Kartik Khanna and Dhvani Shah
Kartik Khanna and Dhvani Shah
Kartik Khanna and Dhvani Shah
I. INTRODUCTION
India is closing in on nearly three decades of having an anti-defection law in force. Inserted in the Constitution of India by way of the 52nd Amendment in 1985,2 the concerned law is enshrined in the Tenth Schedule (Schedule X). India was spurred to introduce this law after witnessing as many defections in one year as it had in the four Lok Sabhas preceding it. The amendment was intended to bring stability to the structure of political parties
4th & 2nd year students, the W.B. National University of Juridical Sciences, Kolkata. The authors would like to thank Prof. (Dr.) M.P. Singh, Prof. (Dr.) P. Ishwara Bhatt and Smaran Shetty. 1 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651 (Kihoto Hollohan). 2 The Constitution (Fifty Second-Amendment) Act, 1985, available at http://india.gov.in/govt/ documents/amendment/amend52.htm (Last visited on September 17, 2011).
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and strengthen parliamentary practice by banning floor-crossing. The prior failure to deal with this issue had lead to rampant horse-trading and corruption in daily parliamentary functioning. Schedule X was thus seen as a tool to cure this malaise.3 The import of this constitutional measure meant that once a member was elected under the symbol of a political party to Parliament, the member could not later opt to leave that party or switch to another party. Independent members of Parliament on the other hand would be liable upon moving to the folds of a political party subsequent to the election. The most intriguing provision and the subject of this paper, however, lies in Paragraph 2(1)(b) of Schedule X and reads: 2. Disqualification on ground of defection.- (1) Subject to the provisions of Paragraphs 4 and 5, a member of a House belonging to any political party shall be disqualified for being a member of the House [] (b) if he votes or abstains from voting in such House contrary to any direction issued by the political party to which he belongs or by any person or authority authorised by it in this behalf, without obtaining, in either case, the prior permission of such political party, person or authority and such voting or abstention has not been condoned by such political party, person or authority within fifteen days from the date of such voting or abstention[] Floor-crossing, therefore, is not the only form of defection envisaged under Schedule X. In the occasion of a direction being issued by a political party to vote in a particular manner on a matter, the member of the party is mandated to comply with the direction. Anything contrary to this directive is also perceived as an act amounting to defection. This paper argues for watering down the current formulation of the defection law in order to preclude voting from its ambit. Two arguments are advanced to this effect. First, the right to vote for or against party lines is a genuine exercise of free speech in Parliament. This freedom of expression is vital in Parliament particularly as it can be a source of dissent in governance. We, therefore, conclude that the aforementioned provision of Schedule X mistakes a legitimate avenue of dissent as an act constituting defection. By giving every member the opportunity of actually forming an opinion, parliamentary debate can be fostered. This would shift the focus of political parties
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from merely giving directions to convincing members of the merits of a particular vote. Second, the paper argues that anti-defection law is not the optimal means to check bribery in voting in Parliament. That being the case, even the impugned provision, although wide in its phraseology, is inadequate to cure the malaise of cash for votes. This vital check will instead come from correcting the wrong course taken in P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State,4 which held that even voting tainted by bribery was absolved from judicial scrutiny as per the provisions of the Constitution. The relaxation of anti-defection law in times of voting will not contravene the intention behind enacting Schedule X. Fostering free and fearless voting shall instead, as in the case of America and Britain, cement the credentials of our Parliament as an impervious pillar of government. To establish a case for the same, we will elucidate in Part-IV, the problems arising out of Paragraph 2(1)(b) that persist in spite of a purposive interpretation of the same by the Supreme Court5. Part-III will look at legislative practice in Britain and the United States to glean the wisdom behind allowing members to speak and vote freely with limited restrictions, internal to political parties. In Part-IV, we will conclude with suggestions as to how to reconcile this provision with the Indian ideals of parliamentary democracy.6
(1998) 4 SCC 626 (Narasimha Rao). See discussion infra Part IV.A. The discussion contained in this piece will not touch upon floor crossing and its mertis thereof. SUBASH C. K ASHYAp, PArLIAmENTArY PrOcEDUrE: THE LAW, PrIVILEGES, PrAcTIcE AND PrEcEDENTS, Vol. II, 2345 (2000). The whips issued in parliament can of three types: one-line,
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Even if the member sees merit in a contrary opinion, this provision restricts individual decision-making and mandates a faithful adherence to the directions of the party whip. By curtailing a parliamentarians discretion in voting, this provision has effectively mitigated the need for debate in Parliament. An obvious corollary of encumbered voting is that the law has negatived any scope for expressing dissent in the House.8 In order for a parliamentarian to effectively fulfil his functions, he must have the right to vote according to his conscience and not be tied to his party lines. Allowing for intra-party dissent on the floor of the house is, therefore, in line with the Parliaments duty of ensuring freedom in action of its members. In addition to the harms enumerated, this paper argues that the impugned provision fails to meets its objective of checking bribery and corruption on the floor of the House. Seeing as the Committee on Defections established by the Ministry of Home Affairs held that corruption is a major cause of defection,9 retaining Paragraph 2(1)(b) can only be justified against the touchstone of preventing corruption. It will be argued that this objective has not been met and to pose an effective check against this ill, efforts are required to nullify the Narasimha Rao judgment.10
two-line or three-line, which indicates the severity and importance of the mandate. V. N. SHUkLA, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 1064 (M.P. Singh ed., 2008). 9 MINISTrY OF HOmE A FFAIrS, R EpOrT OFCOmmITTEEONDEFEcTIONSUNDEr THE CHAIrmANSHIp OF SHrI Y. B.CHAVAN (1969). 10 Narasimha Rao, supra note 4. 11 C.H. McILWAIN, THE HIGH COUrT OF PArLIAmENT AND ITS SUprEmAcY 27 (1910). 12 J.A.G. GrIFFITH, MIcHAEL RYLE, PArLIAmENT: FUNcTIONS, PrAcTIcE AND PrOcEDUrES 6 (1989). 13 Id. 14 L.S A mErY, THOUGHTS ON THE CONSTITUTION 12 (1947).
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The emphasis on debates and discussions is an intrinsic feature of the Indian legislature as well.15 Tellingly, Ryle and Griffith argue that discussions must be of a nature such that the government defends its proposals in response to criticism and alternatives proposed by the opposition.16 Constantly making the Executive defend its position should ordinarily have an impact on the manner in which debate is conducted in the legislature. The operation of Paragraph 2(1)(b) has, however, worked against this theoretical assumption. This is evidenced by the meagre number of debates witnessed in Parliament and the judicial and legislative recognition of the problem.
1. Performance in Parliament
Concerns regarding Parliamentary performance most often relate to the drastic reduction in the level and extent of debate. A detailed appraisal of its work rate reveals the inadequate effort put in by its members in performing their duty. In the entire parliamentary session of 2009, 27 percent of the bills passed were debated less than 5 minutes in the Lok Sabha.17 Further, the Lower House has the dubious honour of holding discussions for less than an hour in the case of half the bills that were passed.18 This is not a practice that has developed overnight and had in fact, festered for a while. In 2007 for instance, this trend was stark considering that the Lok Sabha spent a mere 9 percent and Rajya Sabha, only 12 percent of its time on discussions related to Bills other than Finance Bill and Appropriation Bills.19 In the Monsoon session of 2010, 479 members of the Lok Sabha had an average participation in just three debates. The Congress failed to even muster that average in the session.20 Nearly one-third of the members of both houses, however, failed to participate in any debate.21 When seen in context of the fact that the Lok Sabha passed 17 bills while the Rajya Sabha passed 21
S.H. BELAVADI, THEOrY AND prAcTIcE OF PArLIAmENTArY PrOcEDUrE IN INDIA 174 (1988). J.A.G. GrIFFITH, MIcHAEL RYLE, supra note 12, 13. 17 PRS Legislative Research, Vital Stats: Parliament in 2009, available at http://www.prsindia. org/administrator/uploads/general/1262663823~~parliament%20in%202009.pdf (Last visited on August 23, 2011). 18 Id. 19 PRS Legislative Research, Vital Stats: Legislation in Parliament, available at http://www. prsindia.org/administrator/uploads/general/1241757092~~Legislation%20in%20Parliament. pdf (Last visited on August 23, 2011). 20 PRS Legislative Research, Vital Stats: M.P. Participation in Monsoon Session 2010, available at http://www.prsindia.org/administrator/uploads/general/1283599162~~Vital%20Stats%20 -%20MP%20participation%20in%20Monsoon%20Session%202010.pdf (Last visited on August 23, 2011). 21 PRS Legislative Research, Vital Stats: Parliamentary Monsoon Session 2010, available at http://www.prsindia.org/print.php?bill_id=1277&category= (Last visited on August 23, 2011). What makes this statistic more astonishing is that PRS has collectively regarded interventions in the form of questions during Zero Hour as well as debates on bills and national issues as Debates.
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bills in this period, this inactivity is astonishing.22 This culture has manifested itself to the woeful extent of discussions concerning Private Member Bills, a privilege attached to being a member of parliament.23 Amidst numerous disturbances in 2011, nearly 40% of the bills were passed within an hour.24 These statistics are actually flattering when compared to the level of debate during the Winter Session of 2009. Nearly half the strength of both houses refrained from participating in any debate whatsoever. Out of the number that actually spoke at all, one-fourth restricted itself to participating in two debates, at most.25 This level of participation is shocking considering that the legislature passed 14 bills in all during this session.26 Legislators respond to the claim of poor performance by referring to the fact that bills are debated in full at Committee stage. It is in fact argued that seeing as these Parliamentary Committees comprise of members across political factions, the discussions usually cover myriad facets. Unfortunately, over 2005 and 2006, the Standing Committees in Lok Sabha have recorded an average attendance of 43.5 percent and only six out of eighteen committees have mustered the magic number of 50 percent.27 These figures reflect a Parliament apathetic to the cause of conscientious law making. An ideal Parliament will see the floor debate an issue on its fullest and vote on the merits of the issue. Such are the rigours of anti-defection law that it stifles the precious commodity of exchange. Although it is unclear as to what percentage of the aforementioned inactivity stems from anti-defection law itself, it is clear that its continuance will only aggravate the problem and affect any motivation to deliberate.
of the structural reasons of the same has been attributed to the anti-defection law.28 In this vein, Paragraph 2(1)(b) especially dwindles the need for any debate. Considering that members of a particular political party are effectively ordered to vote in a particular manner, there is little incentive for a parliamentarian to even contemplate discussing a position contrary to that decided upon by the party leaders.29 This issue came to the forefront recently when the Womens Reservation Bill, 2010 was tabled in the Rajya Sabha. It was reported that several parliamentarians had voted in favour, despite being vehemently opposed to the bill, owing to being bound by a whip.30 Such instances reveal the rot in the parliamentary structure in India. To extract the best and most effective performance from our legislature, we must provide all avenues of effective debate. The endeavour must be to facilitate and more importantly, incentivise a member of the house to speak his mind. The Kihoto Hollohan judgment reiterated the importance of incentivising parliamentarians to debate. This ability gains significance especially in cases when a member might choose to raise an opinion, different from the line taken by his party. The benefit of such an instance is that: [] Not unoften the views expressed by the Members in the House have resulted in substantial modification, and even the withdrawal, of the proposals under consideration. Debate and expression of different points of view, thus, serve an essential and healthy purpose in the functioning of Parliamentary democracy. At times such an expression of views during the debate in the House may lead to voting or abstinence from voting in the House otherwise than on party lines [...]31 This observation highlights the value of a distinct opinion in shaping legislative action, by rightly placing a premium on a multitude of opinions being put forth in Parliament. Further, it may add nuances to a bill that are not contemplated if debate on the same is not lively and there is little engagement. It must be kept in mind that a bill goes through three readings. There is a window to debate the bill at the end of the second and to some extent, third reading. While at the second reading, all the provisions are gone through and thoroughly discussed; the third reading concerns a final discussion about
PRS Legislative Research, Measuring Effectiveness of the Indian Parliament: Summary of Proceedings from the Conference on Effective Legislatures, available at http://www.prsindia. org/uploads/media/conference/ConferneceSummaryMeasuringParliamentEffectiveness.pdf (Last visited on August 17, 2011). 29 Indian Express, House for this Debate?, January 3, 2007, available at http://www.indianexpress.com/news/house-this-for-debate/19938/0 (Last visited on August 20, 2011). 30 The Telegraph, Agree to Disagree, April 21, 2010 available at http://www.telegraphindia. com/1100421/jsp/opinion/story_12362774.jsp (Last visited on August 20, 2011). 31 Kihoto Hollohan, supra note 1, 43.
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passing or not rejecting the bill. The third reading cannot repeat the detailed analysis of the second reading. There is thus, scope for debate at the final stage, limited only to the reasons for why the bill should finally be passed or rejected. A debate of limited nature, however, becomes vital seeing as it ideally affects the manner of voting on the bill. The issuance of a whip and concomitant threat of disqualification, however, distorts this regular practice as the purpose of the last two readings is rendered useless by mandating how voting is to be conducted. Even where the bill is tabled before a Committee, it has been previously noted that a bill is not subjected to adequate scrutiny due to low attendance of its members.32 In such a case, the third reading assumes greater significance. This importance when seen with the aforementioned statistics makes the ineptitude of the Parliament stark. The Parliament is the body representing the length and breadth of India. It is the embodiment of the consciousness of the nation. In this regard, the legislature owes it to the electorate to ensure that it conducts business in the fairest and most efficient manner. It is astonishing that Paragraph 2(1)(b) has curtailed an air of democracy in the intrinsically democratic entity, the Parliament.33 The effect of this restriction has transcended into the right of conscientious dissent being denied to members of parliament as well.
National Social Watch, supra note 27. Nick Robinson, Expanding Judiciaries: India and the Rise of the Good Governance Court, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. R EV. 1 (2009). 34 Constitution of India, Art. 105(1).
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(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the rules and standing orders regulating the procedure of Parliament, there shall be freedom of speech in Parliament. (2) No member of Parliament shall be liable to any proceedings in any court in respect of any thing said or any vote given by him in Parliament or any committee thereof [] This privilege vested in the member of the House, grants a right akin to that enshrined in Art. 19(1)(a), which guarantees a fundamental freedom of speech and expression to all persons. Parliamentarians are provided this freedom only when inside the House. The scope of this privilege has been tested in courts before. It has been conclusively established that Art. 105(1) and its equivalent Art. 194(1) are parliamentary privileges and not fundamental rights.35 It has, however, been held that the extent of this privilege is much wider than any right vested in an ordinary person. While reasonable restrictions apply in the case of Art. 19, no such restrictions have been imposed in case of Art. 105. This is indicative of the greater rights that parliamentarians enjoy. Members can, for instance, defame another without fear of censure unlike citizens under Art. 19.36 Aside from unrestricted speech, the Constitution provides for free voting in Parliament.37 Generally, courts have regarded voting by ordinary citizens to be a part of speech on the grounds that it is a tool of expressing feelings, sentiments, ideas or opinions of an individual.38 The right to vote for the candidate of ones choice is nothing but freedom of voting, and it is the essence of democratic polity. While the right to vote is a statutory right, the freedom to vote is considered a facet of the fundamental right enshrined in Art. 19(1)(a).39 Every person has the right to form his opinion about any candidate. Casting a vote in favour of one or the other candidate is tantamount to expression of this preference.40 This final stage in the exercise of voting marks the accomplishment of freedom of speech of the voter.41 Extending this finding to voting in Parliament, voting becomes an essential element of the freedom under Art. 105(1). Voting by members must not thus, be restricted by Paragraph 2(1)(b).
See K. Ananda Nambiar v. Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 657 19. See M ADHAVI DIWAN, FAcETS OF MEDIA LAW 102 (2006). Constitution of India, Art. 105(2). Mian Bashir Ahmad v. State of J&K, AIR 1982 J&K 26; See also Peoples Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (2004) 2 SCC 476, 55. 39 Jyoti Basu v.Debi Ghosal, (1982) 1 SCC 69: (1982) 3 SCR 318, reiterated in Peoples Union for Civil Liberties. v. Union of India, (2009) 3 SCC 200. 40 K.N. Subbareddy, Advocate v. Advocates Association represented by the Secretary of the Association,District Registrar of Societies Registration andKarnataka State Bar Council by its Chairman, ILR 2009 KAR 1697, 21. 41 Id. 37 38
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Having a restricted right to vote then amounts to an inconsistent situation, seeing as the privilege of unrestricted speech is much wider in the case of parliamentarians. Even assuming that voting is not placed on this pedestal; it is undeniable that voting is also a subject of a privilege under Art. 105(2). This does imply of course, that certain restrictions can be placed on the exercise of this right. Any restriction on the right of a parliamentarian to vote according to his own choice, conviction or conscience is a restriction of the exercise of the right of freedom of speech, and it must be reasonable.42 A restriction in the form of Paragraph 2(1)(b), however, stifles a legitimate avenue of dissent.43
Mian Bashir Ahmad v. State of J&K, AIR 1982 J&K 26 . See also PRS Legislative Research, supra note 29. 43 SUBASH C. K ASHYAp, PArLIAmENTArY PrOcEDUrE: THE LAW, PrIVILEGES, PrAcTIcE AND PrEcEDENTS, Vol. II, 2157 (2000). 44 JOHN S. DrYZEk, DELIBErATIVE DEmOcrAcY AND BEYOND: LIBErALS, CrITIcS, CONTESTATIONS (2000). 45 Economic Times, Ruling party as opposition, September 28, 2010, available at http://articles. economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-09-28/news/27574743_1_political-party-party-discipline-dissent (Last visited on September 16, 2011).
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Second, expressing dissent in voting has been regarded as a sign of political instability and poor cohesion. In this regard, the Kihoto Hollohan judgment cited several scholarly works that elucidated the demerits of allowing dissent.46 Undoubtedly, every political party would appreciate unflinching support on the mandate of the day. To cement this aspiration into a binding law, however, disregards the pressures on a parliamentarian when he is to make a decision. A parliamentarians allegiance lies both to his constituency as well as his political party. Allegiance to the party is reflected greatly in the fact that the Member is bound by the directions of the Whip. To balance his interests, however, he cannot ignore the interests of his constituency and must give credence to the same when appropriate. It is fallacious to consider such conduct as being disloyal to the party or as reflecting poorly on the cohesion of the party. Members belonging to the same political party may obviously have different opinions on a matter and expression of such difference of opinion may result in modification or withdrawal of proposals under consideration.47 Such a result is possible only if members express dissent. Intra-party dissent or intra-party debates, both a core element of intra-party democracy, are contingent on the willingness of the leaders to allow members to vote against party lines. Anti-defection law deals with the malaise of floor-crossing, which essentially hampers the functioning of the legislature. Dissent, however, would not pose a similar problem seeing as it is an intrinsic cog of a parliamentary democracy. Disqualification under Paragrpah 2(1)(b) then, confuses dissent for defection. Voicing dissent is still seen as defection in parliamentary politics. The right to dissent is stifled by the frequent use of whips by political parties in order to protect their interests. This results in the unnecessary issuance of whips for trivial matters or as a fake display of party cohesion. The misuse of anti-defection law greatly reduces the authority that a member can exercise when called upon to vote.48 His right to dissent is rarely or never exercised during voting. This is one of the reasons why the Law Commission recommended that the Government should restrict issuing whips only to situations when the Government is in danger.49 Unfortunately, the issuance of whips is not governed by any law or rules framed under the Tenth Schedule or under Rules of Procedure and Conduct in the Lok Sabha/Rajya Sabha.50 It is regulated as
GrIFFITH & RYLE, ON PArLIAmENT, FUNcTIONS, PrAcTIcE & PrOcEDUrE 119 (1989) as cited in Kihoto Hollohan, supra note 1, 19. 47 Kihoto Hollohan, supra note 1, 19. 48 The Hindu, From roaring lion to timid mouse, February 26, 2010, available at http://www. thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article113668.ece (Last visted on September 5, 2011). 49 LAW COmmISSION OF INDIA, 170th R EpOrT: R EFOrm OF THE ELEcTOrAL LAWS (170th R EpOrT), Part-II, Chapter-IV, 3.4.2. 50 Id.
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a matter of party discretion. Controlling party discretion and judgment in this form, by way of a legislation, would be unsuitable. This trend is disappointing particularly as it means that even those considered qualified to represent the public exercise no individuality and creativity in decision-making.
does not meet this objective and falls short of adequately dealing with bribery in Parliament.
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Penal Code for conspiracy and bribery in light of the privilege given by Art. 105. The said Article provides that no member can be held liable in court in respect of anything said or any vote cast in Parliament.56 The Court read this provision extremely broadly to cover all cases of voting in Parliament. Clearly, the purpose of this provision was to prevent a situation in which a parliamentarian is admonished by the judiciary owing to a vote he has given in the House. In no way, however, should this provision have been read to absolve parliamentarians of crimes associated with voting a particular way.57 The Court made an irrational observation in holding that voting in any form is an activity internal to the functioning of the Parliament. Acts of corruption and bribery are external to this parliamentary functioning and must be dealt with by the penal laws of the country. This conclusion stems from the logical reason that a parliamentarian is absolved of any challenge arising from his speech or vote in the capacity of being a member of the house. This privilege obviously will not extend to cases where a parliamentarian provides or accepts a bribe to sway voting on a particular issue.58 A vote legitimately cast then, will by virtue of Art. 105, be prevented from being challenged before a court of law. The Courts interpretation poses the greatest threat to checking corruption in the House. A criminal offence is most effectively deterred by the imposition of a penal punishment. Absolving parliamentarians of court action for bribery makes defection in times of voting a viable option. Such actions are truly dis-incentivised when the threat of criminal law looms large. It is unreasonable to leave such a lacuna in the law while expecting Paragraph 2(1) (b) to tackle bribery. Reliance on this provision is tantamount to plugging a circular hole with a square peg. The judgment, however, lays down a caveat that cash-for-votes will leave a member liable to a contempt motion in Parliament.59 While the Parliament can order prosecution in a court where the conduct of a member is an offence as well,60 as in the case of bribery in voting, mere reliance on Parliament to act as a watchdog is inadequate. The judgment must be neutralized to add a second prong of check against corruption in Parliament and tighten the noose against members indulging in these actions. Paragraph 2(1)(b) besides exacerbating fresh problems, does nothing more than raising the cost of swaying a vote in Parliament. As we will discuss while suggesting a solution, regulating voting in times when the
Constitution of India, Art. 105(2): No Member of Parliament shall be liable to any proceedings in any court in respect of any thing said or any vote given by him in Parliament or any committee thereof []. 57 D.D. BASU, COmmENTArY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 5049 (2008). 58 See Balwant Singh Mallik, P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State: A Critique, (1998) 8 SCC J- 1. 59 Narasimha Rao, supra note 4, 44. 60 K rISHNAN VENUGOpAL & V. SUDHISH PAI, R ESTATEmENT OF INDIAN LAW: LEGISLATIVE PrIVILEGE IN INDIA 117 (2011).
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existence of the government is threatened, might benefit India. It is, however, time to acknowledge that the sweeping terms of Paragraph 2(1)(b) have proven to cause more harm than good.
Time, The Crist Switch: Top 10 Political Defections, available at http://www.time.com/time/ specials/packages/completelist/0,29569,1894529,00.html (Last visited on August 14, 2011). 62 Michael Stokes, When freedoms conflict: Party discipline and the First Amendment, 11 J. L. & POL. 751, 753 (1995). 63 Jonathan Lemco, The Fusion of Power, Party Discipline and the Canadian Parliament: A Critical Assessment, 18 PrESIDENTIAL STUD Q. 283, 284 (1988); See also Sara Brandes Crook & John R. Hibbing, Congressional Reform and Party Discipline: The Effect of Changes in Seniority System on Party Loyalty in the U.S. House of Representatives, 15 BrIT. J. POL. ScI. 207 (1985). 64 Beth Donovan, Democrats may punish Chairmen who defied Clinton on Vote, 51 CONG. WkLY. R Ep. 1411 (1993).
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the same,65 or expulsion of the legislator from the party caucus.66 Interestingly, the arguments against such sanctions have not been culled from the ideals of democracy that justified the lack of an anti-defection law in the first place. In the US as well, the arguments against sanction stem from the First Amendment to the US Constitution, that prohibits the infringement of the freedom of speech.67 The argument involving the practice of political parties imposing sanctions in case of voting, contrary to their directions, involves a two-fold discussionfirstly, on the grounds of freedom of speech of the legislator68 and secondly, on the conflicting freedom of association of a political party.
was unable to conclusively prove any malicious intent in the removal, the case is important as the Court reiterated the staunch protection for a legislators conduct in the House. Vitally, the Court refused to distinguish between minor curtailment of privileges and subtantive restrictions on the rights of a legislator. Both constituted, in its opinion, a violation of freedom of speech as the existence of an individuals constitutional right is not based on nature of the sanction imposed with which that person is threatened for exercising that right.75 The principle behind providing this right to legislators is that the courts do not distinguish between the First Amendment rights of an ordinary citizen and a legislator. Therefore, a legislator also enjoys the First Amendment rights that cover free speech as well as the the right to not speak in favour of something.76 The First Amendment has even been extended to grant a legislator the right to association or not to do so, freely.77 Courts in US have gone on to declare that the First Amendment affords the broadest protection to political expression and that free and uninhibited debate is a concomitant of the Free Speech clause78 as well as a democratic government.79 The extension of the rights principle is different from the privilege model followed in India. The two systems can, however, still be compared as nearly equivalent restrictions apply on voter rights. Cruically, free speech, as protected by First Amendment, has been extended by courts to include the right of the legislators to vote freely.80 The coercion of members to vote unconstitutionally thus, abridges their free speech rights. The possible criticisms of applying this principle in India, as we have suggested, would stem from the fact that it would preclude any avenue for disciplining legislators for breaking party unity at all. This lacuna too, has been addressed by US courts by elucidating upon the freedom of association of political parties and its allied rights.
James S. Wrona, L. Francis Cissna , Switching Sides: Is Party Affiliation a Tie that Binds?, 28 A rIZ. ST. L.J. 735 (1996). 76 Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 976 (1st Cir. 1993) (The First Amendment protects the right not to speak or associate, as well as the right to speak and associate freely.). 77 Id. 78 Gewertz, supra note 74, 1059. 79 Bond, supra note 68, 137. 80 Clarke v. United States, 886 F.2d 404, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1989), Miller v. Town of Hull, 878 F.2d 523, 532 (1st Cir. 1989).
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its internal operations.81 In light of the same, courts were to enquire whether the partys freedom of association could override an individual members freedom of speech.82 The courts held that between the right to vote and the right to form associations, the latter must necessarily take precedence as the right to organize a party in order to make an effective political structure is at stake in case of political parties.83 This right is clearly respected when associations exclude from the party, those who have incompatible views, despite the indviduals right to an opinion.84 In the Bond and Gewertz judgments, the dispute juxtaposed the rights of legislators verus the House or a State entity. The dispute between a political party and its member on the other hand, would fall within the realm of affairs of a private association.85 In such a scenario, political parties can exercise their privelege as an association and exclude members with conflicting philosphies.86 It is argued that parties cannot determine the membership of the legislator in the House. A party thus cannot discipline a legislator-member by using control over his legislature membership. Nevertheless, this does not preclude parties from expelling members from the party as, it would be unfair to use the powers of the organization with whose policies they disagree, to advance their incompatible personal views.87 Thus, a legislator is protected from disqualification in case he opts to oppose his political party on a particular matter. He can be excluded from a party but not the House itself.88 It is doubtful whether India can adopt a model, similar to that in the US when it comes to adjudicating upon the legality of a defection. Even though the defection process is governed internally in the US, while it is dealt with by the Parliament in India, the latter must take lessons from the limited extent of sanctions that can be imposed by a political party upon the member. The imposition of sanctions can be watered down in India to only allow expulsion of a defecting member from his party without costing him his seat in the Parliament.
Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, 489 U.S. 214 (1989). See also Jonathan J. Jessin, Renewing Intraparty Democracy: Assessing Competition, Deliberation and Associational Rights of Political Parties, available at http://works.bepress.com/jonathan_ thessin/4/ (Last visited on February 13, 2012). 82 Michael Stokes, supra note 62, 772. 83 Ripon Society Inc. v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir 1975). 84 OBrien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972). 85 MIcHAEL STOkES, supra note 62. 86 Democratic Party v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 121-122. 87 MIcHAEL STOkES, supra note 62, 777. 88 Barley v. Luzerne County Board of Elections, 937 F. Supp. 362 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
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English Bill of Rights, 1869, Art. 9: That the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament. 90 See The Parliamentary Labour Conscience Clause: While the party recognises the right of members to abstain from voting in the house on matters of deeply held personal conviction, this does not entitle members to vote contrary to a decision of a party meeting, or to abstain from voting on a vote of confidence in a Labour Government as referred to in R.K. Alderman, The Conscience Clause of the Parliamentary Labour Party, 19(2) PArLIAm. A FF. 224 (1965). 91 Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol, available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/ founders/documents/v1ch13s7.html (Last visited on January 23, 2012). 92 A. H. Birch, The Theory and Practice of Modern British Democracy in THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION 78 as cited in Philip Cowley, Crossing the Floor: Representative Theory and Practice in Britain, Public Law 214-224 (1996). 93 Id.
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The UK perspective serves as an important example to assuage fears of allowing dissent in Parliament. This is reflected in emperical research that seeks to throw light on the reasons why parliamentarians dissent from official party view while voting.94 It is widely understood that a member of the House functions in order to further his career. This would entail being in the good books of not just the party but also the constituency.95 A member who tends to dissent from every position that his party takes up is unlikely to be seen as a reliable candidate by the electorate. The same implication is prevalent in case the member dissents on a matter of importance to the government. Thus, the practice of conscientious dissent is one that would be exercised rarely, in cases where a member cannot but vote according the call of his conscience.96 An analysis of the the cases of dissent during voting on the Nolan Committee Recommendations in the House of Commons reveals that dissent is more often restricted to long-serving backbenchers, members looking to retire at the end of the session and those who have conflicts with the interests of the constituencies.97 India must, therefore, not adopt a knee-jerk reaction to any form of dissent in Parliament. The representatives judgment is a principle that should be extended to parliamentary practice in India in order to maintain a balance between meeting the interests of the political party on the one hand, and the constituency on the other.
IV. CONCLUSION
The harms caused by Paragraph 2(1)(b) are an inherent by-product of its wide phraseology and application. Fortunately, this provision has not enjoyed an unblemished constitutional existence. The validity of the said provision was specifically challenged in the Kihota Hollohan judgment.98 Here too, the arguments of dissent and debate being stifled were raised and discussed before the Court. The judgment looked at the subversion of the constitutional rights of parliamentarians and aimed at providing a limited contour to the application of the impugned provision. The case, however, while trying to bring about good, fell short of the mark in light of the excessive solution suggested.
R.J. Johnston et al., Sleaze, Constituency and Dissent: Voting on Nolan in the House of Commons, 29 A rEA 1, 23 (1997). (The paper looks at voting in the House of Commons in 1995 regarding the Nolan Committee Recommendations concerning the disclosure of Members financial interests linked to their Parliamentary position. The Governments position was rejected by the House owing to certain Members dissenting in favour of a Labour amendment. The article looks at the factors that motivates dissension and concludes that considerations such as reelection, career advancement and appointment within the party organization are prime among them). 95 Brian J. Gaines & Geoffrey Garrett, The Calculus of Dissent: Party Discipline in the British Labour Government, 15 POLITIcAL BEHAVIOUr 2, 115 (1993). 96 Id. 97 R.J. Johnston et al., supra note 94. 98 Kihoto Hollohan, supra note 1.
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ently nearly seventy percent of members of the Lok Sabha were conscientiously against this reform and were forced to vote in favour of change due to the issue of a whip.103 It would be difficult to establish that a policy from the manifesto was not an issue on the basis of which the member and party came to power. There is every chance thus, that an obscure, unforeseen issue that did not contribute to the partys victory would preclude the parliamentarians right to vote freely and expose him to the threat of disqualification from the floor of the House. The Court, therefore, by attempting to constrain the instances of disqualification from voting, has unwittingly given too expansive a ground for when dissent is prohibited. Thus, the Courts best intentions are prone to be misconstrued by this inherent flaw seeing as it does not restrict the plethora of issues concerning which whips can be issued.
direction and risk inviting the wrath of the party leaders, who have the sole discretion to invoke Paragraph 2(1)(b) to either initiate the disqualification procedure or condone a members actions. Second, the lack of formal regulations in the case of whips means that a member can challenge a wrong whip after the disqualification process, on the grounds of unconstitutionality. The availability of only an ex post facto check implies that parliamentarians will always be unlikely to disagree with the directions of the party in times of voting. The frustration against the inability to dissent on the floor of the House prompted Manish Tewari, Spokesperson of the Congress to initiate a Private Members Bill in the Parliament.106
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for political and policy expression in the Parliament. Such a law would liberate legislators from the whip-imposed fear of losing their membership except in cases where the life of the government is threatened by a no-confidence motion, money bills and some crucial financial matters.110 This measure would act as an effective countervailing approach to the flaws in Kihoto Hollohan. An alternate proposal had been discussed by the 170th Report of the Law Commission of India. It suggested that there must be regulation on the issue of whips. It opined that whips should be allowed to be issued solely in cases where the existence of the government was at threat.111 This recommendation is at odds with Tewaris Bill and the observations of the Goswami Committee Report. This situation may be rationalized when it is remembered that the Law Commission Report argues for issuance of whips in limited circumstances. On the contrary, Tewari and the Goswami Committee Report argue for disqualification on limited grounds. The difference is that while the latter implicitly allow a whip to be issued in any case, it argues that penalty in the form of disqualification can only be imposed in limited circumstances. On the contrary, the former aims to restrict the very issuance of whips. Tewaris solution seems to be more appropriate in light of the remedy sought and the comparative instances cited. As the American jurisprudence teaches us, the associational rights vested in a political organisation allow it to formulate its own rules of procedure and impose punishment for violation of the same.112 This includes the issuance of whips and dealing with acting contrary to the directions of the whip. Any restriction on the issuance of a whip can amount to an effective curtailment of the said rights to administer its own internal affairs. India too, should allow political parties to initiate internal disciplinary proceedings for dissenting against a whip. It should not, however, curtail freedom of expression of parliamentarians by disqualifying them for dissent, when internal disciplinary methods can easily address the problem. Tewaris solution is more appealing as it better meets the intended objective of anti-defection law when compared against the status quo. The aim of maintaining party stability is met, as floor crossing is not being challenged, at least for now. The impugned provision has, however, contributed to the several aforementioned harms to parliamentary democracy. In addition, restricting free voting has not led to less corruption on the floor of the House. In fact, mistakes from Narasimha Rao have caused a bigger threat of cash for votes than the unbridled right to vote. The tweaking of the said clause to mandate disqualification in limited cases, while keeping everything else same, would take care of numerous defects from the current formulation.
See B. Venkatesh Kumar, Anti-Defection Law: Welcome Reforms, 38(19) EcONOmIc & POLITIcAL WEEkLY 1838 (2003). 111 170th R EpOrT, supra note 49. 112 Michael Stokes, supra note 62, 777.
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In any case, collectively dealing with floor-crossing and voting amounts to a mischaracterisation of the two activities. If floor-crossing were to be allowed, the member would cease to be a part of the party and would not be mandated to vote for it in times of a no-confidence motion. In a case of a dissenting vote, however, the member may at most, be expelled from the party. His unattached status on the floor of the House would still mandate that he vote in favour of his party in times of a no-confidence motion. The different implications of the two actions make it more compelling to deal with them differently. If disqualification were to be restricted to the cases suggested by Tewari, party stability would in no way be harmed. In suggesting the watering down of the present formulation of defection law in India, this paper maintains a balance between the intended freedom to vote and dissent, and the associational rights vested in political parties. Any restriction on voting in Schedule X must be done away with, in the interests of greater and livelier debate in the House, which could lead to better formulated legislations. At the same time, it must be remembered that Schedule X serves to protect the sanctity of a political formation as well as the life of a government. In order to safeguard this function, the principles of responsible and unified political formations cannot be ignored. Therefore, Indian parliamentary practice must adopt the learning from the US and British practices in order to perform its mandate to the fullest. If this cause is taken up, perhaps then, a harmonious atmosphere for Parliamentary democracy, which is not beset with the rigours of Paragraph 2(1)(b), can be fostered. In a time when poor work ethics and commitment in the Legislature has become the norm, the time has never been more ripe for an exceptional measure.