University of San Carlos

School of Law and Governance

College of Law
Pelaez Street, Cebu City

Legal Ethics

Submitted by:
EH 306

Submitted to:
Justice Gabriel Ingles
May 2019
 Bernardita F. Antiporda v. Judge Francisco A. Ante, JR.
(A.M. No. MTJ-18-1908. January 16, 2018)
FACTS:
Complainant alleged that on the morning of March 2, 2014, respondent suddenly
confronted her by saying, "Apay nga agkuskusilap ka? (Why are you glaring/pouting at
me?)" Then, he approached her, slapped her face several times, and whipped her with a
dog chain. He also pointed a .45 caliber pistol at complainant, as well as her boarders and
workers Ridao, Rabe, and Alquiza, who witnessed the incident.
In defense, respondent denied the allegations and averred that it was she who struck
him with a steel chain. He also maintained that complainant harbored a grudge against
him for having reported her illegal house renovation to the Engineering Department of
the City Hall of Vigan.
In a letter dated November 11, 2014, complainant sought the dismissal of the
administrative complaint against respondent, explaining that respondent had not
intentionally caused her harm, and she prayed that the charges against respondent be
dropped in order “to restore the good relationship existing” between them.
However, in a Memorandum dated May 4, 2015, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) denied complainant's request, as the mere desistance or recantation
of a complainant in an administrative complaint against any member of the bench does
not necessarily result in the dismissal thereof. Instead, the OCA referred the matter to
Judge Balloguing of the RTC of Vigan City, Ilocos Sur, for investigation, report, and
recommendation.
Judge Balloguing recommended that respondent be found guilty of acts
unbecoming of a judge and be sanctioned with either a fine or suspension.
The OCA recommended that a fine of P100,000.00 be imposed, to be deducted
from his retirement benefits should the Court resolve this administrative matter after his
retirement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable.
HELD:
The court held that respondent judge’s actions constitute grave misconduct, which
the Court defines as "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer."
Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that "Integrity is essential not
only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of
judges." Thus, Sections 1 and 2 thereof provide:
Section 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but
that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
Section 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must rearm the people's faith in the
integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be
done.
Further, Canon 4 thereof states that “Propriety and the appearance of propriety are
essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.”
Section 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
of their activities.
Section 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal
restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so
freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is
consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity,
independence and respect for himself/herself, the Court, and the Judiciary as a whole. He
must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint. He
should choose his words and exercise more caution and control in expressing himself. In
other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. Judges are required to always
be temperate, patient, and courteous, both in conduct and in language.
This is also not the first administrative complaint charging respondent with grave
misconduct. Previously, “the court suspended respondent for three months on the charges
of grave misconduct, acts unbecoming of a judge, and abuse of authority for having hit
complainant therein with a monobloc chair and shouted invectives at her. Thereat,
respondent had already displayed "a predisposition to use physical violence and
intemperate language which reveals a marked lack of judicial temperament and self-
restraint — traits which, aside from the basic equipment of learning in the law — are
indispensable qualities of every judge." Sadly, it seems that respondent has not learned to
mend his ways and hence, should be dealt with the full force of the law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Francisco A. Ante, Jr. is found GUILTY of
Grave Misconduct. Accordingly, considering respondent's retirement on November 7,
2017, his retirement benefits are hereby FORFEITED, except accrued leave credits. He is
further DISQUALIFIED from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.
 Office Of The Court Administrator Vs. Judge Hector B. Salise
(A.M. No. RTJ-18-2514. January 30, 2018)
FACTS:
Judge Salise has been charged of several violations of the procedures in court.
Among others, a he granted bail to some accused charged with capital offenses in
criminal cases in which no bail was recommended, without conducting the mandatory
bail hearing. In addition, Judge Salise permitted the court interpreter to draft the Decision
in Civil Case No. 1887, granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based
solely on the petition and the psychological report, and there were no copies of the Pre-
trial Order. He further erred in in proceeding to hear several civil cases (for declaration of
nullity of marriage) despite the question on the court's jurisdiction. He also failed to issue
an Order directing the public prosecutor to conduct a background check in Civil Case
Nos. 1506 and 1806, both for declaration of nullity of marriage, due to a mere oversight
and the same was without malice. And to add up, he allowed plea-bargaining in cases for
violation of R.A. 9165 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, with the consent of the
prosecution in order to decongest the jails and even dismissed similar cases under highly
questionable circumstances and without due regard to the applicable procedural rules. He
would also call cases, although not included in the court's calendar, "to the point of
dismissing" the same. Worse, he was also reported to have issued and signed a
Resolution in a case that was not in the court's docket.
Several of the factual circumstances were not refuted nor denied by Judge Salise. He
asserts that his procedural lapses were committed in good faith and without any monetary
consideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Salise can be held administratively liable even with the defense
of good faith

RULING:
The court of found Judge Salise guilty of serious misconduct. The number of cases
involved and the manner by which he disposed of said cases clearly show a pattern of
misdeeds and a propensity to violate the law and established procedural rules, particularly
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, R.A. 9165, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Rules
of Court.
Indeed, it is settled that, unless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty,
corruption, malice or ill will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice, the
respondent judge may not be administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of
the law, or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties,
particularly in the adjudication of cases. However, when the inefficiency springs from a
failure to recognize such a basic and fundamental rule, law, or principle, the judge is
either too incompetent or undeserving of the position and title vested upon him, or he is
too vicious that he deliberately committed the oversight or omission in bad faith and in
grave abuse of authority. Here, the attendant circumstances would reveal that Judge
Salise's acts contradict any claim of good faith.
Indubitably, Judge Salise violated the Code of Judicial Conduct ordering judges to
ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the
confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge
and of the judiciary. He simply used oversight, inadvertence, and honest mistake as
convenient excuses. He acted with conscious indifference to the possible undesirable
consequences to the parties involved.
 Prosecutor Cahanap v. Judge Quinones
(A.M. No. RTJ-16-2470. January 10, 2018)

FACTS:
Complainant Prosecutor Cahanap filed the instant administrative complaint on
October 2012, charging respondent Judge Quinones with Gross Ignorance of the Law,
Gross Misconduct and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Complainant alleged that in his last two (2) years as a prosecutor in Branch 6, he
suffered unbearable and intolerable oppression in the hands of respondent Judge.
Complainant asserted that the prosecutors, who previously appeared before respondent
Judge, opted to be assigned to other courts as they too experienced humiliation and harsh
treatment from her.

Complainant further accused respondent Judge of habitual tardiness which delayed

the start of court sessions.

In the proceedings for the case of Pp v. Heck regarding Estafa; respondent Judge, in
open court and heard by the public, asked private complainant Mamad to go to her house
because she was interested in buying jewelry items from her.

In the proceedings for the case of Pp v. Macapato regarding Attempted Murder,

respondent Judge issued an order directing the release of accused Dimaampao’s vehicle
despite the prosecution’s written opposition.

Respondent Judge in her comment denied that she maltreated the prosecutors
assigned in her sala. She submitted documents showing that the reason for some
prosecutors requesting for transfer of assignment is not because of respondent Judge’s
maltreatment to them but for health, security, and office policy reasons. In addition, with
regards to the cases where she was the judge; she, in her defense, maintains that she was
in good faith in the performance of judicial functions.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) reasoned that a party’s remedy, if
prejudiced by the orders of a judge given in the course of a trial, lies with the proper
reviewing court, not with the OCA by means of an administrative complaint.

Investigating Justice Singh recommended that respondent Judge be held

administratively liable for Oppression with a fine of P40,000 and Habitual Tardiness with
a fine of P20,000. Furthermore, the investigating Justice recommended that respondent
Judge be transferred to a different court considering the irremediably strained relations
between respondent Judge and the court staff.

Testimonies of court staff witnesses also revealed that respondent Judge does not
want to indicate in the Minutes of the Proceedings the actual time court sessions start.

On the charge of Oppression, the Investigating Justice found that respondent

Judge failed to show compassion, patience, courtesy, and civility to lawyers who appear
before her in contravention of the mandates of the New Code of Judicial Conduct which
sets the high standards of demeanor before all judges must observe.
ISSUE:
What is the liability for respondent Judge Leonor Quinones?

HELD:
The Court rules that respondent Judge is liable for her Habitual Tardiness. The
Court has time and again reminded the members of the bench to faithfully observe the
prescribed official hours to inspire public respect for the justice system. This is pursuant
to Section 5 of Supervisory Circular No. 14 issued by the Court on October 1985 and
Administrative Circular No. 3-99. This is but a restatement of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics which enjoin judges to be punctual in the performance of their judicial duties.

The Court also agrees with the OCA with regards to Judge Quinones’ failure to
show compassion, patience, courtesy, and civility to lawyers who appear before her in
contravention of the mandates of the Code of Judicial Ethics, which sets the high
standards of demeanor all judges must observe.

Section 3, Canon 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct clearly provides:

Section 3. Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for
all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues,
without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of
such duties.

In relation to Rule 3.04, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, provides that
judges must always be courteous and patient with lawyers, litigants and witnesses
appearing in his/her court, thus:

Rule 3.04 — A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers,

especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses and others appearing before the court.
A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are
made for the courts, instead of the courts to the litigants.

Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct likewise states:

Section 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the
court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers
and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar
conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction
or control.

The Court is also convinced that respondent Judge is guilty of Oppression as

shown in several incidents of misbehavior by respondent Judge which manifests her
antagonistic behavior towards lawyers and her shouting towards her court staffs. A
display of petulance and impatience in the conduct of trial is a norm of behavior
incompatible with the needful attitude and sobriety of a good judge.
 Atty. Melvin Miranda v. Presiding Judge Wilfredo G. Oca
(A.M. No. MTJ-17-1899 (Formerly OCA EPI No. 14-2646-MTJ), March 07, 2018 ]
FACTS:

Atty. Miranda appeared as a private prosecutor before Judge Oca, acting presiding
judge of Pasig City. Atty. Miranda presented private complainant, Antonio L. Villasenor,
together with his Judicial Affidavit and began to state the purpose of the witness’
testimony pursuant to Section 6 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule (JAR). However, Judge
Oca told Atty. Miranda that there was “no need for that”, and asked Atty. Miranda if he
included the offer or statement of the purpose of the witness’ testimony in the Judicial
Affidavit to which Atty. Miranda replied in the negative. Judge Oca then ordered the
termination of the proceedings, and told Atty. Miranda that he should have included the
offer or state of the purpose of the witness testimony in the Judicial Affidavity.
Moreover, Judge Oca ordered Atty. Miranda to pay a fine of P1,000.00. Atty. Miranda
made an oral motion for reconsideration, asserting that the JAR does not require the
inclusion of the offer or statement of the purpose of the witness’ testimony in the judicial
affidavit and thus there is no basis for the termination of the proceedings and the
imposition of the fine. However, Judge Oca denied outright the said oral motion, excused
the witness, and adjourned the proceedings.

Moreover, Atty. Miranda averred in his Complaint that, on November 4, 2013, he

received the Order dated October 17, 2013 which stated that since the offer or statement
of the purpose of the witness’ testimony was not included in the Judicial Affidavit, the
same may be added thereto after payment of a find of P1,000.00. Thus, Atty. Miranda
asserted that Judge Oca is grossly ignorant of the law since the JAR neither requires the
inclusion of the offer or statement of the purpose of the witness’ testimony in the judicial
affidavit nor does it impose a fine on the part for failure to do the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Oca had acted grossly ignorant of the law by requiring the
inclusion of the offer or statement of the purpose of the witness’ testimony?

HELD:

After considering the allegation in the Complaint and Judge Oca’s Comment, the
OCA agreed with Atty. Miranda’s assertion that the JAR does not require the inclusion of
the offer or statement of the purpose of the witness’ testimony nor does it impose a fine
on a party for a failure to include the same. Moreover, the OCA stressed that the fine
under Section 10 of the JAR is only imposable in the following instances: (a) the court
allows the late submission of a party’s judicial affidavit; and (b) when the judicial
affidavit fails to conform to the content requirements under Section 3 and the attestation
requirement under Section 4. The OCA ratiocinated as follows:

“Basic is the rule that the imposition of a fine, being penal in nature, must strictly comply
with the rule or law, calling for its imposition. Clearly, respondent Judge had no authority
to add to the list provided in Section 3 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule. Neither did he have
the authority to impose a fine for failure of complainant Atty. Miranda to include the
additional requirement he unilaterally imposed. Even if we were to assume that
respondent Judge reminded all lawyers to include an additional requirement in their
judicial affidavits submitted in court, he still had no authority to impose the fine provided
in the Rule for failure to comply with his own directive. In addition, the main purpose of
the subject Rule is "to reduce the time needed for completing the testimonies of witnesses
in cases under litigation." In arbitrarily prohibiting the verbal manifestation of the
purpose of the witness' testimony, the proceedings were delayed for 120 more days. This
delay could have been averted by simply allowing complainant Atty. Miranda to state the
purpose of the testimony which would have taken just a few minutes at the most.”

The respondent Judge was quick to impose a fine for the supposed failure to comply with
his own directive. And yet, he now asks for "mercy and compassion" for failing to
comply with the directive of this Office to submit his comment. In his comment,
respondent Judge claims that the filing of this case against him had caused him so much
"anguish and anxiety x x x that even the preparation of his answer was felt as a torture."

The OCA stated therein that since Judge Oca violated the Supreme Court rules and
directives which is considered a less serious offense under Section 9(4), Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court. The OCA remmended the imposition of P20,000.00 since the Court had
previously found Judge Oca liable for undue delay in rendering order and for violation of
Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars and imposed upon him a fine of
P11,000.00, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same infraction shall be dealt with
severely.
 Rube K. Gamolo, Jr v. Reba A. Beligolo
A.M. No. P-13-3154 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 10-3470-P), March 07, 2018
FACTS:
On August 16, 2010 filed by a complainant Rube K. Gamolo, Jr. Clerk of Court of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities in Malaybalay City, Bukidnon charging respondent
Reba A. Beligolo, Court Stenographer II of the same court, with gross negelct of duty and
inefficiency in relation to her duty to transcribe stenographic notes, and absenteeism and
tardiness based on her failure to observe regular working hours.

The respondent submitted a medical certificate dated July 28, 2010 to explain her
incurred absences prior to July 28, 2010 and for August 2010. However, on August 1,
2010, her co-employees spotted the supposedly sick respondent just roaming around
Malaybalay City, Bukidnon.

In her comment dated January 3, 2011, the respondent denied being an incorrigible
employee, claiming that she had been elected president of the Bukidnon Chapter of the
Court Stenographic Reporters Association of the Philippines (COSTRAPHIL), and had
received performance ratings ranging from "Satisfactory" to "Very Satisfactory" from
December 1997 up to the filing of the complaint.

On her tardiness/absenteeism, the respondent implored the compassion of the Court,

claiming that she had been raising their three children by herself ever since her husband
had left them; and that it was only recently that she was able to hire a helper.

The respondent admitted showing up late in court on March 1-2, 2005, and being
habitually tardy on 12 occasions in January 2009 and 14 times in November 2008. She
clarified that she submitted her daily time records (DTRs) for the period from May to
June 2010, along with her leave applications, but the complainant refused to accept them;
that the documents were later signed by the complainant as reflected in his transmittal
letter dated October 8, 2010 addressed to Deputy Court Administrator Raul Bautista
Villanueva; and that the claim that she was seen by her co- employees roaming around
Malaybalay City, Bukidnon on August 1, 2010 was baseless.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Reba A. Beligolo is liable for gross neglect of duty
in relation to her duty to transcribe stenographic notes?

HELD:

The respondent is liable for simple neglect of duty.

Administrative Circular No. 24-90 requires all stenographers "to transcribe all
stenographic notes and to attach the transcripts to the record of the case not later than
twenty (20) days from the time the notes are taken."

The respondent showed that she was able to submit the TSNs and orders in
question but she did not establish that her submission of the TSNs and orders was made
within the prescribed period.
 The Court cannot but stress the importance of the timely submission of the TSNs
by the respondent. As reminded in Absin v. Montalla,9 a case where the respondent was a
court stenographer of the RTC in San Miguel, Zamboanga, every court stenographer
should realize that "the performance of his duty is essential to the prompt and proper
administration of justice, and his (respondent's) inaction hampers the administration of
justice and erodes public faith in the judiciary." The Court then dismissed the respondent
from the service for failing again to submit the TSNs in several cases for the period from
2004 until 2006.

Nonetheless, although the respondent did not comply with her duty to submit her
TSNs within the prescribed period, there is no showing that her failing to do so was
habitual. Also, she ultimately submitted the TSNs and transcribed the orders. As such,
she was liable for simple neglect of duty.

Neglect of duty is the failure to give one's attention to a task expected of the
public employee. Simple neglect of duty is contrasted from gross neglect, the latter being
such neglect that, from the gravity of the case or the frequency of instances, becomes so
serious in its character as to endanger or threaten the public welfare. Gross neglect does
not necessarily include wilful neglect or intentional official wrongdoing. Those
responsible for such act or omission cannot escape the disciplinary power of this Court.
The imposable penalty for gross neglect of duty is dismissal from the service.10

Under Rule IV, Section 52 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service,11 simple neglect of duty is considered a less grave offense, and is
punishable by suspension from office (for one month and one day to six months) on the
first offense, and dismissal on the second offense. We hasten to point out, however, that
the penalty can be mitigated.

The penalty of fine may be imposed on the respondent. There was no showing of
her having committed the delay with bad faith or fraud. But the fine should be P5,000.00
considering the number of cases where she had failed to submit the TSNs and orders on
time.

On her tardiness and absenteeism, the respondent is admonished to be more

conscientious about her attendance. Under Civil Service Commission Memorandum
Circular No. 23, series of 1998, any employee is considered habitually tardy if, regardless
of the number of minutes, she incurs tardiness 10 times in a month for at least two
months in a semester, or at least two consecutive months during the year. Although the
respondent admitted being habitually tardy in November 2008 and January 2009, her
tardiness took place in different semesters, and did not occur on two consecutive months.
We note that the first semester was from January to June, and the second semester from
July to December.

On the unauthorized leave of absence incurred by the respondent on May 4, 5, 17,

19, 20, 21, 24, 26, and 27, 2010, and on June 7 and 8, 2010, the Acting Presiding Judge
eventually approved the leave applications filed by the respondent.13 Hence, the charges
thereon are dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent REBA A.

BELIGOLO, Court Stenographer II of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities in Malaybalay
City, Bukidnon GUILTY of SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY and FINES her in the
amount of P5,000.00 with a WARNING that her commission of the same or similar acts
shall be dealt with more severely.
 The Court ADMONISHES respondent REBA A. BELIGOLO for her habitual
tardiness, and STERNLY REMINDS her to strictly observe the regular working hours.
 Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Dumayas
(A.M. No. RTJ-15-2435, March 6, 2018)
FACTS:
Judge Winlove Dumayas allegedly rendered a decision without citing the required
factual and legal bases, and by ignoring the applicable jurisprudence, which constitute
gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law. Judge Dumayas supposedly imposed a
light sentence against the accused in a criminal case, when he should have found them
guilty of committing murder instead.
Judge Dumayas committed the following acts: First, he appreciated the presence of a
privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense by concluding that there
was an unlawful aggression on the part of George Anikow, an American National, and
that there was no sufficient provocation on the part of the accused Crispin Dela Paz and
Galiciano Datu. In doing so, he totally ignored the positive testimony of the security
guard, a witness to the case. Second, Judge Dumayas in appreciating several ordinary
circumstances in favor of the two accused, he never cited any factual or legal reason to
justify the same. There was nothing in the record that supports his conclusion.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Judge Dumayas is criminally, civilly and administratively liable for
rendering a decision with no factual or legal bases
HELD:
Yes, Judge Dumayas is liable. Under Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct,
Impartiality applies does not only apply to the decision itself, but also to the process by
which the decision is made. Judge Dumayas chose to simply ignore all the evidence
showing that the accused still pursued Anikow after the latter had already run away, not
even bothering to explain the irrelevance or lack of weight of the same. The act of Judge
Dumayas put the integrity of his entire Decision in question.
Moreover, his failure to cite in the Decision his factual or legal bases for finding the
presence of ordinary mitigating circumstances is not just a mere matter of judicial ethics.
The Constitution provides that no decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law which it is based. The Court cannot
simply accept the lame excuse that Judge Dumayas failed to cite legal bases due to a
mere oversight on his part that was made in good faith.
 Republic Of The Philippines V. Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018
Facts:
From November 1986 to June 1, 2006, or spanning period of 20 years, Maria
Lourdes Sereno served as member of the faculty of the UP College of Law, initially as
temporary faculty member (from November 1986 to December 1991) and thereafter, as
permanent faculty member until her resignation on June 1, 2006. From 2003-2006, she
was concurrently employed as legal counsel of the Republic in two international
arbitrations: (a) PIATCO v. Republic of the Philippines and MIAA; and (b) Fraport AG
Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines (PIATCO cases)
and such employment continued until 2009. Of her 20 years of employment in the
government service, only eleven (11) SALNs were available on record and filed by
respondent. On August 13, 2010, respondent was appointed as Associate Justice.

When the position of the Chief Justice was declared vacant on 2012, the JBC announced
the opening for application and recommendation of the position of Chief Justice and
respondent was among the nominees. JBC then required the applicants for the Chief
Justice position to submit all previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011 for those in
government service. They further stated that that “applicants with incomplete or out-of-
date documentary requirements will not be interviewed or considered for nomination.”

In a letter to the JBC, respondent stated that as her service in the government is not
continuous, she submitted only the SALNs from end of 2009 up to 31 December 2011.
Since she was considered to have been returned to public office and rendered government
service anew from the time of her appointment as Associate Justice. Also, considering
that most of her government records in the academe are more than fifteen years old, it is
reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all those files. Such letter dated July 23,
2012 was received by the Office of the Administrative and Financial Services and copies
thereof were received by the offices of the JBC regular members, the ORSN and the
OEO. The letter was neither examined by the JBC regular members nor was it deliberated
upon either by the JBC En Banc or the Execom.

Despite this, on a report to the JBC, Sereno was said to have “complete
requirements” and on August 2012, respondent was appointed Chief Justice.

On August 30, 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against
respondent with the Committee on Justice of the House of Representatives for culpable
violation of the Constitution, corruption, high crimes, and betrayal of public trust. The
complaint also alleged that respondent failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs
such as pieces of jewelry amounting to P15,000, that were not declared on her 1990
SALN, but was declared in prior years’ and subsequent years’ SALNs, failure of her
husband to sign one SALN, execution of the 1998 SALN only in 2003.

During hearing, it was revealed that respondent purportedly failed to file her SALNs
while she was member of the faculty of the U.P. College of Law and that she filed her
SALN only for the years 1998, 2002 and 2006. On February 21, 2018, a letter was sent
by Atty. Eligio Mallari to the OSG requesting that the latter, in representation of the
Republic, to initiate quo warranto proceeding against respondent.

Senators de Lima, Trillanes, et. al. intervened. Respondent then filed a Motion for
Inhibition against Justices Bersamin, Peralta, Jardaleza, Tijam, and De Castro imputing
bias for testifying against the respondent on her impeachment hearing before the House
of Representatives.
Republic’s Contention
It contends that since the petition only disputes the respondent's eligibility to become
the Chief Justice, the Solicitor General correctly instituted the quo warranto petition only
against respondent. The Republic cites the cases of Estrada v. Desierto and Lawyers
League for Better Philippines and/or Oliver Lozano v. President Corazon Aquino et
al. where this Court took cognizance of petition for quo warranto to oust an impeachable
official. It reiterates its argument that it seeks respondent's ouster, not on account of
commission of impeachable offenses, but because of her ineligibility to assume the
position of Chief Justice.

As to the respondent's claim that this Court has no disciplinary authority over its
incumbent members, the Republic cites Section 13 of A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC which
created permanent Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, tasked to investigate
complaints involving graft and corruption and ethical violations against members of the
Supreme Court. It further argues that the petition is not time-barred, citing the maxim
nullum tempus occurit regi as the State has a continuous interest in ensuring that those
who partake of its sovereign powers are qualified. It argues that the one-year period
provided under Section 11 of Rule 66 merely applies to individuals who are claiming
rights to public office, and not to the State. To consider the instant petition as time-
barred, the Republic argues, is to force the State to spend its resources in favor of an
unqualified person.

As to the question on jurisdiction, the Republic contends that the Supreme Court is
clothed with the authority to determine respondent's qualifications and eligibility to hold
the position of the Chief Justice. The determination of this issue is not political question
because such issue may be resolved through the interpretation of the pertinent provisions
of the Constitution, laws, JBC rules, and Canons of Judicial Ethics.

On the issue of the respondent’s eligibility to hold the position of Chief Justice, the
Republic reiterates that respondent failed to comply with the requirement of submitting
SALNs and thus has failed to prove her integrity. Further, the Republic cites respondent's
gross misrepresentation in stating that her reason for non-submission of SALNs was
because she could no longer retrieve all of such SALNs. This failure to file such, the
Republic contends, shows her lack of integrity.

Respondent’s Contention
Respondent contends that citing the 2010 PET Rules and the cases of Estrada v.
Desierto and Lawyers League for Better Philippines and/or Oliver Lozano v. President
Corazon Aquino et al., erroneously lumps together the Chief Justice, the President and
the Vice-President, simply because they are all impeachable officers. Respondent argues
that there are substantial distinctions between the President and Vice-President on the one
hand, and Members of the Supreme Court on the other: first, unlike Section 4, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution vesting in the Court the power to be the "sole judge" of all
contests relating to the qualifications of the President and the Vice-President, there is no
similar provision with respect to the other impeachable officials, i.e., the Members of this
Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commission or the Ombudsman; and second,
the President and Vice-President are elected officials while the other impeachable
officers are appointive officials.

It is the argument of respondent that since petition for quo warranto may be filed
before the RTC, such would result to conundrum because judge of lower court would
have effectively exercised disciplinary power and administrative supervision over an
official of the Judiciary much higher in rank. She theorizes that if a Member of the
Supreme Court can be ousted through quo warranto initiated by the OSG, the Congress'
"check" on the Supreme Court through impeachment would be rendered inutile.

She further reiterates that the instant petition is time-barred and that the Republic
cannot rely on Agcaoili v. Suguitan because it mentioned the principle nullum temus
occurit regi only in passing, as the "general rule concerning limitation of action in quo
warranto proceedings." She avers that Agcaoili is in fact authority for the principle that
prescription will run against the State if the rule or statute clearly so provides.

As to where her SALNs are, respondent avers that some of her SALNs were in fact
found in the records of the U.P. HRDO, and she was able to retrieve copies of some of
her SALNs from the U.P. Law Center. She argues that the fact that the SALNs for certain
years are missing cannot give rise to the inference that they were not filed. U.P. was only
required to keep the SALNs for period of ten (10) years after receipt of the statement,
after which the SALN may be destroyed. The fact that at least 11 of her SALNs have
been found tends to prove pattern of filing, rather than non-filing.

The burden of proof in quo warranto proceedings falls on the party who brings the action
and that based on Doblada, the Republic failed to discharge this burden.

Furthermore, she maintains that whether respondent was person of "proven integrity"
when she applied for the position of Chief Justice is political question outside the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, which only the JBC and the President as the
appointing authority could determine. Respondent also contends that absent any
challenge to her nomination and appointment on the ground of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the JBC and the President, her appointment can no longer be questioned.

Intervenor’s Argument
Intervenors raised the respondent’s argument that a quo warranto is an improper
remedy against impeachable officials who may be removed only by impeachment and the
application of the PET rules are limited only to the President and Vice-President' who are
elective, and not appointive, officials. Movant-intervenors similarly argue that the
petition is already time-barred as the cause of action arose upon respondent's appointment
as Chief Justice on August 24, 2012 or almost six (6) years ago. Furthermore, they argued
that it is not for the respondent to prove to the JBC that she possessed the integrity
required by the Constitution for members of the Judiciary; rather, the onus of determining
whether or not she qualified for the post fell upon the JBC. They also posit that nowhere
in the Constitution is the submission of all prior SALNs required; instead, what is
required is that all aspiring justices of the Court must have the imprimatur of the JBC, the
best proof of which is person's inclusion in the shortlist.

Issues:
1. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition
for quo warranto against respondent who is an impeachable officer and against whom an
impeachment complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives;

2. Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription;

3. Whether respondent is eligible for the position of Chief Justice:

a. Whether the determination of candidate's eligibility for nomination is the sole and
exclusive function of the JBC and whether such determination. partakes of the
character of political question outside the Court's supervisory and review powers;
 b. Whether respondent failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the Constitution and
required by the law and its implementing rules and regulations; and if so, whether
the failure to file SALNs voids the nomination and appointment of respondent as
Chief Justice;

c. Whether respondent failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required

by the JBC; and if so, whether the failure to submit SALNs to the JBC voids the
nomination and appointment of respondent as Chief Justice;

d. In case of finding that respondent is ineligible to hold the position of Chief

Justice, whether the subsequent nomination by the JBC and the appointment by
the President cured such ineligibility.

4. Whether respondent is de jure or de facto officer.

Decision:

I. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition
for quo warranto against respondent who is an impeachable officer and against whom an
impeachment complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives

The Supreme Court has Original Jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto

While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate

forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs, a direct invocation of the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. In the instant case, direct
resort to the Court is justified considering that the action for quo warranto questions the
qualification of no less than a Member of the Court. The issue of whether a person
usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office is a matter of public
concern over which the government takes special interest as it obviously cannot allow an
intruder or impostor to occupy a public position.

We must always put in mind that public office is a public trust. Thus, the people
have the right to have only qualified individuals appointed to public office. To construe
Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution as proscribing a quo warranto petition is to
deprive the State of a remedy to correct a "public wrong" arising from defective or void
appointments. Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without remedy. Ubi jus ibi
remedium. Where there is a right, there must be a remedy.

II. Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription

Petition is not Dismissible on the Ground of Prescription. Prescription does not lie
against the State

Jurisprudence across the United States likewise richly reflect that when the
Solicitor General files a quo warranto petition in behalf of the people and where the
interests of the public is involved, the lapse of time presents no effective bar. In People
v. Bailey:

Appellant claims that the action is barred by the provisions of the statute of
limitations, x x x We are of the opinion that the established rule of law, as to the statute
of limitations and its bearing upon cases of this character, is correctly stated in the
quotations above made and "that the attorney general may file the information on behalf
of the people at any time, and that lapse of time constitutes no bar to the proceeding."
III. Whether respondent is eligible for the position of Chief Justice

The Respondent is Ineligible as a Candidate and a Nominee for the Position of

Chief Justice

a. Whether the determination of candidate's eligibility for nomination is the sole and
exclusive function of the JBC and whether such determination. partakes of the character
of political question outside the Court's supervisory and review powers;

The Court Exercises Supervisory Authority over the JBC

The Constitution also vests upon the JBC the principal function of recommending
appointees to the Judiciary and such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may
assign to it. On this, Justice Arturo Brion, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in
De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., offers a succinct point:

Under this definition, the Court cannot dictate on the JBC the results of its
assigned task, i.e., who to recommend or what standards to use to determine who to
recommend. It cannot even direct the JBC on how and when to do its duty, but it can,
under its power of supervision, direct the JBC to "take such action or step as prescribed
by law to make them perform their duties," if the duties are not being performed because
of JBC's fault or inaction, or because of extraneous factors affecting performance. Note in
this regard that, constitutionally, the Court can also assign the JBC other functions and
duties — a power that suggests authority beyond what is purely supervisory

Qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived or bargained away by the JBC.

The JBC's exercise of discretion is limited by the Constitution itself when it

prescribed the qualifications absolutely required of a person to be eligible for
appointment as a Member of the Court. The qualifications of an aspiring Member of the
Supreme Court are enshrined in Section 7, Article VIII of the Constitution:

SECTION 7.

xxx
.
(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence,
integrity, probity, and independence.

Evidently, more than age, citizenship and professional qualifications, Our fundamental
law is clear that a member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence,
integrity, probity and independence.

Emphatically, integrity is not only a prerequisite for an aspiring Member of the Court but
is likewise a continuing requirement common to judges and lawyers alike. Canon 2 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the
personal demeanor of judges.

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
observer.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's
faith in the integrity of the Judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but
must also be seen to be done.
SEC. 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures
against lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the
judge may have become aware. The Code of Professional Responsibility,
equally applicable to respondent being first and foremost a lawyer, mince
no words in requiring that a lawyer shall perform his profession in a
manner compatible with the integrity of the profession, thus:

CANON 2 — A LAWYER SHALL MAKE HIS LEGAL SERVICES

AVAILABLE IN AN EFFICIENT AND CONVENIENT MANNER
COMPATIBLE WITH THE INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROFESSION.
Rule 2.01 — A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the
cause of the defenseless or the oppressed.
Rule 2.02 — In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept a
case, he shall not refuse to render legal advice to the person
concerned if only to the extent necessary to safeguard the latter's
rights.
Rule 2.03 — A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 2.04 — A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those
customarily prescribed unless the circumstances so warrant.

xxx xxx xxx

CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE

INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.01 — A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making
a false statement or suppressing a material fact in
connection with his application for admission to the bar.
Rule 7.02 — A lawyer shall not support the application for
admission to the bar of any person known by him to be
unqualified in respect to character, education, or other relevant
attribute.
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession

It is also important to note that the Court has always viewed integrity with a goal
of preserving the confidence of the litigants in the Judiciary.

In Edaño v. Judge Asdala, this Court stated that: The New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain their
independence, integrity and impartiality; but they must also avoid any appearance of
impropriety or partiality, which may erode the people's faith in the Judiciary. Integrity
and impartiality, as well as the appearance thereof , are deemed essential not just in the
proper discharge of judicial office, but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
 This standard applies not only to the decision itself, but also to the process by
which the decision is made. Section 1, Canon 2, specifically mandates judges to ensure
that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view
of reasonable observers. Clearly, it is of vital importance not only that independence,
integrity and impartiality have been observed by judges and reflected in their decisions,
but that these must also appear to have been so observed in the eyes of the people, so as
to avoid any erosion of faith in the justice system. Thus, judges must be circumspect in
their actions in order to avoid doubt and suspicion in the dispensation of justice.

b. Whether respondent failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the Constitution and
required by the law and its implementing rules and regulations; and if so, whether the
failure to file SALNs voids the nomination and appointment of respondent as Chief
Justice Compliance with the Constitutional and statutory requirement of filing of SALN
intimately relates to a person’s integrity

The filing a SALN is an essential requirement to one's assumption of a public

post. It has Constitutional, legal and jurisprudential bases.

Respondent herself, in her Dissenting Opinion in Phil. Savings Bank v. Senate

Impeachment Court interprets that "failure to comply" with the law is " prima facie
evidence of unexplained wealth, which may result in the dismissal from service of the
public officer."

Compliance with the SALN requirement indubitably reflects on a person’s

integrity

Section 7, Article VIII of the Constitution requires that a member of the Judiciary
must be of proven integrity. To be of proven integrity means that the applicant must have
established a steadfast adherence to moral and ethical principles.

Failure to file the SALN is clearly a violation of the law. The offense is penal in
character and is a clear breach of the ethical standards set for public officials and
employees. It disregards the requirement of transparency as a deterrent to graft and
corruption.

c. Whether respondent failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required by the
JBC; and if so, whether the failure to submit SALNs to the JBC voids the nomination and
appointment of respondent as Chief Justice;

The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those applicants who are
incumbent Associate Justices, absent which, the applicant ought not to have been
interviewed, much less been considered for nomination. Further, Respondent’s failure to
submit to the JBC her SALNs for several years means that her integrity was not
established at the time of her application.

d. In case of finding that respondent is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice,
whether the subsequent nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the President
cured such ineligibility.

Respondent’s disposition to commit deliberate acts and omissions demonstrating

dishonesty and lack of forthrightness is discordant with any claim of integrity.
 The Court cannot play blind against the manifest inconsistencies, lack of
forthrightness and dishonesty committed by respondent as a government official prior to
and at the time of her application as Chief Justice. In addition to the suspicious and
highly questionable circumstances surrounding the execution of her SALNs, the
following untruthful statements and dishonest acts (as herein elsewhere discussed)
ultimately negate respondent's claim that she is a person of proven integrity such as
respondent’s commission of tax evasion and her failure to secure a permit from U.P. to
engage in private practice while in government service but she did engage in private
practice as shown in her PDS and admitted in her Ad Cautelam Comment to name a few

The voidance of the JBC nomination as a necessary consequence of the Court's finding
that respondent is ineligible, in the first place, to be a candidate for the position of Chief
Justice and to be nominated for said position follows as a matter of course.

4. Whether respondent is de jure or de facto officer

Respondent is a de facto officer removable through quo warranto

The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is ineligible therefor is that his
presumably valid appointment will give him color of title that confers on him the status
of a de facto officer. Upon a finding that respondent is in fact ineligible to hold the
position of Chief Justice and is therefore unlawfully holding and exercising such public
office, the consequent judgment under Section 9, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court is the
ouster and exclusion of respondent from holding and exercising the rights, functions and
duties of the Office of the Chief Justice.
 Tacorda v. Cabrera-Faller
(A.M. RTJ-16-2460. June 17, 2018)

FACTS:

The complaint stems from a civil case which was initially pending before the sala
of Judge Fernando Felicen of Branch 20, RTC, Imus, Cavite. However, Judge Felicen
later on inhibited himself from the case and it was raffled to the sala of Judge Cabrera-
Felicen of Branch 90, RTC, Dasmarinas, Cavite. Judge Cabrera-Faller set a clarificatory
hearing on March 19, 2013 which was rescheduled on May 22, 2013 because of a
seminar attended by the judge.

The case was then set for pre-trial on August 14 and 29, 2013 although it was
later found out that the case had already been referred for mediation. This prompted the
trial court to suspend the proceedings until receipt of the Mediator’s Report, which was
received on September 18, 2013.

Meanwhile, the plaintiffs of the case filed their pre-trial brief on August 27, 2013,
prompting the defendants to file a Motion to Expunge the pre-trial brief submitted by the
former. Almost two years after the motion was filed, Judge Cabrera-Faller denied the
motion. This delay is why the counsel of the defendant in the case filed this complaint,
charging both Judge Cabrera-Faller and Suluen, the Officer-in-Charge for gross
ignorance of the law and gross inefficiency and delay in the administration of justice.

ISSUE:
Can Judge Cabrera-Faller and Suluen be held liable for the charges?

HELD:
As to the allegation of gross ignorance of the law, both the judge and the OIC are
not liable. The complaint did not allege any act or demeanor committed by the
respondents that would constitute impropriety of performance. To be held liable for gross
ignorance of the law, it must be shown that the error must be gross and patent as to
produce an inference of bad faith. The acts must not only be contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence but should also be motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and
corruption.

On the other hand, Judge Cabrera-Faller was held guilty of gross inefficiency and
delay in the administration of justice, but the charges against Suluen were dismissed. This
is because the responsibility of acting and resolving a pending matter or incident before a
court rests primarily on the judge.

Delay in the disposition of cases amounts to a denial of justice. Section 5, Canon 6 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct provides that “Judges shall perform all judicial duties,
including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable
promptness.”

In the case at bar, Judge Cabrera-Faller failed to meet the expected efficiency
when she failed to act on the Motion to Expunge the pre-trial brief for almost two years.
She was fined with Php20,000 for such act.
Extra Excel International Philippines, Inc., represented by Atty. Rommel V. Oliva,
complainant, vs. Hon Afable E. Cajigal, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
96, Quezon City.

Facts: This is an administrative complaint for the gross ignorance of the law, gross
inefficiency, grave abuse of authority, and evident partiality filed by complainant against
Judge Cajigal.

An information for theft was filed against a certain Ike R. Katipunan and it was
raffled in the sala of Judge Cajigal. It was alleged that Judge Cajigal did not set the case
for arraignment nor issue a warrant of arrest, instead, he granted the accused’s Motion for
Preliminary Investigation and Motion to Deter Further Proceedings.

There being no resolution on the preliminary investigation despite the lapse of the
60-day period, and pursuant to AM No. 11-6-10 SC which mandates the accused’s
arraignment upon the lapse of the 60-day period, complainant filed a Motion to Set Case
for Arraignment.

The Judge eventually arraigned the accused on June 9, 2014 but instead of
ordering the accused’s commitment, and despite the offense being nonbailable,
respondent judge allowed the accused to go home.

Moreover, the complainant asserted that respondent Judge attempted to fast-track

the proceedings in the criminal case by rescheduling the redirect examination of the
prosecution’s witness from February 17, 2015 as earlier agreed by the parties, to
December 17, 18, and 22, 2014, in view of his impending retirement on December 29,
2014.

Issue: Is respondent Judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law, gross inefficiency, grave
abuse of authority, and evident partiality?

Rule: The court agrees with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) that respondent
Judge’s act of granting the accused’s Motion for Preliminary Investigation did not
constitute gross ignorance of the law.While the Order granting the Motion for
Preliminary Investigation may not be proper inasmuch as respondent Judge based on the
Order on the accused’s bare allegation of non-receipt of notice from the office of the
Prosecutor, the court lectures that the same did not necessarily amount to gross ignorance
of the law. There was no showing that respondent judge issued the Order because of the
promptings of fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice, ill-will, bad faith or a deliberate
intent to do injustice.

The court however did not agree with the OCA that respondent judge did not err
in allowing the accused to go home after his arraignment. Basic is the principle that upon
setting a case for arraignment, the accused must have either been in the custody of law or
out on bail. Another basic principle is that the judge must conduct his own personal
evaluation of the facts and circumstances which gave rise to the indictment. The failure
of the Judge to conduct a judicial determination of probable cause was exacerbated by his
act of allowing the accused to go home without bail after arraignment. These acts were
indicative of gross ignorance of the law and procedure for which Judge Cajigal must be
called to account.

The court is not also prepared to conclude that respondent Judge’s denial of
complainant’s motion for inhibition and rescheduling the redirect examination of the
witness to an earlier date amounted to bias and partiality. Judge Cajigal did not act
improperly in denying the motion. His reasons behind his actuations seem to be more a
manifestations of respondent’s errors in judgment rather than bias which excites a
disposition to see and report matters as they are wished for rather than as they are.
Respondent’s stance more in keeping with the accused’s right to speedy trial under
Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
 Re: Deceitful Conduct of Ignacio S. Del Rosario
A.M. No. 2011-05-SC. June 19, 2018

Facts:

Complainant Noel G. Primo, a retired Sheriff of the RTC in Sorsogon, filed a

complaint against petitioner for the return of a sum of money that was entrusted to
petitioner by him. According to Primo, he entrusted to petitioner the amount of
P34,000.00, because petitioner offered to help him process his retirement papers. Out of
the said amount, P32,421.43 would be paid by petitioner to the Court's cashier, while the
balance would belong to petitioner as a token for the services that he had rendered to
Primo.

Petitioner assured Primo that his retirement papers were already being processed
by GSIS. However, Primo discovered that his retirement papers were still with the Court
and that petitioner did not actually pay his financial liability with the Court. Hence, Primo
demanded from petitioner that he return the money that was entrusted to him.
Unfortunately, Primo's demands were unheeded by petitioner. In his letter-complaint,
Primo accused petitioner of dishonesty, grave abuse of trust and confidence, and conduct
extremely prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

In his comment on the letter-complaint of Primo, petitioner admitted that he

received P34,000.00 and explained that he failed to pay P32,421.43 to the Court's cashier
because he was compelled to use the money to pay for his son's hospitalization. He
averred that he was already able to pay Primo's financial liability with the Court, and that
he requests that the matter be considered as settled and that the complaint against him be
dismissed. On his part, Primo manifested that he no longer desired to continue his
complaint against petitioner.

After evaluating Primo's letter-complaint and petitioner's comment, the Office of

Administrative Services (OAS) recommended that petitioner be held liable for serious
dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

Thereafter, the Court En Banc rendered a Decision that the petitioner's actions
constituted dishonesty and demonstrated conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. However, instead of accepting the recommended penalty imposed by the OAS,
the Court imposed the penalty of dismissal from the service.

Petitioner's wife and children filed a pleading for compassion and mercy with the
Court. However, this was denied. Subsequently, petitioner himself led a motion for
reconsideration of the En Banc Decision. In his motion for reconsideration, petitioner did
not question the finding of his guilt, fully admitting his transgressions. Petitioner noted
that, up until his dismissal, he had served the Judiciary for 33 years and, except for his
administrative case, he had not been charged with any other misdemeanor, during his
entire period of employment. However, the motion for reconsideration was dismissed
lack of substantial matters raised to warrant the reversal of the Decision.

Afterwards, petitioner led a letter requesting the Court for clemency in connection
with the En Banc Decision. The Court En Banc then resolved to note the letter and direct
the OCA to comment. In a Memorandum, the OCA recommended that the request of
petitioner for clemency be granted, noting that defendant has 1) rendered 33 years of
government service and this is the first and only administrative case led against him, 2)
respondent Del Rosario does not question the decision dismissing him from the service,
3) that 5 years have already passed since the transgression and defendant regrets what he
did because he saw how his family suffered as a consequence, and 4) lastly, due to old
age, he is suffering from various illnesses that require medical treatment which he cannot
afford due to poverty caused by his unemployment and dismissal with forfeiture of
retirement benefits.
Issue:

Whether or not the petition for judicial clemency must be granted to defendant-
petitioner?

Ruling:

The petition is denied. The Court disagrees with the recommendation of the OCA.
Judicial clemency is an act of mercy removing any disqualification from the erring
official. It is not a privilege or a right that can be availed of at any time. The Court will
only grant it in meritorious cases. Proof of reformation and a showing of potential and
promise are considered as indispensable requirements to the grant of judicial clemency.

The following are the guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency:

1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. A subsequent finding of guilt in

an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong
presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a
period of reformation.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive
years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem
himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise, as well as potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.

In his petition for clemency, petitioner attached a Certificate of Good Moral Standing
dated Sangguniang Barangay certifying that he has been an active partner in various
programs and activities conducted in their barangay, and a Certificate of Good Moral
Standing issued by the San Lorenzo Ruiz de Manila Parish arming his earnest efforts to
become a renewed and devoted Catholic and attesting that he has been an active member
of the Parish Lay Ministry. Nevertheless, the aforementioned do not sufficiently prove
that he has already fully and effectively reformed himself after his dismissal from the
service meriting the Court's liberality.

The Court has repeatedly held that the image of a court of justice is mirrored in
the conduct, official or otherwise, of its personnel. All court personnel are mandated to
adhere to the strictest standards of honesty, integrity, morality, and decency in both their
professional and personal conduct. In order to preserve the good name and integrity of
the courts of justice, they must exemplify the highest sense of honesty and integrity not
only in the performance of their official duties but also in their private dealings with other
people.
 Samuel N. Rodriguez V Hon. Oscar P. Noel
A.M. No. RTJ-18-2525 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 15-4435-RTJ), June 25, 2018

Facts:
In the case at bar, Samuel Rodriguez filed a complaint against respondent Judge
Oscar Noel, Jr. of the RTC of General Santos City, Branch 35, for violation of the Rules
of Court and the Code of Judicial Conduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of
Discretion and Bias and Partiality, in relation to Misc. Case No. 3957 entitled "In the
Matter of Determination of Bail, Charles Emmanuel A. Gabato II, Cyrex Basalo, Arjay
Balansag, and Exequiel A. Labrador, Jr., Petitioner," and Civil Case No. 8588, entitled
"Golden Dragon International Terminals, Inc. (GDITI) , represented by its president,
Virgilio S. Ramos v. Samuel N. Rodriguez."

Rodriguez was the complainant in a case charging Cirilo Basalo and his
companions for Frustrated Murder as a result of the incident which happened on June 26,
2015 at MAKAR Wharf, General Santos City. Rodriguez and Basalo were in conflict in
relation with the operations of Golden Dragon International Terminals, Inc. (GDITI) at
MAKAR Wharf, wherein the former took over the operations of the said company which
the latter refused to be replaced despite the injunctive writ issued against him.

Rodriguez argues that the respondent Judge erred in issuing a Temporary Release
Order on June 28, 2015, a Sunday, in favor of Basalo and one of his companions.
Rodriguez argued that while executive judges can act on petitions for bail on Sundays
and holidays, a petition for bail must be filed before the court can act on it; here, it was
only on June 29, 2015, or the following Monday, that Basalo and his companions actually
filed the Petition (Determination of Bail), docketed as Misc. Case No. 3957.

Another, Rodriguez claimed that in Civil Case No. 8588, respondent issued, on
July 10, 2015, 12 a 72-hour temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining him from
causing any act that might cause violence and to maintain the status quo in GDITI. To his
surprise, however, on July 14, 2015, 15 the 72-hour TRO was extended for another
twenty (20) days, or way beyond the 72-hour period. Rodriguez claimed that he was also
not furnished a copy of the notice of hearing relative to the extension of the TRO.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge should be held administrative liable for
violation of the Rules of Court and the Code of Judicial Conduct, Gross Ignorance of the
Law, Grave Abuse of Discretion, and Bias and Partiality.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the charges of Rodriguez against respondent Judge
to be administratively liable because he issued the June 28, 2015 Temporary Release
Order before the petition for bail was filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court on June
29, 2015, is untenable. The application for bail and comment thereon by the City
Prosecutor had been submitted to and considered by respondent on June 28, 2015 before
he issued the order for the temporary release of the accused. The Court ruled that the
respondent Judge acted in accordance with the rules granting the application for bail and
there is nothing in the law which prevented him from acting on the bail application
submitted to him on a weekend.

However, the Court finds the respondent Judge guilty of Gross Ignorance of the
Law when it extended the TRO beyond the period allowed by Section 5, Rule 58 of the
Rules of Court which provides that “…in no case shall the total period of the TRO which
shall include the original 72 hours exceed twenty (20) days.” The Rules' requirements are
very clear, basic, and leave no room for interpretation. The Court in previous cases of
Oca v Vestil and De Leon v Corpuz stated that a “failure to consider a basic and failure
elementary rule, a law or principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too
incompetent and undeserving of the position and the title he holds or is too vicious that
the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial
authority.” Such conduct by the respondent Judge is a violation of Canon 1 (Rule 1.01)
of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence, and also of Canon 3 states that "A judge should
perform his official duties honestly and with impartiality and diligence."

Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-
10-SC, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge, which,
under Section 11 (A) of the same Rule, warrants sanctions such as Dismissal from the
Service, suspension from office, or a fine. The Court, however, provided the penalty of
reprimand against the respondent Judge since it was his first infraction of this nature in
his sixteen (16) years of service in the Judiciary and for giving a justifiable explanation
that he had to attend to his duties thus constraining him to delay by one (1) day the
conduct of the summary hearing for the extension of the TRO, such circumstances
mitigates respondent Judge’s liability.
 Philip SEE vs. Judge Rolando G. Mislang
A.M. RTJ-16-2454, June 6, 2018
Administrative complaint by Philip See against Judge Mislang, presiding judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, charging the latter of dishonesty, gross
misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law when he lifted, upon motion, the attachment
of the assets of the defendant, without awaiting the comment of complainant (plaintiff in
civil action).
FACTS:
On December 6, 2011, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) award a medical
procurement contract to One Top System Resources, a sole proprietorship owned by Ruth
D. Bautista (Bautista).
On March 6, 2012, Bautista and See entered in to a Deed of Assignment whereby the
former assigned to the latter a portion of the proceeds of the letter of credit. In turn, See
would provide two (2) units of portable x-ray machine and pay for the freight cost and
other charges. Despite the delivery of the x-ray machines, See was unable to collect from
Bautista, with demand letters having been sent but unheeded.
Seeking payment with damages, complainant filed with the RTC of Pasig a case
seeking a Writ of Preliminary Attachment, pursuant to which copies of the Notice of
Garnishment were served by the sheriff upon UCPB (Bautista’s bank and creditor) and
AFP. The AFP filed a Motion to Lift/Quash the Notice, arguing that the medical
equipment and supplies were undergoing final inspection and evaluation by the AFP.
According to AFP, because the contract price for the project was not yet due and
demandable for lack of a certificate of final acceptance, the alleged earmarked money
constituted public fund, which may not be attached. Respondent Judge denied the AFP’s
motion, holding that the funds ceased to be public funds when they were allocated for
payment to a private individual or entity.
Bautista filed a subsequent Motion to Quash and, despite notice or hearing,
complainant See failed to appear. Respondent Judge granted the Motion upon the same
ground invoked by the AFP in the first Motion. The payment for the contract was
deposited to Bautista’s UCPB account, who withdrew the entire amount, including the
share of the complainant subject to the Deed of Assignment.
After complainant’s filing of an administrative case against respondent, the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) found respondent to have violated Canon 2 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, mandating a judge to avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities. According to the OCA, the lifting of the writ of attachment,
without awaiting the comment or opposition of complainant, “raises questions of
impropriety that taints his credibility, probity, and integrity.” Respondent was fined and
sternly ward that a repetition shall be dealt with more severely.
Incidentally, the Court found respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
ordered his dismissal from the service.
ISSUE:
Whether the alleged error of respondent warrants the Court's exercise of disciplinary
authority over him.
Whether complainant is correct in bypassing judicial remedies, and instead filed an
administrative remedy.
HELD:
No. An administrative complaint against respondent is not a substitute for a lost
judicial remedy. Complainant admits that he no longer filed a motion for reconsideration
or a petition for certiorari, since, according to him, pursuing any of these remedies would
be impractical, with his money having been spirited away already.
However, an administrative complaint against a judge is not a substitute for a proper
remedy taken in due course to review and undo his or her acts or omissions done in the
performance of judicial duties and functions.
The Court, citing Martinez v. Judge De Vera, explained:
Complainants should also bear in mind that an administrative complaint is not
the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued
by a judge, where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for
reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari. Disciplinary proceedings
against a judge are not complementary or suppletory to, nor a substitute for these
judicial remedies whether ordinary or extraordinary. For, obviously, if subsequent
developments prove the judge's challenged act to be correct, there would be no
occasion to proceed against her at all. Besides, to hold a judge administratively
accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision rendered, assuming she has
erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make her position doubly
unbearable
 Tabuzo v. Gomos
(A.C. No. 12005. July 23, 2003)

FACTS:
Atty. Tabuzo alleged that Atty. Gomos, then Comissioner of the IBP, violated the
Constitution, the Rules of Procedure of the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline, Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court RA 6713 6 when he failed to act on her pleadings with
dispatch and for issuing his report and recommendation on August 15, 2014 or 174 days
from the submission of the last pleading.

Complainant averred that respondent was very cruel and heartless to an

inexperienced lawyer when he mutilated statements made in her pleadings; and that he
maliciously cropped and pasted portions of complainant's statement in her position paper
to give the wrong impression before the IBP-Board of Governors that the introductory
heading was an act of name calling against respondent, thereby violating Rules 1.01 8
and 1.02 9 of Canon 1 and Rules 3.01, 10 3.02, 11 and 3.04 12 of Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.

Atty. Gomos denied the allegations and contended that they were not only false
and an unfortunate misappreciation of the laws, facts and circumstances but also an act of
harassment. He countered that it was complainant who caused the delay of the resolution
of the case because of the numerous motions and pleadings she filed.

The IBP recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. It
ratiocinated that complainant's allegations while seemingly couched as acts of
misconduct, actually assails the report and recommendation of respondent as
investigating commissioner.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondent may be held administratively liable in the same
manner as judges and other government officials.

2. Whether or not the respondent may be held administratively liable for

rendering an alleged adverse judgment in his capacity as the IBP Commissioner.

RULING:
1. No. The Court concluded that due to the peculiar manner of creation of the IBP,
it shall be considered as a sui generis public institution deliberately organized, by both
the legislative and judicial branches of government and recognized by the present and
past Constitutions, for the advancement of the legal profession.

Also, Section 4 of the IBP's By-Laws allows only private practitioners to occupy
any position in its organization. This means that only individuals engaged in the private
practice are authorized to be officers or employees and to perform acts for and in behalf
of the IBP. Hence, the IBP Commissioners, being officers of the IBP, are private
practitioners performing public functions delegated to them by this Court in the exercise
of its constitutional power to regulate the practice of law.

Consequently, respondent cannot be held administratively liable in the same

manner as judges and other government officials for reasons discussed.
2. No. The Court evinces its observation that the complainant's charge of delay in
the resolution of the subject unsanctioned pleadings of the complainant appears to be a
mere retaliation on the adverse resolution.

The Court had already declared that an administrative complaint is not the
appropriate remedy for every act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular where a judicial
remedy exists and is available. Similarly, an administrative complaint is not the proper
remedy for an adverse decision, order or resolution of an administrative adjudicator
deemed by a complaining party as erroneous; especially when there are other remedies
under the ordinary course of law such as a motion for reconsideration. Thus, a party who
has lost his or right to appeal a decision, resolution or order of a court or quasi-judicial
body cannot re-litigate the same matters in another administrative case filed against the
adjudicator.

Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall

conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues,
and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Obviously, the filing of
baseless and unfounded administrative complaints against fellow lawyers is antithetical to
conducting oneself with courtesy, fairness and candor. It reduces the Bar's disciplinary
process into an avenue for childish bickering and trivial catfights.
 RE: Show Cause Order In The Decision Dated May 11, 2018 V. Maria Lourdes P.
A. Sereno

(A.M. No. 18-06-01-SC, July 17, 2018)

FACTS:
On August 30, 2017, an impeachment complaint was lodged before the
Committee on Justice of the House of Representatives against respondent for culpable
violation of the Constitution, corruption, high crimes, and betrayal of public trust.

The Court observed that since the filing of the impeachment complaint, during the
pendency of the quo warranto case, and even after the conclusion of the quo
warranto proceedings, respondent continuously opted to defend herself in public through
speaking engagements before students and faculties in different universities, several
public forums, interviews on national television, and public rallies. As the Court noted in
its decision in the quo warranto case, respondent initially refused to participate in the
congressional hearings for the impeachment complaint.

When the petition for quo warranto was filed, respondent likewise continuously
refused to recognize this Court's jurisdiction. Instead of participating in the judicial
process and answering the charges against her truthfully to assist in the expeditious
resolution of the matter, respondent opted to proceed to a nationwide campaign,
conducting speeches and accepting interviews, discussing the merits of the case and
making comments thereon to vilify the members of the Congress, cast aspersions on the
impartiality of the Members of the Court, degrade the faith of the people to the Judiciary,
and falsely impute ill motives against the government that it is orchestrating the charges
against her.
Consequently, having great regard of judicial independence and its duty to
discipline member of the Bar to maintain the dignity of the profession and the institution,
the Court in its decision in the quo warranto case, ordered respondent to show cause why
she should not be sanctioned for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
and the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (NCJC) for
transgressing the sub judice rule and for casting aspersions and ill motives to the
Members of this Court.
ISSUE:
May respondent be held administratively liable for her actions and public
statements as regards the quo warranto case against her during its pendency?

RULING:
Yes, respondent Sereno is found guilty of violating CANON 13, Rule 13.02, and
CANON 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Sections 3, 7, and 8 of CANON
1, Sections 1 and 2 of CANON 2, Sections 2 and 4 of CANON 3, and Sections 2 and 6 of
CANON 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
Before proceeding to address these arguments, it is necessary, at this juncture, to
discuss the concept of the sub judice rule for which respondent is being charged of
violating in this administrative case.

Sub judice is a Latin term which refers to matters under or before a judge or court;
or matters under judicial consideration.19 In essence, the sub judicerule restricts
comments and disclosures pertaining to pending judicial proceedings. The restriction
applies to litigants and witnesses, the public in general, and most especially to members
of the Bar and the Bench.
sub judice often relates to contempt of court. In this regard, respondent correctly
pointed out that the "clear and present danger" rule should be applied in determining
whether, in a particular situation, the court's contempt power should be exercised to
maintain the independence and integrity of the Judiciary, or the Constitutionally-
protected freedom of speech should be upheld.
Truth be told, respondent miserably failed to discharge her duty as a member of
the Bar to observe and maintain the respect due to the court and its officers. Specifically,
respondent violated CANON 11 of the CPR.
She also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon 13, which states that "a lawyer shall not
make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public
opinion for or against a party."
 Sps. Alberto and Lilian Pacho v. Judge Agapito S. Lu

[A.M. No. RTJ-13-2350 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 10-3507-RTJ)]

FACTS:
Complainants Spouses Alberto and Lilian Pacho (Spouses Pacho) brought their
administrative complaint charging respondent Judge Agapito S. Lu (Judge Lu), the
former Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 88, in Cavite City
with undue delay in the rendition of the judgment in Civil Case No. N-7675 entitled Sps.
Lilian and Alberto S. Pacho v. Sps. Eric and Roselie Manongsong
Complainant Sps. Pacho alleges that the complaint for ejectment they filed against
spouses Eric and Roselie Manongsong. Respondent Judge Lu rendered a Decision setting
aside the appealed judgment and remanding the case for further proceedings.
Further, respondent Judge Lu explained to Mrs. Lilian Pacho that he cannot give
due course to their appeal as the Rules of Court proscribes a second appeal of the same
case. He also told Mrs. Pacho that he would "defer action on her second appeal because if
[he] immediately deny due course to or dismiss the appeal and the dismissal of the appeal
becomes final, she may lose her right and opportunity to seek judicial relief."
ISSUE:
May the respondent be held liable for unduly delaying the proceedings of the case
of the complainants?
RULING:
Yes, Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution mandates that the first
and second level courts should decide every case within three months from its submission
for decision or resolution. "A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by
the Rules of Court or by the court itself."
The Code of Judicial Conduct mirrors this constitutional edict by requiring all
judges to administer justice impartially and without delay, and to promptly dispose of
their courts' business and to decide their cases within the required periods.
The period for disposing of judicial matters is mandatory. Yet, the Court
recognizes that the extension of the period may sometimes be proper or necessary, but the
judge concerned must request the extension in writing, and state therein the meritorious
ground for the request. The extension is not loosely granted.
The respondent Judge did not request any extension of his period to resolve the
second appeal. He also did not tender in his comment on the administrative complaint the
ground to justify or explain his inability to resolve the appeal within the period mandated
by the Constitution.
 Anonymous v. Judge Bill D. Buyucan
[A.M. No. MTJ-16-1879 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 14-2719-MTJ)]
FACTS:
The issue started when Respondent Judge Buyucan acquired a parcel of land
located within the property granted for research purposes and declared for taxation
purposes by the Department of Agriculture (DA) known as the Department of Agriculture
Cagayan Valley Hillyland Research Outreach Station (DA-CVHILROS). Informal setters
occupy the said property. Cases were filed before the respondent Judge Buyucan for the
need to clear the said property of informal settlers which were dismissed. Few months
later, Respondent Judge acquired a parcel of land where he was residing.
A Motion for Voluntary Inhibition was filed seeking the inhibition of respondent
as he was residing within the property involved in the complaints for Malicious Mischief
against the informal settlers. However, respondent refused to recuse himself from hearing
the said cases.
A letter was sent to informed the OCA of an anonymous text message received by
tha Ombudsman Lifestyle Check Hotline to investigate the respondent Judge Bill
Buyucan. An investigation was conducted and report was made by Hon. Fernando F.
FLor, Jr (Judge Flor). Respondent Judge Buyucan denied knowledge of the DA’s
ownership of the property and claimed that the land he occupy is within the road-right-of-
way (RRW) of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). Respondent
Judge Buyucan claimed that the alleged two (2)-storey house actually belonged to his
nephew and that what he constructed were merely a "temporary Ifugao native house" and
an adjacent shanty.
Judge Flor submitted a report recommended the penalty of dismissal from the
service against respondent Judge Buyucan. In the OCA 's Report and Recommendation,
the OCA found respondent Judge Buyucan liable for gross misconduct for his illegal
occupation and refusal to vacate the Subject Property despite demands from the DA-
CVHILROS.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent Judge Buyucan is guilty of gross misconduct.
HELD:
Yes. Respondent Judge Buyucan is liable. In this case, the liability of respondent
Judge Buyucan hinges on whether he is in fact illegally occupying a portion of the
Subject Property. The Court finds in the affirmative.

The Court finds that respondent Judge Buyucan was an illegal occupant of the
Subject Property. Even assuming that respondent Judge Buyucan did not occupy a
portion of the Subject Property, he is still liable due to his admission that he was then
occupying a portion of the RRW of the DPWH Nueva Vizcaya-Isabela National Road.
Such act nevertheless constitutes a violation of P.O. No. 17, which makes it unlawful for
any person to "usurp any portion of a right-of-way, to convert any part of any public
highway, bridge, wharf or trail to his own private use or to obstruct the same in any
manner, or to use any highway ditch for irrigation or other private purposes x x x.”

Several other acts of respondent Judge Buyucan that renders him administratively
liable. A few months after dismissing Civil Case No. 626, in August of 2008, it bears
stressing that one of the vendors in the alleged transaction was Eling Valdez, one of the
respondents in Civil Case No. 626 and the accused in Criminal Case No. 4691. Despite
repeated demands from the DA, respondent Judge Buyucan refused to cease his illegal
occupation of the Subject Property.
Respondent Judge Buyucan's continued illegal settlement erodes the public's
confidence in its agents of justice considering that such act amounts to an arbitrary
deprivation of the DA's ownership rights over the Subject Property. His continued refusal
to vacate instigated the continued illegal occupation of other informal settlers residing
therein. Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct requires that the conduct of judges
must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary and that their conduct
must, at the least, be perceived to be above reproach in the view of a reasonable observer.
It is clear the respondent Judge Buyucan fell short of the required conduct of all members
of the bench.
The Court faults respondent Judge Buyucan for his act of acquiring a portion of
the Subject Property from a respondent in a case pending before his sala and further
aggravated by the fact that the respondent, Eling Valdez, received a favorable judgment
just a few months before the purported sale.
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. Section 2 of
Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall ensure that his
conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public
and litigants in his impartiality and that of the judiciary. In this respect, respondent Judge
Buyucan's conduct incites intrigue and puts into question his impartiality in deciding the
cases then pending before him. Such conduct unquestionably gives rise to the impression
that he was motivated by extraneous factors in ruling on the said cases.
A judge should, in pending or prospective litigation before him, be scrupulously
careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that his social
or business relations or friendships constitute an element in determining his judicial
course. He must not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in
such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and
integrity. A decision which correctly applies the law and jurisprudence will nevertheless
be subject to questions of impropriety when rendered by a magistrate or tribunal believed
to be less than impartial and honest.

Therefore, the Court hereby finds respondent Judge Buyucan guilty of gross
misconduct for his flagrant violation of the standard of conduct embodied in the New
Judicial Code of Judicial Conduct.
 L. Yu, Jr. V. Presiding Judge Jesus B. Mupas
(A.M. RTJ-16-2460. June 17, 2018)

FACTS:

For resolution is the Complaint-Affidavit (Complaint) dated June 17, 2010 and
Supplemental Complaint dated November 4, 2010, both filed by Lucio L. Yu, Jr., (Yu,
Jr.), in his capacity as Vice President/Assistant Chief Legal Counsel of the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), charging Presiding Judge Jesus B. Mupas (Judge
Mupas), Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 112, Pasay City, of grave misconduct,
ignorance of the law, violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics, and knowingly rendering
an unjust order relative to Civil Case No. 07-1139-CFM (subject case), entitled
"Government Service Insurance System v. Felix D. Mendoza"

In the subject case, GSIS filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and
Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Attachment, against Felix D. Mendoza (Mendoza)
in connection with the latter's loan obligation which became due and demandable upon
his separation from service. On August 3, 2007, Judge Mupas issued an Order granting
GSIS' prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment. Consequently, the
Ford Explorer Pick-up owned by Mendoza was seized by Sheriff IV Rodelio R.
Buenviaje on April 28, 2008, for safekeeping and as security to answer for whatever
monetary award may be adjudged in favor of GSIS. Subsequently, GSIS filed a motion to
declare Mendoza in default in view of his failure to file an Answer within fifteen (15)
days from the service of summons. On September 5, 2008, Judge Mupas issued an Order
declaring Mendoza in default and allowing GSIS to present evidence ex parte before the
Branch Clerk of Court, which was set on October 20, 2008. In compliance with the trial
court's directive, GSIS presented its evidence ex parte before the Branch Clerk of Court
Joel T. Pelicano at around 9:00 a.m. of October 20, 2008.

However, Mendoza also appeared in court at 2:00 p.m. of even date, manifesting
that he would file the appropriate responsive pleading within fifteen (15) days thereafter.
Consequently, Mendoza filed an Omnibus Motion, with the belated Answer attached
thereto, asking for the following reliefs: a. that the Order declaring him in default and
allowing GSIS to present evidence ex parte be set aside; b. that the Writ of Attachment be
quashed; c. that the reception of evidence be set aside; d. that the Answer to the
Complaint be admitted; and e. that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that the
loan obligation has already been settled due to involuntary surrender of the subject
vehicle.

On February 4, 2009, Judge Mupas issued an Order granting Mendoza's Omnibus

Motion and dismissing the subject case, in contradiction to his September 5, 2008 Order.

The pertinent portion of the February 4, 2009 Order reads as follows:

It appearing further, upon reading the records, that the Motor Vehicle subject
subject (sic) in this case was surrendered voluntarily by herein defendant and already in
possession of the plaintiff, this rendering full satisfaction of the loan obligation of the
defendant in accordance with the terms and conditions being made by both parties.
Considering thereof, Motion to Declare Defendant in Default is hereby Denied for lack of
merit.

Consequently, having been fully satisfied with the loan obligation of the
defendant, thus, the main cause of action is already moot and academic and pursuant to
Rule 16, Sec. 1(h) and Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court, let this case be, as it is
hereby DISMISSED.

GSIS sought reconsideration of said Order but this was denied by Judge Mupas in
his Order dated May 29, 2009.

Aggrieved, GSIS, through complainant Yu, Jr., commenced the instant

administrative proceeding alleging that Judge Mupas grossly ignored the rules when he
suddenly disregarded his September 5, 2008 Order. Complainant claims that the
appropriate action Judge Mupas should have taken was to issue an order setting aside the
order in default, pursuant to Section 3(b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court; that Judge Mupas'
unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence; and that to not be aware
of basic and elementary law constitutes gross ignorance thereof.

Complainant further contends that Judge Mupas violated Canon 3, Rule 3.02 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, which mandates that "in every case, a judge shall endeavor
diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law," when he dismissed the subject
case based on allegedly "twisted and erroneous" interpretation of the GSIS Policy and
Procedural Guidelines.

Complainant further claims that Judge Mupas' conclusion that GSIS was not
remiss in its duty to prosecute the action had no factual and legal bases because had
Judge Mupas diligently reviewed the case instead of arbitrarily dismissing it, he would
have been apprised that GSIS was earnest in prosecuting its cause of action against
Mendoza.

Finally, the complainant claimed that the trial court erroneously dismissed the
complaint on the ground that the same was rendered moot and academic by the eventual
surrender of the loaned motor vehicle to petitioner.

In his Comment, Judge Mupas alleges that the filing of the instant Complaint
while the petition before the CA was still pending constitutes blatant and malicious forum
shopping meriting summary dismissal. Judge Mupas explains that an administrative
complaint against a judge cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies
accorded to parties aggrieved by his erroneous order or judgment; for until there is a final
declaration by the appellate court that the challenged order or judgment is manifestly
erroneous, there will be no basis to conclude whether he is administratively liable.

Judge Mupas also contends that the GSIS failed to overcome the burden of
proving by substantial evidence the accusations of gross ignorance of the law and/or
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, particularly the allegations of bias, bad faith,
malice or corrupt motive.

In his Reply, complainant counters that the issue of prematurity cannot prevail
over the more essential and substantive accusations of gross ignorance of the law and
incompetence in the discharge of Judge Mupas' duties. According to complainant, Judge
Mupas should have refuted the allegations of bad faith by discussing the merits of his
assailed orders, instead of hiding behind the cloak of prematurity. Complainant further
argues that the issue of prematurity becomes immaterial in view of the finality of the CA
Decision and that contrary to the insistence of Judge Mupas, the filing of the instant
Complaint does not constitute deliberate forum shopping as the Certification and
Verification appended thereto disclosed that there is a pending case before the CA.

In his Rejoinder, Judge Mupas insists that judicial remedies must first be
exhausted before complainant may seek redress in the form of an administrative
complaint. He further claims that the two (2) questioned Orders are supported by law.
Judge Mupas likewise justifies the dismissal of the subject case for being moot and
academic and adds that the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duty
should prevail over baseless allegation of bad faith.

Hence, this complaint

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Judge Jesus B. Mupas, Branch 112, Regional Trial
Court, Pasay City, GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and Violation of the New
Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary?
Whether or not Judge Mupas is liable for Grave Misconduct and Knowingly
Rendering an Unjust Judgment?
HELD:

The Court adopted the well-reasoned Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
recommendation finding Judge Mupas guilty of gross ignorance of the law. However, the
penalty was modified.

The pertinent portion of the OCA Report and Recommendation, reads:

Respondent Judge Jesus B. Mupas, Branch 112, Regional Trial Court, Pasay City,
be found GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and Violation of the New Code of
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and be meted the penalty of FINE in the amount of
Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00), with a WARNING that a repetition of the
same or any similar act in the future be dealt with more severely.

The OCA, however, found no substantial evidence to hold Judge Mupas liable for
Grave Misconduct and Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment. Complainant Yu, Jr.
presented no proof that Judge Mupas acted with corrupt motive, with malice or in willful
disregard of the right of GSIS as a litigant.

In Re: Anonymous Letter Dated August 12, 2010, complaining against Judge
Ofelia T. Pinto, Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Angeles City, Pampanga, the Court
ruled that:

"To be able to render substantial justice and maintain public confidence in the
legal system, judges should be embodiments of competence, integrity and independence."
Judges are also "expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes
and procedural rules and to apply them properly in all good faith." Judges are "likewise
expected to demonstrate mastery of the principles of law, keep abreast of prevailing
jurisprudence, and discharge their duties in accordance therewith."

We have previously held that when a law or a rule is basic, judges owe it to their
office to simply apply the law. "Anything less is gross ignorance of the law." There is
gross ignorance of the law when an error committed by the judge was "gross or patent,
deliberate or malicious." It may also be committed when a judge ignores, contradicts or
fails to apply settled law and jurisprudence because of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or
corruption.

Here, Judge Mupas hastily dismissed the subject case without regard to the basic
rules of procedure and the circumstances evident on records.

Verily, for carelessly dismissing the subject case in utter disregard of elementary
rules of procedure, Judge Mupas acted in gross ignorance of the law. Under Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law or
procedure is a serious charge with a penalty ranging from a fine of more than P20,000.00
but not exceeding P40,000.00 to dismissal.

In this regard, it is relevant to note that this is not the first time that the Court has
held Judge Mupas administratively liable. In Mina v. Mupas, the Court fined Judge
Mupas P10,000.00 for undue delay in rendering an order. In view thereof, a fine of
P35,000.00 would be more appropriate.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds Judge Jesus B. Mupas GUILTY of gross
ignorance of the law under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court as amended by
A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, and is hereby ordered to PAY A FINE of Thirty-Five Thousand
Pesos (P35,000.00), with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or any
similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely.
 ATTY. CARLOS D. CINCO v. PRESIDING JUDGE ALFONSO C. RUIZ II
(A.M. No. RTJ-16-2482 .August 15, 2018)

FACTS:

The complainant is the counsel of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-02-46291 presided by
the respondent.

Complainant alleged that he was allowed by the trial court to file his Amended Judicial
Affidavit including its attached exhibits in lieu of direct examination in the presentation
of rebuttal evidence. This included several motions to mark the attached exhibits.

Later, the defendants in the civil case filed their Comment to the Formal Offer on the
grounds that the exhibits were not duly identified and authenticated, and were not marked
during the presentation of rebuttal evidence. Respondent issued an Order setting a
clarificatory hearing. However, the complainant failed to attend the said clarificatory
hearing, hence the issuance of another Order giving the plaintiff five (5) days to file a
rejoinder to the defendants' Comment.

The complainant filed his "Plaintiff Rejoinder" explaining that he could not attend the
clarificatory hearing since he received Notice of such hearing late and even if he had
received the Notice on time, he still could not attend as he "was down in bed at the time."

The complainant the filed the present Complaint before the OCA alleging that herein
respondent acted with gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct, gross inefficiency
and in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct for (1) taking more than nine months to
resolve Plaintiff's Additional Formal Offer of Evidence; and (2) denying the admission of
Exhibits "E" and "H" to "W", which were attached to complainant's Amended Judicial
Affidavit for Rebuttal.

The respondent explained that it was never his intention to delay the resolution of
complainant's formal offer and only wanted to give plaintiff ample time to properly mark
the exhibits attached to their amended judicial affidavits for rebuttal.

In the OCA’s report and recommendation, it cannot be denied that respondent Judge
incurred delay in resolving complainant's formal offer.

It must also be noted that respondent Judge acted immediately when a motion to resolve
the pending matter was filed by complainant and that this is the first time that respondent
Judge has been found guilty of delay. These exacting standards may be relaxed in order
to extend support and compassion to a seemingly well-meaning member of the Judiciary.

ISSUE:

Under the Code of Judicial Conduct, can respondent Judge Ruiz be held administratively
liable for delaying the resolution of herein complainant’s formal offer of evidence and for
not admitting the exhibits attached to the amended judicial affidavit for rebuttal of
complainant?

HELD:

The Court agrees and adopts the finding of facts and conclusions of law in the OCA
report, finding the respondent guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision/order.

However, circumstances considered, the Court and OCA deemed it proper that
respondent be admonished instead of imposing the penalty provided for under section
11(b), rule 140 of the Rules of Court for undue delay in rendering a decision or order,
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or any similar act shall be dealt with
more severely
 Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Juliana Adalim-White

(A.M. No. RTJ-15-2440, Sept. 4, 2018)

FACTS:
Mr. Robert T. Lim filed a complaint for misconduct before the office of the
Ombudsman for acting as counsel to her brother Mayor Adalim, prior to her appointment
as judge when she was still a PAO attorney, in connection with an administrative case
where Mayor Adalim and his business partner operated an unlicensed cable television
network.

The complaint of Mr. Lim was grounded based on the prohibition of a PAO
lawyer from engaging in private practice or as counsel for immediate members of the
family and relatives within the 4th degree without the necessary approval from the
regional director of PAO.

It was admitted by Judge Adalim-White that she represented her brother in front
of the NTC, though she claimed that she was merely expressing her opinion in front of
the NTC. Judge Adalim-White was sentenced to a penalty of one-month suspension.

Mr. Lim filed a Motion for Execution seeking the implementation of the
Ombudsman Decision. OCA recommended the enforcement of the penalty should be held
in abeyance because the OCA had uncovered another infraction committed by respondent
in connection with her case before the Office of the Ombudsman. OCA revealed that
respondent failed to disclose that an administrative case filed against her and that she had
been penalized.

Respondent prayed that the order of suspension be considered as moot and

academic in light of the findings against her in another case Cebreros v. Judge Adalim-
White. Cebreros stated that Judge Adam-White is dishonest for her deliberate failure to
divulge her suspension imposed on her by the Ombudsman on her nomination for RTC
Judge. The court dismissed the complaint that respondent could not be faulted for her
nondisclosure in her JBC Form No. 1, because the form was filed two months (February
14, 2002) before the case was filed to the Ombudsman (April 24, 2002). The Court ruled
that there was insufficient evidence to prove that respondent deliberately omitted to
disclose her pending administrative case because information on the pending
administrative case against her was readily available to the JBC on April 10, 2003.

It was argued by the respondent that she should be exonerated from the present
charge relative to her failure to disclose the same administrative case in her February 9,
2004 Personal Data Sheet when she assumed office, since there was no intent on her part
to deliberately hide the administrative case against her. She further explained she did not
disclose such because she believed that “guilty” meant final and executory judgment and
that she was not declared guilty but merely penalized.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Adalim-White should be held administratively liable for not
disclosing in her PDS the administrative case filed against her before the Ombudsman.

HELD:
The Court rules that Judge Adalim-White should be held administratively liable,
specifically that she be dismissed from the service.
 The Civil Service Rules and Regulations requires the accomplishment of a PDS in
connection with employment in the government and it is important that this is done with
utmost honesty. Respondent’s argument that she honestly believed that the term ‘guilty’
meant final and executory judgment is insufficient, considering that she ought to have
been familiar with the categorical ruling that penalties imposed in administrative cases
are immediately executory. Judges should be embodiments of competence, integrity, and
independence in order to render substantial justice and maintain public confidence in the
legal system. Despite the fact that respondent had good intentions, these cannot relieve
her of the administrative consequences of her actions as they affect her competency and
conduct as a judge in the discharge of her official functions.

Furthermore, it was found that respondent Judge Adalim-White had been

previously reprimanded on several occasions for her actions which erode the people’s
faith and confidence in the judiciary. It is the duty of all members of the bench to avoid
any impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary.

The appropriate penalty for the respondent should be dismissal from the service, with
forfeiture of retirement benefits, except leave credits, and with prejudice to re-
employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-
owned and controlled corporations.
 Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Lyliha Aquino
(A.M. No. RTJ-15-2413, Sept. 25, 2018)

FACTS:
Louie Logarta wrote an article in which he reported that a certain person named
Arlene was a well-known fixer among judges of the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) and
Justices of the Court of Appeals, alleged as a close relative of a Filipino-Chinese flour
importer who wielded influence over the Bureau of Customs and the Department of
Agriculture. Arlene bragged about her considerable influence over the members of the
Judiciary and paid for lavish affairs or parties for her "assets" in the Judiciary.

Tulfo posted a version of the same article in Filipino. Jarius Bondoc (Bondoc),
in his regular column Gotcha in Philippine Star, authored an article in which he
narrated that Ma'am Arlene's connections went beyond the courts and extended all the
way to the Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman. Ma'am Arlene was
not a lawyer but she was lawyering inside chambers.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received reports from several
judges of intense campaigning for positions in the said election, and Ma'am Arlene
allegedly supported one of the candidates therein.

Given the aforementioned circumstances, the OCA conducted an investigation

into the reports and required the candidates vying for the position of President in
the2013 PJA elections to comment on said reports.

Then Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. of the Court of Appeals conducted
his own inquiry into the matter based on the allegations that a clerk in the Court of
Appeals was one of the three women suspected to be Ma'am Arlene.

In the meantime, a resolution was issued by the Court en banc creating an ad

hoc committee to investigate Bondoc's report on Ma'am Arlene. Based on its
investigation, there were findings of acts that might constitute violations of the rules of
the Supreme Court in the conduct of the elections of the officers of the Philippine
Judges Association (PJA) and the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Judge Baybay, Judge Lee, Judge Rubia and Judge Aquino might be probably
guilty of Section 4(a) on prohibited acts, such as provision of campaign materials other
than flyers and curricula vitae, Section 4(d) such as providing free transportation or free
hotel accommodations, Section 4(h) such as the use of court personnel in the
distribution of campaign materials and paraphernalia.

The Court hereby proceeds to present the findings of the assigned Investigating
Court of Appeals Justices and the ruling of the Court on the administrative liability or
liabilities of each RTC judge.

ISSUE:
What are the respective administrative liabilities of the respondent judges?

HELD:
Judge Aquino (A.M. No. RTJ-15-2413)

There was no sufficient evidence to prove that Judge Aquino provided free
accommodations to the PJA members. However, her actions, albeit done in good faith,
could be easily misconstrued during the period of election of PJA officers and, thus, she
needs to be admonished for violating Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. A
judge is the visible representation of the law and of justice and so he or she must
comport himself/herself in a manner that his/her conduct must be free of a whiff of
impropriety, whether in performance of official duties or as a private person. Ethical
principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the
people's faith in the judicial system.

There is an absolute dearth of evidence herein of Judge Aquino's bias, partiality,

malice, or bad faith, which would have called for her voluntary inhibition in the RII
Builders case. The second paragraph of Rule 137, Section 1 does not give judges
unfettered discretion to decide whether to desist from hearing a case. The inhibition
must be for just and valid causes, and in this regard, the mere imputation of bias or
partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is without
basis. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or
prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality. Thus, the Court
finds no basis for holding Judge Aquino administratively liable for her non-inhibition in
the RII Builders case.

Judge Aquino also cannot be faulted for accepting the Chery car she won at the
raffle during the 2009 PJA Convention. Since it was won through luck and there was no
showing of any irregularity in the raffle.

Judge Lee (A.M. No. RTJ-15-2414)

The only findings supported by substantial evidence is Judge Lee's violation of

Section 4 (a) of the Guidelines on the Conduct of Elections of Judges' Associations
which provides that no campaign material other than the curriculum vitae or the biodata
of a candidate and flyers should be prepared, used, and distributed by candidates.
Regardless of his reasons for distributing calendars and using posters and tarpaulins as
campaign election materials, Section 4(a) of the SC En Banc Resolution dated 03 May
2007 is clear that the only election campaign material that can be distributed and
disseminated are the ones enumerated in said guidelines.

Judge Baybay (A.M. No. RTJ-15-2415)

The Court adopts the following factual findings and legal conclusions of
Investigating Court of Appeals Justice Garcia regarding Justice Baybay’s violation of
Section 4 (a) of the Guidelines on the Conduct of Elections of Judges' Associations.
Although the donation of cellular phones per se is not listed as one of the prohibited
materials, the incidents that surrounded the donation reveal that the intention of Judge
Baybay in doing so was to further his presidential bid. The provision, if read in its
entirety, plainly and without interpretation, clearly limits the use of campaign materials
to biodata and flyers. While the guidelines have expressly disallowed even mere posters
which are less expensive per unit cost, what more with cellular phones which are
undoubtedly many times more expensive. Moreover, Judge Baybay as a magistrate is
expected not only to act with propriety, but to avoid even the appearance of impropriety
in his campaign for the PJA presidency. A judge of law must comport himself at all
times in such manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most
searching scrutiny of the public.

The Court also rules that Judge Baybay violated Section 4 (d) of the Guidelines
on the Conduct of Elections of Judges' Associations when he offered room
accommodations at The Pearl Manila with a 25% discount on the room rates to select
judges who were attending the 2013 PJA Convention and voting at the election. A 25%
discount from the regular rate of the hotel room accommodation still constitutes a
significant reduction of the amount payable and can be deemed as a free portion of the
room rate.

Judge Rubia (A.M. No. RTJ-15-2416)

Substantial evidence supports the charge that Judge Rubia violated Section 4 (a) of
the Guidelines on the Conduct of Elections of Judges' Associations by distributing
campaign materials other than his curriculum vitae or biodata and acceptable flyers. It
is undisputed that Judge Rubia distributed to different RTCs around the country
campaign kits, each consisting of a small bag; a cap and a t-shirt bearing the seal of the
PJA, Judge Barza's name and the position he was running for, i.e., "for EVP," and his
campaign slogan of "UNITY = STRENGTH"; and printed materials, including a letter
of endorsement from the Rotary Club.

Final Words

Section 1, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to

"avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities." A
judge's behavior, not only while in the performance of official duties but also outside
the court, must be beyond reproach. While all judges are required to hold themselves to
the strictest standards of conduct, it is only reasonable to expect more of those who
seek elective office in judges' associations as they can best lead by example. To quote
In re: Solicitation of Donations by Judge Benjamin H. Virrey:

“A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public

confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Public
confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct
of judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof.
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and
willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen.”
 Boston Finance And Investment Corporation V. Candelario V. Gonzalez
(A.M. No. RTJ-18-2520. October 9, 2018)
Facts:
A petition to enjoin the sale of public auction of the properties that served as
collateral for the loans obtained from the complainant. Respondent issued an Order of
even date directing complainant to show cause why an injunctive writ should not be
issued. The scheduled hearings were also postponed several times for various reasons,
one of which was the information given to the court by plaintiffs' counsel that the parties
were in the process of negotiations for a final settlement. Complainant again moved for
the prompt resolution of all pending incidents in the case. Respondent explained that the
suspension of the proceedings was not intended to delay the resolution of the case, but to
facilitate the parties' negotiations preparatory to a compromise agreement. Respondent
explained that the suspension of the proceedings was not intended to delay the resolution
of the case, but to facilitate the parties' negotiations preparatory to a compromise
agreement. Complainant maintained that respondent's failure to promptly
resolve all pending incidents in the case.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable.

Held:

The Court finds respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law and undue delay in
rendering an order.

“To be able to render substantial justice and maintain public confidence in the
legal system, judges should be embodiments of competence, integrity[,] and
independence. Judges are also expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance
with statutes and procedural rules and to apply them properly in all good faith. Judges are
likewise expected to demonstrate mastery of the principles of law, keep abreast of
prevailing jurisprudence, and discharge their duties in accordance therewith."

In issuing an indefinite cease and desist order, respondent clearly failed to observe
the rules and restrictions regarding the issuance of a TRO, which are basic tenets of
procedure, and hence, renders him administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law.
Case law states that "when a law or a rule is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply
apply the law." Respondent's failure to perform his judicial duty with reasonable
promptness in this respect clearly contravenes the provisions of Sections 3 and 5, Canon
6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, to wit:

Section 3. Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their
knowledge, skills and personal qualities necessary for the proper performance of judicial
duties, taking advantage for this purpose of the training and other facilities which should
be made available, under judicial control, to judges.

Section 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of
reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.
 Carlos Lopez vs Atty. Milagros Isabel A. Cristobal
(A.C. no. 12146, October 10, 2018)
Facts:
Lopez hired the services of Atty. Cristobal sometime in May 2011, in a civil case
involving the former. Atty. Cristobal agreed, requiring from Lopez the payment of 35,000
pesos as her acceptance fee. Lopez then deposited the said amount in the bank account of
Atty. Cristobal. The court in the civil case then required each party to submit their
position papers at a designated time. The complainant averred that despite such
requirement by the court, Atty. Lopez did not file a position paper. Lopez also alleged
that Atty. Cristobal misrepresented him as the former claims that she already filed their
position paper. Consecutively, as alleged by Lopez, Atty. Cristobal did not attend the
hearings on the subject case and failed to communicate with Lopez. Thus, Lopez
demanded that Atty. Cristobal should withdraw as his counsel and return the 35,000
pesos acceptance fee. Despite this, Atty. Cristobal still continued as his counsel. On
December 6, 2013, Lopez filed a complaint before the CBD-IBP praying that Atty.
Cristobal be disciplined. Atty. Cristobal, in her answer, dismissed the case to be
untruthful and baseless alleging that whatever delays or postponements that have
occurred during the trial are due to circumstances which are sometimes beyond her
control. And there were further inconsistencies with the payment of legal fees by Lopez,
and that Atty. Cristobal further alleged that it was difficult to incorporate all the hearings
for the case because of her growing legal obligations with other clients and work
commitments. And lastly, Atty. Cristobal admitted that she indeed did not prepare the
position paper required of her on the account of the continued refusal of Lopez to pay her
accumulated legal fees.
The IBP recommended that Atty. Cristobal should be suspended from the practice
of law for 6 months. It contended that the mere refusal of the respondent to file the
position paper and for her failure to properly withdraw from the case should render her
liable.
Issue:
Whether or not, Atty. Cristobal is liable under the Code of Professional
Responsibility for failure to prepare a position paper and in properly withdrawing from
the case.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court agrees with the IBP that Atty. Cristobal’s failure to file the
required position paper and her failure to properly withdraw from the case reveals Atty.
Cristobal’s failure to live up to her duties as a lawyer in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibilty.
Canon 18 provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence. Rule 18.03 says that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Further, Rule 18.04
says a lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.
Clearly, the respondent failed to comply with Canon 18 when she failed to
communicate with the client, especially on the matters regarding the case and the reasons
as to why she can’t attend such hearings. It is incumbent upon the lawyer to inform his
client of the status of the case and any circumstances that needed the lawyer’s
explanation. The Court also finds the respondent guilty of violating Canon 22, which
provides for the proper withdrawal of service by a lawyer. Provides further that a lawyer
may withdraw from a case upon due notice to the client and the court. In which this case
the respondent failed to comply.
Philippine Investment Two (Spv-Amc), Incorporated Vs. Hon. Bernabe B. Mendoza
(A.M. No. RTJ-18-2538 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 17-4782-RTJ), November 21, 2018)
FACTS:
PI TWO purchased the subject property from Development Bank of the
Philippines which was covered by TCT No. T-374946. PI TWO filed an Ex-Parte
Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession over said property which was thereafter
granted.

On August 10, 2017, the Heirs of Wilson Nuesa filed a complaint against Samonte,
PI TWO, DBP, the Sheriff of Branch 23, RTC and the Register of Deeds of Ilagan for
Quieting of Title Case. They alleged that the subject property belonged to their father
who executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject property in favor of his common-
law spouse, Samonte, who thereafter used the subject property as a collateral for the loan
she obtained from DBP which was foreclosed. They claimed that the sale between their
father and Samonte was null and void for lack of consideration.

On August 25, 2017 the Clerk of Court issues the summons in the Quieting of Title
Case and on the 29th of the same month the heirs informed the sheriff that they were
availing of the remedy of terceria in the Writ of Possession Case. The sheriff, in turn,
informed PI TWO that the intentions of the heirs and directed PI TWO to put up a bond.

On September 18, 2017 respondent Judge Mendoza issued an Order, directing the
issuance of a 72-hour TRO, upon the posting of a bond and on the 20th issued the TRO.
On 25th of the same respondent issued an Order extending the validity of the TRO until
October 12, 2017. On November 27, 2017 respondent judge also granted the Moti on to
Substitute Case Bond with Injunction Bond

PI TWO filed an instant administrative complaint for Gross Ignorance of the Law
and Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgement. They assailed the judiciousness of the
following orders: (1) the September 20, 2017 TRO and September 25, 2017 extending
TRO up to October 12; and the November 29, 2017 Order granting Heirs of Nuesa’s
Motion to Substitute Cash Bond with an Injunction Bond. In the defense of respondent
judge, he argued that he honeslty believed that there appeared an extreme urgency that
the heirs would suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury and that sufficient evidence
was established for the extension of the life of the TRO. On the issue of immediately
granting the motion to substitute the bod from case to surety he admitted that he honestly
overlooked that it was set for hearing and that substitution of the bond did not adversely
affect the right of the parties.

Upon OCA’s report they found that the respondent judge took missteps in the
Orders he issued. OCA found that the judge’s failure to have the summons served on PI
TWO after the issuance of the assailed 72-hour TRO cannot be cured that it was received
by the sheriff. Furthermore, respondent judge was remiss in his duties when he failed to
set a summary hearing to determine whether the TRO can be extended. It adds that the
judge erroneously extended the TWO where the Rules proved that the life of the TRO
should not exceed twenty (20) days including the original 72hour TRO; TRO could only
be extended up to October 10, 2017.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Mendoza is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment based from the orders he issued
HELD:

Judge Mendoza took missteps in the orders he issued.

Though not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law or of the rules, and
that, when committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, the rule
applies only in cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. When the law or
the rule is so elementary, not to be aware of it or to act as if one does not know it,
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. One who accepts the exalted position of a judge
owes the public and the court proficiency in the law, and the duty to maintain
professional competence at all times. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity
with the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. A judge is expected to
keep abreast of the developments and amendments thereto, as well as of prevailing
jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice.

Even granting that respondent Judge Mendoza had been motivated by good
intentions leading him to disregard the laws governing TROs, these personal motivations
cannot relieve him from the administrative consequences of his actions as they affect his
competency and conduct as a judge in the discharge of his official functions. To be able
to render substantial justice and maintain public confidence in the legal system, judges
should be embodiments of competence, integrity and independence. Judges should
exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules, and
should be diligent in keeping abreast with developments in law and jurisprudence.

In this case, respondent Judge Mendoza's failure to apply the settled laws and
jurisprudence on the issuance of TROs constitutes gross ignorance of the law which
merits administrative sanction. Section 8 (9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies
gross ignorance as a serious charge with the following imposable penalties:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the
Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to
any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations:
Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued
leave credits
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than
three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

Time and time again, the Court has stressed that "the behavior of all employees
and officials involved in the administration of justice, from judges to the most junior
clerks, is circumscribed with a heavy responsibility." As visible representation of the law,
respondent Judge Mendoza should have conducted himself in a manner which would
merit the respect of the people to him in particular and to the Judiciary in general.
 Cipriano G. Puyo vs. Judge James V. Go
(A.M. No. MTJ-07-1677, November 21, 2018)

FACTS:
In 2000, the complainant was charged with the violations of B.P. Blg. 22 by Atty.
Audie G. Bernabe, the private counsel of S.M. Osin Enterprises, Inc. The complainant
stated that the checks subject of the criminal charges had already been paid; and that the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, in Butuan City ruled, in an action for replevin, that S.M.
Osin Enterprises, Inc. did not present rebuttal evidence to show that the "bouncing
checks" had not been replaced with legitimate payments.

According to the complainant, from the time of the filing of the case in 2000 up to
the latest hearing before the filing of the letter complaint, Atty. Bernabe and/or any
representative of the defunct corporation had not attended a single hearing, and the case
should have been thus dismissed for lack of interest or for failure to prosecute.

Despite the repeated failure to appear in court, however, Judge Go refused to

dismiss the case even if six years had already lapsed and simply kept on resetting the
hearings without acting on the complainant's motion to dismiss.

The Court Administrator Velasco, Jr. referred the complaint to Judge Go for
comment and to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him
based on the allegations of the complaint.

Instead of filing the comment, the respondent sent a letter to the Court
Administrator merely stating that he had never been charged administratively in his 23
years of government service, and that the criminal cases against the complainant were
still undergoing trial. He did not fully address the allegations hurled against him.

The Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock directed the respondent to submit a

comment responsive to the allegations or charges against him within 10 days from receipt
of the notice. However, the respondent did not comply with the directive.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent be held administratively liable?

HELD:
The Court finds Judge James V. Go guilty of undue delay in rendering an order
and insubordination.

Although the respondent submitted an initial comment to comply with the

directive of the Court Administrator through the letter, his submission, which merely
manifested his never having been charged administratively in his 23 years of service, did
not squarely address the accusations leveled against him, and thus was not a sufficient
compliance with the directive for him to show cause.

Nonetheless, the Court finds that he did not thereby deliberately and continuously
fail and refuse to comply with the directive to a degree that would render him liable for
grave misconduct and insubordination. Instead, he should answer for a lesser liability.

The Court also declared respondent guilty of undue delay in resolving the
complainant's motions. This is in accordance with Rule 1.02 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which requires every judge to administer justice impartially and without delay.

The respondent was tasked to resolve the complainant's motion for contempt and
motion to dismiss. In addition, he was expected to act on the complainant's
communication entitled Follow Up on the Status of the Case. There is no question that
the respondent did not act on both motions and did not also respond to the inquiry on the
status of the pending motions. His inactions constituted gross dereliction of duty. The
failure to decide a case or to resolve a motion within the reglementary period amounted
to gross inefficiency and warranted the imposition of administrative sanctions against
him.
 A resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere request and
should be complied with promptly and completely. Such failure to comply accordingly
betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in character, but also disrespect for the Court's
lawful order and directive. This contumacious conduct of refusing to abide by the lawful
directives issued by the Court has likewise been considered as an utter lack of interest to
remain with, if not contempt of, the system.

It is essential to reiterate that any judge who deliberately and continuously fails
and refuses to comply with a resolution or directive of the Court is guilty of gross
misconduct and insubordination. This is because the Court is the agency exclusively
vested by the Constitution with the administrative supervision over all courts and court
personnel — from the Presiding Justices of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and
the Court of Tax Appeals to the lowliest clerk and employee of the municipal trial court.
Such gross misconduct and insubordination are serious transgressions of the law and
cannot be tolerated. When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of the law that he
is sworn to obey and to apply, he places his office in severe disrepute, encourages
disrespect for the law, and impairs public confidence in the integrity of the Judiciary
itself.
 Office Of The Court Administrator V. Vladimir A. Bravo

(
A.M. No. P-17-3710 [Formerly A.M. No. 13-6-44-MeTC], March 13, 2018)

Office Of The Court Administrator V. Vladimir A. Bravo

(A.M. No. P-18-3822 [Formerly A.M. No. 13-7-62-MeTC], March 13, 2018)

Facts:
Teodora Balboa, Branch Clerk of Court of MeTC Br 24, Manila, wrote a letter to the
Office of the Court of Administrator requesting the latter that Bravo be considered
Absent Without Official leave in view of her continuous absence since September 19
2012 to December 11, 2012. Office of the Court Administrator endorsed such letter on
June 19 2013 directing Bravo to comment on the report. However, the latter failed to
comply such. Subsequently, an offence of the second violation of Bravo’s leave of
absence was also filed and that the Office of the Court Administrator issued a directive
directing him to comment on the charge. However, he failed to comment on the
subsequent directive as well. A tracer was then dispatched by the Office of the Court
Administrator to his residence but instead of commenting, he tendered his resignation
effective on August 23, 2013.

Issue: Whether Bravo is guilty of habitual absenteeism such that he must be meted the
penalty of being barred from entering public service.

Ruling:The Court resolves to adopt the findings and recommendations of the OCA, and
holds Bravo guilty of habitual absenteeism.

Under Memorandum Circular No. 4, Series of 1991, of the Civil Service Commission
(CSC), an officer or employee in the civil service shall be considered habitually absent if
he or she incurs unauthorized absences exceeding the allowable 2.5 days monthly leave
credit under the leave law for at least three (3) months in a semester; or at least three (3)
consecutive months during the year.

Applying the foregoing rule, Bravo is considered to have incurred unauthorized absences
exceeding the allowable period by law. By reason of the nature and functions of their
office, officials and employees of the Judiciary must faithfully observe the constitutional
canon that public office is a public trust. This duty calls for the observance of prescribed
office hours and the efficient use of official time for public service, if only to recompense
the Government, and, ultimately, the people who shoulder the cost of maintaining the
judiciary. Thus, to inspire public respect for the justice system, court officials and
employees should, at all times, strictly observe official time.15 Frequent unauthorized
absences are inimical to public service, and for this, the respondent must be meted the
proper penalty. Indeed, even with the fullest measure of sympathy and patience, the Court
cannot act otherwise since the exigencies of government service cannot and should never
be subordinated to purely human equations.

Wherefore, Vladimir Bravo is found guilty of habitual absenteeism and dismissed from
service with prejudice to reemployment in any government agency with forfeiture of
retirement benefits.