

a) Hostages;
b) Non-subject civilians;
Page 14 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00
 c) Other personnel; and
d) Subject in question.

c. CEWs shall not be used under the following circumstances unless

deadly physical force in accordance with Article 35 of the New York
State Penal Law, and Albany Police Department policies and
procedures is justifiable:

i. Where the subject is elevated on an object and has the

potential to fall (e.g. building roof tops, trees, river banks,
bridges, fences);
ii. Obviously pregnant or known to be pregnant woman;
iii. Apparent juveniles, unless personnel are justified in using
deadly physical force;
iv. The elderly or visibly frail;
v. Handcuffed subjects(s); unless it is necessary to prevent the
subject from causing harm to themselves, personnel, or
others and all other lesser attempts of control are deemed
ineffective;
vi. Subjects that are in physical control of a vehicle in motion
(e.g., driver of a car, truck, motorcycle, ATV, bicycle,
scooter);
vii. Where the subject has a known heart condition, or an
apparent debilitating illness;
viii. Intentionally utilizing the CEW in the facial or head area of a
subject;

a) CEWs intentionally utilized in the facial and head area

is considered deadly physical force and shall only be
used in those situations deemed reasonable and
justified, as prescribed in Article 35 of the New York
State Penal Law and the Albany Police Department
policies and procedures.

ix. CEWs shall not be used in areas where flammable liquids

and/or gases are present, due to the potential for ignition of
said liquids and/or gases; and
x. CEWs shall not be deployed when a subject has been
sprayed with an alcohol based chemical spray or alcohol
based pepper spray.

a) The Albany Police Department utilizes a non-alcohol

based pepper spray, therefore, it is safe to utilize
when deployed in conjunction with department issued
pepper spray.

d. Personnel should be aware that there is a higher risk to the subject

when the CEW is utilized in the following circumstances:

i. Where the subject is in medical or mental crisis; and

ii. Persons obviously under the influence of drugs and/or
alcohol.
Page 15 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00
 e. When safe and practical, personnel should give a verbal warning to
the subject that a CEW will be used if they do not comply. This can
also include laser painting and/or arching, as defined in this policy.
f. When possible, personnel shall not use a CEW unless there is
another officer present to provide lethal cover.
g. The officer deploying the CEW shall inform all other present
personnel that a CEW is being utilized.
h. It is the responsibility of the cover officer to properly assess the
situation and appropriately provide lethal cover, as the
circumstance dictates.
i. If compliance of the subject is achieved, it shall be the responsibility
of the back-up officer(s) to take control of the subject (e.g.,
handcuffing).

i. Personnel shall not intentionally use more than one (1) CEW
against a subject at a time.
ii. If positive contact with an individual subject is achieved,
personnel shall not use a CEW on an individual subject more
than three (3) times during a single incident (this includes
both deployment of the probes and drive-stun).

j. Personnel should use a CEW for one (1) standard cycle (five
seconds) and then evaluate the situation to determine if
subsequent cycles are necessary.
k. Personnel should consider that exposure to the CEW for longer
than fifteen (15) seconds, whether due to multiple applications or
continuous cycling, may increase the risk of death or serious injury.
l. Any subsequent applications should be independently justifiable,
and the risks should be weighed against other force options.

i. For maximum effectiveness, personnel shall use a CEW at

distances between 3-21 feet, unless utilizing the drive stun
method.

m. Drive Stun Utilization:

i. Utilized to complete the circuit when one of the probes is

ineffective or becomes dislodged.
ii. Utilized in close quarters to protect the officer, others, or to
create a safe distance between the officer and the subject.

a) The primary function of the drive stun mode, when not

used to complete the circuit, is to gain subject
compliance through the administration of pain.
b) Using the CEW to achieve pain compliance may have
limited effectiveness and, when used repeatedly, may
even exacerbate the situation by inducing rage in the
subject.

iii. The CEW probes shall be delivered to the subject target

areas based on the following circumstances:
Page 16 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00
 a) Availability;
b) Clothing;
c) Established safety priorities; and
d) Level of force necessary.

iv. Personnel shall not intentionally target sensitive areas such

as the head, neck, upper center mass, and genitalia.

n. The subject’s lower center mass should be the target area, unless
exigent circumstances dictate otherwise.

i. Personnel shall keep in mind that subjects affected by the

CEW may be unable to physically perform verbal commands
given by personnel (e.g., “put your hands on top of your
head”).

4. Post Deployment:

a. When a CEW is deployed on a subject, personnel shall, as soon as

safe and practical, request Emergency Medical Services for the
subject.
b. These procedures shall be followed for deployment of the probes
and for drive-stuns, and shall occur before transporting any subject
to Central Booking or the Detective Office.

i. Only Emergency Medical Services personnel shall remove

the probes from the subject. Personnel of this department
shall not remove the probes from any subject.
ii. If a CEW is deployed on any subject by personnel of this
department, that subject is assumed to be in custody and
cannot refuse medical attention.
iii. Emergency Medical Services personnel shall determine if a
subject should be treated at the scene or if they should be
transported to a hospital for medical attention, via an
ambulance.

c. Personnel need to be cognizant of how positional asphyxia may

exacerbate the condition of any individual who has received a CEW
application.

i. Positional asphyxia is a death that occurs when a subject’s

body position interferes with breathing, either when the chest
is restricted from expanding properly or when the position of
the subject’s head obstructs the airway.
ii. Positional asphyxia has been mentioned as a possible
contributing factor in a number of cases in which subjects
died after one or more CEW applications.
iii. Personnel shall utilize a restraint technique that does not
impair a subject’s respiration following a CEW application.

5. Care and Maintenance:

Page 17 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00

 a. CEW operators shall use due care with any CEW or CEW related
equipment, and shall not subject them to unnecessary abuse or
destruction.
b. Any CEW that is not function properly shall immediately be taken
out of service and turned into the Training Unit for repair, in
accordance with procedures outlined in this policy.

6. Public Information and Community Relations:

a. The Albany Police Department shall conduct neighborhood

programs that focus on CEW awareness training. This shall include
CEW awareness training during the Citizen Police Academy.

i. The Albany Police Department shall attempt to include law

enforcement partners such as local medical personnel,
citizen review boards, medical examiners, mental health
professionals, judges and the District Attorney’s Office in its
CEW awareness programs.

b. The Albany Police Department Public Information Officer (PIO)

shall receive extensive training on the CEW so that he/she can
better inform the media and the public about the weapon. The
Public Information Officer shall brief the media on the Albany Police
Department’s CEW policy, when applicable.

B. Batons:

1. Sworn officers of this department shall carry only those batons that are
authorized by the Chief of Police and that the officer has successfully
completed department approved training for in the proper use and
deployment. The Albany Police Department currently authorizes the
following batons to be used in official capacity:

a. Cocobolo Police Baton - Up to 26";

b. Composite Wood Police Baton - Up to 26";
c. ASP Expandable Baton - Up to 26";
d. Peacekeeper Rapid Containment Baton - Up to 26”; and
e. Cocobolo Riot Batons - 36”, which shall be stored in patrol
supervisor’s vehicles and authorized/deployed at the direction of a
supervisor.

i. Retention end cap, window breaker cap, and/or a combo of

them both are authorized accessories.

2. Officers shall demonstrate proficiency in the use of an authorized baton,

prior to being authorized to carry said baton.

a. Training shall be completed by a certified weapons instructor and

documented, as outlined in this policy.

3. Proper Handling/Grip:

Page 18 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00

 a. Place the loop or thong of the baton over the right/left thumb so that

Page 19 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00

 the baton will hang with the thong crossing over the back of the
hand.
b. Turn the hand in and grasp the handle so that the thumb points
parallel to the baton.
c. Adjust the length of the thong to fit the hand. When correctly
adjusted, the butt of the baton should extend slightly below the
edge of the grasping hand. If gripped in this manner, the baton will
not fly out of the hand when in use.

i. Attention must be employed in using the thong. The

possibility always exists that the thong may become
entangled in the equipment on the garrison belt.
ii. A grommet may also be used in place of, or in conjunction
with, the thong.

d. Raise the baton to a 45-degree angle for proper deployment.

4. Deployment/Target Areas:

a. Accurately directed blows to the following areas are usually

effective, with less chance of serious physical injury to the intended
subject.

i. A hard forehand/backhand strike to the non-compliant

person’s thigh (inside or outside). This should cause
temporary cramping, as well as a temporary inability to walk.
ii. A hard forehand/backhand strike to the outside of the
forearm or upper arm should also stop an attacker. This
should cause temporary immobility to said arm.
iii. A directed strike to the back of the hand or wrist should also
produce the desired results.
iv. Directed defensive strikes to the shin area will often block
any kick attempts.

b. By using the baton as an extension of the arm, the baton can be an

effective parrying instrument. A powerful thrust, with the end of the
baton, delivered to the solar plexus should temporarily disable most
subjects. Short jabs, with the end of the baton, to the stomach
areas are effective in clearing away crowds or clearing a pathway
through a large, combative group.
c. Strikes to the primary “center mass” target areas generate fluid
shock waves. These strikes have a high potential for control and
low potential for fatal injury.
d. Officers must always attempt to avoid jabbing, striking, or pressing
on a subject’s head, neck, spine, sternum, or groin, as these areas
have a higher chance of resulting in serious physical injuries or
death.
e. Illustrated Depiction of Vital and Vulnerable Striking Areas:

Page 20 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00

 C. CHEMICAL AGENTS

1. Officers shall demonstrate proficiency in the use of an authorized chemical

agent, prior to be authorized to carry such chemical agent.

a. Training shall be completed by a certified weapons instructor and

documented, as outlined in this policy.

2. Authorized chemical agents shall include:

a. Oleoresin Capsicum (OC); and

b. Orthoclorobenzal Malononitrile (CS).

3. Oleoresin Capsicum:

a. Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) is a natural inflammatory agent that contains

the active ingredient capsaicin, which is extracted from pepper plants. As
an inflammatory agent, aerosol OC Spray causes an almost immediate
swelling of the eyes and breathing passages. Additionally, there is an
intense burning sensation of the eyes, throat, and sprayed areas of the
skin. When OC is inhaled, the respiratory tract becomes inflamed and
breathing is restricted, limited to short and shallow breaths. Physical
effects may include involuntary closing of the eyes, coughing, choking,
lack of upper body strength and coordination and nausea. Psychological
effects such as disorientation and fear may also occur.
b. When properly used, OC Spray is usually quite effective on both humans
and animals. OC Spray will incapacitate most subjects for a period of
approximately thirty (30) minutes without permanent injury. Because
Oleoresin Capsicum is a natural and biodegradable substance,
decontamination procedures include proper ventilation, removing any
contact lenses, and providing access to a water source.
c. The sixteen (16) ounce crowd control spray of Oleoresin Capsicum (OC)
Page 21 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00
 must be carried in the approved canister thigh/leg holster when not in use.

4. Circumstances for Use:

a. OC spray shall be used at the officers discretion, under the following

circumstances:

i. When necessary to defend self/others; and

ii. When lower levels of force are deemed ineffective/inappropriate to:

a) Effect an arrest; and/or

b) Prevent the commission of an offense/crime.

b. Whenever possible, a verbal warning of OC deployment and a command

to desist the undesirable behavior shall be given.

i. If unheeded, OC spray may be utilized in an attempt to gain

compliance from the subject.

c. Environmental considerations:

i. To avoid third party contamination, officers shall consider wind

direction and other weather conditions prior to using OC spray.
ii. Officers shall consider the adverse effects if deployed in confined or
enclosed spaces.

d. Health considerations:

i. If possible, avoid chemical spray on the elderly or the visibly frail,

apparent juveniles, obviously pregnant or known to be pregnant
women, and persons with known respiratory conditions.

5. Use of Authorized OC Spray:

a. OC spray is intended for use primarily in incidents where a subject is

actively resisting a lawful arrest. OC spray should be used only after other
methods of subduing violent persons have failed, and only as an
alternative to more extreme uses of force.
b. OC spray produces a potent “ballistic” stream that may incapacitate a
subject from up to twelve (12) feet away. Once the decision has been
made to deploy OC, the stream should be directed at the intended
subject’s face, at a minimum distance of three (3) feet, utilizing a one to
two second burst.
c. When OC spray has been deployed on a subject, the following procedures
shall be followed:

i. The subject shall be provided the opportunity to wash the affected

areas within twenty (20) minutes after the application of the spray,
absent exigent circumstances.
ii. Officers shall not use any creams, ointments, or bandages on
affected areas.
Page 22 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00
 iii. Officers shall not keep a sprayed subject in a face-down position for
a period longer than necessary in order to avoid positional
asphyxia.
iv. Officers shall summon Emergency Medical Services (EMS) and
arrange to have the subject transported to a local medical facility for
treatment, under the following circumstances:

a) Subjects who complain of, or exhibit, continued effects after

having the affected area flushed with water.
b) Subjects who indicate that they have a pre-existing medical
condition (e.g., asthma, emphysema, bronchitis, etc.) that
may be aggravated by OC spray.
c) If, at any point, after exposure the subject displays a reaction
not consistent with the expected reaction to aerosol OC
spray, medical attention is to be summoned immediately.

d. Department issued OC spray may not be used in the following

circumstances:

i. To effect the arrest of a person that is only offering verbal cues or

other forms of passive resistance;
ii. To effect the arrest of a person that is only passively resisting (e.g.,
going limp, offering no physical resistance);
iii. Handcuffed individuals;
iv. Once a subject succumbs or becomes incapacitated;
v. Civil demonstrations in which the subjects are passively resisting;
vi. Crowded areas, except with supervisor approval absent exigent
circumstances;
vii. To threaten or elicit information from a person; or
viii. As a means of punishment.

6. Department Issue and Re-Issue of OC Spray:

a. Issue:

i. Officers will be issued one (1) canister of department approved

chemical spray upon completion of OC Training.

b. Re-Issue:

i. Officers must submit a request for a new canister of OC spray by

completing an Intra-Departmental Correspondence (IDC) to the
Chief of Police. The IDC must detail the reason(s) that the request
is being made. Reasons for a re-issue include:

a) Replacement of an exhausted canister;

b) Replacement of a date-expired canister;
c) Replacement of a non-functioning or damaged canister;
d) Replacement of a lost/stolen canister;
e) Replacement of a canister turned in as evidence; or
f) Training.
Page 23 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00
 7. Use of Authorized CS Gas:

Use of Authorized CS Gas:

7.
a. Officers, in accordance with the Department’s historical practices,1
must severely limit the use of CS Gas as a non-lethal alternative to
respond to a situation that poses risk of serious physical injury or
death to officers or others. The Department’s extremely limited use
of CS Gas reflects the focus of the Department on the sanctity of life,
as set forth in the first paragraph of this general order, to respond to
violent and potentially deadly force with non-lethal CS Gas when
appropriate as a last resort before deploying further and potentially
lethal force.

Barricaded Suspect(s) or Subject(s):

b.
The incident shall be contained with a command structure in
place that is appropriate for the time frame, the location, and
the tactical situation presented. Chemical agents may be
deployed when necessary, with the approval of the incident
commander when:
i.
a) Communication efforts directing the suspect to exit the
location and submit to arrest or custody have failed;
b) An evacuation and/or notification of citizens from the
affected area have been accomplished to prevent
contamination of uninvolved persons;
c) Notification has been given to the present police
personnel to avoid exposing unprotected personnel to
the utilized agent(s); and
Every effort should be made for police personnel
present to don their protective chemical agent mask(s).
d)
Only the volume of chemical agents that is reasonable shall be
used. The amount of chemical agent to be used shall be
determined by the following:
ii.
a) The seriousness of the offense;
b) The threat to the community posed by the
suspect(s)/subject(s);
c) Location demographics: size, single level or multi-level,
available windows or area for insertion of chemical
agents, wind and weather;
d) Type of chemical agent being used;
e) The available positions and locations from which

1 In the last 32 years, the Department has only deployed CS Gas twice, and only when officers faced deadly physical force
including Molotiv cocktails, also known as fire bombs, which are illegal as “incendiary devices” under federal law and the New
York State Penal Code.

Page 24 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00

 chemical agents can be deployed;
f) The potential for injury to person(s) inside the location;
and
g) Other uninvolved subject(s) present inside the location.

c. Unlawful Assembly/Crowd Dispersal:

i. CS Gas may never be used to disperse a peaceful

demonstration.
ii. CS Gas may only be used when a riot is declared, as defined
by New York State law.
iii. A Police Chief or Deputy Chief must order its use.
iv. The Department must give two notifications to the public in the
immediate vicinity tear gas is about to be used.
v. An EMT must be on-site prior to its deployment.
vi. Use of CS Gas is prohibited in residential neighborhoods
unless absolutely necessary to protect lives.
i. The minimum amount of chemical agent shall be used to obtain
compliance.
vii.

viii. other observers, and Albany Police Department members that

are present prior to the use of any chemical agents.

ix. If chemical agent use is contemplated in crowd situations,

Emergency Medical Services must be on site prior to its use
and shall make provisions for decontamination and medical
screening for those persons affected by the chemical agent.

The use of chemical agents against passive resisters is

prohibited absent exigent circumstances.

x.
b. Barricaded Suspect(s) or Subject(s):

i. The incident shall be contained with a command structure in place

that is appropriate for the time frame, the location, and the tactical
situation presented. Chemical agents may be deployed when
necessary, with the approval of the incident commander when:

a) Communication efforts directing the suspect to exit the

location and submit to arrest or custody have failed;
b) An evacuation and/or notification of citizens from the
affected area have been accomplished to prevent
contamination of uninvolved persons;
c) Notification has been given to the present police personnel
to avoid exposing unprotected personnel to the utilized
agent(s); and
Page 25 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00
 d) Every effort should be made for police personnel present to
don their protective chemical agent mask(s).

ii. Only the volume of chemical agents that is reasonable shall be

used. The amount of chemical agent to be used shall be
determined by the following:

a) The seriousness of the offense;

b) The threat to the community posed by the
suspect(s)/subject(s);
c) Location demographics: size, single level or multi-level,
available windows or area for insertion of chemical agents,
wind and weather;
d) Type of chemical agent being used;
e) The available positions and locations from which chemical
agents can be deployed;
f) The potential for injury to person(s) inside the location; and
g) Other uninvolved subject(s) present inside the location.

c. Unlawful Assembly/Crowd Dispersal:

i. With the approval of the Incident Commander, the use of chemical

agents in response to an unlawful assembly may be reasonable
depending on the totality of the circumstance.

a) Members of the Albany Police Department should consider

when, where, and how chemical agents may be deployed,
and consider potential collateral effects.

ii. The minimum amount of chemical agent shall be used to obtain

compliance.
iii. An audible warning of their imminent use and a reasonable amount
of time must be provided to disperse the crowd, on-scene media,

Page 26 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00

 other observers, and Albany Police Department members that are
present prior to the use of any chemical agents.
iv. If chemical agent use is contemplated in crowd situations,
Emergency Medical Services must be on site prior to its use and
shall make provisions for decontamination and medical screening
for those persons affected by the chemical agent.
v. The use of chemical agents against passive resisters is prohibited
absent exigent circumstances.

8. Decontamination:

a. Oleoresin Capsicum:

i. It is the user’s responsibility to make every effort to relieve the

subject’s discomfort after being exposed to OC; by flushing the
eyes and the contaminated areas with cool, clear water. Do Not
Rub.
ii. In the absence of a water source, officers may contact Emergency
Medical Services for assistance in these efforts.
iii. If the subject is wearing contact lenses at the time of exposure,
they should be removed at the earliest opportunity. Soft contact
lenses may hold the active ingredients within, resulting in an
undesired continued effect.

b. CS Gas:

i. Decontamination of First Responder:

a) Begin washing PPE of the first responder using soap and

water solution and a soft brush. Always move in a downward
motion (from head to toe). Make sure to get into all areas,
especially folds in the clothing. Wash and rinse (using cold
or warm water) until the contaminant is thoroughly removed.
b) Remove PPE by rolling downward (from head to toe) and
avoid pulling PPE off over the head. All PPE should be
placed in labeled durable 6-mil (or greater) polyethylene
bag.

ii. Decontamination of Patient/Subject:

a) Remove the patient/victim from the contaminated area and

into a decontamination corridor or safe zone.
b) Request Emergency Medical Services to transport
patient/subject to local medical hospital for further
decontamination.
c) While at hospital, the patient/subject should thoroughly wash
and rinse (using cold or warm water) contaminated skin.
d) Clothing items that are removed from the patient/subject
should be placed in a 6-mil (or greater) polyethylene bag.

IV. RENDERING AID/MEDICAL TREATMENT

Page 27 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00
 A. When an incident of less lethal force results in serious physical injury, minor
injury or complaint of injury, the officer at the scene shall immediately summons
emergency medical services.

1. Should the injury appear to be life threatening in nature, and while

awaiting the arrival of emergency medical service personnel, the officer(s)
present shall initiate any and all life saving techniques for which they have
received training.
2. An officer shall accompany the injured to the medical facility when:

a. The person has suffered serious injuries, or when symptoms of

serious injury becomes apparent;
b. The injured person(s) are under arrest; or
c. After evaluation by qualified emergency medical service personnel
at the scene, there exists a reasonable risk of internal injuries that
may not be manifesting visibly.

3. Once at the medical facility, the person will be examined, treated, and
either admitted to the facility or released to the custody of the officer with a
written medical release from the attending physician.

a. If the person refuses treatment at the medical facility, the officer

may request the refusal be noted in the physician’s records.

V. USE OF FORCE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

A. An Albany Police Department Subject Resistance/Use of Force Report, APD

Form # 422, shown on pages 26, 27 and 28 of this order, shall be completed and
whenever an officer:

1. Takes an action that results in, or is alleged to have resulted in, injury or
death of a person;
2. Applies force through the use of a less lethal weapon, including
display/deployment of a less lethal weapon; or
3. Applies weaponless physical force at a level as defined in this policy.

B. Each officer that uses force must complete a Subject Resistance/use of Force
Report with their own narrative on their use of force. Officers involved in the
incident as witnesses should co-sign these narratives to indicate they reflect the
incident accurately.

B.C. The following information shall be documented on the Subject

Resistance/Use ofForce Report:

1. The nature of the circumstances surrounding the use of force;

2. The officers involved in the incident;
3. The force displayed or used to subdue the subject;

a. When utilizing force that involves the deployment of a CEW, either

through use of multiple probes and/or multiple drive-stuns,
personnel shall state the reasons for each additional use in the
Page 28 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00
 narrative.
b. Deployment of a CEW, baton, or chemical agent by an officer to
gain compliance, whether or not utilized, shall be considered a use
of force incident and shall be documented as such.

Page 29 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00

 4. Injuries, including the following:

a. Complaint of an injury, a sustained injury, or death to the subject;

b. Complaint of an injury or sustained injury to the officer; or
c. Complaint of an injury or sustained injury to another party not
involved in the incident.

5. The medical attention received, or the refusal thereof, along with the name
of the attending physician.

C.D. Upon injury or complaint of injury to an officer as the result of

deployment offorce, officers shall be responsible for completing the
following:

1. A Standardized Incident Report (SIR); and

2. All 207-C and C-3.

D.E. Upon completion of the SIR and/or the Subject Resistance/Use of Force
Report,officers shall submit both documents to their immediate supervisor for
review.

1. Supervisors shall be responsible for completing an administrative review

all Subject Resistance/Use of Force Reports to determine whether policy,
training, equipment, or disciplinary issues should be addressed.
2. If determined that any of the above should be addressed, supervisors
shall submit an IDC to the Chief of Police documenting the reasons why
and the circumstances of the incident.

E.F. Subsequent to the notification of an officer’s use or deployment of less

lethalforce, supervisors shall be responsible for the following:

1. If possible, respond to the incident scene and conduct an initial review of

the circumstances surrounding the use of force, including unintentional
activations of a CEW.
2. Should an officer or subject sustain an injury, supervisors shall determine
if detectives shall respond to the scene of the incident for follow up
investigation. Follow up investigations may include, but are not limited to
the following:

a. Crime scene processing;

b. Interviewing witnesses;
c. Taking statements; and
d. Securing any video/audio recordings.

3. If an officer is unable to complete reports due to injuries, the supervisor

shall prepare, or make arrangements for the completion of all proper
documentation.
4. Upon receiving, and subsequently approving, the officer’s use of force
report, supervisors shall complete an entry into the Blue Team software
application, as per current directives.

a. Approved hard copies shall be forwarded to the Office of

Professional Standards.
Page 30 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00
 F.G. Use of Force Annual Analysis:

Page 31 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00

 1. The Commander of OPS shall conduct a documented annual analysis of
the department’s use of force activities, policies, and practices. The
analysis should identify:

a. Date and time of incidents;

b. Types of encounters resulting in use of force;
c. Trends or patterns related to race, age and gender of subjects
involved;
d. Trends or patterns resulting in injury to any person including
employees; and
e. Impact findings on policies, practices, equipment, and training.

2. The results of this analysis shall be documented on an IDC to the Chief of

Police.

a. The annual analysis shall utilize data from Use of Force Reports
and IAPro between the dates of January 1st and December 31st of
each calendar year.
b. The annual analysis shall be completed by March 31st of each
calendar year.

G.H. Assault on Sworn Officer Review:

1. The Commander of OPS shall conduct a review of all assaults on sworn

personnel with recommendations to enhance officer safety, revise policy,
or address training issues.
2. The review may be included in the annual use of force analysis.

Page 32 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00

Page 33 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00
Page 34 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00
Page 35 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00
Page 36 - Use of Force - Less Lethal Weapons, G.O. No. 1.3.00
 ALBANY, NEW YORK
POLICE DEPARTMENT
165 HENRY JOHNSON BOULEVARD
ALBANY, NY 12210
Eric Hawkins 1789
Chief of Police

OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS: COMPLAINT PROCEDURES

GENERAL ORDER NO: 2.4.05
Issue Date: June 14, 2022 Effective Date: March 1998
Revision Date: June 14, 2022 NYSLEAP: 25.1c,e,f
Volume 2: Logistics Chapter 4: Office of Professional Standards
Distribution: All Personnel Page: 1 of 13
Issuing Authority: Chief Eric Hawkins

PURPOSE: The purpose of this policy is to establish procedures for the proper receiving,
reporting, and investigating of all complaints and allegations of misconduct by the
department or its employees.

POLICY: It is the policy of the Albany Police Department to promptly, competently,

professionally, and impartially investigate all complaints and allegations of
misconduct by the department or its employees.

DEFINITIONS: Albany Community itizens’ Police Review Board (CPRB) – The Albany
Citizens’ommunity Police Review Board (CPRB) is an independent body
established by the City of Albany in 2000 to improve communication between the
Police Department and the community, to increase police accountability and
credibility with the public, and tocreate a complaint review process that is free
from bias and informed of actual police practice.

I. COMPLAINTS

A. Complaint Procedures:

1. The department recognizes that its personnel are often subject to intense
pressures in the discharge of their duties. Employees must remain neutral
under circumstances that are likely to generate tension, excitement,
pressure and emotion. In such situations, words, actions, or events
frequently can result in misunderstandings and confusion.
2. It is to the advantage of all employees and citizenscommunity members to
have a procedure for the investigation of the more serious allegations and
underlying circumstances so that complaints can be resolved taking into
account the complicated pressures of law enforcement services.
3. The image of the department depends on the personal integrity and
discipline of all department employees. To a large degree, the public
image of this department is determined by the professional response to
allegations of misconduct by the department or its employees. Therefore,
the department shall be responsible for the following:

a. Promptly, competently, professionally, and impartially investigating

Page 1 - Office of Professional Standards: Complaint Procedures, G.O. No.2.4.05

 all complaints relative to the department or its employees response
to community needs;
b. Take appropriate disciplinary action in all cases where an
investigation substantiates a violation of law, orders, rules,
regulations, policies, or procedures; and
c. Seek appropriate remedy for false allegations; and
d.c. Establish rules, regulations, policies, or procedures in
order to direct and control the means by which law enforcement
servicesare delivered in the most efficient and effective manner.

4. CCommunity membersitizens who seek to file a complaint against

the department or its employees shall be directed to an on-duty
supervisor to record the complaint.Theon-dutysupervisorshalberesponsiblefortakingthecomplaint and
explaining the complaint process to citizenscommunity members in
a professional manner meaning in .a courteous, non-argumentative
manner which is not defensive and does not question the validity of
the complaint. This step is meant to inform the complainant not
investigate the complaint.

a. Complaints against the department or its employees shall be

documented as outlined in this policy and forwarded to the Office of
Professional Standards (OPS). The OPS Commander shall be
responsible for notifying the Chief of Police when a complaint of this
nature is received.

5. Discretion shall be exercised by the supervisor as to which

citizens’community complaints shall be handled at the supervisor level
and which complaintsshall be forwarded to the Office of Professional
Standards (OPS). If the complaint is forwarded to OPS, then OPS shall
complete a grievance report and forward that report to the Administrative
Agency that administers the Community Police Review Board. If a
complaint is handled at the supervisory level the grievance report
completed as a result of that complaint shall also be forwarded to the
Administrative Agency that administers the CPRB. Regardless, all
complaints will be documented by IDC (Inter-Departmental
Correspondence) from the supervisor handling it to the Chief of Police.

a. Complaints handled at the supervisory level include, but are not

limited to the following:

i. Attitude, character, or rudeness;

ii. A misunderstanding of the law;
iii. Tardiness;
iv. The complainant does not wish to further register a formal
complaint; or
v. The complaint is not related to a violation of
policy/procedure.

b. Complaints that shall be forwarded to OPS include, but are not

limited to the following:

Page 2 - Office of Professional Standards: Complaint Procedures, G.O. No.2.4.05

 i. Complaints whereby an employee may face disciplinary or
criminal action must be forwarded to OPS, such as misuse
of force, corruption, criminal misconduct, or civil rights
violations; or
ii. Incidents where the complainant refuses to file the complaint
with the supervisor, than the complainant shall be referred to
the OPS.

a) Complaints of this nature shall immediately be

brought to the attention of the Chief of Police through
the chain of command.

Page 3 - Office of Professional Standards: Complaint Procedures, G.O. No.2.4.05

 6. If the complaint is handled at the supervisor level, then the supervisor
shall be responsible for completing an Albany Police Department
Supervisor Inquiry Report and entering it into IDC, APD Form # 423
shown on page 8 of this order, and forwarding the report to OPS.
When the Supervisory Inquiry Report is forwarded to OPS, then OPS
shall forward the Supervisory Inquiry Report to the Administrative
Agency that administers the Community Police Review Board.

a. Supervisory officers are not relieved of their responsibilities to

investigate complaints concerning investigations of
citizencommunity complaints against personnel under their
command, and shall notautomatically refer the complainant to
OPS without gathering further information.

7. If the complainant desires further action and the matter warrants further
investigation, the supervisor shall then advise the complainant that they
should file a written complaint via a Community Complaint FormCitizen
CComplaint Form, shown on pages 9 through 12 of this order, or the
complainant may submit a written letter detailing the incident. The
supervisor shall be responsible for offeringthe complainant a
CitizenCommunity Complaint Form.

a. The department shall make information available to the public

regarding the procedures for registering complaints against the
department or its employees.
b. This information shall be accessible at the following locations/sites:

i. Albany Community Development Agency;

ii. Albany Housing Authority;
iii. Capital District Gay and Lesbian Community Council;
iv. Center for Law and Justice;
v. New York Civil Liberties Union;
vi. One Hundred Black Men of the Capital Region;
vii. Any Albany Police Station;
vii.viii. City Hall;
viii.ix. Government Law Center of Albany Law School;
ix.x. Albany High School; and
x.xi. University at Albany.

c. Also located at the above locations are Civilian - Employee

Commendation Forms, APD Form # 456A shown on page 13 of this
order. This form allows a civilian to submit a commendation for an
employee of this department.
d.c. If a complaint is taken by telephone and not in person, the
supervisor shall interview the complainant and determine if the
complaint should be handled at the supervisor level or forwarded to
OPS. If warranted, a Supervisor Inquiry Report shall be completed.
If the supervisor makes the determination that a formal complaint is
warranted or the citizencommunity member desires to initiate a
formal complaint, the supervisor shall explain to the
Page 4 - Office of Professional Standards: Complaint Procedures, G.O. No.2.4.05
 citizencommunity member how to obtain a Citizen Community
Complaint Form and shall memorialize the initial conversation with
the complainant via an IDC, recording, at a minimum, the following
information:

i. Complainant’s name, address, and telephone number;

Page 5 - Office of Professional Standards: Complaint Procedures, G.O. No.2.4.05

 ii. Date, time, and place of incident;
iii. Name of involved employee(s), shield number, if applicable;
iv. Description of involved employee(s), if name(s) is unknown;
v. Name(s), address, and telephone numbers of any witnesses;
vi. Details of the complaint; and
vii. Upon completion, this information shall be forwarded in a
manner agreeable with the complainant (mail, email,
phone or in-person).

e.d. All written complaints shall be addressed to the Chief of

Police orthe Citizens’Community Police Review Board (CPRB).
f.e. Written complaints delivered in person to any department facility
shall be placed in a sealed envelope and addressed to the Chief of
Police.

i. Upon receipt of the pre-printed complaint form, there is a

section marked “Official Use Only,” which shall be utilized for
providing the complainant a receipt.
ii. This section shall be completed by the receiving officer
before placing the form in a sealed envelope.

g.f. CitizensCommunity members shall receive a letter from the

CPRB notifying the complainant that their complaint has been
received and that thecomplaint will be investigated according to
department policy. and administratively handled.
h.g. When a CitizenCommunity Complaint Form is issued or a
complainant chooses to submit a letter addressing their
complaint, the supervisor shall complete an Intra-Department
Correspondence (IDC) to the Chief of Police detailing the
allegation(s) made by thecomplainant. The IDC shall include, but
not be limited to the following information:

i.h. Time and date the complaint was received;

ii. Name, address, and telephone number of the complainant;
iii. Name, any identification number(s), and assignment of the
alleged employee;
iv. Nature of the allegation;
v. Time, date, and location of the alleged incident; and
vi. Comments as to the complainant’s or witnesses’ mental or
physical condition.Any additional applicable information.

8. If the complainant appears under the influence of an intoxicant or drug, or

is apparently suffering from a mental disorder, or displays any other trait or
condition bearing on his/her credibility, this information shall be noted on
the Supervisor Inquiry Report or the IDC. Any visible marks or injuries
relative to the allegation shall be noted and photographed.
9. Complaints, regardless of their nature, can be lodged in person, by mail,
or by phone, at any time. As part of the follow up investigative activity,
persons making complaints by mail or phone normally will be interviewed
and a written signed complaint prepared by OPS.

Page 6 - Office of Professional Standards: Complaint Procedures, G.O. No.2.4.05

 a. Every effort shall be made to facilitate the convenient, courteous,
and prompt receipt and processing of citizencommunity
complaints.

Page 7 - Office of Professional Standards: Complaint Procedures, G.O. No.2.4.05

 10. Prisoners or arrestees may also make complaints. Circumstances may
require a department representative to meet the complainant at a jail or
prison for an interview. If appropriate, the police representative will have
photographs taken of any injuries.
11. Department employees receiving a citizen community complaint
through U.S. mailshall forward the complaint to OPS who will
determine investigative responsibility.

II. COMPLAINT PROCESSING

A. Investigations involving complaints against department personnel shall follow the

procedures outlined in the employee’s respective Agreement, if applicable.

1. This shall include when employees are notified that they have become the
subject of an internal investigation; and
2. That the department issues the employee a written statement of the
allegations and the employee’s rights and responsibilities in regards to the
investigation.

B. Investigation of complaints shall generally be completed within sixty (60) days of

the complaint investigation being assigned to an OPS detective. The detective
may request extensions of the time period from the Chief of Police when
extenuating circumstances exist.

1. OPS shall be responsible for notifying all complainants as to the status of

their complaints and the expected completion date.
2. Should an administrative investigation take longer than expected, OPS will
notify the complainant and the subject employee of the delay and reason.

2.C. Given the possibility of misunderstanding, following an investigation which

fails to find wrongdoing on the part of the officer, the department should NOT
seek any remedy for false allegations filed as a citizen'scommunity members
complaint, which could deter other complainants.

III. CATEGORY OF FINDINGS/CONCLUSION OF FACT

A. The Office of Professional Standards (OPS) shall classify all completed internal
investigations according to the following:

1. Exonerated:

a. Where the facts, which provide the basis for the complaint
occurred, but the review shows that such acts were proper.

2. Unfounded:

a. Where the review shows that the act or acts complained did not
occur or were misconstrued.

3. Not Sustained:

Page 8 - Office of Professional Standards: Complaint Procedures, G.O. No.2.4.05

 a. Where the review fails to disclose sufficient facts to prove or
disprove the allegation made in the complaint.

4. Ineffective Policy or Training:

Page 9 - Office of Professional Standards: Complaint Procedures, G.O. No.2.4.05

 a. Where the matter does not involve guilt or lack thereof, but rather
ineffective department policy or training to address the situation.

5. Sustained:

a. Where the review discloses sufficient facts to prove the allegations

made in the complaint.

6. No Finding:

a. Where, for example, the complainant failed to produce information

to further the investigation;
b. Where the investigation revealed that another agency was
responsible and the complaint or complainant has been referred to
that agency;
c. Where the complainant is unavailable to clarify the complaint; or
d. Where the officer is no longer employed by the City.

7. Mediated:

a. Where the complaint is resolved by mediation.

B. The Office of Professional Standards shall be responsible for the following:

1. Maintaining a record of all complaints against the department or its

employees.

a. All sustained complaints shall be maintained in the employee’s

personnel file, as well as in OPS files.
b. Completed investigations classified by all other adjudications shall
be maintained solely in OPS files.
c. OPS shall protect the confidentiality of these records and maintain
them in a secure area, in accordance with legal requirements.

2. The employee shall be notified of the results of the investigation.

3. Upon completion of an administrative investigation of a citizen’scommunity
members grievance,the complainant shall be notified of the finding by
OPS.
4. Upon completion of a citizen’scommunity complaint, the complainant shall
be notifiedby the CPRB of the finding.
5. No employee of this department shall be permitted to review any file
regarding an active ongoing investigation maintained by OPS, without the
approval of the Chief of Police.

IV. LIAISON WITH DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE

A. The Albany Police Department promotes the well-being of its employees by

maintaining high standards of work performance and professional conduct.

1. The department will not tolerate employee criminal behavior that

negatively impact’s the department’s interests, property, security,
reputation, employee safety, or the confidence of the public.
2. This applies to both on-duty and off-duty conducts, as they both affect the
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 ability for the department to function within the confines of the confidence

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 of the public.

B. If the criminal investigation is being conducted by the Albany Police Department

it will be bifurcated from the administrative case.

1. The investigators assigned to the criminal case will make appropriate

notifications to the District Attorney’s office, when appropriate.
2. Upon the commencement of a criminal proceeding, the investigators will
continue as liaisons with the District Attorney’s office until conclusion of
the case.

C. If the criminal conduct is being investigated by an outside agency or the offense

occurred outside of the department’s jurisdiction, OPS will act as a liaison to the
appropriate law enforcement agency(s) involved and as a liaison to the
appropriate prosecuting agency(s) involved.

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 ALBANY, NEW YORK
POLICE DEPARTMENT
165 HENRY JOHNSON BOULEVARD
ALBANY, NEW YORK 12210
Eric Hawkins 1789
Chief of Police
BODY WORN CAMERAS
GENERAL ORDER NO: 3.2.15
Issue Date: June 14, 2022 Effective Date: August 13, 2018
Revision Date: June 14, 2022 CALEA: 41.3.8
Volume 3: Operations Chapter 2: Uniforms and Equipment
Distribution: Sworn & CTU Personnel NYSLEAP: N/A
Issuing Authority: Chief Eric Hawkins Page: 1 of 7

PURPOSE: The purpose of this policy is to establish procedures for the use of the Body
Worn Camera (herein after referred to as BWC) utilized by sworn personnel. This
Department currently utilizes the Axon 2 BWC System.

POLICY: It is the policy of the Albany Police Department that personnel shall utilize BWCs,
and the resulting video/audio files, in a manner that is in accordance with
applicable laws and the procedures set forth in this policy. BWC video/audio
recordings have proven to be a valuable tool in the prosecution of traffic and
criminal offenses, the collection of evidence, the documentation of a subject’s
actions, as well as an investigative aid, and as a training aid to enhance officer
performance and safety. BWCs are also a tool to ensure accountability and
transparency. In order to maximize the utility of this equipment in these and
related areas, officers shall follow the procedures set forth in this policy.

DEFINITIONS: Body Worn Camera – Body worn camera means audio/video recording
equipment to be worn on an officer’s person.

Axon View – Axon View is a mobile application which allows video playback and
live streaming at 30 fps and the ability to add metadata.

Evidence.com – Evidence.com is a cloud based Digital Evidence Management

System (DEMS).

Evidence Sync – Evidence Sync is a software program which allows full motion
playback and ability to add metadata

I. GENERAL INFORMATION

A. Employees shall only use a BWC system that has been issued and approved by
the department.

B. No BWC shall be accessed, viewed, copied, disseminated, or otherwise used by

a sworn or non-sworn employee, except for an official purpose specified in this
directive.

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 C. Personnel shall inform persons whom they are in contact with that they are being
recorded, if requested.

D. Personnel will dock their BWC in the docking/charging station at their station of
assignment upon completion of their shift and prior to making relief for the
purpose of uploading audio/video data to the BWC server and charging the BWC
battery.

1. An area next to the docking stations shall be maintained for the storage of
fully uploaded and charged BWCs for the purpose of making available
ports within the docking station for those BWCs in need of
charging/upload.

E. No employee shall wear or operate a BWC unless they:

1. Have been authorized to do so by the Chief of Police; and

2. Have received training on the proper care and use of the device in
accordance with department policy.

a. BWC training should include, but is not limited to:

1) Usage;
2) Limitations;
3) Activation;
4) Deactivation;
5) Reviewing and tagging;
6) Docking;
7) Placement; and
8) Retention/request periods.

3. All sworn supervisors shall also receive training in relation to the usage of
reviewing capabilities for administrative purposes.

a. Shift sergeants must review two (2) separate random videos per
officer in their command/per month for the purpose of identifying
training needs and or compliance with department policy and
procedure.
b. Shift Lieutenants must review one (1) random video per sergeant
under their command/per month for the purpose of identifying
training needs and or compliance with department policy and
procedure.
c. All BWC reviews will be documented on Albany Police Department
BWC Audit Report, APD Form #432.
d. While conducting audits, supervisors should also make a note
within the notes section of the video on Evidence.com

F. Employees assigned a BWC are responsible for ensuring the BWC remains
mounted in a position to allow the recording of an encounter or incident and is in
good working order.

1. Personnel who require the use of a pacemaker shall notify the department
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 for the purpose of obtaining a nonmagnetic mount as to not interfere with
its operation.

G. Prior to beginning their shift, personnel assigned a BWC will ensure its readiness
by conducting a pre-shift operational inspection. Personnel shall also inspect
BWC’s at the conclusion of each shift to ensure system integrity.

1. When conducting the pre-shift inspection, the officer shall activate the
BWC and verbally state the date, time, and that a pre-shift inspection and
test are being conducted.

H. Maintenance:

1. Firmware updates are provided from Axon and occur periodically. When
an update is available the BWC will receive the update through the
docking station after any audio/video evidence is uploaded from the
device.
2. Use a soft, damp cloth to clean the surface.
3. Do not use harsh cleaners or solvents and do not use Windex or similar
type cleaners on the camera lens.
4. Do not immerse the BWC in water or place the lens under running water.
BWCs are water resistant, not waterproof.

I. Any problems preventing the use of the unit during the shift will be reported to the
officer’s immediate supervisor as well as a member of the Computer and
Technology Unit (CTU) at support@albany-ny.org and a notation made in the
station blotter.

II. BWC ASSIGNMENTS

A. All officers working in a patrol and traffic safety capacity shall be required to wear
a BWC during the entirety of their shift.

B. All Neighborhood Engagement Unit (NEU) officers shall be required to wear a

BWC during the entirety of their shift.

C. All detectives and officers assigned to plain clothes patrols, including personnel
assigned to D.A.R.T. shall be required to utilize a BWC while engaged in pre-
planned interdiction activities, including search warrants.

1. It shall be at the discretion of the detective/officer or their supervisor as to

whether a BWC shall be utilized when conducting activities other than pre-
planned interdictions, such as door-to-door canvasses or off-site
interviews. However, once a BWC is activated, the procedures outlined in
this policy apply and must be adhered to.
2. Furthermore, it shall be noted that BWCs shall not be activated while in
any of the detective offices, unless otherwise directed to do so by a
supervisor or enforcement action is being taken.

D. K-9 officers shall utilize a BWC while engaged in an enforcement action.

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 E. Spare BWCs will be kept at stations if the need arises to replace a defective or
malfunctioning BWC.

1. Supervisors will be able to assign spare BWC within evidence.com

III. USES OF THE BWC

A. The decision to electronically record an encounter is not discretionary and shall

be limited to circumstances requiring activation as outlined in this general order.

1. Personnel will activate their BWC without unnecessary intentional

delay uponbeing dispatched on a call.
2. BWC will be activated prior to citizen engagement during a self-initiated
stop.
3. BWC will be immediately activated as directed by this policy, except when
an immediate threat to the officer’s life or safety makes activating the
BWC impossible or dangerous, the officer shall activate the camera at the
first reasonable opportunity to do so.
4. After completing the initial pre-shift test, personnel must have their
BWC in standby mode at all times unless outlined by this General
Order.

B. Once activated, the BWC shall record the entire incident until completion unless
directed otherwise by a supervisor or is outlined in this policy. Supervisor shall
document why they are instructing personnel to turn BWC off. If a supervisor
directs an officer to stop recording an incident for a reason that is not in
accordance with the Department’s General Orders, such supervisor’s actions
shall be investigated by OPS.

C. If an officer fails to activate the BWC, fails to record the entire event contact, or
interrupts the recording, the officer will be required to document the reason on an
Investigation Report. If an officer fails to activate the BWC or there is an
interruption in the recording then OPS shall investigate the incident and the
officer may face disciplinary action up to and including termination.

D. While inside department buildings, personnel shall turn off their BWC unless
enforcement action is necessary.

1. This does not pertain to those personnel assigned to the desk position for
their tour of duty. BWC use is authorized for public interactions.

E. Criminal uses of BWC data.

1. Evidence;
2. Statements/Oral admissions; and
3. Miranda warning documentation.

F. Administrative uses of BWC data.

1. Review of data for reports and statements;

2. Departmental investigations; and
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 3. Training purposes.

G. BWCs shall be utilized in the following situations:

1. All calls for service, unless outlined below in Section III-I;

2. When in emergency vehicle operation mode;

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 3. All pursuits;
4. All transports;
5. All enforcement actions, to include but not limited to:

a. Arrests;

1) BWC can be turned off once in Central Booking.

2) During prisoner watches, BWCs shall be placed in standby
mode and must be activated if any enforcement action is taken.

b. Traffic stops;
c. Street encounters;
d. Foot pursuits;
e. Emotionally Disturbed Person calls; and
f. Any use of force situation

6. When administering Standardized Field Sobriety Tests;

7. Any situation the officer feels that the activation of the BWC would serve a
legitimate law enforcement purpose, unless prohibited by law or this
policy;
8. Any situation at the direction of a supervisor;
9. Street level “show up” identification procedures; and
10. Hospital settings, when enforcement action is being taken and as deemed
necessary by the officer.

H. Recordings captured on BWCs that are uploaded to the BWC server shall be
tagged in the most appropriate category, to include:

1. Criminal investigations;
2. DWI related;
3. Miscellaneous;
4. OPS investigations;
5. Traffic Violations;
6. Arrest;
7. Use of force;
8. Injury to officer or suspect; and
9. Video test.

a. A default category for pending review exists within the BWC server.
Videos that are not properly tagged will be left in this category until
properly tagged. Supervisors should routinely monitor this section
in order to prevent untagged videos.

i. While tagging videos, personnel shall also include the

incident number and a title on the audio/video file within
Evidence.com

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 I. BWCs shall not to be utilized for the following:

1. To deceitfully record other department personnel for nefarious purposes;

2. To ridicule or embarrass anyone;
3. In a manner that violates law or where prohibited;
4. When interviewing sexual assault victims or obvious juvenile victims;
5. Routine patrol;
6. For internal police conversations(locker room, squad room, bathroom etc);
7. Other law enforcement meetings;
8. Meetings with advocacy groups, unless enforcement action is necessary;
9. Situations when entering personal residences for routine calls and
requested not to record by occupants, unless enforcement action is
necessary;
10. Traffic control posts, unless enforcement action is necessary; and
11. Personal use.

J. BWCs may be utilized in the following situations, at the discretion of the officer or
supervisor:

1. When speaking with informants or other sources;

2. Undercover operations (drug buys, surveillance operations, etc);
3. When completing reports when no longer with civilians;
4. Interviewing victims/complainants in a police facility;
5. Snow emergency details;
6. General community policing functions (CPTED and security surveys, bike
rodeos, etc);
7. Community meetings;
8. Routine walk up requests (giving directions or other information); and
9. During special events, i.e. parades, festivals, unless enforcement action is
necessary.
9.10. To document misconduct or violations of these rules of Department
personnel.

K. If a BWC is utilized, it shall be documented on the report associated with the call,
i.e. SIR, Contact Card.

IV. AUDIO/VIDEO DATA

A. Prior to BWC footage being uploaded to the BWC server, the officer may review
the footage on Axon View or Evidence.com for the purpose of completing any
reports associated with the call, unless directed not to by a supervisor.

1. Personnel are only allowed to review the footage captured on their

assigned BWC, unless prior authorization is obtained from their immediate
supervisor.
2. Copies of any BWC footage are not authorized.
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 B. Upon approval by Command Staff, Training personnel may be able to review

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 BWC footage for the purpose of identifying training needs.

C. Every time a video file is reviewed, an audit trail is generated with the video file
for tracking purposes.

V. AUDIO/VIDEO FILE PRESERVATION

A. Personnel shall request that specific audio/video files be preserved by submitting

an Albany Police Department Audio/Video Preservation Request Form, APD
Form # 431 to the Office of Professional Services via departmental mail.

B. If an officer makes a request for video/audio captured from their BWC and there
is video/audio captured of the same incident by another officer’s BWC, a
separate request for file preservation must be completed.

C. Supervisors must request that digital video/audio files be preserved in the event
of:

1. The receipt of a civilian complaint and/or notice of claim;

D. BWC files shall not be altered by Department personnel in any manner, and will
be preserved as captured. All digital video/audio files are the property of the
Albany Police Department, and are not to be released or displayed without the
consent of the Chief of Police or his/her designee.

VI. AUDIO/VIDEO FILE STORAGE AND RETENTION SCHEDULE

A. The captured video/audio files will be temporarily stored on the individual BWC
device until downloaded to a cloud based storage solution at the end of each
shift.

B. All downloaded digital audio/video files are scheduled to be held per the
department’s current retention schedule.

C. Digital video/audio files that have been preserved shall not be released to any
person or agency without prior approval from the Chief of Police or his/her
designee, and only after a duplicate copy has been retained by OPS. All FOIL
requests will be processed according to current departmental and city directives.

D. All requests for access to the video files by outside parties will be administered
through the Office Professional Standards. Access to the video files will
determined by applicable laws.

E. Beginning August 13, 2018, this General Order shall be reviewed every six (6)
months until further notice.

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