A.C. No.

7204

March 7, 2007

CYNTHIA ADVINCULA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Cynthia Advincula against respondent Atty. Ernesto
M. Macabata, charging the latter with Gross Immorality.
Complainant alleged the following:
Sometime on 1st week of December 2004 complainant [Cynthia Advincula] seek the legal advice of
the respondent [Atty. Macabata], regarding her collectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours. As
promised, he sent Demand Letter dated December 11, 2004 (copy attached as Annex "I") to the
concerned parties.
On February 10, 2005, met (sic) at Zensho Restaurant in Tomas Morato, Quezon City to discuss the
possibility of filing the complaint against Queensway Travel and Tours because they did not settle
their accounts as demanded. After the dinner, respondent sent complainant home and while she is
about to step out of the car, respondent hold (sic) her arm and kissed her on the cheek and
embraced her very tightly.
Again, on March 6, 2005, at about past 10:00 in the morning, she met respondent at Starbucks
coffee shop in West Avenue, Quezon City to finalize the draft of the complaint to be filed in Court.
After the meeting, respondent offered again a ride, which he usually did every time they met. Along
the way, complainant was wandering (sic) why she felt so sleepy where in fact she just got up from
bed a few hours ago. At along Roosevelt Avenue immediately after corner of Felipe St., in San
Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City when she was almost restless respondent stopped his car and
forcefully hold (sic) her face and kissed her lips while the other hand was holding her breast.
Complainant even in a state of shocked (sic) succeeded in resisting his criminal attempt and
immediately manage (sic) to go (sic) out of the car.
In the late afternoon, complainant sent a text message to respondent informing him that she decided
to refer the case with another lawyer and needs (sic) to get back the case folder from him. The
communications transpired was recorded in her cellular phone and read as follows:
Sent by complainant
At 5:33:46 pm

- forget the case. I decided to refer it with other lawyer

replied by respondent
at 6:16:11 pm

- "does this mean I can not c u anymore"

(Does this mean I cannot see you
anymore)

sent by complainant
at 6:17:59 pm

- I feel bad. I cant expect that u will take advantage of

the situation.

Follow-up message

- wrong to kiss a girl especially in the lips if you dont

Sent by complainant
At 6:29:30 pm

have relationship with her.

Replied by respondent
At 6:32:43 pm

- "Im veri sri. Its not tking advantage of the situation, 2

put it rightly it s an expression of feeling. S sri" (Im
very sorry. Its not taking advantage of the situation, to
put it rightly it is an expression of feeling)

Follow up message
by respondent
at 6:42:25 pm

- Im s sri. Il not do it again. Wil u stil c me s I can show

u my sincerity" (Im so sorry. Ill not do it again. Will
you still see me so I can show you my sincerity)

On the following day, March 7, 2005 respondent sent another message to complainant at 3:55:32
pm saying "I dont know wat 2 do s u may 4give me. "Im realy sri. Puede bati na tyo." (I dont know
what to do so you may forgive me. Im really sorry. Puede bati na tayo).
Respondent replied "talk to my lawyer in due time." Then another message was received by her at
4:06:33 pm saying "Ano k ba. Im really sri. Pls. Nxt ime bhave n me." (Ano ka ba. Im really sorry.
Please next time behave na ko), which is a clear manifestation of admission of guilt. 2
In his answer,3 respondent admitted that he agreed to provide legal services to the complainant; that
he met with complainant on 10 February 2005 and 6 March 2005, to discuss the relevant matters
relative to the case which complainant was intending to file against the owners of Queensway Travel
and Tours for collection of a sum of money; that on both occasions, complainant rode with him in his
car where he held and kissed complainant on the lips as the former offered her lips to him; and, that
the corner of Cooper Street and Roosevelt Avenue, where he dropped off the complainant, was a
busy street teeming with people, thus, it would have been impossible to commit the acts imputed to
him.
By way of defense, respondent further elucidated that: 1) there was a criminal case for Acts of
Lasciviousness filed by complainant against respondent pending before the Office of the City
Prosecutor in Quezon City; 2) the legal name of complainant is Cynthia Advincula Toriana since she
remains married to a certain Jinky Toriana because the civil case for the nullification of their marriage
was archived pursuant to the Order dated 6 December 2000 issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Maburao, Occidental Mindoro; 3) the complainant was living with a man not her husband; and 4) the
complainant never bothered to discuss respondents fees and it was respondent who always paid for
their bills every time they met and ate at a restaurant.
A hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) at the IBP Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, on 26 July 2005.
On 30 September 2005, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa submitted his Report and
Recommendation,4 recommending the imposition of the penalty of one (1) month suspension on
respondent for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Thereafter, the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-117 dated 20 March 2006, approving and
adopting, with modification, the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the aboveentitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering the

behavior of Respondent went beyond the norms of conduct required of a lawyer when dealing with
or relating with a client, Atty. Ernesto A. Macabata is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three
(3) months.5
The issue to be resolved in this case is: whether respondent committed acts that are grossly immoral
or which constitute serious moral depravity that would warrant his disbarment or suspension from
the practice of law.
Simple as the facts of the case may be, the manner by which we deal with respondents actuations
shall have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined.
Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be. This permissiveness
notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a high degree of social
responsibility and, hence, must handle their personal affairs with greater caution.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON I x x x
Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
xxxx
Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.
As may be gleaned from above, the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded that their possession of good moral character is a
continuing condition to preserve their membership in the Bar in good standing. The continued
possession of good moral character is a requisite condition for remaining in the practice of law.6 In
Aldovino v. Pujalte, Jr.,7 we emphasized that:
This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of members of the
Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in
the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Membership in the legal profession is a
privilege. And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and
confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made
him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the
privilege.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. The
legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the
integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions
as officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality.8 We explained
in Barrientos v. Daarol9 that, "as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral

character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with
the highest moral standards of the community."
Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also
throughout their legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored
fraternity. They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor.10
In Bar Matter No. 1154,11 good moral character was defined as what a person really is, as
distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, or the estimate
in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective
term but one which corresponds to objective reality.
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has four ostensible purposes,
namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective
clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves.12
In the case at bar, respondent admitted kissing complainant on the lips.
In his Answer,13 respondent confessed, thus:
27. When she was about to get off the car, I said can I kiss you goodnight. She offered her left cheek
and I kissed it and with my left hand slightly pulled her right face towards me and kissed her gently
on the lips. We said goodnight and she got off the car.
xxxx
35. When I stopped my car I said okay. I saw her offered (sic) her left cheek and I lightly kissed it and
with my right hand slightly pulled her right cheek towards me and plant (sic) a light kiss on her lips.
There was no force used. No intimidation made, no lewd designs displayed. No breast holding was
done. Everything happened very spontaneously with no reaction from her except saying "sexual
harassment."
During the hearing held on 26 July 2005 at the 3rd floor, IBP Building, Dona Julia Vargas Avenue,
Ortigas City, respondent candidly recalled the following events:
ATTY. MACABATA:
That time in February, we met I fetched her I should say, somewhere along the corner of Edsa
and Kamuning because it was then raining so we are texting each other. So I parked my car
somewhere along the corner of Edsa and Kamuning and I was there about ten to fifteen minutes
then she arrived. And so I said she opened my car and then she went inside so I said, would you
like that we have a Japanese dinner? And she said yes, okay. So I brought her to Zensho which is
along Tomas Morato. When we were there, we discussed about her case, we ordered food and then
a little while I told her, would it be okay for you of I (sic) order wine? She said yes so I ordered two
glasses of red wine. After that, after discussing matters about her case, so I said its about 9:00 or
beyond that time already, so I said okay, lets go. So when I said lets go so I stood up and then I
went to the car. I went ahead of my car and she followed me then she rode on (sic) it. So I told her
where to? She told me just drop me at the same place where you have been dropping me for the
last meetings that we had and that was at the corner of Morato and Roosevelt Avenue. So, before

she went down, I told her can I kiss you goodnight? She offered her left cheek and I kissed it and
with the slight use of my right hand, I ... should I say tilted her face towards me and when shes
already facing me I lightly kissed her on the lips. And then I said good night. She went down the car,
thats it.
COMM. FUNA:
February 10 iyan.
xxxx
ATTY. MACABATA:
Okay. After that were through so I said lets go because I have an appointment. So we went out, we
went inside my car and I said where to? Same place, she said, so then at the same corner. So
before she went down , before she opened the door of the car, I saw her offered her left cheek. So I
kissed her again.
COMM. FUNA:
Pardon?
ATTY. MACABATA:
I saw her offered her left cheek like that, so I kissed her again and then with the use of my left hand,
pushed a little bit her face and then kissed her again softly on the lips and thats it. x x
x.14 (Emphases supplied.)
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral
conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional
behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. 15
In Zaguirre v. Castillo,16 we reiterated the definition of immoral conduct, as such conduct which is so
willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable
members of the community. Furthermore, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same
must not simply be immoral, but grossly immoral. It must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act,
or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.
The following cases were considered by this Court as constitutive of grossly immoral conduct:
In Toledo v. Toledo,17 a lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law, when he abandoned his lawful
wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child.
In Obusan v. Obusan, Jr.,18 a lawyer was disbarred after complainant proved that he had abandoned
her and maintained an adulterous relationship with a married woman. This court declared that
respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of
the bar.

In Dantes v. Dantes,19 respondents act of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women
during the subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct
warranting the imposition of appropriate sanctions. Complainants testimony, taken in conjunction
with the documentary evidence, sufficiently established that respondent breached the high and
exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession.
In Delos Reyes v. Aznar,20 it was ruled that it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with
children, to have taken advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking
complainant, a student in said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of
her under the threat that she would flank in all her subjects in case she refused.
In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,21 respondent lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife
and three children, lured an innocent woman into marrying him and misrepresented himself as a
"bachelor" so he could contract marriage in a foreign land.
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,22 respondent entered into multiple marriages and then resorted to legal
remedies to sever them. There, we ruled that "[s]uch pattern of misconduct by respondent
undermines the institutions of marriage and family, institutions that this society looks to for the
rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our
communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole." As such, "there can be no other
fate that awaits respondent than to be disbarred."
In Tucay v. Tucay,23 respondent contracted marriage with another married woman and left
complainant with whom he has been married for thirty years. We ruled that such acts constitute "a
grossly immoral conduct and only indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of
his profession," warranting respondents disbarment.
In Villasanta v. Peralta,24 respondent married complainant while his first wife was still alive, their
marriage still valid and subsisting. We held that "the act of respondent of contracting the second
marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality." Thus, lacking the good moral
character required by the Rules of Court, respondent was disqualified from being admitted to the bar.
In Cabrera v. Agustin,25 respondent lured an innocent woman into a simulated marriage and
thereafter satisfied his lust. We held that respondent failed to maintain that degree of morality and
integrity which, at all times, is expected of members of the bar. He is, therefore, disbarred from the
practice of law.
Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude,
or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or
shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the
community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare. 26
Guided by the definitions above, we perceived acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks as mere
gestures of friendship and camaraderie,27 forms of greetings, casual and customary. The acts of
respondent, though, in turning the head of complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips are
distasteful. However, such act, even if considered offensive and undesirable, cannot be considered
grossly immoral.
Complainants bare allegation that respondent made use and took advantage of his position as a
lawyer to lure her to agree to have sexual relations with him, deserves no credit. The burden of proof
rests on the complainant, and she must establish the case against the respondent by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof,28 disclosing a case that is free from doubt as to compel the

exercise by the Court of its disciplinary power.29 Thus, the adage that "he who asserts not he who
denies, must prove."30 As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party who makes
the allegationsei incumbit probation, qui decit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum
negantis probation nulla sit.31 In the case at bar, complainant miserably failed to comply with the
burden of proof required of her. A mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice.
Accusation is not synonymous with guilt.32
Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the lips, the same was not
motivated by malice. We come to this conclusion because right after the complainant expressed her
annoyance at being kissed by the respondent through a cellular phone text message, respondent
immediately extended an apology to complainant also via cellular phone text message. The
exchange of text messages between complainant and respondent bears this out.
Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where there were several people in the vicinity
considering that Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney route for 24 hours. If respondent truly had
malicious designs on complainant, he could have brought her to a private place or a more remote
place where he could freely accomplish the same.
All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondents acts are not grossly immoral nor highly
reprehensible to warrant disbarment or suspension.
The question as to what disciplinary sanction should be imposed against a lawyer found guilty of
misconduct requires consideration of a number of factors.33 When deciding upon the appropriate
sanction, the Court must consider that the primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings are to
protect the public; to foster public confidence in the Bar; to preserve the integrity of the profession;
and to deter other lawyers from similar misconduct.34 Disciplinary proceedings are means of
protecting the administration of justice by requiring those who carry out this important function to be
competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. 35 While it
is discretionary upon the Court to impose a particular sanction that it may deem proper against an
erring lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or
prejudice, but should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and
independence of the bar and to exact from the lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the court,
to his client, to his brethren in the profession and to the public.
The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases
of misconduct which seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and member of the Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit
disbarment or suspension, while those acts which neither affect nor erode the moral character of the
lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of such nature and to such extent as to
clearly show the lawyers unfitness to continue in the practice of law. The dubious character of the
act charged as well as the motivation which induced the lawyer to commit it must be clearly
demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that attended the commission of the offense should also be considered. 36
Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act of misconduct of a lesser nature. It is
also imposed for some minor infraction of the lawyers duty to the court or the client. 37 In the Matter
of Darell Adams,38 a lawyer was publicly reprimanded for grabbing a female client, kissing her, and
raising her blouse which constituted illegal conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct which
adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law.

Based on the circumstances of the case as discussed and considering that this is respondents first
offense, reprimand would suffice.
We laud complainants effort to seek redress for what she honestly believed to be an affront to her
honor. Surely, it was difficult and agonizing on her part to come out in the open and accuse her
lawyer of gross immoral conduct. However, her own assessment of the incidents is highly subjective
and partial, and surely needs to be corroborated or supported by more objective evidence.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for alleged
immorality, is hereby DISMISSED. However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED to be more
prudent and cautious in his dealing with his clients with a STERN WARNING that a more severe
sanction will be imposed on him for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.
SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 1678

December 17, 2007

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the
practice of law.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to
Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas free medical aid program. His application was approved
and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act
of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance
as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he
returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There is a question,
however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when
he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138
(Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. Every applicant for
admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one
years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in
the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the
disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice
of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyers oath to remind him of his duties
and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It is so delicately affected with public
interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in
order to protect and promote the public welfare.3
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality,
faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing
legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for
enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him
unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued
exercise of his professional privilege.4
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of
the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and
who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the
statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant
for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good
moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. 6
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of
educational, moral and other qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyers
oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate
of the license to practice.10
The second requisite for the practice of law membership in good standing is a continuing
requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership
dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional tax;12 compliance with the mandatory
continuing legal education requirement;13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the legal
profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control. 14

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the
Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to
Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently,
the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso
jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege
denied to foreigners.16
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another
country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens
who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."17Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of
another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in
accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership
in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he
reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority
for a license or permit to engage in such practice." 18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who
reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure
from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is
specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws and
update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to
compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar
Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. L-363

July 31, 1962

IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO Q. GUTIERREZ, respondent.

Victoriano A. Savellano for complaint.
Nestor M. Andrada for respondent.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar, admitted to it on October 5,
1945. In criminal case No. R-793 of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro he was convicted
of the murder of Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor of Calapan, and together with his coconspirators was sentenced to the penalty of death. Upon review by this Court the judgment of
conviction was affirmed on June 30, 1956 (G.R. No. L-17101), but the penalty was changed
to reclusion perpetua. After serving a portion of the sentence respondent was granted a conditional
pardon by the President on August 19, 1958. The unexecuted portion of the prison term was
remitted "on condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines."
On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in the murder case, filed a
verified complaint before this Court praying that respondent be removed from the roll of lawyers
pursuant to Rule 127, section 5. Respondent presented his answer in due time, admitting the facts
alleged by complainant regarding pardon in defense, on the authority of the decision of this Court in
the case of In re Lontok, 43 Phil. 293.
Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime insolving moral turpitude.
Murder is, without doubt, such a crime. The term "moral turpitude" includes everything which is done
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. In re Carlos S. Basa, 41 Phil. 275. As used in
disbarment statutes, it means an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to the accepted rule of
right and duty between man and man. State ex rel. Conklin v. Buckingham, 84 P. 2nd 49; 5 Am. Jur.
Sec. 279. pp. 428-429.
The only question to be resolved is whether or not the conditional pardon extended to respondent
places him beyond the scope of the rule on disbarment aforecited. Reliance is placed by him
squarely on the Lontok case. The respondent therein was convicted of bigamy and thereafter
pardoned by the Governor-General. In a subsequent viction, this Court decided in his favor and held:
"When proceedings to strike an attorney's name from the rolls the fact of a conviction for a felony
ground for disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a
bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted."
It is our view that the ruling does not govern the question now before us. In making it the Court
proceeded on the assumption that the pardon granted to respondent Lontok was absolute. This is
implicit in the ratio decidendi of the case, particularly in the citations to support it, namely. In Re
Emmons, 29 Cal. App. 121; Scott vs. State, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 343; and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 380.
Thus in Scott vs. State the court said:

We are of opinion that after received an unconditional pardon the record of the felony
conviction could no longer be used as a basis for the proceeding provided for in article 226.
The record, when offered in evidence, was met with an unconditional pardon, and could not,
therefore, properly be said to afford "proof of a conviction of any felony." Having been thus
cancelled, all its force as a felony conviction was taken away. A pardon falling short of this
would not be a pardon, according to the judicial construction which that act of executive
grace was received. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 344; Knote v. U.S., 95 U.S. 149, and cases
there cited; Young v. Young, 61 Tex. 191.
And the portion of the decision in Ex parte Garland quoted with approval in the Lontok case is as
follows:
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the
offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out the existence
of guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed
the offense. It granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities,
consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the
penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights it makes him, as it were, a
new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.
The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but conditional, and merely remitted the
unexecuted portion of his term. It does not reach the offense itself, unlike that in Ex parte Garland,
which was "a full pardon and amnesty for all offense by him committed in connection with rebellion
(civil war) against government of the United States."
The foregoing considerations rendered In re Lontok are inapplicable here. Respondent Gutierrez
must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the pardon he invokes in
defense. The crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in
hand, by taking advantage of his official position (respondent being municipal mayor at the time) and
with the use of motor vehicle. People vs. Diosdado Gutierrez, supra. The degree of moral turpitude
involved is such as to justify his being purged from the profession.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid standards
of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar the Rules of Court not only
prescribe a test of academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral
character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer must
continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal. As stated in Ex
parte Wall, 107 U.S. 263, 27 Law ed., 552, 556: "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most
sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to
repudiate and override the laws, to trample them under foot and to ignore the very bonds of society,
argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and
dangerous elements of the body politic.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of the crime for which
respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has been convicted, he is ordered disbarred and his name
stricken from the roll of lawyers.

A. M. No. 139 March 28, 1983

RE: ELMO S. ABAD, 1978 Successful Bar Examinee. ATTY. PROCOPIO S. BELTRAN, JR.,
President of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., complainant,
vs.
ELMO S. ABAD, respondent.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Charged by Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., president of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc.,
of practicing law without having been previously admitted to the Philippine Bar, Mr. Elmo S. Abad
could not deny and had to admit the practice. In exculpation he gives the following lame explanation:
1. On July 23, 1979, respondent conformably with the Resolution of the Honorable
Supreme Court En Banc dated July 10, 1979, ... prior to his taking the Oath of Office
as a member of the bar, paid his Bar Admission Fee in the amount of P175.00 as
shown by Official Receipt No. 8128792, ... paid his Certification Fee in the amount of
P5.00 as shown by Official Receipt No. 8128793, ... and also paid his Membership
Dues for the year 1979-80 to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as shown by
Official Receipt No. 83740,... .
2. On July 26, 1979, Atty. Romeo Mendoza, the then Clerk of Court of the Honorable
Supreme Court, included the respondent as among those taking the Oath of Office
as Member of the Bar as shown by a Letter of Request dated July 23, 1979, ...
3. At around Eleven o' clock in the morning of July 26, 1979, while waiting for my turn
to take my Oath as a member of the Bar, I was made to sign my Lawyer's Oath by
one of the Clerk in the Office of the Bar Confidant and while waiting there, Atty.
Romeo Mendoza told me that Chief Justice, the Honorable Enrique M. Fernando
wants to talk to me about the Reply of Mr. Jorge Uy (Deceased) to my Answer to his
Complaint. The Honorable Chief Justice told me that I have to answer the Reply and
for which reason the taking of my Lawyer's Oath was further suspended . *
4. On July 31, 1979, I filed my Reply to Mr. Jorge Uy's Answer with a Prayer that the Honorable Supreme Court
determines my fitness to be a member of the Bar;

5. While waiting for the appropriate action which the Honorable Supreme Court may
take upon my Prayer to determine my fitness to be a member of the Bar, I received a
letter from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter dated May 10,
1980 informing the respondent of an Annual General Meeting together with my
Statement of Account for the year 1980-1981, ... .
6. Believing that with my signing of the Lawyer's Oath on July 26, 1979 and my Reply
to Mr. Jorge Uy's (Deceased) Answer, the Honorable Supreme Court did not ordered
for the striking of my name in the Roll of Attorneys with the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines and therefore a Member in Good Standing, I paid my membership due

and other assessments to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City
Chapter, as shown by Official Receipt No. 110326 and Official Receipt No. 0948, ... .
Likewise respondent paid his Professional Tax Receipt as shown by Official Receipt
No. 058033 and Official Receipt No. 4601685, ... .
7. On February 28, 1981, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter
also included the name of the respondent as a Qualified Voter for the election of
officers and directors for the year 1981-1982, ... .
8. Respondent's belief and good faith was further enhanced by the fact that on
January 8, 1981, Complainant Jorge Uy in SBC607 died and herein respondent
submitted a verified Notice and Motion with the Honorable Supreme Court on April
27, 1981; notifying the Court of this fact with a prayer that herein respondent be
allowed to take his Oath as Member of the Bar;
9. Thereafter, respondent was again assessed by the Integrated Bar for his 19811982 membership due and other assessment for which the undersigned paid as
shown by Official Receipt No. 132734 and Official Receipt No. 3363, ... .
10. Respondent likewise paid his Professional Tax Receipt for 1981 as shown by
Official Receipt No. 3195776, ... .
11. Respondent likewise has a Certificate of Membership in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines as well as a Certificate of Membership in Good Standing with the Quezon
City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, ....
Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances which he has narrated do not constitute his
admission to the Philippine Bar and the right to practise law thereafter. He should know that two
essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be
administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs. 17 and 19,
Rules of Court.)
The proven charge against respondent Abad constitutes contempt of court (Rule 71, Sec. 3(e),
Rules of Court.)
WHEREFORE, Mr. Elmo S. Abad is hereby fined Five Hundred (P500.00) pesos payable to this
Court within ten (10) days from notice failing which he shall serve twenty-five (25) days
imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 5333. October 18, 2000]

ROSA YAP PARAS, complainant,

PARAS, respondent.

vs. ATTY. JUSTO

DE

JESUS

DECISION
MELO, J:

This has reference to a case for disbarment initiated by complainant Rosa

Yap Paras against her husband, Atty. Justo de Jesus Paras. The parties
exchanged tirades and barbs in their copious pleadings, hurling invectives,
cutting remarks and insults at each other. Reduced to its essentials, Rosa
Paras charged her husband with dishonesty and falsification of public
documents, harassment and intimidation, and immorality for siring a child with
another woman. Respondent denied the allegations, contending that his wife,
in cahoots with her family, is out to destroy and strip him of his share in their
multi-million conjugal assets.
The parties come from wealthy families in Negros Oriental. They were
married on May 21, 1964 and have two grown-up children. They have vast
sugarlands and other businesses.Respondent was a Municipal Judge for 14
years and served as Mayor in their town for 2 terms during the administration
of President Aquino. Complainant is a businesswoman. Sometime in 1988,
their marriage fell apart when due to "marital strain that has developed
through the years," respondent left his wife and children to live with his mother
and sister in Dumaguete City and thence started his law
practice. Complainant, in the meantime, filed a case for the dissolution of their
marriage, which case is still pending in court.
The complaint charged:
DISHONESTY, FALSIFICATION and FRAUD
respondent obtained loans from certain banks in the name of complainant by
counterfeiting complainant's signature, falsely making it appear that complainant
was the applicant for said loans.Thereafter, he carted away and misappropriated
the proceeds of the loans.

. . . to guarantee the above loans, respondent mortgaged some personal properties

belonging to the conjugal partnership without the consent of complainant.
GROSSLY IMMORAL CONDUCT AND CONCUBINAGE
Respondent is . . . engaged in the immoral and criminal act of concubinage as he
maintained an illicit relationship with one Ms. Jocelyn A. Ching, siring an illegitimate
child with her while married to complainant.
UNETHICAL AND UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Respondent abused courts of justice and misused his legal skills to frighten, harass
and intimidate all those who take a position diametrically adverse to his sinister plans
by unethically filing complaints and other pleadings against them. He utilized
strategies to obstruct justice.
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
(Respondent) utilized strategies to obstruct justice. In the criminal actions initiated
against him, respondent used his legal skills not to prove his innocence but to derail
all the proceedings.
(Complaint, Rollo, p. 2)
In his Answer, respondent interposed the following defenses:
(1) On the Charge of Falsification of Public Documents:
That during the sugarboom in the 1970's, his wife executed in his favor a
Special Power of Attorney to negotiate for an agricultural or crop loan
authorizing him "to borrow money and apply for and secure any agricultural or
crop loan for sugar cane from the Bais Rural Bank, Bais City . . ." (Rollo,
Annex "3", p. 262)
(2) On the Charge of Forgery:
That the Report of the National Bureau of Investigation which found that
"the questioned signatures (referring to the alleged forged signatures of
complainant) and the standard sample signatures JUSTO J. PARAS were

written by one and the same person"(Annex "B" of the Complaint, Rollo,
p. 26) was doctored, and that his wife filed against him a string of cases for
falsification of public documents because he intends to disinherit his children
and bequeath his inchoate share in the conjugal properties to his own mother.
(3) On the Charge of Grossly Immoral Conduct and Concubinage:
That this is a malicious accusation fabricated by his brother-in-law, Atty.
Francisco D. Yap to disqualify him from getting any share in the conjugal
assets. He cites the dismissal of the complaint for concubinage filed against
him by his wife before the City Prosecutor of Negros Oriental as proof of his
innocence.
Respondent, however, admits that he, his mother and sister, are solicitous
and hospitable to his alleged concubine, Ms. Jocelyn Ching and her daughter,
Cyndee Rose (named after his own deceased daughter), by allowing them to
stay in their house and giving them some financial assistance, because they
pity Ms. Ching, a secretary in his law office, who was deserted by her
boyfriend after getting her pregnant.
(4) On the Charge of Obstruction of Justice:
That "the legal remedies pursued by (him) in defense and offense are
legitimate courses of action done by an embattled lawyer."
The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines investigated the complaint against respondent summarizing the
causes of action as follows:
(1) Falsification of complainant's signature and misuse of conjugal assets; and
(2) Immorality and criminal acts of concubinage with one Ms. Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching
(for) siring an illegitimate child with her while married to complainant, and,
abandonment of his own family.

(Rollo, Report of the IBP, p. 34)

No actual hearing was conducted as the parties agreed to merely submit

their respective memoranda, depositions, and other pieces of evidence
attached to their pleadings.
Thereafter, the
recommended:

CBD

found

respondent

guilty

as

charged

and

(1) Respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months on the first
charge; and
(2) Respondent's indefinite suspension from the practice of law on the second charge.

(ibid., p. 57)
The CBD held that the dismissal of the criminal cases against respondent
for falsification and use of falsified documents (Criminal Case No. 11768) and
for concubinage (I.S. No. 93-578) will not bar the filing of an administrative
case for disbarment against him. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable
doubt is required for conviction, while in an administrative complaint, only a
preponderance of evidence is necessary.
The CBD gave credence to the NBI Report that "the questioned signatures
(referring to the signatures appearing in the loan agreements, contracts of
mortgage, etc.) and the standard sample signatures of respondent
were written by one and the same person." This affirms the allegation of
complainant Rosa Yap Paras that her husband forged her signatures in those
instruments. Respondent denies this but his denial was unsubstantiated and
is, therefore, self-serving.
In finding respondent liable for Immorality, the CBD relied heavily on the
uncontroverted sworn affidavit-statements of respondent's children and three
other eyewitnesses to respondent's illicit affair with Ms. Jocelyn Ching. For a
better appreciation of their statements, their affidavits are hereby reproduced
in full. Thusly,
"I, DAHLIA Y. PARAS, of legal age, single, resident of Bindoy, Negros Oriental, but
presently living in Dumaguete City, after being duly sworn hereby depose and say:

1. I am a nurse by profession. I finished my BSN degree at the College of Nursing,

Silliman University.
2. My mother is Rosa Yap Paras and my father Justo J. Paras. My father has left the
family home in Bindoy and now lives at his mother's house at San Jose Ext.,
Dumaguete City.
3. My father has a "kabit" or concubine by the name of Ma. Jocelyn Ching. They have a
child named Cyndee Rose, who was delivered at the Silliman University Hospital
Medical Center on July 19, 1990.
4. Jocelyn used to be the secretary of my father and Atty. Melchor Arboleda when they
practice law together in 1988 to 1989. Their relationship started in 1989. When she
became pregnant, my father rented an apartment for her at the Amigo Subdivision,
Dumaguete City.
5. Following delivery of the baby, my father built a house for Jocelyn in Maayong Tubig,
Dauin, Negros Oriental. My father spend time there often with Jocelyn and their
child.
6. I used to visit my father at San Jose Extension these past years, and almost every
time I was there, I would see Jocelyn, sitting, watching TV, serving coffee in my
father's law office, and one time, she was washing my father's clothes.
7. I first saw their child Cyndee Rose in 1992, about early May, at San Jose
Extension. I was there to ask for my allowance. He was there at the time, and when
I looked at Cyndee Rose closely, I became convinced that she was my father's
daughter with Jocelyn.
8. Incidentally, I had an elder sister also named Cindy Rose (now deceased).
9. In September 1992 when I went to visit my father, I saw toys and child's clothes in
my father's room.
10. Whenever, I saw Jocelyn at San Jose Extension, I wanted to talk to her or be alone
with her, but she would deliberately avoid me. I could see that she was hiding
something from me." p. 109, Records.

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
xxxxxxxxx

1. . . . sometime during the period of April-September, 1992, I made several visits to my

father at his mother's house in San Jose Extension, Dumaguete City, where he had
moved after he left our home in Bindoy;
2. That these visits were made on different times and different days of the week;
3. That most of my visits, I would meet a woman who was also living at my father's
place. This woman is now known to me to be Ma. Jocelyn Ching;
4. That my basis for observing that Ms. Ching was living in my father's house is that
during my visits, whether during office hours or after office hours, I would meet her
at my father's place, not his office; she was wearing house clothes and slippers,
such as skimpy clothes, shorts and T-shirt, not street or office clothes; she was
generally unkempt, not made up for work or going out; on one occasion, I even saw
her, washing my father's clothes as well as a small child's clothing; and she
conducted herself around the house in the manner of someone who lived there;
5. That on one of my visits, I confirmed that Ms. Ching was living with my father from
Josie Vailoces, who was then a working student living at my father's place;
6. Ms. Vailoces subsequently confirmed under oath the fact that my father and Ms.
Jocelyn Ching were living together as husband and wife at my father's place in a
deposition taken in connection with Civil Case No. 10613, RTC-Dumaguete City,
Branch 30, the Honorable Enrique C. Garovillo, presiding. A copy of the transcript of
the deposition of Ms. Vailoces is already part of the record of this case. For
emphasis, photocopies of the pertinent portion of the written deposition of Josie
Vailoces is hereto attached as Annexes "A"and "A-1." p. 111, Records

Respondent's son has this to say:

"I, RHOUEL Y. PARAS, 15 years old, single, resident of Bindoy, Negros Oriental, but
presently living in Dumaguete City, after being duly sworn according to law, depose
and say:
1. I am a high school student at the Holy Cross High School, Dumaguete City.
2. My mother is Rosa Yap Paras, and my father Justo J. Paras, a lawyer.
3. My father has left our home in Bindoy, and now lives at his mother's house in San
Jose Extension, Dumaguete City. He is not giving us support any more.
4. However, from October 1991 to December 1992, I was getting my allowance of
P50.00 a week. I would go to their house at San Jose Extension and personally ask
him for it.

5. In October 1992, between 11:30 AM and 1:00 PM, I went to San Jose Extension for
my weekly allowance. I asked Josephus, an adopted son of my father's sister, if my
father was around. Josephus said my father was in his room.
6. So I went direct to his room and because the door was not locked, I entered the
room without knocking. There I saw my father lying in bed side by side with a
woman. He was only wearing a brief.The woman was wearing shorts and T-shirt.
7. They both appeared scared upon seeing me. My father hurriedly gave me P100.00
and I left immediately because I felt bad and embarrassed.
8. Before that incident, I used to see the woman at my father's house in San Jose
Extension. Every time I went to see my father, she was also there.
9. I later came to know that she was Ms. Jocelyn Ching, and that she was my father's
"kabit" or concubine.
10. I am no longer getting my weekly allowance from my father." p. 112, Records

Added to the foregoing sworn statements of respondent's children is the

damaging statement under oath of Virgilio Kabrisante who was respondent's
secretary when respondent was a mayor of Bindoy, Negros Oriental which
reads as follows:
"I, VIRGILIO V. KABRISANTE, of legal age, married, Filipino, a resident of
Malaga, Bindoy, Negros Oriental, after having been sworn in accordance with law, do
hereby depose and state that:
1. I personally know Justo J. Paras, having been his secretary during his incumbency
as Mayor of Bindoy, Negros Oriental. In fact, through the latter's recommendation
and intercession, I was later on appointed as OIC Mayor of the same town from
December 1986 to January 1987.
2. When Justo J. Paras decided to practice law in Dumaguete City, I became his
personal aide and performed various chores for the same. As his personal aide, I
stayed in the same house and room with the latter.
3. Sometime in January 1989, Justo J. Paras confided to me that he felt attracted to my
lady friend named Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching. He then requested me to invite the latter to
a dinner date at Chin Loong Restaurant.
4. Conveying the invitation which was accepted by Ma. Jocelyn Ching, the latter, Justo
J. Paras and myself then had dinner at the above-mentioned restaurant.

5. At the behest of Justo J. Paras, I invited Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching, on several occasions,
always to a picnic at a beach in Dauin, Negros Oriental. Said invitations were
always accepted by the latter.
6. At each of the above-mentioned picnics, I observed that Justo J. Paras and Ma.
Jocelyn A. Ching had become more and more intimate with each other.
7. Sometime in March 1989, at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening on a Friday, I
accompanied Justo J. Paras to the area in front of the Silliman University Medical
Center, where he said he was going to meet someone.
8. After waiting for a few minutes, Ma. Jocelyn Ching arrived and immediately boarded
at the back seat of the Sakbayan vehicle I was driving for Justo J. Paras. The latter
then requested me to drive both of them (Justo Paras and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching) to
Honeybee Motel somewhere in Sibulan, Negros Oriental.
9. When we arrived there, Justo J. Paras asked me to wait for them outside the room,
while he and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching entered the said room.
10. I waited outside the room for about two (2) hours after which the two of them
emerged from the room. We then proceeded to Chin Loong to eat supper.
11. After eating supper, we dropped Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching off in front of the Dumaguete
City Cockpit.
12. This meeting was repeated two more times, at the same place and always on a
Friday.
13. On April 3, 1988, I went home to Bindoy and stopped working for Justo Paras." pp.
56-57, Records.

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
xxxxxxxxx
1. Sometime in May 1989, I returned to Dumaguete City to look for a job, having been
jobless since I left Dumaguete City to go home to Bindoy, Negros Oriental.
2. While looking for a job, I stayed at the house where my friend, Bernard Dejillo was
staying at Mangnao, Dumaguete City. My friend Bernard Dejillo was occupying a
room at the second floor of the said house which he shared with me.

3. Sometime in the last week of May 1989, in the course of my job hunting, I met Justo
J. Paras. Having not seen each other for some time, we talked for a while,
discussing matters about the barangay elections in Bindoy, Negros Oriental.
4. When our discussion was finished, Justo J. Paras asked me where I was staying, to
which I answered that I was staying at the aforementioned house. He then
requested me to find out if there was an available room at the said house which he
could rent with Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching. I told him that I would have to ask my friend
Bernard Dejillo about the matter.
5. When I arrived at the house that evening, I asked my friend Bernard Dejillo about the
matter, to which the latter signified his approval. He told me that a room at the first
floor of the same house was available for rental to Justo Paras and Ma. Jocelyn A.
Ching.
6. The next day, I immediately informed Justo J. Paras of Bernard Dejillo's approval of
his request.
7. Sometime in the first week of June 1989, Ma. Jocelyn Ching moved in to the room
she had rented at the first floor of the house I was also staying at.
8. Almost every night thereafter, Justo J. Paras would come to the house and stay
overnight. When he came at night Justo J. Paras and I would converse and while
conversing, drink a bottle of Tanduay Rum. Oftentimes, Ma. Jocelyn Ching would
join in our conversation.
9. After we finish drinking and talking, Justo J. Paras and Ma. Jocelyn Ching would
enter the room rented and sleep there, while I would also go upstairs to my room.
10. The next morning I could always observe Justo J. Paras came out of said room and
depart from the house.
11. The coming of Justo J. Paras to the house I was staying ceased after about one (1)
month when they transferred to another house.
12. I myself left the house and returned to Bindoy, Negros Oriental some time in June
1989.
13. Sometime in January 1993, on a Saturday at about noontime, I went to the house
of Justo J. Paras to consult him about a Kabataang Barangay matter involving my
son. When I arrived at his house, I noticed that the same was closed and there was
no one there.
14. Needing to consult him about the above-mentioned matter, I proceeded to the
resthouse of Justo J. Paras located at Maayong Tubig, Dauin, Negros Oriental.

15. When I arrived at the said resthouse, Justo J. Paras was not there but the person
in charge of the said resthouse informed me that Justo J. Paras was at his house at
Barangay Maayong Tubig, Dauin, Negros Oriental. The same person also gave me
directions so that I could locate the house of Justo J. Paras he referred to earlier.
16. With the help of the directions given by said person, I was able to locate the house
of Justo J. Paras.
17. At the doorway of the said house, I called out if anybody was home while knocking
on the door.
18. After a few seconds, Ma. Jocelyn Ching opened the door. Upon seeing the latter, I
asked her if Justo J. Paras was home. She then let me in the house and told me to
sit down and wait for a while.She then proceeded to a room.
19. A few minutes later, Justo J. Paras came out of the same room and sat down near
me. I noticed that the latter had just woke up from a nap.
20. We then started to talk about the matter involving my son and sometime later, Ma.
Jocelyn Ching served us coffee.
21. While we were talking and drinking coffee I saw a little girl, about three (3) years
old, walking around the sala, whom I later came to know as Cyndee Rose, the
daughter of Justo J. Paras and Ma. Jocelyn Ching.
22. After our conversation was finished, Justo J. Paras told me to see him at this office
at San Jose Extension, Dumaguete City, the following Monday to discuss the matter
some more.
23. I then bid them goodbye and went home to Bindoy, Negros Oriental.
24. I am executing this affidavit as a supplement to my affidavit dated 22 July 1993."
pp. 58-60, Records

(ibid., pp. 44-52)

The CBD likewise gave credence to the sworn affidavits and the
deposition of two other witnesses, namely, Salvador de Jesus, a former
repairman of the Paras' household, and, Josie Vailoces, a working student
and former ward of the Paras' family, who both gave personal accounts of the
illicit relationship between respondent and Jocelyn Ching, which led to the
birth of Cyndee Rose. De Jesus swore that while doing repair works in the
Paras' household he observed Ms. Ching and Cyndee Rose practically living

in the Paras' house (p. 85, Rollo, Annex "H"). Vailoces, on the other hand,
deposed that she was asked by respondent Paras to deliver money to Ms.
Ching for the payment of the hospital bill after she gave birth to Cyndee
Rose.Vailoces was also asked by respondent to procure Cyndee Rose Paras'
baptismal certificate after the latter was baptized in the house of respondent;
she further testified that in said baptismal certificate, respondent appears as
the father of Cyndee Rose which explains why the latter is using the surname
"Paras." (p. 87, Annex "I", Rollo)
The findings and the recommendations of the CBD are substantiated by
the evidentiary record.
ON THE CHARGE OF FALSIFICATION OF COMPLAINANT'S SIGNATURE

The handwriting examination conducted by the National Bureau of

Investigation on the signatures of complainant Rosa Yap Paras and
respondent Justo de Jesus Paras vis--vis the questioned signature "Rosa Y.
Paras" appearing in the questioned bank loan documents, contracts of
mortgage and other related instrument, yielded the following results:
CONCLUSION:
1. The questioned and the standard sample signatures JUSTO J. PARAS were written
by one and the same person.
2. The questioned and the standard sample signatures ROSA YAP PARAS were not
written by one and the same person.

(Annex "B", Rollo, p. 26, emphasis ours;)

The NBI did not make a categorical statement that respondent forged the
signatures of complainant. However, an analysis of the above findings lead to
no other conclusion than that the questioned or falsified signatures of
complainant Rosa Y. Paras were authored by respondent as said falsified
signatures were the same as the sample signatures of respondent.
To explain this anomaly, respondent presented a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) executed in his favor by complainant to negotiate for an
agricultural or crop loan from the Bais Rural Bank of Bais City. Instead of

exculpating respondent, the presence of the SPA places him in hot water. For
if he was so authorized to obtain loans from the banks, then why did he have
to falsify his wife's signatures in the bank loan documents? The purpose of an
SPA is to especially authorize the attorney-in-fact to sign for and on behalf of
the principal using his own name.
ON THE CHARGE OF IMMORALITY AND CONCUBINAGE

The evidence against respondent is overwhelming. The affidavitstatements of his children and three other persons who used to work with him
and have witnessed the acts indicative of his infidelity more than satisfy this
Court that respondent has strayed from the marital path. The baptismal
certificate of Cyndee Rose Paras where respondent was named as the father
of the child (Annex "J", Rollo, p. 108); his naming the child after his deceased
first-born daughter Cyndee Rose; and his allowing Jocelyn Ching and the
child to live in their house in Dumaguete City bolster the allegation that
respondent is carrying on an illicit affair with Ms. Ching, the mother of his
illegitimate child.
It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law. Its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law (People vs. Tunda, 181 SCRA
692 [1990]; Leda vs. Tabang, 206 SCRA 395 [1992]). In the case at hand,
respondent has fallen below the moral bar when he forged his wife's signature
in the bank loan documents, and, sired a daughter with a woman other than
his wife. However, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution,
and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar
(Tapucar vs. Tapucar, Adm. Case No. 4148, July 30, 1998). Disbarment
should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as temporary
suspension, could accomplish the end desired (Resurrecion vs. Sayson, 300
SCRA 129 [1998]).
In the light of the foregoing, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS on the charge of falsifying his wife's
signature in bank documents and other related loan instruments; and for ONE
(1) YEAR from the practice of law on the charges of immorality and

abandonment of his own family, the penalties to be served simultaneously.Let

notice of this decision be spread in respondent's record as an attorney, and
notice of the same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 4947. February 14, 2005]

ROSA YAP-PARAS, petitioner, vs. ATTY. JUSTO PARAS, respondent.

RESOLUTION
GARCIA, J.:

Before us is this verified Petition[1] filed by Rosa Yap-Paras praying for the
disbarment of her estranged husband Atty. Justo Paras on alleged acts of
deceit, malpractice, grave misconduct, grossly immoral conduct and violation
of his oath as a lawyer.
On 18 January 1989, respondent filed his comment[2] to the Petition.
In a Resolution dated 10 February 1999, [3] the Court referred the case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The background facts are summarized in a Report and Recommendation
dated 13 January 2004[4] of Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, which Report reads in part, as follows:
Complainant alleged that on February 9, 1965 the children of Ledesma de Jesus
Paras-Sumabong namely Conegunda, Justo, Corazon, Carmen and Cataluna all
surnamed Paras executed a Special Power of Attorney prepared by the respondent to
sell parcels of land located in Matobato, Bindoy, Negros Oriental giving authority to
their mother to sell the subject real properties previously registered in the name of the
heirs of Vicente Paras wherein respondent was one of the signatories therein.

Complainant alleged that on May 4, 1966 on the basis of said Special Power of
Attorney, Ledesma J. Paras-Sumabang executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
Aurora Dy-Yap over the subject real property located in Matobato, Bindoy, Negros
Oriental which was with the respondents full knowledge since he was residing at the
house of Soledad Dy-Yap at that time and from that time, the Yap family had been in
possession of the subject real property up to the present.
Complainant alleged that sometime in June 1998 her attention was called to the fact
that a free patent title to the aforesaid property was issued in respondents name and
upon verification with the DENR, Bureau of Lands, Dumaguete City, complainant
was able to get copies of the documents for lot Nos. 660, 490 and 585 pertaining to
the Notice of Application for Free Patent dated April 2, 1985 signed by the
respondent; over the aforesaid lots previously sold by Ledesma de Jesus to Aurora D.
Yap; Quitclaim/Renunciation of Property Rights and Interest Over Real Property
executed by Ledesma de Jesus dated May 28, 1985; Letter of Application dated April
2, 1985 signed by respondent under oath before Apolonio Tan authorized officer to
administer oath; Letter of Certification signed by Apolonio Tan dated June 4, 1985
and Order of Approval dated August 19, 1985 signed by District Land Officer
Teopisto L. Gallozo with a Free Patent No. 328 in the name of respondent Justo J.
Paras.
Complainant alleged that the aforementioned application was made by the respondent
without her knowledge and consent and those acts of deceit, machinations and
falsification of documents were deliberately willfully, and maliciously committed by
the respondent in violation of Art. 172 in relation to Art. 171 of the RPC; in betrayal
of his oath as a lawyer and a transgression of the Canons of Professional
Responsibility.
Complainant alleged that respondent surreptitiously obtained a free patent title over
real properties which had been previously sold by his own mother to Aurora D. Yap
and now still under the control and possession of complainants natural family, a fact
respondent allegedly withheld from the Bureau of Lands which he had full knowledge
in successfully causing the release of a free patent in his name and unjustly and
unlawfully deprived the rightful owners of their legitimate title to the said property in
betrayal of the court to pervert the administration of justice in gross violation of his
oath of office.

xxx

xxx

xxx

In his Comment, respondent alleged that complainant was obviously not the owner of
the properties and considering that the properties were applied for free patent titling
during their marital union prior to its breakage, complainant was likewise a communal
owner thereof and as such was also complaining against herself.
Respondent alleged that later on, a great portion of the public lands classified as
forested zone in Matobato were declared and reclassified into public agricultural
lands, then publicly surveyed and parcelized by lots identified in the survey map
based on actual or known occupants; then the Bureau of Lands allegedly made a
public announcement that the lands were available for private ownership thru Free
Patent Application available only to native settlers or natural born Filipinos.
Respondent alleged that none of the Yaps including complainant being native or
natural born Filipinos muchless Aurora D. Yap who in 1985 was said to be already an
American citizen; complainant and her family; the Yaps prevailed upon him to apply
for free patent over said questioned properties for the reason that respondent had
already occupied the properties; introduced improvements thereon; acted as owner
thereof; and could easily align his right to the property which had been identified in
the public survey as Heirs of Vicente Paras, otherwise the questioned properties
allegedly according to the Yaps will be applied for and awarded to other qualified
natural born Filipinos.
Respondent alleged that Free Patent Application was filed by him over the communal
property of him and the complainant as well as those purchased by him including the
portion whose occupancy of a public land was purchased by Aurora D. Yap from
Ledesma Vda de Paras upon the prodding of the Yaps for all of them were not
qualified to apply for ownership of an agricultural public land via free patent; none of
them being a natural born Filipino or native settler and were disqualified from a
gratuitous grant of public land from the government.
Respondent alleged that the whole idea of giving to him and the complainant the
properties was hatched and executed by the Yaps, most particularly Atty. Francisco D.
Yap to circumvent the law and prevent the properties from being given by the
government to some other qualified persons. He allegedly applied for issuance of free

patent in good faith and thereafter took dominion and control of the properties in the
concept of a legitimate owner under authority of a gratuitous grant of the government.
Respondent alleged that complainant or any member of her family much less
American citizen Aurora Dy Yap had not made any prior demand for the return of the
questioned properties; nor filed a complaint under the Katarungang Pambarangay
Law; nor filed an administrative remedy before the DENR for the cancellation and
reversion/transfer of the Free Patent and Title to them; nor brought any action in any
civil court for either quieting of title, or cancellation of free patent title or recovery of
ownership or whatever.
Respondent alleged that even without such civil court determination on whether or not
complainant or her family were qualified to become grantee of a government
gratuitous grant of public agricultural land, if the Honorable Supreme Court will
decide that complainant, her mother, brothers and sisters were within the ambit of the
term natural born citizen or native citizens under the 1946 Constitution and to them
rightfully belong the ownership of the questioned titled public agricultural lands; and
that he can never be guilty of the Anti-Dummy Law consequent to such cession,
respondent alleged that he will gladly deliver and transfer title to them.
Respondent alleged that he sought and prayed for recovery of possession of all
conjugal/communal properties including the herein questioned properties for after he
left the conjugal home in 1988 possession of all these properties, real and personal
were until now with the complainant and her biological family.
Respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the petition for lack of merit.
Complainant subsequently filed a Reply[5] to respondents Comment,
therein refuting respondents claims that he was used as a dummy since
complainant and her siblings had previously acquired Free Patents in their
names. Complainant further alleged that respondent is morally unfit to
continue to be an officer of the court because of his falsely declaring under
oath that he had been occupying the subject real property since 1985 when in
fact he did not and was never in occupation/possession thereof.
On 27 August 1999, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued an
Order[6] noting the filing of the last pleading and setting the instant case for

hearing. Several hearings[7] were conducted wherein complainant presented

all her witnesses together with their respective affidavits and supporting
documents[8], which were all subjected to cross-examination by the
respondent. Likewise, respondent presented his Counter-Affidavit[9] and
supporting documents.
Based on the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner concluded her
Report and made a recommendation, as follows:
From the facts obtaining respondent committed deceit and falsehood in having
applied for free patent over lands owned by another over which he had no actual
physical possession being aware of the fact that the same was previously transferred
in the name of Aurora Yap; an act which adversely reflected on his fitness to practice
law in violation of Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
It is immaterial as to who instituted the complaint for as long as there was a violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which partakes the nature of proper
disciplinary action pursuant to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Disbarment and
Discipline of Attorneys.
Wherefore in view of the foregoing, the Undersigned respectfully recommends for
the suspension of Atty. Justo Paras from the practice of his law profession for a period
of three (3) months from receipt hereof.
It is also hereby recommended that the IBP Chapter wherein respondent Paras is a
registered member be furnished a copy of the Order and notified of the said
suspension for proper enforcement.
Via Resolution No. XVI-2004-120 dated 27 February 2004, [10] the IBP
Board of Governors adopted the Report of the Investigating Commissioner but
modified the latters recommended penalty by recommending that respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months for violation of Rule
7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The case is now before us for confirmation.

We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be

sanctioned. We find, however, that the recommended penalty is not
commensurate to the gravity of the wrong perpetrated.
The Court has always reminded that a lawyer shall at all times uphold
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession [11] as the bar should always
maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair
dealing among its members. By and large, a lawyer can do honor to the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts
and to his clients.[12] To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the
legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence and
trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal
profession.[13]
In Marcelo v. Javier[14], we held:
It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.
A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law during good behavior and can
only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the
court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. Without invading any
constitutional privilege or right, an attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by
a proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a
license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be
understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring an attorney is to remove from
the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, and thus to
protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to
punish the attorney.
An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his
duties as an attorney and counsellor which include the statutory grounds enumerated
in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. These statutory grounds are so broad
as to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private
capacity. It is a settled rule that the enumeration of the statutory grounds for
disciplinary action is not exclusive and a lawyer may be disciplined on grounds other
than those specifically provided in the law. Generally a lawyer may be disbarred or
suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which

shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court, or an unfit or unsafe person to enjoy
the privileges and to manage the business of others in the capacity of an attorney, or
for conduct which tends to bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the
favorable opinion of the public.
Indeed, the practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege bestowed
by the State upon those who show that they possess, and continue to
possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege.[15] One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and
candor.
And in the recent case of Bergonia v. Merrera[16], we ruled:
Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a practitioners honorable
membership in the legal profession. Lawyers are required to act with the highest
standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct of litigation and in their
relations with their clients, the opposing parties, the other counsels and the courts.
They are bound by their oath to speak the truth and to conduct themselves according
to the best of their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their
clients. x x x
In the instant case, it is clear to the Court that respondent violated his
lawyers oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility which
mandates upon each lawyer, as his duty to society and to the courts, the
obligation to obey the laws of the land and to do no falsehood nor consent to
the doing of any in court. Respondent has been deplorably lacking in the
candor required of him as a member of the Bar and an officer of the court in
his acts of applying for the issuance of a free patent over the properties in
issue despite his knowledge that the same had already been sold by his
mother to complainants sister. This fact, respondent even admitted in the
comment that he filed before this Court when he alleged that the said
properties were public land under the Forestal Zone when the mother of the
respondent ceded to Aurora Yap some portions of entire occupancy of the
Parases[17]. Moreover, respondent committed deceit and falsehood in his
application for free patent over the said properties when he manifested under
oath that he had been in the actual possession and occupation of the said

lands despite the fact that these were continuously in the possession and
occupation of complainants family, as evidenced no less by respondents own
statements in the pleadings filed before the IBP.
Anent his argument questioning the status of complainant and her family
as natural born citizens, this Court holds that the instant case is not the
proper forum to address such issue. Furthermore, as correctly held by the
Investigating Commissioner, [i]t is immaterial as to who instituted the
complaint for as long as there was a violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Likewise, any other action which the parties may make
against each other has no material bearing in this case. For, it must be
remembered that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of
their own. They are distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and
criminal cases.
In line herewith, this Court in In re Almacen,[18] held:
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not and does not
involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into
the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still
a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for
his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity
of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the
office of an attorney. xxx
The facts and evidence obtaining in the instant case indubitably reveal
respondents failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the
strictures of the lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility,
thereby occasioning sanction from this Court.

At this juncture, we take note that on 18 October 2000, in our Decision in

A.C. No. 5333 formerly A.C. No. CBD-371, entitled Rosa Yap Paras v. Atty.
Justo de Jesus Paras, respondent was previously meted with suspension
from the practice of law for six (6) months on the charge of falsifying his wifes
signature in bank documents and other related loan instruments, and for one
(1) year from the practice of law on the charges of immorality and
abandonment of his own family.
Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of
respondents prior misdemeanors for which he was penalized with a six (6)
month and one (1) year suspension from the practice of law, his deplorable
behavior in the present case which grossly degrades the legal profession
warrants the imposition of a much graver penalty.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Justo J. Paras guilty of committing
a falsehood in violation of his lawyers oath and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice
of law for a period of one (1) year, with a WARNING that commission of the
same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more
severe penalty.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the IBP, as well as the Office of
the Bar Confidant and the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all
courts for their information and guidance and likewise be entered in the record
of respondent as attorney.
SO ORDERED.