fm3 21

FM 3-20.
971
Field Manual Headquarters
No 3-20.971 Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 2 December 2002
RECONNAISSANCE TROOP
Recce Troop and Brigade Reconnaissance Troop
Contents
Page
PREFACE .................................................................................................................. iii

Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................1-1
Organizations ...........................................................................................................1-2
Missions, Capabilities, and Limitations...................................................................1-13
Responsibilities.......................................................................................................1-15
Operational Environment........................................................................................1-20
Chapter 2 BATTLE COMMAND ...............................................................................................2-1
The Art of Command ................................................................................................2-2
Command and Control .............................................................................................2-6
Communications.....................................................................................................2-28
Digitization ..............................................................................................................2-31
Techniques of Tactical Control...............................................................................2-38
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only
to protect technical or operational information that is for official government use. This determination was made on
12 March 2001. Other requests for this document will be referred to Commander, US Army Armor Center, ATTN:
ATZK-TDD-C, Fort Knox, Kentucky 40121-5000.
DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will protect disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the
document.
i
FM 3-20.971_______________________________________________________________________________
Chapter 3 RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS ......................................................................3-1

Fundamentals...........................................................................................................3-2
Reconnaissance Planning ......................................................................................3-11
Actions on Contact .................................................................................................3-15
Reconnaissance Handover ....................................................................................3-21
Tactical Employment Considerations and Methods ...............................................3-26
Zone Reconnaissance............................................................................................3-38
Area Reconnaissance ............................................................................................3-43
Route Reconnaissance ..........................................................................................3-49
Chapter 4 SECURITY ...............................................................................................................4-1
Fundamentals...........................................................................................................4-3
Security Planning......................................................................................................4-5
Screen ....................................................................................................................4-10
Area Security ..........................................................................................................4-30
Convoy Security .....................................................................................................4-34
Chapter 5 OTHER TACTICAL OPERATIONS .........................................................................5-1
Movement.................................................................................................................5-2
Offense .....................................................................................................................5-9
Defense as an Economy of Force ..........................................................................5-15
Target Acquisition...................................................................................................5-32
Assembly Areas......................................................................................................5-33
Relief in Place.........................................................................................................5-36
Passage of Lines ....................................................................................................5-40
Breach Operations..................................................................................................5-45
Chapter 6 COMBAT SUPPORT ...............................................................................................6-1
Intelligence ...............................................................................................................6-1
Fire Support/Target Acquisition................................................................................6-8
Army Aviation .........................................................................................................6-25
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Platoon..........................................................................6-45
Ground Sensor Platoon ..........................................................................................6-48
Multisensor Ground Platoon ...................................................................................6-51
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations .......................................................6-54
Brigade Combat Team Engineer Operations .........................................................6-56
Air Defense.............................................................................................................6-60
Chapter 7 URBAN OPERATIONS............................................................................................7-1
Fundamentals of Urban Operations .........................................................................7-2
Understanding the Urban Environment ....................................................................7-5
ii
______________________________________________________________________Reconnaissance Troop
Planning for Urban Reconnaissance......................................................................7-11

Execution of Urban Operations ..............................................................................7-20
Chapter 8 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ..............................................................................8-1
Fundamentals...........................................................................................................8-2
Organization .............................................................................................................8-5
Logistics..................................................................................................................8-14
Personnel Service Support.....................................................................................8-25
Enemy Prisoners of War.........................................................................................8-29
Appendix A OPERATION ORDER GUIDE................................................................................. A-1
Appendix B PROTECTION ......................................................................................................... B-1
Appendix C NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL OPERATIONS ............................... C-1
Appendix D STABILITY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS................................. D-1
Appendix E DEPLOYMENT........................................................................................................ E-1
Appendix F COMMAND POST OPERATIONS.......................................................................... F-1
Appendix G ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ........................................................................G-1
GLOSSARY ................................................................................................ Glossary-1
BIBLIOGRAPY.......................................................................................Bibliography-1
INDEX................................................................................................................Index-1
iii
FM 3-20.971_______________________________________________________________________________
Preface
This manual provides doctrine for the employment of brigade reconnaissance troops (BRTs)
of mounted brigade combat teams (BCTs) and the reconnaissance troops (recce) of the
Cavalry Squadron (Reconnaissance Surveillance and Target Acquisition [RSTA]).
FM 3-20.971 describes the tactical employment and operations of the reconnaissance troop. It
describes troop operations in support of both the mounted BCT and the Cavalry Squadron
(RSTA) of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT). FM 3-20.971 is the doctrinal
foundation that governs the development of equipment, training, and structure of the troop
and its subordinate platoons and sections.
This manual covers basic doctrine in tactics, techniques of employment, organization,
exercise on command, control, movements, and tactical operations appropriate to the troop
and its headquarters section, reconnaissance platoons, and mortar section as applicable to each
troops’ table of organization and equipment.
The procedures described herein are intended as a guide only and are not to be considered
inflexible. Each situation in war and military operations other than war must be resolved by
intelligent interpretation and application of the doctrine set forth herein.
This manual is to be used in conjunction with FM 3-20.96 or FM 3-90.3. The manual reflects
and supports the Army operations doctrine as stated in FM 3-0. Readers should be familiar
with FM 3-20.97 [FM 17-97], FM 3-90 [FM 100-40], FM 3-91 [FM 71-100], FM 1-02 [FM
101-5-1], and FM 3-20.98 [FM 17-98]. Examples and graphics are provided to illustrate
principles and concepts, not to serve as prescriptive responses to tactical situations. This
publication provides units with the doctrinal foundation to train leaders, guide tactical
planning, and develop standing operating procedures (SOP).
The US Army Armor Center is the proponent for this publication. Submit comments and
recommended changes and the rational for those changes on Department of the Army (DA)
Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to: Commander, US
Army Armor Center, ATTN: ATZK-TDD-C, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5000, or e-mail
comments to Doctrine@knox.army.mil, attention to Chief, Cavalry Branch.
Unless otherwise stated, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.
iv
Chapter 1
Introduction
Success across the full
spectrum of operations CONTENTS
(offense, defense, Organizations...................................................... 1-2
The Cavalry Squadron (RSTA) ....................... 1-3
stability, and support) The Recce Troop ............................................. 1-5
requires success in The Mounted Brigade Combat Team............. 1-9
intelligence, The Brigade Reconnaissance Troop ............. 1-11
surveillance, and Missions, Capabilities, and Limitations............ 1-13
Missions........................................................... 1-13
reconnaissance (ISR) Capabilities...................................................... 1-14
operations. The Limitations....................................................... 1-15
maneuver commander Responsibilities .................................................. 1-15
requires accurate, Troop Commander .......................................... 1-15
Executive Officer............................................. 1-16
complete, and timely First Sergeant .................................................. 1-16
reconnaissance for Reconnaissance Platoon Leader ................... 1-17
success. The degree to Platoon Sergeant............................................. 1-17
which he correctly Fire Support Team .......................................... 1-17
Mortar Section Sergeant................................. 1-18
understands the Supply Sergeant.............................................. 1-19
threat situation, his Communications Sergeant............................. 1-19
own force’s situation, NBC NCO ......................................................... 1-19
and the terrain HUMINT NCOIC................................................ 1-19
Operational Environment................................... 1-20
heavily influences his Battlefield Framework..................................... 1-21
battlefield success. Linear and Nonlinear Battlespace ................. 1-21
Emerging command Organizing the Battlefield............................... 1-22
and control systems Organizing Forces for the Offense ................ 1-25
Organizing Forces for the Defense................ 1-26
assist the commander Organizing Forces for Tactical Security ....... 1-28
with understanding Organizing Forces for Tactical
the common Movement..................................................... 1-29
operational picture Scope of Operations ....................................... 1-30
(COP), but the
significance of ground reconnaissance cannot be overstated. The
burden of obtaining real-time information about the threat and terrain
falls on his tactical reconnaissance units. A reconnaissance troop
operates across the full spectrum of conflict: from smaller-scale
contingency (SSC) to major theater of war (MTW) operations.
Regardless of the environment or mission, the troop’s primary
function is always the same: Be the eyes and ears of the maneuver
commander and provide the necessary information to allow him to
make timely and accurate decisions. The need for reconnaissance in
Army operations remains unchanged within the varied operational
environment. Though the Army must respond to modernized
conventional and unconventional threats and capabilities employed
asymmetrically, the fundamentals of reconnaissance and security are
unaltered.
1-1
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
The purposes of this chapter are as follows:
• Describe the organization of the two types of reconnaissance

troops:
Reconnaissance (recce) troop. This troop is an element of the
cavalry squadron (reconnaissance, surveillance, and target
acquisition [RSTA]) in the Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT). It
is equipped with Stryker reconnaissance vehicles (RV).
Brigade reconnaissance troop (BRT). An element of the mounted
brigade combat team (BCT) in the Limited Conversion Division
(LCD) XXI, this troop is equipped with high-mobility multipurpose
wheeled vehicles (HMMWV).
• Outline the missions each type of troop performs.
• Establish the responsibilities of key personnel during
operations.
• Depict the operational environment of each troop and its
supported BCT.
SECTION I – ORGANIZATIONS
1-1. Reconnaissance troops are optimized to conduct reconnaissance

and surveillance of a multidimensional range of threats operating on an
area basis. This means that the troop’s orientation is on the area of
operations (AO) and the wide variety of threats facing the BCT. The troop
must leverage information technology and capabilities in complex and
urban terrain to develop the situation early on by focusing on designated
areas and multidimensional and asymmetrical threats. The troop assists
the BCT commander in attaining situational understanding (SU) to
achieve battlefield mobility and agility while choosing the time and place
to confront the threat and his method of engagement.
1-2. Based on its commander’s intent and guidance, the troop conducts
reconnaissance in support of friendly forces to provide current, accurate
information about the threat, terrain, weather, society, physical
resources, and infrastructure within a specified AO. This provides its
higher headquarters with an opportunity to maneuver freely and rapidly
to achieve their objective. Reconnaissance troops perform three types of
reconnaissance: route, zone, and area. Additionally, higher headquarters
and the troop endeavor to link the purpose of reconnaissance to—
• Answer the commander’s critical information requirements
(CCIR), and/or
• Answer voids in the unit’s intelligence preparation of the
battlefield (IPB) through intelligence requirements (IR),
and/or
• Support targeting through target acquisition.
1-3. As a part of the Army’s transformation process, the recce troop

and the BRT are designed to provide their respective commanders an
1-2
________________________________________________________________ Chapter 1 – Introduction
increased number of tools for executing ISR operations. Unmanned aerial

vehicles (UAV), artillery radars and observers, air defense radars, and
satellite tracking systems all contribute to the effort. However, the BCT’s
primary source of intelligence remains its organic reconnaissance units.
Successful reconnaissance operations permit the BCT commander
freedom of maneuver in order to concentrate combat power and apply
assets deliberately at the decisive time and place of his choosing. Only
through reconnaissance can he determine source information, which
routes are suitable for maneuver, where the threat is strong and weak,
and where gaps exist.
THE CAVALRY SQUADRON (RSTA)

1-4. The cavalry squadron (RSTA) is designed to serve as the SBCT
commander’s primary eyes, ears, and sensors, and as the first-line
military assessment for information gathered through reconnaissance
and surveillance. As such, it is designed to efficiently direct and execute
information collection.
1-5. The SBCT is a full-spectrum combat force. It is designed and
optimized primarily for employment in SSCs in complex and urban
terrain, confronting low-end and mid-range threats that may employ both
conventional and asymmetric capabilities. The SBCT deploys very
rapidly, executes early entry, and conducts effective combat operations
immediately on arrival to prevent, contain, stabilize, or resolve a conflict
through shaping and decisive operations. The SBCT typically maintains
an offensive orientation. However, depending on the nature and evolution
of the contingency, it is capable of conducting the full-spectrum
operations, including offensive, defensive, stability, and support
operations. Its core operational capabilities rest upon excellent
operational and tactical mobility, enhanced SU, combined-arms
integration down to company level, and high dismount strengths for close
combat in urban and complex terrain (see Figure 1-1).
1-3
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Figure 1-1. Stryker Brigade Combat Team Organization
1-6. To conduct the SBCT’s ISR operations, the squadron is composed

of five troops: headquarters and headquarters troop (HHT), three
reconnaissance troops, and a surveillance troop (see Figure 1-2). The
squadron is essential to successful SBCT operations within this
environment in that it—
• Provides a significant dismounted/mounted reconnaissance
force, integrated with UAVs, a ground sensor platoon, a
multisensor ground (MSG) platoon, and a nuclear, biological,
and chemical (NBC) reconnaissance platoon that shape
operations throughout the SBCT’s AO.
• Enables the brigade commander to employ his ground forces
and joint fires precisely at the time and place of his choosing.
• Assures protection of the highly mobile, light-armored force
by providing timely and accurate information.
• Allows the brigade commander to make decisions necessary
for the judicious application of power.
1-7. The squadron’s primary missions that support the SBCT’s
offense, defense, stability, and support operations are—
• Reconnaissance.
Area reconnaissance.
Zone reconnaissance.
• Security.
Screen.
Area security.
1-4
Figure 1-2. Squadron Organization
THE RECCE TROOP

1-8. The recce troop consists of 6 officers and 83 enlisted soldiers. It is
organized into a headquarters section, three recce platoons, and a mortar
section. The three recce platoons are organized with four reconnaissance
vehicles with crews and a scout section (equipped with Javelins) for
dismounted reconnaissance. The mortar section consists of two 120-mm
self-propelled mortars and a fire direction center.
HEADQUARTERS SECTION
1-9. The troop headquarters section is organized and equipped to
perform command and control and logistical support functions for the
troop. The section consists of 3 officers and 14 enlisted soldiers. The
headquarters section includes the troop commander; executive officer
(XO); first sergeant (1SG); and the operations, human intelligence
(HUMINT), NBC, communications, and supply sergeants. The troop does
not have any organic maintenance assets or personnel other than the two
communications repairmen (see Figure 1-3).
1-5
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Figure 1-3. Recce Troop (RSTA) Headquarters Section
TROOP COMMAND POST

1-10. The troop command post (CP) serves as the net control station
(NCS) for the troop and is a critical communications link to the squadron
or SBCT CPs. One of the primary functions of the troop CP is collecting
combat information from the recce platoons and reporting significant
threat information gathered during their reconnaissance and surveillance
activities to the higher CP. The CP functions are:
• Assist the commander in command and control (C2) of the
troop.
• Maintain situational awareness of friendly and threat forces
in the troop’s AO and area of interest (AOI).
• Coordinate combat service support (CSS) for the troop.
• Report information to higher headquarters and adjacent
units.
1-11. The CP operates under the direction of the XO, and is manned by
the troop operations sergeant, the HUMINT noncommissioned officer
(NCO), and may include one or both communications maintenance
personnel. The CP tracks the battle at the troop and squadron levels and
relays information to the commander and subordinate platoons
pertaining to the friendly and threat situation. The CP assists the
commander in the control of the troop by advising him on the status of
subordinate and adjacent units, assisting in creating/forwarding digital
and voice reports, and controlling and monitoring the troop’s CSS
activities. The CP continuously monitors the situational awareness
picture to alert elements to threat, terrain conditions, or obstacles. The
CP coordinates and integrates actions with supporting and adjacent
units. The primary concern when positioning the troop CP is its ability to
communicate with the controlling unit CP and the subordinate elements
of the troop.
1-12. During reconnaissance or offensive operations, the CP positions
to maintain communications with the platoons and the controlling
1-6
headquarters CP (tactical CP [TAC CP] or main CP). During security or

defensive operations, the CP should be positioned in sufficient depth to
avoid contact with the threat while maintaining communications with the
forward scout sections. For noncontiguous environments, the troop is
positioned to facilitate command, control, and communications (C3) and
to provide local security.
FIRE SUPPORT TEAM

1-13. The fire support team (FIST) is responsible for coordinating
indirect fires for the troop. The FIST consists of one fire support officer
(FSO), one NCO (team chief), one enlisted fire support specialist, and one
enlisted radio operator/driver. The team is mounted on a fire support
vehicle.
RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON
1-14. The platoons’ primary missions are reconnaissance/surveillance,
execution of security missions, and in some METT-TC (mission, enemy,
terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and
civil considerations) conditions, to conduct offensive or defensive
missions. Serving as the commander’s eyes and ears, the platoons provide
current battlefield information to help the troop commander plan and
conduct tactical operations. They are critical in painting the picture of the
threat situation, using both FM and digital communications (Force XXI
Battle Command Brigade and Below [FBCB2]). Additionally, the scouts
can be expected to execute target acquisition missions and battle damage
assessment (BDA).
1-15. The platoons are organized and equipped to conduct
reconnaissance and security in support of the troop mission. They may
conduct an economy-of-force role, or offensive, defensive, and retrograde
operations based on METT-TC. The platoon consists of 1 officer and 20
enlisted soldiers and is equipped with 4 RVs (see Figure 1-4).
1-16. Each recce squad in the
Human intelligence is the intelligence
platoon has assigned a 97B derived from the analysis of information
HUMINT collector. HUMINT obtained from a human source or a
collectors are integral members of related document. The HUMINT
their squads and conduct initial discipline includes those personnel and
contact and gather information organizations directed toward the
from enemy prisoners of war collection, processing, analysis, and
production of human intelligence.
(EPW), detainees, refugees, local
inhabitants, friendly forces, and
captured documents. They conduct tactical questioning (the expedient
initial questioning of a HUMINT source directed toward the collection of
priority tactical information) and limited document exploitation in
support of the squadron’s ground reconnaissance mission. They pass their
collection results through their chain of command in the form of size,
activity, location, unit, time, and equipment (SALUTE) reports. They do
not have the expertise, experience, or organizational support to conduct
contact operations or counterintelligence operations. They do pass source
data through the HUMINT noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC)
to the S2X to help the S2X identify human sources for exploitation by the
tactical HUMINT teams of the military intelligence (MI) company.
1-7
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
1-17. The platoon can organize into various configurations, but is

usually employed as two reconnaissance sections, depending on factors of
METT-TC. The reconnaissance platoon may also operate with target
acquisition teams (e.g., combat observation lasing team [COLT]), MI
teams equipped with the improved remotely monitored battlefield sensor
system (IREMBASS), or attached engineer elements.
Figure 1-4. Recce Platoon Organization
MORTAR SECTION
1-18. The mortar section is organized and equipped to provide
immediate indirect fires in support of troop operations. Such supporting
fires are usually suppression, screening, obscuration, or illumination. The
section consists of 10 enlisted soldiers. It is equipped with two 120-mm
mortars mounted in mortar RV carriers with a supporting wheeled
ammunition carrier (see Figure 1-5).
Figure 1-5. Mortar Section Organization
SURVEILLANCE TROOP
1-19. The surveillance troop may operate as an independent
organization, with its subordinate elements operating separately within
the recce troop’s AO, or attach elements to troop control. The surveillance
1-8
troop provides the squadron commander a mix of specialized capabilities

built around airborne and ground mobile sensors.
1-20. The UAV platoon launches, flies, recovers, and maintains the
squadron’s four aerial reconnaissance platforms.
1-21. The ground sensor platoon consists of ground surveillance radar
and remote battlefield sensors. The ground sensor platoon provides
remotely emplaced acoustics monitoring capabilities that capture and
track threat personnel and equipment measurements and signatures.
1-22. The multisensor ground platoon consists of ground-based radio
signals intercept and direction-finding teams capable of conducting nodal
and pattern analysis of area communications activities. The platoon also
has a dedicated communications terminal that transmits, reports, and
receives voice, data, digital, and imagery from sources through national
level.
1-23. The NBC recce platoon provides a special reconnaissance
capability and performs five critical tasks on the battlespace—detect,
identify, mark, report, and sample. It conducts route, zone, and area NBC
reconnaissance to determine the presence and extent of NBC
contamination. It can locate and identify life-threatening chemical
warfare agents and radiological contaminants. The platoon does not have
a biological detection/identification capability, but it can take samples of
suspected biological hazards for transfer to a Theater Army Medical
Laboratory (TAML) for further analysis.
THE MOUNTED BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

1-24. The BCT is a task-organized command optimized for fighting
offensive and defensive operations in an MTW as part of a division, corps,
or joint task force (JTF).
1-25. The BCT is trained and equipped to conduct full-spectrum
operations (offense, defense, stability, and support). The BCT
organization includes its organic headquarters and headquarters
company (HHC) and reconnaissance troop, its assigned mechanized
infantry and tank battalions, its habitually attached division assets (e.g.,
artillery battalion, engineer battalion, forward support battalion [FSB],
air defense artillery [ADA] battery, MI company), and other divisional or
corps assets required to complete its assigned mission (see Figure 1-6).
1-9
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Figure 1-6. Brigade Combat Team Organization
1-26. BCT ISR operations are multifaceted and their integration from
division through battalion levels eliminates unit and functional
“stovepipes” for planning, reporting, and processing information. The
BRT’s primary mission is to obtain information for the BCT commander
and answer his CCIR. It interacts with the divisional cavalry squadron,
supporting MI assets, and battalion scout platoons in the performance of
its reconnaissance and security missions. ISR assets available to the BCT
that the BRT may receive information from, interact with, or execute
operational control over include:
• COLT teams from the direct support (DS) artillery battalion.
• Engineer reconnaissance team from the DS engineer
battalion.
• NBC reconnaissance section from the divisional chemical
company.
• Ground surveillance radar (GSR) team from the DS MI
company.
• Improved Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System
(IREMBASS) team from the DS MI company.
• UAVs operated by the DS MI company.
• Signal intercepts (PROPHET) operated by the DS MI
company.
• Battalion/task force scout platoons.
• Air and ground cavalry troop from the divisional cavalry
squadron.
• AN/TPQ 36 (Q36) counterfire radar.
• AN/MPQ-64 (Sentinel) air defense systems radar.
1-10
THE BRIGADE RECONNAISSANCE TROOP

1-27. The BRT consists of 4 officers and 45 enlisted soldiers. It is
organized into a headquarters section and two reconnaissance platoons.
HEADQUARTERS SECTION
1-28. The BRT headquarters section is organized and equipped to
perform command and control and logistical support functions for the
BRT. The section consists of 2 officers and 11 enlisted soldiers. The
headquarters section includes the troop commander; XO; 1SG; and the
operations, NBC, communications, and supply sergeants. The troop does
not have any organic maintenance assets or personnel other than the two
communications repairmen (see Figure 1-7).
Figure 1-7. Brigade Reconnaissance Troop Headquarters Organization
BRIGADE RECONNAISSANCE TROOP COMMAND POST

1-29. The BRT CP serves as the NCS for the troop and is a critical
communications link to the BCT CP. One of the primary functions of the
BRT CP is collecting combat information from the reconnaissance
platoons and reporting significant threat information gathered during
their reconnaissance and surveillance activities to the BCT. The CP
functions are as follows:
• Assist the commander in C2 of the troop.
• Maintain situational awareness of friendly and threat
elements in the troop’s AO and AOI.
• Coordinate CSS for the BRT.
• Report information to BCT headquarters and to forward and
adjacent units.
• Coordinate required information from higher.
• Ensure information is pushed down.
1-30. The CP operates under the direction of the XO, and is manned by
the troop operations sergeant, the NBC NCO, and the two
communications maintenance personnel. The CP tracks the battle at the
troop and BCT levels and relays information to the commander and
subordinate platoons pertaining to the friendly and threat situation. The
CP assists the commander in the control of the BRT by advising him on
the status of subordinate units and adjacent units, by assisting in
creating/forwarding digital and voice reports, and by controlling and
monitoring the BRT’s CSS activities. The CP continuously monitors the
COP to alert elements to unexpected threat, terrain conditions, or
obstacles. The CP coordinates and integrates actions with supporting and
1-11
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
adjacent units. The primary concern when positioning the BRT CP is its
ability to communicate with the controlling BCT CP and the subordinate
elements of the BRT.
1-31. During reconnaissance or offensive operations, the CP should
position to maintain communications with the platoons and the
controlling brigade CP (TAC CP or main CP). During security or
defensive operations, the CP should be positioned in sufficient depth to
avoid contact with the threat while maintaining communications with the
forward reconnaissance sections.
RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON
1-32. The reconnaissance platoons are organized and equipped to
conduct reconnaissance and security in support of the BCT. They may
conduct an economy-of-force role, or offensive, defensive, and retrograde
operations based on METT-TC. The platoon consists of 1 officer and 17
enlisted soldiers. It is equipped with six M1025/M1026 HMMWVs (three
MK-19 equipped and three caliber .50 equipped, with three of the six also
Long-Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System [LRAS3] equipped).
The platoons may operate with attached COLTs, IREMBASS-equipped
MI teams, or attached engineer elements. The platoon can organize into
various configurations, but is usually employed as a headquarters and
two reconnaissance sections, depending on factors of METT-TC (see
Figure 1-8).
Figure 1-8. Reconnaissance Platoon Organization
COMBAT OBSERVATION LASING TEAM PLATOON

1-33. The COLT platoon is organic to the DS artillery battalion and is
attached to the BCT. COLTs are dedicated assets that can be tasked to
execute fires for the BCT. Although not their primary mission, COLTs
can be integrated into and tasked to support ISR operations. As with the
BRT, employing stealth techniques is crucial to the COLT’s survivability
and key to mission accomplishment. If attached or controlled by the BRT,
the troop CP must ensure that the COLT has communication with the
BCT fire support element (FSE).
1-34. The platoon is composed of 1 officer and 20 enlisted soldiers
organized into a platoon headquarters and 3 squads, with each squad
composed of 2 teams. Each team is equipped with the lightweight laser
designator/range finder (LLDR) for those munitions requiring reflected
1-12
laser energy for final ballistics guidance. The target designator set is also
equipped with a thermal sight. They are also equipped with the Advanced
Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) lightweight computer
unit (LCU) loaded with the forward observer software (FOS-LCU). They
operate from a HMMWV platform and are capable of both mounted and
dismounted operations (see Figure 1-9).
Figure 1-9. COLT Platoon Organization
SECTION II – MISSIONS, CAPABILITIES, AND LIMITATIONS
MISSIONS
1-35. The reconnaissance troops have six core missions in supporting
their respective higher headquarters across the full spectrum of
operations—offense, defense, stability, and support operations. These
missions are route reconnaissance, zone reconnaissance, area
reconnaissance, screen, area security, and convoy security. They may
perform other missions if they are reinforced. The troop’s limitations and
capabilities associated with their tables of organization and equipment
(TOE) and METT-TC must be considered when employing them in a
specific mission role (see Figure 1-10).
BRIGADE RECONNAISSANCE
RECCE TROOP
TROOP
RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS
Route P/R P/R
Zone F F
Area F F
SECURITY MISSIONS
Screen P P
Area Security P P
Convoy Security R P/R
F = Fully Capable
R = Capable when Reinforced
P = Capable under Permissive METT-TC
Figure 1-10. Troop Missions
1-13
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
CAPABILITIES
1-36. The troops are organized to provide the following capabilities:
• Conduct simultaneous reconnaissance of up to six areas based
on the size of the area, the IR, and the time constraints. (A
reconnaissance section would reconnoiter each area, and the
commander must consider the adverse affect on the troop’s
ability to conduct continuous reconnaissance.)
• Conduct a detailed zone reconnaissance at a rate dependent
on the terrain and execution of all the critical tasks associated
with the mission. (A properly performed zone reconnaissance
takes considerable time, typically about 1 kilometer per hour.)
• Reconnoiter one route per platoon in a permissive no-threat
environment. Reconnoiter up to two routes in a low-threat
environment. Reconnoiter one route in a medium- to high-
threat environment.
• When faced with a lightly equipped threat, conduct either
aggressive or stealthy reconnaissance, depending on the
higher commander’s guidance.
• Provide all weather, accurate, and timely reconnaissance and
surveillance in non-restrictive, restrictive, and urban terrain.
• With organic counterintelligence (CI) assets, conduct detailed
operations in urbanized terrain.
• Engage in close, stealthy reconnaissance with threat forces to
provide HUMINT.
• Gather information about multidimensional threats that
range from conventional to unconventional, and use
asymmetrical tactics to include—
Regular and irregular forces.
Special forces.
Terrorists.
Political factions.
Supporting government factions.
Criminal elements and agencies.
• Reduce risk to the BCT by assuring survivability through
information to avoid contact or achieve overwhelming combat
power at the decisive point.
• Conduct or support target acquisition.
• Assist in shaping the battlespace environment by providing
information or directing fires to disrupt the threat
commander’s decision cycle.
• Screen up to a 10-kilometer-wide AO.
• Maintain continuous surveillance of up to six battalion-sized
avenues of approach.
• Maintain 12 separate short-duration (less than 12 hours)
observation posts (OP) simultaneously.
• Maintain six separate long-duration (greater than 12 hours)
OPs simultaneously.
1-14
LIMITATIONS
1-37. The troop has limitations that can be reduced through proper
employment and/or augmentation. It is not organized for decisive
operations. It must be heavily augmented with combat units to be
successful if tasked to conduct offensive and defensive missions in
support of its higher headquarters operations.
• Troop vehicles are lightly armored and are severely limited in
their ability to reconnoiter against a mechanized threat.
• Troop has no organic service support capability (medical and
maintenance) and cannot provide security for service support
operations in a nonpermissive environment without using
reconnaissance sections.
• Crew-served weapons lack standoff, lethality, and
survivability in terrain lacking cover and concealment.
• Troop requires augmentation to perform traditional cavalry
missions such as guard, delay, and other economy-of-force
missions.
• With permissive METT-TC, the troop is capable of operations
in stability or a support environment.
SECTION III – RESPONSIBILITIES
TROOP COMMANDER
1-38. The troop commander is responsible to his higher commander for
the discipline, combat readiness, and training of the troop, and for the
maintenance of its equipment. He must be proficient in the tactical
employment of the troop and its assigned and attached combat support
(CS) or CSS elements. He must also know the capabilities and limitations
of the troop’s personnel and equipment as well as those of elements
attached to him. He uses the troop-leading procedures to prepare the
troop for operations and issues instructions to his subordinate leaders in
the form of clear, concise combat orders.
1-39. The troop commander’s additional responsibilities are—
• Serve as the subject matter expert in reconnaissance and
security fundamentals and critical tasks.
• Plan and execute fires to support the troop’s missions.
• Synchronize operations with adjacent and supporting units.
• Synchronize and plan the use of additional ISR assets (UAV,
IREMBASS, GSR, PROPHET, CI, etc.).
• Understand BCT doctrine.
• Synchronize and plan the use of additional combat arms
assets (infantry platoon, mobile gun system [MGS] platoon,
tank platoon, or mechanized platoon).
• Accomplish all missions assigned to the troop in accordance
with the higher commander’s intent and scheme of maneuver.
• Preserve the reconnaissance capability of the troop.
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EXECUTIVE OFFICER
1-40. The troop XO is second in command. He supervises the troop CP
and stays attuned to the tactical situation in the troop’s AO. He receives,
verifies, and consolidates digital and voice tactical reports from the
platoons and forwards them to the higher headquarters, adjacent, and
following units. When FBCB2 use is limited, the XO ensures the CP
converts FM reports into digital reports to generate the red and blue
situational awareness.
1-41. The XO’s other duties are—
• Assist the commander in performing precombat inspections
(PCI).
• Ensure all voice and digital communications are properly
functioning.
• In conjunction with the 1SG, plan and supervise the troop’s
CSS effort prior to the battle.
• Assist in preparation of the operations order (OPORD),
especially paragraph 4 (service support).
• Conduct tactical coordination with higher, adjacent, and
supporting units.
• As required, assist the commander in issuing orders to the
troop headquarters and attachments.
• Conduct additional missions, as required. These may include
serving as officer in charge (OIC) for a quartering party or as
the leader of the detachment left in contact (DLIC) in a
withdrawal.
• Assist the commander in preparations for follow-on missions.
• Assume command of the troop, as required.
FIRST SERGEANT
1-42. The 1SG is the troop’s senior NCO with the primary
responsibility of training individual skills and sustaining the troop’s
ability to fight. He is the troop’s primary CSS operator; he helps the
commander to plan, coordinate, and supervise all logistical activities that
support the tactical mission. He operates where the commander directs or
where his duties require him.
1-43. The 1SG’s specific duties include the following:
• Execute and supervise routine operations. This may include
enforcing the tactical standing operating procedures (SOP);
planning and coordinating training; coordinating and
reporting personnel and administrative actions; and
supervising supply, maintenance, communications, and field
hygiene operations.
• Supervise, inspect, and/or observe all matters designated by
the commander. For example, the 1SG may observe and
report on a portion of the troop’s sector.
• Plan, rehearse, and supervise key logistical actions in support
of the tactical mission. These activities include resupply of
Class I, III, and V products and materials; maintenance and
recovery; medical treatment and evacuation; and
replacement/return-to-duty (RTD) processing.
1-16
• Assist and coordinate with the XO in all critical CSS

functions.
• As necessary, serve as quartering party NCOIC.
• Conduct training and ensure proficiency in individual and
NCO skills and small-unit collective skills that support the
troop’s mission essential task list (METL).
• In conjunction with the commander, establish and maintain
the foundation for troop discipline.
RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON LEADER
1-44. The platoon leader is responsible to the troop commander for the
discipline, training, and combat readiness of the reconnaissance platoon.
He must be proficient in the tactical employment of the platoon and the
use of his digital equipment. He must know the capabilities and
limitations of the platoon’s personnel and equipment. He must remain
cognizant of all attached elements operating in his sector of responsibility
and continually update plans for their security and logistical support as
required.
1-45. The platoon leader’s additional responsibilities are—
• Accomplish all missions assigned to the platoon in accordance
with the troop commander’s intent.
• Preserve the reconnaissance capability of the platoon, and
inform the commander and XO of the tactical situation via
FM and digitized contact and spot reports.
• Lead an integrated reconnaissance/COLT platoon in
executing fire support tasks within reconnaissance and
security missions.
PLATOON SERGEANT
1-46. The platoon sergeant (PSG) is the senior NCO in the platoon. He
is responsible to the platoon leader and the 1SG for the training of
individual skills. He leads elements of the platoon as directed by the
platoon leader, and assumes command of the platoon in his absence. The
PSG assists the platoon leader in maintaining discipline, conducting
training, and exercising control. He supervises platoon CSS, which
includes supply and equipment maintenance.
FIRE SUPPORT TEAM
1-47. If assigned, the FIST is the critical link with the supporting
artillery and is responsible for coordinating indirect fires (mortar, field
artillery [FA], and close air support [CAS]) for the troop. The team
processes calls for fire from the platoons and allocates the appropriate
indirect-fire system based on the commander’s guidance for fire support.
The FIST can also assist the squadron/BCT with the employment of joint
fires.
1-48. The FIST vehicle also may serve as the alternate troop CP. The
FSO has ready access to the higher-level situation and the radio systems
to replicate the troop CP if it becomes damaged or destroyed.
1-49. The FSO’s additional responsibilities are—
• Advise the commander on the capabilities and current status
of all available fire support assets.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
• Serve as the commander’s primary advisor on the threat’s

indirect fire capabilities.
• Assist the commander in developing the OPORD to ensure
full integration of fires.
• Recommend targets and fire control measures, and determine
methods of engagement and responsibility for firing the
targets.
• Determine specific tasks and instructions required to conduct
and control the fire plan.
• Develop an observation plan, with limited visibility
contingencies, that supports the troop and higher
headquarters missions.
• Request critical friendly zones (CFZ) to assist counterbattery
fires in response to threat artillery and/or mortar attacks.
• Refine and integrate the troop target worksheet; submit the
completed worksheet to the higher headquarters FSE.
• Assist the commander in incorporating execution of the
indirect fire and target acquisition plan into each rehearsal.
This includes integrating indirect fire observers into the
rehearsal plan.
• In tactical situations, alert the commander if a request for
fires against a target has been denied.
• In tactical situations, monitor the location and capabilities of
friendly fire support units and assist the commander in
clearance of indirect fires.
MORTAR SECTION SERGEANT
1-50. If assigned, the mortar section sergeant is responsible for
providing responsive indirect fires to support the troop commander’s
concept of the operation. The section sergeant assists the commander in
indirect mortar fire planning. He assists in establishing movement
control, triggers for movement, triggers for shifting targets, and mortar
caches. As a rule of thumb the section maintains two-thirds maximum
range of mortar fire forward of the reconnaissance elements. The section
sergeant is charged with maintaining discipline, conducting training, and
exercising control over his mortar section. He supervises the section’s
CSS, which includes supply and equipment maintenance.
1-51. The mortar section sergeant’s additional responsibilities are—
• Recommend employment techniques and positioning of the
mortars to support the scheme of maneuver.
• Assist in developing the troop fire support plan; determine
the best type and amount of mortar ammunition to fire, based
on the factors of METT-TC.
• Train the section to ensure technical and tactical proficiency
and combat lifesaver skills; cross-train personnel within the
section on key tasks to ensure continuous operations.
• Select and reconnoiter new positions and routes for the
section; control the movements of the section.
• Keep abreast of the threat situation and locations of friendly
units to ensure the best use of ammunition and the safety of
friendly troops.
1-18
• Supervise the execution of orders; ensure that priority targets

are covered at all times; establish the amount and type of
ammunition set aside for priority targets.
• Coordinate the fires and displacement of the mortar section
with the action of other units.
• Anticipate needs and ensure timely ammunition resupply,
maintenance, and refuel requests are submitted to sustain
combat operations.
SUPPLY SERGEANT
1-52. The supply sergeant picks up, transports, and issues supplies and
equipment to the troop. He works closely with the 1SG to accomplish
these tasks. Using his position navigation (POSNAV) capability and
established checkpoint data, he leads the logistics package (LOGPAC) to
the linkup point; or if the situation dictates, moves it forward to the
supported unit’s location. He also evacuates EPWs and assists in the
evacuation of soldiers who are killed in action to the mortuary affairs
collection point.
COMMUNICATIONS SERGEANT
1-53. The communications sergeant assists in all aspects of tactical
communications. He locates with the XO or 1SG per SOP and may operate
the troop NCS. He receives and distributes signal operating instructions
(SOI) and communications security (COMSEC) encryption keys. He ensures
the troop receives the appropriate database for FBCB2, single-channel
ground/airborne radio system–system improvement program (SINCGARS-
SIP), enhanced position location reporting system–very high-speed
integrated circuit (EPLRS-VHSIC), and other systems operating on the
tactical internet. He ensures operators are properly trained in initialization
and reinitialization of the systems and maintains the troop addressing and
routing schemes. He troubleshoots troop digital communications equipment
and ensures that necessary repairs are completed.
NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER
1-54. The troop NBC NCO is responsible for troop NBC defense
activities. He supervises radiological monitoring, chemical detection, and
decontamination operations. He assists in maintaining NBC equipment
and training NBC equipment operators and decontamination teams. He
operates from the troop CP and assists the XO in executing C2
operations. At this location, he advises the troop commander and XO on
contamination avoidance measures, smoke, flame, and NBC
reconnaissance support requirements. Additionally, he monitors reports
of NBC attacks and advises the commander on their impact. He is the
NBC expert and advises the commander in the employment of the NBC
reconnaissance section/platoon, if the troop is augmented with this asset.
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER IN CHARGE
1-55. If assigned, the HUMINT NCOIC is responsible for the training of
the HUMINT collectors. He advises the troop commander on the optimal
utilization of the HUMINT collectors. He provides technical support and
advice to the HUMINT collectors concerning HUMINT collection and
reporting methodology. He reviews HUMINT reporting for format and
completeness. He reviews HUMINT collector recommendations, identifying
sources for further exploitation by the tactical HUMINT platoon of the MI
1-19
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Company. He operates from the troop CP, acts as the troop intelligence
oversight NCO, and is the point of contact with the S2X for technical support
to HUMINT collection operations.
SECTION IV – OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
1-56. During the Cold War, most nations patterned their doctrine after
those of the two super powers. Consequently, many military operations
around the world demonstrated a high degree of consistency. Standard
reconnaissance tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) at that time
focused on gaining information on the threat and terrain (doctrinal and
situational templates). Foreign military forces are evolving differently
today with states learning from US operations and incorporating
adaptive military strategies within their professional militaries or
paramilitary forces.
1-57. Threats recognize that defeating the US is not always a matter of
winning battles, rather it is a factor of not losing operationally or
tactically the military means necessary to remain in power, while
pursuing strategic victory through other instruments. Systems and
tactics to offset the effects of precision long-range air and missile attacks
give an adversary operational freedom and a way to preserve his military
capabilities. Potential adversaries are developing adaptive strategies and
tactics to take advantage of emerging technologies to exploit perceived
vulnerabilities and to counter or alleviate US strengths.
1-58. The US military is primarily a power projection force. It is tied to
an operational construct requiring entry operations and a deliberate
build-up of force capabilities for contingency response. Today, this
strategy demands airfields and seaports in the AO, forward operating
bases for air forces, significant in-theater logistical stockpiles, secure air
and sea lines of communication (LOC), technical ISR capability as well as
long distance communications for C2—all of which can be interdicted or
denied to some degree.
1-59. From these perceptions, some common emerging trends appear
for dealing with US forces—
• Development of capabilities to deny, limit, interrupt, or delay
US entry and disrupt subsequent actions within the AO.
• Deliberate actions designed to create mass casualties.
• Employment of multiple means—political, economic, military,
and informational—to undermine the coherence of alliances
and coalitions.
• Offsetting US strengths by countering high-tech advantages,
often with low-tech methods or specific “niche” capabilities.
• Adoption of unpredictable operational methods with rapid
transition to conventional operations when decision is
assured.
• Conducting technical exploitation of C2 nodes, networks and
systems.
• Increasing standoff distances through exclusion or other
means to protect forces and capabilities.
1-20
• Maintaining and preserving viable conventional military

capabilities to destroy threat forces, secure territory, and
maintain regime security.
BATTLEFIELD FRAMEWORK
1-60. The capability of potential threats to US forces requires
recognition that the modern battlefield will have many complexities. This
will lead to situations where future conflicts will conform to the linear
battlefield framework or a nonlinear battlefield framework, or a
combination of both linear and nonlinear characteristics.
1-61. In order to better understand and define the battlefield
framework, certain concepts can be applied to most situations (linear and
nonlinear) that define the relationship between friendly forces, their
support forces, the threat, and space. The organization of the battlefield
into identifiable constructs assists the commander in better visualizing
and describing the battlespace and anticipating threat actions.
1-62. This is not a doctrinal template but a tool to assist the
commander in visualizing and describing the battlefield. Units will
develop situational templates and decision support templates based on
their IPB and military decision-making process (MDMP).
LINEAR AND NONLINEAR BATTLESPACE
1-63. Categories used in defining and evaluating the battlespace
include the following:
• Linear operations are military operations that develop along
a secure line from a base toward an objective and are
characterized by an easily definable front and rear.
Orientation of the majority of the force is in one general
direction, defined as the front, normally facing the threat
and/or the objective. During linear operations, the flanks of
units are normally protected by other units, natural terrain
features, or manmade obstacles.
• Nonlinear operations are military operations that seek to
complete a mission, with no secure connection to a base and
no easily defined front and rear, are nonlinear. Orientation of
the force is determined by the location of the immediate
threat or the objective. In most cases, units in a nonlinear
environment rely on movement, deception, cover, and
concealment to provide protection for potentially exposed
elements.
• Contiguous operations. Most military operations embrace the
idea that operational forces should be contiguous. This
ensures that, across an area of responsibility (AOR), all the
geography is accounted for. In other words, some unit or level
of command has responsibility to control military operations
in that zone of action.
• Noncontiguous operations are more problematic. In practice,
units may be assigned noncontiguous zones of action, with the
next-higher headquarters assuming responsibility for the
areas between the assigned zones. Only in the most extreme
cases will a military commander accept areas of the
battlefield over which no unit has responsibility, allowing
1-21
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
threat forces sanctuary and freedom of action. One possible

reason would be if there was such a terrain feature so
forbidding that military operations are extremely unlikely.
• Combinations. Based on the above, there are identifiable
combinations of battlespace:
Linear contiguous.
Nonlinear contiguous.
Linear noncontiguous.
Nonlinear noncontiguous.
1-64. An analysis would indicate that the first two combinations are
the most valuable in terms of tactical applications, with the last two used
only in very special circumstances. Based on this, linear operations are
geographically based, have an easily definable front and rear across the
entire force, and typically produce proportional effects and an expected
measurable result. Nonlinear operations are force- or systems-based,
have no easily defined front or rear across the force, and produce
disproportionate, often unpredicted effects. In both instances, military
necessity requires a contiguous force deployment, except in special cases.
ORGANIZING THE BATTLEFIELD
1-65. Threat forces will organize and define their battlespace by using
areas of responsibility. An AOR is a clearly defined geographic area with
associated airspace. An AOR is bounded by a limit of responsibility (LOR)
beyond which the unit may not operate or fire without coordination
through the next-higher headquarters. AORs may be linear or nonlinear
in nature (see Figures 1-11 and 1-12 for an example of each type of AOR).
Linear AORs may contain subordinate nonlinear AORs and vice versa.
1-66. AORs consist of three basic zones: battle, disruption, and support.
An AOR may also contain one or more attack and/or kill zones. Zones
may be linear or nonlinear in nature. The size of these zones depends on
the size of the threat forces involved, engagement ranges of weapon
systems, the terrain, and the nature of the threat’s operation. Within the
AOR, the threat will normally identify two additional types of control
lines. The support line separates the support zone from the battle zone.
The battle line separates the battle zone from the disruption zone.
1-67. An AOR is not required to have any or all of these zones in any
particular situation. A particular command might have a battle zone and
no disruption zone. It might not have a battle zone if it is the disruption
force of a higher command. If it is able to forage, it might not have a
support zone.
1-68. The various zones in an AOR have the same basic purposes
within each type of offensive and defensive action. Thus, the threat
organizes the battlefield in a way that can facilitate rapid transition
between offensive and defensive actions and between linear and
nonlinear operations. This flexibility helps the threat use adaptive
techniques to gain tactical and operational advantages and create or
exploit windows of opportunity that support their strategic goals.
1-22
Figure 1-11. Example Linear Area of Responsibility
Figure 1-12. Example Nonlinear Area of Responsibility
DISRUPTION ZONE
1-69. The disruption zone is where the threat will set the conditions for
successful combat actions by fixing friendly forces and placing long-range
fires on them. Units in this zone begin the attack on specific components
of the friendly combat system, to begin the disruption and neutralization
of that system. Successful actions in the disruption zone will create a
window of opportunity that is exploitable in the battle zone. For example,
attacking friendly engineer elements can leave his maneuver force unable
to continue effective operations in complex terrain, exposing them to
destruction by forces in the battle zone. Units in the disruption zone also
destroy friendly reconnaissance assets while denying the ability to
acquire and engage threat targets with deep fires. Disruption zones may
be contiguous, noncontiguous, or “layered.”
1-23
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
1-70. In the offense, the disruption zone is that battlespace in which

the threat seeks to use direct and indirect fires to destroy the integrity of
friendly forces and capabilities without decisive engagement. In general,
this zone is the space between the battle line and the LOR. In linear
operations, it typically begins at what the threat anticipates the friendly
forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) is and extends to the threat LOR.
The boundaries of the disruption zone will move forward during the
course of a battle. The higher commander can push the disruption zone
forward or outward as forces adopt a defensive posture while
consolidating gains at the end of a successful offensive battle and/or
prepare for a subsequent offensive battle.
BATTLE ZONE
1-71. The battle zone is where the threat will engage the friendly forces
in close combat to achieve a tactical decision. Forces in the battle zone
will exploit opportunities created by actions in the disruption zone. The
linkage of these tactical successes to the operation plan allows the
accomplishment of operational objectives.
1-72. In the offense, the battle zone is that battlespace in which the
threat seeks to fix and/or destroy friendly forces through simultaneous or
sequential application of all elements of combat power. The dimensions of
this zone are based on threat objectives and the time-space relationships
for the forces involved.
1-73. Threat forces operating in the battle zone engage friendly forces
in close combat to achieve a specific tactical objective. This objective is
typically one of the following:
• Create a penetration in the friendly defense through which
exploitation forces can pass.
• Draw friendly attention and resources to the action.
• Seize terrain.
• Inflict casualties on a vulnerable friendly unit.
• Prevent a part of the friendly force from moving to impact
threat actions elsewhere on the battlefield.
1-74. In the nonlinear attack, multiple battle zones may exist, and
within each a certain task would be assigned to the threat unit assigned
to operate in that space. The tasks given to the units that operate in the
zone can range from demonstration to attack. The battle zone provides
the commander of those units the battlespace in which to frame his
combat actions.
SUPPORT ZONE
1-75. The support zone is that area of the battlespace designed to be
free of significant friendly action and to permit the effective logistics and
administrative support of threat forces. Security forces will operate in the
support zone in a combat role to defeat friendly special operations forces
(SOF). Camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception measures will
occur throughout the support zone to protect the force from standoff
RSTA and precision attack. A support zone may be dispersed within the
support zones of subordinate units or it may be separate from
subordinate AORs. The support zone may be in a sanctuary that is
noncontiguous with other zones of the AOR.
1-24
ATTACK ZONE
1-76. An attack zone is given to a subordinate unit with an offensive
mission to delineate clearly where forces will be conducting offensive
maneuver. Attack zones are often used to control offensive action by a
subordinate unit inside a larger defensive battle or operation.
KILL ZONE
1-77. A kill zone is a designated area on the battlefield where the
threat plans to destroy a friendly target, system, or unit. A kill zone may
be within the disruption zone or the battle zone. In the defense, it could
also be in the support zone.
OBJECTIVES AND AXES
1-78. An objective is a geographic location or physical object, the seizing
and/or holding of which is a goal of an offensive battle. An axis is a
control measure showing the location through which a force will move as
it proceeds from its starting location to its objective.
FIRING LINES
1-79. Firing lines will be established on common graphics to facilitate
coordination of direct fire. Firing lines, which are positions from which to
engage friendly forces, typically have some inherent advantage such as
concealment.
ORGANIZING FORCES FOR THE OFFENSE
1-80. There is no doctrinal order of battle (OB). Units will develop OBs
for specific threat forces based on intelligence provided through IPB and
MDMP. The organization of forces described here is a general concept
that can assist the commander in visualizing and describing threat forces
relative to friendly forces’ locations and actions and their relationship in
time and space on the battlefield. This organization of forces can shift
dramatically during the course of a battle or operation, if part of the plan
does not work or works better than anticipated (see Figure 1-13).
DISRUPTION FORCE
1-81. In the offense, the disruption force would include the disruption
force that already existed in a preceding defensive situation. It is possible
that forces assigned for actions in the disruption zone in the defense
might not have sufficient mobility to do the same in the offense or that
targets may change and require different or additional assets. Thus, the
disruption force might require augmentation.
FIXING FORCE
1-82. Threat offensive operations are focused first on the concept of
fixing friendly forces so that they are not free to maneuver. In the offense,
the threat commander will identify which friendly forces need to be fixed
and the method by which they will be fixed. They will then assign this
responsibility to a force that has the capability to fix the required friendly
forces with the correct method. The fixing force may consist of a number
of units separated from each other in time and space, particularly if the
friendly forces required to be fixed are likewise separated.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Figure 1-13. Example Offensive Operation
ASSAULT FORCE
1-83. The assault force is tasked with creating the conditions that allow
the exploitation force the freedom to operate. In order to create a window
of opportunity for the exploitation force to succeed, the assault force may
be required to operate at a high degree of risk and may sustain
substantial casualties. However, an assault force may not even make
contact with the threat, but instead conduct a demonstration.
EXPLOITATION FORCE
1-84. The exploitation force is assigned the task of achieving the
objective of the mission. It typically exploits a window of opportunity
created by the assault force.
RESERVE
1-85. At the commander’s discretion, forces may be held out of initial
action so that he may influence unforeseen events or take advantage of
developing opportunities. The size and composition of a reserve is entirely
situation-dependent.
ORGANIZING FORCES FOR THE DEFENSE
1-86. There is no doctrinal order of battle. Units will develop an order
of battle for specific threat forces based on intelligence provided through
IPB and MDMP processes. The organization of forces described here is a
general concept that can assist the commander in visualizing and
describing threat forces relative to friendly forces locations and actions
and their relationship in time and space on the battlefield. This
organization of forces can shift dramatically during the course of a battle
or operation, if part of the plan does not work or works better than
anticipated (see Figure 1-14).
1-26
Figure 1-14. Example Nonlinear Defense
DISRUPTION FORCE
1-87. The size and composition of forces in the disruption zone depends
on the level of command involved, the commander’s concept of the battle,
and the circumstances in which the unit adopts the defense. A tactical
commander will always make maximum use of stay-behind forces and
affiliated forces existing within his AOR. However, a disruption force has
no set order of battle. It may contain
• Ambush teams (ground and air defense).
• Long-range reconnaissance patrols and/or special purpose
forces (SPF).
• RSTA assets and forces.
• Counterreconnaissance detachments.
• Artillery systems.
• Target designation teams.
• Elements of affiliated forces (such as terrorists, insurgents,
criminals, or special police).
1-88. The purpose of the disruption force is to prevent friendly forces
from conducting an effective attack. Skillfully conducted disruption
operations will effectively deny friendly forces the synergy of effects of his
combat system. The disruption force may also have a
counterreconnaissance mission. It may selectively destroy or render
irrelevant friendly ISR forces and deny him the ability to acquire and
engage targets with deep fires. The disruption force may deceive friendly
forces as to the location and configuration of the main defense in the
battle zone, while forcing him to show his intent and deploy early. Some
other results of actions in the disruption zone can include delaying to
allow time for preparation of the defense or a counterattack, canalizing
friendly forces onto unfavorable axes, or ambushing key systems and
vulnerable troop concentrations.
1-27
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
MAIN DEFENSE FORCE

1-89. The main defense force is the element charged with execution of
the defensive mission. It operates in the battle zone to accomplish the
purpose of the defense (destroy, preserve, or deny).
PROTECTED FORCE
1-90. In a defense to preserve, the protected force is the force being
kept from harm by covering or delaying forces. It may be in the battle
zone or the support zone.
SECURITY FORCE
1-91. The security force is charged with protecting the entire AOR from
attack by partisans, guerillas, insurgents, terrorists, covert operatives,
and SPFs. The security force may be separate from the
counterreconnaissance detachment or have some command or support
relationship with it.
COUNTERATTACK FORCE
1-92. A defensive battle may include a planned counterattack scheme.
This is typical of a maneuver defense, but could also take place within an
area defense. In these cases, the tactical commander will designate one or
more counterattack forces. He will also shift his task organization to
create a counterattack force when a window of opportunity opens that
leaves friendly forces vulnerable to such an action. The counterattack
force can have within it fixing, assault, and exploitation forces (as
outlined above). It will have the mission of causing the offensive
operation of friendly forces to culminate. The tactical commander uses
counterattack forces to complete the defensive mission and regain the
initiative for the offense.
RESERVE
1-93. The size and composition of a reserve force is entirely situation-
dependent. However, the reserve is normally a force strong enough to
respond to unforeseen opportunities and contingencies at the tactical
level. A reserve may assume the role of counterattack force. Reserves are
almost always combined arms forces.
ORGANIZING FORCES FOR TACTICAL SECURITY
1-94. The threat employs various types of forces in tactical security
roles. The exact task organization depends on the situation and the force
to be protected.
1-95. If the commander chooses to have one organization responsible
for all tactical security in his AOR, these duties fall to the security force.
There is no set organization for the security force, but its sub-elements
will be security detachments (SD). A security force is typically formed
when the types and number and separation of anticipated security
actions require a single responsible commander and planning staff.
SECURITY DETACHMENT
1-96. Detachments formed to undertake tactical security actions are
SDs. An SD may be formed for and given any security mission. Most
commonly, they are formed as part of a tactical movement.
1-28
SECURITY ELEMENT
1-97. Security elements (SE) are task-organized company- or platoon-size
forces operating as part of a detachment. They execute an independent
tactical security task, such as protecting the flank or rear of a moving
force or providing local security while the rest of the detachment executes
the mission.
COMBAT SECURITY OUTPOSTS
1-98. Combat security outposts (CSOP) are task-organized platoon- or
squad-size forces that provide local security to forces in battle positions or
assembly areas. They prevent reconnaissance or small groups from
penetrating positions and force the threat to deploy and lose his
momentum in the attack.
COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE DETACHMENT
1-99. The counterreconnaissance detachment (CRD) is focused almost
entirely on friendly reconnaissance, while other security forces have the
mission to protect from other types of friendly units and action as well.
The commander has great flexibility in determining the size and
composition of his CRD and its relationship with the security force, if
formed.
FIGHTING PATROL
1-100. Fighting patrols (FP) have a security function as well as a
reconnaissance function.
ORGANIZING FORCES FOR TACTICAL MOVEMENT
1-101. Some of the task organizations associated with tactical movement
also play roles on other types of combined arms tactics. For example, SDs
and SEs provide security during tactical movement and in other
situations. FPs perform reconnaissance missions during tactical
movement and in other situations in which the threat force is not in
direct contact with the enemy. The main body contains forces organized
in the same manner as during the offense. Figure 1-15 below shows an
example of the possible deployment of various forces within a unit during
tactical movement.
1-29
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Figure 1-15. Tactical Movement Control Measures and

Example Forces
SECURITY DETACHMENT
1-102. An SD is a task organized battalion or company with the mission
of protecting the moving force from direct fire and other forms of contact
and from being fixed by threat action. The SD is typically also the fixing
force in an offensive action. The SD will be further organized into SEs to
facilitate providing all-around security.
SECURITY ELEMENT
1-103. An SE is a company- or platoon-size force that operates as part of
an SD. SEs are typically charged with providing the moving force with
protection from friendly action originating from a particular area along
the axis (they may be designated as a “front,” “flank,” or “rear” SE).
FIGHTING PATROLS
1-104. A moving force will use as many FPs as the commander’s analysis
deems necessary to facilitate situational awareness and freedom of
movement along each attack route.
MAIN BODY
1-105. The main body consists of the assault, exploitation and
supporting forces of the attacking unit.
SCOPE OF OPERATIONS
FULL-SPECTRUM OPERATIONS
1-106. The full-spectrum operations include offensive, defensive,
stability, and support operations. Offensive and defensive missions
normally dominate MTWs and some SSCs. Stability and support missions
are conducted in SSC operations, peacetime military engagements
1-30
(PME), and to a lesser extent in MTW. Missions in any environment

require brigades to conduct or be prepared to conduct any combination of
these primary operations. Reconnaissance troops assigned to BCTs are
trained and equipped to support these operations. While the Army’s
heavy brigades are optimized for operations in an MTW, they retain the
ability to conduct SSC operations. The SBCT is organized and equipped
to rapidly deploy to SSC operations, but is capable of conducting MTW
operations if reinforced.
MAJOR THEATER OF WAR CHARACTERISTICS
1-107. MTWs have the greatest potential of occurring in regions
containing moderate to well-developed infrastructure (especially roads,
rail, and bridges), complex and urban terrain with large urban areas, and
diverse weather patterns. The most dangerous potential threat remains
those forces with the capacity to conduct full-scale combat operations.
Threat military capabilities common to an MTW will comprise high-end
industrial and information-age forces. They are characterized by both
heavy and mechanized forces as well as motorized/light infantry, mass
precision artillery and rocket forces, large numbers of antitank weapons,
extensive air defense systems down to shoulder-fired systems, and
antimissile and antistealth systems with access to space-based command,
control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities. They possess advanced fixed-/rotary-
wing aviation assets, and will be capable of achieving at least local air
superiority to support tactical operations. Most threats capable of
initiating an MTW possess weapons capable of mass destruction. SPFs,
state-controlled terrorist organizations, and paramilitary forces will be
part of a strategy of simultaneous, distributed operations within the AOI
and AO.
1-108. Threat forces will seek ways to manipulate the commanders’ trust
in the authenticity of data, information, and knowledge. They will
attempt to take away the collaboration that leads to SU (a key component
of information superiority). They will seek to disrupt the time-phased
force deployment at aerial ports and seaports of debarkation, attack CSS
assets and elements throughout the AO, and affect the BCT’s lines of
communications. Present and future trends indicate the acquisition of
more sophisticated and advanced technology; greater, more capable and
secure C3; and increased use of urban areas for operating bases and for
sanctuary.
SMALLER-SCALE CONTINGENCY CHARACTERISTICS
1-109. Historically, SSCs like those in Panama, Haiti, and Kosovo have
occurred in regions with weak infrastructure (especially roads, rail,
bridges), complex terrain with large urban areas, and diverse weather
patterns. Humanitarian issues, such as overpopulation, resource
shortages, natural disasters, and inadequate local, regional, and global
response capabilities, complicate operations in these areas. Threats in
these environments usually contain mid- to low-end industrial-age forces
characterized by limited heavy forces, mainly equipped with small
numbers of early generation tanks, and some mechanized but mostly
motorized infantry. There is a pervasive presence of guerilla, terrorist,
paramilitary, SPF, special police, and militia organizations. These forces
are equipped with man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS),
1-31
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
antitank guided missiles (ATGM), mortars, mines, explosives, and

machine guns. There are limited fixed- and rotary-wing aviation assets.
These forces can be expected, however, to have robust communications
utilizing conventional military devices augmented by commercial
equipment such as cell phones.
PEACETIME MILITARY ENGAGEMENT CHARACTERISTICS
1-110. A PME encompasses all military activities that involve other
nations and are intended to shape the security environment in peacetime.
PMEs include programs and exercises that the US military conducts with
other nations to shape the international environment, improve mutual
understanding with other counties, and improve interoperability with
treaty partners or potential coalition partners. Operations in support of
PMEs are normally interagency in character and are designed to address
the fundamental causes of instability that can lead to regional conflict. A
PME further serves to demonstrate US resolve to allies and adversaries
alike, conveying democratic ideals and civilian-military relationships, and
helping to relieve sources of instability.
1-32
Chapter 2
Battle Command
Battle command is the
exercise of command CONTENTS
in operations against
The Art of Command .......................................... 2-2
a hostile, thinking The Elements of Command............................ 2-2
opponent. It combines Battle Command Methodology ...................... 2-2
leadership and the art Command and Control ....................................... 2-6
and science of The Command and Control System .............. 2-6
Command and Control Procedures............... 2-8
battlefield decision Troop-Leading Procedures ............................ 2-12
making to motivate Communications ................................................ 2-28
soldiers and Digitization .......................................................... 2-31
organizations into ABCS Components ......................................... 2-31
ABCS Communications Links ....................... 2-31
action to accomplish FBCB2 .............................................................. 2-33
missions. Battle CHAT (Cavalry Squadron RSTA) ................... 2-38
command entails Security............................................................ 2-38
visualizing the Techniques of Tactical Control ......................... 2-38
Planning Process ............................................ 2-38
operation, from start Reporting Process .......................................... 2-39
to finish and FM Versus Digital Communications .............. 2-39
formulating a concept
of operation to get from the current state to the desired end state. It
also includes assigning missions, prioritizing and allocating resources,
selecting the critical time and place to act, and knowing how and when
to make adjustments in the fight.
Battle command of the reconnaissance troop is typically decentralized

due to the size of the AO and the nature of reconnaissance missions.
Operating widely disbursed over extended space places the burden of
sound, timely decision making at the lowest levels. Accurate and
timely reconnaissance, reporting, and communications techniques are
essential for the troop, and ultimately the BCT, to be successful.
Integration of command and control, communications, computer
technology, and intelligence (C4I) increases the effectiveness of battle
command and makes accurate and timely decisions possible.
Battle command is a continual and sequential process that begins in

the planning phase and continues through the consolidation phase.
This chapter outlines the digital tools and techniques a troop
commander needs to effectively command and control his unit in
combat. It also addresses aspects of situational awareness, planning,
and C2 procedures in a digital environment. The purpose of this
chapter is to:
• Define the art of command.

• Describe the command and control system.
2-1
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
• Describe the communications and digital systems associated

with troop command and control.
• Describe troop techniques for a commander to effectively
command and control his unit during operations.
SECTION I – THE ART OF COMMAND
2-1. Command and control are interrelated. Command resides solely

with the commander; it consists of authority, troop leading, and
leadership. Control is how the commander executes command. This
section will discuss the following:
• The elements of command (authority, troop leading, and
leadership).
• The battle command methodology (visualize, describe, direct,
and lead).
• The role of the commander.
THE ELEMENTS OF COMMAND

2-2. The elements of command are the following:
• Authority. Authority is the delegated power to judge, act, or
command. It includes responsibility, accountability, and
delegation.
• Troop-leading. This element allows the commander to select
a course of action as the one most favorable to accomplish the
mission and translate it into clear, concise instructions. It
applies the commander’s intuition, knowledge, judgment,
experience, intellect, boldness, perception, and character to
translate his vision into action. It includes knowing when and
what to decide, and understanding the consequences of
decisions. After the commander has made his decision he
must lead the troop in its execution. He leads by example and
by direction, positioning himself where he can best command
without depriving himself of the ability to respond to
changing situations.
• Leadership. Commanders exercise leadership by influencing
others. To do this, they provide purpose, direction, and
motivation while taking actions to accomplish the mission
and improve the organization. Commanders must lead
through a combination of example, persuasion, and
compulsion.
BATTLE COMMAND METHODOLOGY

2-3. Visualize, describe, direct, and lead make up the commander’s
methodology for executing battle command. The commander uses this
process to visualize the battlespace, describe the visualization to
subordinates, direct actions to achieve results, and lead the troop to
mission accomplishment. This process combines the art of command with
the science of control for the troop commander. For the troop commander,
2-2
_____________________________________________________________Chapter 2 – Battle Command
battle command presents unique challenges in the conduct of planning

for, preparing, and executing reconnaissance and security missions. The
nature of reconnaissance and security missions calls for decentralized
operations conducted over large areas and led by subordinate leaders.
VISUALIZE
2-4. This is the process of achieving a clear understanding of the
troop’s current state with relation to the threat and the environment,
developing a desired end state that represents mission accomplishment,
and determining the sequence of activities that moves the troop from its
current state to that end state. The commander begins to visualize the
desired end state when he receives a mission or perceives a change in the
mission. As he analyzes the mission, he applies his current situational
understanding to develop a mental image of his forces in relation to the
threat, the environment, and the end state. The commander must update
and validate his visualization during preparations as the results of feeds
from higher ISR operations become available. He must determine
whether new information (on threat forces, friendly forces, or the
environment) validates his plan, requires him to adjust the plan, or
invalidates his plan. The commander’s visualization is his assessment
tool throughout the operation, and he should focus on three main factors:
• Understand the current state of friendly and threat forces.
This is situational understanding, derived from applying the
commander’s judgment, experience, expertise, and intuition
to the COP. The SU includes physical factors, human factors,
and the relationships between friendly and threat forces and
the environment—seeing the battlefield—that represent
potential opportunities or threats for the troop (see Figure 2-
1).
• Foresee a feasible outcome. The commander must identify a
feasible outcome to the operation that results in mission
success and leaves the troop prepared for future missions and
tasks.
• Visualize the dynamics between opposing forces. The
commander must identify the dynamics throughout the
sequence of actions. This includes evaluating possible threat
reactions and his counteractions. This evaluation may lead to
the identification of possible triggers throughout the
operation.
2-3
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Figure 2-1. Seeing the Battlefield
DESCRIBE
2-5. The commander describes his visualization during the planning,
preparation, and execution phases of operations. Specifically, he follows
the troop-leading procedures and uses orders to provide his commander’s
intent and communicate his decision for execution. He must apply his
judgment, experience, expertise, and intuition before making a decision
and describing that decision to subordinates. During preparation, the
commander uses confirmation and back briefs to ensure his subordinate
leaders understand his vision, their tasks, and how the execution of their
tasks support his end state.
2-6. During execution, the commander uses FM updates, leader
huddles, FBCB2, and when the situation requires a significant change in
the troop’s execution, he uses FRAGOs to describe changes to the troop’s
situation, threat disposition or the unforeseen effects of terrain or civil-
military aspects on the execution of the mission and achievement of the
end state. This is the commander’s ability to concisely communicate
complex actions in time and space and translate them into
understandable and actionable tasks to subordinates. FBCB2 is an
effective tool to communicate changes or describe the changing
environment. It provides a common view of friendly and known threat
activities and locations and affords the commander the ability to verbally
and visually depict the situation as he understands it.
DIRECT
2-7. Once he has made a decision, the commander directs operations
by communicating the decision to his subordinates through an order.
Direction occurs during all phases of an operation.
Planning
2-8. Clear direction is essential to mission success; however,
commanders must strike a balance between detailed directions and
mission-oriented instructions. The commander should assign only the
minimum graphical, written, or procedural control measures (permissive
2-4
or restrictive) necessary to provide essential coordination and prevent

platoons from impeding one another. Orders (warning order [WARNO],
OPORD, fragmentary order [FRAGO]) must enable subordinates to
understand their situation, their commander’s mission and intent, and
their own mission.
Preparation
2-9. The commander directs changes to his plan based on feeds from
on-going ISR operations. He uses rehearsals to ensure synchronization of
tasks and triggers to events and PCIs to ensure completion of precombat
checks (PCC) and other preparations.
Execution
2-10. The nature of operations at the troop level requires the
commander to directly influence the action. The art of command requires
commanders to know when the plan must change, what criteria point
toward a need for changes, and then determining what required changes
will get the maximum effectiveness from the troop. He must be capable of
rapid analysis of the tactical situation and be able to make quick
decisions. The commander exercises judgment and initiative
continuously, assessing the situation and making decisions, often with
incomplete, conflicting, and vague information. The commander uses the
COP to update his visualization and ensure that his platoons and
elements execute appropriate measures for the actual situation. He must
synchronize his subordinates’ activities and integrate his troop’s actions
with his higher headquarters. The commander directs these actions
primarily through a FRAGO.
SUPPORT TO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS BATTLE COMMAND
2-11. The reconnaissance troop supports its higher headquarters in the
battle command process by—
•
Facilitating the commander’s ability to visualize the operation
by answering information requirements (IR and CCIR) and
providing detailed information on the terrain, infrastructure,
society, and threat (components of METT-TC) in his AO.
• Defining portions of METT-TC to allow the commander to
describe the operation with his intent and specified tasks to
his subordinates.
• Assisting the commander’s ability to direct forces by
facilitating situational awareness (SA) and contributing to the
brigade’s SU.
BATTLE COMMAND ASSESSMENT
2-12. The assessment continues the process of visualize, describe,
direct, and lead. The troop commander must continually assess the
current situation in the context of—
• Changes to the higher mission or higher commander’s intent.
• Changes to the threat situation or unanticipated threat
actions.
• The effects of terrain and weather on operations.
• The effects of noncombatants on current operations.
2-5
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
SECTION II – COMMAND AND CONTROL
THE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM

2-13. The C2 system is the Command and control is the
arrangement of personnel, information exercise of authority and
management, procedures, equipment, direction by a properly
and facilities (command posts) essential designated commander over
to the commander to plan, prepare, assigned and attached forces in
execute, and assess operations. The the accomplishment of the
mission.
system supports the commander’s
exercises of command and control by three basic functions:
• Creating and maintaining the common operational picture.
• Supporting troop leading by improving its speed and
accuracy.
• Supporting preparation and communication of execution of
information.
2-14. At the troop level, the C2 system consists of integrating—
• Key personnel.
• SOPs for information management.
• FBCB2 and FM communications.
• The troop CP.
PERSONNEL
2-15. The troop C2 system begins with the key leaders. No technology
can reduce the importance of the human dimension. The duties and
responsibilities of key personnel were described in the first chapter. The
commander must train his personnel in the performance of these duties,
foster a command climate that encourages initiative, and create a
cohesive chain of command. It is the commander’s responsibility to
consider and apply the capabilities and characteristics of his personnel—
their strengths and weaknesses—when delegating authority and
assigning tasks during operations.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
2-16. Information management consists of five activities: collecting,
processing, storing, displaying, and disseminating information. In
practice, these activities overlap, effectively complementing one another
within the C2 system.
Collecting
2-17. Collecting is the continuous acquisition of relevant information
about METT-TC through ISR operations. The troop collects information
through reconnaissance and direct observation to answer higher
headquarters IR and CCIR. These requirements may be revised
throughout the operation as the situation becomes clearer or changes.
2-18. The term relevant information refers to all information of
importance to the troop commander and to the higher headquarters in
the exercise of command and control. For the troop commander, relevant
information for the higher headquarters is categorized into the CCIR and
IR. Relevant information must be accurate, timely, usable, complete,
2-6
precise, and reliable to answer the questions that dictate the successful
execution of military operations. This ensures that the commander is not
overburdened by the sheer volume of information, rather that
information is provided that enables situational understanding and
decision making.
Processing
2-19. Processing covers the activities required to convert data or
information to knowledge or intelligence that supports situational
awareness. It includes organizing, collating, plotting, and arranging data
and information to create and maintain the COP, as well as analysis and
evaluation to support SA and SU. Considerations include the following:
• Common operational picture is a single display of relevant
information within a commander’s/leader’s area of interest.
This information is a display of information such as status
charts, overlays, and friendly and threat icons. This display
can be analog (such as a map with acetate overlay) or digital
(FBCB2 display). Echelons create the COP by collaborating,
sharing, and tailoring information. The COP allows
collaborative interaction and real-time sharing of information
among the commander and his troop leadership and the
higher commander and his staffs.
• Situational awareness is the ability to maintain a constant,
clear mental picture of relevant information and the tactical
situation. Simply stated, situational awareness answers the
question what is the effect of terrain, the friendly situation,
and the threat situation. Since the troop normally operates
dispersed, with its platoons and their individual sections
conducting decentralized operations, all recce leaders must
maintain situational awareness so they can make sound,
quick tactical decisions. The troop assesses and reports
relevant information within their AOs to fulfill their primary
responsibility of assisting their higher headquarters in
maintaining the COP.
• Situational understanding requires the commander to apply
his experience, professional knowledge, and intuition based
on the factors of METT-TC to the COP. Simply stated,
situational understanding answers the question what it
means. Situational understanding enables the commander to
“visualize” his battle space in both real time and in the future.
Storing
2-20. Storing retains information in any form, as written message
forms or log entries, or filed reports within the common system database,
for orderly and timely retrieval when needed. Information is stored
because not all information collected or processed can be displayed at the
same time, nor is it relevant at all times.
Displaying
2-21. Displaying presents information in a usable, easily understood
audio or visual form tailored to the requirements of the commander that
conveys the COP. The troop CP uses standard formats to organize the
display and assist the user in finding the needed information. Graphic
2-7
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
overlays displayed on FBCB2, or map overlays, aid communications and

understanding by using doctrinal terms, graphical conventions, and
standardized formats for presenting information to convey complex
concepts. Displays should allow the commander to communicate
directions to subordinates in a manner that quickly and concisely
portrays his intend, specified tasks, and desired end state. Graphic
information should:
• Display symbols, graphics, and terminology consistent with
FM 1-02 [FM 101-5-1].
• Display relevant information accurately, reliably, and timely.
• Change easily as information is updated.
• Allow rapid dissemination to higher, lower, and adjacent
units.
Disseminating
2-22. Disseminating is communicating information of any kind from
one person or place to another in a usable form by any means to improve
understanding or to initiate or govern action. Information systems
(INFOSYS) are the equipment and facilities that collect, process, store,
display, and disseminate data and information. This includes computers,
hardware and software, and communications as well as the policies and
procedures for their use. The systems include the ability to access
analytical expertise and databases through reach-back to army, national,
and civilian institutions. Enhanced FM and digital communications
(FBCB2) and other C2 systems in the troop portray relevant information
to enable the troop leadership to better visualize their battlespace. These
systems integrate standard threat information (location, composition, and
disposition) with multidimensional aspects such as the psychological,
physical, allegiance, intent, and infrastructure that must be considered.
COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCEDURES

2-23. C2 procedures provide effective guidelines for planning and
preparing both analog and digital units for operations. Techniques for
utilizing digital systems to aid in the execution of these procedures are
included in this discussion.
MISSION-ORIENTED COMMAND AND CONTROL
2-24. This C2 method provides the maximum latitude to subordinates,
encouraging initiative, and assisting them in taking action consistent
with the troop commander’s intent and concept. Mission-oriented C2
requires a clear understanding by subordinate leaders of the troop’s
purpose; at the same time, it provides them with the freedom to react to
or exploit threat actions without further guidance.
Expect Uncertainty
2-25. The commander must understand the combat environment. The
operation is dynamic and the threat uncooperative. Communications may
be degraded, and the chaos of battle may prevent the commander from
knowing what is happening beyond the reach of his own senses. The
situation the unit anticipates during the planning phase will inevitably
change before and during execution.
2-8
Reduce Leader Intervention

2-26. When soldiers expect the commander to make every decision or
initiate every action, they may become reluctant to act. To counter this
tendency, the commander must plan and direct operations in a manner
that requires a minimum of intervention. He operates on the principle
that some loss of precision is better than inactivity.
2-27. The commander must provide subordinates with the guidance
and direction when precise control is required for synchronization.
During the planning process, he should identify those few critical
decisions that are absolutely required during the operation and then
determine the criteria to trigger the actions associated with these
decisions. Examples include the engagement criteria, bypass criteria,
disengagement criteria, reconnaissance handover, or passage of lines.
Optimize Planning Time for Subordinates
2-28. The commander must ensure that the timeline he develops for
mission planning and preparation provide adequate troop-leading time
for subordinate leaders. He should use time management tools such as
backwards planning, published preparation timelines, parallel planning,
and delegation of troop-leading tasks to the XO and 1SG when applicable.
Allow Maximum Freedom of Action for Subordinates
2-29. Given the expected battlefield conditions, leaders at every level
must avoid placing unnecessary limits on their soldiers’ freedom of
action. The leader at the point of decision must have the knowledge,
training, and freedom necessary to make the correct choice in support of
the commander’s intent. Soldiers win battles; their leaders can only place
them in a position where they are able to seize the opportunity to do so.
Subordinates are successful on the battlefield when their commanders
and leaders have fostered the necessary confidence and initiative before
the battle begins.
Encourage Cross-Talk
2-30. Subordinate leaders should not always have to communicate
through their commander to adjacent units, target acquisition teams
(such as COLTs), GSR teams, IREMBASS teams, or other supporting
elements. In some instances, because of their position on the battlefield,
two or more subordinates, working together, may have the clearest view
of what is happening and may be better suited than the commander to
develop a tactical solution. Direct coordination between subordinate
elements to solve a problem or respond to unforeseen situations, is
critical to mission-oriented command and control.
Command and Lead Well Forward
2-31. The commander positions himself where he can best command
and control his troop and make critical decisions to influence the outcome
of the mission. This position is normally forward to allow the commander
to exert his leadership and to shift or retask the troop or attached assets
as necessary. He must be far enough forward to “see” the battlefield using
all available resources he must maintain communication with higher and
subordinate elements either directly or through his CP to maintain
situational awareness and visualize the battlefield; these assets include
2-9
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
not only visual observation but also radio reports and, in digitized units,
information provided over digital systems.
PLANS AND ORDERS
2-32. Plans are the basis for any mission. The troop commander
develops his concept of the operation summarizing how best to
accomplish his mission within the scope of his higher commanders’
intents (two levels up). The troop commander uses troop-leading
procedures to turn the concept into a fully developed plan and to prepare
a clear, concise OPORD. He assigns additional tasks (and outlines their
purpose) for subordinate elements, allocates available resources, and
establishes priorities.
2-33. The foundation of all orders is the troop mission statement and
the commander’s intent. The commander must have a thorough
understanding of the relationship between the mission statement, his
intent, and the concept of the operation and train his subordinates to
understand the relationship as well. The commander normally uses three
types of orders to prepare for, direct, and adjust operations:
• Warning orders.
• Operations order.
• Fragmentary orders.
Mission Statement
2-34. The commander uses the mission statement to focus the troop on
the objective of the upcoming operation. This statement (sometimes a
single sentence) describes the type of operation, the troop’s task, and the
purpose for the troop’s immediate operation. It is written in a format
based on the five “Ws”: who (unit), what (tasks), when (date-time group),
where (grid location/geographical reference for the AOs and/or objective),
and why (purpose). The commander must ensure that the mission is
thoroughly understood by all leaders and soldiers two echelons below
(section or squad).
2-35. Tactical tasks are specific activities performed by the unit while it
is conducting a form of tactical operation or a choice of maneuver. The
tasks should be definable, attainable, and measurable. Critical tasks that
require specific TTPs for the troop are covered in detail throughout this
publication.
2-36. A simple, clearly stated purpose improves understanding of the
commander’s intent. It will also assist subordinate leaders in adjusting
their tasks during execution of the mission, allowing them to stay within
the parameters of the higher commander’s intent. The purpose should tell
the subordinates why the troop is conducting the mission.
Commander’s Intent
2-37. The commander’s intent is a clear, concise statement that
provides the link between the mission statement and the concept of the
operation. Intent is normally expressed in four to five sentences, but can
also be in bullet form, and describes the key tasks that are essential to
the mission and the commander’s desired end state for the mission. He
may also identify the decisive point for the mission and may explain a
broader purpose for the operation in relation to his higher headquarters
beyond that outlined in the mission statement. The intent also includes
2-10
the conditions the force meets to achieve the stated purpose (end state).
The intent provides the basis for subordinates to exercise initiative when
unanticipated opportunities arise or when the original concept of the
operation no longer applies.
2-38. Key Tasks. Key tasks are not tied to a specific course of action
(COA); rather, they identify actions or conditions that are fundamental to
the unit’s success. By identifying these “mission essential” tasks, the
commander emphasizes to his subordinates that during the operation,
someone must execute them regardless of who was assigned to the task in
the order. This allows leaders to anticipate assumption of a key task if
the assigned unit is unable to accomplish it.
2-39. End State. The end state expresses the required conditions that,
when achieved, attain the objective for the operation. The commander
must ensure that he does not describe a set of conditions that conflict
with accomplishment of key tasks or mission accomplishment. The end
state is defined as the relationship of the troop to one or several of the
following criteria: the tempo, duration, effect on the threat, effect on
another friendly force’s operation, or key terrain.
2-40. Decisive Point. The commander may identify the decisive point
for the operation. This reinforces the mission’s objective. The decisive
point may be a geographic location, a threat force or civilian organization,
or an event within the operation.
2-41. Purpose. The commander may expand on the purpose for the
operation, but this is not a restatement of the why (purpose) from the
mission statement. Instead, he looks beyond the purpose of the
immediate operation to describe the purpose within the broader context
of the higher commander’s mission and intent.
Combat Orders
2-42. Combat orders are the means by which the troop commander
receives and transmits information, from the earliest notification that an
operation will occur through the final phases of execution. In a tactical
situation, the commander will receive the troop’s mission from higher in
the form of written, digital (sent on FBCB2), or verbal WARNO, OPORD,
or FRAGO. The commander must take every opportunity to train the
troop in the use of combat orders, as the skills associated with orders
development and dissemination is highly perishable.
2-43. Warning Order. During the planning phase of an operation,
commanders use WARNOs as a method of alerting their subordinate
leaders. Warning orders also initiate the commander’s most valuable
time-management tool, the collaborative and/or parallel planning process.
The troop commander usually receives a series of WARNOs from his
higher headquarters to initiate troop-leading procedures and
preparations prior to receipt of the OPORD. He must issue at least one
WARNO, if not more depending on the factors of METT-TC, to his
subordinate leaders to help them prepare for new missions. The
directions and guidelines in the WARNO allow subordinates to begin
their own planning and preparation activities.
2-44. The content of WARNOs is based on two major variables:
information about the upcoming operation that is available to the troop
from the higher headquarters and what the troop commander ultimately
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
wants to achieve by issuing the WARNO (what he wants his subordinates

to do with the information). The commander normally issues his WARNO
as he completes his own analysis of the situation or as he receives
additional orders from his higher headquarters.
2-45. In addition to alerting the unit to the upcoming operation,
WARNOs allow the commander to put out tactical information
incrementally and, ultimately, to shorten the length of the actual
OPORD. As a result, when he issues the OPORD, he can simply review
previously issued information or brief the changes or earlier omissions.
He will then have more time to concentrate on visualizing his concept of
the fight for his subordinates.
2-46. Operation Order. The commander issues his OPORD as part of
his troop-leading procedures. He does not need to repeat information
covered previously in his WARNOs. The commander may also issue an
execution matrix, either to supplement the OPORD or as a tool to aid in
the execution of the mission.
2-47. Fragmentary Order. The FRAGO is used to implement timely
changes to, or provide pertinent extracts from, existing orders. During
the execution of an operation, FRAGOs are the medium of battle
command. The troop commander uses them to communicate changes in
the threat or friendly situation and to retask his subordinate elements
based on changes in the situation.
2-48. A FRAGO follows the five-paragraph OPORD structure; however,
it includes only the information required for subordinates to accomplish
their mission. To enhance understanding of verbal FRAGOs, digitally
equipped units can quickly develop hasty graphics and transmit digital
overlays. The FRAGO normally includes the following information:
• Updated threat or friendly situation that describes the
reason(s) for the changes.
• If necessary, changes to the troop mission.
• If necessary, changes to the commander’s intent.
• Changes to the concept of the operation, to include fires.
• Changes to platoon and other supporting elements’ tasks
and/or purposes.
• Coordinating instructions, as necessary.
• Changes to CSS, as necessary.
• Changes to command and signal, as necessary.
TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES
2-49. Leaders of company/troop and smaller units use troop-leading
procedures to develop plans and orders (refer to FM 5-0 [FM 101-5]). The
eight troop-leading steps are generally performed concurrently rather
than sequentially. In addition, some steps such as initiate movement,
issue the warning order, and conduct reconnaissance may recur several
times during the process. Although listed as the last step, activities
associated with supervising and refining the plan and other preparations
may occur throughout the troop-leading process.
2-50. The commander uses backwards planning based on the time
constraints prior to mission execution to determine how much time is
2-12
devoted to each step and whether steps are performed concurrently. The
commander must understand how to perform the procedures within the
time constraints. Digital information systems (such as FBCB2, enhanced
position location reporting procedures [EPLRS], and appliqué) are
valuable tools for performing troop-leading procedures. These systems
allow the commander to communicate information quickly and
accurately.
2-51. The commander considers the factors of METT-TC throughout
the procedures to update his visualization of the battlefield and his plan
continuously, based on additional information from his higher
headquarters and ongoing ISR operations by other sources.
STEP 1 – RECEIVE AND ANALYZE THE MISSION
2-52. Troop-leading procedures normally commence upon receipt of a
mission from the higher headquarters either through a WARNO or
OPORD. As a minimum, the commander should receive his commander’s
guidance for reconnaissance that includes the focus, tempo, and
engagement criteria. For a security mission, he should also receive
destruction and displacement criteria (see Chapters 3 and 4 for
descriptions of commander’s guidance). The commander may also initiate
troop-leading procedures upon anticipation or identification of a new
mission during an ongoing operation.
Confirm and Clarify the Mission
2-53. The troop commander gives a confirmation brief to his
commander to confirm his understanding of the higher commander’s
guidance, intent, and/or specified tasks. He obtains clarification on
aspects of the order based on his initial METT-TC analysis, confirming
information about the terrain and the friendly and threat situations, as
necessary. If necessary, he conducts initial coordination with adjacent
and supporting elements. Additionally, he conducts time analysis using
backwards planning, if necessary develops his initial security plan, and
alerts the troop to the upcoming mission.
Analyze the Mission
2-54. The commander conducts mission analysis using the factors of
METT-TC. Mission analysis is a continuous process. The commander
constantly receives information (during the planning phase, or en route to
the reconnaissance objective) and must decide if the information affects
his mission. If it does, he then decides how to adjust his plan to meet this
new situation. METT-TC is not necessarily analyzed sequentially. How
and when the commander analyzes each factor depends on when
information is made available to him.
NOTE: The acronym METT-TC is a common mnemonic device for the factors of mission
analysis. The following discussion presents these elements in the traditional order
(mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available,
and civil considerations). Mission is always the first factor to be analyzed. The
second factor in the analysis, however, should be terrain rather than the enemy. By
analyzing the terrain first, the leader gains a clear picture of factors that influence
the enemy situation; this enables him to develop a better understanding of the
enemy’s capabilities and limitations.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
2-55. Mission Analysis. After receiving an essential task and purpose,

either in a WARNO or the OPORD, the commander can begin the
analysis of his own mission. He may use a refined product, such as the
modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) and/or the situation
template (SITEMP) (if available) to better visualize the interrelationships
of the terrain, threat, and friendly forces. His goal in this analysis is to
clarify what the unit is to accomplish, why the unit is to accomplish it,
and how to achieve its overall purpose.
2-56. Analysis of higher-unit mission and intent. Leaders at every
echelon must have a clear understanding of the intent and concept of
operation of the commander two levels higher. Once he understands the
operation two levels up, the commander can analyze the troop mission.
Key considerations in this analysis include the following:
• Purpose. Identify the troop’s purpose. Determine how the
troop’s purpose relates to the purposes of the brigade and/or
its other troops in the squadron and attached elements.
• Specified tasks. What tasks does the OPORD specify for the
troop to accomplish?
• Implied tasks. What tasks not specified in the OPORD must
the troop execute to successfully accomplish its specified
tasks?
• Essential tasks. What essential tasks specified in the OPORD
must be accomplished for mission success? Are any implied
tasks essential? What specific results must the troop achieve
in terms of the terrain and the threat and/or friendly forces?
• Limitations. What limitations does the OPORD place on the
troop’s freedom of action?
2-57. Restated mission. The commander writes his restated mission,
ensuring that it includes the five “W”s: who, what, when, where, and
why. If the unit must accomplish more than one essential task, they are
listed as on-order missions in the order in which they will occur.
2-58. Enemy Analysis. The commander must apply his own analysis to
the intelligence products provided by his higher headquarters. As an
example, the S2’s SITEMP might identify the location of CSOPs, OPs and
other forces in the disruption zone, and platoon-size battle positions (BP)
on the objective area with templated generic weapons range lines. This is
useful information on how the enemy may look when the BCT is in the
close fight and engaging the enemy on the objective, but it is probably not
what the enemy will look like when reconnaissance and surveillance
assets are engaged in reconnaissance and surveillance to confirm that
specific threat COA. The commander must refine the SITEMP to
anticipate contact with enemy forces in the disruption zone, and how the
enemy will look in and around the objective area during the
reconnaissance phase of the operation. This refinement focuses on known
or templated vehicle(s) or vehicle positions, known or templated
obstacles, intervisibility lines that influence known or templated enemy
vehicles around the objective area.
2-59. Based on the operational environment described in the
intelligence products, the commander further evaluates and refines the
enemy situation to identify the enemy’s most likely objective or end state
within the troop’s and higher’s AO and the feasible threat COAs or civil
2-14
options that enable him to achieve his objective. If possible, he identifies

what factors or events would cause the enemy to select one course of
action over another. He identifies the possible movement and/or
positioning of high payoff targets that he may encounter within the
threat COA. He should identify the capabilities and weaknesses of the
threat forces within the order of battle that he expects to encounter based
on the current threat composition and disposition. He identifies the
strengths and weaknesses of unconventional forces that he may
encounter to include paramilitary forces, militia, police, and/or criminal
organizations.
2-60. Terrain and Weather Analysis. The commander focuses not only
on the impact of terrain and weather on the troop and other friendly
forces, but also on how they will affect threat operations. The commander
normally must prioritize his analysis of the terrain and weather based on
time constraints that influence orders development at the troop level.
2-61. Terrain analysis. The higher headquarters provides the troop
with a MCOO, which depicts the physical effects of the battlefield on
military operations. If the MCOO is focused primarily on identifying just
unrestricted, restricted, and severely restricted terrain, the troop
commander must further refine it to his level using the five military
aspects of terrain: observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment,
obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach (OCOKA). In the absence
of a MCOO, the troop commander should develop his own product.
2-62. Observation and fields of fire. The commander must determine
what locations along each avenue of approach provide clear observation
and fields of fire for both the attacker and the defender. He analyzes the
area surrounding key terrain, objectives, and obstacles. He locates
intervisibility lines and assesses their impact on his ability to obtain
information requirements or acquire targets.
2-63. In analyzing fields of fire, the commander focuses on the ability of
friendly and threat units to cover terrain with direct fires from known or
likely positions. In addition, he must identify positions that afford clear
observation, allowing them to employ indirect fires effectively.
2-64. Cover and concealment. The commander looks at the terrain,
foliage, structures, and other features on the avenues of approach to
identify sites that offer cover and concealment. In a security mission,
antitank (AT) weapon and vehicle positions must be both lethal and
survivable, with effective cover and concealment just as vital as clear
fields of fire.
2-65. Obstacles. In analyzing the terrain, the commander first
identifies existing and reinforcing obstacles that may limit mobility
(affecting such features as objectives, avenues of approach, and mobility
corridors) and affect the troop’s countermobility effort.
2-66. Key terrain. Key terrain is any location or area whose seizure,
retention, or control affords a marked advantage to either combatant. At
the troop level, the commander must assess what terrain is key to his
mission accomplishment. An example of key terrain for a troop
conducting a zone reconnaissance could be a small hill that overlooks a
threat’s reverse slope defense.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
2-67. Designation of an area as key terrain depends largely on the

characteristics of the avenue of approach (such as the width or length and
the restrictiveness of terrain along the avenue) and the size of the unit
required controlling it. Other contributing factors include maneuver
space, fields of fire, and cover and concealment afforded by the key
terrain itself. For example, a vantage point overlooking where several
mobility corridors or trails converge may be key terrain for a troop.
2-68. The troop commander may also identify decisive terrain, which is
key terrain that will have an extraordinary impact on the mission.
Decisive terrain is relatively rare; it will not be present in every situation.
By designating terrain as decisive, the commander recognizes that
seizing and/or retaining it is an absolute requirement for successful
accomplishment of the mission.
2-69. Avenues of approach. These are areas through which a unit can
maneuver. The definition of an avenue of approach is an area that
provides sufficient ease of movement and enough width (for dispersion) to
allow passage of a force large enough to significantly affect the outcome of
the battle. In turn, avenues of approach are composed of mobility
corridors, which are areas through which the force will be canalized by
terrain features and constrictions. If not identified by the higher
headquarters, the troop commander can use the following process to
identify avenues of approach:
• Identify mobility corridors.
• Categorize each corridor by the size or type of force it will
accommodate.
• Group mobility corridors to form avenues of approach.
2-70. The commander must identify mounted, dismounted, and air
avenues of approach within the AO. Mounted forces may move on
avenues along unrestricted or restricted terrain (or both). Dismounted
avenues and avenues used by reconnaissance elements normally include
restricted terrain and, at times, severely restricted terrain. In addition,
the terrain analysis must identify avenues of approach for both friendly
and threat units.
2-71. After identifying avenues of approach, the commander must
evaluate each avenue. He determines the size and/or type of force that
could use the avenue and evaluates the terrain that the avenue traverses
as well as the terrain that bounds or otherwise influences it.
2-72. Weather analysis. Consideration of the effects of weather
conditions is an essential part of the mission analysis. The commander
should review the results of his terrain analysis and determine the
impact of the following factors on terrain, personnel, and equipment and
on the projected friendly and threat COAs.
2-73. Light data. At what times are beginning of morning nautical
twilight (BMNT), sunrise, sunset, end of evening nautical twilight
(EENT), moonrise, and moonset? Is the sun to the back of friendly forces
or the threat? What effect will this have on either force’s ability to see?
Will friendly forces have to remove or install driver’s night periscopes
during movement? When during the operation will they have to use
night-vision goggles? What effect will long periods of darkness (such as
during winter nights) have on soldiers’ ability to stay awake and alert?
2-16
2-74. Precipitation. How will precipitation affect the terrain along each
avenue of approach? Will some restricted terrain become severely
restricted if it rains or snows? Will moist air cause foggy conditions? Will
lack of precipitation cause extremely dusty conditions? How will fog, dust,
or stormy conditions affect visibility?
2-75. Temperature. What will the temperature be during the operation
and what effect will this have on soldiers? Will they be able to sustain a
long fight in extreme conditions? Will the ground freeze or thaw during
the operation? What effect will this have on trafficability? How will
extreme heat or cold affect the optical images in the vehicle sights? Are
temperature dispersions favorable for the use of smoke or chemicals?
2-76. Wind speed and direction. What is the expected wind speed and
direction during the operation? What effect will wind conditions have on
use of smoke, flares, or chemical agents? Will the wind affect dust, fog,
and other battlefield conditions?
2-77. Visibility. How will weather conditions (including light
conditions, precipitation, temperature, and wind speed and direction)
affect visibility? Will friendly forces have the sun in their eyes? Will the
wind blow dust or smoke away from the route of march (making it easier
to see) or back toward friendly forces? Under such conditions, what is the
maximum observation range? How will that range affect the threat?
2-78. Troop Analysis (Troops and Support Available). Analyze the
combat readiness of soldiers and equipment task organized to the troop.
Direct subordinate leaders to outline the readiness status of their
elements; if possible, inspect each element to verify readiness. Compile
updates of each vehicle’s maintenance, fuel, ammunition, and personnel
status. Determine the anticipated readiness status, as of the time the
operation is to start, of vehicles and equipment that are currently non-
mission-capable (NMC). To accomplish its reconnaissance and target
acquisition tasks, the commander should especially consider the status of
special equipment: batteries (e.g. night observation devices [NOD],
position locator grid reference [PLGR], ground/vehicle laser locator
designator [G/VLLD], and mini eye-safe laser infrared observation set
[MELIOS]), to include resupply and recharging, and communications (e.g.
FBCB2, satellite communications, FM, and AM).
2-79. Time Analysis. Backward planning and development of a detailed
timeline are essential in framing the troop-leading procedures. Identify
the specific and implied times governing actions that must occur
throughout the planning, preparation, and execution phases of the
operation. Assess the impact of limited visibility conditions (including
darkness) on the troop-leading process and other time-sensitive
preparations for the troop and its subordinate elements (see Figure 2-2).
Analyze the timing for the execution phase in terms of the terrain and
threat and friendly forces.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Figure 2-2. Use of Time Analysis to Assess

Light Conditions for an Operation
2-80. Analysis of Civil Considerations. Identify any civil considerations

and specific considerations related to the applicable rules of engagement
(ROE) and/or rules of interaction (ROI) that may affect the troop mission.
The commander uses the higher headquarters description of the
operational environment as applicable to—
•
Understand the civilian environment to include ethnicity,
cultural distinctions, religious beliefs, political affiliations,
needs of society, and attitude towards US forces.
• Identify the impact of urban infrastucture that supports the
inhabitants, the government, and the economy on troop
operations within his AO.
• Determine the impact that civilians may have on operations
to include distinguishing threat forces from the local
populace, impeding unit movement, interfering with or
preventing use of weapon systems increased security
measures or readiness conditions, and the impact of civilian
casualties on the local populace and troop personnel.
STEP 2 – ISSUE THE WARNING ORDER
2-81. This step is normally conducted concurrently with other steps.
Based on time constraints and other METT-TC factors, the commander
may issue several WARNOs during troop-leading procedures (see Table
2-1). Troop WARNOs are given verbally or transmitted over FBCB2 and
allow subordinate leaders to plan and prepare for the operation prior to
the receipt of the OPORD. The commander should not delay issuing the
order while awaiting additional information; likewise, he should not
2-18
withhold needed information, even if it is somewhat incomplete. He can

send updates as needed using subsequent WARNOs.
2-82. The first WARNO may be issued after the commander has
confirmed and clarified his mission, to include an initial METT-TC
assessment. It alerts the troop to the upcoming mission and may provide
a preparation timeline for the operation. A subsequent WARNO may be
issued after the commander completes his mission analysis. It provides
the threat and friendly situation, the restated mission, and additional
preparation instructions. An additional WARNO may be issued after the
commander has developed his tentative plan. It provides his intent,
course(s) of action, and task planning or rehearsal priorities for his
platoons and other attached elements.
Table 2-1. Commander’s Use of Multiple Warning Orders
TROOP COMMANDER’S POSSIBLE CONTENT OF COMMANDER’S PURPOSE

ACTION WARNING ORDER
Receive the brigade or First WARNO should cover the Prepare platoons for movement.
squadron WARNO. following: Focus the troop on the new
Proposed mission statement. mission.
Security plan. Specify troop task organization.
Movement plan.
Task organization.
Tentative timeline.
Standard drills to be rehearsed.
Conduct the mission Second WARNO may cover the Initiate platoon-level mission
(METT-TC) analysis. following: analysis.
Friendly situation. Initiate mission-specific
Threat situation. rehearsals (drill- and task-
Terrain analysis. related).
Troop mission. Prepare for combat.
Develop a tentative plan. Third WARNO may cover the Initiate platoon-level COA
following: development.
Commander’s intent. Identify platoon-level ISR
Concept of the operation. requirements.
Concept of fires. Direct reconnaissance.
Subordinate unit tasks and Prepare for combat.
purposes.
ISR guidance.
Updated SITEMP and
operations graphics.
STEP 3 – MAKE A TENTATIVE PLAN

2-83. The commander continuously updates the COP and his
situational understanding using information and intelligence feeds from
his higher headquarters and ongoing ISR operations. The commander
develops his course of action (tentative plan) based on—
• His commander’s reconnaissance guidance.
• His commander’s intent.
• Tasks assigned by his higher headquarters.
• Feasible threat COAs.
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• His understanding of the terrain, enemy, and other relevant

METT-TC factors.
2-84. The commander compares troop and threat combat power,
weapon systems, and other combat multipliers to identify strengths and
weaknesses to avoid or exploit and how the threat may react to his
actions. He links his information requirements and target acquisition
tasks to the reconnaissance focus, tempo, and engagement criteria. The
commander visualizes the end state and the scheme of maneuver
required to achieve that end state.
2-85. The commander develops a scheme of maneuver that provides
flexibility to respond to all feasible threat COAs. The scheme of maneuver
should address—
• Cueing by external ISR assets (e.g., signal intelligence, image
intelligence) using sensors to make first contact with threat
forces.
• Changes to the reconnaissance tempo during different events
based on mission timelines and anticipated threat
dispositions, compositions, and reactions.
• Dismounted and mounted operations to reflect reconnaissance
objectives, tempo, and engagement criteria.
• Positioning assets that provide redundant and mixed
coverage of named areas of interest (NAI) and other locations
to answer information requirements.
• Development or refinement of the fire support plan to support
the scheme of maneuver.
• Positioning of assets to acquire targets and execute assigned
fire support tasks.
• Integration of attached combat elements into the scheme of
maneuver.
• Communications requirements.
• Control measures to support the troop’s maneuver and reduce
the risk of fratricide.
• Integration of CSS assets to support mission accomplishment.
2-86. The commander completes his draft intent and concept of the
operation, and identifies his information requirements that will enable
him to complete his plan. He determines what information is required
and the latest time the information is of value. He forwards requests for
information (RFI) to his higher headquarters for answers. The higher
headquarters may direct its ongoing sensor and aerial reconnaissance to
answer the troop’s RFIs.
STEP 4 – INITIATE MOVEMENT
2-87. This step is normally done concurrently and repetitively with
other steps in the troop-leading procedures. The commander initiates any
movement that is necessary to continue preparations or to posture the
unit for the operation. This may include movement to a screen, an
assembly area, or an attack position; movement of task organized or
supporting elements (such as mortars or GSR); or movement to compute
time-distance factors for the unit’s mission.
2-20
STEP 5 – CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE

2-88. Reconnaissance allows the commander to refine and complete his
plan. The reconnaissance includes both the commander’s personal
reconnaissance and the results of ongoing external ISR operations. If
circumstances permit, subordinate leaders should accompany the
commander. This allows them to see as much of the terrain as possible. It
should also help each leader to visualize the tentative plan and any
related branch plans more clearly.
2-89. The reconnaissance may include movement to or beyond the line
of departure (LD) or a drive from the FEBA back to and through the
security zone along likely threat routes. If possible, the commander
should select a vantage point that provides the best possible view of the
troop AO.
2-90. The commander uses the results of external ISR operations to
augment his personal reconnaissance. These operations should answer
the commander’s information requirements (RFIs) submitted previously
to—
•
Make first contact with threat forces.
•
Confirm threat defensive positions and locate possible gaps in
the defense to support infiltration.
• Reconnoiter infiltration lanes to identify threat positions.
• Locate obstacles or barriers along lanes or routes.
• Identify threat forces positioned in the vicinity of
reconnaissance objectives or NAIs.
• The commander uses the results of his reconnaissance and
external reconnaissance to complete his plan.
STEP 6 – COMPLETE THE PLAN
2-91. The commander adjusts his scheme of maneuver based on ISR
results and conducts limited war gaming to complete his plan. He
assesses the impact of “on-order” and “be-prepared” missions. He then
prepares his OPORD for issue.
Conduct Limited War Gaming
2-92. The commander conducts limited war gaming against the feasible
threat COAs to complete his plan. He conducts threat action/reaction as
he determines how the troop accomplishes each task. The commander
considers actions during mission execution to the expected forms of
contact: visual, physical (direct fire), indirect fire, threat or unknown
obstacles, threat or unknown aircraft, NBC conditions, electronic
warfare, and nonhostile. As a minimum, the plan should address—
• Task and purpose to subordinate elements that support
mission accomplishment.
• Task organization changes and specific tasks that
attachments must conduct to support mission
accomplishment.
• How the troop will maneuver based on the reconnaissance
objective, terrain, and threat disposition.
• How the troop is cued and gains contact based on external
ISR operations.
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• If applicable, movement of the mortar section or other fire-

support assets to maximize and maintain fires forward of the
scouts.
• Primary and alternate responsibilities for target acquisition
and triggers to support essential fire support tasks or other
missions.
• Effect and purpose for each fire support/target acquisition
task.
• Graduated response in accordance with the ROE/ROI.
• Graphic control measures that facilitate control and
flexibility.
• Coordinating instructions.
• Combat service support activities to include casualty
evacuation, resupply, cache, and vehicle maintenance and
recovery.
• Communications plan to include methods to maintain
communications with higher headquarters and between
mounted and dismounted elements, and to integrate
supporting analog elements into the digital network.
2-93. After concluding the war-gaming process, the commander
completes the final refinement and writes the order.
Begin Bottom-up Refinement
2-94. This process includes developing refinements, additions, and
deletions to the higher headquarters plan and submitting them to the
appropriate member of the squadron/brigade staff. For example, if the
fire support plan allocates a smoke target to screen troop movement, the
commander may discover during war gaming that the target is not in a
correct position to support the troop. He would then coordinate a change
to the target list.
Finalize CSS Integration
2-95. With limited CSS assets available to the troop, the commander
may be required to submit requests for additional support or changes to
the higher headquarters CSS plan. This includes (but is not limited to)
the location of unit casualty and maintenance collection points, times
when troop assets will occupy them, routes to higher CSS sites, and
security procedures for CSS assets.
Finalize Graphics
2-96. If necessary, the commander adds troop graphics to the higher
headquarters overlay. (NOTE: One technique is to use a different color to
distinguish the troop’s operational graphics from existing higher
headquarters’ graphics.)
Prepare the OPORD
2-97. The troop commander finalizes his orders products. Examples of
these products include—
• The SITEMP.
• Supporting plans, including those covering higher ISR,
maneuver, fire support, and CSS.
• Operational graphics.
2-22
• Visualization products, such as maps, overlays, sketches,

models, and matrices.
2-98. The commander must decide how these products will be produced
and distributed to the troop’s subordinate elements. One technique is to
employ personnel from the troop CP and headquarters section in
production and distribution tasks, such as building terrain models and
copying graphics or matrices. The commander must also establish a
quality control system to ensure that all products are complete and
accurate.
2-99. Based on time constraints, the commander determines the order
format that best describes and presents the concept of the operation to
subordinate leaders. The commander may decide to use a five-paragraph,
matrix, or overlay format based on his unit’s SOP. The commander must
ensure that the order is not only clear and complete, but also as brief as
possible. Information covered adequately in WARNOs need not be
addressed within the OPORD.
STEP 7 – ISSUE THE ORDER
2-100. The OPORD should precisely explain, both verbally and visually,
the commander’s intent, providing enough information to ensure that all
subordinate elements work toward the desired end state. When the
commander has finished issuing the order, subordinate leaders should
walk away with a clear visualization of what he expects their element to
do.
Location and Time
2-101. The commander should select a location from which to issue the
OPORD that is secure and will help enhance understanding of the order.
An ideal site, when time and security factors allow, is one that overlooks
the AOs. If he must issue the order during limited visibility, he chooses a
location (such as inside the troop CP) that allows subordinates to see
visual materials clearly.
Presentation Techniques
2-102. During the orders briefing, the commander may make use of the
visual materials developed earlier to help paint the picture of how he sees
the fight unfolding. Subordinates will better comprehend complex ideas
and situations with the aid of a sketch, diagram, or model. The
commander should further ensure that subordinates keep their maps,
with graphics posted, on hand for reference. As noted, he may furnish
copies of the written order (or a summary of key details). He then must
present the plan clearly and logically, providing only updates (not
complete restatement) of items he has covered in earlier WARNOs.
2-103. Additionally, if the unit is FBCB2 capable, the order and graphics
can be sent to key leaders prior to the orders brief and allow subordinates
the ability to begin analyzing the mission and their specific tasks prior to
the order’s issue.
STEP 8 – SUPERVISE AND REFINE
2-104. The best plan may fail if it is not managed effectively and
efficiently. Throughout the troop-leading process, the commander must
continue to refine the plan, conduct coordination with adjacent units, and
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
supervise combat preparation and execution. Inspections and rehearsals

are critical elements of this step.
Combat Zone Training
2-105. During continuous combat operations, units at all levels should
have either formal or informal combat zone training programs to convert
new ideas into actual practice. This allows soldiers to practice a variety of
skills that will enhance their protection and endurance during extended
combat. For example, after receiving his mission, the troop commander
should assess the troop’s proficiency in the individual, leader, and
collective tasks required for the upcoming mission. If he feels the troop, or
a subordinate element, cannot perform a task properly, he can then
conduct precombat training during the planning and preparation phases.
Inspections
2-106. Inspections allow the commander to check the troop’s operational
readiness. The key goal is to ensure that soldiers and vehicles are fully
prepared to execute the upcoming mission. Inspections also contribute to
improved morale. The entire troop chain of command must know how to
conduct PCC and PCI in accordance with applicable unit SOPs and
guidelines from the troop mission training plan (MTP).
Additional Preparation Tasks
2-107. To assure himself of adequate time to focus on his own critical
troop-leading tasks, the troop commander must effectively delegate the
numerous preparation tasks that are part of the troop-leading process.
One technique is to use members of the troop headquarters to assist in
completion of these activities. Additional preparations delegated by the
commander may include, but are not limited to, the following tasks:
• Prepare or build rehearsal sites.
• Monitor subordinate unit rehearsals.
• Create visualization products such as sketches, strip maps,
and overlays.
• Copy analog orders, graphics, and matrices.
• Create digital products based on other materials (including
the SITEMP, orders, overlays, and reports).
• Record incoming information such as status reports,
WARNOs, and FRAGOs.
• Continuously refine the SITEMP using the latest intelligence.
• Distribute the updated SITEMP to all troop elements.
• Enforce the troop timeline.
• Receive standard reports from troop elements.
• Pass required reports to higher.
• Track unit battle preparations and logistical and
maintenance status.
Rehearsals
2-108. Rehearsals are practice sessions conducted to prepare units for an
upcoming operation or event. They are essential in ensuring thorough
preparation, coordination, and understanding of the commander’s plan
and intent. The value of rehearsals should never be underestimated.
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2-109. Types of Rehearsals. The following discussion covers the four

types of rehearsals that troops are most likely to conduct.
2-110. Confirmation brief. At the conclusion of the OPORD briefing, the
commander answers any questions, and then conducts a confirmation
brief using a terrain model, sketch, or map that provides accurate
representations of the terrain, the threat, and friendly graphics.
Subordinate leaders must demonstrate their understanding of the
commander’s intent, the troop’s concept of the operation, and their
specific tasks and relationship (purpose) to the troop’s concept. The
commander should avoid questioning subordinates specifically how they
will execute their tasks because they have not yet formulated their own
plans. Rather, he uses the confirmation brief to further clarify the scheme
of maneuver for them and to give them a feel for how they will work in
concert with one another to achieve the unit purpose.
2-111. Backbrief. As subordinate leaders conduct their troop-leading
procedures and develop their plans, the commander conducts backbriefs
to learn how his subordinates intend to accomplish their tasks.
Backbriefs should be conducted early in the subordinate’s troop-leading
procedures, generally after they have completed their tentative plans,
perhaps during the reconnaissance step. This provides subordinates an
opportunity to incorporate additional commander’s guidance into their
actions to complete their plan. Backbriefs enable the commander to—
• Clarify his intent or provide additional guidance.
• Identify problems in the concept of the operation.
• Identify problems in a subordinate commander’s concept.
2-112. Battle drill or SOP rehearsal. Battle drill or SOP rehearsals
ensure that all participants understand a technique or specific set of
procedures. They are used most extensively at platoon, squad, and section
levels. The rehearsals are interactive; participants maneuver their actual
vehicles or use vehicle models or simulations while verbalizing their
elements’ actions. The focus is on the how, allowing subordinates to
practice the required drill or SOP actions. Platoon rehearsals can be
nested within the troop combined arms rehearsal, with the commander
specifying in a WARNO the drills he wants rehearsed prior to the troop
rehearsal. The platoon leader can rehearse additional drills, and in some
cases an SOP may designate drills that are rehearsed for every type of
operation, such as a crew evacuation drill or actions at a danger area.
2-113. Combined arms rehearsal. The troop combined arms rehearsal is
normally conducted after the troop’s subordinate leaders have issued
their OPORDs. The rehearsal ensures that subordinate elements’ plans
are synchronized within the troop and all plans will achieve the troop
commander’s intent. As with battle drill rehearsals, the participants
perform their required tasks under conditions that are as close as
possible to those expected for the actual operation but within the
limitations of the technique used. For example, in a rehearsal, platoon
leaders should actually send spot reports (SPOTREP) when reporting
threat contact, rather than simply saying, “I would send a spot report
now.” The rehearsals also enable the commander to—
• Reinforce training and increase proficiency in critical tasks.
• Integrate the actions of subordinate elements.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
• Reveal weaknesses or problems in the plan, leading to further

refinement of the plan or development of additional branch
plans.
• Confirm coordination requirements between the troop and
adjacent units.
• Improve each soldier’s understanding of the concept of the
operation, the direct fire plan, anticipated contingencies, and
possible actions and reactions for various situations that may
arise during the operation.
2-114. Rehearsal Techniques. Rehearsal techniques are limited only by
the troop’s resourcefulness. There are six techniques used: full dress,
reduced force, terrain model, sketch map, map, and radio. As they are
listed, each successive technique requires a decreasing amount of time
and resources to prepare and conduct. Each technique has different
security risks. Rehearsal techniques include the following:
• Full dress rehearsal. These rehearsals involve every soldier
and system participating in the operation and ensure the
most detailed understanding of the mission. If possible, the
troop should conduct the rehearsal under the same
conditions—weather, time of day, terrain, use of live
ammunition—that it will encounter during the actual
operation. Full dress rehearsals will attract the attention of
the threat, and the troop must coordinate or develop
measures to protect the rehearsal from threat observation.
The rehearsal area must be secured, cleared, and maintained
throughout the process.
• Reduced-force rehearsal. These rehearsals involve the troop’s
key leaders, but the terrain requirements are the same as
those for a full dress rehearsal. The commander must decide
the level of leader involvement and the equipment
requirements. The selected leaders then execute the plan
while traversing the actual or similar terrain. An example of
a reduced-force rehearsal would be the target acquisition and
execution of BCT fires during an operation. Additional
considerations for this technique are:
A reduced-force rehearsal could be used to prepare for a
full dress rehearsal.
A key subordinate unit, such as a COLT platoon, could be
conducting a full dress rehearsal within the troop’s
reduced-force rehearsal.
The rehearsal area must be secured, cleared, and
maintained throughout the process.
• Terrain-model rehearsal. This rehearsal employs a scaled
terrain model to help troop leaders visualize the operation in
accordance with the commander’s intentions. The size of the
model may vary from leaders moving icons or micro armor on
a sand table to one that the participants walk or drive on. If
possible, the model should be on a vantage point, or on the
reverse slope, that overlooks the troop’s AO. The model’s
orientation should coincide with the AO. The participants
may execute the entire operation, or just selected phases,
events, or tasks within the operation.
2-26
• Sketch-map rehearsal. This rehearsal follows the same

procedures as the terrain model, but substitutes a sketch map
for the model. The sketch must be scaled to allow all
participants access or observation while subordinate unit
icons are moved simultaneously. If possible, the rehearsal
should be on a vantage point, or on the reverse slope, that
overlooks the troop’s AO. The map’s orientation should
coincide with the AO.
• Map rehearsal. This rehearsal follows the same procedures as
the terrain model, but substitutes the map of the troop’s AO
for the model. It is most effective for confirmation or
backbriefs involving subordinate leaders and/or portions of
their elements. The leader uses the map and overlay to guide
participants as they brief their role in the operation.
• Radio rehearsal. This rehearsal follows the same procedures
as a map rehearsal and involves the troop’s leaders
interactively and verbally executing key events or tasks of the
operation over established communications networks. The
commander establishes the sequence of events/task to be
rehearsed and the CP rehearses battle tracking. The
rehearsal must include all communications equipment
necessary to execute the rehearsed event or task.
2-115. Rehearsal Guidelines. The troop commander is responsible for
most aspects of the troop’s rehearsals. The commander will select the
tasks to be rehearsed and will control execution of the rehearsal. He will
usually designate someone to role-play the threat elements he expects to
face during the operation.
2-116. Conditions. Rehearsal situations should be as close as possible to
those expected during the actual operation. This includes the physical
aspects of the rehearsal site as well as such factors as light and weather
conditions.
2-117. Actions before the OPORD is issued. Initial WARNOs should
provide subordinate leaders with sufficient detail to allow them to
schedule and conduct rehearsals before the OPORD is issued. For
example, leaders can begin rehearsing mission-specific tasks, drills, and
SOPs for each element early in the troop-leading process. Rehearsals
after the OPORD can then focus on tasks that cover integration of the
entire team.
2-118. Progression of rehearsal activities. Rehearsals begin with soldier
and leader confirmation and backbriefs to ensure understanding of
individual and unit tasks. Individual elements and the troop as a whole
then use sand tables or sketches to talk through the execution of the
plan. This is followed by walk-through exercises and full-speed mounted
rehearsals.
2-119. Rehearsal priorities. The troop commander establishes a priority
of rehearsals based on the time available and the relative importance of
the actions to be rehearsed. As with COA development, the priority
should begin at the decisive point of the operation and move on to actions
that are less critical to the plan.
2-120. Refinement. At all times, the troop commander must ensure that
the troop has an accurate picture of the threat situation and that the plan
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
to defeat the threat is relevant to the threat’s current disposition. This

means that the troop plan must continue to evolve as the threat situation
develops.
2-121. As discussed previously, the troop will receive a constant stream
of additional information about the threat before the operation starts
through a combination of different levels of ISR operations. The
commander uses this information to continually adjust the plan as
necessary. Changes to the plan and the threat situation must be
disseminated down to the lowest level. Although these constant updates
may cause some disruption of troop-leading procedures at the platoon
level, the refinement process is critical to the success of the troop plan.
NOTE: Refinement of the plan does not stop when the troop crosses the LD. Once the
operation is under way, the commander continues to adjust the plan based on the
threat’s actions and the terrain on which the troop is operating. The commander
gains additional information through reports and the troop’s own development of
the situation. He uses FRAGOs to update the troop on refinements to the plan.
SECTION III – COMMUNICATIONS
2-122. Troop communications are an integrated system of doctrine,

procedures, organizational structures, personnel, equipment, and
facilities designed to—
• Collect, evaluate, and interpret the information needed to
develop situational awareness (the COP) in support of a
commander’s mission.
• Support a commander’s exercise of C2 across the range of
military operations through regulation of forces and functions
in accordance with commander’s intent.
2-123. The communications system allows the commander to plan,
execute, collect, control, exploit, disseminate, present, and protect
information using a resilient voice and data communications network to
enable effective C2 on the battlefield. Every reconnaissance vehicle in the
troop is equipped to support all aspects of operations: maneuver, fires,
logistics, force protection, information operations, and intelligence (see
Figures 2-3 and 2-4).
2-28
Figure 2-3. Recce Troop Communications Network
Figure 2-4. Brigade Reconnaissance Troop Communications Network
2-124. The troop operates and transmits or receives information on the

following external nets:
• Brigade/squadron intelligence net. This net is used primarily
to share threat and friendly information. All routine and
recurring reports are transmitted on this net.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
• Brigade/squadron command net. This net is used to pass C2

information from one commander to another.
• Administrative and logistics (A/L) net. This net is used for the
exchange of logistical information and unit status reports, as
required.
• Troop command net. This net is used to pass C2 information
as well as critical reports within the troop.
NOTE: The brigade’s SOP may designate a spare net as an ISR net specifically for the C2
of elements conducting ISR operations.
2-125. The troop commander and the CP normally monitor the

brigade/squadron command net and operate on the brigade/squadron
intelligence net and the troop command net. The 1SG normally operates
on the troop command net and the troop and squadron A/L nets.
2-126. Figures 2-3 and 2-4 also depict how the troop command net links
the troop commander with his subordinate units. The number of
operators on the net will vary with mission and task organization and
may include engineer reconnaissance, NBC reconnaissance elements, or
remote multisensor teams. Platoon leaders and platoon sergeants operate
on the troop command net and their own platoon nets. The FIST
elements operate on three radio nets:
• The troop command net.
• The troop fire direction net.
• The brigade/squadron fire support element digital/voice net.
2-127. If assigned, the FIST also monitors at least one of the following
nets:
• The brigade/squadron command net.
• The brigade/squadron intelligence net.
• The firing battery net (supporting artillery headquarters in
the heavy and light division).
2-128. Designated elements of the troop will monitor the command
and/or intelligence nets of adjacent units or other elements operating in
their AO to transmit information, coordinate operations, or conduct
reconnaissance handover directly. Those nets should be identified prior to
executing an operation and the frequencies included in the troop order
coordinating instructions. These units may include—
• Forward forces such as a divisional cavalry squadron.
• Adjacent reconnaissance troops.
• Follow on battalion or task force scouts.
• Battalions or task forces.
• Surveillance troop or MI Company and their subordinate
elements.
2-30
SECTION IV – DIGITIZATION
ARMY BATTLE COMMAND SYSTEM COMPONENTS

2-129. The Army battle command system (ABCS) is made up of the
Army tactical command and control system (ATCCS) subcomponents, the
FBCB2 system, and the tactical internet (TI). The ATCCS, including the
maneuver control system (MCS), all-source analysis system (ASAS),
AFATDS, forward area air defense command, control, communications,
and intelligence (FAADC3I) system, the combat service support control
system (CSSCS), and the global command and control system-Army
(GCCS-A) are the primary digital communication systems between
battalion/squadron and above CPs. FBCB2 is the primary digital system
for communication and transmission of situational awareness data
between leaders at brigade and below.
ARMY BATTLE COMMAND SYSTEM COMMUNICATIONS LINKS
2-130. While each component of the ABCS is a powerful C2 tool
individually, they reach their full potential when linked by a local area
network (LAN), a wide area network (WAN), or the TI.
LOCAL AREA NETWORK
2-131. A LAN network is a data communications network that
interconnects digital devices within a CP. A tactical LAN is configured to
interconnect various main CP shelters. Two or more computers linked by
software and connected by cable are considered a LAN. The unit S6 is
normally responsible for the LAN and ensuring that it is connected to the
WAN.
WIDE AREA NETWORK
2-132. A WAN connects several LANs and allows for the transmission of
large amounts of data over extended distances. Digital CPs use the WAN
to connect to higher, adjacent, and subordinate unit LANs using one of
the following types of communications systems:
• Mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) network.
• Global broadcast service.
• Near-term data radio (NTDR).
2-133. The LAN connects to the WAN at a gateway. The gateway is

located in a small extension node (SEN) or large extension node (LEN).
The brigade S6 and supporting signal troop are responsible for
connectivity to the SEN and WAN operations.
TACTICAL INTERNET
2-134. The TI consists of tactical radios (SINCGARS and EPLRS) linked
by routers, which allow digital systems to interoperate in a dynamic
battlefield environment. The purpose of the TI is to provide timely,
reliable, and secure battlespace information. The TI provides seamless
communications connectivity that is necessary to deliver situational
awareness and C2 data to digital battlefield systems. FBCB2
communicates with ATCCS systems via the TI. Two distinct subnetworks
comprise the TI: the lower TI and the upper TI.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Lower Tactical Internet

2-135. The lower TI provides for the digital communications for echelons
at brigade and below. It is composed of three primary components—
EPLRS, SINCGARS, and internet controller (INC) (see Figure 2-5). The
function of each component is the following:
• EPLRS provides data-only communication (vehicle position
information, network coordination, and data communication)
capability.
• SINCGARS provides data and voice communications
capability.
• INC is the internet controller that is built into the
SINCGARS radio mount. It provides routing interface
between EPLRS and SINCGARS. The INC controls
information traffic routing. EPLRSs are “servers” in the TI.
All systems are associated with a server in order to pass
digital traffic. Systems not equipped with EPLRS pass data
via the INC through SINCGARS to their EPLRS server. If the
server is degraded, the SINCGARS automatically searches for
a quality server and will jump servers if necessary. This is
invisible to the operator.
Figure 2-5. Lower Tactical Internet
Upper Tactical Internet

2-136. The upper TI (or WIN-T [Warfighter Information Network-
Terrestrial]) provides SA and C2 dissemination between
battalion/squadron and above CPs.
2-32
FORCE XXI BATTLE COMMAND BRIGADE AND BELOW

2-137. FBCB2 is the foundation system for ABCS and the TI. Mounted
on most of the combat vehicles in the BCT, each system is linked to a
PLGR and a SINCGARS or EPLRS. Each FBCB2 generates and
transmits its own position location. Collectively, the FBCB2 systems
generate the Blue SA picture. Operators utilize FBCB2 to generate threat
SPOTREPs, which create the majority of the red picture at the tactical
level. The messaging, reporting, and orders/graphics capabilities of the
system support battle command for each battlefield functional area.
2-138. FBCB2 receives data across the TI via the INC. The INC is a
tactical router built into the SINCGARS. The EPLRS data radio and the
SINCGARS data/voice radio transmit/receive digital information between
vehicles. This communication architecture is discussed in greater detail
in the TI paragraph of this section.
NOTE: The ATCCS discussed below has embedded battle command (EBC) software that
allows interface with FBCB2.
FBCB2 MESSAGE INTERFACE

2-139. FBCB2 (hardware) is at the individual vehicle level. EBC is
FBCB2 background software operating on ATCC systems. It enables
command posts to receive and display SA and C2 information from the
tactical level on any ATCC system. Figure 2-6 shows an example of the
ATCCS message interfaces.
Figure 2-6. ATCCS Message Interfaces
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
VARIABLE MESSAGE FORMATS AND FREE TEXT MESSAGES

2-140. FBCB2 has extensive variable message formats (VMF) as well as
the capability for creating free text (unformatted) messages. To the
maximum extent possible, operators should use the VMF messages in
order to minimize the volume of traffic on the tactical internet and to
interface with other systems in the ABCS in the most effective manner.
When a VMF message is transmitted, only the data in the filled-in fields
is sent. When a free-text message is transmitted, all the text is
transmitted, generally creating a greater transmission load.
2-141. Some VMF reports interface with other systems in the ABCS to
add to database information or to expand communications. For example,
a digital threat SPOTREP sends a text message to the addressees and
creates an icon of the threat in the situational awareness picture that is
transmitted across the brigade network. Additionally, the report
automatically enters into the intelligence database of the ASAS,
populating the intelligence database at brigade, the other subordinate
units in the brigade combat team, and division.
MESSAGE DISTRIBUTION
2-142. The database in FBCB2 contains the tactical internet addresses
of all FBCB2-equipped platforms and the CPs in the brigade, and some
select platforms at division level. Messages, orders, and overlays can be
sent to desired addressees by two methods—unicast and multicast.
Unicast Transmission
2-143. A unicast transmission is one sent to individual addressees on the
address list. Generally, unless orders, overlays, and logistical status
reports are short and carefully crafted, they will have to be transmitted
by unicast. While this may seem arduous and time-consuming, it is
considerably faster than manually copying overlays or reproducing
orders, then having personnel drive to the CP to pick them up.
Multicast Groups
2-144. Multicast groups are set groupings of addressees that are
established in the address database. The benefit of multicast groups is
that an operator can transmit a file to a group of people in a single action
rather than having to go through the process of sending it to each
individual. The message is not sent to all addressees at once, but to each
one sequentially.
2-145. An example of a multicast group is the squadron command group,
which includes the brigade commander, XO, S3, and brigade TAC CP.
There are a variety of multicast groups for each unit and battlefield
functional area, such as fire support or intelligence. Operators can create
or tailor multicast groups to fit their special requirements. For example,
the troop commander can create two multicast groups. The first might be
for key leaders and include the XO, 1SG, platoon leaders and platoon
sergeants, and the troop CP. The second might be for all platforms in the
troop. The troop 1SG could create a supply multicast group that would
include the platoon sergeants, the supply sergeant, the XO, and the
squadron S4. The squadron and troop SOPs should define the addressees
in the most common multicast groups.
2-34
2-146. FBCB2 has transmission settings that can be set for the number
of retries the system will automatically execute to get a message to a
platform that does not receive it the first time. This should be a standard
SOP setting across the troop. As a rule, the setting should be for a one-
time transmission with no retries to reduce the volume of traffic on the
tactical internet.
ORDERS
2-147. FBCB2 provides formats for the creation and transmission of
orders. The formats largely mirror the doctrinal five-paragraph order
format. Considerations in using these formats include the following:
• Each field has a limit on the number of characters that can be
input.
• FBCB2 does not currently have a print capability. Order
recipients will need time to take notes on the order when
received.
• FBCB2 can save an order to the system hard drive, but does
not currently have the capability to save a file to a disk.
• The larger the order, the longer it takes to transmit. Orders
larger than 576 bytes must be transmitted by unicast
addressing.
2-148. The commander’s goal should be to provide a complete order in
writing to his subordinates. As a minimum, he must provide critical
coordinating information. Subordinates should have this information
before the orders brief begins so they can study it beforehand and make
notes during the briefing. The ability to rapidly create and transmit
orders digitally is a tremendous capability, but it is still not as effective
as a face-to-face order brief and rehearsal. FBCB2 does, however, provide
an excellent WARNO and FRAGO capability. When an order has been
digitally transmitted to subordinates, accompany it with an FM radio call
to alert them to check FBCB2 for receipt and to acknowledge that they
have read and understand the order.
GRAPHICS AND OVERLAYS
2-149. The ability to create and transmit digital graphics, coupled with
automatic friendly force SA, is altering the traditional doctrinal
application of graphics. Simplicity is a principal consideration—less is
better since it reduces overlay transmission times and screen clutter
(having too many objects on the screen making the display hard to read
or illegible). A key point is maps are still required and still must have
graphics posted on them. Soldiers will find that a map is easier and more
appropriate to use when referencing a large terrain area, when moving,
and when fighting.
Object Size
2-150. Digital graphic object size is important in creating overlays. The
larger the overall size of an overlay, the longer it will take to transmit.
Considerations in determining the size of graphical objects include—
• A single character (letter or number) is eight bits; 100 bits
equals one byte.
• A single straight line, no matter how long, consists of two
points, equaling 30 bytes of information. Adding another
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
point (by clicking the mouse or touching the screen) increases

the size of the object by 7 bytes.
• A single point icon, such as an unlabelled target symbol, is 21
bytes. The label for an object can be up to 21 bytes. A target
symbol with a five-character alphanumeric designator equals
23 bytes.
• Message headers are 17 to 18 bytes; date-time group (DTG) is
4 bytes.
2-151. A single object can have no more than 50 points. A circle or oval
has a lot of points and is a large amount of information to transfer, no
matter how big it appears on the screen. On the other hand, a square or
rectangle is only four points, or about 80 bytes. Consequently, digital
units draw objective and position areas using squares instead of the
traditional goose egg graphics to reduce file sizes and the volume of
digital traffic on the TI and to speed transmission times.
Color-Coding
2-152. Current graphics doctrine defines what colors to use in depicting
certain activities or elements. For example, friendly graphics are always
in blue or black. But with the variety of colors available in digital
systems, greater clarity can be achieved by expanding beyond the current
doctrinal definitions. In a digital system, greater clarity and ease of use
can be achieved using multiple colors. For example, the BCT may portray
each subordinate battalion’s graphics in a different color and the graphics
for the squadron or BRT in another. The troop commander may elect to
use white for the first scout platoon and blue for the second. If attached,
COLT graphics could be in gray. Templated threat graphics might be in
purple while actual identified threat could be depicted in red. Whatever
color scheme is used, it must be standardized across the BCT.
Filter Settings
2-153. FBCB2 has different filter settings for the depiction of red and
blue elements in the situational awareness picture. The filter settings are
essentially based on time and serve as an indicator of how long an icon
has been in the same location. Operators set times at which an icon will
go stale, get old, and then be purged. An icon will begin to fade as it goes
stale, fade further at the old setting, and then be eliminated from the
display at the purge time. For all elements to have a common picture,
these filter settings must be the same on all platforms and be defined in
troop SOPs.
2-154. An example setting for blue SA is for the system to update every
50 meters of platform movement, for the icon to go stale after 20 minutes
of being stationary, become old after 6 hours, and then be purged at 18
hours. Obviously if the unit is going to be static for an extended period,
the settings should be for longer times.
2-155. Red SA settings should be based on the type of operation the
threat is executing. If they are attacking, the stale and purge settings
should be fairly short. This helps reduce having a false picture of the
threat and prompts personnel to update the threat SPOTREP frequently.
Table 2-2 shows a sample set of standard settings.
2-36
Table 2-2. Standard Settings
Mission Stale Old Purge

Counterreconnaissance 20 minutes 40 minutes 1 hour
Reconnaissance 1 hour 2 hours 4 hours
Threat Attack 10 minutes 20 minutes 1 hour
Threat Defense 1 hour 2 hours 4 hours
2-156. Settings that are too short will require constant regeneration of
SPOTREPs. If the settings are too long, the picture will become obsolete
and misleading unless the threat remains stationary. As the threat
transitions from offensive to defensive operations (or vice versa), a net
call should be made from squadron/brigade level to transition to the
appropriate standard SOP settings. Again, if all elements are to have a
common situational picture, everyone must apply standard SA filter
settings. In stability operations and support operations, the times may be
increased to maintain SA of factional activity over a longer period of time.
Creating Red Situational Awareness
2-157. The hardest and most critical aspect of creating the SA picture is
creating the picture of the threat. It starts with an observer identifying a
threat element, then creating and transmitting a digital SPOTREP. The
SPOTREP must be as accurate as possible in order for the intelligence
picture at troop and higher levels to be correct, and to achieve the
appropriate analysis and decisions. When transmitted, the text of the
report will be sent to all the platforms in the address group. It will also
create a red icon that will be displayed on all platforms in the brigade
network.
2-158. When the SPOTREP is transmitted, it should be addressed to a
multicast group that includes the squadron S2. This not only keeps him
informed but also automatically enters the report into the ASAS database
where it becomes part of the higher-echelon intelligence picture.
2-159. As the threat moves or his strength changes, the observer must
update the SPOTREP. A key point is that only the originator of the
SPOTREP or the S2 can delete an icon from the entire network. To
update the report, the observer deletes the original report, which will
delete the icon across the network, and then he generates a new
SPOTREP. Ideally, an observer maintains responsibility for keeping that
report and its associated icon updated and accurate until the threat is
eliminated or forced to move. In some situations, an observer will pass
observation and responsibility to another observer, a following scout
element for example. That handover should be made only after the new
element verifies it has the threat under observation. When that occurs,
the initial observer deletes his report and icon, and the new observer
initiates a new SPOTREP, assuming responsibility for observation and
reporting.
2-160. The S2 may delete icons from the network picture as he gets
redundant reports or new information that allows him to refine the
threat picture. He also can create a threat picture in ASAS, using all the
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
information sources available to him plus the FBCB2 reports. He can

send this ASAS picture to all FBCB2-equipped platforms.
2-161. This ASAS report will add to—not replace—the existing red SA
shown on FBCB2. This can create confusion and a false picture of the
threat situation. To prevent this, settings on FBCB2 for threat SA allow
an operator to select only the FBCB2 reported icons, only the ASAS-
transmitted picture, or both. At troop level and below, the best technique
is to use the FBCB2 SPOTREP setting, and occasionally switch on the
ASAS picture to check for additional information, and then turn the
ASAS picture off.
CHAT (CAVALRY SQUADRON RSTA)

2-162. CHAT (counterintelligence/human intelligence automated tool) is
a portable or vehicle-mounted computer system used by the HUMINT
collectors assigned throughout the squadron to report HUMINT
operations and maintain an operational database.
SECURITY
2-163. The information architecture on the battlefield contributes
significantly to the warfighting capabilities of units on the battlefield.
The digitized battlefield brings a new threat: computer network attack
(CNA). CNA includes operations the threat undertakes to disrupt, deny,
degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and networks. To
protect against CNA, security architecture is being developed that will
involve security technologies, such as firewalls, intrusion detection
systems, in-line network encryptors, and host security. The digital
security requirements are defined in AR 380-19 and the program
executive officer command, control, and communications systems
(PEOC3S) security policy.
SECTION V – TECHNIQUES OF TACTICAL CONTROL
2-164. This section addresses techniques and procedures for C2 of digital

(FBCB2) and analog units. As much as possible, the section focuses on
techniques that are not software-version specific, and is not limited to
only digital systems.
PLANNING PROCESS
2-165. FBCB2 provides significant enhancements to the troop planning
process. With digitization, minimal time is lost in mission planning and
preparation. The squadron commander and his staff can digitally issue a
warning order and draft operations overlay. With this information in
hand, the troop commander and his subordinate leaders may begin their
troop-leading procedures, rehearsals, and reconnaissance operations, as
required, or they may initiate movement from their assembly areas to
forward locations and develop the initial screen line. Upon receipt of the
OPORD, they can reorient their reconnaissance or surveillance as
required.
2-38
REPORTING PROCESS
2-166. Since reconnaissance and surveillance are stealthy operations,
digital communication will often be the primary method used for C2 and
reporting. However, sending digital reports when moving, when in
contact, and often at night is generally not possible.
2-167. Reporting procedures at the troop level must be well thought out
and addressed in the unit SOP. The troop commander must determine
when and what reports will be transmitted via voice or digital means and
under what conditions these reports will be rendered. For example, if
reports from the scouts must be transmitted via FM voice due to the
tactical situation, the troop commander must determine who at the troop
CP is responsible for the transcription and translation of this information
into FBCB2 format and further transmission to the squadron or BCT
tactical operations center (TOC).
2-168. The troop commander, XO, S6, and S2 must determine the
reporting process and procedures for troops using digital systems. Once
determined, the process and procedures must be integrated into the
overall troop SOP and orders.
FM VERSUS DIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS

2-169. The decision whether to use FM or FBCB2 communications is
based on the situation and SOP. Digital communications should not be
viewed as a replacement for FM; both are viable C2 tools. FBCB2
provides many benefits; however, in some circumstances, it is not the
right tool to use to communicate. An FM alert should accompany some
digital message traffic to prompt the recipient(s) to check their message
cues and act on the message.
2-170. The troop and above SOPs should define what traffic will be sent
digitally and what traffic will be transmitted on FM, and the conditions
for each. Orders should establish triggers for switching from digital to
FM communications as contact with the threat commences.
WHEN TO USE DIGITAL MESSAGES
2-171. At troop and platoon levels, digital message communications
should be used for—
• Transmitting graphics, orders, and when the situation
permits.
• Routine reporting, such as logistical status or routine
requests for logistical support.
• Threat SPOTREPs. This is critical since the SPOTREP is the
means by which a threat icon is created and displayed across
the brigade net. The observer of the threat may not always be
able to create the digital SPOTREP. In that case, he should
report by FM and some other platform in the platoon, or the
troop CP should create the digital report.
• Planned call-for-fire missions. The digital call-for-fire should
be accompanied by an FM alert to the fire support element at
the TOC or the supporting artillery to whom the message was
sent. This is discussed in greater detail in the fire support
section in Chapter 6.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
• NBC-1 reports. NBC-1 reports should be sent digitally to

create the contaminated area icon across the network. An FM
report on troop and brigade command nets should also be
transmitted.
WHEN TO USE FM RADIO

2-172. FM radio remains the primary communication means during
contact. It is quick for both the transmitter and receiver, multiple
stations can eavesdrop on the net and receive the information, and it is a
medium that can convey emotion—a critical aspect in assessing and
understanding a battlefield situation. At night, light discipline will
require most elements of the troop to use FM radio. As a result, the troop
CP must convert FM traffic into the appropriate digital reports. FM radio
is normally the primary means of communication in the following
situations:
• Contact reports should be initially sent on FM.
• Calls for fire on targets of opportunity should be sent by FM
in order to get timely fire support. This is particularly true for
moving targets. There are situations for planned targets or
when the observer is out of FM range but has digital
connectivity that calls for fire and subsequent adjustments
will be sent digitally.
• Urgent MEDEVAC requests should be initially transmitted
on FM. A follow-up digital report should be sent to provide an
accurate reference for the recipients.
TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Boundaries
2-173. Current doctrine establishes that boundaries are used to define a
unit’s AOs and to act as restrictive fire control measures to prevent
fratricide. With units conducting noncontiguous operations in expanded
battlespace and with the capabilities of automated SA and digital
systems, the manner in which boundaries are used is changing. Digital
units may use boundaries to convey the general operational concept and
to generally define a unit’s AO. For digital units, boundaries may not
always be drawn relative to identifiable terrain, often because it is easier
to create and transmit the overlays that way, and because SA allows for
easier tracking and visibility of friendly units. This works relatively well
at echelons above brigade, but at brigade and below, units can experience
problems when they try to clear and coordinate fires and positions. To the
maximum extent possible, keep boundaries along identifiable terrain for
the purpose of clearing fires and preventing fratricide. Remember that
there will be elements on the battlefield that do not have FBCB2 or
whose system is inoperative, forcing them to operate with traditional
analog graphics and FM radios only.
Phase Lines
2-174. Like boundaries, the use of phase lines (PL) is altered by digital
system capabilities. PLs are primarily used for coordinating the
movement of forces and for reporting locations. With automated SA, the
need for PLs is reduced. Digital units use fewer PLs, which eases
2-40
creation/transmission of overlays and reduces screen clutter. Again,

consideration must be given to C2 of units that do not have FBCB2. If the
BCT or squadron includes PLs in its graphics, the troop should include
those in its overlays to ensure they are known and can be referenced if
required during the course of operations. The troop commander should
consider using additional PLs only if it will assist in controlling the unit
or if he has subordinate elements without FBCB2.
Terrain Index Reference System/Grid Index Reference System
2-175. The terrain index reference system (TIRS) is a numbered
reference point drawn relative to identifiable terrain. Graphically, it is
usually a cross with a number. Some units may use TIRS in lieu of most
other graphics. This works well in digital units, since TIRS overlays are
easily created and transmitted, and screen clutter is minimized. FRAGOs
can be given quickly and easily with great clarity using TIRS.
Additionally, TIRS can function as a fire support overlay if it is created
with that in mind, again reducing screen clutter and the number of
overlays that must be created and transmitted. The system is somewhat
limited in utility when working over very large areas or in complex and
urban terrain.
2-176. The grid index reference system (GIRS) is shown by a tick mark
located on a grid line intersection. Each point is given a designator of one
letter and two numbers, such as X56, placed in the upper right quadrant
of the tick mark. GIRS point designation is SOP, and units determine
which letters they will use. They may designate specific letters for
specific unit sectors or AOs.
2-177. The higher headquarters normally issues the TIRS/GIRS to use
for the operation as early as possible, perhaps with the WARNO. The
TIRS/GIRS list should be issued to elements as an annex to a written
OPORD.
2-178. The unit should designate four to six TIRS/GIRS points in each
10-kilometer square. The TIRS/GIRS is normally sufficient for the troop
to operate; however, if the troop designates additional TIRS/GIRS, it
should always ensure only brigade/squadron TIRS/GIRS are referenced in
its communications with higher headquarters.
2-179. TIRS/GIRS are used routinely to control combat operations. Use
them—
• To identify BPs and to pass out control measures (such as
LDs, PLs, and boundaries) quickly.
• To report friendly unit locations.
2-180. Passing control measures (such as BPs, sector boundaries, and

PLs) are quick and accurate using TIRS.
Fratricide
2-181. FBCB2 significantly contributes to fratricide reduction by
allowing all platforms to have visibility of FBCB2-equipped forces in their
network. Vehicle commanders can check their displays quickly to see if
friendly forces are operating in an area as they prepare to execute direct
or indirect fires. There are, however, some limitations to the system that
operators must take into consideration.
2-41
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
2-182. First, not all systems will be equipped with FBCB2 or have
operational systems. Also, elements operating outside the squadron’s
communication architecture will not be visible on FBCB2. When leaders
know there are elements without FBCB2 or with inoperable FBCB2 in
the area, they should alert their soldiers to that situation. For example,
the troop might be executing a rearward passage of lines when some of
the unit’s FBCB2 or associated radios become inoperative. In this
situation, troop leaders should alert the unit in the area that they are
passing through and that some platforms are not able to transmit SA
data. They should identify where they are and what route they are
returning on. This information should then be distributed to the
appropriate elements in the unit being passed through.
2-183. Second, there is no dismounted system for FBCB2. This is critical
for the troop when its dismounted observers are out, particularly as units
begin calling for artillery fire. Fire support elements may check digital
displays and see no blue icons in the target area, and be unaware that
dismounted soldiers are operating in the area. FBCB2’s SA display may
be used for denying fires, but not for clearing fires. FBCB2 can speed the
clearance of fires by quickly identifying if there are FBCB2-equipped
elements in the target area. If a blue icon is in a target area, obviously
artillery should not be fired there. The absence of a blue icon should not
be the basis for assuming the area is free of friendly forces. Dismounted
elements, elements without operational FBCB2, or elements that are not
part of the squadron network could be present.
2-184. Third, depending on the blue SA filter setting, an operator may
not have all blue units displayed. For example, if the filter setting is for
display of only armor and infantry elements, the operator will not have
visibility on all other blue assets such as artillery, air defense, and CSS
vehicles. The same is true for the echelon filter setting. If only company
and higher echelons are selected, the operator will not have visibility on
the majority of the systems on the battlefield.
2-185. Fourth, the nature of tactics and capabilities is constantly
evolving, with an increase in maneuvering forces and the use of rapidly
emplaced obstacles. These changes can increase the chances of obstacle
fratricide. FBCB2 can help reduce these chances if CPs keep obstacle
overlays current and rapidly disseminate changes, and if operators keep
current, critical overlays posted on their systems. Transmission of
updated overlays should be accompanied by net-wide FM alerts to ensure
system operators know new obstacle information has been disseminated
and they are to display the new overlay(s).
2-186. Finally, the increase in maneuvering forces, the increased
forward presence and maneuvering of artillery units, and the decrease in
control graphics being employed can lead to fratricide incidents. To avoid
such incidents, operators must utilize their FBCB2 to track friendly
elements and conduct the essential FM cross-talk to clear fires and
maintain their FBCB2 SA.
2-42
Chapter 3
Reconnaissance Operations
For the recce troop and the BRT, reconnaissance operations obtain
information by visual observation (surveillance), tactical questioning,
or other detection methods related to—
• The activities and resources of a threat.

• The meteorology, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of
a particular area.
• The infrastructure and social aspects of an area.
Reconnaissance is a
focused collection CONTENTS
effort performed prior Fundamentals ..................................................... 3-2
to, in advance of, and Fundamentals of Reconnaissance ................ 3-2
Fundamentals of Reconnaissance
during military Operational Environment............................ 3-6
operations to provide Fundamentals of Reconnaissance Focus..... 3-7
the commander with Reconnaissance Planning ................................. 3-11
information he can Planning Considerations................................ 3-11
Additional Reconnaissance Planning
use to confirm or Considerations ............................................ 3-13
modify his plan or Actions on Contact............................................. 3-15
concept of operations Forms of Contact ............................................ 3-16
and to make decisions. Steps for Actions on Contact......................... 3-17
Reconnaissance Handover................................ 3-21
Reconnaissance focus Considerations of Reconnaissance
is clearly tied to CCIR, Handover...................................................... 3-21
targeting, and Examples of Reconnaissance Handover ...... 3-23
relevant information Tactical Employment Considerations
and Methods.................................................... 3-26
requirements. The Reconnaissance Methods .............................. 3-26
reconnaissance troop Infiltration ........................................................ 3-28
is the squadron/ Exfiltration ....................................................... 3-33
brigade commander’s Tactical Movement .......................................... 3-35
Zone Reconnaissance........................................ 3-38
principal reconnais- Critical Tasks................................................... 3-38
sance organization. Example of Zone Reconnaissance ................ 3-39
Rarely will the troop Area Reconnaissance ........................................ 3-43
fight for information. Critical Tasks................................................... 3-44
Example of Area Reconnaissance................. 3-44
The troop primarily Route Reconnaissance ...................................... 3-49
conducts reconnais- Critical Tasks................................................... 3-50
sance, using surveil- Example of Route Reconnaissance............... 3-50
lance, technical
means, and human interaction to gain information. The troop
performs area, zone, and route reconnaissance in addition to other
responsibilities such as target acquisition and battle damage
assessment.
3-1
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
The purpose of this chapter is to—
• Describe reconnaissance fundamentals and actions on contact.

• Describe the characteristics of reconnaissance planning, to
include surveillance considerations.
• Describe the troop’s three reconnaissance missions.
• Describe reconnaissance handover.
The reconnaissance troop is the higher headquarters commanders

most valuable and effective reconnaissance asset. The troop
commander has an increased number of ISR assets supporting his
reconnaissance operations. The troop and its higher headquarters
employ the reconnaissance fundamentals and incorporate the concepts
of cueing, mixing, integration, and redundancy to capitalize on the
strengths of one asset while mitigating the weaknesses of another.
Satellite tracking systems, UAVs, intelligence sensors, and
reconnaissance troops all contribute to the integrated and
synchronized ISR effort. However, the best reconnaissance asset
remains individual scouts. They provide detailed reconnaissance and
are not as vulnerable to threat deception techniques. Scouts can
assess changes in the environment, allowing them to adapt and
execute within the commander’s intent.
The troop’s ability to assess the situation in its AO, and its link to the
analysis assets at its higher headquarters, helps the troop anticipate
events within the BCT’s area of operations.
SECTION I – FUNDAMENTALS
FUNDAMENTALS OF RECONNAISSANCE
3-1. Successful reconnaissance operations are planned and performed
with the following seven fundamentals in mind:
• Orient on the reconnaissance objective.
• Ensure continuous reconnaissance.
• Maximize reconnaissance assets.
• Gain and maintain contact.
• Develop the situation.
• Report all information rapidly and accurately.
• Retain freedom of maneuver.
ORIENT ON THE RECONNAISSANCE OBJECTIVE

3-2. Due to the BCT’s expanded battlespace, the troop’s
reconnaissance efforts must be focused to avoid becoming overextended.
The reconnaissance objective focuses the troop’s efforts on a critical area
3-2
___________________________________________________Chapter 3 – Reconnaissance Operations
or priority intelligence requirements (PIR). During the IPB process, the

BCT commander and battle staff identify the intelligence requirements to
identify or determine information concerning the threat, society,
infrastructure, or terrain. The commander develops his reconnaissance
guidance that provides the focus, tempo, and engagement criteria for
reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) operations. Based on METT-TC,
the reconnaissance focus may be oriented on threat forces, terrain,
infrastructure, or society. The commander then identifies his
reconnaissance objective based on the related concepts of reconnaissance
pull and push, his reconnaissance focus, and his PIR.
3-3. Reconnaissance pull is used when the threat situation is not well
known and/or is rapidly changing. This is normally during higher’s
planning and preparation phase for the decisive operations. ISR
operations confirm threat courses of action and identify routes that are
suitable for maneuver for either side, where the threat is strong or weak,
where gaps exist, or when multidimensional aspects exist, such as the
needs of society that will influence operations. It may be initiated at any
echelon and is the basis of all ISR operations. Reconnaissance pull
answers initial PIR to enable selection of a scheme of maneuver or course
of action development, thus pulling the BCT to the path of least
resistance, and facilitates initiative and agility in the execution of the
decisive operation.
3-4. Reconnaissance push is used once the commander is committed to
a scheme of maneuver or course of action. ISR operations refine the COP
to enable the BCT to finalize the plan and support shaping and decisive
operations.
ENSURE CONTINUOUS RECONNAISSANCE
3-5. The BCT conducts ISR operations before, during, and after all
operations. The troop is integral in the BCT ISR operations, but is limited
in its ability to conduct sustained and continuous reconnaissance. The
troop will continually be tied to the BCT’s ISR operations through
FBCB2, but may not be actively supporting that ISR operation based on
logistical, tactical, or command-related decisions.
3-6. Before a decisive or shaping operation, ISR operations provide
reconnaissance pull by answering information requirements identified
during IPB, and facilitate selection of a scheme of maneuver or course of
action. During the execution of the decisive operation, ISR operations
provide reconnaissance push by collecting updated information on threat
compositions, dispositions, and intentions as the battle progresses. This
allows the BCT commander to execute decision points tied to his CCIR
and make other decisions based on the actual events within his AO.
During transition operations following the decisive operation, ISR
operations maintain contact with the threat to allow the BCT to locally
exploit success or initiate planning for a subsequent operation.
3-7. The troop commander must consider the troop’s ability to conduct
sustained ISR operations through the width and depth of the BCT AO
and span the duration of the BCT’s operation. The commander may
rotate platoons to maintain continuous coverage by having a follow-on
platoon assume the reconnaissance mission of a lead platoon at a later
time.
3-3
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
MAXIMIZE RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS

3-8. Maximizing reconnaissance is applying the right reconnaissance
asset to the reconnaissance objective, providing redundancy when
necessary, and maintaining contact throughout the depth and width of an
AO.
3-9. The BCT integrates a wide range of ISR assets to maintain its
COP, to include joint surveillance target attack radar surveillance
(JSTARS)/U2 (imagery), signal intelligence, UAVs, ground sensors, and
ground scouts. All systems are complementary and assist the
reconnaissance troop in gaining contact under the most favorable
conditions. UAVs extend the BCT’s “eyes” throughout the depth of the
AO, while ground sensors increase the range and duration of ISR
operations. The troop is most capable of reconnoitering complex terrain;
and they provide the critical human factors of adaptation, action/reaction,
and initiative when developing the situation or interacting with the local
populace. The integration of systems and personnel and their
synchronized efforts compensate for individual weaknesses. In most
cases, the entire troop will be required to operate along and through the
depth of a linear battlespace; however, in a noncontiguous environment,
the troop may have to orient in several directions.
3-10. The troop commander—based on his commander’s reconnaissance
guidance, intent, information requirements, and specified tasks and time
available—determines the method of employing his assets. Based on
METT-TC, he can phase or echelon his assets using cueing and higher
surveillance assets to pull his reconnaissance forces into the area or zone,
or he may decide that the environment is permissive enough or time is
too short to allow echelonment of reconnaissance.
GAIN AND MAINTAIN CONTACT
3-11. Contact is critical to collecting information. Contact should be
gained through sensors to provide scouts maximum standoff range and
limit their exposure to threat acquisition systems. The BCT’s primary
concern is handing over the responsibility of maintaining contact to or
between follow-on ground forces. These procedures must be clearly
articulated in the BCT SOP or ISR order. The troop should gain contact
using the scouts’ long-range acquisition capability, or through hand-over
from higher ISR assets. Once contact is established, surveillance of the
threat force is not broken unless reconnaissance handover occurs, higher
headquarters orders such an action, or the break is IAW higher’s OPORD
and commander’s intent. The BCT, squadron, and troop use the following
concepts to plan gaining and maintaining contact.
3-12. Cueing involves the use of one or more sensor systems to provide
data that directs collection by other systems. For example, a PROPHET
or GSR reveals activities that trigger direct collection by a more accurate
system such as a UAV. The UAV imagery assists the troop in gaining
contact under the most favorable conditions.
3-13. Mix involves complementary coverage by a combination of assets
from multiple disciplines. Sensor mix increases the probability of
collection, reduces the risk of successful threat deception, facilitates
cueing, and provides more complete reporting. For example, UAV
thermal imagery indicates several vehicle-like signatures in an NAI. A
3-4
scout team observing the same location observes that half the signatures
are decoys and the remaining are threat armored vehicles.
3-14. Redundancy involves the application of several identical assets to
cover the same NAI or target. Redundant tasking enables mission
accomplishment when the probability for success by one asset is low. For
example, the troop may infiltrate several scout teams along different
routes to separate OPs overlooking the same NAI, or two COLTs may
observe the same target group to acquire a high pay-off target (HPT).
3-15. Integration involves managing resources during ISR operations to
avoid under-tasking collection systems. At times, collection capabilities
may exceed current taskings. Units should constantly reevaluate each
collection asset for unused capabilities and assign or redirect unused
assets/capacities towards the most important unfulfilled requirements.
For example, the troop commander assigns a scout platoon a series of
NAIs to observe after it has been relieved from its current surveillance by
a battalion scout platoon.
DEVELOP THE SITUATION
3-16. During ISR operations, it is important to gain situational
understanding as soon as possible to provide the BCT commander the
information and intelligence required to effectively maneuver the BCT.
How this is accomplished depends on METT-TC. The BCT develops the
situation by—
• Gaining contact through sensors and other ISR assets.
• Developing the situation out of contact.
• Maneuvering the force out of contact.
• Making contact on its own terms.
• Reevaluating and continuing to develop the situation as
necessary.
3-17. The troop commander quickly gathers as much information as
possible, either visually, or more likely, through reports from the
platoon(s) in contact. Troops must be prepared to alter their plans and
react to changes in the battlefield environment in support of the higher
commander’s intent. They may be required to adjust execution as the
COP becomes more refined and IR and PIR are answered. For example,
the scouts may need time to maneuver or relocate to better observe an
NAI or to determine the exact size, composition, disposition, and activity
of a threat force. Of greater importance is the rapid transmission of
information to the troop, squadron, or BCT CP. Creating the COP
through digital or FM SPOTREPs is critical to providing a common,
accurate picture for focusing combat power against the threat.
REPORT ALL INFORMATION RAPIDLY AND ACCURATELY
3-18. BCT commander bases his planning and tactical decisions on the
battlefield information obtained through the troop’s reconnaissance
efforts and BCT ISR operations. Intelligence loses its relevance as it ages.
The troop must accurately report what it observes in a timely manner.
Digitization promotes the accuracy of the intelligence information
gathered as well as the timeliness with which it can be sent. Using
FBCB2 and FM, the troop can transmit this vital combat information in
real time. If the observer is unable to use an FBCB2 formatted report or
3-5
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
free-text message, such as at night or during contact, he uses FM to

report to the troop commander or CP, who ensures that the report is
forwarded using FBCB2.
RETAIN FREEDOM OF MANEUVER
3-19. The ability to maneuver is essential to reconnaissance. The troop
primarily conducts reconnaissance dismounted or from lightly armored
vehicles and are not capable of surviving protracted engagements with an
threat force. The troop must not become decisively engaged; otherwise
their survivability and ability to maneuver to execute their
reconnaissance missions are at risk. Mixing and cueing ISR assets
minimize chance contact. With the precision movement capability offered
by FBCB2 and GPS, the recce troop can maximize the use of cover and
concealed routes based on their pre-mission analysis of the terrain and
threat location/disposition updates.
FUNDAMENTALS OF RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

3-20. The troop conducts reconnaissance against threat forces, which
assists the BCT commander’s SU of the operational environment (OE).
Rather than just a military focus on the threat, its capabilities, and the
terrain, the troop must be prepared to account for the threat’s multiple
dimensions—political, cultural, economic, and demographic. The troop is
a component of a multilayered approach to reconnaissance by fusing ISR
assets, creating a synergistic network in gaining information within this
complex environment. This multidimensional approach to reconnaissance
means that the BCT must develop an understanding of not just what is
happening, but why. In the OE, identifying threat centers of gravity,
decisive points, and the means to influence the threat’s will and behavior
is one of the most important contributions the troop can make to the
BCT’s success. In order for the troop to successfully contribute, the
commander, and subordinate leaders must understand the effect of the
OE on reconnaissance operations.
3-21. The Army will not always face conventional forces in open areas.
The information age has brought upon the Army the specter of adaptive
warfare—a strategy in which a weaker opponent successfully engages a
stronger opponent by using a variety of offsets for gaining advantage in
hopes of achieving its objectives and goals. The adaptive threats include
regional military forces, paramilitary forces, guerrillas and insurgents,
terrorists, criminal groups, and certain civilian groups and individuals.
Threat adaptive approaches involve information operations, WMD,
hugging complex (mainly urban) terrain, civilian involvement, and
evasive attacks against US forces. The troop must be ready to concentrate
on both the traditional approach to reconnaissance of gathering
information on threat forces and terrain and the adaptive aspects of an
OE that impact military operations.
3-22. In the broader mission of providing information for SU of the OE,
the higher headquarters must direct ISR operations on a myriad of
dimensions—demographics, political, social, cultural, economic,
infrastructures, open terrain, and complex terrain—as well as military
factors. This multidimensional reconnaissance approach expands on the
traditional focus of reconnaissance by concentrating on additional
asymmetric threats, urban environment, society, infrastructure, and
3-6
other aspects that can influence military operations. Multidimensional

reconnaissance is not a mission; it is an expansion of the focus of
reconnaissance as well as the fusion of ISR assets that will direct
information collection for the purpose of fulfilling BCT IR. There are a
myriad of ISR assets that may be working in conjunction with the troop
in this multidimensional approach to reconnaissance.
3-23. Additionally, the urban environment confronts commanders with
a combination of difficulties rarely found in other environments. The
distinct characteristics of the urban environment are primarily a function
of the following factors:
• The increasing size and global prevalence of urban areas.
• The combinations of manmade features and supporting
infrastructure superimposed on the existing natural terrain.
• The density of civilians in close proximity to combat forces.
3-24. Of these, the third factor and the human dimension it represents
is potentially the most important and perplexing for commanders to
understand and evaluate. The urban environment consists of urban
terrain and urban society. An urban environment is not only defined by
its structures or systems but by the people who compose it. Although
complex, understanding the urban terrain is relatively straightforward in
comparison to comprehending the multifaceted nature of urban society.
Military operations often require Army forces to operate in close
proximity to a high density of civilians, and their presence, attitudes,
actions, and needs affect the conduct of operations. As urban areas
increase in size, they become less and less homogenous; therefore,
commanders must understand and account for the characteristics of a
diverse population whose beliefs may vary based on many factors. The
behavior of civilian populations within an urban area is dynamic and
poses a special challenge to commanders conducting military operations.
FUNDAMENTALS OF RECONNAISSANCE FOCUS

3-25. Based on the OE, reconnaissance is focused on more than just the
threat and terrain. The focus depends on what the higher headquarters
needs to concentrate its information gathering. It allows the commander
to determine his reconnaissance objective and select which critical tasks
must be accomplished with what asset(s). Focus enables more detailed,
comprehensive ISR operations and enhances the BCT’s ability to fully
understand its environment. Focusing reconnaissance within the
multiple dimensions of ISR operations is paramount to understanding the
OE. Reconnaissance focus must be linked to answering the higher
headquarters CCIR, supporting targeting (lethal and nonlethal), and
filling additional voids in relevant information. The focus of
reconnaissance is characterized in these broad terms: threat, society,
infrastructure, and terrain.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
THREAT
3-26. The BCT no longer faces a single, monolithic, or well-defined
threat. Reconnaissance units must be able to conduct operations across
the range of military operations (i.e., MTW, SSCs, stability operations,
and support operations) against threats ranging in size from major
regional powers to asymmetric threats. Because of the diversity of the
threat, IPB becomes even more important at the brigade, squadron, and
troop levels. Adversaries may use a variety of doctrine, tactics, and
equipment. The following are examples of threat dimensions of
reconnaissance focus on an AO:
• Conventional threat forces.
• Paramilitary forces.
• Guerrillas, insurgents, or partisans.
• Terrorists or criminal organizations.
• Command and control elements.
• Lines and channels of belligerent authority, or sources of
influence.
SOCIETY (SOCIAL/HUMAN DEMOGRAPHICS)

3-27. The focus of reconnaissance may be the society of a given area.
Gaining an awareness of how the society impacts military operations and
how military operations impact the local society may be critical to the
commander in order for him and his staff to make decisions. To gain
and/or retain the support of the population, commanders must first
understand the complex nature and character of the society. Second, they
must understand and accept that every military action (or inaction) may
influence, positively or negatively, the relationship between the urban
population and Army forces, and by extension, mission success. Without
the support of the society or understanding its needs, the society may
become a threat to military operations. With this awareness,
commanders can plan operations, implement programs, and/or take
immediate action to maintain support of a friendly populace, or
neutralize or gain the support of hostile or neutral factions.
Understanding how operations affect the society (and vice versa)
normally begins with gaining information on the size, location, and
composition of the society.
3-28. The BCT must be aware of the demographics in its AO.
Conventional and unconventional threat forces are still a part of
understanding the civilian demographics; understanding how threat
operations affect the society (and vice versa) will have an impact on
military operations. The higher headquarters leadership must be familiar
with the factional leaders, such as mayors, police chiefs, and local
military commanders. These relationships are critical across the full
spectrum of operations. The BCT must understand the different cultural
and economic backgrounds of the people it encounters and the needs of
the local populace. Refugee situations are a part of the demographic
makeup of an environment. Understanding the full dimension of
demographic framework of a society is the basis of the characteristics of
an environment and determines much of the reconnaissance
objectives/focus.
3-8
3-29. Elements of a society may itself be a threat to the BCT. A mob

demonstrating against US military presence could impact military
operations and consequently be a specific focus for reconnaissance.
Refugees clogging routes the BCT requires for operations may pose a
threat. A focus may then be to identify these groups (and the leaders of
these groups) to allow the BCT to use lethal or nonlethal effects to solve
the problem. The following are examples of social/human dimensions of
reconnaissance focus on an AO:
• Population demographics: Race, sex, age, religion, language,
national origin, tribe, clan, class, party affiliation, education,
or any significant social grouping.
• Government.
• Factional leaders.
Mayors.
Local police chief.
Local political leaders.
Local military commanders.
Local religious leaders.
• Nongovernmental organizations.
• Economy.
• Media.
Organizations.
Reporters.
Publications.
Broadcasts.
INFRASTRUCTURE
3-30. The infrastructure consists of those systems that support the
inhabitants and their economy and government. Destroying, controlling,
or protecting vital parts of the infrastructure can isolate the threat from
potential sources of support. Because these systems are inextricably
linked, destroying or disrupting any portion of the urban infrastructure
can have a cascading effect on the other elements of the infrastructure.
3-31. To successfully operate in an area, the BCT must understand the
local infrastructure, to include utilities, transportation, and food
availability. It includes the financial infrastructure, to include the
monetary base of the different communities, the income demographics,
and the black-market trade. The BCT must also understand the local
community, political, and governmental structure that identifies who can
support BCT CSS requirements. This includes religious, military, and
paramilitary, such as local security and police forces that work
independently from one another. The leadership must develop a general
understanding of these organizations—how they fit into the community
at large and how they relate to one another. A reconnaissance mission
focused on infrastructure might look at these dimensions:
• Communications. Wireless, telegraphs, radios, television,
computers, newspapers, magazines, etc.
• Transportation and distribution. Highways and railways (to
include bridges, tunnels, ferries, and fords); cableways and
tramways; ports, harbors, and inland waterways; airports,
3-9
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
seaplane stations, and heliports; mass transit; and the

trucking companies and delivery services that facilitate the
movement of supplies, equipment, and people.
• Energy. Systems that provide the power to run the urban
area, including the industries that produce, store, and
distribute electricity, coal, oil, and natural gas. This area also
encompasses alternate energy sources such as nuclear, solar,
hydroelectric, and geothermal.
• Commerce. Includes business and financial centers (stores,
shops, restaurants, marketplaces, banks, trading centers, and
business offices) and outlying industrial/agricultural features
(strip malls, farms, food storage centers, and mills) as well as
environmentally sensitive areas (mineral extraction areas
and chemical/biological facilities).
• Human services. Includes hospitals, water supply systems,
waste and hazardous material storage and processing,
emergency services (police, fire, rescue, and emergency
medical services), and governmental services (embassies,
diplomatic organizations, and management of vital records,
welfare systems, and the judicial system). The loss of any of
these often has an immediate, destabilizing, and life-
threatening impact on the inhabitants.
TERRAIN
3-32. A terrain-focused reconnaissance provides the information
requirements that a map or computer-assisted analysis cannot answer.
Terrain-focused reconnaissance evaluates the military aspects of the
terrain (observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles,
key terrain, and avenues of approach, [OCOKA]) and includes the effects
of weather. Although doctrine traditionally focuses on the identification
of bypasses around urban terrain, the nature of asymmetric warfare
entails threat elements exploiting urban terrain to gain an advantage
over US forces. The BCT must become familiar with the aspects of
complex and urban terrain and its impact on a stability, support, and
SSC environment. In a stability, support, or SSC environment, key
terrain may be a religious or cultural monument, or a historic
geographical boundary or town.
3-33. Urban areas include some of the world’s most difficult terrain in
which to conduct military operations. Urban areas vary immensely
depending on their history, the cultures of their inhabitants, their
economic development, the local climate, available building materials,
and many other factors. This variety exists not only among different
urban areas but also within any particular area. Urban areas present an
extraordinary blend of horizontal, vertical, interior, exterior, and
subterranean forms superimposed upon the landscape’s natural relief,
drainage, and vegetation. Troop leaders must become familiar with urban
terrain characteristics discussed in FM 3-06 (FM 90-10).
3-10
SECTION II – RECONNAISSANCE PLANNING
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
3-34. The commander
has specific consid- COMMANDER’S RECONNAISSANCE
GUIDANCE
erations while conducting
troop-leading procedures • Focus of the reconnaissance:
in planning reconnais- − Threat.
sance missions. Critical to − Society/human demographics.
the troop commander’s
− Terrain (bridges, routes, defensible
ability to execute his terrain/threat vs. threat).
mission is to clearly
− Infrastructure (political situation,
understand his higher facilities, food distribution).
commander’s reconnais- • Tempo of the reconnaissance:
sance guidance, including, − Stealthy or forceful.
as a minimum, the focus,
tempo, and engagement
− Deliberate or rapid.
criteria. The commander’s − Aggressive or discreet.
reconnaissance guidance • Engagement criteria (if any):
answers the three basic − What are the ROE?
questions the troop − What is a troop fight?
commander needs to know − What weapon system is used to
to plan his mission and engage what target type?
provide guidance to his − What are the nonlethal (HUMINT)
platoons. The higher engagement criteria?
commander normally
issues his reconnaissance
guidance during mission analysis, but it may be issued earlier if
necessary. He may also include the reconnaissance objective and the key
tasks that must be accomplished to achieve that objective. It may be
presented in a WARNO that enables the troop commander to initiate
troop-leading procedures prior to receipt of the squadron order or the
mounted BCT ISR order.
3-35. The elements of reconnaissance guidance (focus, tempo, and
engagement criteria) are interrelated. From the established focus, the
commander is able to set the appropriate tempo. The tempo links the
required reconnaissance tasks to the mission time constraints to
determine the techniques and tempo of reconnaissance. Engagement
criteria are linked to the focus and tempo by clarifying how the troop
develops actions on contact. Given the focus and tempo, the engagement
criteria provides the instructions on what the unit is expected to fight and
what it is expected to hand over to a supporting or follow-on unit.
3-36. The focus of the reconnaissance allows the commander to identify
and prioritize mission-related tasks. He can identify his specified,
implied, and essential tasks and the information requirements that are
most important to squadron and brigade operations. Focus is further
defined as providing relevant information on specific terrain, threat
forces, social factors, or infrastructure within a specified AO.
3-37. The tempo of the reconnaissance allows the commander to
determine tactical employment to include methods and techniques within
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
the associated time constraints, as related to the focus of reconnaissance.

The commander describes the tempo by answering the following
questions (see Figure 3-1):
• Is the reconnaissance deliberate or rapid (how detailed or
complete and how many tasks are to be accomplished)?
• Is the reconnaissance stealthy or forceful (what is the level of
covertness)?
• Is the reconnaissance aggressive or discreet (will the unit
fight for information and what is the potential for
engagement)?
• Deliberate operations are slow, detailed, and broad-based.
They require the accomplishment of numerous tasks.
Significant time must be allocated to conduct a deliberate
reconnaissance.
• Rapid operations are fast-paced with focus on key pieces of
information. This type of operation entails a smaller number
of tasks. It describes reconnaissance operations that must be
performed in a time-constrained environment.
• Stealthy operations are conducted to minimize chance contact
and prevent the reconnaissance force from being detected.
They are often conducted dismounted and require increased
allocation of time for success.
• Forceful operations are conducted without significant concern
about being observed. They are often conducted mounted or
by combat units serving in a reconnaissance role. It is also
appropriate in a stability or support operation where the
threat is not significant in relationship to the requirement for
information.
• Aggressive operations have very permissive engagement
criteria and allow the reconnaissance commander to engage
in combat in order to meet his information requirements.
• Discreet operations have very restrictive engagement criteria,
and restrain the reconnaissance forces from initiating combat
to gain information.
Figure 3-1. Tempo of Reconnaissance
3-12
3-38. The engagement criteria establish what the troop is allowed to

engage and what they are expected to hand over to their higher
headquarters or follow-on or supporting forces. Conversely, by
understanding what the higher commander will allow the troop to engage
during reconnaissance, coupled with his understanding of the threat’s
feasible courses of action, he is able to develop the platoon’s engagement
criteria. Additionally it allows the commander to develop his bypass
criteria and plan how to maintain contact with bypassed threat elements.
This enables the platoon leader to plan for the engagement of the
specified threat if encountered.
NOTES: The BRT commander’s involvement in ISR planning is: BCT ISR planning must
be accomplished quickly and efficiently so that its ISR elements have sufficient
time to conduct troop-leading procedures and execute operations in support of the
BCT’s decisive operation. Because of time constraints and the necessity to deploy
reconnaissance (and surveillance) forces as early as possible, planning for
reconnaissance must occur parallel with the higher headquarters decision-
making process and ultimately support the higher headquarters decision-making
process.
The BRT troop commander, based on unit SOPs and commander’s guidance, may
participate in planning for BCT ISR operations. The troop commander’s or troop
XO’s involvement in the planning at the BCT level can facilitate some of the
parallel planning at troop level and assist in identifying limitations, facilitate
integration of GSR, UAVs, signal intelligence (SIGINT), task force R&S assets,
and reconnaissance assets into a specific concept of operations for the BCT ISR
operation.
The troop commander is not a staff officer, but a commander. He should not lose
focus of his responsibilities as a troop commander, but must assist the BCT staff
in planning, integrating, and supporting ISR operations, when necessary.
ADDITIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

ANALYSIS OF THE MISSION
3-39. When the troop receives an R&S mission, the assigned AO is
identified inside a solid, continuous boundary (see Figure 3-2). Phase
lines may also be used to identify the troop’s operational area (see
Figure 3-3). The troop may have unit boundaries that also identify its
operational area in a multidimensional reconnaissance mission (see
Figure 3-4). This provides the initial focus (terrain) and allows the
commander to begin analysis of the mission.
3-13
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Figure 3-2. Troop Figure 3-3. Troop Figure 3-4. Troop

Reconnaissance Defined by Reconnaissance Defined by Reconnaissance Defined by
One Continuous Boundary; Phase Line; Platoon Defined Boundary; Platoon Defined by
Platoon Defined by by Phase Line NAI
Boundaries
3-40. In planning a reconnaissance mission, the troop commander must

consider the following:
• Time available from mission receipt to completion.
• Threat size, composition, and disposition.
• Terrain and weather effects on the troop’s maneuver.
• Task organization or attachments/detachments.
• Critical tasks to be accomplished IAW the collection plan.
• Operational tempo (OPTEMPO) (how long surveillance must
be maintained).
• Troop personnel and equipment strengths and weaknesses.
3-41. Based on the considerations above, the troop commander develops

his reconnaissance guidance as he analyzes the mission and may issue
his reconnaissance guidance to subordinate leaders (by issuing a
WARNO) to assist their troop-leading procedures. He addresses the three
components of reconnaissance guidance as part of his concept of
operations. The troop commander also determines the following:
• How critical tasks must be accomplished within the
constraints of time, terrain, and threat.
• Higher headquarters requirements for information.
• Specified or implied tasks associated with the end state.
DEVELOPMENT OF A TENTATIVE PLAN

3-42. The commander makes a tentative plan describing how the troop
will conduct reconnaissance, maintain surveillance, and accomplish its
assigned tasks. The tentative plan must incorporate the concepts of
cueing, mixing, integration, and redundancy at both the higher
headquarters and troop levels. The troop may be augmented by
supporting or attached elements. These elements or assets may be
3-14
retained under troop control, or they may be attached to a platoon for

their use in the execution of the platoon’s specified tasks.
3-43. The commander considers the factors of METT-TC while
developing the tentative plan to conduct and sustain R&S operations. The
commander must also consider the following while developing his
tentative plan:
• Tactical employment and movement techniques IAW tempo.
• How to use effects to support maneuver.
• How attachments will be integrated into the troop’s mission.
• Primary and alternate routes to NAIs or reconnaissance
objective(s).
• Probable line of contact (LC) or probable point(s) of contact
(POC).
• Infiltration start point (SP)/LD locations.
• Actions on contact/discovery.
• Subordinate unit specified tasks.
• Reconnaissance handover, to include:
Handover between the troop and its higher headquarters
or follow-on forces.
Handover between subordinate elements within the troop.
• Communications plan (architecture and required support).
SECTION III – ACTIONS ON CONTACT
3-44. There are two types of contact the unit can expect and prepare
for—known and chance. Known contact entails information and
intelligence on known locations or positions of threat forces enabling
ground reconnaissance units to gain contact under the most
advantageous conditions. When there is no intelligence about the threat’s
location, ground reconnaissance or maneuver elements make chance
contact, forcing deployment on ground of the threat’s choosing. The BCT
uses its ISR assets, to include its reconnaissance troop(s), to limit chance
contact during operations, develop the situation for the BCT, and in effect
pull the combat forces to the decisive point of the commander’s choosing.
3-15
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
FORMS OF CONTACT
3-45. Both known and chance contact EIGHT FORMS OF
during reconnaissance and security CONTACT
operations occurs when the troop
encounters any situation that requires an Visual
active or passive response to the threat. Direct fire
Contact is described in terms of the threat Indirect fire
Obstacles
or friendly forces gaining contact through Aircraft
eight forms of contact. These situations NBC
may entail one or more of the following Electronic
forms of contact: Nonhostile
• Visual contact (friendly elements may or may not be observed

by the threat).
• Physical contact (direct fire) with a threat force.
• Indirect fire contact.
• Contact with threat obstacles or ones of unknown origin.
• Contact with threat or unknown aircraft.
• Situations involving NBC conditions.
• Situations involving electronic warfare (EW) tactics.
Examples of electronic contact include:
GSR or IREMBASS.
SIGINT.
Radios jammed by threat force.
• Nonhostile (civilians or other events that may affect the
mission). Examples of nonhostile contact include:
Refugee traffic on assigned routes.
Peaceful demonstrations in assigned NAIs.
Local or US media contact.
Disruption of electrical power or other vital services in
AO.
Local government services (i.e., police, fire, postal)
suspended.
3-46. Leaders at echelons from platoon through BCT conduct actions on
contact when they or a subordinate element recognizes one of the forms of
contact or receives a report of threat contact. Ideally, the unit will acquire
the threat (visual contact) before being sighted by the threat; then it can
continue with visual contact or initiate indirect contact or physical
contact on its own terms by executing the designated COA. It is also
essential for the troop commander to understand the higher commander’s
intent of the reconnaissance to recommend COAs for the
brigade/squadron to react to the threat contact. The troop may conduct
actions on contact in response to a variety of circumstances, including the
following:
• Subordinate platoon(s)/section(s) conducting actions on
contact.
• Reports from the squadron or BCT.
• Reports from GSR/IREMBASS (surveillance troop or BCT MI
Company).
3-16
• Reports from SIGINT/PROPHET (surveillance troop or BCT

MI Company).
• Reports from UAV (surveillance troop or BCT MI Company).
• Reports from or actions of an adjacent unit.
STEPS FOR ACTIONS ON CONTACT

3-47. Actions on contact are not intended to generate a rigid response
to the threat. Rather, they provide an orderly framework that enables the
troop and its subordinate elements to plan for and survive the initial
contact, then apply sound troop-leading and timely actions to develop the
situation.
3-48. Troop commanders and platoon leaders analyze the threat
throughout the troop-leading process to identify all likely contact
situations that may occur during an operation. Intelligence reports from
higher help to clarify the threat’s COAs and likelihood of contact.
Through the planning and rehearsals conducted during troop-leading
procedures, leaders develop and refine the scheme of maneuver that
includes actions on contact for known and chance threat contact. The
commander needs to consider how the likelihood of contact will affect his
choice of movement techniques and formations. In doing this, he can
begin preparing the unit for actions on contact; he may outline
procedures for the transition to more secure movement techniques before
a contact situation. For example, the commander identifies a threat
dismounted OP along its axis of advance, he incorporates indirect fires
into his scheme of maneuver to defeat the outpost. During operations
when the troop’s platoon makes contact with five threat dismounts, the
commander can quickly assess that this is the anticipated contact and
direct the troop to execute his plan. On the other hand, unexpected
contact with a well-concealed threat force may require time to develop the
situation at platoon and team levels. Known contact actions entail seven
steps:
• Make contact through sensors and other ISR assets.
• Develop and evaluate the situation out of contact.
• Maneuver the force out of contact (choose how, with what,
and where to make contact).
• Deploy and report (make contact on your own terms).
• Reevaluate and continue to develop the situation, if
necessary.
• Choose and/or recommend a COA.
• Execute the selected COA.
3-49. Chance contact actions entail four steps similar to the last four
from known contact actions:
• Deploy and report.
• Evaluate and develop the situation, as necessary.
• Choose and/or recommend a COA.
• Execute the selected COA.
3-17
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
3-50. Commanders must understand that properly executed actions on

contact require time at both platoon and troop levels. To fully develop the
situation, a platoon or team may have to execute extensive lateral
movement, dismount and remount scout squads, and/or call for and
adjust indirect fires. Each of these activities requires time. The
commander must balance the time required for subordinate elements to
conduct actions on contact with the need of the higher unit to maintain
tempo and momentum. In terms of slowing the tempo of an operation,
however, the loss of a platoon or team is normally much more costly than
the additional time required to allow the subordinate element to properly
develop the situation.
MAKE CONTACT THROUGH SENSORS AND OTHER ISR ASSETS
3-51. There will be information and intelligence on the threat in the
troop AO. The troop should receive contact information from its higher
headquarters, which has access through reach-back capabilities to
JSTARS, SOF, intelligence operations, satellite imagery, Guardrail, and
other ISR assets. The higher headquarters may augment theses cues
with its sensor assets to make its initial contact. It may direct ground
reconnaissance from this or provide direct support of or attachment of
sensor assets (e.g., UAV, GSR, IREMBASS, or PROPHET) to the troop
for it to make initial contact. The troop receives this contact information
and updates through FBCB2 or radio reports.
DEVELOP THE SITUATION OUT OF CONTACT
3-52. The troop, or its higher headquarters, maintains sensor contact
as it evaluates the situation out of visual contact. The troop or higher
headquarters must decide whether the current information gained
answers information requirements, or if another type of sensor is
required to confirm, deny, or develop more detailed information about
potential threat COAs. For example, a GSR contact of vehicle movement
within an NAI may require a UAV reconnaissance at a subsequent NAI
to confirm vehicle types. The UAV may be used to further develop the
situation by targeting the force for indirect fires, to include precision
munitions. The troop or its higher headquarters determines if ground
visual contact with this threat element is required to further develop the
situation, or pass the contact to other ISR assets or follow-on elements.
MANEUVER THE FORCE OUT OF CONTACT
3-53. Based on METT-TC and the current plan, the troop must decide
how it will gain contact with the threat element under the most
advantageous conditions. Depending on the situation and available
resources, the troop commander decides how he will make contact, which
subordinate element will make visual contact, and how he will maintain
contact until ordered to break contact or until handover can occur. He
must consider employing overlapping assets to effectively make contact
and minimize risk. He also determines where to make contact based on
terrain and the threat’s probable COAs. The commander decides if direct
fire or indirect fire is warranted under the ROE and engagement criteria.
During operations, the commander may have to adjust his scheme of
maneuver to enable ground contact to be made under the most favorable
conditions for the troop and its subordinate elements.
3-18
DEPLOY AND REPORT

3-54. Against known contact the designated troop element deploys and
gains visual contact using an appropriate technique based on METT-TC.
The commander may coordinate supporting lethal or nonlethal fires to
assist the element as necessary. For chance contact, subordinate
elements deploy, using an appropriate immediate action battle drill.
Battle drills are established through SOPs and IAW the OPORD and
must be trained and rehearsed prior to the operation. Once deployed and
visual contact is gained, the subordinate element reports using FBCB2 or
FM. The troop forwards the initial contact and SPOTREPs to its higher
headquarters IAW its SOP. Information provided must focus on the
information requirements of the higher headquarters and, as a minimum,
should address:
• The size of the threat element.
• The location, composition, activity, and orientation of the
threat force.
• Threat weapon systems, especially antiarmor capabilities,
and special equipment such as body armor or night-vision
devices.
• The impact of obstacles and terrain.
REEVALUATE AND DEVELOP THE SITUATION

3-55. As the troop commander receives the initial reports from the
observing element(s), he reevaluates (known contact) or evaluates
(chance contact) the situation and, as necessary, continues to maneuver
to develop it. The commander gathers as much information as possible
from the elements in contact, visually confirming if possible or applicable.
He analyzes the information to determine its relation to the higher
commander’s CCIR and its impact on operations, to include:
• Threat capabilities.
• Probable threat intentions.
• How to gain positional advantage over the threat (from the
troop’s and the BCT’s perspective).
• The friendly situation (location, strength, and capabilities).
• Possible friendly COAs to achieve the specified end state.
3-56. After evaluating the situation, the commander may determine

that he cannot answer the required information requirements to support
the higher commander’s decisions, or identify the threat’s impact on
current or future operations. To answer these information requirements,
he must further develop the situation in accordance with the higher
commander’s intent, using one or any combination of the following
techniques:
• Surveillance, using binoculars and other optical aids,
employing recce scout squads/teams in a recon patrol.
• Mounted and/or dismounted maneuver, to include lateral
maneuver, to gain additional information by viewing the
threat from another perspective.
• Supporting lethal and/or nonlethal fires.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
• Reconnaissance-by-fire when augmented or with permissive

engagement criteria.
3-57. The troop uses follow-up SPOTREPs IAW its SOP to answer the
information requirements and enable the higher headquarters to
maintain SU and its COP.
RECOMMEND/CHOOSE A COA
3-58. After developing the situation to answer the information
requirements, the troop commander determines how best to continue the
mission IAW the higher commander’s intent and his order. He may direct
the troop to continue the mission based on the original scheme of
maneuver and tasks to subordinate units, or he may have to revise his
plan, select a new COA, and issue a FRAGO. If the COA meets the higher
commander’s intent and is within his troop’s capabilities, he selects the
COA and informs the commander prior to execution, if possible. If his
COA is within the troop’s capabilities, but deviates from the higher
commander’s intent, then he backbriefs the COA to his commander for
approval. If he is unable to continue the mission with his available assets,
he requests additional instructions or assistance from his commander.
3-59. The commander has several options in continuing his mission, to
include:
• Leave a subordinate element to maintain contact with the
threat element, and continue reconnaissance of the AO with
the rest of the troop.
• Conduct reconnaissance handover with another element, and
continue reconnaissance of the AO.
• Break contact, using fire and movement if necessary, and
continue the mission.
• Continue to develop the situation, reorganizing as necessary,
and continue reconnaissance to gather additional information
about the threat contact.
• Establish a screen while maintaining contact with the threat
force.
• Conduct a security drill to withdraw while maintaining
contact.
• Take no action; continue reconnaissance within the AO.
EXECUTE THE SELECTED COA

3-60. The troop transitions to maneuver to execute the COA. It then
continues to maneuver throughout execution, either as part of a tactical
task or to advance while in contact to reach the point on the battlefield
from which it executes its tactical task. As execution continues, more
information will become available to the troop commander. Based on the
emerging details of the threat situation, he may have to alter his COA
during execution. For example, as the troop maneuvers with mortar and
field artillery to destroy a target acquisition radar hidden in a barn, it
discovers a motorized infantry platoon in prepared positions in and
around the farmhouse. The commander must analyze and develop the
new situation. He then selects and recommends an alternate COA to the
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higher unit, such as establishing a surveillance position to support an

infantry company team’s maneuver against the newly discovered threat
force.
SECTION IV – RECONNAISSANCE HANDOVER
3-61. Reconnaissance handover is the action that occurs between two

elements to coordinate and transfer responsibility for observation
(reconnaissance and/or surveillance) of threat contact, or the transfer of
an assigned area from one element to another.
3-62. Reconnaissance handover is similar to battle handover in that it
may be conducted in conjunction with other tasks such as relief in place,
linkup, or passage of lines. Unlike battle handover, however, it does not
imply the assumption of a fight or being within direct fire range. Instead,
it focuses on planning for, preparing, and executing the passing of
information, threat contact, or an assigned area and the related
responsibility for it from one element to another.
3-63. This task provides the information connection, overlapping
communications, and commander’s reconnaissance focus (commander’s
focus may differ for each echelon) required when planning and executing
layered ISR operations with multiple assets. Reconnaissance handover is
normally associated with a designated handover coordination point to
facilitate ground link-up or a phase line designated as the reconnaissance
handover line (RHOL). It may be the handover of an AO, NAI, TAI,
and/or threat contact. Reconnaissance handover can be visual, electronic,
digital, analog, or any combination of these.
CONSIDERATIONS OF RECONNAISSANCE HANDOVER

3-64. ISR operations must be integrated with higher, lower, and
adjacent units to provide a coordinated and integrated effort. Planning
for these operations includes coordinating reconnaissance handover from
Army Force (ARFOR)/division to brigade, brigade to squadron or troop,
squadron to troop, squadron or troop to follow-on battalions, and between
subordinate elements of the troop to the lowest level. This includes
coordination between adjacent units/elements.
PLAN
3-65. Responsibility for the coordination of reconnaissance handover
normally occurs from higher to lower units. Planning for reconnaissance
handover may take place before an operation, or it may be conducted
during operations as part of a change of mission. The troop commander
integrates directed handovers by his higher headquarters into his scheme
of maneuver. Using the control measures and criteria specified by his
higher headquarters, the commander must designate who is responsible
for accepting handover from an external element, and how handover will
be transferred to other elements. He must also determine when and
where to conduct handover between elements within the troop. If
necessary, the commander develops additional control measures and
criteria for reconnaissance handover within the troop. Pertinent control
measures are then added to aid in C2.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
PREPARE
3-66. The troop commences coordination as reconnaissance handover
requirements between units are identified. The commander may find
handover criteria in the remarks block of the higher headquarters ISR
order. Coordination includes establishment of a communications plan
between the units as necessary. The communications plan includes radio
frequencies, net identifications (ID), EPLRS needlines, host files required
to conduct the linkup (if units are from different maneuver control
systems), and communications security (COMSEC) variables for
communications. Recognition signals are established or confirmed to
prevent friendly troops from exchanging fires.
3-67. The troop exchanges IR requirements to understand how it may
answer or support the adjacent or follow-on unit’s IR. For example, this
will allow the BRT to understand the follow-on battalion’s IR needs while
remaining focused on the brigade’s requirements. This understanding
may lead to the transfer of vital information collected by the troop to the
battalion during critical moments, such as identifying a security element
along the battalion’s axis of advance that is not a brigade PIR.
3-68. If necessary, the troop coordinates indirect fires and fire support
coordination measures (FSCM), critical friendly zones (CFZ), preplanned
targets, final protective fires, and smoke missions. This includes any
criterion for preplanned or high pay-off target handover.
3-69. Coordination is conducted to identify the transfer and/or
acceptance of C2 of elements between units as necessary. An example is
for the troop to leave a scout section in contact with a threat security
element, while the rest of the troop continues reconnaissance farther into
the AO. As the BCT shifts the hand-off between the troop/squadron and
the follow-on battalion, the follow-on battalion may accept C2 of the
troop’s scout section until one of its scout sections is able to relieve the
troop’s section from observing the threat element. Additionally, the
higher headquarters may have on-order missions to other ISR assets to
assist handover between the troop and other elements. An example of
this is a UAV tasked to establish and maintain contact with a moving
force while reconnaissance handover of the force is being conducted from
troop to a follow-on battalion. As reconnaissance handover becomes
imminent and final coordination begins, the UAV supports the
reconnaissance handover. This level of coordination will allow the UAV
maximum time on station, ensuring redundant observation during
handover.
3-70. Rehearsals are of paramount importance before executing any
plan. During rehearsals, reconnaissance handover coordination is
confirmed and practiced to ensure clarity and understanding.
EXECUTE
3-71. The troop may conduct reconnaissance handover with follow-on or
security (stationary) forces, accept reconnaissance handover from a
forward force, or command and control the handover between subordinate
elements.
3-72. When executing reconnaissance handover, liaison with a unit
may consist of collocating the units’ commanders, XOs, or CPs, if
applicable. The follow-on battalion may attach a scout section to the troop
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to facilitate C2 and handover. Every effort should be made to establish a

face-to-face liaison. If a face-to-face linkup is not possible, establish a
reliable digital and/or voice linkup to exchange critical information. As
the distance closes between the forces, the requirement to maintain
liaison and exchange information increases.
3-73. If face-to-face linkup is made, final coordination is completed and
information is exchanged. Confirmation is made to ensure reconnaissance
handover is complete as per specified criteria. If a target is being handed
over, the criteria should require the accepting unit to acquire the target
before handover is complete. The unit conducting reconnaissance
handover may then be required to support the unit accepting the
reconnaissance handover by executing the responsibilities of the
stationary unit while conducting a forward passage of lines or relief in
place. If follow-on forces are conducting an attack, the unit conducting
the reconnaissance handover may facilitate the follow-on force’s attack by
conducting reconnaissance pull and by executing targeting, to include
previously coordinated indirect fires.
EXAMPLES OF RECONNAISSANCE HANDOVER
NOTE. Although the following example depicts a recce troop from the cavalry squadron
(RSTA) assigned to an SBCT, the same basic techniques apply to a BRT assigned to
a mounted BCT.
3-74. During operations, JSTARS identifies threat forces moving into

the SBCT’s AO and preparing to cross the RHOL previously established
forward of the SBCT (see Figure 3-5). As the threat approaches the
RHOL, the SBCT’s higher headquarters initiates reconnaissance
handover to the SBCT, which in this case the squadron coordinates as the
controlling headquarters for SBCT ISR operations. The squadron directs
the surveillance troop to use sensors to gain contact with the threat forces
forward of the RHOL, and have a UAV to gain contact along the RHOL
and assist a ground troop in gaining visual contact. The troop is directed
to gain contact within its AO. The surveillance troop directs a GSR team
operating within the troop’s AO to shift from its current NAI to another
and establish contact with the advancing threat force forward of the
RHOL. The UAV platoon is directed to establish contact with the threat
force as it crosses the RHOL. It is determined from initial reports that
the threat will advance into an infantry battalion’s AO and an
intelligence summary (INTSUM) is disseminated throughout the SBCT,
and a WARNO is issued to the designated infantry battalion to prepare to
accept handover of the threat force from the troop at the
squadron/battalion RHOL.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Figure 3-5. Reconnaissance Handover
3-75. The GSR team remains oriented on the NAI, forwarding reports
that the surveillance troop uses to direct the UAV to the appropriate NAI.
The troop ensures that its scout teams are positioned to gain and
maintain contact with the threat force throughout its AO. After the
scouts gain contact, the troop accepts handover from the surveillance
troop using digital and electronic means. Upon confirmation that the
troop has accepted handover, the surveillance troop redirects the GSR
and UAV, as required or directed. The troop establishes or confirms
communications with the infantry battalion. The troop may consider
collocating its CP with the infantry battalion’s TAC CP to further
facilitate reconnaissance handover. The SBCT directs the battalion to
attack and destroy the threat force, and the battalion’s reconnaissance
platoon moves to a designated RHO checkpoint to coordinate with the
platoon in contact (see Figure 3-6). The squadron remains oriented on the
brigade ISR mission, but supports the attacking battalion by directing
fires against the threat force in support of SBCT shaping operations for
the attack.
3-24
Figure 3-6. Reconnaissance Handover (continued)
3-76. The battalion and troop reconnaissance platoon leaders

coordinate transfer of contact, and the battalion platoon positions to gain
contact with threat force. After the battalion reconnaissance platoon
establishes contact with the threat force, they focus their efforts to
answer the battalion commander’s CCIR and to support targeting (see
Figure 3-7). Both the troop and the battalion reconnaissance platoon
report to their higher headquarters when the criteria for handover
between the troop and the battalion have been met. The squadron
facilitates command and control of the reconnaissance handover, and
provides additional information necessary to allow the attacking
battalion the ability to attack at its own time and place(s) of choosing.
When the troop confirms the battalion’s acceptance of reconnaissance
handover, it breaks contact with the threat force and continues its
mission as directed. As the attack occurs, squadron ISR assets continue
to support the battalion, reporting threat retrograde actions and/or
approaching reinforcements.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Figure 3-7. Reconnaissance Handover (continued)
SECTION V – TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS AND METHODS
RECONNAISSANCE METHODS
3-77. There are four reconnaissance methods: sensor, aerial, mounted,
and dismounted. The troop’s higher headquarters should use a
combination of all methods in employing the reconnaissance
fundamentals, providing depth and redundancy throughout the AO. The
troop conducts mounted and dismounted reconnaissance. The troop
commander may use a single method or a combination of methods to
accomplish the reconnaissance mission based on the factors of METT-TC,
the reconnaissance guidance (focus, tempo, engagement criteria), and the
higher commander’s intent. Though maneuver during a reconnaissance
operation may be primarily mounted, dismounted activities are required
to achieve stealth and security. Stealth is paramount in most
reconnaissance operations. Mounted and dismounted surveillance may be
used simultaneously, providing flexibility and capitalizing on the
strengths of both methods. Effective reconnaissance relies on proper
employment of mounted or dismounted reconnaissance, discipline, long-
range acquisition, and maximum use of cover, concealment, and
camouflage for stealth to avoid detection.
SENSOR RECONNAISSANCE
3-78. Sensor reconnaissance allows flexibility to economize
reconnaissance assets. Sensors can be used to cover areas where contact
may not be expected, but likely, or used for surveillance of areas that
need to be covered over extended periods. Sensors may be employed as
the “cue” for aerial, dismounted, and/or mounted reconnaissance. They
3-26
provide redundancy when assets are pushed forward to facilitate ground

reconnaissance or extend surveillance distance between ground
reconnaissance and the threat. Some sensor elements such as PROPHET
may operate under higher headquarters control within the troop’s AO,
while other elements such as GSR or IREMBASS may be attached to the
troop to facilitate ground reconnaissance.
3-79. The higher headquarters may direct sensor reconnaissance to—
• Conduct missions in a large AO.
• Surveil a flank (assume risk).
• Conduct missions of an extended duration.
• Conduct NBC reconnaissance for WMD or contaminated
areas.
• Trigger (cue) a more thorough ground or aerial
reconnaissance.
• Trigger reachback (PROPHET triggers gaining more
information from Guardrail).
AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE (UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE)

3-80. Aerial reconnaissance provides a flexible, low-risk means of
conducting reconnaissance to gain basic information in the least amount
of time. Aerial reconnaissance may be used as a link between sensor and
mounted or dismounted reconnaissance. Sensor operations cue a
combination of aerial and dismounted/mounted methods. Normally aerial
assets are controlled by its parent organization or higher headquarters;
however, a troop may receive operational control (OPCON) of a UAV to
facilitate air-ground coordination. This is done to support close
reconnaissance with the threat, to ensure scout survivability, and to
facilitate target acquisition.
3-81. Complex terrain, adverse weather, and threat
deception/countermeasures can degrade the UAV’s effectiveness. The
troop may find the UAV ground control station (GCS) operating forward
in its AO to facilitate reconnaissance in complex terrain or to maximize
the UAV’s operational range. Whenever a GCS operates within a troop’s
AO, both its parent organization and the troop commander must be
aware of joint security and logistics/support requirements.
3-82. The higher headquarters may direct aerial reconnaissance
when—
• Time is extremely limited or information is required quickly.
• Detailed reconnaissance is not required.
• Objective is at an extended range.
• Verification of a target is needed.
• Threat locations are known and extremely dangerous (high
risk) to ground assets.
• Threat locations are vague, but identified as high risk to
ground assets.
• Terrain is complex and weather conditions are favorable.
3-27
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
MOUNTED RECONNAISSANCE
3-83. Mounted reconnaissance enables a more rapid tempo, at the
expense of stealth and security. Mounted reconnaissance increases the
probability of threat detection, thus compromising reconnaissance efforts.
Information is primarily gathered through mounted surveillance using
high magnification vehicle-mounted sights to observe from a greater
distance. Though a reconnaissance operation may be primarily mounted,
dismounted activities will probably be required during the operation for
security reasons.
3-84. The troop commander directs platoons to conduct mounted
reconnaissance when—
• Time is limited.
• Distances require mounted movement.
• Stealth and security are not primary concerns.
• Detailed information is not required, or the mounted method
affords the same opportunity to collect information as the
dismounted method.
• Surveillance target allows vehicles to approach (terrain
feature or road intersection in stability or support operations).
• Threat locations are known.
DISMOUNTED RECONNAISSANCE
3-85. Dismounted reconnaissance is the primary and most time-
consuming means of reconnaissance for ground troops. This method
permits the troop to collect the most detailed information about the
threat, terrain, society, and infrastructure within a given area, zone, or
along a route. Dismounted reconnaissance permits a troop to collect
detailed information about a fixed site or threat from a close proximity.
The troop is limited in the number of dismounted scouts it can employ at
any time. For example, a scout section is required to operate a long-
duration OP.
3-86. The troop commander may direct platoons to conduct dismounted
reconnaissance when—
• Time is available.
• Detailed information is required.
• Reconnaissance target is a stationary threat, fixed site, or
terrain feature.
• Stealth is required.
• Threat contact is expected or has been achieved through
visual/electronic means.
• Reconnaissance vehicles cannot move through an area
because of terrain or threat.
• Security is the primary concern.
INFILTRATION
3-87. Infiltration is a form of maneuver that entails movement by small
groups or individuals at extended or irregular intervals through or into
an area occupied by a threat or a friendly force in which contact with the
3-28
threat is avoided. The troop infiltrates through the AO to achieve the

reconnaissance objective without having to engage the threat or fight
through prepared defenses. This form of maneuver is slow and often
accomplished under reduced visibility conditions. Synchronized ISR
operations using other assets provide additional security for the troop by
locating threat positions and identifying infiltration routes that avoid
threat contact. The troop’s higher headquarters uses UAVs, cued by
imagery intelligence (IMINT), PROPHET, GSR, and IREMBASS, to
locate gaps in threat positions and assist the troop in infiltrating.
3-88. Threat dispositions may require the BCT to attack and destroy
specific elements in the disruptive zone, or to penetrate the defense to
enable the troop to infiltrate. Another technique is for the BCT to conduct
a limited feint or demonstration as a deception and enable the troop to
infiltrate at another point.
PLANNING
3-89. Infiltration is one of the most difficult troop missions and must be
resourced and supported by its higher headquarters. The troop requires
detailed knowledge of the terrain and current threat information to
enhance survivability and maximize chance for the success. The higher
headquarters IPB, focused on identifying potential infiltration routes,
using the capabilities of ASAS and digital topographic support system
(DTSS), facilitates detailed terrain analysis. The analysis and control
team (ACT) and ASAS databases can provide detailed threat dispositions
and compositions to support infiltration planning. The S2 evaluates
intelligence shortfalls, and the S3 tasks ISR assets to obtain more detail
to support the infiltration mission. For example, he may task UAVs to
conduct aerial reconnaissance of the proposed infiltration lanes or zone to
obtain a current picture of the battlefield prior to and during movement
of the ground scouts.
3-90. The XO and S3 review terrain analysis and threat data to identify
gaps within threat dispositions and potential infiltration routes. The
troop commander participates with this analysis and determines whether
he will move his troop as a unit or in echelon on single or multiple
infiltration lanes. The overriding factor in determining whether to use
single or multiple lanes is the ability to remain undetected. Space and
time separate forces moving along the infiltration lane. Moving the troop
by platoons is faster and easier to control. Conversely, echeloned
movement by sections or individual vehicles lessens the likelihood of
detection due to the smaller size of the moving elements. The commander
plans for lead elements to confirm clear routes, or transmits waypoints to
follow-on elements.
3-91. The higher headquarters and troop commander must plan
adequate time for infiltration to allow for potential delays and to ensure
that the troop has sufficient time to reach its AO and subsequent primary
or alternate rally points. Contingency plans should address aborting the
infiltration, shifting elements during reconnaissance, and actions if an
element fails to arrive or arrives late at the primary rally point. Alternate
rally points are designated and used if—
• The primary rally point is occupied by the threat.
• The primary rally point is compromised.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
• The primary rally point is found to be unsuitable before the

infiltrating element reaches it.
EXECUTION
3-92. The troop commander positions himself in the infiltration order of
movement that allows him to best exercise command and control. If a
penetration is required, he may initially locate with the maneuver force
command group. The troop CP and/or XO may collocate with the
stationary force CP to coordinate the forward passage and fires. The
commander and the CP/XO track forward movement using FBCB2,
ensuring that FM reports are entered into the system. The commander
modifies his scheme of maneuver based on METT-TC factors, and quickly
submits FRAGOs via FBCB2 or FM to reorient his forces and ensure
synchronization of effort.
INFILTRATION METHODS
3-93. The troop can move as a unit or echeloned by individual platoons.
Infiltration can be executed mounted, dismounted, or a combination of
the two. Depending on the availability of equipment and type of mission,
the troop can infiltrate by foot, vehicle, rotary-wing aircraft, or watercraft
to the objective.
Employment by Unit
3-94. This technique lends itself to command and control as the entire
troop is infiltrating at once. The troop gains flexibility by using multiple
lanes. The troop may infiltrate mounted and/or dismounted to conduct
different reconnaissance missions.
Employment by Section
3-95. This technique lends itself to the flexibility required by a
reconnaissance organization. It assists the troop in providing continuous
reconnaissance by not committing the entire troop at one time. The troop
moves on single or multiple lanes, mounted and/or dismounted, and
enters the zone at different times and locations to conduct different
reconnaissance missions.
Dismounted Infiltration
3-96. The troop commander may direct scouts to conduct dismounted
infiltration when—
• Time is available.
• Stealth is required.
• Threat contact is expected or has been achieved through
visual means.
• Scout vehicles cannot move through an area because of
terrain or threat.
• Security is the primary concern.
Mounted Infiltration
3-97. The troop commander directs scouts to conduct mounted
infiltration when—
• Time is limited.
• Threat locations are known.
• Distances require mounted movement.
3-30
3-98. Though an infiltration may be primarily mounted, dismounted

activities may be required during the operation to achieve stealth and
security.
Aerial Insertions
3-99. The aerial insertion of a troop is planned and conducted similar to
an air assault operation. The planning team must include the BCT XO,
S2, S3, S4, S6, FSO, air and missile defense coordinator (AMDCOORD),
aviation liaison officer, Air Force air liaison officer (ALO), and the troop
commander. The plan must account for deceptive actions, use of reserves,
suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD), actions at the landing and
pickup zones, re-supply, and MEDEVAC support. Deception inserts
should be made en route to and when returning from the insertion. (See
FM 3-18.12 [FM 90-4], FM 3-20.98 [FM 17-98], and Chapter 6 of this
manual for more information related to aerial insertions.)
Single-lane Infiltration
3-100. Infiltration on a single lane is the least desirable technique. It
requires all infiltrating groups to move at intervals in the same lane. This
technique is used only when METT-TC analysis supports the
identification of only one gap in the threat positions. The troop
commander must consider the number of vehicles to be infiltrated, the
time available, route concealment, and the vehicle time/distance interval
that must be used to prevent detection. See Figure 3-8.
Figure 3-8. Single-lane Infiltration
Multiple-lane Infiltration
3-101. This is the preferred method of infiltration. The troop infiltrates
by multiple lanes when two or more gaps are found through the threat
defense. See Figure 3-9.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Figure 3-9. Multiple-lane Infiltration
INFILTRATION ACTIONS ON CONTACT

3-102. When reconnaissance elements infiltrate, the detection of one
subordinate element may alert the threat and compromise the entire
mission. The troop must have rehearsed techniques and procedures for
actions with known and chance contact during infiltration. For example,
if detected, subordinate elements return fire, break contact, and report. If
the reconnaissance unit makes visual contact, but is not detected, it
bypasses the threat force and continues the mission. The commander’s
intent must clearly state what the unit should do upon contact with the
threat (tempo and engagement criteria).
3-103. The techniques and procedures may also address:
• Shifting to alternate infiltration lane.
• Actions at rally points and in the objective rally point (ORP).
• Actions upon loss of communications.
INFILTRATION CONSIDERATIONS
3-104. Infiltration is characterized by centralized planning and
decentralized execution. Plans for infiltration are based on movement to
the AO with the least risk of detection. The troop’s higher headquarters
must actively assist planning and preparation, to include using
reconnaissance fundamentals to provide early warning and detection of
the threat using imagery, SIGINT, GSR, IREMBASS, and other ISR
assets. The commander uses the higher headquarters graphic control
measures, NAIs, and collection requirements and objective in planning
the infiltration. The location of assigned NAIs may affect the selection of
an infiltration route or location of an ORP. Additional planning
considerations include:
• Terrain analysis using IPB, imagery, and ground
reconnaissance enables the troop to identify primary and
alternate infiltration routes. These routes should avoid threat
positions, obstacles, populated areas, silhouetting, main
3-32
avenues of approach, and movement along heavily populated

routes and trails.
• Weather analysis to allow the infiltration during reduced
visibility and NOD effectiveness.
• Threat analysis identifies the probable line for deployment,
line of contact, battle positions, fighting positions, obstacles,
security forces deployed for counter-reconnaissance, and
times of reduced alertness.
• Concept of the operation describes the infiltration method,
sequencing (by unit of echelon), and timing. The commander
uses the assigned NAIs and information requirements to
develop his reconnaissance focus and objective. He identifies
primary and alternate rally points. Actions at rally points
include the first scout element reaching the rally point,
establishing security, and then using FBCB2 or FM to
identify and exchange recognition signals with follow-on troop
elements. The concept describes the higher headquarters
deceptive actions and their purpose or relation to the
infiltration. The commander identifies potential OPs, ORPs,
and vehicle hide positions and prescribes actions on contact
and infiltration abort criteria. The commander integrates
fires to support the infiltration, to include priority of fires.
• Graphic control measures include checkpoints or TIRS to
control movement and provide command and control
flexibility. Checkpoints can be used as a rallying point if a
scout element becomes misoriented, or is forced off the
infiltration route or OP.
• Command and control procedures must support decentralized
execution and include identification or retrans in follow-on
sections to maintain contact with the lead elements.
EXFILTRATION
3-105. Exfiltration is the removal of personnel or units from areas under
threat control by stealth, deception, surprise, or clandestine means. If the
troop infiltrates to conduct its mission, it may be required to exfiltrate
once the mission is complete. In this case, exfiltration is planned with
infiltration and refined as the mission progresses. During other
operations, troop elements may not withdraw in contact with lead
elements (security drill), but may be required to maintain observation for
follow-on forces. The commander must plan for exfiltration only in this
case. The commander may also plan for contingency exfiltration should
conditions force the troop or its subordinate elements to conduct an
unplanned exfiltration. The troop order must address troop actions for
both planned and unplanned exfiltration.
METHODS OF EXFILTRATION
3-106. Exfiltration can be accomplished via land, air, or water.
Exfiltration by land with its organic vehicles is the most preferable
method. Exfiltration by land is used when—
• Friendly lines are close.
• No other method is feasible.
• Areas along the route are largely uninhabited.
3-33
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
• Threat forces are widely dispersed.

• Threat forces are not conducting aggressive/active
counterreconnaissance and security.
• Terrain degrades threat’s ability to maneuver against
exfiltration unit.
3-107. Extraction by air is favored when the resources are available and
its use will not compromise the mission. These methods are used when—
• Long distances must be covered.
• The element cannot infiltrate by land or is in danger of being
destroyed or captured.
• Time of return is essential.
• Cover and concealment are lacking.
• The threat does not have air superiority.
• The threat has not employed ADA assets in the AO.
EXFILTRATION CONSIDERATIONS
3-108. Planning considerations are similar to those for infiltration. The
principles of route selection, movement formations, and movement
security are observed during movement along exfiltration routes or to the
extraction site. Exfiltration operations require additional time to account
for unforeseen circumstances, such as inadvertent contact with threat
forces or unexpected restrictive terrain. The following additional
considerations are required to ensure a successful exfiltration:
• Exfiltration timing is critical from a standpoint of morale and
mission accomplishment. Plans for extraction are made before
the operation, with alternate plans for contingencies, such as
the evacuation of sick or injured personnel.
• The plan must address actions on lost communications. When
an element has missed a certain number of required
transmissions, the commander assumes that the element has
a communication problem, is in trouble, or both. The
commander must prescribe a no-communication resupply and
exfiltration plan that accounts for all possibilities.
• The plan must address alternate forms of exfiltration in
addition to a link up with their vehicles. The OPORD may
specify dismounted exfiltration or link up with friendly forces
in an offensive operation. Any of these means may also be
planned as an alternative if their vehicles cannot extract the
team, or if capture is imminent.
• Exfiltration pick-up points for dismounts should be far
enough away from the OPs to ensure the threat does not hear
vehicle or helicopter noises. Mountains, dense foliage, and
other similar terrain features can screen these noises. Under
normal conditions, in flat, open terrain on a clear night,
rotary-wing aircraft lose most of their audio signature at
approximately a five-kilometer distance.
• Movement routes are planned that put ridgelines, rivers, and
other restrictive terrain between the unit and threat forces.
3-34
• Primary and alternate linkup points should never be on a

single azimuth leading away from the OP of an exfiltration
route.
TACTICAL MOVEMENT
3-109. The troop commander must consider all aspects of his AO when
organizing his assets and developing control measures. Even when the
operational environment is linear for its higher headquarters, the troop
may be operating in a noncontiguous environment (see Figure 3-10).
Figure 3-10. Contiguous versus Noncontiguous Environment
3-110. During operations, the troop’s AO may encompass extended

distances that do not support close troop formations. Under these
conditions, or in a noncontiguous operational environment, the troop will
be required to conduct decentralized operations. In these cases, the troop
may deploy its platoons into separate AOs that are not mutually
supportive. The platoons may be required to move in different directions,
or some platoons may be stationary conducting surveillance, while others
are conducting mounted or dismounted reconnaissance (see Figure 3-11).
3-111. The troop commander, XO, and CP, if applicable, should position
to best command and control the troop while maintaining contact with its
higher headquarters and adjacent units as necessary. This may require
separation of the commander and the XO, or CP, by tremendous
distances, requiring primary and alternate retrans assignments to
maintain communications.
3-112. The troop commander usually places himself where he can best
control the troop’s actions. Usually this is trailing the lead platoon or the
element he expects to make contact. He must determine where he can
best see the battlefield without getting decisively engaged and losing
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
focus on the troop fight. In nontraditional formations, the troop

commander may place himself with the main effort, or if applicable,
collocate with the troop CP to facilitate command and control.
3-113. The XO is usually located at the troop CP, if applicable,
controlling its movement and reporting information to higher
headquarters. The commander can also position the XO with another
platoon, such as the lead platoon conducting a zone reconnaissance. The
commander then controls the operation from and moves with the trail
platoon, monitoring specific HUMINT requirements or liaison with local
leaders.
3-114. The troop combat trains is placed in a position that best supports
the majority of the tasks or in a position to support the key tasks. The
troop 1SG and the medics usually follow the troop’s trail elements by one
kilometer or terrain feature. The 1SG controls the medics while they are
operating in the troop’s AO. If the threat warrants the use of a trail platoon
providing security during reconnaissance, the 1SG should position between
the lead platoons and the rear security platoon.
3-115. The recce troop must place its mortars in a position that best
supports the troop or high-risk platoon missions. Position the mortars in
or near the center of the troop AO to provide indirect fire support across
the troop front. Keep them positioned to fire about two-thirds and no less
than one-third of their maximum effective range (about 3 to 5 kilometers,
terrain dependent) beyond the scouts, so the scouts can engage threat
forces at long range with indirect fires.
NOTE: Line of sight is the determining factor in range forward of the scouts. In densely
wooded terrain, the scout’s visibility may be only 100 to 200 meters forward of their
front line trace, so mortar range need not always be 3,000 meters forward of the
scouts.
3-36
Figure 3-11. Example of Troop Operations
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
SECTION VI – ZONE RECONNAISSANCE
3-116. Zone reconnaissance is the directed effort to obtain detailed

information concerning all threat forces, routes, obstacles, and terrain
within a zone defined by boundaries. A zone reconnaissance is assigned
when the situation is vague or when information concerning cross-
country trafficability is desired. It is appropriate when previous
knowledge of the terrain is limited or when combat operations have
altered the terrain. As with an area reconnaissance, the zone
reconnaissance may be threat-, terrain-, society-, or infrastructure-
oriented. It may include any orientation combination and be focused on
specific requirements from the orientation such as the location of the
threat’s reserve or food distribution points within the troop’s AO.
Commanders must be aware that when the reconnaissance is focused on
both combinations such as threat and terrain, the speed of the operation
will be extremely slow, especially in complex terrain.
CRITICAL TASKS
3-117. Zone reconnaissance is a deliberate, time-consuming process;
therefore, it must be focused within time constraints. During a zone
reconnaissance, the troop accomplishes the critical tasks listed below
unless specifically directed otherwise by the higher headquarters
commander. The brigade/squadron commander, depending on the
conditions of METT-TC and his critical information requirements, may
select specific critical tasks for the troop to accomplish.
• Reconnoiter all terrain within the zone.
• Inspect and classify all bridges within the zone.
• Locate fords or crossing sites near all bridges in the zone.
• Inspect and classify all overpasses, underpasses, and culverts.
• Locate and possibly clear all mines, obstacles, and barriers in
the zone within its capability.
• Locate a bypass around urban areas, obstacles, and
contaminated areas.
• Locate and report all threat forces within the zone.
• Report reconnaissance information.
3-118. In addition to the critical tasks, the troop must be prepared to

conduct other tasks as directed by the commander. These additional
tasks may include the following:
• Recognize threat and countermeasures (identify threat
activities and recommend threat probable COAs).
• Determine the size, location, and composition of the society
demographics (e.g., race, sex, age, religion, language, tribe,
clan, class, education, history, government, and/or factions).
• Establish and maintain contact with local civilian and
military leadership.
• Reconnoiter the society to determine the regional, local, and
neighborhood situations.
3-38
• Determine the needs of the society to decide operation/actions

that will support a friendly populace or neutralize or gain
support of a hostile or neutral faction.
• Identify key municipal infrastructure that can affect military
operations (utilities, sewage, communications).
• Determine media activities.
• Clarify organizations and methods of operation for terrorists,
transnational groups, and ethnic centers of power.
• Identify local populous allegiances to factions, religious
groups, or other organizations.
3-119. Commanders must guard carefully against over-tasking the troop

or its subordinate elements. The commander who directs a zone
reconnaissance mission must remember the number and complexity of
the tasks to be accomplished. The troop can accomplish its critical tasks
and effectively reconnoiter a zone from 6 to 10 kilometers wide; however,
the troop quickly exceeds its ability to accomplish the critical tasks if
assigned a larger zone. The maximum width of the zone that the troop
can effectively reconnoiter in accomplishing limited critical tasks is
dependent on the time available, the depth of the zone, the complexity of
the terrain, the nature of the threat, the troop’s task organization, other
collection assets being integrated, and the critical tasks the troop is being
directed to perform. The commander must also consider the tempo of
reconnaissance. An increased tempo limits the tasks that can be
performed. If the commander desires a faster tempo, he must prioritize
reconnaissance tasks for the troop.
EXAMPLE OF ZONE RECONNAISSANCE

3-120. When the troop receives a zone reconnaissance mission, the zone
is usually identified by lateral boundaries with a line of departure (PL
JAMIE) and a limit of advance (PL SUE) specified. The higher
headquarters may include Army airspace command and control (A2C2)
measures to facilitate aerial reconnaissance within the troop’s AO.
3-121. The troop commander must have all the known information and
intelligence of the operational environment. He must also coordinate to
ensure support from other ISR assets available to the squadron and/or
BCT to facilitate troop-leading procedures in developing his plan and
support his reconnaissance. Because the threat situation is vague and
knowledge of the terrain is limited, the troop’s scheme of maneuver must
also provide a good measure of protection for the troop as it executes the
mission. When considering techniques for conducting a zone
reconnaissance, the scheme of maneuver has to be flexible. The troop
commander must convey his intent to subordinates so they can act
quickly and without orders.
3-122. The commander considering the following as he develops his zone
reconnaissance plan during troop-leading procedures (see Figure 3-12):
• The threat situation, to include:
Type and capabilities of likely threat weapons systems,
night observation systems, and surveillance radar.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Special equipment, such as ground sensors and signal

intercept, may be addressed.
Higher headquarters threat COAs, to include a situation
template depicting composition, known and template
dispositions, and potential engagement areas.
• Civilian considerations, to include:
Locations and jurisdictions of government agencies.
Compositions and dispositions of military, paramilitary,
and law enforcement organizations.
Locations of police stations, armories or barracks,
encampments, weapons holding areas, and staging areas.
Factions, key leaders, locations, compositions, and
dispositions of known friendly, neutral, and belligerents,
to include:
− Recent trends in public opinion.
− Intensity levels of current and past disturbances.
− If required, effects from use of lethal force, against
civilians.
If applicable, description and capabilities of uniforms,
insignia, vehicles, markings, and equipment to include
weapons and NODs.
Locations, functions, and purpose for nongovernmental
organizations.
Locations of power generation/transformer facilities,
water treatment plants, and food distribution points.
Locations of communications networks and media outlets.
• Terrain and weather considerations, to include:
Effects on effective ranges of weapons systems, laser
designators, and NODs.
Effects on UAVs and other aviation assets for
reconnaissance, transport, resupply, casualty evacuation,
or fire support.
Effects on cross-country mobility.
Effects on civil functions and services.
• Friendly force considerations, to include:
Mission of adjacent and follow-on forces.
Higher headquarters and follow-on force reconnaissance
objectives.
Higher headquarters and follow-on force CCIR.
Higher commander’s reconnaissance focus, tempo, and
engagement criteria, to include adjusting tempo and
engagement criteria during reconnaissance.
Missions of ISR elements, such as a PROPHET, operating
within the troop’s AO, but not under troop control.
Capabilities and limitation of ISR elements, such as a
GSR, that have been attached to or controlled by the
troop.
3-40
Figure 3-12. Situation for Zone Reconnaissance
3-123. The commander develops his intent that addresses the following:
• Key reconnaissance tasks that must be accomplished during
the zone reconnaissance.
• Purpose for reconnaissance in relation to the higher
headquarters reconnaissance objective.
• End state for reconnaissance.
3-124. The commander develops a concept of operation that describes, as

a minimum—
• Focus and tempo for reconnaissance, to include changes to
tempo based on anticipated contact or other requirements.
• Reconnaissance of the zone to answer the information
requirements.
Determine if platoons should conduct zone, area, or route
reconnaissance, or any combination of the three to enable
the troop to complete its zone reconnaissance.
Identify platoon and other subordinate element tasks, to
include reconnaissance, security, and follow and support,
as required.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Determine task organization and subordinate unit AOs

based on tasks and other METT-TC factors.
Integrate reconnaissance methods such as sensor,
mounted, and dismounted reconnaissance and
surveillance.
Determine deployment method and select movement
techniques that support the tempo.
If necessary, identify infiltration route(s) against a higher
threat.
If necessary, identify vehicle positions that allow
utilization of onboard optics, such as LRAS3, to assist in
observation and provide overwatch.
If necessary, determine requirements for short and long
duration surveillance of NAIs.
If necessary, integrate urban assessment and information
requirements (see Appendix D).
• Plan for establishing a screen upon reaching the limit of
advance (LOA).
• Synchronization of target acquisition assignments with
reconnaissance tasks.
Target description, location (known or template), and
method of engagement.
Desired target effect and purpose for effect.
Criteria to change from target surveillance to designation
(illumination).
• Integration of other elements or assets into the
reconnaissance effort.
UAVs reconnoiter routes, infiltration lanes, or key and
restrictive terrain within the AO.
PROPHET monitors for specified communications traffic
or transmissions within designated areas containing
suspected threat or supporting forces.
GSR orients on NAIs in advance of the platoons or on
avenues of approach or routes on the flanks of the
platoons’ reconnaissance.
Ground sensors, such as IREMBASS, are emplaced on
flank avenues of approach or routes leading into the troop
AO.
Engineers assist with classification of bridges, overpasses,
culverts, fords, routes, and obstacles.
• Locations and criteria for reconnaissance and target
handover.
Accepting handover from or transferring to another
element.
Conducting handover within the troop by subordinate
elements.
• Priorities of fire and use of fires to maintain maximum range
forward of the reconnaissance platoons.
• Bypass and engagement criteria during reconnaissance.
• If necessary, instructions for forward passage of lines.
3-42
• Commitment criteria and actions of the higher headquarters

reaction force or reserve in support of the troop’s infiltration,
movement, and reconnaissance.
• Graphic control measures that support the concept of the
operation, to include:
Boundaries identifying the troop’s AO, platoon AOs, line
of departure, and LOA.
For routes or lanes, designate start points, release points,
and rally points for each route.
Phase lines, checkpoints, and contact points for
coordination with other elements.
TIRS or GIRS to assist command and control.
3-125. CSS considerations include the following:

• Priorities for service support.
• Security requirements and techniques for combat trains or
supporting service support elements.
• Movement and positioning of trains and logistical supply
points.
• Resupply, to include emergency and caches.
Caches for Class I, III, IV, VIII, and other mission-specific
items such as batteries.
Drop points away from vehicle hide and observation posts.
• Casualty consolidation and evacuation.
• Vehicle recovery, to include secured collection points and
maintenance procedures.
• Equipment and supply destruction criteria.
3-126. Communications considerations include the following:

• Positioning of commander, XO or CP, and retrans to maintain
communications with the higher headquarters and other
designated elements.
• Method and techniques for communication between mounted
and dismounted elements.
• If necessary, responsibilities and procedures for integrating
supporting analog units into the troop digital network.
SECTION VII – AREA RECONNAISSANCE
3-127. An area reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain detailed

information concerning the terrain, threat activity, society and
infrastructure within a prescribed area. These areas can include
facilities, such as water plants, weapon storage sites, political
headquarters, a village or town; or other areas, such as a suspected
assembly area, cache site, or an airport complex. The troop can conduct
decentralized reconnaissance in two or three areas simultaneously. The
troop commander can conduct area reconnaissance by maneuvering
elements through the zone or by establishing observation posts within
3-43
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
and/or external to the area. The troop commander must also plan for
movement to the designated area. Tactical movement, road march,
infiltration, or conducting a zone reconnaissance to the area are common
methods.
CRITICAL TASKS
3-128. During an area reconnaissance, the following critical tasks must
be accomplished unless the troop commander directs otherwise:
• Reconnoiter all terrain within the area.
• Inspect and classify all bridges within the area.
• Locate fords or crossing sites near all bridges within the area.
• Locate and mark all mines, obstacles, and barriers in the
area.
• Locate a bypass around urban areas, obstacles, and
contaminated areas.
• Find and report all threats within the area (identify threat
activities, deceptive measures, and recommend threat
probable COAs).
3-129. In addition to the primary tasks, the troop must be prepared to

conduct other tasks as directed by the commander. These additional
tasks may include the following:
• Determine size, location, and composition of societal
demographics (e.g., race, sex, age, religion, language, tribe,
clan, class, education, history, government, and/or factions).
• Establish and maintain contact with local civilian and
military leadership.
• Reconnoiter the society to determine the regional, local, and
neighborhood situations.
• Determine the needs of the society to decide operation/actions
that are needed to support a friendly populace, or to
neutralize or gain support of a hostile or neutral faction.
• Identify key municipal infrastructure that can affect military
operations (utilities, sewage, communications).
• Determine media activities.
• Clarify organizations and methods of operation for terrorists,
transnational groups, and ethnic centers of power.
• Identify local populous allegiances to factions, religious
groups, or other organizations.
EXAMPLE OF AREA RECONNAISSANCE

3-130. As with the zone reconnaissance, the troop commander must
ensure the troop has all the known information and intelligence of the
AO. In addition to boundaries, phase lines, and A2C2 measures, the
higher headquarters may designate troop infiltration lanes. The
commander determines the infiltration method and sequence. At times,
the commander may be required to identify the infiltration lanes. In
these cases he must use reconnaissance during his troop-leading
3-44
procedures to identify and select infiltration lanes. He must coordinate

support from other ISR assets available to the squadron and/or BCT to
assist with this reconnaissance. Information from SIGINT and IMINT
can assist the commander develop and complete his scheme of maneuver
during troop-leading procedures. IMINT facilitates a detailed map
reconnaissance in determining how terrain supports movement. The
commander views the terrain not only from the perspective of how it
supports his mission success but also from the threat’s perspective.
Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) assets should be
focused on restricted terrain or high-speed avenues of approach to
provide early warning of potential threat movements. UAV(s) can support
infiltration and reconnaissance to provide early warning and
reconnaissance of areas that are restricted to the ground troop.
3-131. The commander considers the following as he develops his area
Types and capabilities of likely threat weapons systems,
night observation systems, and communications systems.
Special equipment, such as body armor, may be
addressed.
Higher headquarters threat COAs, to include a SITEMP
depicting composition, known and template dispositions,
observation or combat outposts, patrols, and potential
engagement areas.
Locations of government offices, political party
headquarters, and nongovernmental organizations.
Compositions and dispositions of regional/local military,
paramilitary, and law enforcement organizations.
to include:
− If required, effects from use of lethal force against
civilians.
insignia, vehicles, markings, and equipment, to include
weapons and NODs.
• If applicable, an urban operations sketch that portrays key
terrain, to include:
Safe havens.
Hospitals.
Police stations and armories or equivalent.
3-45
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Embassies.
Power generation, communication, and water treatment
facilities.
Restricted or protected areas designated by the ROE.
Hazardous areas, to include:
− Above- or below-ground natural gas or other fuel
storage.
− Construction sites.
− Intersections and bridges.
− Known hostile, belligerent, or criminal areas.
Major terrain features such as:
− Buildings that mask or interfere with communications
or GPS.
− Parks.
− Industrial complexes.
− Airports.
Avenues of approach, to include:
− Main thoroughfares and/or improved road surfaces.
− Escape and evasion routes or corridors.
− Subterranean routes and access.
or fire support.
Effects on civil demonstrations or services.
objectives.
Higher commander’s reconnaissance focus, tempo,
Missions of ISR elements, such as PROPHET, supporting
troop movement, and/or reconnaissance.
Missions of ISR elements, such as GSR or IREMBASS,
operating within the troop AO but not under troop
control.
troop.
3-46
Figure 3-13. Situation for Area Reconnaissance
the area reconnaissance.

a minimum:
• Movement to the areas to be reconnoitered, to include
techniques and formations, if applicable.
Select movement techniques that support the tempo and
avoid known threat forces outside the areas to be
reconnoitered.
Select the route(s) and establish a march order on each
route.
Identify infiltration route(s) against a higher threat and
establish an order of march.
3-47
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Identify dismount point and suitable concealed locations

to position vehicles prior to conducting the
reconnaissance.
Identify vehicle positions that allow utilization of onboard
optics, such as LRAS3, to assist in observation and
provide overwatch.
• Reconnaissance of the designated areas to answer the
information requirements.
Platoon and other subordinate element tasks, to include
reconnaissance, security, and follow and support, as
required.
Determine task organization and subordinate unit AOs
Integration of reconnaissance methods, to include sensor,
surveillance.
Requirements for short and long duration surveillance of
NAIs.
Urban assessment and information requirements (see
Appendix D).
(illumination).
or transmissions within the designated areas, or within
other areas containing threat reserves or supporting
forces.
flank approaches or routes into the designated area or
leading to NAIs within the area.
culverts, fords, routes, and obstacles within the
designated area.
handover.
element.
elements.
3-48

• Bypass and engagement criteria both during movement to
and reconnaissance of designated areas.
operation to include:
Boundaries identifying the troop’s AO, platoon AOs, and a
line of departure.
and rally points for each route,
Areas to be reconnoitered.

points.
• Resupply to include emergency and caches.
• Caches for Class I, III, IV, VIII, and other mission-specific
items, such as batteries.
• Drop points away from vehicle hide and observation posts.
• Vehicle recovery to include secured collection points and

SECTION VIII – ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE
3-136. Route reconnaissance is a directed effort to gain detailed

information about a specific route and the terrain on either side of the
route that the threat could use to influence movement along the route. In
3-49
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
a permissive environment, a route may be assigned to each platoon,

depending on the terrain. If threat contact is likely, as in an SSC or an
MTW, only one route may be reconnoitered. A route reconnaissance is
often a specified or implied task in a zone or area reconnaissance mission.
CRITICAL TASKS
3-137. During a route reconnaissance, the following critical tasks must
be accomplished unless the troop commander directs otherwise:
• Reconnoiter and determine trafficability of the route.
• Reconnoiter all terrain the threat can use to place direct fires
on the route.
• Reconnoiter all built-up areas along the route.
• Reconnoiter all lateral routes in the area of responsibility.
• Inspect and classify all bridges along the route.
• Locate fords or crossing sites near all bridges along the route.
• Reconnoiter all defiles along the route; possibly clear all
defiles of threat and obstacles within its capability, or locate a
bypass.
• Locate mines, obstacles, and barriers, and within its
capability, clear the route.
• Locate a bypass around obstacles and contaminated areas.
• Locate a bypass around or, if the mission requires, routes
through built-up areas.
• Report route information.
• Find and report all threats that can influence movement
along the route.
3-138. In a permissive environment, the troop may reconnoiter up to
three routes when security is not required. Only one route can be
reconnoitered when the security must provide security for the route
classification.
EXAMPLE OF ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE

3-139. The higher headquarters specifies the route, to include the start
point, release point, and other critical points along the route. It
establishes A2C2 measures, specifies the reconnaissance start time, and
may designate a completion time. Using the provided IPB and imagery,
the troop commander analyzes the terrain to gain an appreciation of the
danger areas within his zone and the nature of the potential threat. He
must determine how much terrain on each flank of the route must be
reconnoitered. Higher headquarters constraints or restrictions may also
influence how much terrain is reconnoitered. Again, he must coordinate
to ensure support from other ISR assets available to the squadron and/or
BCT both prior to and during reconnaissance. The troop commander may
also direct a platoon to conduct a route reconnaissance as a specific task
in another mission.
3-140. The troop normally performs a tactical road march to the line of
departure and deploys to execute the reconnaissance of the route. Based
3-50
on the amount of intelligence known about the threat, the troop

commander determines how much security is required for the move
forward to the line of departure. Also the commander should consider the
effect his final disposition of forces will have on the troop’s follow-on
mission. The commander considers these effects as he develops his route
addressed.
and potential engagement areas.
− Ambushes along the route in close or restricted
terrain or tied to obstacles along the route.
− Attack by long-range direct or indirect fires from
dominating terrain along the route.
Jurisdictions of local government agencies that
encompass the route.
Relief and other nongovernmental organizations using the
route.
Refugee and displaced civilians using the route.
to include:
civilians.
weapons and NODs.
encampments, and staging areas.
reconnaissance, casualty evacuation, or fire support.
Effects on civilian traffic flow.
objectives.
3-51
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________

Missions of ISR elements, such as PROPHET or UAV,
supporting troop reconnaissance.
Missions of ISR and other elements operating within the
troop AO but not under troop control.
Figure 3-14. Situation for Route Reconnaissance
the route reconnaissance.

a minimum:
• Reconnaissance of the route to answer the information
requirements.
3-52
Determines requirements to reconnoiter and classify the

route, or designated portions of the route.
Determines requirements to conduct a zone
reconnaissance of designated terrain to either side of the
route.
Identifies platoon and other subordinate element tasks, to
include reconnaissance, security, and follow and support,
as required.
Determines task organization and subordinate unit AOs
Integrates reconnaissance methods, to include sensor,
aerial, mounted, and dismounted reconnaissance and
surveillance.
Selects movement techniques that support the tempo.
Determines actions at built-up areas and actions on
contact with threat forces or civilians.
If necessary, identifies vehicle positions that allow
utilization of onboard optics, such as LRAS3, to provide
overwatch.
If necessary, integrates urban assessment and
• Transition to follow-on mission after completing the
reconnaissance or reaching the LOA.
• If necessary, synchronization of target acquisition
assignments with reconnaissance tasks.
(illumination).
UAVs reconnoiter routes or key and restrictive terrain
along the route.
or transmissions within the designated areas containing
threat or supporting forces.
GSR orients on lateral routes and on the flanks of the
route.
culverts, fords, routes, and obstacles along the route.
NBC reconnaissance reconnoiters for contamination and
bypasses.
• Locations and criteria for reconnaissance handover.
element.
elements.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
• Bypass and engagement criteria both for elements conducting

route classification and zone reconnaissance.
Boundaries identifying the troop’s AO and subordinate
element boundaries lateral to the route to support zone
reconnaissance on the flanks.
Routes, to include start points, release points, and other
checkpoints for other critical points.
Phase lines, contact points for coordination with other
elements, and the LOA.

points.
• Emergency resupply.

• Methods and techniques for communication between mounted
3-54
Chapter 4
Security
Security operations, as
CONTENTS
defined in FM 3-90 Fundamentals ..................................................4-3
[FM 100-40], are those Orient on the Main Body .............................4-3
operations undertaken Perform Continuous Reconnaissance .......4-3
by a commander to Provide Early and Accurate Warning .........4-4
Provide Reaction Time and
provide early and Maneuver Space .......................................4-4
accurate warning of Maintain Threat Contact ..............................4-4
threat operations, to Security Planning ............................................4-5
provide the force being Commander’s Guidance..............................4-5
protected with time and Troop Planning Considerations .................4-6
Screen ..............................................................4-10
maneuver space within Key Tasks .....................................................4-11
which to react to the Stationary Screen ........................................4-11
threat, and to develop Example of Stationary Screen ....................4-13
the situation to allow the Moving Screen .............................................4-18
Area Security ...................................................4-30
commander to effectively Area Security Techniques ...........................4-33
use the protected force. HVT Asset Security Considerations ...........4-33
Convoy Security ..............................................4-34
Critical Tasks................................................4-35
For the reconnaissance Convoy Security Elements..........................4-35
troop, security oper- Convoy Security Techniques......................4-36
ations are characterized
by conducting reconnaissance to reduce terrain and threat unknowns,
gaining and maintaining contact with the threat to ensure continuous
information, and providing early and accurate reporting of
information to the protected force.
Security is an essential part of all offensive and defensive operations.

Security operations may be considered in terms of the degree of
security provided and the amount of combat power required.
Reconnaissance troops normally screen, providing security for the
commander along an exposed front, flank, or rear of the main body
where a threat may exist. In noncontiguous operations, the troop may
provide 360-degree security orientation. The troop may also conduct
area and convoy security for high-value assets (HVA).
The purpose of this chapter is to—

• Define security fundamentals.
• Describe screens.
• Describe area and convoy security.
4-1
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
The three primary troop missions for security operations are—
• Screen.
• Area security.
• Convoy security.
Reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance are inherent and

continuous in all security operations. The focus is on providing
information to the protected force commander, denying the threat any
information about friendly operations, and destroying or repelling
threat reconnaissance elements throughout the depth of the AO.
Keeping the protected force informed of the situation provides the

majority of the security to the brigade. UAVs and ground
scouts/sensors are coordinated to synchronize their complementary
capabilities. Exchange of orders, intelligence reports, and graphics
using FBCB2 is efficient in keeping all forces synchronized; however,
over extended distances or when communication links are tenuous,
liaison officers may be required.
Counterreconnaissance is not a mission, but a task or purpose within

a security mission. It is the sum of actions taken at all echelons to
counter threat reconnaissance efforts and deny threat information
through the depth of the AO. It is both active and passive to include
combat action to destroy or repel threat reconnaissance elements.
Counterreconnaissance requires a reconnaissance effort—the
“looker”—and a combat effort—the “killer.” The troop enables
counterreconnaissance by locating and directing or coordinating its
destruction by fires or combat elements. The troop suppresses threat
reconnaissance elements with indirect fire and guides combat forces to
destroy the threat. The troop requires combat element augmentation
when tasked to engage in direct fire combat for counterreconnaissance
as part of its security mission.
The width and depth of an AO that the troop can effectively cover
depends on METT-TC.
• The number of avenues of approach, infiltration lanes, or NAIs

that must be covered simultaneously.
• The requirements for long versus short duration observation
posts (OP).
• Additional assets assigned to the troop, such as COLTs, GSR
teams, and IREMBASS, or other remote sensors.
4-2
____________________________________________________________________ Chapter 4 – Security
As METT-TC dictates an extended screen beyond doctrinal frontages,

the troop’s ability to accomplish its key tasks, or its ability to screen in
depth, diminishes as the frontage increases.
SECTION I - FUNDAMENTALS
4-1. The troop performs security missions to provide information

about the threat and terrain, to prevent the main body from being
surprised, and to preserve the combat power of friendly forces for decisive
employment. Critical information includes the size, composition, location,
direction, and rate of movement of the threat. Terrain information
focuses on obstacles, avenues of approach, and key terrain features that
impact the maneuver of either force. The intent is to provide information
that gives the BCT commander the reaction time and maneuver space
necessary to effectively fight the threat.
4-2. Successful security operations are planned and performed
maintaining these five fundamentals:
• Orient on the main body.
• Perform continuous reconnaissance.
• Provide early and accurate warning.
• Provide reaction time and maneuver space.
• Maintain threat contact.
ORIENT ON THE MAIN BODY

4-3. During security operations, the troop may operate in a large AO.
This will require the troop to focus on the brigade commander’s
information requirements provided through the use of the commander’s
reconnaissance guidance that supports the BCT with continuous
situational understanding. The troop operates at a specified distance or
area that provides the maximum standoff distance and early warning to
the protected force, but is within supporting distance. If the protected
force moves, the troop also moves or shifts its orientation. The troop
commander must know how the protected force commander intends to
maneuver his forces and where he wants the troop in relation to his
movement. The troop commander maneuvers his troop to positions that
provide the observation and orientation necessary for security.
PERFORM CONTINUOUS RECONNAISSANCE

4-4. Information enhances security, and it is also an element of
combat power. Security comes in large part from knowing as much as
possible about the threat and terrain within the assigned AO. ISR
operations are inherent in all security operations and must integrate the
concepts of cueing, mixing, integration, redundancy, and depth to provide
the protected force commander the maximum information possible and
reaction time and space. The troop uses doctrinal reconnaissance
4-3
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
methods, tactics, techniques, and procedures to obtain this information

during security operations. If the security mission involves movement,
reconnaissance is necessary for both the higher headquarters or
protected force. The troop’s higher headquarters synchronizes air and
ground operations to exploit the longer-range observation capabilities of
the UAV, and accesses additional intelligence through reachback
capabilities of the ABCS to gain the greatest flexibility and extended
depth. The purpose is to determine what the terrain will allow the BCT
and the threat to do, and identify all threat forces that will influence
operations.
PROVIDE EARLY AND ACCURATE WARNING

4-5. Early and accurate warning of threat activity is the cornerstone
of security operations. Early warning of threat activity provides the
protected force commander the time and information needed to retain the
tactical initiative and to choose the time and place to concentrate against
the threat. ISR assets outside of the BCT cue the BCT or squadron to
reposition assets to make contact with threat forces as soon as possible.
UAVs, working in tandem with ground sensor units, allow the BCT to
initially develop the situation with threat forces without endangerment
of ground forces. This enables the troop to make contact under the most
favorable conditions. The troop commander should employ remote
sensors on the ground to monitor avenues of approach that cannot be
easily observed. The troop employs scouts in positions that afford long-
range observation of expected threat avenues of approach, and uses GSR
to enhance their ability to see. Cueing, mixing, flexibility, depth, and
redundancy must be built into the ISR plan.
PROVIDE REACTION TIME AND MANEUVER SPACE

4-6. All security operations are designed to provide reaction time and
maneuver space to the protected force to enable it to attack the threat
early and in depth with precision fires from artillery and aviation while
maneuvering to decisively apply combat power. The security force
operates as far from the protected force as possible, consistent with the
factors of METT-TC. This distance provides the reaction time and
maneuver space required by the protected force commander. Digital
technologies and communications enhance timely and accurate reporting
of threat activity, and natural or man-made obstacles in near-real time,
providing the situational awareness needed to facilitate the BCT’s
maneuver. The troop operates within the BCT’s battlespace, maximizing
the BCT’s increased long-range target acquisition capabilities. The troop
uses BCT ISR assets to assist in cueing subordinate elements on threat
activity and allows the commander to reorient or retask platoons and
maximize cover and concealment.
MAINTAIN THREAT CONTACT

4-7. Unless otherwise directed, contact is not broken once it is gained.
Contact does not have to be maintained by the individual scout or sensor
that first makes it. The concepts of cueing, mixing, integration, and
redundancy support maintaining contact. FBCB2 assists the commander
in tracking changes to threat composition and disposition, support by
4-4
voice SPOTREPs and updates. Continuous information on the threat’s

activities must be gathered and disseminated higher, lower, and
laterally. Maintaining contact requires—
• Continuous contact (mixing and redundant capabilities are
planned and executed).
• Direct and indirect fires planning and support.
• Freedom to maneuver.
• Depth.
4-8. In support of defensive operations the troop may use a security

drill to maintain threat contact throughout the depth of its AO. During
support of offensive operations, the troop may conduct reconnaissance
handover to pass the contact to another brigade, squadron, or maneuver
battalion element.
SECTION II - SECURITY PLANNING
COMMANDER’S GUIDANCE
4-9. Critical to COMMANDER’S SECURITY GUIDANCE
the troop com- Security Missions
mander’s ability to • Destruction Criteria (if any):
execute his mission − What must the troop/platoons destroy in
counterreconnaissance fight?
is to clearly
• Displacement Criteria:
understand the
− What conditions cause displacement to
destruction and alternate screen lines?
displacement − What conditions cause displacement in contact
criteria for the vs. out of contact?
security mission. − What are the criteria for reconnaissance
This is in addition handover between the troop and the protected
to the reconnais- force?
sance guidance of
focus, tempo, and engagement criteria that is provided if required for the
mission. The threat situation is often vague when planning a security
mission. The troop should develop plans that are flexible enough to react
to all feasible threat COAs. The completed plan should include a detailed
description of how contact with the threat is gained and maintained, and
how and where it is destroyed or handed over to other ISR elements or
the protected force. The plan should explain what threat contact is
connected to the higher commander’s information requirements. The plan
should address target acquisition and execution of BCT fires as
necessary. Because of the need for depth, redundancy, integration, and
flexibility, security operations often have the following characteristics or
phases.
4-10. Security operations at troop level usually occur in four phases:
• Movement to an initial security position (occupation of a
screen).
• Reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
• Gaining and maintaining contact with threat forces and

either destroying or displacing in accordance with the
commander’s guidance (conduct handover to combat forces or
conduct a security drill).
• Transition (conduct a passage of lines or initiate a new
mission in support of higher’s decisive operation).
4-11. Command guidance should address each phase of the operation

and cover at least the following:
• Location/orientation/width of the screen in relation to the
protected force.
• Depth of troop AO.
• Graphic control measures (include ISR [NAIs, UAV restricted
overflight zone (ROZ)/air corridors, GSR/PROPHET location],
fire support, and combat service support [CSS]).
• Duration of the screen.
• Method of movement to and occupation of the screen.
• Location and disposition of the friendly force being screened.
• Positioning, orientation, and/or integration guidance for
nonorganic assets operating within the troop AO or in
support of the troop as applicable. (COLTs or other target
acquisition assets, GSR, PROPHET, UAVs, retrans, task
force scouts).
• Engagement/destruction criteria.
• Displacement/disengagement criteria.
• Fratricide avoidance measures.
• C2 procedures, to include positioning and sequencing of
signal nodes or retrans.
• Follow-on mission.
TROOP PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
TIME SCREEN MUST BE ESTABLISHED

4-12. The time the screen must be set and established will influence
the troop’s method of deploying to and occupying the screen.
MOVEMENT TO SCREEN
4-13. The troop may use various methods to move to its initial screen
based on the factors of METT-TC, the operations tempo, and the degree
of security required. The three common methods are zone
reconnaissance, infiltration, or tactical road march.
TRACE AND ORIENTATION OF SCREEN
4-14. The initial screen is depicted as a phase line and often represents
the forward line of own troops (FLOT). As such, the screen may be a
restrictive control measure for movement (LOA); coordination/permission
would be necessary to move beyond the line to establish OPs or perform
4-6
reconnaissance. When occupied, OPs are established on or behind the

phase line. OPs are given specific orientation and observation guidance.
INITIAL OP LOCATIONS
4-15. The squadron/brigade or troop commander may determine
tentative initial OP locations to ensure effective coverage of the area and
designated NAIs. As a minimum, the troop commander designates a
primary orientation of observation for the scouts during the conduct of
the screen. Scouts, once established on the screen, will report their
location to the troop CP and verify they are in compliance with the
commander’s orientation and surveillance guidance. The scouts who
occupy each OP always retain the responsibility to modify the location to
achieve the commander’s intent and guidance for surveillance.
4-16. OPs may be either mounted or dismounted. Mounted OPs
maximize use of vehicular optics, weapon systems, and speed of
displacement, but are more readily detected by the threat. Dismounted
OPs provide maximum stealth at the expense of speed of displacement
and vehicle-mounted optics and weapons. Dismounted and mounted OPs
may be used together to provide depth and mutual security.
WIDTH AND DEPTH OF THE SCREENED AO
4-17. The troop sector is defined by lateral boundaries extending out to
an LOA (the initial screen), forward of a rear boundary. The troop AO is
established by its higher headquarters. The troop boundaries may be a
squadron/brigade phase line and may serve as a reconnaissance handover
line to control passing of responsibility for the threat to another force.
The term screen is descriptive only of the forward trace along which
security is provided. The troop’s ability to gain depth decreases as
screened frontage increases. Depth allows a threat contact to be passed
from one element to another without requiring displacement. Depth is
advantageous in the following situations:
• Destroying or repelling a threat reconnaissance patrol
without compromising critical OPs.
• Preventing a threat force from penetrating the screen
undetected.
• Minimizing gaps when OPs displace or are lost.
• Preventing threat templating of the screen.
4-18. Depth is achieved primarily by positioning OPs (mounted and

dismounted) along templated avenues of approach (mounted and
dismounted) and focused on points or NAIs along those avenues of
approach. Additionally, cueing by other assets outside the troop AO adds
depth, and integration of GSR/IREMBASS, PROPHET, and UAVs into
the screen creates a mix of sensors and redundancy of observation and
surveillance on key NAIs or avenues of approach. Attached or assigned
combat elements (antitank sections, tanks, mechanized infantry,
infantry), positioned behind and in support of the OPs, establish local
security and provide surveillance.
4-7
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
LOCATIONS OF SUBSEQUENT SCREENS

4-19. The troop commander uses additional phase lines, checkpoints, or
platoon boundaries to control the operation. These graphics serve as a
tool to reorient subordinates, reposition subordinates, or conduct
displacement to subsequent screens. Displacement to subsequent screens
is event-driven. The troop commander may also use TIRS or checkpoints
to control the troop’s maneuver.
RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON AREA OF OPERATIONS
4-20. The troop commander assigns clear responsibility of identified
avenues of approach and designated NAIs. The observation of an NAI
must be tied to a PIR or a target acquisition task. The nature of a screen
normally requires platoons to deploy abreast or in depth.
AT/MGS/TANK SECTIONS/INFANTRY PLATOONS
4-21. The troop commander or subordinate platoon leader positions
combat assets in depth supporting the forward OPs oriented on EAs
along templated avenues of approach. They are the primary direct-fire
killing assets. The troop commander establishes tentative BPs, EAs,
engagement criteria, and target handover procedures that support the
troop’s counterreconnaissance and security tasks. The supporting combat
assets must reconnoiter their BPs, develop the BP and EAs (and
alternate and subsequent BPs and EAs) and conduct coordination and
rehearsals with the OPs they are supporting. These assets must be
flexible and adaptive in developing their positions. Critical is the tie
between observer and shooter. Commanders must ensure the
communication and target handover plan is synchronized and that all
observers and combat assets maintain situational awareness through
FBCB2 or repetitive FM friendly forces updates to negate fratricide
incidents.
FORCE TO BE SCREENED
4-22. The troop must orient on the force it is securing. If the main body
is moving, the troop may move to maintain the screen’s position relative
to the main body. The troop commander must understand the protected
force’s scheme of maneuver in order to maintain the proper security
posture and anticipate the troop’s reaction to friendly and threat actions.
ATTACHMENTS
4-23. GSR and engineers are common attachments at troop level.
• GSR/IREMBASS. Sensors are used during screen operations
to augment reconnaissance OPs and to add depth to the
screen. They should be attached to platoons for security but
given their focus, orientation, specific instructions and tasks
by the commander. The commander ensures that the
GSR/IREMBASS elements are integrated into the troop’s
security plan, the displacement plan (security drill), and into
the troop’s CSS plan.
• Engineers. If engineers are attached to the troop, the troop
commander will assign them a priority of mission and priority
of effort IAW higher’s guidance or specified tasks that support
the troop’s scheme of maneuver. During screen operations,
4-8
engineers will normally conduct countermobility operations to

support the commander’s security plan by using turning
obstacles to canalize avenues of approach, fixing obstacles in
support of target acquisition and fire support tasks, and
blocking obstacles to deny the threat a specific avenue of
approach. The commander ensures that the engineer
elements are integrated into the troop’s security plan, the
displacement plan (security drill), and into the troop’s CSS
plan as necessary.
• UAVs. UAVs can provide depth to the troop screen. They can
be the first BCT asset to make visual contact forward of the
troop and maintain contact with elements attempting to
penetrate the screen. If the troop is extended over a large
distance, UAVs can assist in identifying gaps in the
reconnaissance platoon’s surveillance. UAVs may also assist
the troop in displacing. While the tactical UAV maintains
contact with the approaching threat main elements, the
reconnaissance troop may execute its security drill, reducing
the risk of scouts becoming decisively engaged as they
attempt to maintain contact as they displace.
INDIRECT FIRE PLANNING
4-24. Fire planning integrates artillery, and mortar fires, if available.
The troop commander or FIST positions the troop mortars to fire up to
two -thirds of their maximum range, but no less than one-third of the
range forward of the FLOT. A wide AO may require the troop commander
to position them to provide effective coverage of the most likely avenue of
approach. The troop commander or FIST plans artillery fires to
adequately cover any gaps in mortar coverage. Position COLTs, if
attached, or other laser designators along the avenues of approach that
best support the BCT’s essential fire support tasks (EFST). Leaders at all
levels must ensure that each assigned target has a purpose, a location, an
observer, a trigger, and a communication plan, and that it is rehearsed.
DIRECT FIRE PLANNING
4-25. Based on his analysis of the terrain and the threat, the troop
commander determines where to engage the threat (EAs). He also
determines the location of BPs that provide observation, fields of fire, and
cover and concealment that support each EA. See Chapter 5 for more
information on direct fire planning and control.
POSITIONING OF C2, CS, AND CSS ASSETS
4-26. The troop commander positions himself to best command and
control the maneuver of the troop and the conduct of the security mission.
The troop CP occupies a position to provide continuous control and
reporting during initial movements and during occupation of a screen.
The key is to maintain communication with higher and with
subordinates. The 1SG and the medics are positioned behind masking
terrain close enough for rapid response. They are best sited along routes
providing good mobility laterally and in depth.
PATROL REQUIREMENTS
4-27. Patrols are required to cover identified gaps between OPs. The
troop commander tasks the platoon leaders to perform specific patrols
4-9
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
based on threat capabilities and assets available. Platoons report any

information on executed patrols with a patrol report.
FBCB2 FILTER SETTINGS
4-28. Achieving an operational picture begins at the platform level as
users set up their FBCB2 filters. There are filters that apply to the user’s
own system and those that apply to how the user sees other friendly
platforms. There are also red filters that depict how red icons will be
viewed. Filters allow the user to set the icons, overlays, labels, and geo-
referenced graphics that are displayed as part of the overall SA picture.
Filter settings are driven by METT-TC. The brigade S3 or tactical
standing operating procedure (TAC SOP) should dictate SA filter settings
to all units under operational control, attached, or assigned to achieve a
common operational picture.
SECTION III - SCREEN
4-29. Screen is defensive in nature but not passive in execution. It is an

active operation and the most common security mission assigned to the
reconnaissance troop. Troops conduct screen missions to—
• Provide early warning of threat approach.
• Provide real-time information, reaction time, and maneuver
space to the protected force.
• Destroy or repel threat reconnaissance elements within their
capability.
• Impede and harass the threat.
4-30. The screen has the minimum combat power necessary to provide
the desired early warning, but provides the least amount of protection of
any security mission. It does not have the combat power to develop the
situation. It is employed to cover gaps between forces, exposed flanks, or
the rear of stationary or moving forces. The troop normally conducts a
screen when the BCT commander wants to ensure time to respond to an
unexpected threat action and cannot afford to commit other forces to the
task.
4-31. Reconnaissance troops screen the front, flanks, and rear of a
stationary force, but only to the flanks or rear of a moving force.
Screening operations are not performed forward of a moving force. In
noncontiguous brigade operations, the troop may be screening in depth
within the brigade’s battlespace.
4-10
KEY TASKS
4-32. To achieve the intent of a screen mission, the troop must
accomplish the following key tasks:
• Allow no threat ground element to pass through the screen
undetected and unreported.
• Maintain continuous surveillance of all avenues of approach
larger than a designated size into the AO under all visibility
conditions.
• Gain and maintain contact with threat forces and report any
activity within the AO.
• Maintain contact with the protected force and any security
forces operating on its flanks.
• Destroy or repel threat reconnaissance patrols
(counterreconnaissance) within its capabilities and in
accordance with its engagement and destruction criteria.
• Impede or disrupt the threat within its capabilities and in
accordance with its engagement and destruction criteria.
• Do not become decisively engaged.
STATIONARY SCREEN
4-33. The troop can conduct a stationary screen for a stationary or
moving protected force. In order to plan for and perform all the key tasks
of a screen, the protected force commander may provide the troop with
the information below.
AUGMENTATION
4-34. Augmentation is any additional assets the troop receives to
conduct the mission. Augmentation from the BCT can include an
antiarmor, MGS, infantry, or tank platoon; an engineer platoon; a sniper
squad(s); GSR or IREMBASS teams; and air defense or logistical
elements.
THE GENERAL TRACE OF THE SCREEN AND THE TIME THE SCREEN MUST BE
ESTABLISHED
4-35. A PL placed along identifiable terrain graphically indicates the
trace. Consideration should be given to the amount of early warning,
range of indirect fires, desired protected force maneuver space, and fields
of observation. When screening forward of the BCT, this PL represents
the FLOT and may be along or close to a coordinated fire line. Placing
screening forces beyond the trace line requires approval of higher
headquarters, and will usually require modification of fire support
coordination measures (FSCM).
THE WIDTH OF THE SCREENED AO
4-36. The troop may be assigned a wide frontage in excess of its
doctrinal capabilities. If the troop is required to screen beyond the
capacity it can handle, the commander requests additional assets to
accomplish the tasks assigned. Careful consideration must be given when
assigning ground-based sensors their own terrain, since the ability to
execute the mission can be impacted by weather, station time, and
4-11
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
terrain. Ground-based sensors should be used to complement ground

forces and to provide extended depth, some width, and increased
flexibility to the operation.
THE FORCE TO BE SCREENED
4-37. The troop must understand the mission, purpose, and
commander’s intent of the unit it is screening. Knowing this information
allows the troop commander to better focus the platoons and enhances
initiative during execution.
THE REAR BOUNDARY OF THE SCREENING FORCE
4-38. The rear limit of the troop is depicted as a boundary.
Responsibility for the area between the protected force and the troop rear
boundary lies with the protected force. This boundary reflects time and
space requirements, clearly delineates terrain responsibilities, and
provides depth required by the troop. The boundary may also serve as a
reconnaissance handover line to control passing responsibility for the
threat to the protected force.
COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE AND ENGAGEMENT CRITERIA
4-39. The higher headquarters IPB should focus on identifying the
type, quantity, and avenues of approach for threat reconnaissance and
security forces. A thorough understanding of the composition of threat
reconnaissance elements enables the troop to accurately determine likely
reconnaissance avenues of approach and how best to acquire them. This
drives the task organization and positioning of forces. If possible, the
troop commander or XO should work with the staff during terrain
analysis to identify these avenues of approach. The higher commander’s
guidance must specifically define the troop’s engagement and destruction
criteria for counterreconnaissance.
MOVEMENT TO OCCUPY THE SCREEN
4-40. Time and threat situation determine the method of occupying the
screen. There are primarily three methods available to occupy the screen:
• Zone reconnaissance. If the situation is vague or more
information is required on the terrain between the protected
force and the screen line and time is available, the troop
conducts a zone reconnaissance to the screen. This method
identifies any threat in the sector and familiarizes the troop
with the terrain. It is time-consuming, but provides the most
security.
• Infiltration. If the threat situation is vague, or the threat is
known to be in sector, and the intent is not to make contact
with the threat prior to occupying the screen, the troop should
infiltrate to get to the screen. Infiltration provides the
optimum level of stealth, but is also time-consuming and less
secure for the troop due to the reduction of flexibility in
massing combat power.
• Tactical road march. If there is an accurate picture of the
threat situation or time is short, the troop may conduct a
tactical road march to a release point behind the templated
screen and deploy from there to the screen.
4-12
CONTROL OF DISPLACEMENT TO SUBSEQUENT POSITIONS

4-41. The higher headquarters uses PLs and other control measures to
control the operation and orient the screen. Since displacement to
subsequent positions is event-driven, PLs serve to guide the troop
commander’s planning and orientation for displacement to subsequent
screen lines during the execution of the screen mission. The higher
headquarters should define the event criteria triggering displacement.
POSSIBLE FOLLOW-ON MISSIONS
4-42. To facilitate planning and future operations, the troop’s next
likely mission should be defined with enough information to allow the
commander to begin planning and preparing for it. Providing this
information also helps define the end state of the screen mission.
EXAMPLE OF STATIONARY SCREEN

4-43. Events described in the example stationary screen are depicted in
Figure 4-1.
Figure 4-1. Reconnaissance Troop Stationary Screen
4-44. When the troop receives a security mission, its AO is usually

identified by lateral boundaries with an FLOT or LOA (PL SUE) and a
rear boundary (PL JIM) specified. The threat boundary may also be
designated the reconnaissance handover line. The higher headquarters
4-13
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
may include A2C2 measures to facilitate aerial reconnaissance within

and/or beyond the troop’s AO.
4-45. Based on higher headquarters or protected force guidance, the
troop commander develops his plan during troop-leading procedures,
considering the following:
• Friendly force considerations, to include—
Protected force’s mission, commander’s intent, and CCIR.
Mission of adjacent forces.
engagement criteria, and security destruction and
displacement criteria.
Missions of ISR elements, such as a PROPHET or
IREMBASS, operating within the troop AO or in support
of the troop, but not under troop control.
troop.
• Terrain and weather considerations, to include—
or fire support.
• The threat situation, to include—
Type and capabilities of likely threat weapons systems
and NODs.
Special equipment, such as ground sensor systems, signal
intercept, and surveillance radar may be addressed.
depicting composition, dispositions, and likely axis of
advance.
− Identify reconnaissance composition and purpose, and
the objective of threat reconnaissance efforts.
− Identify threat reconnaissance COAs and avenues of
approach, to include mounted and dismounted
infiltration routes.
− Identify possible air insertion landing zones.
• Civilian considerations that may impact on the mission such
as—
Compositions and dispositions of military, paramilitary,
and law enforcement organizations.
4-14

weapons and NODs.
• Key security and reconnaissance tasks that must be
accomplished during the screen.
• Purpose for screen in relation to the protected force’s mission.
• End state for screen.
4-47. The commander develops a mission statement that includes the

screen location, start time, duration, orientation, and follow-on mission
and a concept of operation that describes, as a minimum:
• Movement to initial screen line.
If applicable, zone reconnaissance to answer the
− Focus and tempo for any reconnaissance, to include
changes to tempo based on anticipated contact or
other requirements.
− Identify platoon and other subordinate element tasks,
to include reconnaissance, security, and follow and
support, as required.
− Determine task organization and subordinate unit
AOs based on reconnaissance tasks, security tasks,
and METT-TC factors.
− Integrate reconnaissance methods such as sensor,
surveillance.
− Determine deployment method and select movement
techniques that support the tempo.
If applicable, infiltration to avoid threat forces and
establish the screen.
If applicable, tactical road march to the screen line.
• Establishing the screen.
If necessary, determine changes to task organization and
subordinate unit AOs after zone reconnaissance based on
tasks and METT-TC factors.
Determine primary screen orientation for platoons and
primary OPs, as necessary.
Identify method to gain contact with threat
reconnaissance and other designated threat forces.
Identify engagement criteria for scouts and combat forces,
as necessary.
Identify method of displacement while maintaining
contact to subsequent screen lines.
4-15
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
If applicable, identify initial locations for attached combat

forces, such as SBCT rifle or a tank platoon, that provide
flexible response against threat reconnaissance
throughout the troop AO.
If necessary, identify vehicle positions that allow
utilization of onboard optics, such as LRAS3, to assist in
observation and provide overwatch.
If necessary, determine requirements for short- and long-
duration surveillance of NAIs.
If necessary, determine patrol requirements between or in
support of OPs.
• Conduct reconnaissance that uses cueing, mixing, and
redundancy to integrate troop and other assets into the
security effort to gain and maintain contact throughout the
depth of the AO.
OPs are positioned in depth and focused on NAIs.
UAVs reconnoiter avenues, routes, infiltration lanes, or
key and restrictive terrain forward or to the flanks of the
troop AO.
or transmissions within designated areas containing
suspected threat or supporting forces.
GSR orients on NAIs located on avenues of approach or
routes forward or to the flanks of the troop screen line.
flank avenues of approach or routes leading into the troop
AO.
NBC reconnaissance teams reconnoiter templated attacks
and bypasses.
• Destroy or repel threat reconnaissance in accordance with
troop capabilities and engagement criteria.
Position reconnaissance elements—the “hunters”—as far
forward as possible to gain contact with threat
reconnaissance.
Position attached combat elements—the “killers”—for
flexible response and destruction of threat reconnaissance
without compromising the locations of OPs or ISR
elements.
Array and position hunters and killers with flexibility to
refine or adjust dispositions throughout the operation.
− Coordinate and position elements to accept handover
from higher ISR assets cues.
− Mix troop elements and assets to provide depth and
redundancy within the AO, using GSR and
IREMBASS to make first contact, or on less likely or
restricted reconnaissance avenues of approach.
4-16
− Position or coordinate combat elements to allow

maximum response time and mobility to be guided to
destroy the threat reconnaissance.
• Synchronization of target acquisition tasks with security and
Target description, location (known or templated), and
Criteria to change from target surveillance to designation.
• Synchronize fires to suppress stationary elements or destroy
high-value targets with precision-guided munitions.
Priorities of fire and use of fires to maintain maximum
range forward of the reconnaissance platoons.
Incorporate hasty obstacles with restrictive terrain to halt
reconnaissance elements and enable effective indirect
engagement.
Link surveillance tasking to triggers.
Cover both mounted and dismounted avenues of
approach.
handover.
Accepting from or transferring to another element.
elements.
operation to include—
Boundaries identifying the troop’s AO, line of departure,
and initial and subsequent screen lines.
Designate start points, release points, and rally points for
each route,
PLs, checkpoints, and contact points for coordination with
other elements.
RHOLs, TIRS, or GIRS to assist C2.
4-48. Logistic operations are conducted to prevent the threat from

detecting reconnaissance and combat element locations, to include—
Troop reconnaissance elements should be prepared to
operate for as long as possible (24-72 hours) without
resupply.
Combat forces may require refueling on a daily basis.
Forward movement of resupply vehicles is restricted.
Reconnaissance and combat elements are rotated to
resupply points in the rear of the troop AO.
4-17
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________

supporting elements.
points.
• Resupply, to include emergency and caches.
items.
Drop points away from vehicle hide and OPs.
• Casualty consolidation and evacuation plan that addresses
the location of all aid stations and methods for ground and air
evacuation.
4-49. Define and establish procedures for the communications

architecture, to include reporting flow, and C2 responsibilities, to
include—
• Establishing digital connectivity and communications with
supporting assets.
Communication plan for target or reconnaissance
handover.
FBCB2 friendly SA display to assist clearing fires.
Procedures to track analog elements, such as dismounts,
to avoid fratricide.
Coordination with combat (killer) elements to operate on
the same FM nets, unless they are operation control
(OPCON) to the scout platoons they are operating behind.
Tailored message addressing groups to ensure proper
message routing.
• Identify all BCT aid station internet protocol (IP) addresses
to assist location and navigation to the nearest aid station.
MOVING SCREEN
4-50. Given the nature of US Army operations and the capabilities of
the BCT, the majority of the operations undertaken will be offensive,
usually operating over extended distances. The same planning
considerations discussed above apply to a moving screen, with additional
requirements to enable the troop to reorient OPs and/or screen lines with
the movement of the protected force. The troop may be required to
conduct moving flank or rear screens. The troop’s maneuver is regulated
by the requirement to maintain the time and distance factors desired by
4-18
the protected force commander. UAVs or sensors may assume the screen
during the maneuver of reconnaissance platoons or sections, or work to
extend the areas of coverage.
4-51. Screening the rear of a moving force is essentially the same as a
stationary screen. As the protected force moves, the troop occupies a
series of successive screens and the protected force moves forward.
4-52. The troop may conduct a moving flank screen by itself or as part
of the squadron or BCT. The width of the screen AO is not as important
as maintaining orientation on the force being protected and maintaining
continuous observation of the threat avenues of approach that might
affect the protected force’s maneuver. Excluding the protected force’s
front and rear security forces, the troop screens from the front of the
protected force’s lead combat element to the rear of the protected
elements.
4-53. There are three basic techniques for occupying a flank screen of a
moving force. The technique, or combination of techniques, is determined
by the threat situation and the knowledge available on the threat, the
BCT commander’s intent, and the speed that the protected force is
moving.
4-54. In the first technique, the troop crosses the LD separately from
the protected force and conducts a tactical road march within an AO
parallel to the force. It then deploys from a release point to the initial
screen positions and orientation. Scout platoons occupy OPs as they
reach them. This is the fastest but least secure technique. If available,
UAVs can reconnoiter forward of the troop or maintain contact with the
protected force. Sensors can occupy OPs and provide long-range
surveillance of threat avenues of approach. This technique is appropriate
when the protected force is moving very quickly, the LD is not an LC, or
earlier ISR indicates threat contact is not likely in the area through
which the troop is moving.
4-55. In the second technique, the troop crosses the LD separately from
the protected force and conducts a zone reconnaissance within an AO
parallel to the force. Screen positions are occupied as they are reached.
This technique is slower, but provides better security to the troop and the
protected force. This technique is appropriate when the protected force is
moving slower, the LD is not an LC, or earlier ISR indicates threat
contact is possible in the troop AO.
4-56. In the third technique, the troop crosses the LD with the
protected force and conducts a zone reconnaissance out to the screen.
This technique provides the most security for the troop and the protected
force, but requires more time. This technique is appropriate when the
protected force is moving slowly, the LD is the LC, or the threat situation
is vague or expected.
4-57. In all three techniques the troop must maintain contact with the
protected force, reorient the screen in relation to the protected force’s
maneuver, and conduct reconnaissance and screen in two directions
(forward of the troop and flank).
4-19
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
APPLYING COMMAND AND CONTROL MEASURES

4-58. The inherent dual orientation of a moving flank screen, direction
of movement versus orientation of the screen, poses numerous challenges
for control of the operation. Control measures must facilitate both
orientations. The procedures below provide a method to applying graphic
control measures to a moving flank screen (see Figure 4-2).
• Use PLs to control the reconnaissance platoon’s movement
(placed perpendicular to the screen), but do not divide
avenues of approach. Plan to use these PLs as on-order
boundaries for subordinate platoons if threat contact is
gained. Place PLs no more than 2 to 3 kilometers apart
(corresponding to the width of a reconnaissance platoon’s
screen frontage).
• Use additional PLs rearward of (parallel to) the initial screen
to control retrograde movement (toward the protected force).
Plan to use these PLs as subsequent (on-order) screens.
• If available, use mortar firing positions or checkpoints to
control movement of the mortar section. Position these firing
positions rearward of the screen where they allow the
mortars to fire two-thirds maximum range forward or cover
likely avenues of approach. Plan subsequent (on-order)
mortar firing positions between the screen and the protected
force.
4-59. While the number of graphic control measures and required

planning may seem excessive, they provide maximum flexibility in terms
of mission execution. The troop commander can issue simple FRAGOs to
adjust the plan to the threat situation.
4-20
Figure 4-2. Troop Moving Flank Screen Graphics
REPOSITIONING THE SCREEN

4-60. The troop must reposition to stay oriented on the force it is
securing. Movement along the screen is determined by the speed of the
protected force. Movement is conducted by one of the following
techniques (see also Figure 4-3):
• Continuous marching.
• Bounding by platoons (alternately or successively).
• Bounding by OPs (alternately or successively).
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
TECHNIQUE CONSIDERATIONS ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES

Continuous Main body movement very Fast. Least secure.
Marching fast. Maintains unit integrity.
Perform as route recon.
Contact not likely.
Air screen active on flank.
Alternate Bounds by Main body movement is Fast. May leave temporary
Platoon faster. Good surveillance. gaps.
Bound rear to front by Maintains unit integrity.
platoons.
Contact possible.
Successive Bounds Main body movement is Most secure. Slowest method.
by Platoon slow. Maintains maximum Less secure during
Bound simultaneous or in surveillance. simultaneous move.
succession by platoon or Maintains unit integrity. May leave temporary
troop. gaps.
Threat contact possible.
Bounds by Main body movement is Very secure. Slow.
Observation Post faster. Maintains maximum Disrupts unit integrity.
(Alternate and Threat contact possible. surveillance.
Successive) Execute bounds from rear
to front.
Figure 4-3. Screen Movement Techniques
CONTINUOUS MARCHING
4-61. This technique is appropriate when the protected force is moving
quickly and contact is not likely. It is the least secure movement
technique.
4-62. Reconnaissance platoons deploy in platoon column formation
with their reconnaissance and security orientation to the flank. The
remaining troop elements, organic or attached, deploy in depth between
the screen line and the protected force. The trace of the screen is
essentially the route of advance for the reconnaissance platoons in
column. The remainder of the troop moves along a designated route or
axis of advance (see Figure 4-4).
4-22
Figure 4-4. Troop Repositions the Screen by Continuous Marching
BOUNDING BY PLATOONS
4-63. This technique is appropriate when the protected force requires
greater protection than afforded by continuous marching, is not moving
quickly, or knows threat contact is possible. Bounds may be alternating
or successive. Bounding platoons alternately may leave temporary gaps
in the screen as they move. Bounding platoons successively is more
secure but slower than bounding platoons alternately.
4-64. Platoons deploy into their AOs by alternately bounding around or
to the rear of another (see Figure 4-5), or successively bounding around
forward platoons along the screen (see Figure 4-6) to assume new
positions along the screen. The remaining troop elements, organic or
attached, move in depth between the screen line and the protected force
to best support the reconnaissance platoons.
4-23
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Figure 4-5. Troop Repositions the Screen by Alternately

Bounding Platoons
Figure 4-6. Troop Repositions the Screen by Successively

Bounding Platoons
4-24
BOUNDING BY OBSERVATION POSTS

4-65. This technique is appropriate when the main body is moving
slowly, contact is possible, and maximum security is required. Bounding
OPs alternately will disrupt the integrity of the scout platoons as OPs
bound to their next position. Bounding OPs successively is easier for the
scout platoons to control.
4-66. The troop initially deploys the scout platoons abreast and
alternately bound the rearmost OP around or to the rear of the forward
OP to assume a new position along the screen line (see Figure 4-7). OPs
may successively bound along the screen line (see Figure 4-8). The
number of OPs on the screen line at any given time may be reduced as
two or more may be bounding at any given time. The protected force’s
rate of advance determines this.
Figure 4-7. Troop Moves by Platoon Alternately Bounding

Observation Posts
4-25
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Figure 4-8. Troop Moves by Platoon Successively Bounding

Observation Posts
SECURITY DRILL
4-67. A security drill is a series of rehearsed actions a platoon or troop
takes to maintain contact with the advancing threat force throughout the
depth of its AO in accordance with commander’s guidance. It is used
when displacing the screen to subsequent screen line or OP positions.
The displacement criteria is established in the commander’s guidance
and OPORD and must be clearly understood at all echelons. The troop’s
conduct of security drills is tempered by the protected force commander’s
overall concept, intent, and scheme of maneuver. Threat actions, or
events, drive security drill execution (see Figure 4-9 through Figure 4-
11).
4-26
Figure 4-9. Reconnaissance Troop Security Drill
4-27
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
4-28
4-68. At troop level, the security drill combines the displacement of the
initial screen with the actions of the combat elements such as antitank
platoons, MGS platoons, tank platoons, or mechanized infantry platoons
from the BCT. Combat platoons occupy BPs in advance of a security drill
to support platoon or section displacement based on engagement and
disengagement criteria in addition to METT-TC factors.
4-69. A detailed, rehearsed indirect fire plan must be established to
assist in the displacement of the troop. If applicable, caches of mortar
ammunition must be positioned at primary and subsequent mortar firing
positions.
4-29
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
4-70. At platoon level, OPs gain contact with the threat main body,
then report and prepare to displace to a subsequent position. When the
threat force reaches the OP break point or trigger point (point where the
OP must displace or his position/movement will compromise him to the
threat), the OP passes off the responsibility to maintain contact to
another OP in depth. The platoon displaces its OPs to subsequent
positions in depth while maintaining contact with the threat. If attached
or in support, UAVs and ground sensors enhance the ability of the troop
to maintain contact without compromising the ground scouts.
4-71. Withdrawing to the main battle area should be planned and
executed as a rearward passage of lines under threat contact. Too often,
units underestimate the speed of a threat attack and withdraw too late.
Critical execution aspects include ensuring all elements have updated
digital overlays of obstacles and friendly forces; transmitting the troop’s
SA data to the forces they are passing through; coordinating recognition
signals, passage points, and return routes and depicting them in a digital
operations overlay; and planning indirect fires to cover the withdrawal.
Withdrawing analog vehicles, or those whose FBCB2 is inoperative,
should notify the controlling headquarters that they cannot send SA data
and will not appear on FBCB2. Those vehicles should link up and move
with a vehicle that is transmitting SA data to reduce the possibility of
fratricide.
4-72. A security drill is one of the more difficult tasks the troop
executes. Coordination, rehearsals, planned depth, cueing, mixing, and
redundancy tied to engagement and displacement criteria are paramount
for successful execution for displacement in and out of contact.
SECTION IV - AREA SECURITY
4-73. Units conduct area security missions primarily during stability

operations and support operations to deny the threat the ability to
influence friendly actions in a specific area, to deny the threat use of an
area for its own purposes, or to protect an HVA. This may entail
occupying and securing an area before the threat can, or taking actions to
destroy threat forces already present. Area security involves a variety of
techniques and may include reconnaissance, security, defensive,
offensive, stability, and support tasks.
4-74. Area security is a form of security that includes reconnaissance
and security of designated personnel, airfields, unit convoys, facilities,
main supply routes, lines of communications, equipment, and critical
points. The reconnaissance troop may conduct the following in support of
area security:
• Area, route, or zone reconnaissance.
• Screen.
• Offense and defense tasks (within capability based on METT-
TC).
• Convoy security.
4-30
• HVA security.
NOTE: The reconnaissance troop relies on the BCT to provide combat elements to perform
offense and defense actions if the threat situation is not permissive.
4-75. The troop may conduct the following additional tasks in stability
operations and support operations:
• Secure a base camp.
• Liaison.
• Conduct compliance inspections.
• Conduct presence operations.
• Support checkpoint operations.
• Provide humanitarian support.
• React to civil disturbance.
4-76. An area security force neutralizes or defeats threat operations in
a specified area. It operates in an area delineated by the headquarters
assigning the area security mission. It screens, reconnoiters, attacks,
defends, and delays (within capability) as necessary to accomplish its
mission. Area security operations may be offensive or defensive in nature
and focus on the threat, the asset or element being protected, or a
combination of the two. Commanders may balance the level of security
measures with the type and level of threat posed in the specific area;
however, all-around security is essential.
4-77. The factors of METT-TC determine specific unit missions. Factors
such as—
• The natural defensive characteristics of the terrain.
• Existing roads and waterways for military lines of
communication and civilian commerce.
• The control of land and water areas and avenues of approach
surrounding the area to be secured extending to a range
beyond that of threat artillery, rockets, and mortars.
• The control of airspace.
• The proximity to critical sites such as airfields, power
generation plants, and civic buildings.
4-78. Due to the possibility of commanders tying their forces to fixed

installations or sites, these types of security missions may become
defensive in nature. This must be carefully balanced with the need for
offensive action. Early warning of threat activity is paramount in the
conduct of area security missions and provides the commander with time
to react to any threat. Proper reconnaissance planning coupled with
dismounted/mounted patrols the integration of ISR assets (UAVs,
GSR/IREMBASS, PROPHET, HUMINT, IMINT, electronic intelligence
[ELINT], Q36/37 radar, Sentinel radar) that allow for cueing, mixing, and
depth for the security force.
4-79. A perimeter is established when a unit must secure an area
where the defense is not tied into an adjacent unit. Perimeters vary in
shape depending on METT-TC. If the commander determines the most
4-31
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
probable direction of threat attack, he may weight that part of the

perimeter to cover that approach. The perimeter shape conforms to the
terrain features that best use observation and fields of fire.
4-80. Perimeters are divided into platoon sectors with boundaries and
contact points. Mutual support and coordination between defensive
elements (usually combat elements within the brigade) require careful
planning, positioning, and coordination due to the circular aspects of the
perimeter. A screen line is established, integrating OPs, GSR, and
patrols. Combat elements are placed overwatching chokepoints or high-
speed avenues of approach. Likely threat drop zones, landing zones, or
bases are identified and kept under observation. Air assets, if available,
are integrated into the reconnaissance plan (see Figure 4-12).
Figure 4-12. Area Security Operations for a Cavalry Squadron (RSTA)
4-32
AREA SECURITY TECHNIQUES

4-81. When deploying for area security, the troop establishes a
perimeter around the point, area, or asset to be secured. Vehicle positions
are adjusted to orient on likely threat avenues of approach. The
headquarters element is positioned in the center of the perimeter to
facilitate C2 and to ensure enhanced protection. Vehicle and dismounted
positions are selected to provide effective protection and
observation/fields of fire on mounted and dismounted avenues of
approach. Direct and indirect fire planning and obstacle planning are
initiated as survivability and fighting position preparation begins.
4-82. Platoons deploy into assigned AOs and establish local security. If
necessary they clear their AO and establish or occupy OPs, checkpoints,
and/or fighting positions oriented on NAIs, avenues of approach, routes,
and/or infiltration lanes. The platoons search, safeguard, and evacuate
EPWs and/or detained civilians to the troop collection point (normally the
troop trains). They integrate crew-served and dismounted automatic
weapons to create a fire plan and deploy antitank ambushes as
necessary. OPs are deployed to observe likely avenues of approach, to
provide early warning of threat activity, and to assist in controlling
indirect fires.
4-83. The troop also employs patrols to enhance security.
Reconnaissance patrols and combat patrols are employed to become
familiar with the AOs, to gain information on threat forces, to liaison and
gain information on the civilian populace and needs of society, and to
destroy small threat dismounted reconnaissance elements.
4-84. If assigned, the mortar section occupies a fire point in the center
of the perimeter. The section lays its mortars on the priority target
established by the troop commander, but is prepared to shift fires 360
degrees. The section will continue to improve its position and plan and
emplace ammunition caches as time allows.
4-85. The troop coordinates for and emplaces supporting ISR assets,
such as GSR and IREMBASS. If available, it coordinates for UAV
coverage of NAIs and along avenues of approach. These ISR assets are
positioned to provide depth to the troop’s security plan.
HIGH-VALUE ASSET SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

4-86. New systems and communications equipment have resulted in a
significant increase in the number of critical systems on the battlefield
that have no defense or security capability. Commonly called HVAs,
these may include artillery and air defense radars, multiple launch
rocket system (MLRS) units, UAV launch and recovery sites, C2 nodes,
and intelligence acquisition systems. The troop or some of its subordinate
elements may be assigned a mission to provide security for HVAs,
particularly when in a resupply or reorganization phase.
4-87. When assigned an HVA security mission, the commander must
resolve the following issues—
• What are the IP address, FM frequency, location, and linkup
point of the HVA and quick reaction force (QRF)?
4-33
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
• What is the mission and movement/positioning plan of the

HVA?
• What is the threat? What are its capabilities?
• Can the HVA be easily detected and subjected to indirect
fires? If so, the security force needs to consider its own
survivability and maintain adequate standoff from the HVA.
• What is the expected duration of the security mission, and
who will determine security force change of mission?
• What other forces are in the area that can assist if needed or
need to be aware of the presence of the HVA and the security
force? Consider other HVA security forces, military police,
engineers, and logistics base clusters.
• Is there a QRF? If so, consider the following:
Current location and time required to reinforce.
Unit’s capabilities.
Graphic control measures (including restrictive fire
measures).
• Are there any triggers to leave the security mission to enter
the close fight? Is there an implied reserve mission for the
security force?
• What is the mission/movement plan for the parent unit of the
security force? The security force needs to maintain SA on the
parent force to facilitate linkup or to react to orders to join
the close fight.
• Who will be the security force’s higher headquarters (brigade,
squadron, HVA headquarters)? What are its IP address,
location, FM frequency, and movement plan?
• Who provides logistical security?
SECTION V - CONVOY SECURITY
4-88. Convoy security missions are conducted when insufficient

friendly forces are available to continuously secure lines of
communication in an AO. They may also be conducted in conjunction
with route security missions. A convoy security force operates to the
front, flanks, and rear of a convoy element moving along a designated
route. Convoy security missions are offensive in nature and orient on the
force being protected.
4-89. The troop must be augmented with a combat platoon in order to
conduct convoy security missions independently under permissive METT-
TC. The reconnaissance troop should also be reinforced with engineers to
reduce obstacles along the route. The higher headquarters should
coordinate additional ISR assets to support the security mission. UAVs or
aerial reconnaissance should reconnoiter the route in advance of the
troop’s lead elements.
4-34
CRITICAL TASKS
4-90. A convoy security mission has certain critical tasks that guide
planning and execution. To protect a convoy, the security force must
accomplish the following critical tasks:
• Reconnoiter and determine the trafficability of the route the
convoy will travel.
• Clear the route of obstacles or positions from which the threat
could influence movement along the route.
• Provide early warning and prevent the threat from impeding,
harassing, containing, seizing, or destroying the convoy.
CONVOY SECURITY ELEMENTS

4-91. A convoy security force is organized into four elements:
• Reconnaissance element, which performs tasks associated
with zone and route reconnaissance forward of the convoy.
• Screen element, which provides early warning and security to
the convoy’s flanks and rear (troop may utilize outposts).
• Escort element, which provides close-in protection to the
convoy. It may also provide a reaction force to assist in
repelling or destroying threat contact.
• Reaction force, which provides firepower and support to the
elements above in order to assist in developing the situation
or conducting a hasty attack. It may also perform duties of
the escort element.
4-92. If participating in a convoy security mission under a higher
headquarters, the troop may be assigned tasks as the reconnaissance or
screening element. Under permissive METT-TC it may be assigned the
escort task. If conducting the mission independently, the troop assigns
reconnaissance and screening tasks to its reconnaissance platoons and
the escort task to attached combat elements. The troop’s higher
headquarters provides the reaction force.
4-93. The commander must coordinate with the escorted unit to obtain
or exchange the following information:
• Time and place of linkup and orders brief.
• Number and type of vehicles to be escorted.
• HVAs within the convoy.
• Available weapon systems, ammunition, and ordnance (crew-
served, squad, and individual).
• Vehicle maintenance status and operating speeds.
• Convoy personnel roster.
• Troop or escorted unit SOP, as necessary.
4-35
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
CONVOY SECURITY TECHNIQUES

4-94. The troop commander organizes and coordinates the efforts of his
unit to fulfill the critical tasks associated with the convoy security
mission. In a nonpermissive environment, the troop should be augmented
with attached combat elements to conduct convoy security. A platoon is
tasked to conduct a route reconnaissance focusing on route trafficability,
threat forces that may influence movement along the route, or refugees
or civilian traffic that may disrupt movement. Engineers are attached to
the platoon to assist reconnoitering and classifying bridges, fords, and
obstacles along the route. Normally the reconnaissance element should
operate from 3 to 4 kilometers ahead of the main body of the convoy. If
available, UAVs or aerial reconnaissance should precede the
reconnaissance element by 5 to 8 kilometers dependent on the terrain
and visibility conditions.
4-95. The recce troop assigns the screening task to his two remaining
platoons, one to either flank. The BRT organizes its remaining platoon
into two sections, with each section performing the flank screen. The
troop commander must develop graphic control measures to enable a
moving flank screen centered on the convoy. The screen’s purpose is to
prevent observation for employment of effective indirect fires and identify
combat elements prior to a direct fire engagement against the convoy.
Screening elements gain and maintain contact with threat
reconnaissance and combat elements, employing indirect fire to suppress
and guiding reaction or escort elements to defeat or destroy the threat
force.
4-96. The combat platoon is assigned the escort mission to provide local
security throughout the length of the convoy. It should have an element
with engineers deployed as an advance guard to the convoy, with its
remaining vehicles dispersed throughout the convoy order of march. The
escort element defeats close ambushes and marks bypasses or breaches
obstacles identified by reconnaissance as necessary. If the reaction force
is not available in sufficient time, the escort element may be required to
provide a reaction force to defeat far ambushes or block attacking threat
forces.
4-97. In a permissive environment, the troop may conduct convoy
security without attachments or augmentation, but it must organize
differently to accomplish the same tasks (see Figure 4-13). A platoon is
tasked to conduct a route reconnaissance and provide a section for flank
security. A second platoon provides security to the other flank and rear.
The last platoon is assigned the escort mission for local security and the
advance guard. The BRT commander tasks one platoon to conduct a route
reconnaissance and security to both flanks and the second platoon to
conduct the escort, to include advance and rear guards.
4-36
Figure 4-13. Reconnaissance Troop Conducts Convoy Security
4-98. The troop may utilize an outposting technique as an alternative

to screen the route after it has been reconnoitered (see Figure 4-14). It is
similar to the technique for covering lateral and boundary routes in
reconnaissance operations; however, for route security it is generally
assigned to a platoon for the specific purpose of securing a route for a
convoy. It involves employing OPs on critical portions of the route or on
key avenues of approach to the route to provide early warning of threat
elements attempting to interdict the route or convoy.
Figure 4-14. Brigade Reconnaissance Troop

Conducts Outposting of a Route
4-37
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
4-99. Outposting differs from a conventional screen in that the outposts

are oriented on the route rather than on the friendly main body.
Normally, the outposting element follows the element that is executing
the route reconnaissance (see Figure 4-15). Outposts have a limited
ability to destroy small threat forces attempting to influence the route.
Their primary purpose is to acquire the threat and then to direct the
employment of reaction forces or indirect fire to destroy it.
Figure 4-15. Recce Troop Conducts Convoy Security

Mission with Outposting
4-38
Chapter 5
Other Tactical Operations

Other tactical operations
are specialized tasks that CONTENTS
require planning and Movement .....................................................5-2
Administrative Movement ........................5-2
development of training
Tactical Movement ...................................5-3
associated with tactics, Offense .........................................................5-9
techniques, and pro- Purpose.....................................................5-9
cedures. These types of Characteristics .........................................5-10
operations are mainly Fire and Movement...................................5-10
Hasty Attack..............................................5-11
based on SOPs to ensure Defend as an Economy of Force ................5-15
they can be conducted Purpose.....................................................5-15
quickly and efficiently. Fundamentals ...........................................5-16
Digitization increases the Defensive Tasks .......................................5-18
situational awareness of Principles of Fire Control ........................5-19
Engagement Area Development..............5-21
troop leaders during other Target Acquisition ......................................5-32
tactical operations. Assembly Areas ...........................................5-33
Quartering Party Activities ......................5-34
Movement and Occupation......................5-34
These operations may be Security .....................................................5-34
Readiness Condition Levels....................5-35
considered a routine part Routine Tasks...........................................5-36
of the combat operations Relief in Place ..............................................5-36
discussed in preceding Methods of Relief in Place.......................5-37
chapters; however, they Planning ....................................................5-38
are no less important. This Sequence of Relief ...................................5-39
Passage of Command..............................5-39
chapter focuses on— Reconnaissance .......................................5-39
Security .....................................................5-39
Movement Control....................................5-40
• Movement. Passage of Lines..........................................5-40
Key Tasks..................................................5-40
• Limited offensive Graphic Control Measures ......................5-41
and defensive Planning Considerations .........................5-44
operations. Breach Operations.......................................5-45
Breaching Fundamentals ........................5-45
• Target acquisition Planning Considerations .........................5-46
in support of the
BCT’s fire support
plan.
• Specialized tasks such as relief in place, passage of lines, and
breaches.
The differences in the capabilities and limitations between the recce

troop and the BRT associated with their TOEs and METT-TC must be
considered in the assignment and performance of other tactical
operations. The recce troop is capable of performing some missions
with or without reinforcement that the BRT is not (see Figure 5-1).
5-1
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Recce Troop BRT

Movement F F
Offensive Operations
Fire and Movement P P
Hasty Attack R/P NC
Defensive Operations as an Economy of Force
Defend an AO R/P NC
Defend a BP R/P NC
Target Acquisition F F
Assembly Area Activities F F
Relief in Place F F
Passage of Lines F F
Breach Operations R/P R/P
F = Fully Capable
R = Capable When Reinforced
P = Capable Under Permissive METT-TC
NC = Not Capable
Figure 5-1. Troop Capabilities in Other Operations
SECTION I - MOVEMENT
5-1. Based on reconnaissance missions and decentralized execution,

troop maneuver does not lend itself to strict formations and their
associated movement techniques unless conducting missions that require
greater C2 and mutual observation and support between platoons.
5-2. Movement within the various operational environments can be
complex to execute when considering heavy route congestion, battlefield
debris, limited route priority, converging forces, threat ground or air
interdiction, civilian noncombatants, effects of terrain, and requirements
to cross unit boundaries. In a noncontiguous environment, movement
planning is paramount to the troop’s successful repositioning within and
between AOs. Movements may be classified as administrative or tactical.
ADMINISTRATIVE MOVEMENT
5-3. Administrative movement occurs in the communications zone to
deploy or reposition forces. Administrative movements are planned by
the higher headquarters S4, and are normally closely coordinated and
controlled by the movement control center responsible for that
communications zone. Administrative movement may include reception,
staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) activities as required
for the brigade’s deployment into an AO.
5-2
_____________________________________________________ Chapter 5 – Other Tactical Operations
TACTICAL MOVEMENT
5-4. Tactical movement includes movement and maneuver during
reconnaissance or when contact is anticipated. In a tactical movement,
troop elements are organized to react to or facilitate combat. Movement
in a combat zone of corps and below is considered tactical, as is
movement around an area of responsibility while participating in
stability or support operations. Tactical movements are planned by the
higher headquarters S3, with the XO serving as the movement control
officer. In rear areas they are coordinated with movement control centers.
5-5. Tactical movements may be conducted by ground, air, rail, or
water. Ground movements are normally conducted using tactical
movement or as road marches. Tactical movement includes formations
and techniques that enable a unit to traverse terrain. These formations
and techniques (traveling, traveling overwatch, or bounding overwatch)
are determined by the likelihood of enemy contact. Road marches are
characterized by the following factors:
• Unit relocation when threat contact is not expected.
• Prescribed rates of march and intervals.
• Rapid movement.
• Security.
5-6. Maneuver is the movement of combat forces on the battlefield in

relation to the threat. Supported by fire or potential fire from all sources,
combat forces maneuver to gain positional advantage from which to
destroy or threaten destruction of the threat to accomplish the mission
(see FM 1-02 [FM 101-5-1]).
5-7. Troop tactical movement is completely dependent on METT-TC
and reconnaissance tempo, reconnaissance focus, and engagement
criteria. Tactical movement is executed to allow flexibility in reacting to
known or chance contact and to minimize casualties and vehicle losses.
Troop movement control may be decentralized, with platoons moving and
executing tasks that are not mutually supportive. Platoons may move
separately, either mounted or dismounted.
5-8. The troop commander should consider the following while
planning tactical movement in conjunction with a reconnaissance or
security mission.
• Determine and adjust mounted and dismounted movement
that reflects the reconnaissance tempo, threat weapon system
stand-off ranges, NOD capabilities, and enables contact to be
gained under the most advantageous conditions.
• Determine troop formations when moving under centralized
control, and platoon positioning/orientation under
decentralized control.
Column when speed is critical, ease of control is desired,
and/or troop is moving through restrictive terrain or on a
route.
5-3
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Line when speed is not critical, troop is reconnoitering

across a front with minimal threat contact, or conducting
security or defensive operations.
Vee when contact is possible, troop is reconnoitering
terrain allowing dispersion, and/or forward
reconnaissance is required with a follow-and-
assume/support, reserve, or follow-on mission
requirement.
• Develop graphic control measures that enable centralized or
decentralized control.
Assign platoon AOs, axes of advance, or routes to
facilitate decentralized control.
Identify checkpoints and GIRS/TIRS to enable flexibility
during movement.
• Determine positions and movement of commander and troop
control elements to best observe and influence operations
while maintaining contact with higher and adjacent units.
• Identify communication methods and techniques to command
and control the operation based on higher headquarters
limitations and other METT-TC factors.
• If applicable, determine troop movement techniques based on
reconnaissance tempo, likelihood of enemy contact, and/or
ability of platoons to provide mutual support.
• If available, position and move attached combat elements in
depth behind the reconnaissance platoons to attack or defend
in support of reconnaissance elements.
• If available, position and move the mortar section to provide
fires across the troop front, or at least to the main effort,
while maintaining one-third to two-thirds of their effective
range to the front of the lead scouts.
TACTICAL ROAD MARCH
5-9. Successful road movements must be well organized. The
organization and responsibilities of the troop and its higher headquarters
for road marches are best suited for inclusion in the unit SOP. Units
organize into march columns to conduct movement. A march column
includes all elements of a force using the same routes for a single
movement under the control of a single commander. Whenever possible,
battalions and above march in multiple columns over multiple routes to
reduce closing time. A large column may be composed of four elements,
each under the control of a subordinate commander. When conducting a
road march under control of its higher headquarters, the troop is
assigned and/or provides elements to the following:
• Reconnaissance party.
• Quartering party.
• Main body.
• Trail party.
5-4
Reconnaissance Party
5-10. The size of the reconnaissance party depends on the factors of
METT-TC and the number of routes. It normally consists of a
reconnaissance platoon, but for a brigade-sized element, it may involve
the entire troop on one or more routes. It may be preceded by UAVs to
gather initial information about the route(s) and surrounding terrain.
The party may have engineers and combat elements attached, depending
on the expected threat. The party normally moves by infiltration and
reports to the movement control officer who determines the report times,
information requirements, follow-on mission after completion of the
reconnaissance, and coordinates bypasses, as necessary. The
reconnaissance party conducts route reconnaissance with a potential
follow-on mission of area reconnaissance of the unit’s march destination
such as an assembly area.
Quartering Party
5-11. The quartering party is normally a composite higher
headquarters organization consisting of subordinate element quartering
parties. They are employed when the unit is going to occupy an assembly
area upon arrival at its march destination. The higher headquarters
provides a command and control element, such as a tactical or jump CP,
and the party moves by infiltration. Subordinate element quartering
parties should be organized and conducted as a combat patrol and are
normally led by the XO or 1SG with sufficient personnel to clear and
secure their assigned area.
Main Body
5-12. The main body is composed of the bulk of the troop’s higher
headquarters and is organized into serials and march units. Within a
brigade-sized march column, battalions and squadrons are considered
serials, divided into company/troop or platoon-sized march units. Serials
and march units should move task organized for the follow-on mission
when possible.
Trail Party
5-13. The trail party is organized to conduct repair and recovery of
vehicles, medical aid and evacuation, and unscheduled refueling. In
addition to the march column trail party, each serial has a trail party as
its last march unit. It is organized from the unit’s combat trains under
control of the maintenance officer. If a vehicle cannot be repaired or
towed by the serial trail party, the crew is left with the vehicle and the
trail party must coordinate with the march unit trail party or return for
its recovery. The movement order must address other criteria and actions
in such cases, such as vehicle destruction, based on METT-TC.
5-14. Movement may be considered either deliberate or hasty.
Deliberate movements are normally administrative in nature and may
require crossing corps, divisional, joint task force, or national boundaries.
Hasty movements are normally in conjunction with combat operations
with the troop moving across the parent unit’s AO, especially in a
noncontiguous environment.
5-5
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
5-15. Movement is heavily determined by backwards planning. The

mission following the movement determines the movement completion
times, pass times, start times, and march serial and unit organization.
The basic considerations in planning a road march are listed below:
• Time available.
• Distance of the move.
• Current threat situation.
• Availability and condition of routes.
• Size of the unit.
• Types, numbers, and characteristics of vehicles that must
move.
5-16. When moving as part of a higher headquarters road march, and

not tasked as the reconnaissance party, the troop will normally be a
march unit as part of the main body, providing a quartering party to the
quartering party element. If the troop is conducting an independent road
march, it organizes into three elements: the quartering party, the main
body, and the trail element.
• Quartering party. The quartering party reconnoiters and
prepares the march destination area before the troop main
body arrives.
• Main body. The troop normally moves as a single march unit
in column formation when conducting a tactical road march.
To ensure dispersion and prevent congestion, the unit uses
march columns based on the commander’s METT-TC
assessment and situational requirements.
• Trail element. The trail element, under the supervision of the
1SG or XO, is composed of personnel and equipment normally
assigned to the troop trains. Depending on the logistical
support available to the troop, this party handles emergency
vehicle repair, recovery, medical aid and evacuation, and
immediate refueling. As a minimum, the trail party assesses
maintenance problems within its capabilities, and coordinates
recovery and repair with the higher headquarters.
5-17. As part of troop-leading procedures, the commander considers or

takes the following actions:
• Prepare and issue a WARNO, using FBCB2, FM, or oral
communication, giving the troop’s mission, SP location and
time, earliest time for movement from present location to SP,
preparation timeline, and any follow-on missions. This
enables the platoon leaders time to execute their troop-
leading procedures in preparation for the movement.
• Analyze the situation to determine if any of the movement
factors (such as order of march, rate of march, or interval)
specified in the troop SOP must be altered to meet mission
requirements.
5-6
• Identify critical points that may cause congestion,

canalization, or timing problems along the route of march.
• For limited visibility movement, consider the effects on
navigation and march speed because of capabilities and
variations of different night observation devices in use by the
troop and attached elements.
• Conduct a map reconnaissance of the route (if assigned) or
determine the best available route.
• Time permitting, the troop commander or designated
representative, such as the lead platoon leader, should
conduct a reconnaissance from the initial position to the SP to
determine travel time. Scheduled halts can be designated on
the digital overlay along the route of march.
• Organize and dispatch the quartering party (if occupying an
assembly area).
• Prepare the movement order with FBCB2 overlays, strip
maps for non-FBCB2-equipped vehicles, or acetate overlays
based on mission requirements and reconnaissance
information.
• Establish the readiness condition (REDCON).
5-18. The troop movement order should contain the following

information:
• March order.
• Start point.
• Designated route of march, including waypoint data.
• March speed.
• Formations.
• Intervals.
• Weapons orientation.
• Actions at halts, both scheduled and unscheduled.
• Release point.
• Actions at release point.
• Final positions.
• Critical points (such as choke points, fords, or ambush sites).
• Threat situation.
• TIRS/GIRS.
• Rally points.
OVERLAYS
5-19. The troop commander prepares a FBCB2 digital overlay that
depicts the designated route of march, SP, selected checkpoints,
scheduled halts, and RP. The SP should be near recognizable terrain and
far enough away from the march unit’s initial position to allow it time to
deploy into march formation prior to reaching it.
5-7
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
5-20. Acetate overlays are prepared for analog units or for backups to
the digital overlays in the event of digital failure or the attachment of
nondigitized units. They contain the same information as the digital
overlay. Strip maps and traffic control points help control analog
elements attached or OPCON to the troop. The strip map should contain
the same information that is displayed on the digital and/or acetate
overlay, to include the distances between points. Detailed sketches of the
scheduled halts and potentially confusing areas should be provided to
each driver and included in the strip map.
ACTIONS DURING THE MARCH
5-21. The troop commander positions himself where he can best control
the movement of the troop. This may be behind the lead platoon, to
respond to contingencies while on the move. If applicable, the troop CP
should be positioned farther back in the column as a security measure to
disperse C2.
5-22. During the road march, the troop commander and the XO or CP
monitors the progress of the troop on tactical displays, reviewing FBCB2
reports as required. This facilitates movement under radio listening
silence or results in a significant reduction in FM communication. The
troop commander can track the progress of his troop on the automated
operations overlay during movement to and occupation of the assembly
area.
5-23. The troop’s column organization must provide adequate security
against air and ground threats while on the move and during halts. The
troop performs the march in open or close column, depending on the
situation.
• Close column. A close column is normally used during limited
visibility conditions. Vehicles are typically spaced 25 to 50
meters apart and vehicle density is 15 to 30 vehicles per
kilometer along the route of march. Close column may be
used if road space is critical or to speed movement and reduce
the likelihood of an element getting lost or leaving the desired
route.
• Open column. Open column formation is used when greater
dispersion and security are desired. In this case, the distance
between vehicles varies from 50 to 100 meters. Open column
is normally used in daylight conditions. The troop’s march
speed is based on the slowest vehicle in the column.
5-24. See Figure 5-2 for a way to organize a troop march column. This
order of march provides 360-degree security, disperses the C2 assets of
the troop, and provides reconnaissance forward of the main body. Vehicle
commanders assign sectors of observation to their crews, who search for
air and ground threats.
5-8
Figure 5-2. Troop Column Organization
5-25. Halts are used to rest personnel, provide personal comfort and
relief, facilitate mess operations, refuel vehicles, maintain and inspect
equipment, adjust the schedule, and allow other traffic to pass. They may
be scheduled or unscheduled. Scheduled halts must be factored into
march table and movement times. The troop SOP and/or movement order
specifies the frequency and duration of halts, and prioritizes actions
during them. They also specify actions at unscheduled halts to determine
the reason for the halt, correct the problem, and resume the march as
quickly as possible. Units provide for security during all halts, and
establish OPs to provide early warning of threat forces during any halt.
5-26. Vehicles that become disabled during movement must not
obstruct traffic. The crew of the disabled vehicle moves the vehicle off the
route, posts guides to direct traffic, and finds the problem. If the vehicle
can be fixed, it rejoins the rear of the column. It does not return to its
original position until the column has halted. If the vehicle cannot be
readily repaired, the troop trail element recovers it, if applicable, or it is
reported to the higher headquarters trail party for recovery.
SECTION II - OFFENSE
5-27. The troop usually performs reconnaissance and security missions

in support of brigade offensive operations. Both recce troop and BRT may
take limited offensive action as part of its actions on contact to develop
the situation or break contact when other methods fail or are not
possible. In addition, the recce troop may perform certain offensive
missions as part of a squadron, other combined arms force, or within an
economy-of-force role for a higher headquarters. FBCB2 allows greater
situational understanding and facilitates command and control for
offensive operations, enabling the troop to remain dispersed and
maneuver to gain a positional advantage out of contact.
PURPOSE
5-28. Offensive operations aim at destroying or defeating a threat.
Offensive operations are also undertaken to seize decisive terrain,
deprive the threat of resources, gain information, deceive or divert the
threat, develop intelligence, or hold the threat in position.
5-9
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
CHARACTERISTICS
5-29. Surprise, concentration, tempo, and audacity characterize the
offense. Effective offensive operations capitalize on accurate intelligence
and other relative information regarding threat forces, weather, and
terrain. The commander maneuvers his force to advantageous positions
prior to visual or direct fire contact. Security operations prevent or
inhibit the threat from acquiring accurate information about friendly
forces. Contact with threat forces prior to decisive operations are
deliberate, designed to shape the situation for decisive success. The
decisive operation is a sudden, shattering action that capitalizes on
subordinate initiative and the common operating picture.
• Surprise. Strike the threat at the time and place or in a
manner that is least expected.
• Concentration. Mass available forces and/or fires; achieve
overwhelming superiority in men, weapons, and firepower.
The commander must maintain situational awareness to
anticipate the battlespace conditions that allow him to mass
at the critical point, achieve decisive success, and quickly
disperse to continue the mission.
• Tempo. Tempo is the rate of speed of military action.
Controlling or altering the rate is essential for maintaining
the initiative. Tempo can be fast or slow, depending on the
capabilities of the unit relative to those of the threat.
Commanders must adjust tempo based on METT-TC to
ensure synchronization.
• Audacity. Boldness in the plan’s execution is key to success in
offensive operations. Commanders must analyze and accept
tactical risk to enable violent execution without hesitation to
break the threat’s will or destroy him.
FIRE AND MOVEMENT

5-30. The troop normally conducts fire and movement to develop the
situation or after actions on contact if the commander determines the
necessity to maintain reconnaissance tempo against an inferior threat or
gain a positional advantage over a superior threat force. In gaining a
positional advantage, the commander has identified terrain that enables
the troop to better maintain observation, target and engage the threat
with indirect fires, assist a troop element to break contact, or enable
transition to a subsequent mission. An essential consideration during the
commander’s decision to employ fire and movement is whether, upon
completion, he will have sufficient combat power to continue his
reconnaissance or security mission.
5-31. The commander must anticipate and plan for successful fire and
movement. He must coordinate indirect fire to suppress threat forces and
obscure movement. The commander ensures that indirect fires have
achieved their desired effect and/or smoke has built up before initiating
movement. As a minimum, he considers—
• Identifies targets and determines desired effect (suppress,
neutralize, obscure, or destroy) and purpose for fires.
5-10
• If necessary, determines time on target to support movement

and trigger to initiate fires.
• If necessary, identifies primary and alternate observers and
criteria to lift fires.
5-32. The troop establishes a base of fire element with sufficient fire
power to suppress the threat with direct fire as necessary. The element
occupies positions that afford clear observation for targeting and fields of
fire providing coverage of both the threat and the friendly moving
elements. The overwatching element uses direct and indirect fires to
achieve the desired effect against the threat force, shifting or
redistributing fires as necessary to achieve or maintain the desired
effects on the threat force. The commander may also direct the element to
initiate and adjust indirect fires as necessary. The base of fire element
should maintain local security to prevent a close assault by the threat. It
should maintain observation with fields of fire to its flanks and rear, and
be prepared to reposition weapon systems to defend itself while
maintaining suppressive fires in support of the moving friendly element.
5-33. The maneuvering element bounds to a position that provides
either positional advantage over the threat for surveillance and/or
targeting, or a position from which to suppress the threat in support of
continued movement towards an advantageous position or to break
contact. The maneuvering element must also maintain local security to
prevent ambush or close assault that may include using bounding within
the element or employing dismounted scouts to reconnoiter dead space or
positions prior to occupation by vehicles.
5-34. Although the commander positions himself to best observe and
influence operations, he will not be able to observe the actions of the
entire troop. In addition to the increase situational understanding
provided FBCB2, it is critical that subordinate leaders cross-talk during
fire and maneuver and provide the commander with information and
recommendations using the communications system that allows him to
make timely decisions. Subordinate leader recommendations may include
how to adapt to changes in the situation or how to exploit opportunities
provided through fire and maneuver.
HASTY ATTACK
5-35. A hasty attack is conducted with a minimum of preparation to
defeat a threat force that is not prepared or deployed to fight. It is a
course of action routinely employed in reconnaissance operations to seize
or retain the initiative, or to sustain the tempo of operations. It may also
be employed in area security operations to defeat penetrations of the
perimeter, or during convoy security to defeat or respond to an ambush.
Once the attack is completed, immediately establish hasty defensive
positions and OPs on high-speed avenues of approach into the troop
position.
5-36. The decision to conduct a hasty attack is usually made after a
reconnaissance of a threat force, and dispositions show that winning
requires a quick strike with little preparation. Under no circumstances
should a hasty attack be ordered unless the threat position has been
thoroughly reconnoitered and the individual positions are known.
5-11
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
KEY TASKS
5-37. To successfully execute a hasty attack, the following key tasks
must be accomplished by using a mix of all available assets such as UAV,
GSR, scout platoons:
• Reconnoiter to determine the size, composition, and
orientation of the threat force.
• Determine if the objective threat force is mutually supported
or can be immediately reinforced by nearby units.
• Find a covered and concealed approach into the threat’s
flank(s).
• Isolate the objective threat force from other mutually
supporting units with indirect fires (usually with smoke and
HE mortar/FA ammunition, or a scout platoon).
• Establish a base-of-fire element to defeat or suppress all
observed threat weapons with long-range direct and indirect
fires before the maneuver force deploys into its attack.
• Identify the maneuver element to move to a position of
advantage and attack the threat by fire.
• Achieve the desired effect by supporting direct and indirect
fires, then attack the threat by fire or by fire and movement
to destroy or defeat it.
TECHNIQUES
5-38. The key tasks must be synchronized, and a successful attack
depends on the commander’s sense of timing and on his ability to employ
his forces to accomplish the tasks in the proper sequence. The
commander has to apply different forms of combat power against the
threat at the right times and places. Techniques for conducting a hasty
attack have three features:
• Known threat weapons are destroyed or suppressed with
direct and indirect fires before the maneuver force is
committed.
• The threat is forced to fight in two directions.
• The objective is isolated.
• The threat is suppressed and unable to react.
ESTABLISHING THE CONDITIONS FOR A HASTY ATTACK

5-39. The scout platoon in contact continues to reconnoiter the threat’s
position with one element maintaining contact while other scout
elements reconnoiter to gather information for the hasty attack.
However, the commander may have to direct another platoon to conduct
the reconnaissance based on METT-TC. The designated platoon develops
the situation by identifying the threat flanks and rear and determining
the presence of mutually supporting threat forces. The commander may
also direct elements not in contact to provide security for the attack on
5-12
the flanks. The scouts identify routes to close on the threat force, support-
by-fire positions, and, if applicable, attack-by-fire or assault positions.
5-40. The FIST, if assigned, XO, or a designated element occupies a
position that provides observation of the threat force and known or
suspected supporting positions to control the indirect fires. If assigned,
the mortar section occupies a firing position and prepares to screen
maneuver or suppress the threat position.
5-41. If the troop has attached tank, MGS, or AT platoons, a scout
platoon provides guides to support- or attack-by-fire positions at a contact
point. They may also guide an infantry platoon to its assault position.
5-42. The commander either collocates with an overwatching element
or follows the assault or attack-by-fire force to best control and influence
the attack. The XO positions to best assist the commander and keep the
higher commander informed. The 1SG moves medics to support the
attacking or assaulting force.
INDIRECT FIRES IN SUPPORT OF A HASTY ATTACK

5-43. Indirect fires must complement the troop’s scheme of maneuver,
and can be the best weapon of destruction available to the troop. The
troop can acquire and engage the threat with indirect fire from positions
offering cover and concealment from threat direct and indirect fire. To
effectively employ indirect fire, the troop commander must determine the
following:
• Who will control the indirect fires during the hasty attack?
• Who will initiate indirect fires onto the objective?
• Who will shift the indirect fires to subsequent targets?
• What will the signal be for shifting indirect fires?
• Are there any restrictive fire measures or restrictive fire
areas?
• Are there any restrictions of DPICM munitions in the ROE or
due to tactical considerations, such as friendly forces moving
on the objective after fires are executed?
5-44. The commander uses METT-TC to answer these questions. If
available, control measures can be quickly disseminated using FBCB2.
Under most conditions the FIST, if assigned, or XO should be positioned
to control the engagement of indirect fire systems. The troop commander
uses available indirect fires to—
• Suppress the threat while scouts are maneuvering to develop
the situation.
• Obscure threat observation of scouts during reconnaissance,
or the assault element during the attack.
• Isolate the threat contact by firing HE mortars and smoke
between the threat force and any possible supporting
positions.
• Shift indirect fires off the objective to block threat withdrawal
routes.
DIRECT FIRES DURING A HASTY ATTACK
5-13
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
5-45. The troop commander should strive to engage the threat with a
combination of direct and indirect fire weapons. Direct fires must be
controlled. The commander must determine the following before
executing a hasty attack:
• What is the trigger and who will initiate direct fires into the
objective area and from where will they be initiated?
• What is the aim point for the support element? What is the
trigger and when and to where do they shift fires?
• How are suppressive fires maintained? What are the
ammunition consumption and resupply considerations?
• When and how are SBF positions shifted or repositioned to
minimize effects of threat indirect and direct fires?
• How are fires controlled (focused, distributed and shifted)?
• What is the limit of advance for the assault force?
ACTIONS AFTER A HASTY ATTACK

5-46. Once threat resistance in the objective area has ceased, the troop
may begin consolidating in preparation of continuing its mission.
• Dismounted scouts clear the area as soon as possible,
securing prisoners and searching for items of intelligence
value.
• Immediately establish a hasty defense oriented on mounted
and/or dismounted counterattack approaches into the troop
position.
• Redistribute ammunition and balance crews as time allows.
• Replace key leaders quickly.
• If available, position the mortar section and have the guns lay
on the most likely threat avenue of approach.
• If time is available and threat counterattack unlikely, begin
resupply operations.
DETERMINE WHERE AND HOW TO MASS FIRES

5-47. To achieve decisive effects, friendly forces must mass their fires.
Effective massing requires the commander to focus the fires of
subordinate elements and to distribute the effects of the fires. Based on
his estimate of the situation and his concept of the operation, the
commander identifies points where he wants to, or must, focus the unit’s
fires. Most often, these are locations he has identified as probable threat
positions or points along likely avenues of approach where the unit can
mass fires. The commander plans the focus of fires by placing control
measures on and beyond the identified position or point. Because
subordinate elements may not initially be oriented on the point where
the commander wants to mass fires, he may issue a fire command
utilizing the added control measures to focus the fires. At the same time,
the commander must use direct fire control measures to effectively
distribute the fires of his elements, which are now focused on the same
point. Figure 5-3 illustrates how the commander masses fires against the
threat.
5-14
Figure 5-3. Example of Identifying Probable Threat Locations

and Determining Threat Scheme of Maneuver
SECTION III - DEFEND AS AN ECONOMY OF FORCE
5-48. The troop normally conducts security missions during brigade

defensive operations. Generally, the troop defends a perimeter during
area security of a high-value asset. When required and adequately
augmented, the troop may also conduct a defensive mission as an
economy-of-force mission. The troop must be augmented with tank or
mechanized forces to defend against a mechanized, motorized, or light
infantry force. The troop does not have the antiarmor or dismount
capability to defend an AO or BP that may include a dismounted threat
assault. FBCB2 assists situational awareness, reducing the possibility of
duplicate SPOTREPs and providing the commander a more accurate
threat picture on which to base his decisions. It also facilitates command
and control for defensive operations, enabling the commander to issue
FRAGOs and shift forces quicker to defeat the threat’s intent.
PURPOSE
5-49. Defensive operations defeat a threat attack, buy time, economize
forces, or develop conditions favorable for offensive operations. Defensive
operations alone are not decisive, but create the conditions for a
counteroffensive to regain the initiative (FM 3-90 [FM 100-40]).
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
5-50. Defensive operations may also be conducted to—

• Retain or deny decisive terrain to the threat.
• Attrit or fix the threat as a prelude to offensive operations.
• Increase the threat’s vulnerability by forcing him to
concentrate his forces.
FUNDAMENTALS
5-51. Eight fundamentals are common to defensive operations. These
are—
• Position elements and obstacles in depth.
• Disperse subordinate elements.
• Employ security measures.
• Maximize terrain advantages.
• Disrupt or stop the threat rate of advance.
• Mass combat power at the right place and time.
• Force the threat to fight in two directions.
• Counterattack.
POSITION PLATOONS/OBSTACLES IN DEPTH

5-52. Depth allows the troop to—
• Gain threat contact early.
• Perform counterreconnaissance tasks.
• Ascertain threat direction of attack/intentions.
• Develop the situation, providing reaction time and maneuver
space to concentrate combat power when and where it is
needed.
DISPERSE SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS

5-53. Deploy subordinate elements as far apart as possible without
losing their ability to concentrate (mass) firepower against the threat and
to mutually support each other. The more dispersed the troop, the harder
it is for the threat to mass fires against it as a whole. However, do not
allow the threat to concentrate its forces or fires against isolated
elements.
EMPLOY SECURITY MEASURES

5-54. The troop may employ passive or active measures, or a
combination of techniques. All must be considered in the defensive plan.
See Figure 5-4 for examples of passive and active security measures.
5-16
Passive Active
Disperse vehicles and platoons. Screen/establish OPs.
Use camouflage/cover and concealment. Perform mounted/dismounted patrols.
Impose radio listening silence. Establish GSR posts.
Use hide positions. Establish M8 chemical alarm net.
Enforce noise and light discipline.
Minimize movement.
Do not position in likely target areas.
Figure 5-4. Examples of Passive and Active Security Measures
MAXIMIZE TERRAIN ADVANTAGES

5-55. Reconnoiter the terrain from both the troop’s and the threat’s
view to determine the following:
• Avenues of approach, to include infiltration, reconnaissance,
mounted, and dismounted.
• Restricted/severely restricted areas.
• Defiles (canalizing terrain).
• Engagement areas.
• Battle positions.
• Subsequent and alternate BPs.
• Hide positions to support BPs.
• OP positions forward of defensive positions.
• Subsequent and alternate OP positions.
• Positions where obstacles can be tied in with natural
obstacles to turn, disrupt, or block the threat.
• Positions that facilitate counterattacking by fire or by fire
and maneuver into the flanks and throughout the depth of
the threat.
• Routes to and from each position.
DISRUPT OR STOP THREAT RATE OF ADVANCE

5-56. Offense is based on two principles—speed and mass. Develop a
defensive plan that disrupts the momentum of the threat attack through
the use of obstacles and fires (direct and indirect). If most of its combat
power is destroyed, the threat will be forced to establish a hasty defense
or withdraw.
MASS COMBAT POWER AT THE RIGHT PLACE AND TIME
5-57. The troop must mass fires against the threat where and when it
is least able to escape the effects to defeat a massed attack. The ability of
the troop to mass combat power when and where it is needed is a
function of—
• Early warning and reaction time.
• Responsive and rapid maneuver by subordinate elements.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
FORCE THE THREAT TO FIGHT IN TWO DIRECTIONS

5-58. Position and maneuver platoons to force the threat to fight in two
or more directions. This exposes threat flanks and forces threat forces to
split their fires, preventing them from concentrating fires.
COUNTERATTACK
5-59. Draw the threat into structured engagement areas and attack en
masse with overwhelming firepower to destroy it quickly and decisively.
Maneuver forces to exploit the situation to wrest the initiative from the
threat. Use fire and movement and attack by fire and by fire and
maneuver against threat flanks and throughout the depth of its
formation.
DEFENSIVE TASKS
5-60. The troop may be assigned one of two defensive tasks by its
higher headquarters.
• Defend from a BP.
• Defend an AO.
5-61. The commander may also develop his scheme of maneuver using
platoon BPs, AOs, or a combination of the two.
DEFEND FROM A TROOP BATTLE POSITION
5-62. The troop is assigned a battle position when the threat situation
is clear, there are limited avenues of approach, and/or its higher
headquarters desires centralized control. The troop cannot maneuver
outside the position without the higher commander’s permission. The
troop commander closely controls the actions and movement of
subordinate elements within and between BPs. Within the BP, the troop
commander positions his platoons to concentrate all direct fires on or into
a designated location. The troop fights to retain the position unless
ordered by the higher commander to counterattack or withdraw.
5-63. To successfully defend from a troop BP, the following key tasks
must be accomplished:
• Decide where the threat will be killed and designate the
engagement area.
• Establish OPs oriented forward and to the flanks of the BP to
gain contact with the threat force and provide early warning.
• Establish primary and alternate platoon BPs to concentrate
direct fires within the engagement area as directed by the
higher commander.
• Designate supplementary platoon BPs to cover other routes of
threat approach.
• Establish sectors of fire for each platoon.
• Reconnoiter and establish platoon routes from hide positions
to platoon BPs and for withdrawal to subsequent
platoon/troop BPs.
5-18
DEFEND AN AREA OF OPERATIONS

5-64. This method may be used when the AO has adequate depth,
when the threat situation is vague, when there is more than one avenue
of approach, or when the higher headquarters allows decentralized
control and subordinate elements require more freedom of action. In this
scheme of maneuver, the focus is on emplacing obstacles and utilizing
indirect fires to disrupt and defeat the threat attack. The higher
headquarters commander delegates much of the responsibility for
fighting the battle to his subordinate leaders within their AOs. The troop
commander focuses on coordinating fire support and engineer assets, and
maneuvering his subordinate elements before they become fixed in
position or destroyed. METT-TC considerations determine optimal troop
AO width; however, the troop is normally allocated a sector oriented on a
single battalion-size avenue of approach.
5-65. Troops may defend an AO when—
• The squadron/brigade cannot concentrate its fires due to the
following:
Extended frontages.
Defending along a cross compartment.
Multiple avenues of approach.
• Retention of specific terrain features is not necessary.
• The depth of the AO is needed to dissipate the threat’s attack.
• Maximum flexibility to maneuver is desired.
5-66. To successfully defend an AO, the following key tasks must be

accomplished:
• Maintain continuous surveillance of all avenues of approach
into the troop AO.
• Destroy or repel all threat reconnaissance elements forward
of the troop’s initial defensive positions
(counterreconnaissance).
• Shape the battlefield by utilizing obstacles and indirect fire to
canalize the threat onto a single avenue of approach and/or
into engagement areas.
• Structure engagement areas.
• Position platoon BPs to support engagement areas.
• Engage the threat from more than one direction.
• Determine criteria for initiating fires, counterattack, and
disengagement.
• Prevent the threat from penetrating the troop rear boundary
or designated phase line.
PRINCIPLES OF FIRE CONTROL

5-67. The troop’s primary goal in any direct fire engagement is to both
acquire first and shoot first. Effective fire control requires a unit to
rapidly acquire the threat and mass the effects of fires to achieve decisive
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
results in the close fight. The troop commander must describe how he
expects contact, how targets are acquired, who engages targets with what
weapon system, and what the desired effects and/or threat destroyed are.
This information allows subordinates the freedom to act quickly upon
acquisition of the threat. The commander should consider the following
principles:
• Mass the effects of fire.
• Destroy the greatest threat first.
• Employ the best weapon for the target.
• Avoid target overkill.
• Minimize friendly exposure.
• Prevent fratricide.
• Plan for extreme limited visibility conditions.
• Develop contingencies for diminished capabilities.
MASS THE EFFECTS OF FIRE
5-68. Random application of fires is unlikely to have a decisive effect.
The troop must mass its fires to achieve decisive results. The commander
and subordinate leaders must establish and utilize control measures and
engagement techniques to control and rapidly mass fires at the desired
point. An inherent problem is that the troop may be dispersed across a
wide AO, with platoons not being mutually supportive. In this case, the
commander must determine how to shift forces and use the depth of his
AO to mass effects.
DESTROY THE GREATEST THREAT FIRST
5-69. The most dangerous targets are engaged and destroyed first. The
commander uses the factors of METT-TC to determine the most
dangerous targets based on terrain visibility, weapons, effective range,
and positioning. Presented with multiple targets, a unit should initially
concentrate fires to destroy the greatest threat, and then distribute fires
over the remainder of the threat force.
EMPLOY THE BEST WEAPON FOR THE TARGET
5-70. The commander must determine how to best deploy weapon
systems against threat targets based on the target type, range, exposure,
and ammunition available. The commander task organizes and arrays
his forces based on the terrain, threat, and desired effects of fires.
Subordinate leaders should consider individual crew capabilities when
determining the specific employment of weapons.
AVOID TARGET OVERKILL

5-71. Plan or allocate fires to achieve necessary effects. The commander
and subordinate leaders use control measures and engagement
techniques to concentrate fires, yet avoid engaging single targets with
multiple weapon systems. Target overkill wastes ammunition and ties up
weapons that are better employed acquiring and engaging other targets.
5-20
MINIMIZE FRIENDLY EXPOSURE

5-72. Units increase their survivability by exposing themselves to the
threat only to the extent necessary to engage it effectively. Natural or
manmade defilade provides the best cover from kinetic-energy direct fire
munitions. Crews and squads minimize their exposure by constantly
seeking effective available cover, attempting to engage the threat from
the flank, remaining dispersed, firing from multiple positions, and
limiting engagement times.
PREVENT FRATRICIDE
5-73. The commander must be proactive in reducing the risk of
fratricide and noncombatant casualties. Fratricide prevention starts with
identification training for combat vehicles and aircraft. During
operations the commander must integrate his control measures into
those from his higher headquarters and disseminate them throughout
the troop. He prescribes the troop’s weapons safety posture, the weapons
control status, and recognition markings. Unit locations displayed on
FBCB2 greatly assist preventive measures; however, because dismounted
scouts are not displayed, the commander must constantly monitor the
position of dismounted squads to distinguish between friendly and threat
soldiers. Knowledge and employment of applicable ROE are the primary
means of preventing noncombatant casualties.
PLAN FOR EXTREME LIMITED VISIBILITY CONDITIONS
5-74. At night, limited visibility fire control equipment enables the
troop to engage threat forces at nearly the same ranges that are
applicable during the day. Obscurants such as dense fog, heavy smoke,
and blowing sand, however, can reduce the capabilities of thermal and
infrared equipment. The commander should therefore develop
contingency plans for such limited visibility conditions. Although
decreased acquisition capabilities have minimal effect on area fire, point
target engagements will likely occur at decreased ranges. Typically,
firing positions, whether offensive or defensive, must be adjusted closer
to the area or point where the commander intends to focus fires. Another
alternative is the use of visual or infrared illumination when there is
insufficient ambient light for passive light intensification devices.
DEVELOP CONTINGENCIES FOR DIMINISHED CAPABILITIES
5-75. Leaders initially develop plans based on their units’ maximum
capabilities. They make backup plans for implementation in the event of
casualties or weapon damage or failure. While leaders cannot anticipate
or plan for every situation, they should develop plans for what they view
as the most probable occurrences. Building redundancy into these plans,
such as having two systems observe the same sector, is an invaluable
asset when the situation (and the number of available systems) permits.
Designating alternate sectors of fire provides a means of shifting fires if
adjacent elements are destroyed.
ENGAGEMENT AREA DEVELOPMENT

5-76. The commander plans to defeat or destroy a threat force using
the massed fires of all available weapons in engagement areas. The
success in any engagement depends on how effectively the commander
5-21
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
can integrate the obstacle, indirect fire, and direct fire plans within the
engagement area to achieve the unit’s tactical purpose.
5-77. At the troop level, EA development is a complex function,
demanding parallel planning and preparation if the troop is to
accomplish the myriad tasks for which it is responsible. Despite this
complexity, however, EA development resembles a drill in that the
commander and his subordinate leaders use an orderly, fairly standard
set of procedures. Beginning with evaluation of METT-TC factors, the
development process covers these steps:
• Identify all likely threat avenues of approach.
• Determine likely threat schemes of maneuver.
• Determine where to kill the threat.
• Plan and integrate obstacles.
• Emplace weapon systems.
• Plan and integrate indirect fires.
• Rehearse the execution of operations in the engagement area.
IDENTIFY LIKELY THREAT AVENUES OF APPROACH
5-78. The following procedures and considerations apply in identifying
the threat’s likely avenues of approach (see also Figure 5-5):
• Conduct initial reconnaissance. If possible, do this from the
threat’s perspective along each avenue of approach into the
AO or EA.
• Identify key terrain. This includes locations that afford
positions of advantage over the threat as well as natural
obstacles and/or choke points that restrict forward movement.
• Determine which avenues of approach afford cover and
concealment for the threat while allowing it to maintain its
tempo.
• Determine the reconnaissance and company/battalion
avenues of approach, to include mounted and dismounted
avenues.
• Evaluate lateral routes adjoining each avenue of approach.
5-22
Figure 5-5. Identify All Likely Threat Avenues of Approach
DETERMINE THE THREAT SCHEME OF MANEUVER

5-79. The troop’s higher headquarters depicts the feasible threat
courses of action through situation templates developed during IPB. The
troop commander must apply this information to his AO, using the
following procedures and considerations to further define the threat’s
actions at platoon and section levels as necessary (see also Figure 5-6):
• Determine how the threat might structure the attack in the
troop’s AO for each course of action.
• Determine how the threat might use and move his
reconnaissance assets to achieve his reconnaissance objective.
Identify correlations between possible threat reconnaissance
and different courses of action.
• Determine where and when the threat might change
formations and/or establish support-by-fire (SBF) positions.
• Determine where, when, and how the threat might conduct
breaching operations and its assault.
• Determine where and when the threat might commit follow-
on forces.
• Determine the threat’s expected rates of movement.
• Assess the effects of the threat’s combat multipliers.
• Determine what reactions the threat is likely to have in
response to projected friendly actions.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Figure 5-6. Determine the Threat’s Scheme of Maneuver
DETERMINE WHERE TO KILL THE THREAT

5-80. The commander identifies the best locations to kill the threat (see
Figure 5-7). It may be an area where several avenues of approach come
together, or a spot where several branch from one avenue. The
commander considers the following:
• Identify target reference points (TRP) that match the threat’s
feasible courses of action, allowing the troop to identify where
it will engage threat forces through the depth of the AO.
• Identify and record the exact location of each TRP.
• Determine how many weapon systems will focus fires on each
TRP to achieve the desired end state.
• Determine which platoons will mass fires on each TRP.
• Establish engagement areas around TRPs.
• Develop the direct fire planning measures necessary to focus
fires at each TRP.
NOTE: In marking TRPs, use thermal sights to ensure visibility at the appropriate range
under varying conditions, including daylight and limited visibility (darkness,
smoke, dust, or other obscurants).
5-24
Figure 5-7. Determine Where to Kill the Threat
PLAN AND INTEGRATE OBSTACLES

5-81. The higher headquarters provides the troop with the obstacle
intent and Class IV/V barrier requirements. The troop commander with
the engineer platoon leader is responsible for siting these obstacles to
accomplish the intent within its engagement areas (see Figure 5-8). The
commander may augment the obstacle plan with hasty protective
obstacles. The exact location of all obstacles should be identified by
elements using their optics, to include night vision devices (NVD), and
weapon systems from their fighting positions. The commander considers
the following steps:
• In cooperation with the engineer platoon leader, identify, site,
and mark tactical obstacles and protective obstacles.
• Ensure coverage of all obstacles with direct fires.
• Assign responsibility for guides and lane closure, as required.
• Ensure guides fully understand lane closure or situational
obstacle employment criteria.
• Provide security for the engineer elements while emplacing
the obstacles.
• Assign an element responsibility for obstacle security to
defeat threat attempts at breaching prior to the decisive
engagement.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Figure 5-8. Plan and Integrate Obstacles
PLAN DIRECT FIRES AND EMPLACE WEAPON SYSTEMS

5-82. To successfully bring direct fires against a threat force, the
commander and subordinate leaders must continuously apply the
principles of fire control (see Figure 5-9). Direct fire plans must ensure
rapid, accurate target acquisition and the massing of fire to achieve
decisive effects on the target. The direct fire plan must describe the
following, as a minimum:
• Where and how to mass (focus and distribute) fire effects.
• Where and how to orient forces to speed target acquisition.
• How and when to shift fires to refocus or redistribute their
effects.
5-83. Based on his estimate of the situation, the commander decides

where and when he wants to mass fire effects within his concept of the
operation. The commander develops control measures around and within
the engagement areas.
5-26
Figure 5-9. Example of Determining Where and How to Mass

(Focus and Distribute) Fire Effects to Kill the Threat
ORIENT FORCES TO SPEED TARGET ACQUISITION

5-84. The troop must rapidly and accurately acquire threat elements to
effectively engage with direct fires. Orienting friendly forces on probable
threat locations and likely avenues of approach will speed target
acquisition. To achieve this critical orientation, the commander typically
designates TRPs within engagement areas and on avenues of approach.
He then orients his subordinate elements using directions of fire or
sectors of fire. Normally, the gunners on crew-served weapons scan the
designated direction, sector, or area while other crewmembers observe
alternate sectors or areas to provide all-around security. Figure 5-10
illustrates how the commander orients the troop for quick, effective
acquisition of the threat force.
5-27
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Figure 5-10. Example of Orienting Forces to Speed Target Acquisition
SHIFT FIRES TO REFOCUS AND REDISTRIBUTE

5-85. The commander envisions the fight, and integrates techniques or
procedures to shift fires and redistribute the effects into the plan (see
Figure 5-11). The commander applies the same techniques and fire
control measures that were initially used to focus and distribute fires,
and considers a variety of situations for shifting fires:
• Appearance of a threat force posing a greater threat than the
one currently being engaged.
• Extensive attrition of the threat force being engaged, creating
the possibility of target overkill.
• Attrition of friendly elements that are engaging the threat
force.
• Change in the ammunition status of the friendly elements
that are engaging the threat force.
• Maneuver of threat or friendly forces resulting in terrain
masking.
• Increased fratricide risk as a maneuvering friendly element
closes with the threat force being engaged.
5-28
Figure 5-11. Example of Shifting to Refocus and Redistribute Fires
5-86. Weapon systems are emplaced in conjunction with siting

obstacles. The commander selects tentative platoon positions based on
observation and fields of fire, effective ranges, and tentative targets.
Weapons systems should be placed to engage from the flanks when at all
possible. The commander and his subordinate leaders consider the
following in selecting and improving BPs and emplacing vehicles, crew-
served weapon systems, and dismounted scout positions:
• Select tentative platoon BPs. When possible, select these
while reconnoitering the EA. Using the threat’s perspective
enables the commander to assess survivability of the
positions.
• Conduct a leader’s reconnaissance of the tentative BPs.
• Confirm and mark the selected BPs.
• Ensure that BPs do not conflict with those of adjacent units
and that they are effectively tied in with adjacent positions.
• Select primary, alternate, and supplementary fighting
positions to achieve the desired effect for each TRP.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
• Ensure that platoon leaders, platoon sergeants (PSG), vehicle

commanders, and/or dismounted scout squad leaders position
weapon systems so that each TRP is effectively covered by the
required number of weapons, vehicles, and/or platoons.
• Ensure that positions allow vehicle commanders, loaders,
and/or gunners (as applicable for each vehicle) to observe the
engagement area from the turret-down position and engage
threat forces from the hull-down position.
• Stake vehicle positions in accordance with unit SOP so
engineers (when augmented) can dig in the positions while
vehicle crews perform other tasks.
• Proof all vehicle positions.
• Locate hide positions. Mark and time routes from hide
positions to the BP. Ensure the hide is positioned within the
time space required to set the BP from the last possible
identification of the threat entering the sector.
PLAN AND INTEGRATE INDIRECT FIRES
5-87. The commander, with assistance from the FSO, completes his fire
plan by integrating the effects of indirect fires with his direct fire and
obstacle plans (see Figure 5-12). The commander considers the following
in planning and integrating indirect fires:
• Determine the purpose of fires and develop a fire support
plan that supports the brigade’s EFSTs.
• Determine where and when that purpose will achieve the best
results.
• Establish the observation plan, with redundancy for each
target. Observers will include the FIST as well as members of
maneuver elements with fire support responsibilities (such as
PSGs).
• Establish triggers based on threat movement rates. Mark
triggers and ensure that observers understand the
engagement criteria for each target set. (NOTE: It is more
important for the observers to see the trigger than the target
location.)
• Obtain accurate target locations using survey and/or
navigational equipment.
• Refine target locations to ensure coverage of obstacles.
• Adjust artillery and mortar targets.
• Plan final protective fires.
• Request critical friendly zones for protection of maneuver
elements and no fire areas for protection of OPs and forward
positions.
5-30
Figure 5-12. Plan and Integrate Indirect Fires with Direct Fires
REHEARSE THE ENGAGEMENT

5-88. The troop may use various rehearsals for engaging threat forces
within the EA. The platoons may rehearse engagement techniques and
direct fire control during battle drill rehearsals. The commander leads a
combined arms rehearsal to ensure that subordinate leaders and soldiers
can cover their assigned areas, acquire targets, and execute direct and
indirect fires. The rehearsal should cover these actions:
• Rearward passage of security forces, as required.
• Closure of lanes, as required.
• Movement from the hide position to the BP.
• Use of fire commands, triggers, and/or maximum engagement
lines to initiate direct and indirect fires.
• Shifting of fires to refocus and redistribute fire effects.
• Preparation and transmission of critical reports using FM
and digital systems, as applicable.
• Assessment of the effects of threat weapon systems.
• Displacement to alternate, supplementary, or successive
OPs/BPs.
• Cross-leveling or resupply of Class V.
• Evacuation of casualties.
NOTE: The troop commander should coordinate the troop rehearsal with its higher
headquarters to ensure its rehearsals are not planned for the same time and/or
location.
5-31
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SECTION IV - TARGET ACQUISITION
5-89. Target acquisition is the detection, identification, and location of

a target to permit the effective employment of weapons. The process itself
is inherent in all reconnaissance and security operations and may be an
objective or a focus of a reconnaissance mission. As in reconnaissance, the
higher headquarters uses a mix of assets to cue the troop in gaining
ground observation. The mix of assets available to the higher
headquarters includes—
• OH-58D helicopters.
• UAV.
• COLTs.
• FISTs.
• Scouts.
• AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 radars.
• PROPHETs.
5-90. The troop may perform target acquisition in support of the higher
commander’s EFSTs, or to attack high pay-off targets listed within the
attack guidance matrix (AGM). The troop is required to detect and
identify those targets specified in the higher headquarters order and in
accordance with the higher commander’s intent for fire support. The
troop must maintain observation of the specified targets until the desired
effect is achieved through lethal or nonlethal fires, or it completes
reconnaissance handover to another unit. The troop provides battle
damage assessment within its capabilities and may recommend
additional attacks to meet the higher commander’s desired effect as
necessary.
5-91. The BRT commander or XO may participate in the target value
analysis conducted by the BCT battle staff. The commander should be
prepared to advise the staff on the capabilities and probabilities of troop
assets acquiring high pay-off and other targets based on his analysis of
METT-TC. He may recommend what troop assets be used to support
EFSTs or attack targets from the AGM.
5-92. During his troop-leading procedures, the commander must link
the designated targets and desired effects to the higher commander’s
reconnaissance and/or security guidance. He must consider the effects of
terrain and weather on his capabilities to detect, identify, track, and
designate (paint) targets for attack. The commander should address the
following within his order:
• The relation between his reconnaissance focus, tempo, and
engagement criteria and the higher commander’s EFSTs and
AGM.
• Maneuvering or positioning elements to acquire targets.
Integration and cuing by external ISR assets.
5-32
Mounted and/or dismounted OPs to observe NAIs, TAIs,

and preplanned targets.
If available, COLTs deployed to execute fires throughout
the depth of the AO.
• Instructions for target acquisition, to include:
Target description and method of engagement.
Criteria to transition from surveillance to target
designation.
Trigger description to initiate engagement.
Purpose and desired target effect.
Coordination or procedures for reconnaissance and/or
targeting handover to other elements.
5-93. The XO assists the commander in coordinating target acquisition
and attack to ensure fire missions meet the higher commander’s purpose
for fires. He coordinates for UAV or other aerial reconnaissance support
based on electronic signatures or the collection plan and the
implementation of protective fire control measures as necessary. The XO
may recommend alternate fire support means of attack if the preferred
weapon and/or munitions are not available, or close air support is late or
diverted. He monitors on-going battle damage assessment and
recommends continued or revised attacks to achieve the desired effect.
5-94. During operations the troop CP assists the commander in
controlling acquisition and reconnaissance handover between elements.
The CP assesses information and intelligence from higher headquarters
providing high pay-off and other target signatures and cues from assets
such as PROPHET, MASINT, and IMINT. The CP assists the commander
in identifying and tracking all friendly forces operating within the troop
AO and ensures that the higher headquarters fire support element has
accurate locations of these elements. It monitors reports and FBCB2 to
confirm primary or alternate triggers of attacks, and consolidates
SPOTREPs to forward exact battle damage assessment to the higher
headquarters.
SECTION V - ASSEMBLY AREAS
5-95. An assembly area (AA) is an area the troop occupies to prepare

for further action. The troop may occupy an AA independently or as part
of the squadron or mounted BCT. AA activities include order preparation
and issue, vehicle maintenance and repair, resupply operations, and rest.
AAs are positioned out of range of threat light artillery.
5-96. Within the area available to the troop, leaders should conduct a
map reconnaissance, and if time is available, an advance party should
conduct a ground reconnaissance. The troop SOP should have a standard
AA occupation drill and layout.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
QUARTERING PARTY ACTIVITIES

5-97. The quartering party must maintain digital (FBCB2) and voice
communications with the troop CP. Prior to quartering party movement,
quartering party vehicles display the automated operations overlay on
their tactical displays. This overlay typically includes the movement
route, waypoints, specific critical points, and the AA. Additional control
measures, such as contact points, coordination points, observation points,
and screen lines, may be included to enhance control and/or security. If
fire support, obstacle, and threat overlays are also available, quartering
party members should study and store these in their FBCB2.
5-98. During movement, the quartering party leader passes critical
information to the troop CP via FBCB2 or FM voice. The quartering
party annotates changes to the published route on the FBCB2 overlays
and updates the troop CP by forwarding overlay updates.
5-99. Normally, the XO or 1SG will lead the quartering party into the
AA. When the quartering party arrives at the forward AA, they must—
• Reconnoiter the area. If the area is not suitable, report
immediately and provide recommendations.
• Organize the area. Select locations for all elements of the
troop based on the commander’s instructions or as terrain,
cover, and concealment dictate. Select general locations for
vehicles. Vehicle commanders and the chain of command
refine these positions when they arrive.
• Improve and mark entrances, exits, and internal routes.
• Update the overlay to reflect any changes in the location of
the assembly area and any obstacles encountered.
• Perform guide duties as required. Platoon representatives
guide their elements into position after clearing the RP.
MOVEMENT AND OCCUPATION

5-100. The main body begins movement to the AA with an updated
digital overlay obtained from the quartering party. Upon reaching the
RP, the troop quickly moves into their assigned positions, without
slowing or halting, using platoon guides or established drills. Color-coded
lights can be used to link up guides and lead vehicles for those elements
that are not FBCB2-equipped.
SECURITY
5-101. Although the AA is not a defensive position, the area’s perimeter
must be secured to detect and defeat threat ground attacks. The
commander assigns specific sectors of responsibility to subordinate
elements based on weapons systems capabilities and METT-TC. The
troop uses both passive and active security measures. This is
accomplished by—
• Posting guards at all entrances and exits to stop traffic that
tries to enter the area.
• Establishing OPs to observe key terrain features and likely
avenues of approach for early warning of threat approach.
5-34
• Providing overlapping observation and fires within platoons

and with flank platoons. Once each platoon of the troop has
occupied its perimeter defensive position, the platoons will
digitally transmit their respective sector sketches to the troop
XO for consolidation into the troop sector sketch.
• Organizing a quick reaction force to defeat penetrations of the
perimeter.
• Establishing dismounted patrol plans.
• Camouflaging vehicles and equipment to prevent threat
detection from the ground and air.
• Emplacing NBC alarms upwind (or in a 360-degree
perimeter) and no more than 150 meters from the troop’s
positions to provide early warning of an NBC attack.
READINESS CONDITION LEVELS

5-102. The troop maintains the appropriate REDCON while occupying
an AA. Each REDCON level indicates critical tasks and time available to
prepare for future operations. The unit SOP may establish additional
REDCON levels based on METT-TC factors.
• REDCON 1 (be prepared to move immediately).
All personnel alert and ready for action.
Vehicles loaded and secured, and weapons manned.
Vehicle engines running and OPs recalled.
• REDCON 2 (be prepared to move in 15 minutes).
All personnel alert and ready for action.
Vehicles loaded and secured, and weapons manned.
OPs manned or scouts dismounted with wire or alternate
communications.
• REDCON 3 (be prepared to move in half an hour).
Fifty percent of each crew/squad stand down for rest,
feeding, and maintenance.
Remaining 50 percent man vehicles, OPs, weapons, and
monitor radios/phones.
• REDCON 4 (be prepared to move in one hour).
Two men per platoon make dismounted checks of platoon
area.
One man per vehicle monitors radios/phones and mans
turret weapon.
5-103. All personnel remain at 100 percent alert until the prioritized
work is completed after entering the AA. Initiate the appropriate
REDCON when the work is finished. As the time for execution of a
mission nears, increase the REDCON in accordance with guidance from
higher headquarters, achieving REDCON 1 before the troop must move.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
ROUTINE TASKS
5-104. In addition to establishing security as outlined above, several
tasks are routinely accomplished in an AA. These tasks should be listed
in the troop SOP under priority of tasks upon arrival in an AA.
Subordinates must know how long the troop will remain in the AA and
any special requirements. Common AA tasks include—
• Prepare fire plan, to include indirect fires.
• Establish communications. The troop must ensure that all
communications links (i.e., digital and voice) are maintained.
Backup means of communication (messenger and landline)
are emplaced as opportunity, time, and equipment permit.
• Maintain radio watch and man crew-served weapons.
• Prepare protective obstacle plan.
• Select alternate and supplementary positions.
• Reconnoiter routes of withdrawal.
• Perform preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS).
• Continue to improve positions.
• Conduct logistics resupply (Classes I, III, and V).
• Prepare for future operations to include combat training,
rehearsals, weapons test-fire, precombat checks, and
precombat inspections.
• Rest in accordance with REDCON status.
SECTION VI - RELIEF IN PLACE
5-105. A relief is an operation in which a unit is replaced by another

unit. The incoming unit assumes responsibility for the mission and is
assigned a position or AO. A relief in place may be conducted during
reconnaissance, security, stability, support, offensive or defensive
operations during any weather or light conditions. During combat, they
are normally executed during limited visibility to reduce the possibility of
detection. During stability or support operations they may be conducted
during daylight and at times that best fit the social environment (such as
not during religious activities). FBCB2 enhances the planning and
execution of relief operations by providing a complete common tactical
picture of the AO. Prior to the actual contact between the incoming and
outgoing units, the outgoing commander should provide digital overlays
to the incoming commander outlining fire support; obstacles; threat
situation; and primary, alternate, and supplementary friendly positions.
Reconnaissance handover must be conducted to ensure all NAIs, TAIs,
and relevant information sources are transitioned to the incoming unit.
5-106. A relief can be conducted for the following reasons:
• Reconstitute a unit that has sustained heavy losses.
• Decontaminate a committed unit.
• Rest a unit that has been in prolonged combat.
5-36
• Conform to a larger tactical plan.

• Assign a new mission to the relieved unit.
• Introduce a new unit into combat.
5-107. The troop may conduct a relief in place with another troop on a
screen line, in a base camp, or during area security. When a maneuver
unit relieves the troop, the differences in task organization are a prime
consideration in determining the method of relief.
METHODS OF RELIEF IN PLACE

5-108. There are three basic methods of conducting a relief in place:
• One unit at a time.
• All units simultaneously.
• Occupying in-depth or adjacent positions.
ONE UNIT AT A TIME
5-109. Relieving one unit at a time is the most time-consuming, but
secure method. Relief proceeds by platoon. Platoons are normally relieved
in place with the relieving unit assuming the relieved unit’s positions and
missions. This method is most common when units have similar
organizations or when occupied terrain must be retained. Subsequent to
relief, the assuming unit makes adjustments to positions. The relieved
units withdraw once they are relieved without waiting for other units.
This method requires detailed planning and coordination.
ALL UNITS SIMULTANEOUSLY
5-110. Relieving units simultaneously is a variation of the first method.
It is faster but less secure as all platoons are moving simultaneously.
Close coordination is required to prevent congestion. Once command
groups and combat trains are collocated, platoons move forward at the
same time along designated routes. Relief occurs simultaneously at each
location. Relieved units withdraw immediately upon relief. The
withdrawing unit does not wait to form up company or troop march
columns, but normally forms up at rally points behind the FEBA in
platoon columns before moving out.
OCCUPYING IN-DEPTH OR ADJACENT POSITIONS
5-111. Relief by occupying positions in depth or adjacent to the relieved
unit is considered an area relief. It is appropriate when units are
dissimilar, when the relieving unit performs a different mission, or when
improved defensive terrain is away from the line of contact. This method
is also appropriate when the unit being relieved has been chemically or
radiologically contaminated. When possible, the relieving unit should be
able to place direct fires on the other unit’s FSCMs. The relieved unit
withdraws one platoon at a time or simultaneously and conducts a
rearward passage of lines through the relieving troop, if appropriate.
5-112. In all three methods the normal sequence of relief is from rear to
front. Overlap always occurs with the relieved unit maintaining
communications, fire support, and positions until relieved. Due to the
noncontiguous, dispersed, and decentralized operations of the mounted
BCT or squadron, relief will most likely occur one troop or platoon at a
time or by area relief with units withdrawing at different times.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
PLANNING
5-113. The primary purpose for a relief in place is to maintain the
combat effectiveness of committed elements. A relief in place should be
conducted during a lull in combat, if possible. FBCB2 enables the
commanders to build and share a complete picture of the area over which
the incoming commander will assume control. As part of the planning,
coordination, and synchronization process, the incoming and outgoing
commanders should coordinate and provide the following:
• Updated friendly and threat situations.
• Impact of civilian considerations on the relief.
• Time for the relief to begin, and estimated time for
completion that takes advantage of limited visibility.
• Sequence of relief, either sequential or simultaneous.
• Method of relief.
• Reconnaissance handover criteria and procedures.
• Locations of contact points, forward AAs, SPs, routes, RPs,
and passage lanes.
• Locations of subordinate element OPs, battle or fighting
positions, checkpoints, and/or roadblocks.
• Fire plans and sector sketches for vehicle fighting positions
and/or crew-served weapons.
• Fire support plans, to include—
Assets available.
Critical friendly zones and no fire areas (NFA).
Preplanned targets.
Final protective fires.
Smoke targets.
• Locations of and procedures to transfer responsibility for
obstacles.
• Locations or employment and purpose of ISR assets/elements
working within the troop AO.
• Far- and near-range recognition signals.
• Locations and responsibilities of guides from the relieved
unit.
• Actions on contact during the relief.
• CSS responsibilities and requirements, to include transfer of
supplies and equipment between units.
• Collocation of command posts.
• Communications information, to include exchange of IP
addresses, communications security, and signal operating
instructions.
5-114. The outgoing commander briefs the incoming commander to
ensure that the relieving unit is thoroughly familiar with the AO and
existing plans of the relieved force. Additional coordination between the
two units is normally effected through the exchange of a liaison, normally
5-38
the XO, who remains on site and provides assistance as needed until the
incoming unit becomes familiar with overall operations. This facilitates
information exchange and the command transition process. Additional
face-to-face meetings and the sharing of digitized overlays and/or free-
text messages between liaisons complement this process. The troop
WARNO for a relief in place must specify, as a minimum, the time for
commencing and completing the relief and the priorities for the routes
involved.
SEQUENCE OF RELIEF
5-115. In determining the sequence of the relief, both commanders
should consider—
• Subsequent mission of the unit conducting the relief.
• Strength and combat efficiency of the unit presently in place.
• Capability of the threat to detect and react against the relief.
• Characteristics of the AO.
• Communications architecture.
PASSAGE OF COMMAND
5-116. The circumstances under which the incoming commander
assumes responsibility for the area must be clearly defined in the order.
During the relief, the commander having responsibility for the area,
mission, and terrain management will exercise OPCON over all
subordinate units within his AO. Responsibility passes to the incoming
commander normally when digital/FM communications that allow
effective command and control have been established and in excess of 50
percent of all the units being relieved have been relieved.
RECONNAISSANCE
5-117. The troop commander and subordinate leaders of the incoming
unit conduct a thorough daylight reconnaissance. The relieved force
commander should initially select and transmit through FBCB2 at least
two routes (ground or air), checkpoints, and contact points for the
incoming unit. The incoming unit’s reconnaissance element with the
troop CP and trains should move to the relieved unit’s location as soon as
possible upon receiving the order from higher headquarters.
SECURITY
5-118. The conduct of a relief in place must be accomplished by the most
covert means possible to prevent the threat from learning that a relief is
taking place. The following security measures should be taken:
• Restrictions on the size of advance parties and
reconnaissance parties must be enforced.
• Communications during the relief are conducted digitally to
the maximum extent possible. A common FM voice net must
be established between the two forces.
• Operations security (OPSEC) is enforced throughout the
operation.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
MOVEMENT CONTROL
5-119. Strict movement procedures must be established and coordinated
between the incoming and outgoing units. The movement along the
routes will be tracked through FBCB2, giving the commanders positive
control and a common picture of the movement of both units.
Coordination between units can be extensively executed through the
sharing of digital overlays. Information must include the following:
• Routes and checkpoints to be used and priorities for their use.
• Responsibility for traffic control.
• Location of assembly areas.
• Common use of transportation.
• Unit maintenance collection point (UMCP) locations and
responsibilities.
• Aid stations and/or hospitals.
5-120. Units conducting a relief in place also share mobility information
via digitized means or acetate overlays. If terrain and the road network
allow, relieved units should be assigned separate routes and assembly
areas to reduce congestion and to minimize concentration of units.
SECTION VII - PASSAGE OF LINES
5-121. A passage of lines passes one unit through the positions of

another when the situation does not permit the unit to bypass the other.
Passages are designated forward or rearward and may be conducted
during offensive, defensive, stability, or support operations. The troop is
particularly vulnerable during a passage of lines. The passing unit may
be concentrated and the fires of the stationary unit may be temporarily
masked. The troop normally conducts a passage of lines as part of a
larger operation such as:
• Forward passage to initiate reconnaissance or flank screen.
• Rearward passage at the conclusion of a security mission.
KEY TASKS
5-122. Passing unit key tasks include—
• Establish digital and voice communications with the
stationary unit. Enter the command, intelligence, and fire
support nets.
• Collocate CPs in accordance with the passage timetable.
• Continuously report the following to the stationary unit:
Current threat activity (i.e., location, size, and
composition).
Friendly activity (i.e., location, size, and activity of
subordinate combat, CS, and CSS elements).
5-40
• Send an order with an FBCB2 overlay to each subordinate

unit specifying where they will physically coordinate passage
with the stationary unit.
• Dispatch representatives to assigned contact points and
coordinate passage for their units. At the contact point,
confirm recognition signals and exchange required
information.
• Display correct recognition signals and use correct challenge
and password as specified in the SOI during passage.
• Maintain proper vehicle spacing and weapons orientation.
5-123. Stationary unit key tasks include—

• Establish digital or voice communications with the passing
unit.
• Ensure contact points are manned and subordinate
commanders have personal communications with their
representatives.
• Ensure representatives at the contact point—
Assign each passing unit a passage point into the AO and
a route that extends from the passage points to the rear
boundary or to an assembly area (defensive operations).
Exchange required information with the passing unit. If
security forces are employed, position them along the
battle handover line (BHL) to observe threat avenues of
approach.
• Ensure routes through obstacles are clearly marked and
physically controlled by guides, or provide an escort to the
passing unit.
• Ensure routes of withdrawal are unobstructed and facilitate
rapid movement to the release point (defensive operations).
• Ensure routes of advance, attack positions, and routes to the
BHL are unobstructed and permit rapid movement (offensive
operations).
• Provide CS and CSS as required or within capabilities.
GRAPHIC CONTROL MEASURES

5-124. Control measures normally used in a reconnaissance handover
and passage of lines include the following:
• Assembly area. An assembly area in the rear area of the
stationary unit allows the passing unit to conduct hasty
reorganization and emergency CSS actions. This assembly
area is temporary in nature.
• Reconnaissance handover line.
• Passage points. Passage points should be concealed from
threat observation. Stationary unit guides may meet the
passing unit at the passage point.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
• Passage lanes. Passage lanes, established by the stationary

unit, allow the passing unit to move quickly and uniformly
through the stationary unit’s AO. This could include passing
through gaps in friendly obstacles and moving near friendly
engagement areas. The passage lane begins at the passage
point and ends at the rear of the stationary unit positions.
The passage is considered complete when the moving unit
exits the lanes.
• Passage routes. Routes are not as restrictive as lanes. Routes
allow a passing unit to move more rapidly through the
stationary unit area. If a passage route is used in conjunction
with a passage lane, it begins where the passage lane ends.
The number of lanes/routes designated will vary based on
METT-TC considerations, but as a general rule, multiple
lanes/routes should be planned to facilitate the rapid passage
of the moving units and to avoid unnecessary massing of
units. The stationary unit may escort the passing unit along
the lane/route.
• Release points. A release point is a well-defined point on a
route at which the elements composing a march column
return under the authority of their respective commanders.
Each one of these elements continues its movement toward
its own appropriate destination.
• Infiltration points. Units should plan infiltration points for
personnel not able to complete the passage with the unit. The
passing unit’s liaison officers (LNO) may remain located with
stationary unit CPs to serve as a point of contact for
infiltrating personnel/equipment. The key is that personnel
attempting to infiltrate must have some way of contacting the
stationary unit prior to attempting to cross into friendly
territory.
5-125. Figure 5-13 and Figure 5-14 show the graphic control measures
that support reconnaissance handover and rearward and forward
passage of lines.
5-42
Figure 5-13. Rearward Passage of Lines
Figure 5-14. Forward Passage of Lines
5-43
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
5-126. The passage of lines involves the stationary unit, the passing
unit, and the commander exercising command authority over both these
units (common commander). The common higher headquarters
coordinates and provides control measures and passage criteria. Critical
tasks of the common commander are as follows:
• Establish the location and criteria for reconnaissance
handover.
NOTE: The troop’s higher headquarters may also be conducting a battle handover with the
other force’s higher headquarters. The common commander may establish a battle
handover line (BHL), designating a phase line forward of the FEBA. The stationary
unit commander controls the ground forward of the FEBA up to the BHL. He can
place security forces, obstacles, and direct and indirect fires into this area to
support his scheme of maneuver within the constraints and intent of the higher
commander.
• Designate contact points just forward of the reconnaissance
or battle handover lines at which stationary and passing
units are required to conduct physical coordination (only in
defensive operations).
• Ensure the passing unit is provided indirect fire support
while its artillery is displacing during battle handover and
passage of lines.
5-127. The commanders of the passing and stationary units coordinate
to confirm and/or exchange information to support the passage, reporting
any discrepancies from the coordination to their respective higher
headquarters. Exchanged information should include the following:
• Updated friendly situation, to include stationary force
dispositions.
• Updated threat situation, to include recent threat activities
and trends.
• Updated civilian situation, to include impact on the passage
and future missions.
• Impact of terrain on the passage and future missions.
• Obstacle locations, to include friendly lanes and, if necessary,
lane closure criteria.
• Unit designations.
• Reconnaissance handover location and criteria.
• Locations of passage points, passage lanes, SPs, routes, RPs,
rally points, attack positions, and AAs as necessary.
• Overwatch and direct fire support provided by the stationary
unit to the passing unit.
• Fire support information, to include—
Assets available.
Critical friendly zones.
Preplanned targets.
Final protective fires.
5-44
Smoke targets.
• Locations or employment and purpose of ISR assets/elements
working within the stationary unit’s AO.
• Vehicle recognition markings and far and near range
recognition signals.
• Locations and responsibilities of guides from the relieved
unit.
• Estimated time of arrival of first element at the passage point
and the number and type of vehicles expected at each point
and lane.
• Actions on contact during the passage.
• CSS responsibilities and requirements, to include:
Locations of supporting CSS elements.
Emergency Class III and V resupply.
Medical evacuation.
Maintenance procedures, to include vehicle recovery.
EPW safeguard and evacuation.
• Collocation of command groups and/or posts.
• Communications information, to include:
FM and EPLRS frequencies.
IP addresses.
COMSEC, COMSEC key, SOI.
Procedures for integrating analog units into the digital
network, providing information, and tracking on FBCB2
displays.
SECTION VIII - BREACH OPERATIONS
5-128. The troop may conduct limited breaching operations when a

bypass is not possible and overwhelming combat power is not required.
The troop relies on stealth, lane reduction techniques, and dismounted
maneuver to achieve surprise and to minimize casualties. Due to limited
dismounted capability of the troop, it must be augmented with engineers
or infantry to ensure success. The breach should be conducted under
limited visibility with terrain favoring a stealth approach to and
reduction of the obstacle.
BREACHING FUNDAMENTALS
5-129. Normally the troop breaches to support its infiltration through
the threat’s defenses or to support the maneuver or assault of a follow-on
combat element. The troop plans for and/or applies the breaching
fundamentals of suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and assault (SOSRA)
to successfully breach the obstacle.
5-45
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
SUPPRESS
5-130. Suppression is the focus of available fires on the threat to prevent
effective fires against the troop; however, suppressive fires must not
betray the stealth nature of the troop’s breach. The troop should plan for
on-call fires on threat forces if the breach is detected. The commander
may also request fires against threat forces away from the breach site as
a deceptive measure.
OBSCURE
5-131. The troop should maximize the use of limited visibility and
natural cover and concealment during the breach. The commander may
employ HC smoke grenades or pots to reduce signature. As with indirect
fires, the troop should plan for on-call smoke missions if the breach is
detected. The commander may also request smoke missions away from
the breach site as a deceptive measure.
SECURE
5-132. The commander should plan for a support-by-fire position that
could use dismounted crew-served weapons. The security force
establishes ambushes to the flanks of the breach site to guard against
threat patrols. If necessary, the force silently eliminates outposts
protecting the breach site. The security force provides early warning of
threat patrols to the breach force, avoiding direct fire and employing
indirect fires against patrols when at all possible.
REDUCE
5-133. After the security force is set, the breach force uses silent
techniques to reduce the obstacle. These techniques include probing a
path through minefield, marking mines, cutting wire, cutting down the
sides of ditches with shovels, and setting demolition charges for later
detonation at a predetermined signal. The troop should employ expedient
far and near marking symbols in accordance with its SOP.
NOTE: The troop should clear one lane for infiltrating reconnaissance or assault platoon or
company and a minimum of two lanes for each mounted battalion.
ASSAULT
5-134. Normally, the troop assault is limited to establishing OPs on the
threat side of the lanes. Under some METT-TC conditions, the troop may
silently eliminate threat OPs on the far side of the obstacle.
5-135. The commander must obtain all pertinent information on the
location, disposition, composition, and orientation of the obstacle and
overwatching threat forces. The commander studies the terrain to
identify potential approaches and breach site(s) that make the maximum
use of perceived cover, concealment, and dead space. The commander
may coordinate aerial reconnaissance of potential approaches and sites to
confirm his estimate, ensuring that the reconnaissance does not draw
undo attention to the reconnoitered areas.
5-136. The commander identifies the lane requirements, and task
organizes assigned and attached elements to best accomplish the breach.
He designates reconnaissance and security, support, and breach forces.
5-46
The commander may use decentralized engineer support for breaching in

support of an infiltration, or centralized support in breaching for a follow-
on assault force. He determines the focus, tempo, and engagement
criteria for the reconnaissance and security force, and determines the
method to best silently reduce the obstacle based on his engineer’s
recommendations.
5-137. The commander integrates indirect fires to support the breach.
He plans on-call fires to support actions such as—
• Threat detects breach before reduction or passage is
complete.
• Suppressive fires on threat forces away from the actual
breach site.
• Assault by follow-on forces after reduction is complete.
• Breach force detonates charges to clear mines or complete
reduction of the obstacle.
5-138. The commander plans for smoke to enhance limited visibility
conditions without arousing suspicion or upon detection of the breach. He
develops actions on contact and/or contingency plans if the breach is
detected. Actions on contact may include—
• Defeat or destroy threat security patrols with indirect and/or
direct fires.
• Suppress threat forces to enable the breach force to withdraw,
aborting the breach.
• Transition to an assault breach within capabilities for follow-
on combat force.
5-47
Chapter 6
Combat Support
The troop can expect to
receive various combat CONTENTS
Intelligence................................................... 6-1
support elements, such as
HUMINT Mission and Organization
an engineer squad or an (Recce Troop Only) .............................. 6-2
ADA Stinger team, from Assessment of AO ................................... 6-7
higher headquarters. The Special Considerations ........................... 6-7
Fire Support/Target Acquisition................. 6-8
troop will also employ Roles and Responsibilities ..................... 6-8
indirect fires and other COLT Platoon and BRT ........................... 6-12
effects during operations. Fire Support Assets and Capabilities .... 6-13
Effective use of these Army Aviation .............................................. 6-25
Air Cavalry ................................................ 6-25
assets requires that the Attack Helicopter Support....................... 6-33
troop commander have an Assault and Cargo Helicopter Support .. 6-42
understanding of their UAV Platoon................................................. 6-45
capabilities and limitat- Platoon Headquarters.............................. 6-46
Ground Planning and Control Section... 6-46
ions. Although these Launch and Recovery Section................ 6-48
assets may be with the Maintenance Team................................... 6-48
troop on a temporary Ground Sensor Platoon .............................. 6-48
basis, troop planning Platoon Leadership.................................. 6-49
IREMBASS/GSR Section ......................... 6-49
must address such issues Multisensor Ground Platoon ...................... 6-51
as their position during Headquarters Element............................. 6-51
movement, security Control Team............................................ 6-52
responsibilities, and PROPHET (SIGINT) Section .................... 6-52
NBC Operations........................................... 6-54
resupply requirements. Troop NBC Defensive Operations .......... 6-54
Use of CS and fire NBC Reconnaissance.............................. 6-55
support must be practiced BCT Engineer Operations........................... 6-56
during troop rehearsals. Capabilities............................................... 6-56
Concept of Operations ............................ 6-56
Organization and Functions.................... 6-58
The troop commander Air Defense .................................................. 6-60
must also consider unique Passive Air Defense................................. 6-60
communications require- Active Air Defense ................................... 6-61
ments when employing
supporting elements. Some CS and fire support organizations will
have ABCS such as FBCB2 and AFATDS. Communications for other
supporting units may be limited to FM radios.
SECTION I - INTELLIGENCE
6-1. While only the recce troop has 97Bs (HUMINT collectors)
assigned, the mounted BRT uses HUMINT as well. Reconnaissance
organizations have used information gained from locals and prisoners
from the beginning of organized warfare. HUMINT operations are an
integral part of the troop’s reconnaissance effort. The operational
environment of the troop offers a wide array of human intelligence
6-1
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
sources, to include EPWs, detained persons, refugees, local inhabitants,

and friendly forces. Troop, squadron, and brigade operations and the
emphasis on HUMINT have required changes in the employment and
reporting procedures of the HUMINT collectors to ensure that their
contribution to the common operating picture is timely and relevant.
During entry and combat operations, the HUMINT collection assets
provide combat information obtained from human sources and
documents. During stability or support operations, HUMINT collection is
the primary contributor to intelligence support for force protection.
HUMINT contributes to the development of a situational understanding
through the interrogation and debriefing of HUMINT sources and the
exploitation of documents in response of higher’s ISR plan.
6-2. As illustrated from our experience in the former Yugoslavia,
reconnaissance squads with assigned HUMINT collectors can enhance
the effectiveness of traditional operations. This is because of the large
amount of incidental contact between an R&S patrol and the civilian
population in the course of routine missions. The immediate employment
of an intelligence specialist who is trained in soliciting combat
information via interrogations/interviews greatly expands the value of
the R&S patrol. HUMINT collectors can assist the troop commander in
assessing his operating environment by their knowledge of the following:
• Attitude of local populace.
• Ability of local populace to take care of itself.
• Capability of local government to function.
• Civilian chain of command.
• Populations of major towns and villages in the AO.
• Number and demographics of displaced civilians.
• Origin and flow of displaced civilians.
• Location of collection points, assembly areas, and displaced
civilian camps.
• Expected increase or decrease in number of displaced civilians
in the next 24 hours and their direction and means of travel.
• Terrorist or guerrilla activity in the same AO.
• Status of planned/on-going civil-military operations.
6-3. With the new appreciation of HUMINT collection, the troop has a
robust organic HUMINT collection capability. The recce troop contains 13
HUMINT collection specialists—one at the troop headquarters and four
pushed down to each platoon. Placing a HUMINT specialist organic to
each squad will institutionalize the capability and place a trained
HUMINT collector where he can best interface with the local populace on
a day-to-day basis. This additional asset will elevate the traditional R&S
mission to a new dimension of gathering combat information. If the
imbedded language capability within the troop does not match the
contingency language, linguists will be attached to the unit during
deployment. The troop leadership must make provisions to integrate
these linguists into their concept of operation.
HUMINT MISSION AND ORGANIZATION (RECCE TROOP ONLY)
6-4. The four HUMINT collectors in each recce platoon provide the
recce troop an organic trained HUMINT collection capability. The
HUMINT collector will normally be distributed as one per reconnaissance
6-2
_____________________________________________________________ Chapter 6 – Combat Support
squad, but can be task organized based on METT-TC to concentrate

HUMINT collection capability as needed to meet specific mission
parameters. The HUMINT collectors could be task organized as a team
within the platoon to focus efforts on a specific checkpoint, or task
organized as a twelve-man team to focus on an urban area. The HUMINT
collector’s mission is to—
• Collect information of immediate tactical value from EPWs,
civilian detainees, refugees, and civilians on the battlefield.
• Collect information of immediate tactical value from foreign
documents.
• Assist in the debriefing of friendly forces, such as patrols.
• Identify individuals for potential detailed exploitation by the
HUMINT collectors in the brigade’s MI Company.
6-5. The senior HUMINT collection NCO at the platoon level will
advise the platoon leader on HUMINT collection operations, provide
initial assessment and quality control of HUMINT collection and source
spotting, and act as the platoon HUMINT trainer. The HUMINT
collections NCO at troop level will advise the troop commander on
HUMINT collection operations, provide assessment and quality control of
HUMINT collection and source spotting, and ensure the training is
conducted to standard.
HUMINT COLLECTION OPERATIONS
6-6. HUMINT collection is an integral part of all recce troop
operations. The synchronization of the information collected from human
sources is vital to troop mission success.
HUMINT Collection in Support of Offensive Operations
6-7. During offensive operations, the HUMINT collectors are focused
on the integration of EPWs and civilians on the battlefield. The
commander will determine, based on METT-TC, when and if the scouts
should attempt to make contact with civilians or to capture prisoners.
The commander must weigh the benefits of information gained against
exposing the HUMINT collector and scouts to threat forces.
HUMINT Collection in Support of Defensive Operations
6-8. HUMINT missions in defensive operations include interrogation
of EPWs, to specifically include EPWs captured and brought back by
patrols; refugee debriefing; assisting in friendly force patrol debriefing;
and limited force protection source operations.
HUMINT Collection in Support of Urban Operations
6-9. During military operations in urban terrain, people (EPWs and
civilians) are the preeminent source of information. HUMINT collection
provides information, such as descriptions of building interiors, not
otherwise available through signal or imagery intelligence. In urban
operations, the HUMINT collectors can be deployed at the squad level, or
consolidated for focused mass HUMINT collection. Maintaining the
HUMINT collectors at the squad level achieves dispersed collection
operations and increases the opportunities for chance contact with either
an EPW or displaced civilian. Massing the HUMINT collectors at the
troop may be applicable during a stability operation or a support
operation where there is a diminished need for the recce platoons to
6-3
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
provide security. During SSC operations, the HUMINT collectors are able
to interrogate EPWs, to persuade holdouts to surrender, and to help with
the questioning and evacuation of noncombatants that are encountered in
buildings. They also collect information concerning floor plans, defensive
plans, locations of combatants and noncombatants in buildings and the
surrounding neighborhood, and other pertinent information. The
collected information is passed both vertically and horizontally, based on
unit SOP.
HUMINT Collection in Support of Stability Operations or Support Operations
6-10. The primary focus of the HUMINT collectors during stability
operations or support operations is intelligence support for force
protection. Centralized management and databases are key to successful
HUMINT operations in support of force protection. The HUMINT
collectors organic to the recce troop will normally be allocated to
individual reconnaissance squads, as necessary, to provide a language
and tactical questioning ability, to translate and exploit foreign
documents, and to identify individuals as potential counterintelligence
(CI) sources to be more fully exploited by the HUMINT platoon in the MI
Company. The HUMINT teams establish a network of force protection
sources, debrief casual sources, and interview/debrief local national
employees to increase the security posture of US forces, to provide
information in response to command collection requirements, and to
provide early warning of threats to US forces. The HUMINT collectors
develop both the overall HUMINT picture and the more specific threat
intelligence collection (CI) picture. Additionally, the HUMINT collector is
in the position to articulate the friendly force’s position and draw
commonality with the local populace while dispelling antifriendly
propaganda.
DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION OPERATIONS
6-11. Document exploitation (DOCEX) is the extraction and
exploitation of information with intelligence value from documents, to
include all types of written or recorded media. The HUMINT teams
perform limited exploitation of documents for information of immediate
tactical interest dealing primarily with documents found on or in
immediate association with EPWs, civilian detainees, refugees, and other
HUMINT sources. In their traditional role, HUMINT collectors review
captured orders and maps. In stability operations, as an example, they
monitor election posters in different ethnic areas.
6-12. The exploitation of documents captured on or in association with
HUMINT sources is performed in conjunction with the initial tactical
questioning of these individuals. Documents that cannot be exploited by
the HUMINT teams in a timely fashion (due to their size or technical
nature) are scanned and transmitted to higher for translation and
exploitation.
6-13. See FM 2-22.3 [FM 34-52] and FM 2-22.2 [FM 34-5] for more
detailed information on HUMINT operations.
TACTICAL QUESTIONING
6-14. When conducted properly, tactical questioning elicits valuable,
timely, and accurate information from the local populace. When
conducted improperly, the questioner confuses the subject, waste time,
6-4
and receive inaccurate information. Tactical questioning must answer

who, what, where, when, how, and why.
Effective Questioning
6-15. Questioning is more than just asking questions. Reconnaissance
soldiers, acting as questioners, must maintain control and not lose the
initiative. Since the questioner is conducting a hasty/unconventional
interrogation, he should tailor his questions to fit the source. A civilian
may not understand if he uses jargon or speak too quickly. Below are four
types of effective questioning:
• Direct. What is your name? Who is your organization’s
leader?
• Follow-up. These are used to exploit a topic of interest.
Questions usually flow from one to another based on the
answer to the previous question.
• Control. Used to maintain control and to check the accuracy
and truthfulness of the source’s statements. Control questions
should be mixed with normal questions throughout the
interview/interrogation.
• Repeat. A technique to ensure accuracy, particularly when
you suspect the source is lying. Since a lie is more difficult to
remember than the truth, you can discover errors by
rephrasing or disguising the same questions that the source
has already answered.
6-16. Principles of good questioning include the following:
• Ask questions that are simple, brief, and to the point.
• Ask for narrative responses.
• Use follow-up questions.
6-17. The following are types of questions to avoid:
• Negative. Questions that contain not, no, or none.
• Leading. These tend to prompt the source to give the reply he
believes the questioner wants to hear, or they may simply
answer yes or no, which requires the questioner to ask more
leading questions to complete the facts.
• Compound. A compound really asks two or more questions.
The source may either become confused or intentionally
provide incomplete responses.
• Vague. Vague questions elicit very broad and general
answers. The source may answer a question totally unrelated
to the topic. This may lead to tangents or false and
misleading information.
6-18. Additional guidelines to effective questioning include:
• Clarify vague statements sources make.
• Never take anything for granted; always ask the obvious.
• Clarify ambiguous statements. Ambiguity is something that
can be interpreted more than one way; therefore, statements
that include words like possible, always, everywhere,
everything, a few, far, and near should be clarified.
6-5
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
• If a point is still unclear, have the source make a drawing.

Annotate the drawing with the source, i.e., what the drawing
represents, where the drawing was made (such as hilltop
looking south), north directional arrow, and date-time group.
Effective Listening
6-19. Along with effective questioning, questioners must learn the skill
of effective listening. They need to remain calm, gather the facts, and
exploit all leads completely. Questioners should not let the excitement of
the source divulging information fog their judgment. Showing excitement
may indicate to the source what the questioner is attempting to exploit.
Secondly, don’t jump the gun. Cutting off the source before he finishes
answering may cost the questioner a valuable lead. Ask the question and
observe the source. If the source answers and then pauses, wait him out;
he or she may have more to say. Silence can also be a strong weapon. Do
not put words in the source’s mouth; let him finish his thoughts.
Understanding Human Reactions
6-20. Along with effective questioning and listening, understanding
human reactions provides valuable information about the source’s
responses. During an interaction, people will often break eye contact and
avert their eyes momentarily as they access information to answer a
question or to think about what they are going to say. We all have a
unique pattern of accessing internal information. Generally, individuals
will shift their eyes according to the internal system they are accessing.
The model below is a generalization and unreliable in some cases.
NOTE: This model is for a right-handed person. The cues are reversed for a left-handed
person.
• Subject looks up and to the right, indicating he is visualizing
something that has not been seen before, i.e., creating images.
• Subject looks up and to the left, indicating he is recalling
something seen before, i.e., a visual memory.
• Eyes staring into space. Not focused with some pupil dilation;
either visual recall or visualizing something that has not been
seen before.
• Subject looks directly right, indicating he is imagining sounds
and creating spoken language.
• Subject looks directly left, indicating he is recalling sounds
from memory.
6-21. In addition to watching eye movements, the following behavior
should be observed:
• Gestures.
• Posture.
• Muscle tension.
• Skin color.
• Breathing.
• Voice tone/tempo/volume.
Debriefing
6-22. As soon as a team returns to the assembly area, it goes to a
secure area for debriefing. In preparing for the debriefing, the team—
6-6
• Accounts for all team and individual equipment.

• Prepares overlays of the team’s route, AO, infiltration point,
exfiltration point, and sighting locations.
• Reviews and discusses the events listed in the team notebook,
from infiltration to return to the assembly area, including the
details of each threat sighting.
6-23. IO personnel or the troop commander normally conducts the

debriefing. A communication representative debriefs the team members
separately after the team debriefing to develop the communications
architecture within the urban area. The team leader gives a step-by-step
discussion of every event listed in the team notebook, from the
infiltration until the return to the assembly area. When the debriefing is
over, the team is released for equipment maintenance and recovery.
ASSESSMENT OF AREA OF OPERATIONS

6-24. The troop commander receives and analyzes the information
gathered by the R&S teams. The commander then assesses the AO
according to the mission and intent of higher. The assessment will
include, but is not limited to—
• Threat composition and activity.
• Areas of vulnerability to friendly forces.
• Key terrain.
• Approach routes for mounted and dismounted forces.
• Entry points or points of penetration.
• Support positions for direct and indirect systems.
• Civilian disposition.
• Density and composition of urban area.
• Hazard areas (fuel storage, natural gas lines, chemical
production sites).
• Communication facilities.
• Retransmission sites.
• Intent of civilian populace (stay or flee).
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
6-25. The SSC environment is the most difficult, complex, and
challenging environment for ISR integration/operations. Ambiguous and
difficult-to-identify threats characterize this environment. SSC operations
require detailed intelligence on equipment and facilities not normally
considered military targets, diverse augmentation requirements, and
intense political pressures, to include demands to minimize friendly and
threat casualties. Such operations might often be in urban areas where it is
extremely difficult to predict terrain, health, and criminal factors that
affect the employment of soldiers and weapons. The heavy reliance on
HUMINT sources, coupled with the continuing demand for traditional
technical collection means used in the MTW environment, demand a more
robust analytic and collection effort than in the traditional intelligence
organizations. The ISR capabilities resident in the brigade are capable of
meeting the challenge of ISR operations across the spectrum of conflict.
6-7
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
SECTION II - FIRE SUPPORT/TARGET ACQUISITION
6-26. Digital systems greatly enhance the commander’s ability to focus

both direct and indirect fires. However, their lethality is a by-product of
effective planning, integration, and synchronization. These systems
provide the commander improved situational awareness that enhances
his ability to visualize his battlespace and subsequently tailor fire
missions and essential fire support tasks to meet a variety of needs. In
the case of indirect fires, FBCB2 provides a basic call-for-fire capability,
linking an FBCB2-equipped observer to a supporting FIST who further
transmits the call-for-fire via an AFATDS handheld terminal unit to the
supporting fire direction center. As an alternative, a scout may send a
call for fire via FM voice to the FIST, a platoon leader, or to the troop CP.
6-27. While the advent of digitization enhances the focusing of fires, it
does not increase the lethality of munitions or ammunition allocations.
Digitization allows the commander to rapidly exploit his battlespace by
both lethal and nonlethal fires. It also improves his ability to tailor fire
missions to meet a variety of critical fire support tasks.
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
6-28. The fire support system is the collective body of target acquisition;
weapons/ammunition; and digitized C4ISR systems, facilities, and
personnel required to manage, integrate, and synchronize fire support.
Scouts, FISTs, and unit leaders are the primary acquisition element of the
fire support system. The troop commander and his fire support officer must
know the capabilities and limitations of the systems available.
FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATOR
6-29. At troop level, the fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) is the
FSO. As such, he advises and assists the troop commander in all aspects
of fire support planning and coordination, to include fires planned in
support of troop missions. He coordinates indirect fires based on the troop
commander’s focus and intent and the directives from higher. The troop
commander must ensure the FSO/FIST understands the fire support plan
and his responsibilities as specified in the brigade/squadron OPORD and
ensure they are briefed on the following:
• Target responsibilities.
• Reconnaissance responsibilities (if applicable).
• Location of proposed OPs.
• Routes.
• Concept of fires, including fires to support troop operations.
• Current threat dispositions.
• Logistical and administrative requirements.
• Operational frequencies and nets.
• FBCB2 IP addresses.
• Attack criteria.
• When/where the commander wants to mass indirect fires.
6-8
FIRE SUPPORT TEAM (RECCE TROOP ONLY)

6-30. The troop commander has overall responsibility for the
integration of fires and maneuver for his unit. However, he has an
element within his headquarters to assist with the planning,
coordination, and integration of all the fire support assets that may
support the troop. This fire support organization is called the FIST and is
supervised by the troop FSO (see Figure 6-1). On the basis of the
commander’s guidance, the FSO develops a fire support plan and
presents it to the commander for approval. Some of the responsibilities of
the FSO/FIST include—
• Plan, coordinate, and execute fire support.
• Advise the commander on all aspects of fire support.
• Request, adjust, and direct all types of fire support assets.
• Advise the commander on the positioning and employment of
the troop mortars.
• Provide emergency control of CAS missions in the absence of
qualified Air Force personnel.
• Provide emergency control of naval gunfire (NGF) missions in
the absence of qualified USMC personnel.
6-31. The FIST element also assists in target acquisition, calls for fire,
and fire control through digital links established with the FSE. The
squadron FSO, S2, and S3 coordinate closely to focus and synchronize
fires that will support the scheme of maneuver by taking advantage of
near-real time targeting information provided by intelligence, acquisition,
and targeting systems. Information provided by AFATDS is often useful
to the S2 in preparing and analyzing situational templates. Additionally,
FA target acquisition systems and the all source analysis system–
workstation (ASAS-RWS) provide targeting information that the scout
and FIST elements use during R&S missions.
6-32. The squadron FSO develops the squadron fire support plan. Once
developed, the squadron FSO assigns responsibility for each of the
targets to a FIST team, troop scouts, or a subordinate unit. In doing so,
he will specifically task the troop, through the S3, for positioning of FIST
teams and execution of fire support tasks.
6-33. The FIST element operates on two radio nets:
• Troop net.
• Supporting artillery call for fire net 1 (CFN-1).
Figure 6-1. Fire Support Team Organization
6-9
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
PLANNING AND COORDINATION

6-34. To provide the troop commander with the necessary support, the
FIST must conduct planning specific to the type of operation that the
troop is conducting. Fire support planning and coordination begins on
receipt of a mission and continues throughout planning and execution.
The troop FSO should be positioned with the troop commander, at the
troop CP, or where he can best maintain situational awareness and
provide support in executing the squadron and troop fire support plan as
well as control the positioning of the FIST.
NOTE: Planning and coordination aspects apply to both troops except where indicated.
Offensive Operations
6-35. The following actions and considerations apply for fire support
planning, coordination, and execution when the troop conducts offensive
operations:
• Determine when and how to shift priorities of fires.
• Specify the trigger for shifting priorities of fire.
• Plan fires en route to the line of departure/line of contact.
Plan fires to support hasty defense if attack stalls.
Plan fires in support of the unit assembly area.
• Plan fires from the line of departure/line of contact to the
objective.
Provide priority of fires to lead elements.
Consider smoke to limit threat observation of friendly
elements.
Consider smoke in support of breach sites, screening
movements, and deception operations.
Plan fires on exposed flanks to disrupt counterattacks.
Consider task organization of observers to ensure all
critical targets are observed.
Consider preparatory fires.
• Plan fires on the objective.
Plan fires that isolate the objective.
Consider fires to delay threat reinforcements and
resupply.
Plan fires to suppress threat direct fire weapons.
Consider the use of smoke to screen or obscure.
Plan signals for shifting fires.
Plan fires in support of a hasty defense upon successful
attack of the objective.
• Plan fires beyond the objective.
Plan fires to divert, delay, or limit threat reinforcements.
Plan fires on likely counterattack avenues of approach.
Plan fires to disrupt or delay threat retreat.
6-10
Defensive Operations
6-36. The following actions and considerations apply for fire support
planning, coordination, and execution when the troop conducts defensive
operations:
• Plan alternate positions for mortars.
• Plan suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) in support of
CAS missions.
• Plan for priority of fires.
• Plan fire support early and throughout the entire defensive
sector.
• Plan final protective fires (FPF).
• Plan fires forward of the main battle area (MBA).
Plan counterreconnaissance fires.
Plan fires to force the threat commander to deploy his
forces early.
Position observers on templated avenues of approach.
Plan fires on key choke points.
Plan FASCAM and smoke to separate lead elements from
follow-on forces.
• Plan fires in the MBA.
Mass to disrupt, delay, and destroy the threat.
Plan fires on key obstacles and assign redundant
observers to execute fire plan.
Know the engineer obstacle plan and types of obstacles.
Consider the terrain when targeting obstacles.
Consider the use of smoke to support the obstacle plan.
• Plan fires in support of engagement areas.
Use fires to canalize the threat.
Plan groups and series for simultaneous engagements.
Mass fires in engagement areas.
Plan coordinated attacks with close air support.
Consider use of special munitions (illumination, smoke,
Copperhead).
• Ensure fires are in strict accordance with the rules of
engagement. Nonlethal fires may be the primary means in
these types of operations.
• Plan and rehearse clearance of fires drill.
• Plan for employment of radars, e.g., critical friendly zones.
• Plan for employment of precision munitions to limit collateral
damage.
6-11
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
COLT PLATOON AND BRT

6-37. The COLT platoon is organic to the direct support artillery
battalion, but will normally operate attached to the BRT. It is capable of
mounted and dismounted operations, to include dismounted airmobile
operations. The focus of effort for the platoon is essential fire support
tasks established by the brigade commander and his staff. The purpose of
the fire support effort must be clearly stated to prevent the COLT platoon
from wasting time. The platoon leader acts as the BRT fire support officer
(FSO). Fire support and reconnaissance missions require the platoon to
be more tactically mobile than the parent brigade. The same or similar
HMMWV platforms as the BRT scouts provide this mobility.
6-38. The distance that the COLT platoon operates from the main body
is restricted by the capability of its communications equipment. With its
organic equipment, the platoon operates three nets—brigade OI net,
brigade fire support net, and the platoon net.
6-39. The training of COLTs should parallel that received by scouts, as
their roles are similar and overlap. Scouts exist to conduct R&S and
small-scale tactical operations in support of the higher headquarters
plan. COLTs can be tasked to support the ISR plan, but this is not their
primary mission. Their primary mission is the execution of fires in
support of the brigade battle plan, but in doing so, will usually be
positioned to provide surveillance and intelligence. (The platoon’s ability
to conduct continuous surveillance is limited due to operational
requirements and personnel constraints. METT-TC dictates the extent of
operations the platoon can conduct.) Like scouts, the COLTs rely on
stealth and communications to be successful and survive.
6-40. The COLT platoon can operate as squads, as separate teams
under platoon control, or be tasked organized with the scouts. The
decision to work as squad or team is based on METT-TC factors. The
COLT platoon leader considers those factors while making his estimate of
the situation. Squads perform fire support and reconnaissance missions
as directed by the platoon headquarters. Squads also assist in tactical
control and coordination.
SQUADS
6-41. A squad is composed of two teams; each team consists of a team
leader (who may also be a squad leader) and two soldiers. Each team is
equipped with the lightweight laser designator/rangefinder (LLDR) that
will designate targets for those munitions requiring reflected laser energy
for final ballistics guidance. They are also equipped with the AFATDS
lightweight computer unit loaded with the forward observer software
(FOS-LCU). The target designator set also has a thermal sight.
TASK ORGANIZATION
6-42. The structure of the BRT as described above provides some
unique capabilities and some challenges in task organization. There are
essentially three task organization options the troop commander should
consider for tactical employment: pure platoons, integrated platoons, and
attached COLT teams. Which option to use is primarily dependent on—
• Brigade commander’s reconnaissance guidance.
• The width of the sector the troop is operating in.
6-12
• Threat situation.
• Whether the mission is weighted more toward reconnaissance
or executing the brigade fire support plan.
• Distances for communications and impact on command and
control.
• Security requirements for the BRT and attachments.
Pure Platoons
6-43. Although employing pure platoons will probably not be the
normal method of operation, some conditions or missions require pure
platoon employment. Some conditions that might require this are—
• A large portion of the troop conduct reconnaissance or
surveillance operations to the flanks and/or rear of the
brigade while the COLTs are required forward of the BCT.
• The COLT platoon is required to operate under the direct
control of the BCT FSCOORD.
• There are no additional assets to task organize with the scout
platoons, and the COLT platoon is operating under artillery
control.
Integrated Platoons
6-44. Probably the most common way to employ the platoons is to
integrate the scouts and COLT platoons together, creating two platoons,
each with a platoon headquarters, two scout sections, and two to four
COLT teams. This method of employment is best utilized when the troop
must cover an extended sector, requiring both reconnaissance and fire
support observation capabilities throughout the area.
Attached COLT Teams
6-45. The situation may dictate that the best task organization is to
attach two or three COLT teams to the scout platoons. The remainder of
the COLTs is left under the control of the COLT platoon leader to focus
on execution of the brigade fire support plan. This might be used when
one or both of the scout platoons require some fire support augmentation,
and when execution of the fire support plan requires some COLT assets
to remain under artillery control focused on artillery observation
missions.
6-46. No matter what task organization is employed, success will be
achieved only if the scouts and COLTs have habitually trained together
on the same critical reconnaissance, surveillance, and artillery observer
tasks. The unit cannot achieve full potential and the ability to be flexibly
employed if they focus only on their individual artillery or scout MOS
tasks. They must constantly work and train with the mindset that they
are both scouts and artillery observers, equally versed in both missions.
FIRE SUPPORT ASSETS AND CAPABILITIES
6-47. Fire support assets include field artillery, mortars, close air
support, and naval surface fire support (NSFS). These assets support
operations by disrupting, delaying, diverting, limiting, and destroying
threat forces. Lethal fires, nonlethal fires (currently smoke and
illumination), or combinations of both are employed to accomplish this
support.
6-13
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
6-48. Effects are the result of an application of lethal fires (excluding

ground-based direct fires) and nonlethal effects directed against a target
within the battlespace to achieve a desired purpose (decisive, shaping, or
protective), supporting the commander’s intent. Effects provided by
organic, OPCON, and joint, multinational, and national lethal and
nonlethal systems are integrated and synchronized by the SBCT. The
application of these capabilities achieves full spectrum effects.
6-49. The troop leadership must be aware of the capabilities of the
available radar systems (see Table 6-1). Radars will play a significant
role in the detection of threat artillery/mortar systems and provide
valuable location information to the troop.
Table 6-1. Radars
1
Range-Meters Scan Sector Emplacement Displacement General
2 2
Time Time* Location
MIN MAX MIN MAX
AN/TPQ 36 750 m 12K-Arty and 230 mils 1,600 mils 20 minutes 10 minutes 3-6 km
Mort behind the
24K-Rockets FLOT
AN/TPQ 37 3,000 m 30K-Arty 300 mils 1,600 mils 30 minutes 15 minutes 8-12 km
50K-Rockets behind the
FLOT
1
Can scan 6,400 mils by using extended azimuth search function; however, this is not common practice.
2
Time does not include set-up or take down of camouflage systems.
FIELD ARTILLERY
6-50. The brigade, cavalry squadron (RSTA), and hence the troop, is
supported by a field artillery battalion. As part of its unit basic load, this
battalion has several different munitions available to support the troop.
It has lethal munitions such as HE, DPICM, Copperhead, white
phosphorous (WP), and scatterable mines (ADAM/RAAMS). It also has
nonlethal munitions that include smoke and illumination. Table 6-2 lists
some capabilities of the various munitions.
Table 6-2. Munitions Capabilities
CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS
MAX RANGES (M198) FPF WIDTH RATES OF FIRE
HE/DPICM ERDPICM RAP SUSTAINED MAX
400m
18,100 28,400 30,000 varies 4 rounds/min
ILLUMINATION
MAX RANGE BURN TIME RATE OF FIRE CONTINUOUS ILLUM ILLUM DIAMETER
17,500 2 minutes 1 round/min 1,000m
SMOKE
TYPE TIME TO BUILD EFFECTIVE SMOKE AVG BURN TIME (MINUTES)
WP 30 SECS 1 to 1½
SMOKE 30 SECS 5 to 10
6-14
6-51. In addition to the supporting cannon units, MLRS elements may

also provide either rocket or missile fires. Unlike cannon artillery, MLRS
units do not fire a variety of munitions. The maximum range of MLRS
rockets is 32,000 meters.
NAVAL SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT
6-52. Destroyers and cruisers are the predominant ships used in NGF
roles. Both ships use five-inch guns to provide fires. In the event
augmentation to conduct NGF missions does not occur, the NGF call-for-
fire procedures are listed step by step in Figure 6-2. Table 6-3 provides
naval gunfire data for the available types of munitions.
Figure 6-2. Naval Gunfire Call-for-Fire Form
6-15
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Figure 6-2. Naval Gunfire Call-for-Fire Form (continued)
Table 6-3. Naval Gunfire Capabilities
Ammunition RANGE
High Explosive Full Charge: 23,127M; Reduced Charge: 12,200M
Illumination Full Charge: 23,127M; Reduced Charge: 12,200M
White Phosphorous Full Charge: 23,127M; Reduced Charge: 12,200M
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

6-53. The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps provide the Army with
the following five types of fixed-wing air support:
• CAS.
• Combat air reconnaissance.
6-16
• Tactical airlift.
• Electronic combat.
• Air interdiction.
6-54. CAS missions are the most common type of mission flown in
support of the troop. CAS is defined as air attacks on hostile surface
forces that are in close proximity of friendly troops. CAS can be employed
to blunt a threat attack, support the momentum of the ground attack, or
provide cover for friendly movements. For best results while avoiding
mutual interference or fratricide, aircraft are kept under “detailed
integration” (part of the Air Force’s combat air system). Until the USAF
achieves air superiority, competing demands between CAS and
counterair operations may limit sorties apportioned for the CAS role.
Nomination of CAS targets is the responsibility of the commander, ALO,
and S3 at each level.
6-55. In most cases, these CAS sorties are planned by the squadron S2,
S3, and FSCOORD and requested through the squadron ALO. It is quite
possible that the troop may have a tactical air control party (TACP)
attached to it for security and positioning to execute planned CAS
missions. FISTs attached to the troop are also trained in controlling close
air support and may have control of a CAS mission as part of an essential
fire support task. CAS flown specifically in support of the troop is
normally an on-call mission and takes the form of an immediate CAS
request that can be controlled by an FSO or TACP. In other cases, Army
aviation aircraft (OH-58D and AH-64D aircraft) and USAF or USMC
aircraft may perform joint air attack team (JAAT) operations.
6-56. Tables 6-4 and 6-5 depict the aviation assets most likely to be
available to support the troop. USAF, USN, and USMC aircraft are listed
within the same charts to save space. USAF and USMC personnel are the
primary means for requesting and controlling their respective service’s
aircraft. However, if no personnel augmentation by the other services is
available, then the organic fire support personnel are the primary means
for coordinating and controlling CAS aircraft. In the event USAF or
USMC personnel do not augment the troop to assist in controlling CAS, a
CAS briefing form is located at Figure 6-3.
6-17
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Table 6-4. Fixed-Wing Aircraft
AIRCRAFT SERVICE CHARACTERISTICS (Typical Munitions)

AV-8B1 USMC, USN VSTOL CAS aircraft; subsonic; typical load 4,000 lbs.
Maximum load 9,200 lbs; 25-mm Gatling gun.
A-10 or USAF, USAF Res, Specialized CAS aircraft; subsonic; typical load 6,000 lbs.
O/A-101 USAF NG Maximum load 16,000 lbs; 30-mm gun.
F-15E USAF Multirole aircraft; priority is air-to-ground; supersonic;
maximum load 24,500 lbs; 20-mm cannon w/512 rounds.
F-161 USAF, USAF Res, Multirole aircraft; complements the F-15 in an air-to-air role;
USAF NG most accurate air to ground delivery system in the inventory;
supersonic; typical load 6,000 lbs. Maximum load 10,500 lbs.
F/A-181 USN, USMC Multirole fighter; wide variety of air-to-surface weapons;
typical load 7,000 lbs. Maximum load 17,000 lbs; 20-mm gun
mounted in the nose and air-to-air missiles.
AC-1301 USAF, USAF Res Specialized CAS/RACO aircraft, propeller driven, two models.
The A model is equipped with two 40-mm guns, two 20-mm
guns, and two 7.62-mm miniguns. The H model is similar,
except it has no 7.62 miniguns and one of the 40-mm guns is
replaced with a 105-mm Howitzer. Both models have
advanced sensors and target acquisition system including
FLIR and low-light TV. Weapons employment accuracy is
outstanding. This aircraft is vulnerable to threat air defense
systems and must operate in a low ADA threat environment.
1
Aircraft with FM communications.
NOTE: Typical load is average load for typical support mission; maximum load is the amount the aircraft
can carry in an ideal situation.
Table 6-5. Rotary-Wing Aircraft
AIRCRAFT SERVICE CHARACTERISTICS (Typical Munitions)

AH-1 US Army 20-mm gun (750 rounds); 8 TOW or 8 Hellfire missiles; 76 2.75-inch
AH-1W USMC FFAR; Capable of carrying limited fuel-air explosives.
OH-58D US Army 4 Hellfire missiles, 14 2.75-inch FFAR; 524 caliber .50 machine gun
(Kiowa rounds; 4 air-to-air Stinger missiles (if only weapon system used, or
Warrior) 2 in combination with another weapon system).
AH-64D US Army 30-mm gun (1200 rounds); 16 Hellfire missiles; 76 2.75-inch FFAR
NOTE: FFAR – folding fin aerial rocket.
6-18
Figure 6-3. Close Air Support Briefing Form
FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION MEASURES

6-57. Once established, FSCM are displayed on maps, firing charts,
overlays, and stored in computers. Graphic portrayal includes, as a
minimum, the visual code, the abbreviation for the measure, the
establishing headquarters, and the effective date-time group. Often, the
date-time group is shown as a from-to time. Usually, coordination
measures are labeled at each end of a line or within the graphic, space
6-19
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
permitting. Both the graphics and the lettering are in black for all
measures.
6-58. With the exception of boundaries, FSCM are either permissive or
restrictive. In essence, the primary purpose of a permissive measure is to
facilitate the attack on targets. A restrictive measure imposes certain
requirements for specific coordination before the engagement of those
targets affected by the measure. Therefore, the primary purpose of a
restrictive measure is to safeguard friendly forces.
Permissive Measures
6-59. Coordinated Fire Line. A coordinated fire line (CFL) is a line
beyond which conventional or improved conventional indirect fire
(surface-to-surface fires only) means (mortars, field artillery, and NGF)
may fire at any time within the zone of the establishing headquarters
without additional coordination. The purpose of the CFL is to expedite
the attack on targets beyond it. Usually, a brigade or a division
establishes the CFL, but a maneuver battalion may establish it. It is
located as close to the establishing unit as possible, without interfering
with maneuver forces, to open up the area beyond to fire support. There
is no requirement for the CFL to be placed on identifiable terrain.
However, additional considerations include the limits of ground
observation, the location of the initial objectives in the offense, and the
requirement for maximum flexibility of both maneuver and the delivery
of supporting fires. Higher headquarters may consolidate subordinate
CFLs.
6-60. The CFL is graphically portrayed by a dashed black line followed
by the establishing headquarters (brigade or division) in parentheses
above the line and a date-time group below the line (see Figure 6-4).
Locations for CFLs are disseminated by message and/or overlay through
both maneuver and fire support channels to higher, lower, and adjacent
maneuver and supporting units.
Figure 6-4. Coordinated Fire Line
6-61. Fire Support Coordination Line. A fire support coordination line

(FSCL) is a line established and adjusted by the appropriate land or
amphibious force commander within his unit’s boundaries in consultation
with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders (see
Figure 6-5). Forces attacking targets beyond an FSCL must inform all
affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary reaction to
avoid fratricide, both in the air and on the ground. FSCLs facilitate the
rapid attack of targets of opportunity beyond the coordination measure.
Supporting elements may attack targets beyond the FSCL, provided the
attack will not produce adverse effects on, or to the rear of, the line that
may affect current tactical operations. The FSCL is used to coordinate all
6-20
fires of air, ground, or sea weapons systems using any type of

ammunition against surface targets.
Figure 6-5. Fire Support Coordination Line
6-62. The FSCL is not a boundary. The synchronization of operations

on either side of the FSCL is the responsibility of the establishing
commander out to the limits of the land or amphibious force boundary.
6-63. The decision on where to place or even whether to use an FSCL
requires careful consideration. If used, its location is based on estimates
of the situation and concept of operations. Location of threat forces,
anticipated rates of movement, weapons capabilities, and tempo of the
operation, as well as other factors deemed appropriate, are considered in
the commander’s estimate. The FSCL is normally positioned closer to the
FLOT in the defense than in the offense. The exact positioning of the
FSCL is situation dependent; however, the FSCL should follow well-
defined terrain features to ease identification from the air.
6-64. Establish an FSCL at sufficient depth to not limit high-tempo
maneuver operations. FSCLs established at sufficient depth assist land
or amphibious force commanders in easing the coordination requirements
for attack operations within their AO by forces not under their control,
such as naval gunfire. The FSCL is a term oriented to air-land
operations; there is no similar term used at sea.
6-65. An associated benefit of employing an FSCL is the reduction in
potential for fratricide. Short of an FSCL, the appropriate land or
amphibious force commander controls all air-to-ground and surface-to-
surface attack operations. Commanders employ restrictive measures to
improve the protection of friendly forces operating beyond an FSCL.
6-66. Coordination of attacks beyond the FSCL is especially critical to
commanders of air, land, and special operation forces. Their forces may
operate beyond an FSCL or plan to maneuver on that territory in the
future. Such coordination is also important when attacking forces employ
wide area munitions or munitions with delayed effects. Finally, this
coordination assists in avoiding conflicting or redundant attack
operations. In exceptional circumstances, the inability to conduct this
coordination will not preclude the attack of targets beyond the FSCL.
However, failure to do so may increase the risk of fratricide and could
waste limited resources.
6-67. The land or amphibious force commander adjusts the location of
the FSCL as required to keep pace with operations. In high-tempo
maneuver operations, the FSCL may change every few hours. The
6-21
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
establishing commander quickly transmits the change to higher, lower,

adjacent, and supporting headquarters to ensure attack operations are
properly coordinated. Anticipated adjustments to the FSCL are normally
transmitted to other elements of the joint force sufficiently early to
reduce potential disruptions in their current and near-term operations.
6-68. Free Fire Area. A free fire area (FFA) is a specific area into which
any weapon system may fire without additional coordination with the
establishing headquarters (see Figure 6-6). It is used to expedite fires and
to facilitate the jettison of munitions when aircraft are unable to drop
them on a target area. Usually, a division or higher commander
establishes the FFA. It is located on identifiable terrain when possible or
by grid designation when necessary. It is disseminated through both
maneuver and fire support channels. Aircraft operations in an FFA may
be extremely hazardous since there is no deconfliction from fires going
into the FFA.
Figure 6-6. Free Fire Area
Restrictive Measures
6-69. No Fire Area. A no-fire area (NFA) is an area into which no fires
or effects of fires are allowed (see Figure 6-7). Two exceptions are—
• When the establishing headquarters approves fires
temporarily within the NFA on a mission-by-mission basis.
• When a threat force within the NFA engages a friendly force.
The commander may engage the threat to defend his force.
6-70. The purpose of the NFA is to prohibit fires or their effects in the
area. Usually a division or corps establishes NFAs. NFAs are normally on
easily identifiable terrain. However, they may be located by grid or by a
radius (in meters) from a center point. Like other fire support
coordination measures, an NFA’s location is disseminated through both
maneuver and fire support channels to concerned levels.
6-22
Figure 6-7. No Fire Area
6-71. Restrictive Fire Area. A restrictive fire area (RFA) is one in which
specific restrictions are imposed and in which fires that exceed those
restrictions will not be delivered without coordination with the
establishing headquarters (see Figure 6-8). The purpose of the RFA is to
regulate fires into an area according to the stated restrictions. Maneuver
battalion or higher echelons of command establish it. On occasion, a
company operating independently may establish an RFA. Usually, it is
located on identifiable terrain, by a grid or by radius (in meters) from a
center point. Its location is disseminated in the same manner as that of
the coordinated fire line. Restrictions may be shown on a map or an
overlay, or reference can be made to an OPORD that states the
restrictions. RFAs are suited for aircraft operations since fires into an
RFA can be controlled and deconflicted from the aircraft.
Figure 6-8. Restrictive Fire Area
6-72. Restrictive Fire Line. The restrictive fire line (RFL) is a line
established between converging friendly forces (one or both may be
moving) that prohibits fires or the effects of fires across the line without
6-23
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
coordination with the affected force (see Figure 6-9). The purpose of the
line is to prohibit fires or the effects of fires across the line without
coordination between the converging friendly forces. The commander
common to the converging forces establishes it. Its location is
disseminated in the same manner as that of a coordinated fire line.
Figure 6-9. Restrictive Fire Line
6-73. Airspace Coordination Area. The airspace coordination area

(ACA) is a block of airspace in the target area in which friendly aircraft
are reasonably safe from surface fires (see Figure 6-10). Occasionally, it
may be a formal measure (a three-dimensional box in the sky) or
informal. The purpose of the ACA is to allow the simultaneous attack of
targets near each other by multiple fire support means, one of which
normally is air. For example, aircraft, FA, and NGF can attack the same
target complex or targets close to one another while operating within the
parameters of an established ACA.
Figure 6-10. Airspace Coordination Area
6-74. Implementation of the formal ACA takes a significant amount of

time. Therefore, informal ACAs are most often used and are the preferred
method. The informal ACA can be established by using time, lateral
6-24
separation, or altitude to provide separation between surface-to-surface

and air-delivered fires. An example would be to designate a road as the
lateral separation feature, direct air support to stay north of the road,
and restrict FA and NGF to airspace and targets south of the road.
Normally, the informal ACA established at task force or higher level is
temporary in nature and not usually displayed on maps, charts, or
overlays.
6-75. Occasionally, there may be a requirement for a separate brigade
or higher-level commander to establish a formal ACA. The FSE, the A2C2
element, and the fire direction center (FDC) coordinate the formal ACA
location. It is located above the target area as recommended to the FSE
by the air liaison element. The type of aircraft and the ordnance in use
dictates the size of the area.
6-76. Vital information defining the formal ACA includes minimum and
maximum altitudes, a baseline designated by grid coordinates at each
end, the width (either side of the baseline), and the effective times.
Information concerning the ACA is disseminated in the same way that it
is for the coordinated fire line.
SECTION III - ARMY AVIATION
AIR CAVALRY
6-77. Air cavalry may be OPCON to the brigade or the cavalry
squadron (RSTA) to augment reconnaissance troop operations. Troops
and platoons must therefore be prepared to establish a close working
relationship with air cavalry troops. Through its mobility and speed, air
cavalry gives the troop commander added flexibility, increasing the speed
with which reconnaissance is conducted. Refer to FM 3-20.95 [FM 17-95]
and FM 3-04.114 [FM 1-114] for doctrine on air cavalry operations. See
Figure 6-11 for air cavalry troop organization.
Figure 6-11. Air Cavalry Troop Organization
EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
6-78. The aeroscout platoon consists of four aircraft, led by a
lieutenant. It includes a flight examiner, instructor pilot, and individual
aircraft pilots. Its primary mission is to conduct armed R&S missions.
6-25
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
6-79. The primary aircraft in air cavalry units is the OH-58D(I) Kiowa
Warrior. This helicopter provides the maneuver commander with a
versatile platform; it can be armed with various weapon systems and is
suitable for employment in numerous types of situations and operations.
6-80. The aircraft features a stabilized mast mounted sight (MMS) with
a low-light TV camera, thermal imaging system, and laser range
finder/designator. The aircrew of the Kiowa Warrior can detect a heat
source in day or night conditions at a range up to 15 kilometers and is
capable of providing laser designation of targets for laser-guided
munitions. In optimal conditions the Kiowa Warrior can detect targets at
15 kilometers, acquire targets at 10 to 15 kilometers, and identify targets
from 5 to 8 kilometers.
NOTE: The Kiowa Warrior’s detection and identification capabilities and its maximum
operational and weapons ranges can be significantly affected by such factors as
terrain, weather, and crew experience.
AIR-GROUND INTEGRATION
6-81. Effective integration of air and ground assets is required to
successfully conduct cavalry operations. Each element (air and ground)
brings unique capabilities and limitations to the cavalry commander.
Integration starts at home station with the implementation of effective
SOPs, habitual relationships, and air-ground team training. It continues
through planning, preparation, and execution of the operation.
Fundamentals
6-82. To ensure effective integration, commanders and staffs must
consider some basic fundamentals for air-ground integration. These
fundamentals provide the framework for enhancing the effectiveness of
both air and ground maneuver assets. In all cases, the commander must
employ air cavalry assets as a maneuver force. The basic fundamentals
are—
• Understanding capabilities and limitations.
• Use of SOPs.
• Command and control.
• Maximizing available assets.
• Employment methods.
• Synchronization.
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

6-83. Figures 6-12 through 6-17 show TTPs for integrated
reconnaissance and stationary flank screen operations.
6-26
Figure 6-12. Air-Ground Integration – Route Reconnaissance
6-27
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Figure 6-13. Air-Ground Integration – Area Reconnaissance

(Technique 1)
6-28
Figure 6-14. Air-Ground Integration – Area Reconnaissance

(Technique 2)
6-29
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Figure 6-15. Air-Ground Integration – Zone Reconnaissance

(Technique 1)
6-30
Figure 6-16. Air-Ground Integration – Zone Reconnaissance

(Technique 2)
6-31
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Figure 6-17. Air-Ground Integration – Stationary Flank Screen
6-32
ATTACK HELICOPTER SUPPORT
TECHNIQUES, TACTICS, AND PROCEDURES FOR AIR-GROUND INTEGRATION IN THE

CLOSE FIGHT
6-84. A hasty attack in the close fight typically lacks proper
coordination between air and ground elements to ensure mission success.
Effective coordination between ground maneuver units and attack
aviation assets will maximize the capabilities of the combined arms team,
while minimizing the risk of fratricide. The key to enhancing air-ground
coordination and the subsequent execution of the tasks involved begins
with standardizing techniques and procedures. The end state is a detailed
SOP for air and ground maneuver units that addresses hasty attacks in a
close combat situation.
6-85. Effective integration of air and ground assets begins with the
ground maneuver brigade. When the aviation brigade or task force
receives a mission to provide assistance to a ground unit engaged in close
combat and planning time is minimal, the initial information provided by
the brigade in contact should be sufficient to get the aviation attack team
out of the aviation tactical assembly area to a holding area for direct
coordination. The attack teams employed in this procedure will be placed
under operational control of the unit in contact. The air-ground
coordination procedure contains five major steps.
• Maneuver brigade planning requirements.
• Unit close fight situation report (SITREP).
• Attack team check-in.
• Employment of aviation close fires (ACF).
• BDA/reattack.
6-86. The following discussion of this procedure includes sections on
aviation employment considerations and maneuver brigade LNO
coordination requirements, all which are pertinent to the employment of
attack aviation in the close fight.
Step 1. Maneuver Brigade Planning Requirements
6-87. The maneuver brigade, through its aviation LNO, provides the
necessary planning requirements to the aviation brigade headquarters
(see Table 6-6). The initial planning and information to be passed to the
aviation brigade headquarters includes the location of the holding area,
along with an air axis, route, or corridor for entry and exit through the
brigade and subordinate units’ sectors.
6-88. The holding area should be in the sector of the unit involved in
close combat. The holding area may be a concealed position or an aerial
holding area that allows for final coordination between the attack team
leader and the ground unit leader before the attack begins. It must be
located within FM radio range of all units involved. Alternate holding
areas, along with ingress and egress routes, must be designated if
occupation is expected to last longer than 15 minutes.
6-89. The brigade also provides the call signs and frequencies or
SINCGARS hop sets and/or COMSEC information regarding the unit in
contact. If the unit is SINCGARS-equipped, the attack team must also
have the common “time,” which may be taken from global positioning
6-33
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
systems (GPS). In addition, the brigade provides a current situation

update for its AO, and specifically, for the supported unit’s AO. This will
include a recommended EA, which will allow for initial planning for BPs
or attack-by-fire/support-by-fire (ABF/SBF) positions and could possibly
prevent unintentional overflight of threat positions.
Table 6-6. Minimum Brigade Planning Requirements
Current situation should include friendly forces location and situation, threat situation highlighting known
ADA threat in the AO, and tentative EA coordinates.
Brigade/squadron-level graphics can be updated via MCS-P or radio communications. Update critical
items, such as LOA, fire control measures, base maneuver graphics, to better integrate into the friendly
scheme of maneuver.
Fire support coordination information, such as location of direct support artillery and organic mortars and
call signs and frequencies.
Ingress/egress routes into the AO. This includes passage points into sector or zone, and air routes to the
holding area.
Holding area for face-to-face coordination between the attack team and the brigade/squadron/unit in
contact. A holding area equates to an assault position. It must be adequate in size to accommodate the
number of aircraft assigned the mission and out of range of threat direct fire systems. It should also be
out of threat mortar range.
Call signs/frequencies of the brigade/squadron in contact down to the unit in contact. Air-ground
coordination must be done on command frequencies to provide situational awareness for all elements
involved.
SINCGARS time hack.
Step 2. Unit Close Fight SITREP

6-90. En route to the holding area, the attack team leader contacts the
unit on its FM command net to receive a close fight SITREP (see
Table 6-7). This SITREP is used to verify the location of the holding area
and to conduct additional coordination. The attack team leader receives
an update from the unit on the threat and friendly situations. The unit
also verifies frequencies and call signs of the unit in contact. By this time,
the mounted BCT or squadron has contacted the troop commander to
inform him that attack aviation is en route to conduct a hasty attack.
Table 6-7. Close Fight Situation Report
Threat situation, focusing on ADA in the AO, type of threat vehicles/equipment position (center
mass), and direction of movement. If dispersed, provide front line trace.
Friendly situation, including location of troop in contact, its mission, and method of marking its position.
Call sign/frequency verification.
Holding area verification, if face-to-face coordination is used. A sign/countersign must be agreed upon,
such as using a light/heat source to provide a recognizable signature, answered by either aircraft IR lights
or visible light flashes to signify which aircraft to approach.
6-91. Table 6-8 shows simulated radio traffic as an example of what

may occur during this step.
6-34
Table 6-8. Example Close Fight Situation Report
ATTACK TEAM SQUADRON

“Bulldog 06, this is Blackjack 26, over”
“Blackjack 26, this is Bulldog 06, L/C, over”
“Bulldog 06, Blackjack 26 en route to HA at grid VQ
98454287, request SITREP, over”
“Blackjack 26, this is Bulldog 06, threat situation
follows, Hardrock 06 is taking direct fire from a
platoon-size armor element at grid VQ 96204362,
Hardrock 06 elements are established on PL
Nevada center mass VQ 96000050, holding area
VQ 94004000 expect radio coordination only,
contact Hardrock 06 on FH 478, over”
6-92. Upon receiving the required information from the squadron, the
attack team leader changes frequency to the troop’s FM command net to
conduct final coordination before ingressing on attack routes to BPs or
ABF/SBF positions (see Table 6-9 for example). Coordination begins with
the troop commander and ends with the leader of the lowest-level unit in
contact (platoon).
6-93. Regardless of which key leader the attack team leader
coordinates with, the troop command net is the most suitable net on
which both air and ground elements can conduct the operation. It allows
all key leaders on the ground, to include the FIST chief and the attack
team leader and his attack crews, to communicate on one common net
throughout the operation. Operating on the command net also allows the
attack team to request responsive mortar fire for either suppression or
immediate suppression of the threat. The AH-64 and the AH-1 Cobra are
limited to only one FM radio because of the aircraft configuration. The
OH-58 is dual-FM capable, which allows the attack team leader to
maintain communications with the troop as well as its higher
headquarters or a fire support element.
Table 6-9. Example Radio Frequency Change
ATTACK TEAM TROOP

“Hardrock 06, this is Blackjack 26 on FH 478, over”
“Blackjack 26, this is Hardrock 06, L/C over”
Step 3. Attack Team Check-in

6-94. Upon making initial radio contact with the ground maneuver unit
in contact, the attack team leader executes a check-in consisting of its
present location, which is normally the attack team ground or aerial
holding area; the composition of the attack team; the armament load and
weapons configuration; total station time; and the night-vision device
capability of the attack team (see Table 6-10). In the event a ground
holding area is not used due to METT-TC considerations, the attack team
will select and occupy an aerial holding area within FM communications
range until all required coordination is complete.
6-35
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
6-95. The attack team leader and ground unit’s key leaders must
consider the effects on friendly forces of the various weapons carried by
the attack aircraft prior to target selection and engagement. Weapon
systems and munitions selection for a given engagement is METT-TC
dependent. Point target weapon systems, such as Hellfire or TOW, are
the preferred system for engaging armor or hardened targets in the close
fight. The gun systems and the 2.75-inch rockets are the preferred
system/munitions for engaging troops in the open and soft targets, such
as trucks and trench works. These area fire weapon systems pose a
danger to friendly soldiers who may be in the lethality zone of the rounds
or rockets. In this case, the leader on the ground must be very precise in
describing the target he wants the aircraft to engage.
Table 6-10. Example Check-In Transmission
ATTACK TEAM TROOP

“Hardrock 06, Blackjack 26 is currently holding at
grid VQ 98454287, 2 Kiowa Warriors with 450
rounds of .50 cal, 2 Hellfires each, half hour station
time, all aircraft are NVG and FLIR capable, over”
“Blackjack 26, Hardrock 06, stand by, over”
“Blackjack 26, roger”
Step 4. Employing Aviation Close Fires

6-96. There are two methods of employing aviation close fires. ACF can
be preplanned, using a face-to-face coordination method (see Table 6-11),
or conducted as an immediate ACF (see Table 6-12), using only radio
communications. Face-to-face coordination between the commander in
contact and the attack team leader is preferred, but METT-TC will
dictate the final method of coordination. A major benefit to face-to-face
coordination is the ability to talk to the ground commander with a map
available and to integrate into the ground scheme of maneuver. This also
provides an opportunity for the members of the attack team to update
their maps with the maneuver squadron’s latest graphics.
Table 6-11. Face-to-Face Method of Employing

Aviation Close Fires
PREPLANNED AVIATION CLOSE FIRES CHECKLIST
Threat situation, including specific target identification.

Friendly situation, including location and method of marking friendly positions.
Planned EA and BP and/or ABF/SBF positions.
Ground maneuver mission/scheme of maneuver.
Attack aircraft scheme of maneuver.
Fire coordination and fire restrictions.
Map graphics update.
Method of designating targets.
Request for ACF.
6-36
Table 6-12. Immediate Method of Employing

Aviation Close Fires
REQUEST FOR AVIATION CLOSE FIRES

Friendly location (individual/unit requesting support).
Heading to target (MAG).
Distance to target (kilometers).
Target description.
Target coordinates.
Target designation method.
Flight hazards.
Restrictive fire control measures.
Threats, such as ADA.
Clearance for fires authority.
Remarks, as necessary.
6-97. Preplanned Aviation Close Fires. When employing preplanned

ACF, the reconnaissance troop commander and attack team leader meet
at the holding area and plan their attack after the flight check-in is
received. To be considered preplanned, certain elements of coordination
must be completed at the holding area. The target must be identified and
its activity explained. The friendly force’s positions must be identified on
a map, with a method of visually marking those positions passed to the
attack team. If not previously done, the EA must be verified or defined.
After defining the EA, the attack team leader will establish BPs and/or
ABF/SBF positions. The scheme of maneuver for the ground elements
must be explained, including the commander’s intent and description of
what is considered the decisive point on the battlefield. With that
information, the attack team will provide a supporting scheme of
maneuver. Existing or required fire control measures must be planned for
and used to minimize the potential for fratricide. Then key maneuver
graphics that are required to support or understand the scheme of
maneuver are passed between the ground commander and attack team
leader. A method of designating targets, such as laser pointers or tracers,
will also be discussed. After completing this coordination, the
synchronized attack plan can be executed. Targets of opportunity will be
attacked on a case-by-case basis, using the request for immediate ACF.
Consideration of the time available for this planning is critical; ground
and air commanders accept increased risk of holding area compromise if
the position is maintained for more than 15 minutes. METT-TC will
dictate the extent of preplanning that may be accomplished and the
length of time the holding area may be occupied.
6-98. Immediate Aviation Close Fires. Use a request for ACF when
employing immediate ACF (see Table 6-13). With immediate ACF,
portions of the preplanned ACF checklist are omitted to provide fires in a
timely manner. A basic update is provided and the attack aircraft are
called forward from their holding area or aerial holding area with the
request for aviation close fires. Whether the attack team uses a holding
area or aerial holding area will be dictated by its ability to maintain FM
communication with the ground element in contact. Once the flight
6-37
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
check-in has been received, the ground maneuver leader provides a

situation update, METT-TC permitting, containing essential elements
from the preplanned ACF checklist. The attack team maintains position
at an aerial holding area or within a holding area. The ground maneuver
leader succinctly outlines the concept of his ground tactical plan. This
includes updates on threat composition, disposition, and most recent
activities, particularly the location of air defense weapons. He also
provides an update on the friendly situation, to include the composition,
disposition, and location of his forces and supporting artillery or mortar
positions. After providing this information, the ground maneuver leader
uses the ACF request format for attack and for subsequent reattacks.
NOTE: To employ immediate ACF, essential elements from the planning checklist should
be briefed via radio as a SITREP by the ground commander prior to a request for
ACF.
Table 6-13. Example Request for Aviation Close Fires
ATTACK TEAM TROOP

“Blackjack 26, Hardrock 06, stand by for update,
friendly platoon in contact located at VQ 96000050,
marked by IR strobes, threat platoon-size armor
element is 800 meters due north, there has been
sporadic heavy machine gun fire and main tank
gun fire into our position, fire appears to be coming
from road intersection vic VQ 96204362, negative
knowledge on disposition of threat ADA, I’ll be
handing you down to Hardrock 16 for the ACF
request, over”
“Hardrock 06, Blackjack 26, good copy, standing by
at HA for ACF request, over”
“Roger Blackjack 26, Hardrock 16 request follows,
friendly location VQ96000050, 360 degrees to
target, 800 meters, 2 T-80s at the road intersection,
target location VQ96000850, PAQ-4 spot on, no
friendlies north of the 00 grid line, low wires directly
over our position, over”
6-99. After receiving a request for ACF, the attack team leader informs
the ground unit leader of the BP and/or ABF/SBF position, or the series
of positions his team will occupy to gain the best observation and fields of
fire into the EA or target area. The BP or ABF/SBF position is a position
from which the attack aircraft will engage the threat with direct fire. It
includes a number of individual aircraft firing positions. It may be
preplanned or established as the situation dictates. Size will vary
depending on the number of aircraft using the position, the size of the
EA, and the type of terrain. The BP and/or ABF/SBF position is normally
offset from the flank of the friendly ground position, but close to the
position of the requesting unit to facilitate efficient target handoff. This
also ensures that rotorwash, ammunition casing expenditure, and the
general signature of the aircraft does not interfere with operations on the
ground. The offset position also allows the aircraft to engage the threat
on its flanks rather than its front, and reduces the risk of fratricide along
the helicopter gun-target line.
6-38
6-100. The attack team leader provides the ground maneuver unit leader
with his concept for the team’s attack on the objective. This may be as
simple as relaying the direction the aircraft will be coming from or the
attack route, time required to move forward from their current position,
and the location of the BP. Only on completion of coordination with the
lowest unit in contact does the flight depart the holding area for the BP.
As the attack team moves out of the holding area, it uses nap of the earth
(NOE) flight along attack routes to mask itself from ground threat
observation and threat direct fire systems. The attack team leader
maintains FM communications with the ground unit leader while he
maintains internal communications on either his very high frequency
(VHF) or ultra high frequency (UHF) net (see Table 6-14).
Table 6-14. Example Transmission During Attack
ATTACK TEAM PLATOON

“Hardrock 16, Blackjack elements will attack from
the southeast, turn on IR strobes at this time, we
will establish a BP west of your position 50 meters,
over”
“Blackjack 26, Hardrock 16, strobes on at this time,
over”
“Roger Hardrock, Blackjack has your position, en
route for attack 30 seconds, over”
“Hardrock 16, roger”
“Hardrock 16, Blackjack 26, engagement
complete, 2 T-80s destroyed, over”
“Blackjack 26, Hardrock 16, roger 2 T-80s
destroyed, end of mission, out”
NOTE: This scenario was written without friction, as though in perfect conditions. Grid locations may be
difficult for the ground maneuver element to determine, depending on the intensity of the ongoing
engagement. Actual FM communications between the ground and air may not work this well.
Step 5. Battle Damage Assessment and Reattack

6-101. After completing the requested ACF, the attack team leader
provides a BDA to the ground maneuver commander. Based on his intent,
the ground maneuver commander determines if a reattack is required to
achieve his desired end state. Requests for ACF can be continued until all
munitions or fuel is expended. Upon request for a reattack, the attack
team leader considers the effects on duration and strength of coverage he
can provide the ground maneuver commander.
TARGET IDENTIFICATION AND FRIENDLY POSITION MARKING
6-102. Regardless of time available, ground and air commanders must
thoroughly plan the method of target identification and marking friendly
positions before starting a mission. The proximity of friendly forces to
targets requires positive target identification and makes marking of
friendly units especially critical. All ground and air participants must
clearly understand the procedures, and fire support assets must be
familiar with the friendly marking system. Accurate and detailed maps,
charts, or imagery facilitates aircrew orientation to the friendly scheme of
6-39
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
maneuver. Positive air-to-ground communications are essential to

coordinate and authenticate marks.
6-103. Visual signaling or marking positions helps determine the
disposition of friendly forces. The signal or combination of signals is
based on items commonly carried by ground maneuver units. The signals
must be acquirable by the night-vision or thermal imaging systems on the
aircraft and recognizable by the aircrew. Often, the simplest methods are
the best. Traditional signaling devices, such as flares, strobes, and
signaling mirrors, are quite effective.
6-104. Target marking, or orientation on threat positions, may also be
accomplished by signaling. Common techniques include the use of smoke,
laser pointers, or tracers. Other devices are available to aid in the
recognition of friendly forces and equipment where the fluid tactical
situation and intermingling of forces in the close fight may make
identification difficult. The use of glint tape, combat identification panels
(CIP), and infrared beacons assist in the clear identification of friendly
ground forces. Ground lighting, thermal contrast, and intermediate
obstructions influence the effectiveness of these devices.
6-105. Table 6-15 contains various methods of marking positions.
Commanders should use this table as a reference, but not limit
themselves to only these methods. Adapt methods to prevalent conditions
at the time of attack.
6-106. Time permitting, attack aircraft may input a target grid into the
aircraft GPS/inertial navigation system, which will provide fire control
cues (range, heading, time) to the target. This will aid in quicker target
acquisition and help distinguish friendly from threat. Because ACF
missions may be “danger close” with short firing ranges, expect minimum
tracking time and thus minimum time to optimize the sensor.
Table 6-15. Target and Friendly Marking Methods
DAY/ FRIENDLY TARGET

METHOD ASSETS REMARKS
NIGHT MARKS MARKS
SMOKE D/N All Good Good Easily identifiable, may compromise friendly
position, obscure target, or warn of fire support
employment. Placement may be difficult due to
structures.
SMOKE (IR) D/N All/NVD Good Good Easily identifiable, may compromise friendly
at Night position, obscure target, or warn of fire support
employment. Placement may be difficult due to
structures. Night marking is greatly enhanced
by the use of IR reflective smoke.
ILLUM GND D/N All N/A Good Easily identified, may wash out NVDs.
BST
SIGNAL D All Good N/A Avoids compromise of friendly location.
MIRROR Dependent on weather and available light and
may be lost in reflections from other reflective
surfaces (windshields, windows, water, etc.).
SPOT N All Good Marginal Highly visible to all. Compromises friendly
LIGHT position and warns of fire support employment.
Effectiveness is dependent upon degree of
urban lighting. May wash out NVDs.
6-40
Table 6-15. Target and Friendly Marking Methods (Continued)
DAY/ FRIENDLY TARGET

METHOD ASSETS REMARKS
NIGHT MARKS MARKS
IR SPOT N All NVD Good Marginal Visible to all with NVGs. Less likely to
LIGHT compromise than overt light. Effectiveness
dependent upon degree of urban lighting.
IR LASER N All NVG Good Marginal Effectiveness dependent upon degree of urban
POINTER lighting.
(< 0.4 watts)
IR LASER N All NVD Good Good Less affected by ambient light and weather
POINTER conditions. Highly effective under all but the
(>0.4 watts) most highly lit or worst weather conditions.
IZLID-2 is the current example.
VISUAL N All Good Marginal Highly visible to all. Risk of compromise is high.
LASER Effectiveness dependent upon degree of urban
lighting.
LASER D/N PGM or N/A Good Highly effective with PGM. Very restrictive laser
DESIG- LST acquisition cone and requires line of sight to
NATOR equipped target. May require precoordination of laser
codes.
TRACERS D/N All N/A Marginal May compromise position. May be difficult to
distinguish mark from other gunfire. During
daytime use, may be more effective to kick up
dust surrounding target.
ELEC- D/N See Excellent Good Ideal friendly marking device for AC-130 and
TRONIC remarks some USAF fixed wing (not compatible with
BEACON Navy or Marine aircraft). Least impeded by
urban terrain. Can be used as a TRP for target
identification. Coordination with aircrews
essential to ensure equipment and training
compatibility.
STROBE N All Marginal N/A Visible by all. Effectiveness dependent upon
degree of urban lighting.
STROBE N All NVD Good N/A Visible to all NVDs. Effectiveness dependent
(IR) upon degree of urban lighting. Coded strobes
aid in acquisition.
FLARE D/N All Good N/A Visible by all. Easily identified by aircrew.
FLARE (IR) N All NVD Good N/A Visible to all NVDs. Easily identified by aircrew.
GLINT/IR N All NVD Good N/A Not readily detectable by threat. Very effective
PANEL except in highly lit areas.
COMBAT ID D/N All FLIR Good N/A Provides temperature contrast on vehicles or
PANEL building. May be obscured by urban terrain.
VS-17 D ALL Marginal N/A Only visible during daylight. Easily obscured by
PANEL structures.
CHEMICAL D/N ALL FLIR Poor N/A Easily masked by urban structures and lost in
HEAT thermal clutter. Difficult to acquire can be
SOURCES effective when used to contrast cold
background or when aircraft knows general
location.
SPINNING N ALL Marginal N/A Provides distinct, unique signature. May be
CHEM- obscured by structures. Effectiveness
LIGHT dependent upon degree of urban lighting.
SPINNING N ALL NVD Marginal N/A Provides unique signature. May be obscured by
CHEM- structures. Effectiveness dependent upon
LIGHT (IR) degree of urban lighting.
6-41
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
TELEVISION/ELECTRO-OPTICAL
6-107. TV/EO sensors are subject to many of the same limitations as the
naked eye, particularly TVs without low-light capability. Aircrews may
not be successful in acquiring a target and achieving lock-on if smoke,
buildings, or other factors repeatedly interrupt their line of sight (LOS).
Low-light or all-light TV/EO sensors may require frequent gain and filter
changes to accommodate varying light levels. Normal means of target and
friendly identification may prove ineffective. IR strobes or even overt
strobes normally visible to TV/EO sensors may be lost in the light clutter.
Laser pointers will suffer the same type of degradation. TV/EO resolution
is typically not sufficient at medium and extended ranges to discriminate
between a friendly position or a target and its surrounding urban
features. Ground personnel may need to use more aggressive and overt
means of identifying their position and that of the target if TV/EO
sensors are used to identify, track, and engage targets.
LASER DESIGNATION
6-108. A major challenge for a gunner in a moving aircraft is achieving
and keeping LOS with a target or friendly position. Laser designation
requires uninterrupted LOS to identify and engage a target. Helicopters
may use hover capabilities, but only in the most permissive
environments. This may mean the lasing platform has to be very near the
target, often within danger-close or weapon-arming distances, to keep the
spot on the target until ordnance impact. Smoke from burning vehicles or
other fires may drift across the laser-to-target line, causing laser
dispersion.
6-109. Most laser designation platforms cannot actually see their laser
spot on a target. Lasers are often boresighted to other supporting sensors
like FLIR/TIS or TV/EO. If the supporting sensor cannot see a target,
then the laser cannot effectively mark the target. Further, even though a
FLIR/TIS may “see” a target, the laser may not be capable of guiding
ordnance against it, since smoke invisible to the FLIR/TIS may attenuate
the laser energy. For the wave length of the laser, the most important
contributor to this nonselective scattering is water vapor or absolute
humidity. The impact of humidity on FLIR/TIS performance is greater
than its impact on the laser. In other words, if you can detect the target
in clear air, then the laser should provide sufficient laser energy for
seeker acquisition. A rule of thumb is if you detect a target with a visual
sensor and consistently determine a range to it with a laser range finder,
then you can likely designate it satisfactorily for a laser-guided weapon.
For low and medium threats where sufficient time is available to use the
FLIR/TIS to point the laser, the methods are simple. As the threat
escalates and the time available for target acquisition shrinks, targeting
with the FLIR/TIS becomes more difficult, and the accuracy of laser
munitions delivery may be degraded significantly.
ASSAULT (UTILITY) AND CARGO (LIFT) HELICOPTER SUPPORT
RESUPPLY OPERATIONS
6-110. Aerial resupply operations provide the squadron/mounted BRT
commander with a flexible, responsible means to resupply his force.
Although limited by weather and threat air defense systems, aerial
resupply enables the commander to bypass congested supply routes,
6-42
destroyed bridges, and most terrain obstacles to deliver supplies where

they are most needed. At brigade level and below, aerial resupply is
generally confined to helicopters.
Planning Considerations
6-111. Close coordination between all participants must occur. The
entire mission is reviewed and all limitations and problem areas resolved.
If a particular problem cannot be resolved, another mode of transport
should be considered for the item of equipment that presents the
problem.
6-112. Planning for aerial resupply must consider the following factors:
• Type/amount of cargo to be carried.
• Helicopter assets available.
• Sling/cargo net/cargo container requirements.
• Ground crew training requirements.
• Selection of the pickup zone (PZ)/landing zone (LZ).
• Integration into the tactical plan.
• Priorities of cargo/unit resupply.
• PZ/LZ security.
6-113. Helicopter resupply assets are limited. Internal to the division,
the combat aviation company of the combat aviation brigade (CAB)
provides the only organic utility helicopter support. Normally, corps
aviation assets provide aerial resupply support. Requests for support are
routed through the squadron S3 to the division G3 for action.
Reconnaissance Troop Responsibilities
6-114. The troop receiving the supplies is responsible for selecting,
preparing, and controlling/securing the PZ/LZ. In addition to general
PZ/LZ responsibilities, specific tasks to be accomplished are—
• Recovery and assembly of equipment and supplies.
• Training available ground crews to guide the aircraft in and
derig the load.
• Coordinating with the supported (sending) unit for the control
and return of that unit’s slings, A-22 bags, and other items.
• Preparing, coordinating, and inspecting backloads (such as
slings and A-22 bags) and having them ready for hookup or
loading when the aircraft comes in.
• Providing limited weather observations such as wind velocity,
direction, cloud cover, visibility, and approximate ceiling.
• Providing terminal guidance with appropriate advisories such
as obstacles, wire hazards, threat situation, to include ADA.
Pickup Zone/Landing Zone Selection
6-115. The reconnaissance troop may be required to establish a PZ/LZ
for resupply, extraction, or MEDEVAC. In addition, the troop may be
tasked to establish its own PZ to conduct scout insertions in support of air
assaults.
6-116. The selection of a usable PZ or LZ is extremely important.
Logistical and tactical considerations must be analyzed and taken into
account to ensure that the PZ or LZ is placed at the right spot to support
6-43
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
the ground unit. Determining vulnerability to air and ground attacks is

key to the site selection. The area must also be accessible to the aircraft
that are going to use the sites. The commander of the helicopter company,
his designated LNO, or Pathfinder-qualified NCO/officer will make the
final decision as to PZ/LZ acceptance.
6-117. Size and Shape of the PZ/LZ. As a general rule, the PZ/LZ must
provide for 100 feet (30 meters) of separation between utility aircraft and
130 feet (40 meters) between cargo aircraft. It must have no obstructions,
such as trees, stumps, bushes, and man-made objects, that could cause
damage to the helicopter rotor systems or the load itself. The number of
aircraft that will be using it at one time must be considered along with its
use after dark. If night resupply is scheduled, a larger area is normally
needed.
6-118. Surface Condition. The surface condition should be solid enough
to prevent a helicopter or load from bogging down. Blowing dust, sand,
gravel, or loose debris can cause injury to people as well as damage to
equipment and aircraft. A helicopter cannot land on a site that has a
slope of 15 degrees or more. Obstacles can be no more than 18 inches tall.
Immovable obstacles must be clearly marked with a VS-17 panel or red
chemlite.
6-119. Approach/Departure Direction. When carrying an external load,
helicopters should use gradual approach and departure angles (not a
vertical ascent or descent). The avenues of approach and departure for a
PZ/LZ should be over the lowest obstacle in the direction of the prevailing
winds. Arrival and departure obstacle clearance and wind direction are
especially important when visibility is reduced. Table 6-16 shows an
example of a terminal guidance radio transmission.
Table 6-16. Terminal Guidance Radio Transmission
AIRCRAFT TROOP
“Hardrock 06, Comanchero 06 is 30 seconds
inbound to your location, request terminal
guidance, over”
“Comanchero 06, Hardrock 06, signal is displaced,
over”(use prearranged signal method if possible)
“Roger Hardrock, Comanchero has red smoke,
over”
“Hardrock 06, roger green smoke, be advised there
is a large bolder at the far end of the LZ and a
suspected ZSU 23-4 four kilometers to the east,
over”
MEDICAL EVACUATION OPERATIONS

6-120. The reconnaissance troop will contact the brigade support
battalion (BSB) medical company on the medical company command
frequency for all ambulance requests. If unable to contact the medical
company on its frequency, relay the request through the troop command
frequency, using the standard nine-line air MEDEVAC request
(Table 6-17). The medical company will prioritize the troop’s request with
all others to determine if air MEDEVAC is possible.
6-44
Table 6-17. Air Medical Evacuation Request (Nine Line)
The following information is required when requesting a MEDEVAC for casualties:

• Location: Grid coordinates will contain the six-digit grid location and be preceded by the
100,000-meter grid identification.
• Radio/Frequency/Call Sign: The frequency and call sign should be that of the radio at the
site of the unit requesting the MEDEVAC.
• Patient Category of Precedence: Be prepared to classify the casualty’s priority to be
evacuated.
• Urgent: Within two hours to save life or limb.
• Priority: When casualty’s medical condition will deteriorate and become urgent within four
hours.
• Routine: Requires evacuation, but when casualty’s condition is not expected to deteriorate
for several hours.
• Tactical immediate: Evacuation needed, tactical situation permitting.
• Special Equipment/Emergency Medical Supplies: List requirements.
• Number and Type of Casualties: Self-explanatory.
• Security of Pickup Site: Describe conditions of security.
• Site Marking: Describe marking method used.
• Patient Nationality and Status: Self-explanatory.
• NBC Contamination Area: Give location of NBC contamination area.
6-121. The reconnaissance troop must—

• Prepare a suitable LZ for the MEDEVAC aircraft.
• Secure the LZ.
• Provide terminal guidance for the MEDEVAC aircraft.
6-122. The initial contact and terminal guidance transmission in
Table 6-18 is an example of what may occur during a MEDEVAC
operation.
Table 6-18. Medical Evacuation Transmission
MEDEVAC AIRCRAFT GROUND MANEUVER PLATOON

“Hardrock 06, Dustoff 26 is 30 seconds inbound to
your location, request terminal guidance, over”
“Dustoff 26, Hardrock 06, signal is displayed,
over”(use method in 9 line request)
“Roger Hardrock, Dustoff has green smoke, over”
“Hardrock 06, roger green smoke, over”
SECTION IV- UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE PLATOON
6-123. The UAV platoon operates four UAV aircraft (12 hours of
continuous coverage in a 24-hour period and a surge capability of 18
hours out of 24-hour coverage for a period of three days). The platoon
consists of a headquarters element, a mission planning and control
6-45
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
section, a launch and recovery section with an attached maintenance

team (see Figure 6-18).
Figure 6-18. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

Platoon Organization
PLATOON HEADQUARTERS
6-124. The platoon headquarters collocates with the launch and recovery
section. The headquarters ensures the subordinate teams are deployed,
employed, and supported in accordance with the brigade/squadron
OPORD and the troop commander’s guidance. The headquarters
performs mission planning and coordinates airspace coordination for
UAV operations. Upon receipt of a mission or a mission change, the
platoon headquarters plots the mission change as well as ingress and
egress routes and makes sure the changes are accomplished safely and
within operational parameters of the system. Additionally, the platoon
headquarters coordinates UAV airspace requirements through the
squadron S3 up to the brigade.
6-125. Missions are normally flown from a location in close proximity to
the squadron CP. The platoon leader is responsible for locating suitable
launch and recovery sites when new sites are required. The platoon
headquarters plans the mission to collect the required information in a
timely manner and submits flight requests to the squadron S3 for
airspace deconfliction and integration into the air tasking order, special
instruction, or the airspace control order.
GROUND PLANNING AND CONTROL SECTION
6-126. The section is normally collocated with the squadron CP to
support situation development, reporting, and dynamic retasking of the
UAV. The section operates a ground control station (GCS). The GCS has
two primary functions. First, it is the primary means to control, track,
6-46
and operate the UAV. Second, it manipulates the payload and receives
and processes telemetry and video downlinks from the UAV.
6-127. There are a variety of imagery sensors available for use on UAVs.
Each sensor has a unique capability, with distinct advantages and
disadvantages for each sensor. Sensors are currently limited to electro-
optical and infrared. Additional payloads are currently under
development and may be fielded as payload technology matures.
Table 6-19 is a matrix of sensor characteristics for the types of sensors
currently available on UAVs.
Table 6-19. UAV Sensor Characteristics Matrix
ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES
ELECTRO-OPTICAL
Affords a familiar view of a scene. Can be deceived by employment of camouflage
Offers system resolution that cannot be achieved in and concealment techniques.
other optical systems or in thermal images and Restricted by weather conditions; visible light
radars. cannot penetrate clouds or fog.
Preferred for detailed analysis and measurement. Restricted by terrain and vegetation.
Offers stereoscopic viewing. Limited to daytime use only.
INFRARED
A passive sensor and is impossible to jam. Not effective during thermal crossover (1 to 1.5
Offers camouflage penetration. hours after sunrise or sunset).
Provides good resolution. Tactical platforms threatened by threat air
Night time imaging capability. defenses.
Bad weather degrades quality.
6-128. Control of the UAV during flight is effected through the GCS.
After the external air vehicle operator (EAVO) at the launch site takes
the aircraft off and it has climbed to an en route altitude, the EAVO
transfers control of the UAV to the air vehicle operator (AVO) inside the
GCS. The mission is flown with the AVO controlling the UAV via the C
band microwave data link from inside the GCS shelter. The data link
must maintain line of sight between the air vehicle and the GCS. The
shelter can be located within the brigade or squadron TOC, allowing the
supported commander to immediately effect a mission change. The GCS
can also be located up to several kilometers away from the TOC.
Communications between the GCS and the TOC is by landline or radio as
provided by the supported unit.
6-129. The UAV platoon can also use the TROJAN SPIRIT tactical
satellite system to send UAV video over extended ranges or from
locations where the area communications networks are immature. When
the GCS is not located with the TOC, a remote video terminal (RVT) is
placed in the TOC. The RVT is a receiver-only terminal that allows the
supported commander to view the down-linked video from the UAV.
When the GCS is not collocated with a supported unit TOC, mission
changes must be requested through the platoon headquarters via the
supported unit to the GCS.
6-130. Reporting is normally performed through voice or data messages
detailing observed activity. Reports are produced in the GCS and sent to
the ASAS or other consumers as directed. The report flow will be through
6-47
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
normal intelligence reporting channels and will be in the SALUTE report

format. This format is compatible with ASAS requirements and
facilitates correlation and dissemination. Imagery analysts at the brigade
S2 perform detailed analysis of UAV products as needed.
LAUNCH AND RECOVERY SECTION
6-131. The launch and recovery section is located at a site (road, soccer
field, etc.) suitable for the launch and recovery of the UAVs. The section
assembles and disassembles the air vehicle from storage containers. It
performs the launch procedures for remote site rocket assist takeoff
launches as well as normal launch preparation and recovery operations.
It also performs maintenance of the runway areas and arresting cables.
6-132. Launch and recovery must be from an area easily accessible to
the commanders, with rapid set-up and tear-down times, enabling it to
keep up with the brigade’s movement. To safely operate in the airspace
within the brigade’s AO and AOI, it is necessary to coordinate the use of
the airspace and deconflict any potential problems with all other users
and potential users.
MAINTENANCE TEAM
6-133. The maintenance team is collocated with the launch and recovery
section. It is responsible for all major maintenance and repairs of the air
vehicles, sensors and support vehicles, and generators. The team also
performs normal fueling and defueling tasks as dictated by mission
requirements.
SECTION V – GROUND SENSOR PLATOON
6-134. The ground sensor platoon consists of four IREMBASS/GSR

sections (see Figure 6-19). The platoon depends on the ISR integration
section located at the squadron CP for SIGINT mission management,
technical support, and direction-finding analysis. See FM 2-00.21
[FM 34-2-1] or FM 3-20.96 for addition information on the capabilities,
limitations, and TTP of IREMBASS and GSR.
Figure 6-19. Ground Sensor Platoon
6-48
PLATOON LEADERSHIP
6-135. The platoon leadership consists of a platoon leader and a platoon
sergeant. The element is integrated into the platoon during tactical
operations. They work together to ensure the subordinate sections are
deployed, employed, and supported in accordance with the squadron
operation order and the surveillance troop commander’s guidance. In
accordance with standard troop-leading procedures, the platoon leader is
responsible for coordinating the movement and link-up of platoon
elements that the surveillance troop might attach to the recce troop.
IREMBASS/GSR SECTION
6-136. Based on METT-TC, the brigade/squadron may attach an
IREMBASS/GSR system to operate in direct support of the troop. The
direct support relationship increases situational awareness and
capability of the recce troop to perform its missions, particularly during
initial entry, cross-FLOT, and close battle offensive operations. In direct
support, the IREMBASS/GSR system employs the tactics and techniques
described for general support operations, but on a troop versus squadron
or brigade scale.
IREMBASS/GSR TEAM
6-137. Each team is equipped with the AN/PPS-5D GSR and
IREMBASS. The team emplaces its GSR and IREMBASS in areas of
expected threat activity as directed in the squadron S2’s ISR plan. The
IREMBASS monitoring site is located within the team vehicle at the
multi-sensor section position. The team prepares and submits a sensor
activated SPOTREP and a SALUTE report to the ISR integration section,
or if in direct support, to the recce troop CP. The team uses its systems
to—
• Provide indications and warning of threat movement,
reinforcement, or withdrawal.
• Provide near-real time combat information and targeting
data.
• Confirm or deny movement along major supply routes,
avenues of approach, or through specific NAIs.
• Support flank and rear security.
• Vector friendly forces to objectives during periods of visibility
by monitoring their movement.
• Provide tip-off and cross-cueing of other sensors to support
the brigade’s targeting effort.
6-138. The team’s IREMBASS is capable of detecting and classifying
moving targets by responding to seismic acoustic disturbance, changes to
the infrared energy, and magnetic field changes produced by the targets.
IREMBASS uses remotely monitored sensors that are capable of
detecting and classifying moving targets by responding to seismic
acoustic disturbance, changes to the infrared energy, and magnetic field
changes produced by the targets. Once a moving target activates the
sensor(s), they send a burst of digital messages to the portable monitoring
set/monitor-programmer and/or the sensor monitoring set/advanced
monitoring display system. Based on the availability of line-of-sight,
these digital messages are sent directly, or they go through a radio
repeater.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
NOTE: The system requires radio line of sight to transmit activations from the sensors to
the monitor station. A radio repeater can extend the range by 15 kilometers on the
ground and by 100 kilometers from the air.
6-139. The sensor monitoring set demodulates, decodes, temporarily

displays, and provides a hard-copy printout of the sensor activity. The
operator analyzes the sensor data and determines the type of target,
number of targets, direction of travel, rate of speed, length of column, and
last known location. With this information he prepares and submits a
sensor activation SPOTREP directly or through combat net radio to the
ISR integration section at the squadron or the supported unit.
6-140. The IREMBASS operator collects information using three types of
sensors.
• Magnetic Sensor. The magnetic sensor is a count indicator
sensor capable of detecting, counting, and determining the
direction of travel when objects containing ferrous metal
(iron) come within its detection radius.
• Seismic Acoustic Sensor. The seismic acoustic sensor is a
classification sensor capable of detecting and classifying
targets by ground vibrations and acoustic signals. The sensor
classifies the target as personnel, vehicle, wheeled vehicles,
tracked vehicles, and unidentified.
• Infrared-Passive Sensor. The infrared-passive sensor is a
count indicator sensor capable of detecting, counting, and
determining the direction of travel of a target by measuring
the temperature change of the target against a steady
thermal background.
6-141. The team hand-emplaces a string of three or more IREMBASS
sensors along likely avenues of approach, choke points, and obstacles.
The number of sensor strings depends on the area being covered. The
first sensor is normally a seismic acoustic sensor for early warning and
classification. The second sensor is normally a count indicator of the
expected type of target—a magnetic sensor for vehicles and an infrared-
passive sensor for personnel. The count indicator sensor provides the
number of targets and direction of travel. A third sensor, also a count
indicator, provides the rate of speed and length of column.
GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADAR TEAM
6-142. The team’s AN/PPS-5D detects, locates, identifies, and tracks
moving ground targets in an area under surveillance. The GSR detects
moving ground targets only and cannot distinguish between threat and
friendly targets. The team uses radar to search an area by one of four
different modes of operation:
• Search-Auto. This mode is used for sector surveillance, with
continuous scanning occurring automatically at a sector width
of 800 to 1,000 mils or 1,600 to 2,000 mils. When operating in
this mode, the radar set detects all targets within the
surveillance area.
• Search-Manual. This mode is used to locate and track targets
in any desired azimuth. Using a control switch, the operator
can rotate the radar set to the left or right and stop it at any
6-50
azimuth. When operating in this mode, the radar set detects

all targets within the surveillance area.
• Search-Range. This mode is used to locate and determine the
range of selected targets. Operation of the RANGE control
enables determination of target range.
• Range Gate. This mode is used to determine the precise range
of targets detected in the other modes of operation. Only
targets within 20 meters of the range displayed will be
detected.
6-143. The team can operate the system up to nine meters from the
vehicle or its battery power source. The operator evaluates the radar data
to determine the type of target, number of targets, direction of travel,
rate of speed, length of column, and last known location. With this
information he prepares and submits a SPOTREP to the ISR integration
section at the squadron or the supported unit.
SECTION VI – MULTISENSOR GROUND PLATOON
6-144. The multisensor ground platoon consists of a headquarters

element, a control team, and three PROPHET sections (see Figure 6-21).
The platoon depends on the ISR integration section located at the
squadron CP for SIGINT mission management, technical support, and
direction-finding analysis. See FM 2-00.21 [FM 34-2-1] or FM 3-20.96 for
addition information on the capabilities, limitations, and TTP of SIGINT
systems.
Figure 6-21. Multisensor Ground Platoon
HEADQUARTERS ELEMENT
6-145. The platoon headquarters consists of a platoon leader and a
platoon sergeant. The element is integrated into the platoon during
tactical operations. They work together to ensure the subordinate
sections are deployed, employed, and supported in accordance with the
squadron operation order and the surveillance troop commander’s
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
guidance. In accordance with standard troop-leading procedures, the

platoon leader is responsible for coordinating the movement and link-up
of platoon elements that the surveillance troop might attach to the recce
troop.
CONTROL TEAM
6-146. The control team consists of two signal analysts and two
collection specialists. The section is normally collocated with the
squadron CP to support situation development, reporting, and retasking
of the PROPHET systems. Reporting is normally performed through voice
or data messages detailing collection activity. Reports are produced and
sent to the ASAS or other consumers as directed. The report flow will be
through normal intelligence reporting channels and will be in the
SALUTE report format. This format is compatible with ASAS
requirements and facilitates correlation and dissemination. SIGINT
analysts at the brigade S2 perform detailed analysis of SIGINT products
as needed.
PROPHET (SIGINT) SECTION (COLLECTION TEAMS)
6-147. Each SIGINT team is equipped with the AN/PRD-13(V)2
PROPHET. The PROPHET system is capable of monitoring or scanning
from 20 MHz to 2000 MHz, stop at detected signals, and restart after
either a predetermined time or when manually cued by the operator. The
system can filter selected signals. The receivers identify single channel
digital and analog signals with modulations of AM, FM, single side band
(SSB), and Morse/continuous wave (CW). The PROPHET system is
capable of message internal exploitation of unencrypted tactical voice
communications from single channel, push-to-talk emitters (see Figure
6-22).
Figure 6-22. PROPHET System
6-148. When mounted, PROPHET allows for early entry into the
contingency area (force projection) to support force protection missions. In
support of fluid mobile operations, the system has on-the-move
capabilities, such as direction-finding (line of bearing) and signal
6-52
intercept exploitation capabilities. It has a stationary direction-finding

accuracy of 15 degrees root mean square (RMS) and on-the-move
accuracy of less than 22.5 degrees RMS. The PROPHET receives power
from the vehicle’s battery system. The power source for the system
produces minimal thermal, electromagnetic, acoustic, and visual
signatures. The PROPHET can use standard commercial power. A
vehicular-mounted antenna is used to increase the system’s intercept
range. The PROPHET uses a quick erect antenna for stationary
direction-finding operations. The PROPHET crew can set up the system
and be fully operational for stationary direction-finding operations within
5 minutes. The crew can tear down the system from stationary operations
to a fully operational on-the-move configuration within 3 minutes. The
PROPHET system is C-130 drive-on/drive-off capable and can be sling-
loaded by a UH-60.
6-149. The PROPHET can also be employed in a dismounted
configuration. This configuration is similar to the low-level-voice-
intercept teams found currently in light divisions. It can be broken down
into man-transportable loads for deployment on foot and may be carried
as part of a parachutist’s load.
6-150. The dismounted PROPHET has a 72-hour battery supply and can
be broken down into three 30-pound loads. The system withstands
deployment in airborne operations. The crew can set up or tear down the
dismounted PROPHET within 3 minutes. An operator can install the
PROPHET into the vehicle within 5 minutes. The dismounted system is
able to accept external standard commercial power.
6-151. The PROPHET operator can search, intercept, and locate signals
from high frequency to super high frequency bands. The team can configure
the system for employment under a number of mission conditions:
• Local (manned).
• Remote (unmanned). Using the 50-foot cable, operator-
interface equipment is remoted to an alternate site for cover
and concealment.
• Stand-alone. In the stand-alone mode, the PROPHET
determines only line-of-bearing data of target emitters, and is
not in a direction-finding net.
• Man-pack. Operator uses the MA-308 handheld antenna for
intercept and direction finding.
6-152. The platoon deploys its systems so that the SIGINT teams can
operate independently or as part of an integrated direction-finding
baseline that supports the interception and location of threat emitters
across the width and depth of the brigade AO. In a baseline, one SIGINT
team normally collocates with the platoon CP and occupies the center
position of the baseline. Each team in the baseline reports its signal data
and lines of bearing using secure communications to the ISR integration
section for evaluation and correlation into a fix (intersection of three or
more lines of bearing).
6-153. The SIGINT teams deploy into one of three multistation
direction-finding formations based on the mission, location of the threat,
and terrain. A good baseline has a width that is approximately equal to
the depth of coverage. In addition, the closer the SIGINT teams are to the
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
threat force or target, the better the direction-finding accuracy and the
further their systems can intercept and locate threat targets. The terrain
and location of the threat in relationship to the direction-finding baseline
are the basis for formation selection.
• Convex Baseline is a multistation formation used when the
threat forces are operating along a broad, deep front. This
formation supports intercept coverage over a larger front, but
not a precision location.
• Concave Baseline is a multistation formation used when the
threat is operating in a compact, narrow, but deep, area like a
salient. The direction-finding accuracy of this formation is
excellent at short ranges and satisfactory at longer ranges.
• Lazy-W Baseline is a multistation formation that uses four or
more systems and combines the characteristics of the convex
and concave baselines. This formation is the most effective
formation for situations where the location of threat or its
main effort is unknown.
6-154. In reconnaissance operations the PROPHET may be tasked to
support forward reconnaissance patrolling. In these types of missions, the
PROPHET is primarily in an electronic support role to protect the
patrolling assets and provide possible electronic order of battle in support
of the reconnaissance effort. Reconnaissance assets normally operate very
slowly. The PROPHET can also operate very slowly and in a blackout
condition. When a signal of interest is detected, the operator notes the
essential elements of information, and depending on immediacy, the
vehicle commander reports this information to the leader of the
reconnaissance mission, or holds the information until the mission is
completed. The bottom line in this type of operation is that the
PROPHET will operate very slowly either close to or across the FLOT in
support of the reconnaissance effort.
SECTION VII - NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICIAL, AND CHEMICAL OPERATIONS
TROOP NBC DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

6-155. In the event of NBC attacks, a well-planned NBC defense
operation reduces casualties and contamination to equipment and
material, which in turn minimizes confusion and interruption of the
troop’s mission. These operations are a command responsibility and are
performed concurrently with combat operations to preserve the fighting
strength of the troop. The troop’s NBC defense personnel are an NBC
trained officer (ideally the XO), an MOS-qualified NBC NCO, and an
enlisted alternate.
6-156. The NBC officer supervises troop NBC defense activities and
assists the commander in training NBC equipment operators. The NBC
NCO and his alternate directly supervise radiological monitoring,
chemical detection, and decontamination operations. During combat
operations, the NBC NCO is located in the troop CP where he—
• Receives, prepares, evaluates, and digitally disseminates
information on NBC attacks via FBCB2 and FM.
6-54
• Supervises employment of detection, monitoring, and

surveying operations.
• Maintains unit radiation exposure status records.
• Assists the troop commander in analyzing guidance from the
brigade/squadron for mission, threat, and weather as they
affect NBC operations and recommends appropriate MOPP
level based on this information.
6-157. To facilitate operations in an NBC environment, all soldiers must
be proficient in operating the assigned NBC detection equipment. The
troop SOP may designate teams for NBC operations based on MTOE
equipment authorizations. See FM 3-11 (FM [M] 3-100) for detailed
discussions on NBC techniques and procedures for operations in an NBC
environment.
NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL RECONNAISSANCE
6-158. The various types of NBC reconnaissance platoons in the
chemical force structure generally have the same capabilities, but differ
in the number of NBCRS vehicles in each platoon. Augmentation with an
NBC reconnaissance platoon provides a special reconnaissance capability
and allows the performance of five critical tasks on the battlespace—
detect, identify, mark, report, and sample. They conduct route, zone, and
area reconnaissance to determine the presence and extent of NBC
contamination. They can locate and identify life-threatening chemical
warfare agents and radiological contaminants. The NBC reconnaissance
platoon does not have a biological detection/identification capability, but
they can take samples of suspected biological hazards for transfer to a
Theater Army Medical Laboratory (TAML) for further analysis. See
Figure 6-23 for an NBC reconnaissance platoon organization within the
SBCT cavalry squadron (RSTA).
Figure 6-23. NBC Reconnaissance Platoon Organization

within the SBCT Cavalry Squadron (RSTA)
6-55
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
6-159. The NBC reconnaissance platoon has some significant limitations

with respect to area coverage, staff planning, and organic
decontamination capabilities. The size of the AO in which the BCT is
expected to operate presents a challenge to the platoon’s ability to provide
full coverage. Any determined effort by an adversary to employ NBC
capabilities against the BCT will require chemical staff and unit
augmentation.
6-160. The troop may be required to conduct NBC reconnaissance of
routes or specific terrain features, using attached NBC reconnaissance
sections. Security for this critical asset is always a concern, as is
fratricide. Soldiers should always receive an FM warning when an NBC
reconnaissance vehicle is entering their area.
6-161. For detailed discussion of NBC operations, refer to FM 3-11.3
(FM[M] 3-3), FM 3-11.4 (FM[M] 3-4), and FM 3-11.5 (FM[M]3-5).
SECTION VIII - BCT ENGINEER OPERATIONS
CAPABILITIES
6-162. The BCT engineer assets provide mobility, force protection, and
topographic support to designated units within the brigade. Limited
countermobility, survivability, and sustainment engineering capability
are made possible using the same force structure required for a mobility
mission. Engineers provide mobility support to mounted maneuver,
dismounted assault, and urban operations. They are equipped with
reduction assets for existing, natural, and reinforcing obstacles in open
rolling terrain, and in challenging complex and urban terrain. Bridging
assets provide the brigade with enhanced mobility for limited dry- and
wet-gap crossing. Topographic capabilities, located in the Maneuver
Support Cell, assist the brigade in acquiring situational awareness.
Countermobility assets enhance the brigade’s ability to preserve and
protect friendly forces; to shape threat maneuver; and to gain, retain, or
secure the positional advantage. The survivability capability preserves
the brigade’s combat power during assembly area and base camp
operations and while in a transition to the defense. The sustainment
capabilities provide the brigade with enhanced movement, maneuver,
and force protection throughout the brigade area of responsibility. The
engineer elements have no dedicated reconnaissance assets, but with
measured risk to organic mobility and force protection support, it can
provide engineer reconnaissance teams to augment the BCTs ISR assets
and plans.
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
MANEUVER
6-163. Brigade engineers support the movement of combat forces to
achieve a position of advantage with respect to threat forces. Mobility
operations maintain freedom of movement for personnel and equipment
within the AO without delay due to terrain, barriers, obstacles, or mines.
Combat mobility platoons are task organized to maneuver battalions to
provide mobility support to mounted maneuver, dismounted assault, and
6-56
urban operations. A mobility support platoon consists of three sections

and provides the enabling equipment to facilitate freedom of maneuver,
reduce force exposure to direct and indirect fires, and increase force
effectiveness in complex and urban terrain. This platoon is used to
enhance mobility capabilities based on METT-TC. The platoon may be
used to weight the main effort. Sections can be tasked organized to the
combat mobility platoons, or the mobility support platoon may be
employed as an integral unit based on METT-TC.
6-164. Limited organic countermobility capabilities support planning,
integration, and construction of reinforcing obstacles to attack the
maneuver of a threat force, to increase time for target acquisition, and to
mass and increase weapon effectiveness. Scatterable mines and
submunitions assets provide capabilities in obstacle integration for close-
in force protection, flank protection, and battlefield shaping in the
decisive fight. Obstacle protection measures focus on
counterreconnaissance to prevent the threat from gathering obstacle
intelligence and obstacle reduction.
INTELLIGENCE
6-165. Brigade engineers provide a threat engineer and terrain
knowledge in both asymmetric and symmetric environments.
Topographical and engineer reconnaissance capabilities generate
knowledge of products portraying the threat and environmental features
needed for development of the real-time visualization of the battlefield.
Topographical and reconnaissance capabilities include the collection and
analysis of environmental information (weather and terrain and their
impacts) on both friendly and threat operations. Ultimately, engineer
intelligence capabilities integrated with reconnaissance assets provide
tools to rapidly and accurately visualize the battlespace environments
and their dynamics.
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
6-166. Brigade engineer sustainment capability enhances force mobility
in the forward AO through construction/repair of combat roads, trails,
forward airfields, and landing zones. Organic engineer capabilities for the
construction and maintaining of sustainment lines of communications are
limited and require augmentation. This includes construction and
maintenance of roads/trails, ports, and airfields, which connect forces
with supply lines and reinforces movement. Organic engineer forces
provide limited support for the construction or renovation of facilities.
Echelons above division engineer forces are needed as augmentation for
real estate support in identifying private and public property for use.
OFFENSE
6-167. Engineers provide a significant offensive capability to the force.
Their primary mission is to provide enhanced mobility on the battlefield
for the maneuver forces. To accomplish this, engineers conduct obstacle
reduction and fortification reduction with organic systems, to include
explosives and mechanical (mounted plows and rollers) and dismounted
combat engineer soldier equipment. They normally task organize as
combat mobility units and assets to the combined arms battalion.
Engineers at all levels find or create a weak point in the threat’s
defensive obstacles and assist in suppressing the threat’s fires, isolating
the threat, maneuvering against weak points, and exploiting success.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
6-168. Engineer assets assist in reconnaissance by developing a detailed

threat obstacle template and ensuring that obstacle intelligence
requirements are included in the ISR plan. Engineer reconnaissance
teams or individual engineers with other reconnaissance elements can
observe specific NAIs to gain information on terrain, obstacles, and areas
for exploitation by maneuver forces.
6-169. In the offense, engineer elements can be task organized either
with the security force, advance guard, main body, flank, or rear guard.
Engineers support the attack by reducing obstacles to allow the advance
guard to move into position to fix the threat. As the main body
maneuvers, engineers emplace obstacles (VOLCANO, MOPMS) to protect
the flanks and reduce obstacles to allow the main body to attack into the
threat’s position. The engineer company will be employed with the
forward elements of the main attack. Engineer elements will accompany
the combined arms battalion’s breaching force and assist in reducing and
crossing all obstacles encountered. Dismounted engineers conduct covert
breaching to attack the threat’s obstacle system (before the main attack)
to gain surprise. Situational obstacles can be used behind the threat to
prevent repositioning, to delay threat counterattacks, or to fix the threat
in his defensive positions.
DEFENSE
6-170. When or if the combined arms battalion transitions into a
defensive posture, its purpose is to conserve combat power for use
elsewhere. The brigade’s engineers have the capability to provide
defensive support. Defensive security operations focus on providing early
warning and disrupting the threat attack early and continuously. With
inherent risk, engineers integrated with the reconnaissance and
counterreconnaissance elements provide security through identification of
threat engineer forces, assisting with friendly deception operations, and
construction of friendly protective obstacles.
ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS
6-171. The engineer company supports the maneuver force. It is ideally
suited for integration into the maneuver operations at all levels. It is an
agile organization that assures the freedom to maneuver on the
battlefield within the combined arms team framework. Its structure and
operational characteristics enhance force momentum and lethality and
increase the synchronization of engineer actions within the maneuver
battle space. The company consists of a company headquarters, three
combat mobility platoons, and a mobility support platoon. The company
can be organized to operate as an engineer-pure element, or task
organized with platoons supporting maneuver forces (see Figure 6-24).
For a review of the engineer company in support of a heavy organization
and capabilities, refer to FM 3-90.2 (FM 71-2).
6-58
Figure 6-24. Engineer Company Organization (SBCT)
ENGINEER COMPANY HEADQUARTERS

6-172. The company headquarters commands and controls the unit’s
tactical employment and administrative operations. The company
headquarters includes the commander, operations officer (also known as
the XO), 1SG, operations NCO, supply sergeant, NBC sergeant, two
communications specialists, two drivers, and four combat medics. The
communication specialists and the medics are task organized to provide
support to the platoons. All additional CSS is required through the FSB
or the supported maneuver forces to which engineers are tasked
organized. This includes all classes of supply, maintenance,
administrative, recovery, and area MEDEVAC.
COMBAT MOBILITY PLATOON
6-173. The combat mobility platoon is normally the lowest-level engineer
unit that can effectively accomplish independent missions and tasks. It is
a basic unit capable of maneuvering during combat operations, and it can
fight as part of the engineer company or as part of the maneuver
company/team. The combat mobility platoon consists of a platoon
headquarters section and three eight-man combat engineer squads. On
the battlefield, the platoon can facilitate rapid and frequent movement. It
is capable of fighting, both mounted and dismounted, during various
situations. The combat mobility platoon frequently receives augmentation
in the form of special equipment from the mobility support platoon. With
risk to mobility, engineer squads can be task organized for specific
missions such as engineer reconnaissance missions. Specific platoon
equipment includes IAV with mountable rollers/blades and associated
engineer equipment, demolitions, and weapons. The eight-man sapper
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
squad is the minimum force required to provide effective dismounted

maneuver support.
MOBILITY SUPPORT PLATOON
6-174. The mobility support platoon consists of a platoon headquarters
section and three equipment-based mobility sections. Like the combat
mobility platoon, the mobility support platoon is not organized to operate
independently on the offense. Each section is structured for mobility
missions, focused on reducing threat obstacles and fortifications that
inhibit friendly maneuver. The platoon provides the commander with
specialized equipment capabilities to weight the main effort. Each section
has breaching, gap-crossing, and lane-obstacle reduction capabilities as
well as specialized vehicle-mounted tools and heavy blades. The same
task organization and equipment required for mobility operations provide
a limited capability for countermobility, survivability, and sustainment
operations.
SECTION IX - AIR DEFENSE
6-175. Air defense actions include the passive and active measures
employed by the troop to protect themselves from aerial attack. The
commander must decide whether to engage threat aircraft (active air
defense) based upon his assigned mission and the tactical situation. The
following paragraphs are an overview of the passive and active air
defense measures the troop may employ. Refer to FM 3-01.8 (FM 44-8) for
further discussion on both passive and active air defense, and the
techniques involved with each.
PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE
6-176. Passive air defense measures are the troop’s best defense against
hostile aircraft. These measures are of two types—attack avoidance and
damage-limiting measures. Both include the use of cover, concealment,
camouflage, and deception.
ATTACK AVOIDANCE
6-177. Attack avoidance means taking the actions necessary to avoid
being seen by the threat—concealment and, lacking concealment,
camouflage. The techniques, procedures, and materials used for
concealment from aerial observation are the same as used for
concealment from ground observation.
6-178. There are three concealment principles employed to minimize
recognition.
• Siting. Siting means selecting the most advantageous position
in which to hide a man, an object, or an activity.
• Discipline. Success in any concealment effort is the strict
maintenance of concealment discipline by both the unit and
by the individual soldier.
• Construction. Adding natural materials to blend with the
surrounding terrain augments this type of concealment.
6-60
6-179. The three fundamental methods of concealing installations and

activities are below.
• Hiding. Hiding is the complete concealment of an object by
some form of physical screen.
• Blending. Blending is the arrangement or application of
camouflage materials on, over, and around the object so that
it appears to be part of the background.
• Disguising. Clever disguises can often mislead the threat
concerning identity, strength, and intention, and may draw
its fire from real assets.
6-180. The difference between concealment and camouflage is that
concealment uses terrain to hide, and camouflage is constructing
concealment. In addition to hiding equipment, camouflage glass surfaces
and windshields with mud and unfilled sandbags.
DAMAGE-LIMITING MEASURES
6-181. Damage-limiting measures are an attempt to limit any damages
if the threat detects friendly forces. These measures are used when the
troop or its platoons are located in a static position, such as an assembly
area, or when maneuvering. If caught in the open, vehicles should
immediately execute battle drills and move to positions of cover and
concealment that reduce the ability to be acquired or engaged. The same
measures taken to limit damage from artillery attack are used—
dispersion, protective construction, and cover.
• Dispersion. Dispersed troops, vehicles, and equipment will
force the attacker to concentrate on a single small target that
will likely be missed. While maneuvering, maintain safe
distances among vehicles to reduce the effects of threat
actions.
• Protective Construction. Protective construction is the use of
cover, natural or manmade, to reduce damage and casualties.
Digging in or sandbagging natural or manmade cover can
offer additional protection from attack.
• Cover. Cover is the shelter or protection from threat
observation that reduces the effects of threat direct or indirect
fires. While stationary or maneuvering, select the available
cover that will mitigate the effects of attack. Folds in the
earth, natural depressions, trees, buildings, and walls all offer
damage-limiting cover.
ACTIVE AIR DEFENSE
6-182. Although passive measures are the first line of defense against an
air attack, the troop must be prepared to engage attacking threat
aircraft. The decision to fight an air threat is based on the immediate
situation and weapon system capabilities. Based on the mission, the troop
will not typically engage aircraft except for self-preservation or as
directed by the troop commander.
RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE
6-183. The right of self-defense is never denied. You may defend your
unit from direct attack, but do not engage aerial platforms that are not
attacking you except on the command of the next higher authority.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
CREW-SERVED AND VEHICLE WEAPON SYSTEMS

6-184. Crew-served weapons and vehicle weapon systems provide a large
volume and lethal means of engaging threat aircraft. When different
munitions are available, use the currently loaded munition, and then
reload with the appropriate munition to engage the aircraft.
SMALL ARMS USED FOR AIR DEFENSE
6-185. Small arms used for air defense incorporate the use of volume fire
and proper aiming points according to the target. The key to success in
engaging threat air is to put up a high volume of fire. The commander
must decide whether to engage and issue the command for the entire
troop to fire upon the attacking aircraft, not just individual soldiers firing
at the aircraft.
FOOTBALL FIELD TECHNIQUE
6-186. The football field technique is a simple method of estimating lead
distance. This technique is used to lead the target by a common distance
(the length of a football field as the base). The aircraft will then fly into
the volume of fire. Aiming points for jets and helicopters are summarized
in Table 6-20. UAVs should be engaged using the helicopter aiming
points.
Table 6-20. Football Field Technique of Estimating Lead
HELIBORNE INFANTRY AND PARATROOPERS

6-187. Infantry repelling from a hovering helicopter should be engaged
by first destroying the helicopter with volume fire. Airborne troops are
more difficult to engage because of their rapid descent. When engaging
paratroopers, lead two body lengths below their feet. The Geneva
Convention of 1949 and our rules of engagement prohibit engaging
crewmen parachuting from a disabled aircraft.
6-62
Chapter 7
Urban Operations
Throughout history, CONTENTS
military planners have Fundamentals of Urban Operations........... 7-2
viewed cities as centers of Characteristics ......................................... 7-2
gravity and sources of Urban Operations Framework................. 7-3
Understanding the Urban Environment ..... 7-5
national strength. Cities Terrain....................................................... 7-6
are population centers; Society ...................................................... 7-10
transportation and Infrastructure............................................ 7-10
communication hubs; key Threat ........................................................ 7-10
Planning for Urban Reconnaissance ......... 7-11
nodes of industrial, Planning Fundamentals........................... 7-12
financial, and information Planning Considerations ......................... 7-13
systems; seats of Execution of Urban Operations .................. 7-20
government; and Approach/Enter the Urban AO ................ 7-20
Employ Surveillance Teams.................... 7-22
repositories of wealth. Conduct Reconnaissance ....................... 7-24
Because the US has Assess the AO.......................................... 7-31
worldwide interests that CSS Considerations................................. 7-31
directly relate to global End State .................................................. 7-32
security, deployments
into urban environments will likely become more frequent in order to
neutralize or stabilize extremely volatile political situations, to defeat
a threat force that has sought protection afforded by urban terrain, or
to provide assistance to allies in need of support. Reconnaissance
(recce) troops are essential to provide real-time information and
situational awareness to defeat threat forces in the urban
environment.
This chapter provides the tools necessary for planning and executing
missions in an urban environment. Urban operations and
reconnaissance in support of urban operations will follow the eight-
step troop-leading procedures with emphasis on the special planning
considerations of urban operations at the troop level. Additionally the
commander’s reconnaissance guidance will apply to reconnaissance in
urban operations, but the emphasis will be on focus, tempo, and
engagement criteria as they support the BCT’s urban operations.
NOTE: The multidimensional aspect of reconnaissance is also conducted in

permissive and semipermissive environments if executed by reconnaissance
platoons augmented with supporting ISR assets for this mission focus.
7-1
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
SECTION I - FUNDAMENTALS OF URBAN OPERATIONS
CHARACTERISTICS
7-1. Urban operations are among the most difficult and challenging
missions a troop will undertake. In conducting urban operations, the
troop’s higher headquarters applies the fundamentals below that may
effect troop operations.
CONDUCT AGGRESSIVE ISR OPERATIONS
7-2. Urban operations require significant HUMINT reconnaissance, as
sensors and other technical devices are not as effective in urban
environments. The troop uses stealthy surveillance teams, tactical
questioning of noncombatants, and reconnaissance of key terrain and
avenues of approach to conduct ISR operations. The troop collects and
provides information to develop urban maps that include a common
reference system (such as numbering buildings).
UNDERSTAND THE HUMAN DIMENSION
7-3. The higher headquarters must carefully consider and understand
how to influence the allegiance and morale of the civilian population that
may decisively affect operations. The human dimension may have the
most significance and greatest potential for affecting the outcome of
urban operations. The troop’s HUMINT collection may provide the BCT
with the initial contact and primary information needed to make timely
decisions.
SEPARATE NONCOMBATANTS FROM COMBATANTS
7-4. Separating noncombatants from combatants facilitates urban
operations by reducing some of the restrictions on firepower and
enhances force protection. Using intelligence and other information, the
troop can diminish some of the threat’s advantages. Troops may be
required to interact with nongovernmental organizations (NGO) to
separate and control refugee flow.
AVOID THE ATTRITION APPROACH
7-5. BCTs that conduct urban operations that use linear and
methodical COAs based on firepower normally result in high casualties
and significant collateral damage. Troops should only consider this
approach when attempting to gain contact or fix threat forces as part of a
larger operation. The troop focuses on providing information that enables
the BCT to make decisions to avoid this type of situation.
CONTROL WHAT IS ESSENTIAL
7-6. The BCT focuses its efforts on controlling only those areas that
are essential to mission accomplishment. The troop identifies key terrain
that may be determined by its functional, political, or social significance.
MAXIMIZE EFFECTS WITHOUT UNNECESSARY COLLATERAL DAMAGE
7-7. Troops conduct aggressive ISR operations to provide information
to the BCT commander to develop situational understanding. Using the
situational understanding, COAs are developed that maximize the effects
of lethal and nonlethal fires without inflicting unnecessary collateral
7-2
____________________________________________________________ Chapter 7 – Urban Operations
damage. The troop conducts target acquisition and adheres to firepower

restrictions, as necessary, that will allow for mission accomplishment.
CONDUCT CLOSE COMBAT
7-8. Closing with and defeating the threat is required to be decisive in
urban operations. The troop assists in shaping the urban area for the
BCT through aggressive ISR.
TRANSITION CONTROL
7-9. The end state of urban operations is when control is transferred
to civilian or other agency’s control. The troop supports the BCT’s
transition plan to ensure restoration of peaceful conditions and avoid
further disruption to the stability of the AO.
URBAN OPERATIONS FRAMEWORK
7-10. Divisions and above plan the operational level of urban
operations and have the primary responsibility of setting the conditions
for tactical success. A framework used to visualize and conceptualize UO
is—
• Assess.
• Shape.
• Dominate.
• Transition.
7-11. The reconnaissance troop supports the BCT as it conducts each
phase of urban operations.
ASSESS
7-12. The troop conducts aggressive ISR to provide the BCT with
intelligence that impacts current operations. It identifies relevant forces,
their strengths and vulnerabilities, and critical nodes of the urban area
that provide leverage if controlled. The troop identifies noncombatants
through HUMINT collection. This allows the BCT to determine whether
or not to establish a limited civil military operations center (CMOC) to
plan and prepare to deal with noncombatants, NGOs, and international
agencies. The troop answers information requirements (IR) to enable the
BCT to conduct urban mapping. Some of the IR the troop focuses on are—
• Where are the threat’s critical C2 nodes located?
• What is the status of the key lines of communications leading
into and within the urban area?
• Where are the diplomatic embassies and missions located
within urban areas?
• What is the location and status of tunnels within the urban
areas?
• What are the likely threat withdrawal routes and
chokepoints?
• What are the potential vulnerabilities to infrastructure
facilities?
• Where are the cross-mobility corridors within the urban area
located?
• Where are the cultural, political, and symbolic facilities
located?
7-3
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
• Are there any American citizens or Third Country Nationals

that need to be extracted?
• Are there any American citizens or Third Country Nationals
being detained against their will? If so, where?
• How do locals view us?
• What is the availability of maps and charts for the AO or
AOI?
• What are the locations and status of hospitals and key
personnel?
• Are there obstacles impeding movement along the routes to
and from assembly areas?
• Is there any opposition from the national criminal enterprise?
SHAPE
7-13. The troop supports shaping operations by providing accurate and
timely intelligence to the BCT. The intelligence allows the BCT
commander to determine the extent and manner in which his forces can
isolate the outlying urban AO. The troop supports isolation by employing
sensors and recce platoons along avenues of approach to detect threat
forces as they attempt to enter or leave the AO. The BCT can engage
these forces with indirect fires, aerial fires, or a combination of the two,
consistent with ROE. This technique may be effective in detecting and
stopping large threat units from entering or leaving.
DOMINATE
7-14. Domination is achieved when all mission requirements are
achieved and preeminent military control over the threat, geographical
isolation, or population is established. The troop provides intelligence to
the BCT which allows the BCT commander to determine techniques for
conducting urban operations—
• Search and attack technique.
• Attack on a single axis.
• Attack on multiple axes.
• Cordon and attack.
• Fix and bypass.
• Multiple nodal attacks.
TRANSITION
7-15. During the transition phase, the recce troop may move from
combat operations to stability operations and/or support operations. ISR
operations continue during this phase and may focus more on
noncombatants and displaced civilians. The troop interacts with NGOs
and private organizations during transition. The troop will consolidate,
reorganize, and conduct area protection while preparing for follow-on
missions.
7-4
SECTION II - UNDERSTANDING THE URBAN ENVIORNMENT
7-16. Whether a metropolis or a village, each urban environment has

an identifiable system of components that constantly change and interact.
This environment consists of the terrain, the society, and the
infrastructure that links the two. During combat operations, stability
operations, or support operations, a fourth element, the threat, is added
(see Figure 7-1).
Figure 7-1. Urban Components
7-17. These components are not separate and distinct categories but
rather are overlapped and interdependent. Thoroughly analyzing these
elements contributes to commanders’ situational understanding, allows
them to develop COAs that apply appropriate resources against decisive
points, and potentially lessens the number and cost of close combat
engagements. In stability operations and support operations, this
understanding allows commanders to engage decisive points critical to
maintaining peace or restoring normalcy to the urban environment.
TERRAIN
7-18. Although complex and difficult to penetrate with many ISR
assets, the terrain is the most recognizable aspect of an urban area. Truly
understanding it, however, requires comprehending its multidimensional
nature. The terrain consists of natural and manmade features, with
manmade features dominating; an analysis must consider both.
Buildings, streets, and other infrastructure have varied patterns, forms,
and sizes. The infinite ways in which these factors can intertwine make it
difficult to describe a “typical” urban area. However, these elements
provide a framework for understanding the complex terrain within an
urban area. Furthermore, manmade features have significant effects on
military systems and soldiers, and thus tactics and operations.
7-5
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
7-19. Urban areas present an extraordinary blend of horizontal,

vertical, interior, exterior, and subterranean forms superimposed on the
natural relief, drainage, and vegetation. While an urban area may appear
dwarfed on a map by the surrounding countryside. In fact, the size and
extent of the urban battlespace is many times that of a similarly sized
portion of natural terrain. The sheer volume and density created by
urban geometry can make urban operations resource-intensive in time,
manpower, and materiel.
7-20. Commanders in other environments normally address the depth,
breadth, and height of their AO in terms of two areas: airspace and
surface. In an urban environment, commanders must broaden their scope
to include supersurface and subsurface areas. Although spatially
separated, each area may be used as an avenue of approach or mobility
corridor, line of communications (LOC), and EA.
PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT
7-21. Reconnaissance troops must understand the physical
organization and complexity of the urban terrain, both manmade and
natural, and tactical reconnaissance capabilities. Structures of the urban
area significantly degrade the information that imagery acquires because
it cannot penetrate inside buildings or into subsurface facilities. It can
provide significant detail regarding major portions of the infrastructure.
The physical attributes of the urban area also diminish the effectiveness
of electronic reconnaissance capabilities. The limitations on imagery and
electronic reconnaissance place a premium on human-based visual
reconnaissance. Urban terrain presents an extraordinary mix of
horizontal, vertical, interior, exterior, and subterranean forms. The four
physical dimensions that must be considered are airspace over the city,
buildings, streets, and subterranean systems.
7-22. Supersurface and subsurface areas magnify the complexity of the
urban physical environment. Commanders must not only consider
activities that occur outside of buildings and subterranean areas (the
external space), but also the activities that occur unseen in buildings and
subterranean systems (the internal space). The internal space further
challenges command, control, and intelligence collection activities and
increases the combat power required to conduct urban operations.
Commanders must develop methods to help themselves visualize the
multiple dimensions of the urban environment.
AIRSPACE
7-23. Aircraft and aerial munitions use the airspace as rapid avenues of
approach in urbanized areas. Forces can use aviation assets for
observation and reconnaissance, aerial attack, or high-speed insertion
and extraction of soldiers, supplies, and equipment. Some surface
obstacles, such as rubble, do not affect aviation assets. However,
buildings of varying height and the increased density of towers, signs,
power lines, and other urban constructions create obstacles to flight and
can limit low-altitude maneuverability. Additionally, excellent cover and
concealment afforded threat gunners in an urban area increases aviation
vulnerability to small arms and MANPADS, particularly when
supporting ground forces.
7-6
SURFACE
7-24. Surface areas apply to exterior ground level areas, such as
parking lots, airfields, highways, streets, sidewalks, fields, and parks.
They often provide avenues of approach and the means for rapid advance.
However, buildings and other structures often canalize forces moving
along them. As such, obstacles on urban surface areas usually have more
effect than those in open terrain since bypass often requires entering and
transiting buildings or radical changes to selected routes. In cases where
urban areas abut the ocean or sea, large lakes, and major rivers, surface
areas also apply to the surface of these bodies of water and may be a
significant consideration for the commander of a major operation.
SUPERSURFACE
7-25. These areas include the roofs and upper floors of buildings,
stadiums, towers, or other vertical structures. They can provide cover and
concealment; limit or enhance observation and fields of fire; and restrict,
canalize, or block movement. However, forces can move within and
between structures at upper levels creating additional, though normally
secondary, avenues of approach. Supersurface areas may also provide
excellent locations for snipers; lightweight, handheld antitank weapons;
and MANPADS. They enable top-down attacks against the weakest
points of armored vehicles and unsuspecting aircraft. This area (and the
subsurface area) requires commanders to think, plan, and execute ground
operations vertically as well as horizontally.
SUBSURFACE
7-26. These areas are subterranean or below surface level. They may
serve as secondary and, in fewer instances, primary avenues of approach
at lower tactical levels. When thoroughly reconnoitered and controlled,
they may provide excellent covered and concealed LOCs for moving
supplies and evacuating casualties. They may also provide sites for
caching and stockpiling supplies. They include the subways, sewers,
drainage systems, cellars, and utility systems of the urban area. Both
attacker and defender can use subsurface areas to gain surprise and
maneuver against the rear and flanks of an adversary and to conduct
ambushes. However, these areas are often the most restrictive and
easiest to block. Their effectiveness normally depends on superior
knowledge of their existence and overall design.
STREET PATTERNS
7-27. Patterns within the urban area result from the arrangement of
the streets, roads, highways, and other thoroughfares. These patterns
influence all battlefield operating systems; however, they greatly affect
maneuver, C2, and CSS. Urban areas can display any of three basic
patterns and their combinations: radial, grid, and irregular (see Figure
7-2).
7-7
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Figure 7-2. Basic Internal Street Patterns
7-28. Societies of highly concentrated religious or secular power often

construct urban areas with a radial design: all primary thoroughfares
radiating out from the center of power. Cities with this design may signal
an important historical aspect of significant relevance in the overall
analysis of the urban society. Terrain permitting, these streets may
extend outward in a complete circle, or may form a semicircle or arc when
a focal point abuts a natural barrier such as a coastline or mountain. To
increase mobility and traffic flow, societies often add concentric loops or
rings to larger radial patterns. Unless commanders carefully plan
boundaries, routes, and axes of advance, their subordinate units’
movement or maneuver may be inadvertently funneled toward the center
of urban areas with this pattern resulting in congestion, loss of
momentum, and an increased potential for fratricide.
7-29. The most adaptable and universal form for urban areas is the
grid pattern: lines of streets at right angles to one another forming blocks
similar to the pattern of a chessboard. A grid pattern can fill in and
eventually take over an original radial pattern. Grid patterns often
appear to ease the assignment of boundaries for subordinates units.
However, commanders must also consider the influence of the natural
terrain that underlies the manmade construction. They must also
consider the influence of the buildings and other structures lining these
streets, such as their height and construction, before assigning
boundaries. Describing boundaries (and PLs) by easily recognizable
features is as important in urban areas as elsewhere. If available, natural
features are a better descriptor than manmade features that may be
altered or unrecognizable. In some instances, particularly in stability
operations and support operations where Army forces work closely with
local law enforcement agencies, street patterns may have no effect on the
assignment of boundaries. Instead, commanders may assign boundaries
overlaid on existing administrative boundaries established by local law
enforcement agencies.
7-30. In most urban areas, regardless of the original intent, plan, or
vision, existing street patterns emerge from successive plans overlaid one
on another, some well-planned to fit with previous plans and others a
haphazard response to explosive urban growth. The result may mix
patterns. Urban engineers and planners may specifically design irregular
patterns for aesthetic reasons (as in many suburban housing
7-8
developments) or to conform to marked terrain relief. Irregular street

patterns may alert commanders and analysts that the underlying natural
terrain may exert greater influence over operations than in other portions
of the urban area.
CORE
7-31. The core is the heart of the urban area—the downtown or central
business district. Relatively small and compact, it contains a large
percentage of the urban area’s shops, offices, and public institutions.
Often, it houses the headquarters for commercial and financial activities
and usually contains important cultural, historical, and governmental
buildings. As the focal point of the transportation network, residents find
the core the easiest part of the urban area to reach. It has the densest
concentration of multistory buildings and subterranean features
(basements, underground parking garages, underground shopping
centers).
INDUSTRIAL AREA
7-32. Industrial areas often develop on the outskirts of the urban areas
where commercial transportation is easiest (along airfields and major
sea, river, rail, and highway routes). The dispersed pattern of the
buildings provides sufficient space for large cargoes, trucks, and materiel
handling equipment. These areas may provide ideal sites for logistic
bases and maintenance sites.
HIGH-RISE AREA
7-33. High-rise areas consist of multistoried apartments, commercial
offices, and businesses separated by large open areas such as parking
lots, parks, and individual one-story buildings. The automobile, mass
transit systems, and improved road networks encourage these areas to
grow and function further from the urban core. High-rise buildings are
framed, light-clad construction with thin walls of brick, lightweight
concrete, or glass.
RESIDENTIAL AREA
7-34. Residential areas can be found dispersed throughout the urban
area; however, large suburban areas (or sprawl) normally form on the
outskirts. Residential areas often consist of row houses or single-family
dwellings set in a grid or ringed pattern within a planned development
project. Yards, gardens, trees, and fences usually separate the buildings
in a residential area. Openings between buildings range from 5 to 75
meters. The buildings are normally of a light-clad, framed wood
construction or brick. The combined population of surrounding suburban
areas often far outnumbers that of the urban area proper. Specific
suburbs tend toward homogeneity based on ethnicity, religion, economics,
or some other social aspect.
COMMERCIAL RIBBON AREA
7-35. Commercial ribbon areas are rows of stores, shops, and
restaurants built along both sides of major streets that run through and
between urban areas. These same types of areas often develop along the
roads that connect one urban area to another (strip areas). The buildings
uniformly stand two to three stories tall (about one story taller than the
dwellings on the streets behind them.
7-9
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
SOCIETY
7-36. During urban operations, the troop will be required to interact
with or in close proximity to large numbers of civilians. As the urban area
increases, the troop must be aware of the characteristics of a diverse
population whose beliefs may vary based on numerous factors. The troop
collects information the squadron uses to determine what civilian
considerations the brigade will encounter through multidimensional
reconnaissance. Information requirements for the troop consists of the
following:
• Demographics.
• Political affiliations and grievances.
• Ethnicity.
• Factions.
• Cultural distinctions.
• Living conditions.
• Religious beliefs.
• Attitude toward US forces (friendly, neutral, hostile).
7-37. Analyzing the information gained on the civilian populace will be
an important factor in determining COAs for the brigade. The
commander analyzes the information collected and assesses what actions
are necessary to control the impact of civilians. Various options that the
commander can recommend to higher are screening civilians, prohibition
of unauthorized movement, diverting or controlling refugee movements,
and evacuation.
7-38. It is extremely important that all the members of the troop
understand the characteristics of the society. The side that gains the
support of the population retains innumerable advantages. To gain or
retain the support of the population, commanders must understand its
social and political characteristics.
INFRASTRUCTURE
7-39. Urban structures are those physical and cyber-based systems that
support the inhabitants and their economy and government. Targeting or
controlling vital parts of the infrastructure can deter or isolate threat
aggression. Targeting any portion of the urban infrastructure can have a
cascading effect (either intentional or unintentional) on the other
elements of the infrastructure. The commander can gain a tactical
advantage using precision munitions, electronic disruption of
communications, or intelligence on essential facilities or structures.
Commanders must look beyond the immediate tactical situation and
understand the effects that the destruction of any of these elements may
have on future operations and the inhabitants of the urban area. The
troop identifies infrastructure in the urban area that may provide
commanders with essential logistics and CSS assets and also recommend
what the initial expenditure of time and resources may be necessary to
support operations within the urban area.
THREAT
7-40. The troop must be trained and ready to address urban threats
ranging from regional conventional military forces, paramilitary forces,
guerrillas and insurgents to terrorists, criminal groups, and angry
7-10
crowds. Increasingly, the Army will face threats that severely differ in
doctrine, organization, and equipment. In stability operations and
support operations, commanders will have to broaden the threat to
include natural disasters, hunger and starvation, and rampant disease.
These threats may be found in isolation, but most likely commanders will
encounter them in various combinations. An emphasis on asymmetric
means to offset US military capability has emerged as a significant trend
among potential threats and become an integral part of the threat
principles and tactics discussed below. Asymmetry results when one
opponent has dissimilar capabilities—values, organization, training, or
equipment—that the other cannot counter. It is not a new concept; it is
the natural outgrowth of a sound METT-TC analysis by an intelligent,
freethinking, and adaptive threat.
7-41. Trends indicate an increasing availability and integration of more
sophisticated technology and unorthodox operational approaches by
potential opponents. Offsetting their inherent weaknesses, threat forces
will seek advantage in urban and complex terrain to remain dispersed
and decentralized, adapting their tactics to provide them the best success
in countering a US response. They seek to counter the technological and
numerical advantages of US joint systems and forces, and to exploit
constraints placed on US forces due to cultural bias, media presence,
ROE, and distance from the crisis location. Urban environments also
provide many passive dangers, such as disease from unsanitary
conditions and psychological illnesses.
7-42. While the active threats will vary widely, many techniques will be
common to all. During his analysis, the troop commander must consider
techniques threat forces have used in the past.
SECTION III - PLANNING FOR URBAN RECONNAISSANCE
7-43. Reconnaissance troops conduct reconnaissance in urban

environments to gain critical information for the BCT. Reconnaissance
troops must have clear and detailed reconnaissance guidance from the
commander to begin planning for reconnaissance in support of the BCT
during the operation.
7-44. To be successful the reconnaissance effort must be exceptionally
comprehensive and synchronized. Success requires integrating all
reconnaissance sources into tactical planning. This requires that
reconnaissance assets deploy and execute early with clear reconnaissance
guidance (focus, tempo, engagement criteria) and an integrated plan that
supports insertion or infiltration, fires to support maneuver,
communication, extraction, resupply, and cueing and mixing ISR assets.
This is embodied in the ISR plan. The plan must be flexible and conform
to the changing information requirements of the commander. The plan
must also support all phases of urban operations (see Figure 7-3).
7-11
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Phases of Urban Operations

Reconnoiter the Objective
Move to the Objective
Isolate the Objective
Secure a Foothold
Clear a Built-Up Area
Consolidate
Reorganize
Figure 7-3. Phases of Urban Operations
PLANNING FUNDAMENTALS
7-45. Reconnaissance units require significantly more time to execute
missions and maintain an acceptable survivability rate. Reconnaissance
often will be a slow and methodical effort. Such forces must have the time
to reconnoiter carefully the interior of structures for snipers and other
small threat teams. They must also have time to breech small obstacles
and mass combat power necessary to fight through security forces to
continue their reconnaissance.
7-46. The troop commander must ensure the troop has all the known
information and intelligence of the operational environment. He must
coordinate for support from other ISR assets available to the squadron
and/or BCT both prior to and during reconnaissance. Information from
SIGINT and IMINT can assist the commander to develop and complete
his scheme of maneuver during troop-leading procedures. IMINT
facilitates a detailed map reconnaissance in determining how terrain
supports movement. The commander views the terrain by not only how it
supports his mission success but also from the threat’s perspective.
MASINT assets should be focused on restricted terrain or high-speed
avenues of approach to provide early warning of potential threat
movements. UAVs can support infiltration and reconnaissance to provide
early warning and reconnaissance of areas that are restricted to the
ground troop.
7-47. Figure 7-4 illustrates the planning checklist for urban operations.
PLANNING CHECKLIST
Develop human intelligence collection plan.
Determine R&S objectives.
Plan infiltration and exfiltration routes.
Synchronize aerial and ground reconnaissance plans.
Coordinate for fire support.
Develop communications and sustainment plan.
Continue improving urban operations sketch.
Figure 7-4. Urban Reconnaissance

Planning Checklist
7-12
7-48. The commander considers the following as he develops his urban
operations plan during troop-leading procedures:
addressed.
and potential engagement areas.
Locations of government offices, political party
headquarters, and NGOs.
to include:
civilians.
weapons and NODs.
• If applicable, initial map and aerial photograph
reconnaissance is conducted to pinpoint key terrain and other
important locations in the AO, and an urban operations
sketch that portrays key terrain, to include (see Figures 7-5,
7-6, and 7-7):
• Safe havens.
• Hospitals.
• Police stations and armories or equivalent.
• Embassies.
• Power generation, communication, and water treatment
facilities.
• Restricted or protected areas designated by the ROE.
• Hazardous areas, to include:
Above- or below-ground natural gas or other fuel storage.
Construction sites.
− Intersections and bridges.
− Known hostile, belligerent, or criminal areas.
7-13
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Major terrain features such as:

− Buildings that may mask or interfere with
communications or the GPS.
− Parks.
− Industrial complexes.
− Airports.
Avenues of approach, to include:
− Main thoroughfares and/or improved road surfaces.
− Escape and evasion routes or corridors.
− Subterranean routes and access.
reconnaissance, transport, resupply, casualty evacuation
(CASEVAC), or fire support.
Effects on - mobility.
Effects on civil demonstrations or services.
Missions of ISR and other elements operating within the
troop AO but not under troop control.
objectives.
Higher headquarters and follow-on force commander’s
CCIR.
Higher commander’s reconnaissance focus, tempo, and
7-14
Figure 7-5. Initial Photo Reconnaissance in Urban Operations
Figure 7-6. Refinement of Urban Operations Photo Reconnaissance
7-15
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Figure 7-7. Urban Operations Sketch
urban operations.

a minimum:
Reconnaissance and HUMINT collection start outside the
urban area to gain information about the objective prior
to entering the urban area.
If the troop commander is tasked to conduct
reconnaissance operations, he must decide on stealthy or
aggressive methods.
If METT-TC forces the troop commander to conduct only
surveillance operations, the troop’s focus must be clearly
defined.
• HUMINT collection plan that focuses on the location of
reliable sources of information near the urban area to gain
the most current situation in the AO.
7-16
• If applicable, movement to the areas to be reconnoitered, to

include techniques and formations.
Select movement techniques that support the tempo and
avoid known threat forces outside the areas to be
reconnoitered.
Select the route(s) and establish a march order on each
route.
Identify infiltration route(s) against a higher threat and
establish an order of march.
Identify dismount point and suitable concealed locations
to position vehicles prior to conducting the
reconnaissance.
Identify vehicle positions that allow utilization of onboard
optics, such as the LRAS3, to assist in observation and
provide overwatch.
Identify surveillance positions within the urban area.
• Reconnaissance of the designated areas to answer the
Platoon and other subordinate element tasks, to include
reconnaissance, security, and follow and support, as
required.
Integration of mounted and dismounted reconnaissance
and surveillance.
Requirements for short and long duration surveillance of
NAIs.
Urban assessment and information requirements (see
Appendix D).
• Synchronization of aerial and ground reconnaissance assets.
Target description, location (known or templated), and
(illumination).
or transmissions within the designated areas, or within
other areas containing threat reserves or supporting
forces.
flank approaches or routes into the designated area or
leading to NAIs within the area.
7-17
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________

culverts, fords, routes, and obstacles within the
designated area.
Redundant tasking to cover the same NAI or target.
handover.
element.
elements.
7-51. The commander prioritizes fires and use of fires to maintain
maximum range forward of the reconnaissance platoons. Troop leaders
must consider numerous factors when coordinating and planning targets
that will support operations in an urban environment. The most likely
mission that troops must coordinate is for targets that will support
disengagement from unexpected contact. The following are fire support
considerations for urban operations (they are by no means all-inclusive):
• Determine who controls each fire support asset.
• Exchange fire plan and observer plan with adjacent units.
• Develop observer plan, to include OPs in buildings, location of
laser designators, and overwatch of trigger points.
• Identify location of hazardous sites—above and below ground
fuel and industrial storage tanks, gas distribution lines—any
other area where incendiary effects of detonating artillery and
mortar rounds will start fires.
• Identify the general construction or composition of the
buildings and road surfaces (may impact the type of
munitions used).
• Determine where building masking, overhead power lines, or
towers degrade GPS and compass functioning.
• Determine if use of obscurants and illumination favor friendly
units or the threat.
• Determine if buildings or structures require fire support
personnel to carry/use equipment not normally carried (e.g.,
field expedient antennas, climbing rope, wire gloves, axes or
sledgehammers).
• Determine the requirements for radar coverage? Do radar
zones need to be established? If so, where? For how long?
7-52. The troop commander must also plan how to employ mortars to
provide maximum coverage for teams that may be dispersed at greater
distances than the range of the guns. In addition to the use of
conventional munitions, precision-guided munitions (PGM) must also be
carefully considered. The biggest consideration for using PGMs is that
some sort of laser or infrared designator equipment must be available. If
these assets are not available, personnel augmentation may be required.
7-53. The reconnaissance troop may receive support from a variety of
attack helicopters ranging from fully modernized AH-64s to lightly armed
but agile OH-58Ds. Regardless of the specific type of attack helicopter
available, the inherent flexibility of Army aviation units allows them to
7-18
accomplish the same missions and tasks in a variety of situations.

Because of the increased risk of small arms and MANPAD engagements,
aviation forces normally support urban operations by operating away
from built-up areas; their key role usually is isolation of the objective. If
risk analysis determines that the payoff is higher than the risk, however,
aviation forces can be employed in and around the urban area.
• Bypass and engagement criteria both during movement to
and reconnaissance of designated areas.
Boundaries identifying the troop’s AO and a line of
departure.
and rally points for each route,
Areas to be reconnoitered.
• CSS considerations, to include—
Priorities for service support.
Security requirements and techniques for combat trains
or supporting service support elements.
Movement and positioning of trains and logistical supply
points.
Resupply, to include emergency and caches.
items such as batteries.
− Drop points away from vehicle hide and observation
posts.
Casualty consolidation and evacuation. Organic medical
support in the troop is generally limited to self and buddy
aid. The nearest medical facility that can provide
definitive care and treatment must be identified due to
the remote placement of teams and primary care is not
readily available. CASEVAC/medical evacuation
(MEDEVAC) operations are considered and planned for.
Reconnaissance soldiers should be combat-lifesaver
qualified and have emergency medical technician
training.
Vehicle recovery, to include secured collection points and
Equipment and supply destruction criteria.
• Communications considerations, to include—
Positioning of commander, XO or CP, and retrans to
maintain communications with the higher headquarters
and other designated elements.
7-19
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Method and techniques for communication between

mounted and dismounted elements.
If necessary, responsibilities and procedures for
integrating supporting analog units into the troop digital
network.
• Continue updating urban operations sketch.
SECTION IV - EXECUTION OF URBAN OPERATIONS
7-54. Figure 7-8 outlines the steps for executing urban operations. Each
step is explained in the paragraphs that follow.
Approach/enter the urban area of operations

Employ surveillance teams (mounted/dismounted)
Conduct reconnaissance
Assess the area of operations
Combat service support considerations
End state
Figure 7-8. Urban Operations Execution
APPROACH/ENTER THE URBAN AREA OF OPERATIONS

7-55. The recce troop conducts reconnaissance and HUMINT collection
outside of the urban area to gain information on the objective. Depending
on the time available, the troop develops the urban situation
progressively from the surrounding area toward the city. The commander
refines objectives and routes as he gains and analyzes information (see
Figure 7-9). Using data obtained from cues from one or more sensors,
such as PROPHET or GSR, UAVs or aerial reconnaissance assets are
employed to conduct aerial reconnaissance of routes and objective areas.
UAVs are focused on unit entry points to determine the threat situation,
such as obstacles in the urban area, ambush positions on rooftops, or
movement of personnel and vehicles as units approach. As discussed
earlier, the aerial and ground reconnaissance plans must be synchronized
to be effective (see Figure 7-10).
7-20
Figure 7-9. Approach of the Urban Area
Figure 7-10. Entering the Urban Area
7-56. The troop commander manages resources during ISR operations

to avoid undertasking collection systems. At times the troop’s collection
capability may exceed current taskings. Units constantly reevaluate each
collection asset for unused capability, and assign or redirect unused
assets/capacity towards the most important unfulfilled requirements.
7-21
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
7-57. The troop may be redundant in assigning several identical assets

to cover the same NAI or target. Redundant tasking enables mission
accomplishment when the probability for success by one asset is low.
7-58. The reconnaissance troop orients on the objective by occupying
and/or observing key terrain and threat avenues of approach. The scout
platoons can use their sights, including thermals, to conduct long-range
surveillance and to locate threat positions and/or vehicles prior to forces
entering the urban area. In addition to surveillance, the troop may
conduct security tasks, which includes the following:
• Calling for and adjusting indirect fires.
• Identifying and preventing threat forces from escaping
(within unit’s capability).
• Identifying and providing early warning of threat
reinforcement of the built-up area.
• Identifying and providing early warning of threat
counterattack.
EMPLOY SURVEILLANCE TEAMS (MOUNTED/DISMOUNTED)

7-59. The primary method of employing surveillance teams is in a hide
or surveillance site. However, the terrain, mission, and location of the site
may dictate that the teams establish separate surveillance site(s) to
effectively observe the area. A minimum of two soldiers is required to
conduct surveillance. One observes while the other records the
information in the surveillance log. Because observer efficiency decreases
rapidly after 30 minutes, the observer and the recorder switch duties
about every 30 minutes. When using night vision devices, the observer’s
initial period of viewing is 10 minutes followed by a 15-minute rest
period. After several periods of viewing, the period is extended to 15 to 20
minutes. Hide site personnel should be rotated every 24 hours.
7-60. During limited visibility, two to three (normally three) members
may be required to set up a new surveillance site. The site is near the
target area so that information may be collected through close-in
observation and sound detection. The remainder of the team stays in the
hide site. The surveillance site and the route to and from it are selected
during good visibility. Members go in and out of the surveillance site
during limited visibility. One member observes, one records, and one
maintains security to the rear and flanks. Only passive night vision
devices are used to help prevent detection.
7-61. The hide site may not be suitable for transmitting reports. When
this is the case, a separate communication site is needed. A minimum of
two personnel is required at the communication site: one to send the
message and erect an antenna, if necessary, and one to provide security.
The communication site is occupied long enough to transmit the message
and conceal any signs of the team’s presence.
7-62. Hasty sites are used when the team plans to occupy for a short
period (generally less than six hours). This most often occurs during
target acquisition missions. The team makes the best use of natural cover
and concealment. It uses manmade camouflage materials to improve
concealment, as required, keeping movement to a minimum.
7-22
7-63. Generally, two or three members are positioned forward to

observe the target area and record information. The hasty hide site is
positioned far enough to the rear so it is out of the direct line of threat
observation. The distance normally depends on terrain and vegetation. It
must be far enough away from the surveillance element so that if a threat
force discovers one of the two elements, the other element has enough
standoff to prevent its members from being discovered also. The position
will allow them to fire on the threat, and enable one or both elements to
break contact. The team members in the hasty hide site maintain rear
and flank security. Communication is normally conducted after the team
moves away from the area.
INFILTRATION
7-64. Depending on the mission and the information gained initially,
the troop may have to conduct infiltration using surveillance teams to
observe areas of interest or conduct target acquisition. Plans for
infiltration are based on the requirement for conducting movement to the
AO with the least risk of detection. Infiltration considerations are—
• Concealed primary or alternate routes are selected based on
detailed map reconnaissance and aerial photographs, ground
reconnaissance, and threat information from other sources.
• Infiltrating elements must avoid obstacles, silhouetting
locations, threat positions, main avenues of approach, and
movement on heavily populated routes and trails.
• Infiltration should be during periods of reduced visibility and
reduced threat alertness. The time is especially important
during critical phases such as moving through populated
areas.
• Scouts must know routes, rally points (primary and
alternate), time schedules, danger areas, and the threat
situation. These are critical to an optimum balance of speed
and stealth.
• The team should be provided with centralized coordination to
ensure that all scouts are acting in accordance with cover and
deception plans. Infiltration by land is characterized by
centralized planning and decentralized execution.
EXFILTRATION
7-65. The principles of route selection, movement formations, and
movement security are observed during movement to the extraction site.
Exfiltration considerations are—
• The amount of time that a team remains in the urban AO
depends on its mission, composition, and equipment. The
exfiltration is critical from a standpoint of morale and mission
accomplishment. Plans for extraction are made before the
operation, along with alternate plans for contingencies such
as the evacuation of sick or injured personnel. During the
mission, the team leader may be faced with an unforeseen
situation that may demand the utmost flexibility, discipline,
and leadership.
7-23
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
• Each team is given code words in the OPORD for use during
exfiltration. For example, one code word may mean that the
team is at its PZ. Another may mean that both the primary
and alternate PZs are compromised and to abort the
extraction.
• When a team has missed a certain number of required
transmissions, the command assumes that the team has a
communications problem, is in trouble, or both. At that time,
a no-communication resupply and exfiltration plan is used.
• Exfiltration of the team may be by means other than linkup
with the team’s vehicles. The OPORD may specify
dismounted exfiltration or linkup with friendly forces in an
offensive operation. Any of these means may also be planned
as alternatives in the event the team cannot be extracted by
its vehicles or must take action to avoid capture.
• Teams must be trained in exfiltration techniques so they can
walk out singly or in groups.
NOTE: Infiltration and exfiltration are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3 of this
manual.
URBAN SURVEILLANCE SITE

7-66. Surveillance teams can construct fixed urban hide sites in
occupied and abandoned buildings, water tanks, shrubbery, on warehouse
rooftops, or in attics of multistory buildings or other tall structures. If
possible, teams should avoid wooden buildings and buildings in a
significantly deteriorated condition because of the risk of injury from fire
and structural failure. Fixed sites should not be in buildings that attract
the threat’s attention, but should be in rubble, yards, and gardens. If the
site is set up in an undamaged part of the urban area, teams should
select buildings of solid construction with serviceable stairs and
basements that can be equipped for the rest and shelter of personnel
during artillery bombardments.
7-67. Site construction may consist simply of taking a position by a
suitable viewing port, or it can be much more elaborate, time being a
crucial factor. Windows, doors and other openings (like bullet holes not
used for observation) are filled with bricks, fragments of building
materials, or sandbags if available. Flammable objects are removed from
the premises. Supplies of water and sand are assembled for fighting fires.
If the threat has previously occupied the building, the team takes
precautions against booby traps and mines. When the threat is near,
several places in the building are prepared for observation and departure.
HASTY SUBSURFACE SITE
7-68. A hasty subsurface site is constructed when there is not enough
time to construct a complete subsurface site. The site is especially useful
when there is little natural cover and concealment.
CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE
7-69. Although the fundamentals of reconnaissance described in
Chapter 3 are applicable in an urban environment, the type of
information and the method by which it is collected takes on a new form.
7-24
Reconnaissance troops will develop an understanding of the regional,

local, and neighborhood level situation. The reconnaissance troop soldiers
and leaders generate a sense for their AO similar to the awareness of a
“cop on the beat” or street detective. Reconnaissance soldiers must learn
how the urban area operates and who are the sources of power or
influence. Examples of these include—
• The formal and informal political power structure.
• Police/secret police/intelligence agencies.
• Criminal organizations.
• The military and paramilitary structures.
• Key terrain.
• Sensitivities of the populace.
7-70. Although each vehicle contains a HUMINT soldier, every soldier
must possess the ability to gain information on the local area. This is the
key to multidimensional reconnaissance. The most common technique for
gaining this information is tactical questioning (see Chapter 6).
URBAN PATROLLING
7-71. Reconnaissance troops will not normally perform building-to-
building clearing in urban areas. However, they may perform urban
patrolling to accomplish reconnaissance missions. As discussed
previously, detailed planning is accomplished prior to execution of a
patrol. Using maps, aerial photography, and any known intelligence,
leaders will determine the following:
• Preliminary route reconnaissance.
• Insertion and extraction routes.
• Choke points along the routes.
• Escape and evasion directions or corridors.
7-72. Urban patrols may be conducted mounted or dismounted with
vehicles supporting. Patrols should never be conducted lower than section
level.
NOTE: For detailed discussion on employment methods of dismounted and mounted
reconnaissance in urban terrain, see FM 3-20.98 (FM 17-98).
Mounted Patrolling
7-73. Mounted patrols capitalize on the mobility of the unit’s vehicles.
Mounted urban patrolling principles include the following:
• Ensure mutual support and depth by maintaining constant
observation among vehicles.
• Coordinate a supporting fire plan with any dismounted units
in the area.
• Maintain all-around security.
• Develop a reliable communications plan for mounted and
dismounted elements.
• Adjust patrol routes and speed to promote deception and
avoid repetitive patterns.
• Maintain situational awareness.
7-25
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
7-74. Mounted patrols never enter an area via the route they will use to
exit it (see Figure 7-11). Vehicles should travel at moderate speeds, with
the lead vehicle stopping only to investigate those areas that pose a
potential threat or support the essential tasks of the patrol. Use a vehicle
speed of 15 to 20 miles per hour to allow for adequate observation and
quick reaction. Slower speeds may allow noncombatants or a more
aggressive group to impede movement. On the other hand, vehicles
should move at high speeds only when responding to an incident.
Equipment stored externally on the vehicle should be secured high
enough to prevent locals from snatching equipment and weapons.
7-75. When vehicles must stop, designated crewmembers dismount to
provide security. The vehicle gunner is at the ready, and the driver
remains in his seat with the engine running. It is imperative that units
maintain situational awareness during patrols; this includes orientation
on other patrols in the urban area. If an element takes fire, it should be
capable of communicating with other patrols to obtain assistance and
support.
Figure 7-11. Mounted Urban Patrol
Dismounted Patrolling
7-76. During multidimensional reconnaissance, dismounted patrolling
is used in HUMINT collection (see Figures 7-12 and 7-13). At a minimum,
patrols are organized at squad level (three soldiers). Section-size patrols
7-26
(six soldiers) are the preferred organization for security purposes; a

section-size patrol can maintain both an information-gathering team and
a security team.
7-77. Leaders of dismounted patrols must maintain communications
with vehicles and the patrol headquarters throughout the mission. In the
reconnaissance platoon, vehicles must be prepared to react to any
situation the dismounted element may encounter. Patrols should avoid
areas with large masses of civilians, who could quickly turn against the
presence of foreign soldiers. As with mounted patrols, dismounted patrol
leaders must be ready to contact other patrols or supporting elements for
support in unfavorable or dangerous situations.
Figure 7-12. Dismounted Urban Patrol with Vehicle Supporting
7-27
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Figure 7-13. Dismounted Urban Patrol

Subterranean Patrolling
7-78. Reconnaissance of subterranean systems is accomplished to
determine threat use of the passageway, capabilities, or in support of
isolating the urban area. The team leader organizes his patrol with one
soldier tasked with security to the front, point man, and one tasked with
rear security. If available, an engineer should assist the team leader in
classifying the passageway or reducing obstacles. The team leader
navigates and records data through the passage. Two soldiers are left as
a security post at the point of entry. They are responsible for detecting
any threats that come upon the unit’s rear and as a communications link
between the team leader and higher.
7-79. The team leader should carry a map or sketch, compass, street
plan, and information requirements. A team member should carry the
tools needed to open manhole covers. The point man is equipped with
night vision goggles and a feeler for trip wires. All soldiers entering the
passageway should carry a sketch of the sewer system, to include
magnetic north, azimuths, distances, and manholes. They should also
have protective masks, flashlights, gloves, and chalk for marking features
along the route. The team should be equipped with a 120-foot safety rope
to which each man is tied. The safety rope assists the team in retrieving
members who may slip or fall.
7-80. A constant concern to troops conducting a subterranean patrol is
chemical defense. If used in tunnels, chemical agents are normally
7-28
encountered in dense concentrations with no chance of dissipating. The

point man should carry a suitable NBC detection system (such as
detector paper or a chemical agent monitor [CAM]) to be able to warn
team members to don their masks.
7-81. In addition to chemical agents, noxious gases from decomposing
sewage, especially methane gas, can pose a threat. These gases are not
detected by NBC detection systems nor are they completely filtered out
by the protective mask. Physical signs that indicate their presence in
harmful quantities are nausea and dizziness. Team leaders should be
constantly alert to these signs and know the shortest route to the surface
for fresh air.
7-82. Once the team is organized and equipped, it moves to the
entrance of the tunnel, which is usually a manhole. After the manhole is
removed, the team waits 15 minutes to allow any gases to dissipate. The
point man then descends into the tunnel to determine if the air is safe to
breathe and if movement is restricted. The point man should remain in
the tunnel for 10 minutes before the rest of the team follows. If he
becomes ill or is exposed to danger, he can be pulled out by the safety
rope.
7-83. When the patrol is moving through the tunnel, the point man
moves about 10 meters in front of the team leader. Other team members
maintain five-meter intervals. If the water in the tunnel is flowing fast or
if the sewer contains slippery obstacles, the intervals should be increased
to prevent all members from falling if one man slips.
7-84. The team leader should note the azimuth and pace count of each
turn he takes in the tunnel. When the team encounters a manhole to the
surface, the point man should open it and determine the location, which
the team leader then records. Recognition signals with friendly troops
must be coordinated to prevent fratricide as the point man opens the
manhole.
7-85. Once the patrol has returned and submitted its report, the
commander decides how to use the tunnel. Sealing off manhole covers
and emplacing obstacles in the tunnel are options to the commander. The
patrol report is converted into an overlay for the urban operations sketch
and sent to higher.
ACTIONS ON CONTACT
7-86. Reconnaissance troops always resist becoming decisively engaged.
However, rehearsed actions on contact are essential to the survivability of
the unit and success of the mission. All soldiers must have a clear
understanding of the ROE; however, ROE does not prevent a soldier from
protecting himself or his unit members. Figure 7-14 illustrates an
approach to a battle drill when encountering a sniper or antiarmor
weapons.
• Upon contact, make positive confirmation of the position or
direction from which the fire came.
• Move the vehicles quickly out of the line of direct fire while
returning fire if the threat position can be identified.
• Use other vehicles to envelop or cut off a sniper/antiarmor
gunner’s avenue of escape.
7-29
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
• If vehicles are caught in an area where they become decisively

engaged, the vehicles must suppress the threat while moving
out of the potential kill zone as quickly as possible.
7-87. For obstacles and barricades, patrols will move rapidly to an
alternate route and report obstacles/barricades to higher headquarters.
Do not try to clear an obstacle or barricade. These are usually covered by
threat fire, mined, or booby trapped.
Figure 7-14. Actions on Contact
URBAN SWARM
7-88. Urban swarm is similar to the tactic used by police forces
responding to an emergency that requires backup. The swarm concept
considers numerous teams operating in a dispersed, noncontiguous
fashion in the urban environment. As the units patrol their assigned
area, they must be prepared to respond rapidly to a call for assistance by
neighboring teams. Whether they can respond to a call for assistance will
depend on their current situation and distance from those making the
request.
7-89. A call for assistance should include an estimate of the support
required. This request is transmitted to all other teams on the platoon
and troop net. The commander directs the appropriate teams to respond
and adjusts other teams to fill or cover gaps that are created. Alternative
methods may include the teams closest to the requesting unit responding
without direction, rather reporting their intention to respond. Situational
awareness is critical in avoiding fratricide.
7-90. Command of the teams responding can be accomplished in several
ways. The leader of the requesting unit who has the best situational
awareness could assume tactical command of responding units. Another
7-30
option is to have the commander or XO command and control responding

teams. Having too many leaders on the ground in one area is risky and
must be avoided.
7-91. The key to this tactic is speed and flexibility. The requesting
group has to be able to quickly and concisely inform the responding units
of the situation and maneuver them to positions of advantage as they
arrive. Again, the need for an urban operations sketch is of the utmost
importance for command and control. The responding units also need to
have the flexibility and training to enter an emerging situation
effectively. Implicit in this concept is the capability of junior leaders to
assume increased levels of responsibility and command.
7-92. Reconnaissance troops should be cautious of establishing easily
targetable patterns. If units respond to crises in similar patterns, threat
forces will quickly identify them and deliberately create crises in order to
lure responding units into ambushes or exploit the temporary void
created in the AO by responding units.
ASSESS THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

7-93. The troop commander receives and analyzes the information
gathered by the platoons. The commander then assesses the AO
according to the mission and intent of higher. The assessment will
include, but is not limited to, the following:
• Threat composition and activity.
• Areas of vulnerability to friendly forces.
• Key terrain.
• Approach routes for mounted and dismounted forces.
• Entry points or points of penetration.
• Support positions for direct and indirect systems.
• Civilian disposition.
• Density and composition of urban area.
• Hazard areas (fuel storage, natural gas lines, chemical
production sites).
• Communication facilities.
• Retrans sites.
• Intent of civilian populace (stay or flee).
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS

7-94. Additional medical support is requested as needed. When
possible, MEDEVAC of team members is delayed until the whole team is
evacuated from the AO. Wounded team members are sent directly to the
nearest medical facility that can provide definitive care and treatment.
7-95. If necessary, the troop uses self-recovery to extract vehicles to an
identified secured maintenance collection point outside the urban area.
7-31
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
END STATE
7-96. The end state of the reconnaissance troop’s effort is allowing the
commander to answer the two critical questions for the brigade: Is it
essential to conduct operations in the urban environment, and if so, how
can they employ combat power in the most efficient manner?
7-97. The troop conducts reconnaissance handover to provide the
brigade with the following support:
• Production of urban operations sketches.
• Recommendation of entry points and routes.
• Surveillance of key objectives.
• Target acquisition.
• Assistance in isolating the AO by screening (or checkpoints)
on the perimeter.
• Performing continuous HUMINT collection during the
operation (recce troop focus).
7-98. The troop can continue to assist during the brigade operation by
assisting in the isolation of the AO and collecting HUMINT on personnel
attempting to leave or enter the area.
7-32
Chapter 8
Combat Service Support

The reconnaissance troop’s CONTENTS
ability to continue its Fundamentals...............................................8-2
mission for extended Tactical CSS Functions ...........................8-2
CSS Characteristics .................................8-4
periods of time depends on Organization .................................................8-5
the parent unit’s ability to FBCB2 Role in CSS ..................................8-5
obtain, transport, and Troop Trains .............................................8-7
distribute fighting Cavalry Squadron (RSTA) CSS ...............8-10
Brigade Reconnaissance Troop CSS .....8-13
resources such as fuel, Logistics .......................................................8-14
ammunition, replacement Supply Operations ...................................8-14
personnel, and rations. Resupply Operations ...............................8-16
Likewise the troop must Maintenance and Recovery
Operations.............................................8-22
develop rapid, dependable Field Services ...........................................8-24
ways to treat and evacuate Personnel Service Support .........................8-25
wounded soldiers, and Personnel and Administrative.................8-25
repair combat equipment to Combat Health Support ...........................8-26
Unit Ministry Team ...................................8-28
sustain troop morale, Enemy Prisoners of War .............................8-29
combat power, and the Capture and Handling ..............................8-29
readiness to fight. The Evacuation Techniques ...........................8-29
troop must deploy with a
minimum of three days of
supply to sustain initial operations.
For the BRT, planning and execution of resupply and casualty and
vehicle evacuation must be addressed and integrated at the BCT staff
level in order for it to be effective. The troop 1SG and XO must ensure
the troop’s CSS requirements are nested in the BCT’s scheme of
support. They must also ensure that the assets are in place to support
BRT operations before, during, and after the BCT’s decisive operation
and also the troop’s transition to the BCT’s follow-on mission.
More so than the recce troop of the cavalry squadron (RSTA), the BRT
must tie into different CSS assets from within the BCT such as the
brigade support battalion (BSB), task force trains, and task force
combat units. The troop 1SG and XO, in conjunction with the BCT
staff, must identify the CSS needs of the troop early and throughout
the operation and assign responsibility to units to support or address
those needs; or coordinate with units outside the BCT to support
specific requirements such as aerial resupply or medical evacuation.
8-1
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
SECTION I – FUNDAMENTALS
8-1. The CSS system will be challenged to sustain the troop in the
fast-paced, nonlinear AO. The CSS structure throughout the brigade or
squadron is extremely austere, allowing for quicker deployability and a
reduction of the support footprint in the AO. Utilization of the latest
technological advances in CSS, such as the combat service support control
system (CSSCS) and FBCB2, increases the parent unit’s support-related
situational awareness, allowing for effective support of the troop. This
austere CSS organization will be significantly challenged to support the
troop’s wide-ranging and, in some situations, decentralized missions.
8-2. Logistics is planned in advance and aggressively pushed forward
to the troops without the delay imposed by reacting to requests. FBCB2
provides CSS functionality by having logistics SITREPs, personnel
SITREPs, logistical call for support and logistics task order messaging,
situational awareness, and task management capabilities. This
functionality affects the synchronization of all logistics support on the
battlefield between the supported and the supporter.
TACTICAL COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

8-3. Tactical CSS involves six essential functions: manning, arming,
fueling, fixing, moving, and sustaining soldiers and their systems.
MANNING
8-4. Manning involves the personnel support activities that ensure the
commander has the personnel required to accomplish the mission. It
involves the management of personnel readiness, replacements, and
casualties. Platoon leaders/platoon sergeants (PSG) must quickly and
accurately report personnel status to the troop XO/1SG, who in turn
sends the information to the CTCP via FM or FBCB2. Troop 1SGs ensure
soldiers are in-processed into the unit and receive initial training on unit
SOPs.
ARMING
8-5. Arming the troop is important to ensure it can protect itself when
it physically contacts a threat force. The BSB transports ammunition
during LOGPAC operations and may utilize aerial supply and airdrops,
when available, to resupply the troop. Maintaining the unit basic load
(UBL) of ammunition according to load plans on all combat and support
vehicles within the troop is key to ensuring it is properly armed.
Commanders must ensure that the UBL reflects the operational
requirements based on the current mission. Basic loads may be adjusted
for urban operations, stability operations, or in a high-armor threat
environment. The arming system must be able to meet the needs of the
troop through integration of supply, transportation, and maintenance
functions.
FUELING
8-6. Fueling is the provision of petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL)
to the troop. Due to the BSB’s limited ability to distribute fuel to the
troop, maintaining POL UBL according to vehicle load plans will ensure
8-2
______________________________________________________ Chapter 8 – Combat Service Support
the troop has adequate fuel. All operations depend on movement of

personnel, equipment, and supplies as well as the operation of
equipment. Those activities are possible if logisticians are able to
accurately forecast and effectively provide the fuel to meet these needs
when required.
FIXING
8-7. Fixing the force is a vital component of ensuring maximum
availability of scarce equipment to the commander. Fixing entails
maintaining, recovering, repairing, and evacuating equipment. The
troop’s ability to conduct maintenance is limited to battle damage
assessment and repair (BDAR), controlled substitution, extremely limited
component replacement, and the use of any available floats. The cavalry
squadron (RSTA) does have limited communications, missile, line
replaceable units (LRU), electronics, and power generation repair. The
BRT is normally supported by the brigade support company (BSC) of the
brigade’s forward support battalion (FSB). Operator PMCS cannot be
stressed enough, and are essential to sustaining equipment and
maintaining the troop’s operational readiness. Prompt recovery and
repair by organizational and unit-level maintenance elements and the
operators are critical to keeping systems operational and reducing
turnaround time. Battle damage assessment and evacuation keep the
troop effort focused within its capabilities and recoverable equipment in
the support system. Managing the limited repair parts is another critical
part of fixing.
MOVING
8-8. Moving is inherent in all operations. Moving the force specifically
relates to the planning and execution of the movement of soldiers,
equipment, and supplies. It includes movement within the troop as well
as to and from the support echelons. The limited transportation assets
and the road networks they use must be managed with maximum
efficiency. All vehicle movements should be planned in advance to ensure
it is being used to maximize time and cargo space, to include tactical and
support vehicles.
SUSTAINING
8-9. Sustaining soldiers involves the provision of a wide range of
services and supplies. Quality of life for the soldier is a command
responsibility. It affects the soldier’s readiness and willingness to conduct
missions. It is associated with services that directly ease his personal
concerns, including personnel service, combat health, field service, and
general supply support. Quality of life also depends on the knowledge
that a soldier’s family is receiving care. Soldier sustainment involves the
following systems:
• Personnel services support. This support enhances soldier
performance by providing services that bolster his morale and
his sense of well-being. Specific functions include personnel
services, religious support, legal service support, finance
services, and resource management.
• Combat health support (CHS). CHS provides a continuum of
health care from all locations throughout a theater to the
continental US (CONUS) base.
8-3
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
• Field service support. This consists of a variety of capabilities

designed to provide essential services and enhance a soldier’s
quality of life during operations. It includes food preparation,
water purification, mortuary affairs support, airdrop support,
laundry and shower services, and clothing and light textile
repair.
8-10. FM 3-0 (FM 100-5) and FM 4-0 (FM 100-10) discuss these
functions in detail.
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT CHARACTERISTICS

8-11. Sustainment enables the troop commander to accomplish the
wide range of tasks he may be assigned. The logistics tail must not
needlessly inhibit the operations of the troop. To meet this challenge, CSS
leaders are guided by the following five imperatives when planning or
executing:
• Anticipation.
• Integration.
• Continuity.
• Responsiveness.
• Improvisation.
ANTICIPATION
8-12. CSS leaders must not only support the ongoing operation, but
also anticipate future events and requirements. The troop XO and 1SG
must anticipate the needs of the unit as an operation is occurring,
coordinate to push support forward, keep the commander abreast of CSS
status and capabilities, and keep the support echelons informed of
requirements. If CSS becomes reactive, support will be too late. The XO
and 1SG, in conjunction with the BCT or squadron S4, must immediately
begin planning when he receives the WARNO and FRAGOs. He must
determine support requirements, coordinate changes to support
relationships, and alert the supporting units to new trains positions to
maintain the flow of support.
INTEGRATION
8-13. Commanders and staffs must integrate CSS into the planning
process. At troop level, the commander, XO, and 1SG perform this
function. At BCT/squadron level, the S4 has staff responsibility and
works with the BCT/squadron commander, XO, S3, and HHC/HHT
commander, and the BSB staff to ensure integration occurs. CSS leaders
must identify sustainment problems during the estimate process and
before the operation starts. Discussing CSS in maneuver and in fire
support rehearsals is a highly recommended method to ensure the CSS
plan is integrated and all planners and executors outside of the CSS
arena (commanders, battle captains, S2, etc.) know of the plan.
CONTINUITY
8-14. Sustainment efforts are continuous. CSS is never in reserve.
Support continues during preparations before an operation begins, during
the operation, and afterwards as the troop reconstitutes or prepares for
another mission. Operator and organizational maintenance and repair
work is done whenever the opportunity exists. Repairing and returning
8-4
damaged equipment to the fight requires early diagnosis and

identification of faults and is done as far forward as possible. Immediate
resupply is conducted when needed, but routine resupply (LOGPAC) is
the standard. Vulnerability and limited cross-country mobility of CSS
vehicles dictate the predominant use of road and trail networks.
Continuous CSS operations require careful personnel management to
provide sustained effort. Local security, routine details, and operator
maintenance all compete for time with CSS operations. Fatigue can
quickly degrade the effectiveness of soldiers who must simultaneously
provide continuous support to the squadron and maintain their own
equipment. Carefully planned and strictly enforced rest plans help to
ensure continuous support.
RESPONSIVENESS
8-15. Responsiveness is the ability to meet changing or unforeseen
requirements on short notice. The CSS system must be as agile as the
maneuver system to allow the commander to successfully seize
opportunities or exploit tactical success.
IMPROVISATION
8-16. Improvising is essential as CSS leaders seek to solve significant,
often unanticipated problems. These problems may be caused by threat
action against the support system, mass casualties and destruction of
maneuver assets, environmental conditions of the AO, or disruptions of
command and control. Normal operating procedures may be suspended
and extraordinary measures taken to overcome the problem. Agility,
initiative, and ingenuity on the part of CSS leaders are essential.
8-17. These imperatives should be encompassed in SOPs as they
establish the focus for organization and operations of the CSS system.
FM 3-0 (FM 100-5) and FM 4-0 (FM 100-10) provide background on these
imperatives.
SECTION II – ORGANIZATION
8-18. Troop trains are made up of immediate battlefield service support

systems. The remainder of the troop CSS elements is collocated with its
parent unit’s CSS assets in the brigade or squadron combat trains. The
troop CSS team consists of the troop XO, 1SG, supply sergeant,
communications soldier, NBC sergeant, armorer, and the troop senior
medic. In addition to the senior medic, a medical/evacuation team may be
attached to the troop for combat operations from the medical platoon.
FBCB2 ROLE IN COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
8-19. There is no dedicated service support radio net at troop level. All
logistical reports and initial requests for logistical support are conducted
on the troop command net, or on a designated net identified in the unit’s
SOP or order. Additional coordination is conducted on the platoon radio
nets. Routine reports are sent before and after combat operations, and
are delivered by FBCB2. All service support coordination with the
brigade or squadron is conducted on the A/L net and by FBCB2 logistics
status (LOGSTAT) reports. The 1SG operates on the A/L net. The CP
monitors the A/L net, but uses it when necessary to forward reports and
8-5
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
to conduct logistical coordination. The troop’s CSS team uses FBCB2 to

manage the CSS requirements for the troop.
FBCB2 LOGISTICS STATUS REPORTING
8-20. LOGSTAT reports are divided into two categories with respect to
their routing requirements—individual platform reports and unit roll-up
reports. The report will show the amount units have in their Class I, II,
III, IV, V, and VIII supplies. It reports what is on-hand and serviceable.
For Classes VII and IX, the LOGSTAT reports whether what is on-hand
is fully mission capable or not.
8-21. The LOGSTAT reporting chain is as follows:
•
Individual platform LOGSTATs are prepared and submitted
by all platforms. Addressed to sending platform PSG for
action and platoon leader/OIC for information.
• Platoon roll-up LOGSTATs are prepared and submitted by all
PSGs. Addressed to sender’s team/company 1SG for action
and to the platoon leader/OIC for information.
• Troop roll-up LOGSTATs are prepared and submitted by all
troop 1SGs. Addressed to the squadron S4 CTCP FBCB2 for
information and brigade S1/S4 rear CP for action. The brigade
rear CP will forward to the CSSCS company-level LOGSTATs
(i.e., not rolled up above company level). CSSCS cannot
process battalion or brigade rolled-up reports.
FBCB2 LOGISTICS CALL FOR SUPPORT
8-22. Call for support (CFS) is used in accordance with unit SOP to
send digital requests for support to either the supporting forward support
company (FSC), brigade rear CP, or BSB. When a CFS message is
received, the logistics task order (LTO) thread is initiated by the tasking
authority. The LTO thread is composed of the CFS, the LTO message, the
task synchronization message, and the task status message. Once a CFS
has been sent, the rest of the logistics messages are accessed through
either the logistics task management application or the long form reports
screen. All active CFS will appear on the LTO matrix. (See Figure 8-1 for
the CFS thread in FBCB2.)
8-6
Figure 8-1. Call for Support Thread in FBCB2
TROOP TRAINS
8-23. The troop trains provides CSS for the troop during combat
operations. The 1SG directs movement and employment of the troop
trains. He receives logistical reports directly from the PSGs or through
the troop CP, coordinates logistical matters with the XO, and assists the
XO in ensuring the troop is logistically ready for battle. During
operations, the 1SG coordinates and directs the evacuation of casualties
and equipment to designated troop or squadron logistic release points
(LRP), which are graphically depicted by checkpoints, leads the troop
LOGPAC forward from the LRP to resupply the troop and then leads it
back to the LRP; and organizes the LOGPAC to conduct troop resupply
operations. Depending on METT-TC, PSGs may assume the 1SG’s role for
their platoon and may have to coordinate with the CTCP for the platoon’s
logistical support.
8-24. The troop trains may be collocated with the troop CP, or it may
operate separately under the control of the 1SG. Threat situation and
distances between the platoons are some of the major determining
factors. The troop trains may consolidate or coordinate with a task force
trains or task force main CP, if locations and distances allow for
collocation. This method alleviates stress on the troop’s limited CSS
assets and maximizes the brigade support area’s (BSA) assets.
8-7
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
LOCAL SECURITY
8-25. Trains must provide their own local security. They do not have
the manpower or equipment to clear large areas, so they should move into
areas that have already been cleared by scouts. The trains’ best defense is
to avoid detection. The trains should disperse their vehicles and
camouflage the positions by using natural concealment like a wooded
area or a small built-up area. A built-up area is best because there are a
limited number of approaches and the thermal signature of the trains is
concealed. Enforce strict noise and light discipline. Hide vehicles in barns
or garages, if available. The buildings in a built-up area and the trees in a
wooded area provide some protection against the effects of indirect fires
and air-delivered munitions. Dispersion also limits the damaging effects
of these weapons.
8-26. Establish OPs around the trains to provide early warning of
threat movement toward the position. Put them where they can cover
major avenues of approach. An OP has at least two soldiers, a crew-
served weapon (if available), a map, binoculars, a night observation
device, and a radio or field phone. The OP must immediately report, by
radio or phone, threat ground and air attacks so the trains can take
appropriate actions.
8-27. Passive defense is the trains’ best defense against air attack. The
steps taken to locate them properly, disperse vehicles, camouflage
positions, and use the cover and concealment of built-up or wooded areas
help prevent the threat from detecting and attacking, and if attacked,
limit the effects of threat munitions.
8-28. Air attacks cannot always be avoided. If attacked, take active air
defense measures. The 1SG or senior soldier present must coordinate the
small arms fires of the trains for them to be effective against an air
threat. Refer to Chapter 6 of this manual for more information on passive
and active air defense.
8-29. Collocation with the troop CP or another trains element provides
additional personnel for security for both the CP and trains.
PLANNING
8-30. CSS planning must be fully integrated into all operations
planning; it is the primary responsibility of the troop XO and 1SG.
Logistics support must be synchronized with the concept of operations.
CSS planning is continuous and concurrent with ongoing support
execution, and is conducted to ensure support during all phases of an
operation. Troop orders should address only specific support matters for
the operation and any deviations from SOP. The troop SOP should be
based on the squadron’s CSS operations.
8-31. At troop level, CSS planning is informal; it is normally
formulated in terms of the following considerations:
• Current and projected unit status of maintenance and supply.
• Quantities and types of logistics needed to support the troop’s
operation.
• How it will be transported.
• When it must be on hand.
• Required displacement of CSS assets.
8-8
• Shortfalls and impact on the operation.

• Supportable courses of action in priority.
• Availability of MEDEVAC and treatment.
8-32. The information to address many of these considerations should
be found in the higher unit’s OPORD. Troops frequently use the “push”
concept of resupply. Under this concept, standard loads of supply are
brought forward to platoons unless a specific request is made otherwise.
Thus, LOGSTAT reports are used by the parent unit to preconfigure
supply loads and anticipate future demands.
SUPPORTING OFFENSIVE AND RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS
8-33. During operations that are mobile, such as reconnaissance,
establishing troop LRPs or using higher’s LRPs throughout the zone or
area is essential to supporting the troop. These LRPs may either be
casualty collection points, vehicle recovery points, or a combination of
both. Unit SOPs must be specific about who (section leader/PSG/1SG)
evacuates casualties and equipment and where they are taken (LRPs or
MSR). If trains are augmented with maintenance, medical, or emergency
resupply vehicles, position the troop trains in the center of the troop zone
and about two kilometers or one terrain feature behind the trail element.
Use the established road network, if possible, to move the trains. Bound
the trains forward to successive concealed positions, based on the
movement of the troop, to keep them in position to support the troop. The
availability of adequate supplies and transportation to sustain the
reconnaissance operation becomes more critical as the operation
progresses. MSRs lengthen, communications are strained, and
requirements for repair and replacement of weapon systems increase.
The availability of adequate supplies and transportation to sustain the
operation becomes more critical as the operation progresses. Additional
reconnaissance planning considerations are listed below.
• Ensure basic loads remain replenished.
• Plan for an increased consumption of POL.
• Use push packages of preplanned and preconfigured essential
logistics items.
• Plan for increased vehicular maintenance, especially when
operating over rough terrain.
• Use maintenance support teams well forward.
• Use captured threat supplies and equipment, particularly
support vehicles and POL. Test POL for contamination before
using.
• Vehicles must be well marked to prevent misidentification
and engagement by friendly units.
• Test natural water sources before using.
• Select supply routes, LRPs, and subsequent trains locations
for the entire operation. Plan alternate routes and means.
• Plan for increased casualties, use of casualty collection points,
and use of aeromedical evacuation resources.
• Upload logistics required for the operation in advance as
much as possible.
• Plan for increasing distances and longer turn-around times
for MSR operations.
8-9
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
SUPPORTING DEFENSIVE AND SECURITY OPERATIONS

8-34. During operations that are static in nature, such as screen
missions, the same considerations for mobile missions apply. If the trains
are augmented with maintenance, medical, or emergency resupply
vehicles, position the troop trains about three kilometers behind the
troop’s screen positions in the center of the troop sector. If possible, hide
the trains in a small built-up area, which provides cover and
concealment, and use an established road network to facilitate the
movement of the trains. The trains must be ready to move to support the
troop or displace to a new location. The XO and 1SG plan subsequent
locations, and as the situation requires, the 1SG or maintenance sergeant
moves the trains to the next location.
8-35. Defensive-oriented security missions and defensive missions
assigned as economy of force have similar general planning
considerations. These missions tend to be dynamic in nature, involving
substantial maneuver. As they become more dynamic, certain planning
considerations for reconnaissance apply. The most important
consideration for security operations is best use of available preparation
time and front-loading of the CSS effort. As with reconnaissance,
emphasis on any particular consideration varies with the mission
assigned and shifts during mission execution. Planning considerations
include the following actions:
• Plan for increased use of Class IV and Class V.
• Preposition limited amounts of ammunition, POL, and barrier
material in centrally located forward positions.
• Preposition ammunition and other critical supplies on
subsequent positions in depth.
• Use push packages of critical supplies on a scheduled basis.
Continue resupply until the last possible moment.
• Resupply during limited visibility to reduce the chance of
threat interference.
• Prepare to conduct emergency resupply on short notice well
forward during lulls in the battle or as required.
• Plan displacement of CSS assets so uninterrupted support
continues.
• Select MSRs that do not interfere with movement of units or a
reserve force. Plan alternate routes and means.
• Plan mobility operations to maintain MSRs.
• Plan alternate means of evacuation for casualties.
• Emphasize recovery and evacuation of equipment over
forward repair to preclude loss to the threat. Use all available
noncombat vehicles to tow disabled vehicles.
CAVALRY SQUADRON (RSTA) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

8-36. To ensure responsive CSS for the squadron, the S4 organizes the
squadron support into echeloned trains and establishes a MSR, a UMCP,
and an LRP. These trains are made up of combat trains (which provide
immediate recovery, maintenance, medical, and emergency resupply
support), and field trains (which provide the remainder of the squadron
service support and limited direct support maintenance). The UMCP is
8-10
established to provide maintenance support for combat operations. It is

collocated with the squadron combat trains, and is the closest point to
which damaged or failed equipment and systems are recovered. The
UMCP is the focal point of the squadron maintenance effort. The MSR
links troop trains to the squadron combat trains and the field trains.
LRPs are established along the MSR to facilitate the handover of
LOGPACs and equipment between the troops and the squadron. An
example of a squadron support plan is shown in Figure 8-2.
Figure 8-2. Squadron Combat Service Support Plan
SQUADRON COMBAT TRAINS

8-37. The combat trains are located between the BSA and the
reconnaissance troops. Combat trains are the forward CSS element of the
squadron. The squadron S4 and S1 with their personnel run the combat
trains from the CTCP. The combat trains also include the medical platoon
headquarters, two medical treatment teams, five MEDEVAC teams, the
medical supply vehicle, and the combat repair team (CRT).
8-38. The combat trains are responsible for coordinating all classes of
supply, personnel, and maintenance support, to include evacuation of
8-11
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
casualties and equipment from the troops to the combat trains for further
evacuation to the BSA.
8-39. The combat trains can establish operations in various locations
throughout the AO. The level and capabilities of the threat (security), and
the dispersion/distance of the troops and squadron main CP determine
positioning of the combat trains. The combat trains can locate/collocate in
either of these areas:
• Independent/not collocated. The threat is low, or not capable
of finding small, hidden, and dispersed elements. Dispersion
between troops is great and the combat trains need to move
forward to provide better support.
• Collocated with squadron, infantry, or artillery battalion CP.
Collocation affords better security and C2 within an area.
• Consolidated trains. This method is used when the forward
elements of the squadron are within a closer supporting
distance of the BSA (less than 30 kilometers). Consolidated
trains afford better C2 of the squadron’s CSS assets.
• Collocation with infantry or artillery battalion trains.
Provides additional security, assists in deconfliction of AOs,
and maximizes the limited CSS assets of the brigade.
8-40. The troop supply sergeant, shown with driver and vehicle in
Figure 8-3, is the troop representative in the squadron combat trains.
Figure 8-3. Troop Supply Sergeant, Driver, and Vehicle
8-41. The supply sergeant is responsible for the following tasks:

• Maintaining records of troop clothing and equipment.
• Processing or forwarding requests for all Classes I, II, III, IV,
V, VI, and VII. He also assists medics in resupplying Class
VIII (medical) and the maintenance section in ordering Class
IX repair parts.
• Transporting personnel to and from the field trains, when
required.
• Assisting the 1SG in organizing the LOGPAC site for troop
resupply and in evacuating soldiers who are killed in action
(KIA), EPWs, and disabled vehicles; and in medically
evacuating wounded and injured soldiers.
• Delivering mail, when available, via the troop LOGPAC.
8-12
8-42. At the squadron combat trains, the supply sergeant coordinates

with the S4 and the squadron field trains (located in or near the BSA) via
radio or FBCB2 to ensure the LOGPAC meets the troop’s CSS
requirements. The squadron’s LOGPAC meeting serves to coordinate the
requirements for the next LOGPAC.
8-43. The supply sergeant coordinates with the S4 for parts and
maintenance and with the squadron personnel and administration center
(PAC) section for mail, promotions, awards, Standardization
Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS), and other personnel
actions. The supply sergeant must frequently check with the HHT CP in
the field trains for any additional troop requests reported on the A/L net.
8-44. The squadron combat trains is responsible for its own local
security. The supply sergeant will be tasked to assist the S4 in
maintaining security of the combat trains. He must execute and
supervise security operations in accordance with the S4’s plan. During
the movement through nonsecure areas, the supply sergeant should
ensure that all crew-served and individual weapons are manned and
ready. He should also ensure that all members of the troop combat trains
are briefed on immediate action drills for threat contact or vehicle
breakdowns.
SQUADRON FIELD TRAINS
8-45. The squadron field trains is the primary direct coordination
element between the squadron and the BSA. The field trains may
collocate with the BSA, operate independently between the BSA and
combat trains, collocate with the squadron trains, or with the nearest
trains of the infantry battalions. Field trains location is determined by
the level and capabilities of the threat and the distances between the
forward elements of the squadron and the BSA. The field trains will
normally consist of the HHT commander, XO, 1SG, NBC NCO, and
supply sergeant. The field trains ensure the LOGPACs are organized and
configured per the unit’s requests and that the LOGPAC makes it
forward, at a minimum, to the combat trains and back to the BSA.
BRIGADE RECONNAISSANCE TROOP COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
8-46. The BRT has no organic logistics capability and requires detailed
planning for support by the brigade staff. The BSC of the FSB normally
supports the BRT. If the situation permits, the BSC pushes assets
forward to designated LRPs to meet the BRT’s needs. Alternately, the
brigade assigns subordinate task forces the responsibility to support the
logistics requirements of the troop. Reference FM 3-90.3 (FM 71-3) for the
capabilities and organization of the brigade’s CSS assets. Regardless of
the arrangement, the BRT ensures that the brigade staff considers the
following items during planning:
• Passage lanes and coordination points to move logistics assets
safely through the MBA into the brigade’s security zone.
• Casualty collection points for the troop to conduct self-
evacuation.
• Positioning of ambulance exchange points (AXP) and aid
stations to support CASEVAC.
• Medical air evacuation plan.
8-13
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
• LRPs and LOGPAC schedule for Classes I, III, and V

resupply.
• Designating a combat force to fight to extract brigade ISR
assets, if required.
• Planning for logistical refit of the BRT between operations.
8-47. The BRT supply sergeant, shown in Figure 8-4, is the troop
representative in the brigade’s combat trains.
Figure 8-4. Brigade Reconnaissance Troop Supply Sergeant
8-48. The BRT supply sergeant’s duties and responsibilities are the
same as the recce troop’s supply sergeant. Since the BRT has no
supporting combat trains, the BRT coordinates directly with the BSC.
SECTION III – LOGISTICS
SUPPLY OPERATIONS
8-49. The supply sergeant is responsible for getting supplies and
delivering them to the troop. He delivers small items, but is largely
dependent on BSA assets to deliver bulky or high expenditure items. The
commander establishes priorities for delivery, but the demands of combat
normally dictate Classes I, III, V, VIII, and IX as most critical.
CLASS I (RATIONS)
8-50. Meals ready to eat (MRE) are stocked on each troop vehicle in a
basic load prescribed by SOP (three-day supply). Class I is delivered daily
by the supply sergeant as part of the LOGPAC from the squadron field
trains. Hot meals (B or tray-pack rations) are served when possible, but
the normal ration cycle is C-C-C during combat operations. This requires
resupply of at least 34 cases of MRE per day per troop. Water is a critical
item, and must be resupplied daily. Soldiers may require up to five
gallons of water per soldier per day, or more than 600 gallons for the
entire troop. The troop can transport only 400 gallons of water on the
water trailer. Soldiers should top off their water cans when possible. The
supply sergeant should carry five-gallon cans of water on his truck to
supplement the needs of the troop. When he resupplies the troop, he
exchanges the full cans for empty ones.
8-14
CLASS II (SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT)

8-51. Class II items are requisitioned through the S4 and delivered by
the supply sergeant as needed. The troop also maintains the following
supplies, as a minimum:
• One case of BA-30s.
• One mile of WD-1 wire.
• Additional batteries as necessary for night-vision devices and
other equipment.
• Five sets of CTA-50, to include personal clothing of various
sizes, stored in duffel bags.
• Fifteen body bags.
• Map cases, grease pencils, permanent markers, etc.
CLASS III (PETROLEUM, OIL, AND LUBRICANT)
8-52. Class III is delivered by BSA assets both as part of the troop
LOGPAC and on an as-needed basis. PSGs report their Class III status to
the CP daily, when status is requested, or when any Class III item is
below a certain percentage, usually 59 percent.
8-53. Each troop vehicle carries a small basic load of packaged products
as prescribed by SOP, and the fuel carriers normally have only small
amounts of packaged products on board. Requests for large quantities of
packaged products must be requested through the S4.
CLASS IV (CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS)
8-54. Class IV supplies are requested through the CTCP and delivered
by the supply sergeant with the LOGPAC. Class IV supplies needed at
troop level may include concertina wire, sandbags, and lumber.
CLASS V (AMMUNITION)
8-55. The troop deploys with a basic load of Class V as prescribed by
the unit for each type of vehicle. Ammunition status is reported by PSGs
to the CP daily, upon completion of threat contact, or as needed. Normal
resupply of Class V is delivered with the LOGPAC. Emergency resupply
is requested through the 1SG to the S4, and is delivered from the combat
trains if it is available. Emergency resupply of Class V will normally
consist of ammunition for major weapon systems.
CLASS VI (PERSONAL DEMAND ITEMS)
8-56. Class VI items (such as soap, toothpaste, and cigarettes) are
requested through the S4 by the 1SG. They are usually delivered as part
of the LOGPAC.
CLASS VII (MAJOR END ITEMS)
8-57. Class VII items, such as vehicles and night-vision devices, are
automatically requested based on equipment shortages and battle losses.
Items are delivered to the field trains, which notifies the troop of the
availability of the equipment. The equipment is delivered with a
LOGPAC or brought forward immediately to an LRP where the 1SG
meets it and delivers it to the troop.
CLASS VIII (MEDICAL SUPPLIES)
8-58. The recce troop’s Class VIII is provided by the squadron medical
platoon. The troop senior medic requests supplies through the squadron
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
aid station. During intense combat, supplies may be pushed forward.

They are then delivered to the combat trains where the troop medic picks
them up from the squadron aid station, or they are brought forward on
ambulances. The BRT’s Class VIII is coordinated through the brigade
HHC. It is provided by the BSC and delivered to the troop via LOGPACs.
CLASS IX (REPAIR PARTS)
8-59. The troop XO consolidates DA Forms 2404 and/or 5988E and
sends them to the S4 and/or the CRT auto repair supervisor, also known
as the motor sergeant. The CRT motor sergeant requisitions, receives,
and maintains records for all Class IX items through the CSSCS for the
troop. When the troop XO needs a repair part, the request is sent through
the CTCP/S4 to the CRT motor sergeant. The CRT motor sergeant
determines if the part is available through the maintained combat spares
and fills the request if possible. If the part is not in the combat spares, he
requests it through the maintenance control section of the BSB in the
BSA, using CSSCS. When the requisition is filled, the part is delivered
through the combat trains, using LOGPAC when feasible. The motor
sergeant updates the records to reflect the requisition.
MAPS
8-60. Maps are requested through the troop CP to the S4. As maps are
available, the supply sergeant picks them up in the field trains and
delivers them to the troop as part of a LOGPAC. The S2 also has access to
digital mapping products and special maps developed by the topographic
engineers.
RESUPPLY OPERATIONS
8-61. Resupply of combat resources is accomplished using standardized
procedures to rearm, refuel, and refit the troop as fast as possible to
sustain its combat potential. For the BRT, resupply operations are
complicated by limited CSS assets organic to the troop, the location of
BRT platoons and sections forward of the BCT’s FEBA, and the
requirements to secure any resupply assets that must go forward to the
BRT’s forward positions.
8-62. The BCT staff must conduct detailed planning and coordination
to effect combat resupply of BRT elements forward of the BCT’s FEBA.
The BRT elements should carry a three-day supply forward. The BCT
should plan on extracting BRT elements prior to their three-day supply
being used and conduct resupply of those elements in the BRT assembly
area. When this is not feasible, the troop XO and 1SG along with the BCT
staff must plan and coordinate for ground infiltration or aerial insertion
of supply to designated drop off points or cache points to support the
forward OPs.
8-63. Routine resupply (Classes I, III, V, IX; mail; and other items
needed by the troop) occurs when the troop is not in contact or when the
troop commander decides the risk of not conducting resupply outweighs
the risk of interrupting ongoing operations. Resupply may be conducted
in an assembly area or behind troop positions when the troop is deployed
in sector or zone.
8-16
8-64. Routine resupply is conducted using the LOGPAC from the field
trains and the troop trains. The LOGPAC is organized in the BSA. Its
composition is based on the troop’s needs as reported to the S4,
requisitions, and the availability of supplies. Field trains personnel
ensure that all available supplies are picked up and organized by troop. If
personnel are to be brought forward, the supply sergeant should be
informed so he can go to the field trains and pick them up if no
transportation assets are available in the BSA. The designated field
trains representative leads the LOGPAC to the LRP, where the 1SGs
meet them. Each 1SG leads his LOGPAC to the troop resupply site. When
it arrives, members of the troop trains guide the LOGPAC vehicles into
position. Once the LOGPAC is established, the 1SG reports to the CP
that he is set. The troop commander or the XO coordinates resupply
operations, and ensures all platoons and sections are resupplied. Security
of the LOGPAC is extremely important. Crew-served weapons should be
mounted and manned on all support vehicles. When available, combat
vehicles should provide escort service.
8-65. Resupply is conducted by one of two basic methods—tailgate issue
or service station. Either method may be performed at troop or platoon
level, depending on dispersion of the platoons.
TAILGATE ISSUE METHOD
8-66. The tailgate method is used in static positions such as assembly
areas. Class III and V supply vehicles and other bulk-issue vehicles move
from vehicle to vehicle to conduct resupply. The rest of the service
support vehicles are centrally located in the troop area. Little or no
movement is required by the combat vehicles. Personnel move to a
centralized location to receive supplies, Class I, and mail. This method
provides 360-degree security throughout the resupply operation; however,
it is very time-consuming and requires an adequate road network for the
wheeled supply vehicles to reach each vehicle. See Figure 8-5 for an
example of this method.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Figure 8-5. Tailgate Issue Method in a

Troop Assembly Area
8-67. The following takes place during tailgate resupply:

• Combat vehicles remain in place. POL and ammunition
trucks travel in a clockwise direction around the assembly
area to each vehicle position, in turn, to conduct resupply.
• Crewmen rotate through the feeding area and pick up
supplies, water, and mail.
• The 1SG and PSGs arrange for pickup of those KIA and their
personal effects. The KIA are brought to a graves registration
(GRREG) holding area near the medical aid station, but kept
out of view.
• Ambulances pick up, treat, and evacuate seriously wounded
soldiers. Other wounded soldiers are carried to the ambulance
or walk to it for emergency medical treatment.
• Prisoners are kept together and guarded. As soon as possible,
they are moved to the squadron trains on a returning supply
vehicle.
• The troop armorer, the radio repairman, and the
organizational mechanics repair known problems and spot-
check other vehicles.
• Vehicles needing maintenance are brought to the
maintenance area.
• The 1SG and PSGs closely monitor the resupply operation.
8-18
• Empty LOGPAC vehicles are moved to a holding area, where

they are loaded with KIA, EPWs, and inoperative equipment.
• The supply sergeant moves the LOGPAC back to an LRP to
link up with the support platoon leader and return to the field
trains.
8-68. Due to the limited assets in the brigade, tailgate issue is the least
preferred method. It will occur only if it allows for faster service than the
service station method or for better OPSEC.
SERVICE STATION METHOD
8-69. Service station resupply is used during tactical operations. It is
most effective when the troop is positioned in an AO no more than 3 to 5
kilometers wide, such as is found in a defend in sector or defend from a
troop BP mission. Platoons or sections are resupplied at the LOGPAC
while the rest of the troop stays in position. The 1SG sets up the
LOGPAC as shown in Figure 8-6. LOGPAC security is provided by
soldiers from the combat trains who are not involved in the resupply, and
by platoon vehicles that have completed or are awaiting resupply.
Figure 8-6. Service Station Resupply Method
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
8-70. The following takes place during service station resupply:

• Vehicles of the first platoon or section enter the LOGPAC at a
designated location and follow one-way traffic flow.
• The vehicle carrying the KIA in body bags moves to the
holding area, out of view of the troop, and leaves the remains
and personal effects.
• Soldiers requiring medical attention are delivered to medics
and treated or prepared for evacuation.
• The PSG supervises the operation and coordinates face-to-
face with the 1SG for any special requirements.
• The platoon leader dismounts his vehicle and uses the 1SG’s
vehicle and radio to contact the troop commander for orders
and SITREPs.
• Crews requiring unit-level maintenance remain in the
maintenance holding area.
• Vehicles rotate through stations.
• Unit-level mechanics, the armorer, and the radio repairman
repair known problems and spot-check other vehicles.
• Crews rotate to the supply truck to pick up mail, supplies,
and Class I.
• The platoon leader and PSG conduct precombat inspection.
• When the platoon or section has completed resupply, it moves
to its designated position.
• The rest of the platoons rotate individually through the
LOGPAC for resupply.
COMBINATION METHOD
8-71. The reconnaissance troop can vary the specifics of the two basic
techniques, or it can use them in combination. During a screening
mission, for example, it may use the tailgate method for its most forward
OPs and the service station method for its OPs in depth. (See Figure 8-7.)
8-72. At the end of the resupply operation, the troop LOGPAC returns
to the LRP to link up with the representative (combat or field trains
representative) who led the LOGPAC forward, and returns to the BSA.
AERIAL RESUPPLY
8-73. Helicopters can be a vital lifeline when reconnaissance troops are
forced to operate forward of friendly lines for extended periods. Aerial
resupply operations may reduce the risks associated with conducting
ground resupply operations under such conditions; however, they require
significant planning and entail a different set of risks to consider. Aerial
assets are also useful in resupplying dismounted reconnaissance troops in
OPs in restricted terrain. On the other hand, aerial resupply sometimes
will not be feasible because helicopters are not available. In addition, the
signature of resupply helicopters can compromise troop positions. Careful
choice of resupply routes and landing zones helps to minimize this risk.
8-20
Figure 8-7. Combination of Resupply Techniques
TROOP PRESTOCK OR CACHE

8-74. These resupply techniques, also called prestock resupply, differ in
the level of security provided for the supplies. In prepositioning, supplies
are generally left unattended, without security, although steps should be
taken to prevent detection of the location by threat elements. When the
unit resupplies by cache, it should leave security personnel to guard the
site.
8-75. Both prepositioning and cache can be used in a variety of
reconnaissance or security operations. During reconnaissance, prestock
positions can be established along the intended route of advance or near
the objective by advance elements. In security operations, the
reconnaissance platoon can set up prestock points throughout the AO.
These points should be in each alternate or supplementary OP, in
addition to other locations throughout the depth of the sector. Scouts can
also use prestock to provide resupply for patrols.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
8-76. Prestock operations must be carefully planned and executed at

every level. Prestock points should be placed where they can be located by
simple instructions that are clear to someone who has never visited the
site. All leaders, down to vehicle commander and squad leader, must
know the exact locations of prestock points. As noted, the troop CSS team
must take steps to ensure security and survivability of prepositioned
supplies by digging in prestock positions, selecting covered and concealed
positions, and considering the effects of weather and terrain. The CSS
team must also have a plan to remove or destroy prestock supplies to
prevent the threat from capturing them.
EMERGENCY RESUPPLY
8-77. Emergency resupply normally involves only fuel and ammunition
and is conducted while in contact with the threat. The resupply begins at
section and platoon level by redistributing ammunition between vehicles
to cross-level loads. The PSG reports his need for emergency resupply to
the 1SG, who relays the request to the S4. The unit’s combat trains may
maintain a small load of Class III and V for these situations. The BRT
may need to coordinate with a task force for emergency resupply. The S4
or support platoon leader coordinates a linkup between the combat trains
and the troop 1SG. The 1SG meets the resupply trucks and moves back to
the troop area. The 1SG and troop XO choose a resupply point that is just
behind the troop position and masked by terrain from threat direct fire
and observation. If fuel is needed, the fuel truck is moved to the resupply
point and vehicles or sections go there to refuel. Emergency resupply
should occur only because the rate of fuel and ammunition expended is
greater than expected, and not due to lack of CSS planning and
operations.
RESUPPLY SITE SELECTION
8-78. The LOGPAC site must be carefully chosen to provide responsive
support for the troop, to support the movement of wheeled resupply
vehicles, and to limit exposure to threat fires. The 1SG selects the exact
location to be used by the LOGPAC. He knows about the current tactical
situation, and can determine what the troop will be doing in the next
couple of hours. The 1SG selects the exact LOGPAC site based on map
and ground reconnaissance. He selects a site that provides—
• Cover and concealment.
• Proximity to the platoon positions, from 3 to 8 kilometers
behind the FLOT and center of the sector.
• A road or trail network that supports the wheeled resupply
vehicles and the heaviest troop vehicles and allows one-way
traffic flow to the LOGPAC.
• Enough room to disperse the vehicles.
• Reduction of thermal signature.
• Terrain level enough to allow refueling.
MAINTENANCE AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS

8-79. The decrease in the CSS footprint has caused a shift to a “replace
forward/fix rear” system. Replace forward means a soldier performs “on-
system” maintenance. On-system refers to replacing components or
subcomponents at the point of repair, breakdown site, or UMCP. Replace
8-22
forward/fix rear is a maintenance conservation concept for replacing

LRUs or modules instead of attempting to repair the LRUs or modules.
Repair rear means that soldiers perform “off-system” maintenance. Off-
system maintenance refers to those actions taken to return components
or subcomponents of weapons systems to serviceable condition. These
actions occur at designated places throughout the battlefield.
8-80. The troop XO and 1SG are responsible for the coordination and
conduct of maintenance in the troop. The troop armorer is responsible for
unit-level maintenance and repair of the troop’s small arms weapons. He
is positioned in the combat trains where he can provide battlefield
support.
MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS
8-81. Maintenance responsibilities begin at crew level. Operator-level
PMCS must be performed before, during, and after operations. During
operations, the crew begins the maintenance process when it identifies
the fault. Once a problem develops, the vehicle commander determines
support requirements, to include self-recovery, assistance from another
vehicle, or assistance from the CRT, and takes the following actions:
• Reports the situation to the PSG, providing condition(s),
location, and circumstances.
• Attempts to self-recover, if mired.
• Uses another vehicle to move to a secure location if exposed to
threat observation and fire. Uses smoke to screen the area
between the mired vehicle and the threat.
8-82. When repairs are beyond the capability of the crew (replace
forward), the PSG uses the troop command net to notify the 1SG of the
situation and to request assistance. The crew must maintain radio
contact (if the radio is operational) on the platoon net and maintain local
security. The 1SG contacts the CTCP with an FM message and follows it
up with an FBCB2 free text message. The CTCP needs the following
information:
• Identification of the troop.
• Equipment involved.
• Location of equipment.
• Nature of damage.
• Pertinent information about the tactical situation, and any
other necessary information.
8-83. CRT mechanics are dispatched to evaluate the situation. The
CRT checks whether the problem can be corrected in place within the
time criteria established in unit SOPs. If repairs will take more than the
allowable time, evacuate the equipment to squadron UMCP (fix rear).
8-84. Based on the information above, the S4 will designate a time and
place for equipment handover.
RECOVERY OPERATIONS
8-85. When a vehicle cannot be repaired within the allowable time or is
damaged beyond repair, the troop trains recovers the vehicle to the
UMCP, nearest MSR, or LRP based on SOP or the OPORD if the vehicle
is repairable. The use of FBCB2 enables crews to accurately report the
exact location of the inoperable vehicle, assuming that the vehicle still
8-23
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
has communications and system power. Otherwise, an accurate report

must be given by the chain of command. The CRT will pull the vehicle to
the UMCP or the field trains. When the decision is made to repair the
vehicle at the BSA, the CTCP requests recovery support from the
recovery section in the BSA. Equipment that cannot be repaired at the
BSA support unit is normally evacuated and, if available, replaced with a
float.
8-86. If a vehicle is a catastrophic kill, or not able to be recovered based
on the threat situation, the commander may authorize the destruction of
the vehicle. Before using thermite grenades to destroy a vehicle, remove
as many valuable items as time permits, such as—
• Classified equipment and documents.
• Communications equipment.
• Weapons.
• Ammunition.
CONTROLLED EXCHANGE
8-87. Controlled exchange is the removal of serviceable parts from a
non-mission capable (NMC) vehicle to install on a vehicle that can be
more quickly or easily rendered mission capable. Due to the commonality
of the vehicles throughout the brigade, the brigade commander has the
authority to direct controlled exchanges, but will normally delegate the
authority to the squadron commander, who further delegates to the XO or
S4. Controlled exchanges must be closely monitored and tracked.
Controlled exchange is performed on site or at the UMCP.
CANNIBALIZATION
8-88. Cannibalization is the authorized removal for reuse of parts or
components from uneconomically repairable or disposable end items or
assemblies. It is a supply source for authorized low mortality or difficult
to obtain repair parts, components, and assemblies. It is a source for high
priority items when delivery cannot be made by the required delivery
date. It is performed in strict compliance with the SOP and in close
coordination with maintenance support team personnel. The
authorization process is the same as for controlled exchange, and it also
must be closely monitored. Cannibalization is a major source of repair
parts in a combat environment and should be aggressively used to keep
the maximum number of combat systems operational.
COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY MAINTENANCE
8-89. COMSEC equipment is evacuated through normal Class VII
channels to the signal company. All direct support maintenance is
performed in the BSA.
FIELD SERVICES
8-90. GRREG is performed by the field services platoon from corps,
located in the BSA. The initial collection, identification, safeguarding of
personal effects, and evacuation of the dead is the troop’s responsibility.
8-91. When remains are discovered, be careful to preserve all items
that may be used for identification. If metal identification tags (dog tags)
are on the remains, do not remove them. Secure all personal effects in a
8-24
bag or poncho and tie it to the remains. Place each casualty in a body bag,
poncho, or shelter half and evacuate with the first available means of
transportation, such as LOGPAC vehicles or disabled vehicles, to the
squadron field trains. The supply sergeant receives all remains, and is
responsible for turning them over to the GRREG collection point.
8-92. If the tactical and logistical situation makes evacuation
impossible, emergency on-site burial is performed. On-site burial requires
the permission of the squadron commander. If an on-site burial is
performed, do the following:
• Complete two copies of DD Forms 551 and 1077 for each body.
These forms are available through the squadron PAC. The
1SG and supply sergeant should carry them.
• If there are several remains, engineer support may be needed
to dig trenches.
• Dig a trench 6-1/2 feet wide and 3-1/2 feet deep. The number
of remains determines the length.
• Remove one identification tag from each body, and string the
tags on a wire in the order in which the remains are buried.
• Place the remains in the grave shoulder to shoulder.
• Bury all personal effects with the remains.
• Mark the ends of each row with a stake. Tag each stake to
identify the marker as a grave. Indicate the length of the
grave.
• Prepare an overlay that shows the location of the gravesite.
• Cover the grave with earth removed from the trench.
• Forward the completed forms, overlay, and identification tags
to squadron.
8-93. If the remains are contaminated, the gravesite must be clearly
marked and separated from noncontaminated gravesites. This must also
be indicated on the gravesite overlay.
SECTION IV – PERSONNEL SERVICE SUPPORT
PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATIVE

8-94. The squadron PAC in the field trains handles all troop
administrative and personnel actions. The troop chain of command is
responsible for ensuring that soldiers receive passes, leaves, promotions,
awards, mail, legal assistance, financial services, and other personnel
and welfare services on a fair and prompt basis. The 1SG interfaces with
PAC daily through the supply sergeant, at the CTCP with the S1/S4, or
at the LRP.
8-95. Casualties and missing personnel are reported on DA Forms 1155
and 1156. These forms are initiated by the individual who witnessed the
incident and are forwarded to the 1SG. This action is the basis for
notification of the next of kin and awarding benefits such as Serviceman’s
Group Life Insurance (SGLI), so accuracy is a must.
8-96. The commander should continuously manage the troop personnel
situation to ensure trained personnel are manning key positions, crew
8-25
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
shortages are filled with available personnel, and replacement personnel

are trained and incorporated into crews. During combat, platoon leaders
and PSGs must balance their crews after casualties are evacuated. They
must fill key positions on vehicles with the most qualified soldier. If
necessary the commander may direct cross-leveling of personnel within
the troop.
8-97. The troop submits daily personnel reports to the
brigade/squadron as prescribed by SOP. The personnel reports are
important because they allow the squadron commander to make tactical
decisions for the employment of the troop. The reports also allow the S1,
with the squadron commander’s guidance, to properly distribute
personnel replacements. The supply sergeant in the field trains receives
replacement personnel. The sergeant in-processes the soldier into the
troop, ensures he has the proper equipment, and then delivers him to the
1SG during the troop LOGPAC.
COMBAT HEALTH SUPPORT

FIRST AID
8-98. First aid is the responsibility of all soldiers; they use first aid,
self-aid, buddy-aid, and combat lifesavers. All must be trained to take
action after a soldier is wounded to keep him breathing, stop the
bleeding, prevent shock, and dress the wound until medical personnel are
available to treat the soldier. Training must include treatment of NBC
casualties and crew evacuation drills to get soldiers out of a vehicle
without creating further injury. Selected soldiers from each platoon will
be trained in advanced medical skills in the combat lifesaver program.
TREATMENT
8-99. The 1SG should position troop medical aid and evacuation teams
on the battlefield where they can be most responsive. They will usually
operate under the control and direction of the 1SG in the troop combat
trains. The medics must know the locations of and routes to each platoon,
the troop combat trains, the squadron combat trains, and each casualty
collection point (CCP).
EVACUATION
8-100. The BRT XO and 1SG must plan and coordinate with the BCT
staff for CASEVAC requirements for BRT elements forward of the FEBA.
The primary means available to the troop for CASEVAC is the use of
scout HMMWVs or the 1SG’s HMMWV. When the casualty is not urgent
or priority, this method should suffice. When the casualty is urgent or
priority the need for timely evacuation is a priority. The two methods
available are ground evacuation with an ambulance secured by a combat
element or aerial evacuation using a MEDEVAC aircraft or cargo
aircraft.
8-101. Either method requires the troop XO and 1SG to conduct
coordination and planning through the BCT staff to the supporting unit
conducting the evacuation mission. The troop and BCT staff should have
already planned for the need for this type of evacuation and have
identified and tasked a specific unit to support the evacuation. The
requirement then is to conduct final coordination between the BRT and
8-26
the supporting unit to facilitate a secure and timely linkup and

evacuation.
8-102. For the recce troop of a cavalry squadron (RSTA) to receive
medical assistance, a platoon leader or PSG calls the 1SG on the troop
command net. The medic team monitors the call and goes to the platoon
frequency to make any other necessary coordination. The platoon and the
troop 1SG coordinate for linkup at the appropriate CCP. The 1SG and
medic team (if attached) move to the reported location to treat the
soldier(s). The 1SG coordinates for transport of wounded to an
established AXP. If attached, medics transport as many wounded soldiers
as possible in their armored ambulance. Do not transport the dead with
the wounded; evacuate them separately. If the medics determine the
soldiers are seriously wounded, they either transport them directly to the
squadron combat trains, or coordinate to hand them over to squadron at a
collection point. Soldiers with slight wounds should not be evacuated
unless it is necessary. They should be treated and returned to duty.
Secure the seriously wounded soldiers on their litters to prevent any
further injury during the evacuation.
8-103. As a general rule, do not use combat vehicles to evacuate the
wounded; this reduces combat strength. Use combat vehicles only if
absolutely necessary, and no other transportation is available. Aerial
evacuation, if it is available, is preferred because of its speed. The
reconnaissance platoon coordinates with the troop then changes to the
designated frequency to coordinate directly with the MEDEVAC or
CASEVAC aircraft. They must pick a relatively flat, open, and covered
and concealed position for the aircraft’s LZ. The location should be given
to the aircraft by radio and marked with colored smoke as the aircraft
approaches the area. The reconnaissance platoon provides local security
of the LZ until the evacuation is complete. Additionally, infiltration and
exfiltration routes may be used to support CASEVAC operations.
8-104. Weapons and military equipment (except NBC protective
equipment) of personnel being evacuated are secured with the PSG, 1SG,
or supply sergeant. Ensure the soldier keeps his protective mask and
overgarments. When the situation permits, all equipment that was
secured by the 1SG or PSG is turned over to the supply sergeant.
8-105. Casualties are evacuated to the nearest aid station to the troop.
This may be the squadron aid station located at the combat trains. It is
possible that the troop may be working in the AO of one of the infantry
battalions and should coordinate to evacuate to that battalion’s aid
station.
COMBAT STRESS CONTROL
8-106. The psychological effects of combat on soldiers influence their
ability to execute their missions. Individual self-control and self-
discipline in the face of danger are maintained through unit discipline
and firm leadership. The commander and his subordinate leaders are key
to the mental toughness of soldiers. Commanders should be visible to
soldiers and share their hardships with them. They should talk to their
soldiers individually and as a troop to keep them informed. The
commander’s tone of voice on the radio must indicate that he has the
situation under control. He should transmit the successful
accomplishments of the troop and tell the soldiers they are doing a good
8-27
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
job. Keep details about any casualties in the troop off the radio and
ensure that soldiers who are KIA are covered up and kept out of view of
the troop. The chaplain can be a great asset in maintaining troop morale.
Do not neglect the mental fitness of soldiers, because uncontrolled fear is
contagious and can quickly lead to chaos.
DISEASE AND NONBATTLE INJURIES
8-107. More soldiers are lost in combat to illness and disease than to
combat-related wounds. Maintaining the health and fighting fitness of
the troop is a leadership responsibility. Disease can quickly spread
through the troop and incapacitate its soldiers. Watch for symptoms and
ensure the soldiers’ immunizations are current. Personal hygiene, field
sanitation, and rest must be incorporated into all troop operations. If
these are ignored, the combat effectiveness of the troop will decrease
rapidly.
8-108. The personal hygiene of soldiers is a leader’s responsibility. Rules
of hygiene must be observed to ward off disease and improve troop
morale. Ensure soldiers wash and change their socks and underwear
daily, if possible. All soldiers should shower as time and resources are
available. The senior medic plays a big part in personal hygiene by
educating soldiers and by checking for signs of trench foot or immersion
foot and frostbite.
8-109. Field sanitation is vital to the prevention of the spread of disease.
The troop medics must assist in this effort by checking troop water
supplies to ensure they are potable, and by ensuring mess utensils and
equipment are properly cleaned. In static situations, such as when in
assembly areas, soldiers will use slit trenches or latrines; at other times
soldiers will use cat holes. Slit trenches and cat holes must be covered up
after use to prevent the spread of disease.
8-110. Rest is extremely important for both commanders and their
soldiers. When the troop is at REDCON 3 or 4, troop leadership should
ensure a sleep plan is planned and executed.
UNIT MINISTRY TEAM

8-111. The unit ministry team (UMT), consisting of an appropriate
number of chaplains and chaplain assistants, is assigned to provide unit,
area, and denominational coverage to all troops in the cavalry squadron
or units in a BCT. UMT provides the following eight subfunctions of
worship opportunities:
• Administration of sacraments, rites, and ordinances.
• Pastoral care and counseling.
• Development and management of the UMT.
• Management of material resources.
• Advising the commander on matters of religion, morale, and
morals as affected by religion.
• Ministry in support of soldiers suffering from battle fatigue.
• Development of programs that enhance the total well-being of
the soldier.
• Development of activities to enhance unit cohesion.
8-28
SECTION V – ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR
CAPTURE AND HANDLING

8-112. EPWs and maps, military documents, letters, and diaries
obtained on the battlefield are valuable sources of combat intelligence.
Reconnaissance platoons usually obtain information while searching the
battlefield in the conduct of reconnaissance operations or after contact
with the threat. They should rapidly report this information to the troop
commander for evacuation instructions. The scouts may be ordered to
take the documents to the troop CP or to rendezvous with the 1SG at a
specific location to turn over the documents. Proper handling and
evacuation of captured documents and equipment are important. The
materials must be immediately turned over to trained intelligence
personnel. In most cases, captured documents lose their value over time.
EVACUATION TECHNIQUES
8-113. In most situations, returning supply vehicles, aircraft, or troop
headquarters vehicles can be used to evacuate EPWs from the troop
combat trains to the squadron collection point. The troop is responsible
for guarding EPWs until they are turned over to the S1. Wounded EPWs
are treated through normal medical channels, but are kept separate from
US soldiers.
8-114. When support vehicles are not readily available and the troop
must continue its operation, secure the EPWs in a holding area such as a
basement or compound. Notify the 1SG and the S1 of the EPW location
and continue the mission. The 1SG will pick up the EPWs and complete
their evacuation to the collection point.
8-29
Appendix A
Operation Order Guide

Because of the inherently CONTENTS
rapid tempo and fluid Troop-leading Procedures.......................... A-1
nature of reconnaissance Annotated OPORD Format.......................... A-2
operations, troop orders FRAGO Format ............................................ A-8
WARNO Format ........................................... A-9
are seldom published as Reconnaissance Planning .......................... A-11
formal, written paper Analyze the Situation............................... A-11
documents. In most cases Identify Focus .......................................... A-14
the troop issues orders as Array Assets ............................................. A-14
Develop a Scheme of Maneuver ............. A-15
verbal instructions using Integrate Support Assets and
FM radio, or as more Command and Control......................... A-16
detailed FBCB2 Conduct Reconnaissance ....................... A-16
messages and overlays. Complete the Plan/Finalize
When the variables of Scheme of Maneuver and Tasks ......... A-17
METT-TC allow, the
troop commander issues the order to subordinates as part of a detailed
face-to-face briefing; however, mission requirements may not allow
this. Regardless of how the order is issued, it is developed and
implemented by applying the eight steps of the troop-leading
procedures.
SECTION I – TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES
A-1. The troop-leading procedures listed below, and discussed in detail

in Chapter 2, are accomplished by the troop during planning,
preparation, and execution of a mission. The troop commander receives
assistance from key subordinates, such as XO and 1SG, as he applies the
eight steps. For example, during the step “receive and analyze the
mission,” the XO may review the combat support and fire support
sections of the higher headquarters order, while the 1SG examines CSS
instructions, and the troop commander analyzes other portions of the
order. This type of collaborative planning is most easily accomplished
when troop leadership is collocated, but that may not be possible during
normal troop operations. Use of FBCB2, particularly free text messages,
facilitates remote collaboration when the troop applies the steps of the
troop-leading procedures. The eight troop-leading procedures are:
• Receive and analyze the mission.
• Issue a WARNO.
• Make a tentative plan.
• Initiate movement.
• Conduct a reconnaissance.
• Complete the plan.
A-1
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
• Issue an order.
• Supervise and refine.
SECTION II – ANNOTATED OPERATION ORDER FORMAT
A-2. Doctrinal formats for an OPORD are described in FM 5-0

(FM 101-5). The annotated OPORD in Figure A-1 can be used by the
troop commander and his subordinates when developing a troop OPORD.
In some cases available planning time will limit the amount of detail
contained in the order. Likewise, if the commander issues a FRAGO to
adjust execution during an operation, it will also follow the OPORD
format, but it will only contain the information and instructions required
by the situation, i. e., some paragraphs will be omitted. FM 5-0 contains
detailed information on developing the OPORD components listed in the
figure that follows.
Copy _____ of _____ copies

Issuing headquarters
Place of issue
Date-time group of signature
Message reference number
OPERATIONS ORDER __________
References: Refer to higher headquarters OPLAN/OPORD, and identify map sheet for
operation. (Optional)
Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: (Optional)
Task Organization: (Optional) (See paragraph 1c.)
1. SITUATION.
a. Enemy.
(1) Weather (note effects - include light data).
(a) Light data.
(b) Weather forecast for operation.
(c) Effects of weather and light data on operations.
1. Trafficability.
2. Visibility.
3. Effect on lasers/thermals.
4. Effect on air operations.
Figure A-1. Example Troop OPORD
A-2
_____________________________________________________________ Appendix A – OPORD Guide
(2) Terrain.
(a) Obstacles, hills, valleys, road types and conditions, streams, rivers, bridges,
and towns.
(b) Avenues of approach.
1. Size unit supported.
2. Start and end point.
3. Objective.
(c) Key terrain.
(d) Observation.
(e) Cover and concealment.
(f) Engagement areas.
(g) Effect of terrain on the operation.
(3) Enemy forces.
(a) Identification of enemy forces.
(b) Activity of enemy forces.
(c) Location of enemy units.
(d) Disposition of enemy forces.
(e) Strength of enemy forces.
(f) Composition of enemy forces, to include type of equipment.
(g) Other enemy information critical to the upcoming operation, to include the
following:
1. Chemical and nuclear capabilities.
2. Air defense artillery (ADA).
3. Aviation, including helicopters.
4. Electronic warfare.
(h) Enemy courses of action (COAs).
(i) Probable enemy COA.
Figure A-1. Example Troop OPORD (continued)
A-3
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
b. Friendly.
(1) Mission of higher headquarters (squadron) and commander’s intent.
(2) Mission of adjacent units (left, right, front, rear).
(3) Mission of other organic units in higher headquarters.
(4) Mission of reserves in higher headquarters.
(5) Mission of supporting units who are in direct support/reinforcing (DS/R) to higher
headquarters (field artillery, engineer, and ADA).
(6) Which element from higher headquarters has priority of fires.
(7) Reinforcing units with a reinforcing/general support (R/GS) role to supporting
units.
(8) Close air support (CAS) and number of sorties allocated to higher headquarters.
c. Attachments and detachments to the troop.
2. MISSION. The paragraph tells the who, what, when, where, and why for the troop. It states
the essential task or tasks to be accomplished by the entire unit, to include on-order missions, and
clearly defines the troop’s objective.
3. EXECUTION.
Intent. The intent describes the commander’s vision of what the troop must do to succeed with
respect to the enemy, terrain, and desired end state. The commander’s intent is a clear, concise
statement that provides the link between the mission statement and the concept of the operation.
Intent is normally expressed in four to five sentences, but can also be in bullet form. The intent
describes the key tasks that are essential to the mission and the commander’s desired end state for
the mission. He may also identify the decisive point for the mission and explain a broader
purpose for the operation in relation to his higher headquarters beyond that outlined in the
mission statement. The intent also includes the conditions the troop meets to achieve the stated
purpose (end state). The intent provides the basis for subordinates to exercise initiative when
unanticipated opportunities arise or when the original concept of the operation no longer applies.
Platoon leaders use the commander’s intent as a basis for action when unanticipated opportunities
arise. An example follows:
“Success is determining the disposition, composition, and location of the enemy defensive
positions then determining the axis and point for the penetration of the enemy’s defense in the
troop AO. Key tasks are determining composition of obstacles at NAI 461, confirming the
location of enemy AT weapons vicinity NAI 462, and conducting a reconnaissance of Route RED
from Checkpoint 4 to Checkpoint 6. Our end state is the troop screening along Phase Line
PHOENIX ready to pass elements of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team forward for their attack.”
A-4
a. Concept of the operation. This paragraph provides a clear and concise description of
how the troop will accomplish its mission. It should include the troop commander’s
reconnaissance guidance (focus, reconnaissance tempo, and engagement criteria). For example:
“We will conduct a forward passage of lines, and perform zone reconnaissance in a troop vee
with engineer platoon squads conducting a detailed route reconnaissance of Route Cherry behind
the first and second platoons. The focus is locating enemy positions in the AO; the tempo is
stealthy, and engagements with enemy elements will be avoided except for self-defense. Indirect
fires will be used to provide immediate suppression.”
(1) Maneuver. This section describes the details of how the concept will executed.
For example:
“Troop crosses the LD at 0500 with 1st Plt on left (south), 2d Plt on right (north), mortars,
engineers, and 3d Plt moving center of AO (troop vee). Troop CP moves to the rear of 3d Plt.
Platoons reconnoiter AO abreast, establishing contact at designated troop internal and flank
contact points. Bypass all built-up areas larger than 1 kilometer square not on Route Cherry.
Upon contact with enemy main defensive belt, conduct dismounted patrols to ascertain enemy
disposition, composition, orientation, and location of obstacles.
“Mortars cross the LD and establish MFP 10 following 3d Plt. Move from MFP 11 to MFP 12
through MFP 25 in sequence.
“Engineers conduct a detailed route reconnaissance of Route Cherry from SP to RP.”
(2) Fires.
(a) Purpose for field artillery and mortar fires. (Describe how indirect fires will
support the scheme of maneuver.)
(b) Preparation starting time, duration, and description of any fires landing in the
AO.
(c) Allocation of final protective fires (FPF).
(d) Which element will have priority of fires.
(e) Number of priority targets allocated and who will control them.
(f) Special fires, restrictions, allocation/use of smoke, illumination, or CAS.
(g) Description of scheduled fires (offensive).
(h) Reference to fire support or target annexes.
(3) Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). The troop normally describes
its reconnaissance actions under Paragraph 3a(1), Maneuver; however, when performing security
or economy-of-force missions, the troop will describe its supporting ISR task here.
A-5
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
(4) Obstacles, mines, and fortifications.

(a) Priority of engineer effort.
(b) Priority of engineer mission.
(c) Obstacle overlay.
(d) Obstacle list.
(e) Logistical constraints.
(f) On-order missions.
b. Specific tasks to subordinate units. For example:
“1st Plt observe NAI 875 from 071000 until 071500.”
c. Coordinating instructions.
(1) Movement instructions.
(2) Time schedule of events.
(a) Rehearsal.
(b) Backbrief times.
(c) Precombat inspection time.
(d) First movement time.
(3) Passage of lines.
(a) Contact points.
(b) Passage points.
(c) Lanes and identification.
(4) Mission oriented protection posture (MOPP) level.
(5) Operational exposure guide (OEG).
(6) Actions on contact.
(7) Actions at danger areas.
(8) Priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and intelligence requirements (IR).
(9) Effective time of attachment or detachment.
(10) Rally points.
(11) Rules of engagement (ROE) and rules of interaction (ROI).
(12) Priority targets for direct-fire weapons.
(13) Uniform and equipment, to include weapons and ammunition.
(14) Air defense posture and weapons control status.
(15) Any instructions not provided in concept of the operation or specific instructions.
A-6
4. SERVICE SUPPORT.
a. General.
(1) Organization of trains.
(a) Combat.
(b) Field.
(2) Location of trains (initial and subsequent).
(3) Movement of trains (movement instructions).
b. Materiel and services.
(1) Supply.
(a) Class I: Time and type.
(b) Class III: Time, location, and method.
(c) Class V: Time, amount, and type.
(d) Logistics package (LOGPAC) instructions (include squadron logistics
release point [LRP]).
(2) Transportation. Location of main supply route.
(3) Services.
(a) Mortuary affairs.
(b) Clothing exchange and bath.
(c) Maintenance.
c. Medical evacuation and treatment.
(1) Location of supporting aid station.
(2) Displacement of aid station.
(3) Location of clearing station.
(4) Aero-medical evacuation information.
(5) Location of ambulance exchange points.
(6) Handling of contaminated wounded personnel.
d. Personnel.
(1) Prisoner of war (PW) handling and disposition instructions.
(2) PW guard instructions.
(3) Location of PW collection point.
(4) Instructions for interaction with local civilian populace (ROE).
(5) Number of expected replacements.
(6) Cross-leveling procedures.
e. Miscellaneous.
A-7
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

a. Command.
(1) Location of troop commander, troop/squadron CP.
(2) Succession of command.
b. Signal.
(1) Signal operating instructions (SOI) index and edition in effect.
(a) Key frequencies.
(b) Key call signs.
(c) Current item number identifier.
(2) FBCB2 situational awareness filter settings, unless specified in the troop SOP.
(3) KY-57 fill and change over.
(4) Current sign and countersign.
(5) Code words.
(6) Action if jamming or “hot mike” occurs.
(7) Pyrotechnics use.
(8) Periods and conditions of listening silence.
ACKNOWLEDGE: (Mandatory)
NAME (Commander’s last name)
RANK (Commander’s rank)
OFFICIAL: (Optional)
ANNEXES: (Optional)
DISTRIBUTION: (Optional)
Figure A-1. Example OPORD Format (continued)
SECTION III – FRAGMENTARY ORDER FORMAT
A-3. The troop uses FRAGOs to modify and change previously issued
OPORDs. The FRAGO uses only those portions of the OPORD needed to
change the existing troop plan. Paragraphs that are not modified by the
FRAGO are marked “No Change.” FRAGO use and format are described
in FM 5-0 (FM 101-5). The troop commander may issue the FRAGO as an
FM voice message, or as FBCB2 FRAGO or free text message. Figure A-2
shows how he might use a FRAGO to change an ongoing operation.
A-8

Place of issue
FRAGMENTARY ORDER __________
References: Refer to higher headquarters OPLAN/OPORD, and identify map sheet for operation.
(Optional)
1. SITUATION. (Mandatory) Include any changes to the existing order.
2. MISSION. (Mandatory) List the new mission.
3. EXECUTION.
Intent: (Optional)
a. Concept of the operation. (Mandatory)
b. Tasks to subordinate units. (Mandatory)
c. Coordinating instructions. (Mandatory) Include statement, “Current overlay remains
in effect” or “See change 1 to Annex C, Operations Overlay.” Mark changes to control measures
on overlay or issue a new overlay.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT. Include any changes to existing order or the statement, “No change
to OPORD XX.”
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. Include any changes to existing order or the statement, “No
change to OPORD XX.”
ANNEXES: (Optional)
DISTRIBUTION:(Optional)
Figure A-2. Example FRAGO Format
SECTION IV – WARNING ORDER FORMAT
A-4. The troop commander uses a WARNO to alert subordinates that

a new mission is being planned. WARNOs help subordinates plan quickly
by providing details of the troop plan as they emerge. Depending on the
time available, the troop may publish several WARNOs. The troop
commander will normally publish the WARNO as an FM voice
transmission, FBCB2 WARNO Message or FBCB2 free text message.
A-9
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Like the FRAGO, the WARNO format is similar to the OPORD and a
detailed description is in FM 5-0 [FM 101-5]. See Appendix for an
example WARNO format.
NOTE: A WARNO does not authorize execution unless specifically stated.

Place of issue
WARNING ORDER __________
References: Refer to higher headquarters OPLAN/OPORD, and identify map sheet for operation.
(Optional)
1. SITUATION.
a. Enemy forces. Include significant changes in enemy composition, dispositions, and
COAs. Information not available for inclusion in the initial WARNO can be included in
subsequent WARNOs.
b. Friendly forces. (Optional) Only address if essential to the WARNO.
(1) Higher commander’s mission.
(2) Higher commander’s intent.
c. Attachments and detachments. Initial task organization. Only address major unit
changes.
2. MISSION. Issuing headquarters mission at the time of the WARNO. This is nothing more
than higher headquarters restated mission or commander’s decisions during planning.
Figure A-3. Example WARNO Format
A-10
3. EXECUTION.
Intent:
a. Concept of operations. Provide as much information as available. This may be done
during the initial WARNO.
b. Tasks to maneuver units. Any information on tasks to units for execution, movement
to initiate, reconnaissance to initiate, or security to emplace.
c. Tasks to combat support units. See Paragraph 3b.
d. Coordinating instructions. Include any information available at the time of the
issuance of the WARNO. It may include the following:
(1) Commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR).
(2) Risk guidance.
(3) Deception guidance.
(4) Specific priorities, in order of completion.
ANNEXES: (Optional)
DISTRIBUTION: (Optional)
Figure A-3. Example WARNO Format (continued)
SECTION V – RECONNAISSANCE PLANNING
A-5. The troop faces unique challenges in applying the troop-leading

procedures to reconnaissance operations. The following example shows
how a troop commander might synchronize reconnaissance operations by
applying the planning considerations listed for each reconnaissance
mission in Chapter 3 of this manual.
ANALYZE THE SITUATION

A-6. The commander should begin planning as early as possible. His
analysis includes identifying the troop tasks and the essential troop task
and its purpose, which is the troop’s mission. He also applies the
commander’s reconnaissance guidance (as a minimum, focus, tempo, and
engagement criteria) that he received from higher headquarters as an
OPORD, WARNO, or FRAGO. As part of his analysis, the commander
identifies the AO and overlays the enemy situation, as described in the
S2 SITEMP and higher headquarters operations graphics on this terrain
(see Figures A-4 and A-5).
A-11
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Figure A-4. S2 Situation Template
Figure A-5. Higher Headquarters Operations Graphics
A-12
A-7. Next the commander refines the enemy situation. This

refinement begins with the consideration of the effects of terrain and
weather as described by the modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO),
if available (see Figure A-6).
Figure A-6. Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay
A-8. Next, the commander uses his experience with the enemy’s
tactics, techniques and procedures to add detail to the SITEMP he
received from higher headquarters. The refinement must provide as
much clarity as possible while accounting for all capabilities of the
enemy. The refined SITEMP (Figure A-7) will depict known and likely
enemy forces down to vehicle or squad level, known and likely enemy
obstacles, and must account for considerations of timing associated with
enemy COAs. This refined SITEMP reflects how the commander
envisions the enemy situation when the troop conducts its mission, and it
drives the development of the troop’s scheme of maneuver.
A-13
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Figure A-7. Refined Situation Template
IDENTIFY FOCUS
A-9. Higher headquarters provides the troop specific ISR directions
(R&S tasks) using OPORDs, FRAGOs, and WARNOs to focus the troop’s
operations. In most cases the focus established by the higher
headquarters includes designating a reconnaissance objective, or
objectives, that support planning for, or execution of, a specific scheme of
maneuver or COA. Typically this focus is achieved through the use of
assigning NAIs, or specifying an area(s) that must be reconnoitered. In
some cases the focus might be a zone that must be reconnoitered. NAIs,
areas, or zones will be tied to CCIR, targeting, or specific information
requirements (SIR). Higher headquarters will also specify the tempo and
engagement criteria necessary to support obtaining the information
required for planning or execution.
NOTE: In stability operations and support operations missions, the focus may include or be
directed at social or infrastructure-related objectives. The commander must still
depict that environment graphically in order to better understand the dynamics
between terrain, the focus of reconnaissance, and the friendly forces.
ARRAY ASSETS
A-10. Focus provides the commander detailed insight into what the
troop must observe and report. Based on the troop assets available, the
A-14
refinement of the SITEMP, and the priority associated with each CCIR,
the commander tentatively places assets to surveil or reconnoiter
specified NAIs. If the troop is assigned an area or zone, the commander
conducts further analysis of the area or zone to identify intelligence
requirements and engagement criteria.
DEVELOP A SCHEME OF MANEUVER

A-11. The troop commander develops a scheme of maneuver using the
MCOO, the refined SITEMP, reconnaissance guidance, and mission
analysis to identify assets allocated to specific tasks. Typically, maneuver
is accomplished by using stealth to avoid contact en route to the
reconnaissance objective(s).
A-12. The commander begins maneuver planning by assigning
subordinates and attached assets tasks that support the troop’s mission
and end state. Next, he designates OPs, objective rally points, release
points, infiltration lane(s), vehicle dismount points, vehicle hide sites (if
not using vehicles in the infiltration), and probable lines or points of
contact. Displaying these graphically with the refined SITEMP, higher
headquarters operations graphics, and the terrain (map) will provide the
details of the troop’s scheme of maneuver (see Figure A-8).
Figure A-8. Develop Troop Scheme of Maneuver
A-15
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
A-13. By using graphics to describe platoon-level actions, the

commander is not eliminating the requirement of subordinate leaders to
conduct their own analysis of mission, terrain, and threat forces. The
purpose of these graphics is to focus subordinates on where and what the
commander wants and integrate subordinate maneuver and support into
the troop’s scheme of maneuver and support. Graphics will continued to
be refined as additional information concerning threat actions is received
by the troop.
INTEGRATE SUPPORTING ASSETS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL

A-14. After developing the scheme of maneuver the commander
determines what organic, attached, or higher assets are available to
facilitate maneuver and support the troop by cueing troop elements (see
Figure A-9). Considerations addressed by the troop commander include
the following:
• How can UAVs, OH-58Ds, GSR, or SIGINT support
identification and cueing of the troop’s scouts?
• Does the troop echelon their reconnaissance infiltration into
zone based on cueing from UAVs, GSR, and SIGINT, or do all
troop elements move concurrently?
• How will communication support the maneuver of the troop?
• Where will the troop CP locate to support communication
between the troop assets and with higher headquarters?
• Does the troop require signal support to communicate with
higher headquarters?
• Is there a retrans line and how does it impact the troop’s
maneuver?
• How will CSS assets support the troop’s maneuver? Do the
graphics support casualty evacuation and resupply of
platoons forward?
A-15. The commander, with assistance from the FSO, plans effects to
support the troop’s maneuver. If the troop has specific fire support tasks
to accomplish, the commander and FSO plan how the troop will
accomplish these tasks with the assets available. By identifying the
probable line or points of contact, the commander and FSO can integrate
effects into maneuver.
CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE
A-16. Before the plan is finalized, the troop commander conducts
reconnaissance to answer specific concerns or questions he identified in
his mission analysis and development of the tentative plan. Time and
other assets may create reconnaissance limitations; however, the
commander can use organic and reach sources of reconnaissance as he
refines and finalizes his plan. Examples include UAV capabilities,
satellite images, and higher IPB products.
A-16
Figure A-9. Cueing Troop Elements
COMPLETE THE PLAN/FINALIZE SCHEME OF MANEUVER AND TASKS

A-17. The planning steps followed sequentially result in the following
products:
• Refined troop SITEMP.
• Troop graphics.
• Concept of operations.
• Feasible scheme of maneuver, which includes cueing, mixing,
and integrating.
• Nested tasks and purposes to subordinates.
• Specific reconnaissance guidance to the troop; guidance on
actions on contact.
• Effects plan to support maneuver.
• C2 scheme of support to support maneuver.
• CSS plan to support maneuver.
A-18. The combined products may be reflected graphically (see
Figure A-10).
A-17
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Figure A-10. Final Reconnaissance Planning Product

A-19. At this point, the troop commander should create, or finalize, a
matrix for use as a tracking tool and decision aid. This matrix should
show the relationship between assets, requirements, and time. These
instructions apply to the example in Figure A-11:
• The first column shows the priority of each mission and
depicts which ones are the commander’s PIR.
• The next column provides the asset with the NAI number and
grid coordinate.
• The instructions column explains to the assets exactly what
they are looking for (target).
• The start/stop column provides times for the mission.
• The next set of columns lists the actual assets tasked to
conduct each mission. An “X” placed under each asset
identifies the tasking.
• The coordination column tells the assets which units to
coordinate with for this mission.
• The last column provides the assets with reporting
requirements.
A-20. These products support a feasible plan that is flexible enough to
refine as new information is provided about the enemy situation, or
during execution when contact is made. The plan includes planning for
redundancy of observation and the ability to prioritize tasks and plan for
retasking or reorienting based on chance contact or unexpected enemy
actions. These types of events during execution may require a
A-18
reassessment of available assets to meet the commander’s reconnaissance

guidance, CCIR, or targeting tasks.
DECISION POINT
PURPOSE OR
COORDINATION
INSTRUCTIONS
1st PLT
2nd PLT
3rd PLT
UAV
GSR
IREMBASS
PROPHET
ENG
NBC
Recon
START/
STOP
TIME
(ANSWER THE FOLLOWING
INSTRUCTIONS
PIR/SIR)
NAI
PRIORITY
Figure A-11. Reconnaissance Planning Tracking Tool/Decision Aid Matrix
A-19
Appendix B
Protection
Protection is the CONTENTS
preservation of the Risk Management ........................................ B-1
troop’s fighting potential. Identify Hazards ....................................... B-1
This appendix focuses on Assess Hazards to Determine Risks ...... B-2
Develop Controls and Make
two aspects of protection: Risk Decisions...................................... B-3
safety or risk Implement Controls ................................. B-4
management, and the Supervise and Evaluate........................... B-5
avoidance of fratricide. Fratricide ...................................................... B-6
Risk Identification and
Risk is the chance of Preventive Measures............................ B-7
injury or death for Fratricide Risk Considerations
individuals and damage (OPORD Format)................................... B-10
to or loss of vehicles and
equipment. Risks, and/or the potential for risks, are always present in
every combat and training situation the troop faces. Risk management
must take place at all levels of the chain of command during each
phase of every operation; it is an integral part of all tactical planning.
The troop commander, platoon leadership, and all soldiers must know
how to use risk management, coupled with fratricide reduction
measures, to ensure that the mission is executed in the safest possible
environment within mission constraints. For additional information
on risk management, refer to FM 5-19 (FM 100-14).
SECTION I – RISK MANAGEMENT
B-1. There are five steps of risk management. Leaders must always
remember that the effectiveness of the process depends on situational
awareness. They should never approach risk management with “one size
fits all” solutions to the hazards their unit will face. They must consider
the essential tactical and operational factors that make each situation
unique.
STEP 1 – IDENTIFY HAZARDS

B-2. A hazard is a source of danger. It is any existing or potential
condition that could result in injury, illness, or death of personnel;
damage to or loss of equipment and property; or some other form of
mission degradation. Hazards arise in both tactical and training
operations.
B-3. The leaders must identify the hazards associated with all aspects
and phases of the mission, paying particular attention to the factors of
METT-TC. Risk management must never be an afterthought; leaders
must begin the process during the military decision-making process, or
troop-leading procedures for troop and below, and continue it throughout
the operation.
B-1
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
B-4. Figure B-1 lists possible sources of risk the troop might face
during a typical tactical operation. The list is organized according to the
factors of METT-TC.
SOURCES OF BATTLEFIELD RISK
MISSION
• Duration of the operation.
• Complexity/clarity of the plan. (Is the plan well developed and easily understood?)
• Proximity and number of maneuvering units.
ENEMY
• Knowledge of the threat situation.
• Threat capabilities.
• Availability of time and resources to conduct reconnaissance.
TERRAIN AND WEATHER
• Visibility conditions, including light, dust, fog, and smoke.
• Precipitation and its effect on mobility.
• Extreme heat or cold.
• Additional natural hazards (broken ground, steep inclines, water obstacles).
TROOPS AND SUPPORT AVAILABLE
• Equipment status.
• Morale.
• Experience the units conducting the operation have working together.
• Soldier/leader proficiency.
• Soldier/leader rest situation.
• Degree of acclimatization to environment.
• Impact of new leaders and/or crewmembers.
TIME AVAILABLE
• Time available for planning and rehearsals.
• Time available to conduct the mission.
CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS
• Applicable rules of engagement and/or rules of interaction.
• Potential stability and/or support operations involving contact with civilians (such as noncombatant
evacuation operations, refugee or disaster assistance, or counterterrorism).
• Potential for media contact/inquiries.
Figure B-1. Examples of Potential Hazards
STEP 2 – ASSESS HAZARDS TO DETERMINE RISKS

B-5. Hazard assessment is the process of determining the direct
impact of each hazard on an operation (in the form of hazardous
incidents). Use the following steps:
• Determine which hazards can be eliminated or avoided.
• Assess each hazard that cannot be eliminated or avoided to
determine the probability that the hazard can occur.
• Assess the severity of hazards that cannot be eliminated or
avoided. Severity, defined as the result or outcome of a
hazardous incident, is expressed by the degree of injury or
illness (including death), loss of or damage to equipment or
property, environmental damage, or other mission-impairing
B-2
___________________________________________________________ Appendix B – Force Protection
factors (such as unfavorable publicity or loss of combat

power).
• Taking into account both the probability and severity of a
hazard, determine the associated risk level (extremely high,
high, moderate, and low). Table B-1 summarizes the four risk
levels.
• Based on the factors of hazard assessment (probability,
severity, and risk level, as well as the operational factors
unique to the situation), complete the risk management
worksheet. Figure B-2 shows an example of a risk
management worksheet.
Table B-1. Risk Levels and Impact on Mission Execution
RISK LEVEL MISSION EFFECTS

Extremely high (E) Mission failure if hazardous incidents occur in execution.
High (H) Significantly degraded mission capabilities in terms of required mission standards.
Not accomplishing all parts of the mission or not completing the mission to
standard (if hazards occur during mission).
Moderate (M) Expected degraded mission capabilities in terms of required mission standards.
Reduced mission capability (if hazards occur during the mission).
Low (L) Expected losses have little or no impact on mission success.
STEP 3 – DEVELOP CONTROLS AND MAKE RISK DECISIONS

DEVELOPING CONTROLS
B-6. After assessing each hazard, develop one or more controls that
will either eliminate the hazard or reduce the risk (probability and/or
severity) of potential hazardous incidents. When developing controls,
consider the reason for the hazard, not just the hazard by itself.
MAKING RISK DECISIONS
B-7. A key element in the process of making a risk decision is
determining whether accepting the risk is justified or, conversely, is
unnecessary. The decision-maker must compare and balance the risk
against mission expectations, then decides if the controls are sufficient
and acceptable and whether to accept the resulting residual risk. If the
risk is determined unnecessary, the decision-maker directs the
development of additional controls or alternative controls; as another
option, he can modify, change, or reject the selected COA for the
operation.
B-3
B-4
1. Organization and Unit Location: 2. Page of
1 3
3. Mission/Task: 4. Begin Date: 5. End Date: 6. Date Prepared:

Swim Site Set-up
000103 000104 991201
7. Operational Phase in which the Mission/Task will be conducted:
B-8.
8. Prepared by: (Name/Rank/Duty Position)
9. Identify Hazards 10. Assess the 11. Develop Controls & Make Decisions (Specific 12. Determine 13. Implement 14. Supervise and Evaluate
Hazards & Determine measures taken to reduce the probability and severity Residual Risk Level Controls (Include (Continuous, Leader
Initial Risk Level of a hazard) SOPs, References, Checks, Buddy System,
OPORD, etc.) AAR, etc.)
(Be Specific) L M H E (Be Specific) L M H E (Be Specific) (Be Specific)
STEP 4 – IMPLEMENT CONTROLS

1a. Safety brief 1a. Safety brief verified
1. Collision between vehicles during troop X 1a. Safety brief-covering route, march speed, catch X
conducted at 0600 by COC upon completion
Movement to swim site. up speed, intervals, use of seat belts prior to SP on 000104
& 000105 1b. Licenses verified as
1b. Drivers properly licensed to operate their vehicle
valid by COC @
1b. Licenses checked conclusion of PCI
1c. Route reconned to reduce chance of accidents during PCI on 991229
1c. Strip map and route
1d. Vehicle dispatched to ensure it goes through 1c. Route reviewed verified and reconed by
QA/QC and is IAW –10 during safety brief COC prior to 991229
1d. Vehicle dispatch 1d. Dispatches valid,
1e. Winter driver’s course conducted focusing on safe checked during PCI
operation of vehicle in a winter environment verified by COC @
completion of PCI
1e. 991220 winter
1f. Vehicles prepared for winter driving conditions: drivers course 1e. Verification by COC
chains, heaters functional, tires, spot checked with conducted for mission upon completion of
depth gauge personnel by SSG Poe course on 991220
1f. Vehicle 5988 and
Figure B-2. Example Risk Management Worksheet

1f. Verification
mechanical soundness conducted by COC @
verified during PCI on conclusion of PCI
991229
15. Remaining Risk Level After Countermeasures Are Implemented:

(CIRCLE HIGHEST REMAINING RISK LEVEL) Î
LOW MEDIUM HIGH EXTREMELY HIGH
16. RISK DECISION AUTHORITY: (Approval Authority Signature Block)

FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
hazards or reduce their risk. Implementing controls, the most important
contribution to the unit’s safety. Implementing controls includes

Controls are the procedures and considerations used to eliminate
part of the risk management process, is the chain of command’s

coordination and communication with appropriate superior, adjacent, and

subordinate units and with individuals executing the mission. The troop
commander must ensure that specific controls are integrated into
operations plans (OPLAN), OPORDs, SOPs, and rehearsals. The critical
check for this step is to ensure that controls are converted into clear,
simple execution orders understood by all levels.
B-9. If the leaders have conducted a thoughtful risk assessment, the
controls will be easy to implement, enforce, and follow. Examples of risk
management controls include the following:
• Thoroughly brief all aspects of the mission, including related
hazards and controls, and ensure that subordinates know the
plan.
• Allow adequate time for rehearsals at all levels.
• Drink plenty of water, eat well, and get as much sleep as
possible (at least 4 hours in a 24-hour period).
• Enforce speed limits, use of seat belts, and driver safety.
• Establish recognizable visual signals and markers to
distinguish maneuvering units.
• Enforce the use of ground guides in assembly areas and on
dangerous terrain.
• Limit single-vehicle movement.
• Establish SOPs for the integration of new personnel.
STEP 5 – SUPERVISE AND EVALUATE

B-10. During mission execution, it is imperative for leaders to ensure
that risk management controls are properly understood and executed.
Leaders must continuously evaluate the unit’s effectiveness in managing
risks to gain insight into areas that need improvement.
SUPERVISION
B-11. Leadership and unit discipline are the keys to ensuring that
effective risk management controls are implemented. All leaders are
responsible for supervising mission rehearsals and execution to ensure
standards and controls are enforced. In particular, NCOs must enforce
established safety policies as well as controls developed for a specific
operation or task. Techniques include spot checks, inspections, SITREPs,
confirmation briefs, and supervision.
B-12. During mission execution, leaders must continuously monitor
risk management controls to determine whether they are effective and to
modify them as necessary. Leaders must also anticipate, identify, and
assess new hazards. They ensure that imminent danger issues are
addressed on the spot and that ongoing planning and execution reflect
changes in hazard conditions.
EVALUATION
B-13. Whenever possible, the risk management process should also
include an after-action review (AAR) to assess unit performance in
identifying risks and preventing hazardous situations. Leaders should
B-5
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
then incorporate lessons learned from the process into unit SOPs and
plans for future missions.
B-14. The troop commander gives the platoon leaders and NCOs
direction, sets priorities, and establishes the command climate (values,
attitudes, and beliefs). Successful preservation of combat power requires
him to imbed risk management into individual behavior. To fulfill this
commitment, the commander must exercise creative leadership,
innovative planning, and careful management. Most important, he must
demonstrate support for the risk management process. The commander
and others in the chain of command can establish a command climate
favorable to risk management integration by taking the following actions:
• Demonstrate consistent and sustained risk management
behavior through leading by example and by stressing active
participation throughout the risk management process.
• Provide adequate resources for risk management. Every
leader is responsible for obtaining the assets necessary to
mitigate risk and for providing them to subordinate leaders.
• Understand their own and their soldier’s limitations, as well
as their unit’s capabilities.
• Allow subordinates to make mistakes and learn from them.
• Prevent a “zero defects” mindset from creeping into the unit’s
culture.
• Demonstrate full confidence in subordinates’ mastery of their
trade and their ability to execute a chosen COA.
• Keep subordinates informed.
• Listen to subordinates.
B-15. For the commander, his subordinate leaders, and individual
soldiers alike, responsibilities in managing risk include the following:
• Make informed risk decisions; establish and then clearly
communicate risk decision criteria and guidance.
• Establish clear, feasible risk management policies and goals.
• Train the risk management process. Ensure that
subordinates understand the who, what, when, where, and
why of managing risk and how these factors apply to their
situation and assigned responsibilities.
• Accurately evaluate the unit’s effectiveness as well as
subordinates’ execution of risk controls during the mission.
• Inform higher headquarters when risk levels exceed
established limits.
SECTION II – FRATRICIDE
B-16. Fratricide is broadly defined as the employment of friendly

weapons and munitions with the intent to kill the threat or destroy his
equipment or facilities, but the action results in the unforeseen and
unintentional death or injury to friendly personnel. Fratricide is
B-6
avoidable; leader actions coupled with current resources (such as the

FBCB2) can greatly reduce the risk of fratricide.
B-17. The modern battlefield is more lethal than any in history. The
tempo of operations is rapid, and the nonlinear nature of the battlefield
creates command and control challenges for all unit leaders. The
accuracy and lethality of modern weapons make it possible to engage and
destroy targets at these extended acquisition ranges. At the same time,
however, the ability of US forces to acquire targets using thermal
imagery and other sophisticated sighting systems exceeds their ability to
accurately identify these targets as friend or foe. As a result, friendly
elements can be engaged unintentionally and destroyed in a matter of
seconds.
B-18. Battlefield obscuration adds to the problem, which becomes a
critical consideration whenever thermal sights are the primary source of
target identification. Rain, dust, fog, smoke, and snow degrade
identification capability by reducing the intensity and clarity of thermal
images.
B-19. On the battlefield, positive visual identification cannot be the sole
engagement criteria at ranges beyond 1,000 meters. Situational
awareness is the key; it must be maintained throughout an operation.
RISK IDENTIFICATION AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES

B-20. Reduction of fratricide risk begins during the planning phase of
an operation and continues throughout preparation and execution. Risk
identification must be conducted at all levels during each phase, and the
results clearly communicated throughout the chain of command so risk
assessment can begin. This section covers considerations that influence
risk identification; it also focuses on measures leaders can implement to
make the identification process more effective and to help prevent
friendly fire incidents from occurring.
PLANNING PHASE
B-21. A plan that is thoroughly developed and understood helps to
minimize fratricide risk. The following considerations help indicate the
potential for fratricide in a given operation:
• The clarity of the threat situation.
• The clarity of the friendly situation.
• The clarity of the commander’s intent.
• The complexity of the operation.
• The planning time available at each level.
B-22. Graphics are a basic tool that commanders at all levels use to
clarify their intent, add precision to their concept, and communicate their
plan to subordinates. As such, graphics can be a very useful tool in
reducing the risk of fratricide. Leaders at all levels must understand the
definitions and purpose of operational graphics and the techniques of
their employment.
NOTE: See FM 1-02 (FM 101-5-1) for the definitions of each type of graphic control
measure.
B-7
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
PREPARATION PHASE
B-23. The following are some indicators that may identify potential
fratricide risks:
• Rehearsals not conducted to standard, or not done at all.
• Low training or proficiency levels of units and individuals.
• No habitual relationships between units conducting the
operation.
• Weakened physical readiness (endurance) of the troops
conducting the operation.
B-24. Backbriefs and rehearsals are primary tools in identifying and
reducing fratricide risk during the preparation phase. The following are
some considerations for their use:
• Backbriefs ensure subordinates understand the commander’s
intent. They often highlight areas of confusion, complexity, or
planning errors.
• The type of rehearsal conducted determines what types of
risks are identified.
• Rehearsals should extend to all levels of command and
involve all key players.
EXECUTION PHASE
B-25. During execution, in-stride risk assessment and reaction are
necessary to overcome unforeseen fratricide risk situations. The following
are factors to consider when assessing fratricide risks:
• Intervisibility between adjacent units.
• The level of cross-talk between units.
• Amount of battlefield obscuration.
• Ability or inability to positively identify targets.
• Similarities and differences in equipment, vehicles, and
uniforms among friendly and threat forces.
• Vehicle density on the battlefield.
• The tempo of the battle.
B-26. Maintaining situational awareness at all levels and at all times is
another key to fratricide reduction as an operation progresses. Units
must develop and employ effective techniques and SOPs to aid leaders
and crewmen in this process. These techniques include—
• Monitoring on the next higher net.
• Radio cross-talk between units.
• Accurate position reporting and navigation.
• Training and use/exchange of LNOs.
B-8
B-27. The following measures for reducing fratricide risk are not
directive in nature, nor are they intended to restrict initiative. Apply
them as appropriate based on the specific situation and METT-TC
factors. Risk reduction guidelines are the following:
• Identify and assess potential fratricide risks in the estimate
of the situation. Express these risks in the OPORD or
FRAGO.
• Maintain situational awareness, focusing on such areas as
current intelligence; unit locations and dispositions; denial
areas (minefields/family of scatterable mines [FASCAM]);
contaminated areas, such as improved conventional
munitions (ICM) and NBC; SITREPs; and METT-TC factors.
• Ensure positive target identification. Review vehicle/weapon
identification cards. Know at what ranges and under what
conditions positive identification of friendly vehicles/weapons
is possible.
• Establish a command climate that stresses fratricide
prevention. Enforce fratricide prevention measures,
emphasize the use of doctrinally sound tactics, techniques,
and procedures. Ensure constant supervision in the execution
of orders and the performance of all tasks and missions to
standard.
• Recognize the signs of battlefield stress. Maintain unit
cohesion by taking quick, effective action to alleviate it.
• Conduct individual, leader, and collective (unit) training
covering fratricide awareness, target identification and
recognition, and fire discipline.
• Develop a simple, decisive plan.
• Give complete and concise mission orders.
• Use SOPs that are consistent with doctrine to simplify
mission orders. Periodically review and change SOPs as
needed.
• Strive for maximum planning time for you and your
subordinates.
• Use common language/vocabulary and doctrinally correct
standard terminology and control measures, such as fire
support coordination line, zone of engagement, and restrictive
fire lines.
• Ensure thorough coordination is conducted.
• Plan for and establish effective communications (to include
visual).
• Plan for collocation of command posts whenever it is
appropriate to the mission, such as during a passage of lines.
• Designate and employ LNOs as appropriate.
• Ensure rules of engagement are clear.
• Include fratricide risk as a key factor in terrain analysis
(observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment,
obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach, [OCOKA]).
B-9
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
• Conduct rehearsals whenever the situation allows time to do

so.
• Be in the right place at the right time. Use position
location/navigation devices (GPS and POSNAV); know your
location and the locations of adjacent (left, right, leading, and
follow-on) units (FBCB2 as an enabler); and synchronize
tactical movement.
• Plan and brief operations security, especially when utilizing
dismounted operations (challenge/password,
sign/countersign).
• Include discussion of fratricide incidents in after-action
reviews.
FATRICIDE RISK CONSIDERATIONS (OPORD FORMAT)

B-28. Figure B-3, which uses the OPORD format, contains key factors
and considerations in fratricide reduction. This is not intended to be used
as an OPORD preparation guide; rather, it should be used as a checklist
during OPORD development to ensure fratricide reduction measures are
considered and included in the order. The factors and considerations may
warrant inclusion in additional paragraphs than those listed in this
format.
1. SITUATION.
a. Threat forces.
(1) Are there similarities among threat and friendly equipment and uniforms that
could lead to fratricide?
(2) What languages do threat forces speak? Could these contribute to fratricide
risk?
(3) What are the threat’s deception capabilities and his past record of deception
activities?
(4) Do you know the locations of threat forces?
b. Friendly forces.
(1) Among the allied forces, are there differences (or similarities with threat
forces) in language, uniform, and equipment that could increase fratricide risk during combined
operations?
(2) Could differences in equipment and uniforms among US armed forces increase
fratricide risk during joint operations?
(3) What differences in equipment and uniforms can be stressed to help prevent
fratricide?
(4) What is the friendly deception plan?
(5) What are the locations of your unit and adjacent units (left, right, leading,
follow-on)?
(6) What are the locations of neutrals and noncombatants?
Figure B-3. Example OPORD Format with Fratricide Reduction Measures
B-10
c. Own forces.
(1) What is the status of training activities? What are the levels of individual, crew,
and unit proficiency?
(2) Will fatigue be a factor for friendly forces during the operation? Has an
effective sleep plan been developed?
(3) Are friendly forces acclimatized to the area of operations (AO)?
(4) What is the age (new, old, or mix) and condition of equipment in friendly
units? What is the status of new equipment training?
(5) What are the expected MOPP requirements for the operation?
d. Attachments and detachments.
(1) Do attached elements understand pertinent information regarding threat and
friendly forces?
(2) Are detached elements supplied this pertinent information by their gaining
units?
e. Weather.
(1) What are the expected visibility conditions (light data and precipitation) for the
operation?
(2) What effect will heat and cold have on soldiers, weapons, and equipment?
f. Terrain.
(1) Do you know the topography and vegetation (such as urban, mountainous,
hilly, rolling, flat, desert, swamp/marsh, prairie/steppe, jungle, dense forest, open woods) of the
expected AO?
(2) Have you evaluated the terrain using the factors of OCOKA?
2. MISSION. Are the mission and all associated tasks and purposes clearly understood?
3. EXECUTION.
a. Task organization.
(1) Has the unit worked under this task organization before?
(2) Are SOPs compatible with the task organization (especially with attached
units)?
(3) Are special markings or signals (for example, cats’ eyes, chemlites, or panels)
needed for positive identification of uniforms and equipment?
(4) What special weapons and/or equipment will be used? Do they look or sound
like threat weapons and/or equipment?
b. Concept of the operation.
(1) Maneuver. Are main and supporting efforts identified to ensure awareness of
fratricide risks and prevention measures?
Figure B-3. Example OPORD Format with Fratricide

Reduction Measures (continued)
B-11
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
(2) Fires (direct and indirect).

(a) Are priorities of fires identified?
(b) Have target lists been developed?
(c) Has the fire execution matrix/overlay been developed?
(d) Have locations of denial areas (minefields, FASCAM) and contaminated
areas (ICM, NBC) been identified?
(e) Are the locations of all supporting fire targets identified in the
OPORD/OPLAN overlays?
(f) Are aviation and close air support targets clearly identified? Have signals
been established to positively identify these targets for the aircraft? Have airspace coordination
areas been developed? Have threat air defense systems been suppressed?
(g) Has the direct-fire plan been developed and synchronized with the fire
support plan?
(h) Have final protective fires been designated?
(i) Have sector limitsbeen identified and verified?
(j) Have executors for each target been assigned and do they understand
when and where to shoot? Do the shooters have “eyes on” the target?
(k) Are the observers surveyed in or are they using a map grid? Target
location errors can cause problems.
(l) Do all leaders and executors understand where the fire support
coordination measures are and when they go into effect? Rehearsal is the key.
(m) Can the fire support officer hear what targets are being called on the
maneuver nets?
(n) Have all targets been rehearsed with the executors and the field artillery
battalion?
(o) Does the reinforcing or general support reinforcing field artillery have all
the proper graphics and understand where they fit in? Did they attend the rehearsal?
(p) Have restrictions on specific munitions been established and does
everyone know where they are planned and emplaced?
(3) Engineer tasks.
(a) Are friendly minefields, including FASCAM and ICM dud-contaminated
areas, known?
(b) Are obstacles identified, along with the approximate time needed for
reduction/breaching of each?
(4) Tasks to each subordinate unit. Are friendly forces identified, as appropriate,
for each subordinate maneuver element?
(5) Tasks to CS/ CSS units. Have locations of friendly forces been reported to
CS/CSS units?

B-12
(6) Coordinating instructions.

(a) Will rehearsals be conducted? Are they necessary? Are direct and
indirect fires included?
(b) Is a backbrief necessary?
(c) Are appropriate control measures clearly explained and illustrated in the
OPORD and overlays? Have they been disseminated to everyone who has a need to know? What
is the plan for using these control measures to synchronize the battle and prevent fratricide?
(d) Have target/vehicle identification drills been practiced?
(e) Do subordinate units know the immediate action, drill, or signal for
“CEASE FIRE” or “I AM FRIENDLY” if they come under unknown or friendly fire? Is there a
backup action?
(f) Is guidance in handling dud munitions, such as ICM and cluster bomb
units, included?
4. SERVICE SUPPORT.
a. Are trains locations and identification markings known by everyone?
b. Do medical and maintenance personnel know the routes between train units?
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
a. Command.
(1) What are the locations of the commander and key staff members?
(2) What is the chain of command and the succession of command?
b. Signal.
(1) Do instructions include backup code words and visual signals for all special
and emergency events?
(2) Do instructions cover how to identify friendly forces to aircraft?
(3) Are SOI distributed to all units with a need to know, such as higher, lower,
adjacent, leading, and follow-on elements?

B-13
Appendix C
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

Because many potential CONTENTS
adversaries have the Contamination Avoidance .......................... C-1
capability to employ Defense Before a Nuclear Attack............ C-2
biological, chemical, and Biological Defense................................... C-2
Defense Before a Chemical Attack ......... C-3
nuclear weapons, scouts NBC Protection ............................................ C-3
must prepare to fight in MOPP Levels, Alarms, and Signals ........ C-3
an NBC environment. Defense During a Nuclear Attack ........... C-5
Collecting, processing, Defense After a Nuclear Attack............... C-5
Defense During and After a
and disseminating Chemical Attack ................................... C-6
needed NBC hazard Symptoms and Treatment of
information is also vital. NBC Casualties ........................................ C-7
To survive and remain Marking Contamination............................... C-8
effective on the inte- Marking Procedures............................... C-8
Unmasking Procedures ......................... C-9
grated battlefield, the Warning and Reporting Systems.......... C-10
troop must be proficient Decontamination ......................................... C-11
in the three principles of Immediate Decontamination ................... C-11
NBC defense: contam- Operational Decontamination ................. C-12
Thorough Decontamination .................... C-12
ination avoidance, NBC R&S in an NBC Environment ...................... C-13
protection, and decon- Toxic Industrial Material Hazards............... C-14
tamination.
Additional-duty NBC personnel should be designated by the troop

SOP for operations in an NBC environment. The crews of the section
leaders’ vehicles should be designated and trained as chemical agent
detection and radiological survey and monitoring teams. Crews should
be designated as decontamination teams and trained to operate all
decontamination equipment organic to the brigade or squadron.
NOTE: See FM 3-20.98 [FM 17-98] for more detailed information on NBC
procedures and equipment.
SECTION I – CONTAMINATION AVOIDANCE
C-1. Avoidance is the most important principle of NBC defense. The

best way to survive an NBC attack is to avoid being the object of one.
Avoiding contaminated areas minimizes the risk of additional casualties
and the degradation of combat power caused by operating in MOPP level
3 or 4 for extended periods of time. In addition, the unit is not required to
spend the time and resources needed for decontamination.
Contamination avoidance include using passive avoidance measures,
locating contaminated areas, identifying NBC agents, warning other
members of the troop as well as other units, and reporting NBC threats
to higher headquarters. If the tactical situation does not allow avoidance,
the troop must be prepared to operate in a contaminated environment.
C-1
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
C-2. Passive avoidance measures can decrease the possibility of NBC

attack or reduce the effects of an attack already under way. Effective use
of concealment, dispersion, prepared positions, OPSEC, and signal
security lessen the chances of being acquired as a target. The
reconnaissance troop should continually analyze its vulnerability to NBC
attack and take appropriate protective measures.
C-3. Attacks and contamination must be detected quickly and reported
to adjacent units and headquarters elements. The troop must have an
effective method of quickly passing the alarm in the event of an NBC
attack. The alarm can be passed by radio, audible signals, hand-and-arm
signals, or via the FBCB2, if available, to update the COP. The SOP
should specify automatic procedures for employing detection teams and
submitting the required NBC reports after an NBC attack or when
contamination is encountered.
C-4. All movement routes and future positions should be
reconnoitered for nuclear and chemical contamination whenever possible.
Reconnaissance and quartering parties should be prepared to encounter,
detect, identify, report, and mark contamination. By finding the location
and type of hazard (nuclear radiation or chemical agent), the troop can
determine the best plan for bypassing, crossing, or operating in the
hazard. The troop must be prepared to locate and evaluate the hazard
based on available information from fallout predictions (simplified and
detailed), chemical downwind hazard predictions, monitoring data, and
contamination overlays. Based on the situation, the troop commander
must be able to implement protective measures specified in the SOP to
minimize personnel losses and limit the spread of contamination.
DEFENSE BEFORE A NUCLEAR ATTACK

C-5. The best defense against a nuclear attack is to dig in. Unit
defensive positions, which vary from individual foxholes to improved
positions, should be prepared whenever the tactical situation permits.
C-6. Scouts should keep their individual weapons, equipment,
clothing, and other issue items in their vehicles. The blast wave will
convert unsecured items into lethal missiles. Supplies, explosives, and
flammable materials should be dispersed and protected.
C-7. Reverse slopes of hills and mountains give some nuclear
protection. The initial radiation and the heat and light from the fireball
of a nuclear blast tend to be absorbed by hills and mountains. Use of
gullies, ravines, ditches, natural depressions, fallen trees, and caves can
reduce nuclear casualties.
BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE
C-8. The key protective measure against a biological attack is
maintaining a high order of health, personal hygiene, and sanitation
discipline. Biological attacks are hard to detect. If an attack occurs,
chances of survival are better if crewmembers are healthy and physically
fit and maintain good personal hygiene. Keeping the body clean helps to
prevent ingestion of biological agents. Keep small cuts or scratches
covered and germ-free by using soap, water, and first-aid measures. Since
insects carry biological agents, prevent insect bites by keeping clothes
buttoned and covering the skin.
C-2
__________________________________ Appendix C – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations
C-9. After an attack, assume that all surfaces have been exposed to
germs. Eat or drink only food that has remained sealed; consume it only
after you have washed and cleaned the outside of the container. All water
must be boiled at least 15 minutes.
DEFENSE BEFORE A CHEMICAL ATTACK

PROTECTIVE PROCEDURES
C-10. Ensure all personnel have their protective masks available, and
make sure each mask fits and functions properly. All personnel should
wear the proper protective clothing in accordance with the MOPP level
designated by the commander. Protect all equipment and supplies from
liquid chemical contamination by keeping them organized and covered.
EMPLACING THE M22 OR THE M8A1 AUTOMATIC CHEMICAL AGENT ALARM
C-11. In the troop, the M22 or the M8A1 automatic chemical agent
alarm (ACADA) is the primary means of detecting an upwind chemical
attack. Either system provides two essential elements of survival:
detection of a toxic agent cloud or vapor and early warning to troops in
the monitored position. The M22 ACADA, the newer piece of equipment,
detects and identifies, by class, all nerve agents, mustard, and lewisite.
The M8A1 only detects dangerous concentrations of G and V type nerve
agent vapors. The troop leader decides where to place the chemical
alarm. Both the M22 and the M8A1 are placed in the same manner, no
more than 150 meters from the troop’s perimeter or position. The
available detector units are spaced approximately 300 meters apart and
connected to the alarm unit by telephone cable (WD-1). Positioning the
alarm units near radiotelephone assets makes it easy to alert the unit of
an attack. Blowing sand or dust, rain, sleet, snow, cold temperatures,
tropical conditions, and other chemical interferents, such as petroleum
products, can possibly affect operation of the alarms.
SECTION II – NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL PROTECTION
C-12. If an NBC hazard cannot be avoided, the troop must be prepared

to protect personnel and equipment from the effects of exposure. The type
and degree of protection required will be based on the unit’s mission and
the hazard. Note that the line between contamination avoidance and
protection is not distinct; many actions contribute equally to both.
MOPP LEVELS, ALARMS, AND SIGNALS

C-13. Soldiers on the integrated battlefield will face a combination of NBC
and conventional attacks. The key to effective protection in an NBC
environment is the troop’s proficiency in automatically and correctly
implementing an effective NBC defense SOP. Individual and unit protection
against chemical attack or contamination hinges on effective use of the
MOPP and on individual proficiency in basic NBC skills. All soldiers in the
troop must be familiar with the standard MOPP levels shown in Table C-1.
C-14. When an NBC attack is recognized, every soldier must receive the
warning and assume the appropriate MOPP level (see Table C-1). Those
in immediate danger need warnings they can see or hear. The alarm or
C-3
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
signal must be simple and unmistakable for quick and correct reaction.
Troop elements not immediately affected need the information to prepare
for the hazard or to change plans.
C-15. If an NBC hazard has been located, the contaminated area should
be marked. The NBC warning and reporting system (NBCWRS) and
contamination markers contribute to the warning procedures for follow-
on forces. In the immediate area of contamination, several methods (or a
combination of methods) will allow quick reaction by all soldiers. These
methods include vocal alarms (shout of “GAS”), the M8A1 alarm,
nonvocal alarms (horn blast or banging of metal-to-metal objects), and
visual alarms (most commonly, hand-and-arm signals). The tactical
situation may not allow for audible alarms; therefore, the troop SOP
should clearly detail the visual signals for contamination. The FBCB2 is
another method that provides NBC hazard situational awareness.
Table C-1. MOPP Levels and Equipment Requirements

Command
(Mask
Only)
Worn
The chemical protective undergarment is worn under the BDU (this primarily applied to armor vehicle crewmen and
These items must be available to the soldier within two hours, with a second set available within six hours.
MOPP 4
4
Worn
Worn
Worn
Worn
Worn
Worn
3
MOPP 3
Available
1
4
Worn
Worn
Worn
Worn
Worn
3
MOPP 2
Available
Carried
4
Worn
Worn
Worn
Worn
These items must be positioned within arm’s reach of the soldier.

In hot weather, coat or hood can be left open for ventilation.
3
3
MOPP 1
Available
Available
Available
Carried
4
Worn
Worn
3
3
MOPP 0
Available
Available
Available
Available
Available
(ZERO)
Carried
READY
Carried
2
MOPP
Ready
Ready
Ready
Ready
Ready
special purpose forces).

MOPP Level
Protective Cover
Vinyl Overboots
Undergarment
Overgarment
Equipment
Protective
Chemical
Helmet
Gloves
Mask
C-4
DEFENSE DURING A NUCLEAR ATTACK

DISMOUNTED DEFENSIVE ACTIONS
C-16. Never run for cover! Immediately drop flat on the ground (face
down) or to the bottom of a foxhole, with head toward the blast. Keep
your helmet on and cover exposed skin as much as possible. Close your
eyes. Remain down until the blast wave has passed and debris has
stopped falling. Stay calm, check for injury, check weapons and
equipment for damage, and prepare to continue the mission.
MOUNTED DEFENSIVE ACTIONS
C-17. As time permits, mounted scouts take the following actions:
• Position the vehicle with the front slope facing the blast and
the main weapon system pointed away from the blast.
• Lock the brakes.
• Secure loose equipment inside the vehicle to prevent injuries
and equipment damage.
• Secure all exterior components that could be damaged by the
blast (such as water cans, duffel bags, and antennas) inside
the vehicle.
• Turn off all radios as well as turret and master power.
• Close and lock all hatches, including ballistic shields.
• Wear the proper helmet and eye protection.
DEFENSE AFTER A NUCLEAR ATTACK

C-18. Once the attack ends, forward an NBC-1 nuclear report, organize
the survivors, secure and organize equipment, repair and reinforce the
BP, assist casualties, improve protection against possible fallout, and
begin continuous monitoring. If the radiation dose rate reaches a
hazardous level after fallout is complete, be prepared to move, on order,
to a less hazardous area.
FALLOUT WARNING
C-19. The first person to detect the arrival of fallout is usually the
radiological monitor operating a radiacmeter. As soon as he notes a dose
rate of 1 centigray per hour (cGy/hr) or higher, he warns unit personnel.
All personnel hearing the warning relay it to others. If the mission
allows, soldiers should move into a shelter with overhead cover and stay
there until given an “ALL CLEAR” signal or until otherwise directed to
move. If the mission does not allow the unit to take cover,
decontamination becomes more important and perhaps more difficult.
SUPERVISION OF RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING
C-20. Radiological monitoring is performed routinely to determine the
presence and intensity of a radiation hazard. It is conducted using the
IM-174 or AN/VDR-2 radiacmeter. Soldiers must be properly trained on
this equipment. There are two types of monitoring: periodic and
continuous.
C-21. Periodic monitoring assures the troop that the area is not
contaminated or, if applicable, provides a warning when contamination is
C-5
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
detected after the troop arrives. Readings are taken once every hour.
Periodic monitoring is initiated under the following conditions:
• After first use of nuclear weapons in theater.
• When the troop is out of contact with higher headquarters.
• When ordered by higher headquarters.
• When the troop stops continuous monitoring.
C-22. Continuous monitoring is the surveillance for radiation in the
troop’s area or position. (AO). Continuous monitoring will be initiated
when any of the following situations occur:
• When a nuclear detonation is observed or reported in the AO.
• When an NBC-3 report is received and the troop is in the
predicted area of contamination.
• When ordered by higher headquarters.
• When a dose rate of 1 cGy/hr is recorded in periodic
monitoring.
SUPERVISION OF TACTICAL DOSIMETRY OPERATIONS
C-23. Check all dosimeters to be used for the operation; any that do not
read zero should be turned in for recharging. If a charger is not available,
note the original reading. Make sure dosimeter readings are reported
accurately. Collect readings at least once daily. Average these readings,
round to the nearest 10, and report this average and the radiation
exposure status (RES) to higher headquarters.
C-24. When operating in or crossing radiologically contaminated areas,
use the individual actions for nuclear defense. Vehicles should be closed
tightly; cargoes should be covered by tarps or tenting. Mission
permitting, speed should be kept down to prevent dust, and vehicles
should maintain adequate following distances to stay out of the dust
raised by preceding vehicles.
C-25. After the unit exits a contaminated area, personnel, equipment,
and cargo should be checked for contamination and decontaminated, if
necessary. Dose rates should be monitored closely to ensure compliance
with operational exposure guidance (OEG). The RES should be updated,
if appropriate.
DEFENSE DURING AND AFTER A CHEMICAL ATTACK

C-26. During a chemical attack, give the alarm and have all unmasked
soldiers put on their protective masks and other MOPP gear. All
personnel should move inside their vehicles and close all hatches (if
applicable); this will aid in the protection from gross liquid
contamination. Use M256A1 chemical agent detector kits to determine
the type of agent for vapor hazards or the M8 paper that comes with the
kit to detect liquid V and G nerve agents, or H-type blister agents.
Submit an NBC-1 report. Continue the mission based on the
commander’s guidance.
C-27. After a chemical attack, forward an NBC-1 chemical report, treat
casualties, perform immediate decontamination as required, and mark
the contaminated area.
C-6
SECTION III – SYMPTOMS AND TREATMENT OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL,

AND CHEMICAL CASUALTIES
C-28. Potential adversaries may have access to a wide variety of

biological and chemical agents on the modern battlefield. These agents
can be dispensed alone or with other carriers or agents. Casualties
resulting from exposure to biological or chemical agents require medical
treatment as quickly as possible.
C-29. The first step in the treatment process is usually appropriate self-
aid and buddy-aid measures. These vary depending on the agent.
Soldiers should first mask to prevent them from either inhaling or
ingesting additional agents; then they should remove agents from
exposed skin, either by washing with soap and water or by using the
M291 kit. Soldiers use buddy-aid procedures to observe each other for
early symptoms of toxic exposure and to request medical assistance.
C-30. The troop commander should select separate casualty collection
points for both contaminated and noncontaminated casualties to prevent
cross-contamination. The 1SG should rehearse movement to and from
these sites in MOPP 4. Additionally the commander should designate
vehicles to be used in a dirty casualty evacuation. All contaminated
casualties should be decontaminated as thoroughly as the situation
allows before being evacuated. The troop must include in its casualty
evacuation request the number of contaminated patients; this will allow
the evacuation team to send the proper number of vehicles for pickup.
C-31. Chemical agents fall into four major categories: nerve, blister,
blood, and choking. Their primary routes of attack on the body are
through the respiratory system and the skin. These agents are especially
dangerous because they can kill or incapacitate quickly. The first, and
most important, step in dealing with them effectively is to recognize
symptoms so proper treatment can be administered. Table C-2 lists
protection and detection measures, symptoms, and treatment and
decontamination procedures for chemical agents.
C-7
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Table C-2. Chemical Agent Protection Procedures
Agent Type Nerve Blister Blood Choking

Protection Protective mask and Protective mask and Protective mask Protective mask
suit suit
Detection M22 ACADA, M8A1, M22 ACADA, M256A1 Odor only
M256A1, chemical M256A1, M8 paper, (resembles
agent monitor (CAM) CAM/ICAM new-mown hay
or improved chemical or green corn)
agent monitor
(ICAM), M8 paper
Symptoms Difficult breathing, Burning eyes, Convulsions Coughing,
drooling, nausea, stinging skin, irritated and coma choking,
vomiting, nose (no symptoms nausea,
convulsions, blurred with mustard or headache,
vision nitrogen mustard) tightness in
chest
Effects Incapacitates Blisters skin and Incapacitates Floods and
damages respiratory damages lungs
tract
First aid Mark 1 nerve agent Same as for second- NONE Avoid
antidote kit (NAAK); and third-degree movement and
convulsive antidote, burns keep warm
nerve agent (CANA)
Decontamination Use M291 kit on skin Use M291 kit on skin NONE NONE
and flush eyes with and flush eyes with
water; use M295 water; use M295
IEDK to IEDK to
decontaminate decontaminate
individual equipment individual equipment
SECTION IV – MARKING CONTAMINATION
C-32. Contamination must be marked so unsuspecting personnel will

not be exposed to it. When troop detection, monitoring, or reconnaissance
teams detect or suspect NBC hazards, they mark all likely entry points
into the area and report the contamination to higher headquarters.
C-33. The only exception to this policy occurs when marking the area
would help the threat. If the commander makes this exception, the
hazard must still be reported to protect friendly units.
MARKING PROCEDURES
C-34. Markers should always face away from the contamination. For
example, if markers are placed on the edge of a contaminated area to
mark a radiological hot spot, they face away from the point of the highest
contamination reading. Markers are placed at roads, trails, and other
likely points of entry. When time and mission permit, additional markers
should be emplaced. The distance between signs varies. In open terrain,
they can be placed farther apart than in hilly or wooded areas. Soldiers
should be able to stand in front of a marker and see the markers to the
left and right of it.
C-8
C-35. Units discovering a marked contaminated area do not have to

conduct elaborate, time-consuming surveys. The new unit checks the
extent of contamination and alters its plans, if necessary. If the size of
the hazard has either expanded or decreased, they relocate the signs. If
the hazard is gone, they remove the signs. Changes are reported to
higher headquarters.
C-36. US forces use standard NATO markers to make it easier for allies
to recognize the hazards (see Figure C-1). These markers are in the
standard NBC marking set. Colors and inscriptions on a marker indicate
the type of hazard. Other contamination information is written on the
front of the sign.
Figure C-1. NBC Marking Devices
UNMASKING PROCEDURES
C-37. Soldiers should unmask as soon as possible except when a
biological or chemical attack is expected. Use the procedures outlined in
the following paragraphs to determine if unmasking is safe.
C-38. If an M256/M256A1 detector kit is available, use it to supplement
unmasking procedures. The kit does not detect all agents; therefore,
proper unmasking procedures, which take approximately 15 minutes,
must still be used. If all tests with the kit (including a check for liquid
C-9
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
contamination using M8 detector paper) have been performed and the

results are negative, use the following procedures:
• The senior person should select one or two soldiers to start
the unmasking procedures. If possible, they move to a shady
place; bright, direct sunlight can cause pupils in the eyes to
constrict, giving a false symptom.
• The selected soldiers unmask for 5 minutes, then clear and
reseal their masks.
• Observe the soldiers for 10 minutes. If no symptoms appear,
request permission from higher headquarters to signal “ALL
CLEAR.”
• Watch all soldiers for possible delayed symptoms. Always
have first-aid treatment immediately available in case it is
needed.
C-39. If an M256/M256A1 kit is not available, the unmasking
procedures take approximately 35 minutes. When a reasonable amount of
time has passed after the attack, find a shady area; use M8 paper to
check the area for possible liquid contamination. Conduct unmasking
using these procedures:
• The senior person selects one or two soldiers. They take a
deep breath and break their mask seals, keeping their eyes
wide open.
• After 15 seconds, the soldiers clear and reseal their masks.
Observe them for 10 minutes.
• If no symptoms appear, the same soldiers break the seals,
take two or three breaths, and clear and reseal their masks.
Observe them for 10 minutes.
• If no symptoms appear, the same soldiers unmask for 5
minutes, then remask.
• If no symptoms appear in 10 minutes, request permission
from higher headquarters to signal “ALL CLEAR.” Continue
to observe all soldiers in case delayed symptoms develop.
C-40. The all-clear signal is given by word of mouth through the chain
of command. It is initiated by higher headquarters after testing for
contamination proves negative. If required, standard sound signals may
be used, such as a continuous, sustained blast on a siren, vehicle horn, or
similar device. When “ALL CLEAR” is announced on the radio, it must be
authenticated before compliance. The commander designates the specific
all-clear signal and includes it in his SOP.
WARNING AND REPORTING SYSTEMS

C-41. The NBCWRS is a rapid means of sending reports of an NBC
attack. The reports inform other affected units of clean areas and possible
contamination. They are also used to report contaminated areas up and
down the chain of command and to adjacent units. Each report has a
specific purpose and uses standard codes to shorten and simplify the
reporting process. Refer to FM 3-11.3 [FM(M) 3-3] for the formats and
letter codes of standard NBC reports. The scout troop’s priority should be
to pass detailed information, in the form of SPOTREPs, to the
C-10
battalion/squadron chemical officer or NBC NCO. The troop NBC NCO

should then send the proper NBC report to higher headquarters.
SECTION V – DECONTAMINATION
C-42. Since continued operation in the presence of nuclear or chemical

contamination will cause casualties and severe combat degradation,
decontamination is essential. To get the maximum benefit of the time
and resources available, the troop should conduct decontamination using
the following decontamination principles:
• Conduct it as soon as possible.
• Conduct it only to the extent necessary to ensure safety and
operational readiness.
• Conduct it as far forward as possible.
• Conduct it by priority.
C-43. These principles are consistent with doctrine that places the
burden of decontamination at battalion or troop level. For this reason,
the troop must use all of the available decontamination assets to
maximum benefit and develop a thorough SOP covering decontamination
methods and priorities. Refer to FM 3-11.5 (FM 3-5) for more detailed
information on NBC decontamination.
IMMEDIATE DECONTAMINATION
C-44. Immediate decontamination is a basic soldier survival skill
carried out by soldiers as soon as possible after they discover they are
contaminated. Its basic purposes are to minimize casualties, save lives,
and limit the further spread of contamination. Any contact between
chemical or biological agents and bare skin should be treated as an
emergency. Some agents can kill if they remain on the skin for longer
than a minute. The best technique for removing or neutralizing these
agents is to use the M291 skin decontamination kit. Leaders must ensure
that their soldiers are trained to execute this technique automatically,
without waiting for orders. Skin decontamination is a soldier’s basic
survival skill and should be performed within one minute of being
contaminated.
C-45. Personal wipedown should begin within 15 minutes of
contamination. The wipedown removes or neutralizes contamination on
the hood, mask, gloves, and personal weapon. For chemical and biological
contamination, soldiers use mitts from the M295 individual equipment
decontamination kit (IEDK). For radiological contamination, they wipe
off the contamination with a cloth or simply brush or shake it away.
C-46. Operator’s spraydown of equipment should begin immediately
after completion of personal wipedown. The spraydown removes or
neutralizes contamination on the surfaces operators must touch
frequently to perform their mission. For chemical and biological
contamination, operators can use on-board decontamination apparatuses,
such as the M11/M13, or the newly fielded M100 sorbent
C-11
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
decontamination system (SDS). Use the M295 IEDK to decontaminate

surfaces to which decontaminating solution 2 (DS2) cannot be applied, or
if the M100 SDS is not available.
NOTE: DS2 must be washed off surfaces no more than 30 minutes after application. If
necessary, use 5-gallon water cans or other water sources to assist in removing
DS2. For radiological contamination, they brush or scrape away the contamination
with whatever is at hand or flush it with water and wipe it away.
NOTE: M100 SDS replaces the M11’s and M13’s currently employed in operator spraydown
operations associated with immediate decontamination. It is not approved for use
on skin. The system uses powdered sorbent to remove chemical agents from
surfaces. The SDS is designed to operate at temperatures between -25 degrees and
120 degrees Fahrenheit.
OPERATIONAL DECONTAMINATION
C-47. Operational decontamination allows a force to continue fighting
and sustain its mission after being contaminated. It limits the hazard of
transferring contamination by removing most of the gross contamination
on equipment and nearly all the contamination on soldiers. This speeds
the weathering process and allows clean areas (people, equipment, and
terrain) to stay clean. Following operational decontamination, soldiers
who have removed sources of vapor contamination from their clothing
and equipment can use hazard-free areas to unmask temporarily to eat,
drink, and rest.
C-48. Operational decontamination is accomplished using assets of the
parent unit. It makes use of two decontamination techniques: vehicle
washdown and MOPP gear exchange. These procedures are conducted at
the same time and are best performed at squad level. Vehicles and
personnel that are not contaminated should not go through either
process.
C-49. Vehicle washdown, conducted as far forward as possible, is
performed by the task force power-driven decontamination equipment
(PDDE) crew with assistance from the squad decontamination crew. It is
most effective if started within 1 hour after contamination. There are two
steps in vehicle washdown:
• Step 1. Button up the vehicle and secure equipment.
• Step 2. Wash down the vehicle and equipment with hot, soapy
water for 2 to 3 minutes.
C-50. Because speed is important, do not check vehicles for
contamination after vehicle washdown. Remove only gross
contamination.
THOROUGH DECONTAMINATION
C-51. Thorough decontamination reduces contamination to negligible
risk levels. It restores combat power by removing nearly all
contamination from unit and individual equipment. This allows troops to
operate equipment safely for extended periods at reduced MOPP levels. A
contaminated unit conducts detailed troop decontamination under
supervision of the chemical unit. Ordinarily, the chemical unit selects a
C-12
site, sets it up, and performs the detailed equipment decontamination

with assistance from the contaminated unit. A small risk from residual
contamination remains, so periodic contamination checks must be made
after this operation.
C-52. Thorough decontamination is conducted as part of an extensive
reconstitution effort in brigade, division, and corps support areas;
support sites at lower levels cannot provide the quantities of
decontamination resources (such as water, decontaminants, and time)
required for such an extensive process. In some cases, a contaminated
unit can conduct a thorough decontamination operation with organic
decontamination assets, but support from a chemical unit is usually
required.
C-53. After thorough decontamination, the unit moves into an adjacent
assembly area for reconstitution. Support elements from the brigade,
division, or corps support areas replenish combat stocks, refit equipment,
and replace personnel and equipment. The newly reconstituted unit
leaves the assembly area fully operational and fit to return to battle.
C-54. Thorough decontamination does the most thorough job of getting
rid of contamination and its hazards, but it often is not possible. It
requires large quantities of valuable resources that may not be
immediately available. The next best solution is to decontaminate only
what is necessary to sustain the force and continue to fight.
SECTION VI – RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY IN AN NBC

ENVIRONMENT
C-55. In an ideal situation, all NBC reconnaissance will be performed

by an NBC reconnaissance platoon. When NBC reconnaissance assets are
not available, the troop will assign one of its recce platoons the task to
perform NBC reconnaissance. In other cases, the troop must be prepared
to integrate NBC reconnaissance elements into troop reconnaissance
operations.
C-56. The NBC reconnaissance platoon may work closely with the
troop. When the two organizations are working together, their
capabilities should complement each other. The command relationship
between the troop and NBC reconnaissance platoon, which should be
based on METT-TC factors, may be one of the following:
• The troop providing assets OPCON to the NBC
reconnaissance platoon.
• The NBC reconnaissance platoon OPCON to a platoon from
the troop.
• A platoon and the NBC platoon working together under the
control of the troop commander.
C-57. As an example, if the primary focus of the troops’ reconnaissance
mission is to locate contaminated areas, the NBC reconnaissance platoon
leader may be selected to lead the operation. On the other hand, the troop
may select one of its organic platoons to lead and coordinate the mission
if threat presence is significant, if extensive dismounted operations are
C-13
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
anticipated, or if the mission is oriented on the threat force. FM 3-20.98

[FM 17-98] provides additional details concerning the integration of NBC
and recce platoon operations.
C-58. In all cases when the two types of units are operating together,
the NBC platoon’s primary task should be NBC reconnaissance. The
troop has capabilities for which it is better equipped or organized; it
should perform tasks related to those capabilities, such as the following:
• Overwatch and security for NBC reconnaissance elements.
• Dismounted operations in concert with NBC reconnaissance.
• Reconnaissance of bypasses once a contaminated area is
identified.
• Initial location of contaminated areas, followed by handover
to the NBC reconnaissance platoon for detailed
reconnaissance and marking.
• Liaison or command and control linkup between the NBC
reconnaissance platoon and the commander of the scouts.
SECTION VII – TOXIC INDUSTRIAL MATERIAL HAZARDS
C-59. Toxic industrial material (TIM) hazards, previously considered

insignificant during wartime, increase greatly in significance when
manufactured, stored, distributed, or transported in close proximity to
fixed sites, ports, or airfields. Deliberate or inadvertent release
significantly increases hazards to the indigenous population and US
forces. While continuous wave (CW) agents are highly toxic and lethal
even in small amounts, countries that produce them are generally known
and are few in number when compared to the quantities and universal
nature of TIMs. Given the prevalence of TIMs throughout the world, US
forces use area studies, intelligence estimates, and/or economic studies to
possibly indicate TIM hazards in an area of operation. TIMs should be
recognized for the singular hazards they pose as well as the potential
risks that may result from explosion or fire. Most TIMs present a vapor
(inhalation) hazard. Vapor concentration at or near the point of release
may be very high and may reduce the oxygen concentration below that
required to support life. TIMs are generally classified in one of the
following categories:
• Agricultural—insecticides, herbicides, and fertilizers.
• Industrial—chemical and radiological materials used in
manufacturing processes or for cleaning.
• Production or research—chemicals and biological materials
produced or stored in a facility.
• Radiological—nuclear power plants, medical facilities, and
laboratories.
C-14
Appendix D
Stability Operations and Support Operations

The reconnaissance troop’s CONTENTS
flexibility and deploy- Stability Operations .....................................D-1
ability has made it an Characteristics of Stability
attractive asset for use in Operations.............................................D-2
The Army’s Role in Stability
stability operations and Operations.............................................D-2
support operations as part Types of Stability Operations..................D-3
of its parent unit. The Considerations for Stability
troop may perform a Operations.............................................D-8
Support Operations .....................................D-9
variety of missions in a Characteristics of Support
wide range of political, Operations.............................................D-9
military, and geographical The Army’s Role in Support
environments and in both Operations.............................................D-10
combat and noncombat Types of Support Operations ..................D-10
Forms of Support Operations .................D-11
situations. These oper- Considerations for Support
ations will normally be Operations.............................................D-14
decentralized and can Troop’s Role in Stability/Support
require immediate decis- Operations.............................................D-15
Planning and Preparation
ions, down to the squad Considerations......................................D-16
leader level, that may have Force Protection.......................................D-25
strategic or operational Task Organization ....................................D-25
consequences. The distinc- CSS Considerations.................................D-25
tion between these roles Media Considerations ..............................D-26
Operations with Outside Agencies .........D-26
and situations will not Leader Requirements...............................D-26
always be clear, presenting Soldiers’ Responsibilities........................D-26
unique challenges for the Employment Considerations...................D-27
troop, its leaders, and its Specific Troop Tasks ...............................D-27
soldiers.
SECTION I – STABILITY OPERATIONS
D-1. Stability operations are conducted outside the US and its

territories to promote and protect US national interests by influencing
political, civil, and military environments and by disrupting specific
illegal activities. Combatant commanders employ Army forces to
accomplish those goals by supporting diplomatic initiatives, improving
military-to-military relations, and by deterring or resolving conflict.
Their overall purpose is to promote and sustain regional stability.
D-2. Stability operations may include both developmental and coercive
actions. Developmental actions are aimed at enhancing a government’s
willingness and ability to care for its people. Coercive actions involve the
application of limited force or the threat of force to change the
environment within the AO.
D-1
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
CHARACTERISTICS OF STABILITY OPERATIONS

D-3. Stability operations are normally executed in the context of the
geographic combatant commander’s theater strategy. Commanders
employ military forces to complement and reinforce the other elements of
national power as part of their theater engagement plan.
D-4. Stability operations may include both developmental and coercive
actions. Developmental actions enhance a host nation (HN) government’s
willingness and ability to care for its people. Coercive actions apply
carefully prescribed limited force or threat of force to change the
environment of the AO. Military forces conduct stability operations to
accomplish one or more of the following:
• Protect national interests (as defined by the National
Command Authority).
• Promote peace/deter aggression.
• Satisfy treaty obligations or enforce agreements and policies.
• Reassure allies, friendly governments, and agencies.
• Encourage a weak or faltering government.
• Maintain or restore order.
• Protect life and property.
• Demonstrate resolve.
• Prevent, deter, or respond to terrorism.
• Reduce the threat of conventional arms and weapons of mass
destruction to regional security.
• Eliminate or contain subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.
THE ARMY’S ROLE IN STABILITY OPERATIONS

D-5. Army forces are particularly well suited for stability operations
because they are trained, equipped, and organized to control land,
populations, and situations for extended periods of time. Its capabilities
provide the commander vital options to meet operational requirements.
This routinely includes conducting peace operations, military-to-military
contacts, humanitarian demining operations, and multinational training
exercises or exchanges.
D-6. Stability operations are inherently complex and place greater
demands at the small-unit level. Junior leaders are required to develop
engagement skills while maintaining warfighting skills. Capable,
trained, disciplined, high-quality leaders, soldiers, and teams are
especially critical to success. Soldiers and units at every level must be
flexible and adaptive. Often stability operations require the mental and
physical agility to shift from noncombat to combat operations and back
again.
D-7. Stability operations conducted by Army forces complement and
are complemented by offensive, defensive, and support operations.
Stability operations help restore law and order during support operations
in unstable areas. Offensive and defensive operations may be necessary
to defeat adversaries intent on preventing the success of a stability
operation. Shows of force (presence) often precede offensive and defensive
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___________________________________ Appendix D – Stability Operations and Support Operations
operations in attempts to deter aggression and provide opportunities for

diplomatic and economic solutions. The ability of Army forces to stabilize
a crisis is directly related to its ability to attack and defend.
D-8. Army forces may conduct stability operations before hostilities, in
crisis situations, during hostilities, and after hostilities. Before hostilities
begin, stability operations focus on deterring or preempting conflict. In a
crisis situation, a stability operation may resolve a potential conflict or
prevent escalation. During hostilities, it can help keep armed conflict
from spreading. Following hostilities, it can provide a secure environment
for civil authorities to work in to regain control.
PEACETIME MILITARY ENGAGEMENT
D-9. Peacetime military engagement (PME) activities are stability
operations designed to have a positive impact on the regional security
environment and preclude conflict. The objectives of PMEs are to open
communication, increase interoperability, increase regional military
professionalism, educate HN forces on the role of the military in a
democracy, and increase regional stability. Examples of PME activities
include multinational training exercises, individual training and
observers, medical and engineer projects and exercises, and staff
information exchanges.
RAPID RESPONSE AND PRECLUSION
D-10. Rapidly responding in the early stages of an imminent or ongoing
crisis is a critical component of stability operations. For example, rapidly
responding to a smaller-scale contingency (SSC) can defuse a crisis
situation and restore regional stability. Prompt deployment of sufficient
forces in the initial phase of a crisis can preclude the need to deploy a
larger force later. The deployed force must be capable of conducting
decisive offensive and defensive operations to achieve successful
preclusion.
PRESENCE AND DETERRENCE
D-11. Presence promotes a secure environment in which diplomatic and
economic programs designed to eliminate root causes of instability may
flourish. It can take the form of forward basing, forward deploying, or
prepositioning assets in an AO.
D-12. Deterrence for both SSCs and major theaters of war (MTW) is the
sustainable presence of strong, capable ground forces. If deterrence fails,
or if required, Army forces must be ready to transition to decisive combat
operations. Effective deterrent forces should ideally be capable of
conducting decisive operations immediately.
TYPES OF STABILITY OPERATIONS

D-13. There are typically 10 types of stability operations. These
operations may be conducted to complement any offensive, defensive,
and/or support operation; may be the decisive operation; or they may
occur before, during, and/or after an offensive, defensive, and support
operation. The types of stability operations, which are described in this
discussion, are the following:
• Peace operations.
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• Foreign internal defense.

• Security assistance.
• Humanitarian and civic assistance.
• Support to insurgencies.
• Support to counterdrug operations.
• Combating terrorism.
• Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO).
• Arms control.
• Show of force.
PEACE OPERATIONS
D-14. Peace operations support strategic and policy objectives. Peace
operations include peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement
operations. The US usually participates in peace operations as part of a
UN force or another multinational organization; it reserves the right to
conduct peace operations unilaterally. Peace operations require the
continual assessment of commanders and staffs to ensure that units are
ready to transition into other operations as a result of an escalation of the
current situation. The transition may be from a US unilateral operation
or multinational coalition to a UN led coalition, from noncombat to
combat operations, and from military to civilian control.
Peacekeeping Operations
D-15. A peacekeeping operation is conducted with the consent of all
major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate
implementation of agreements (cease fire, truce, or other such
agreements), and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long term political
settlement. They use or threaten the use of force only in self-defense or as
a last resort to accomplish the mission.
Peace Enforcement Operations
D-16. Peace enforcement operations are the application of military
force, or threat of force, normally to compel compliance with resolutions
or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. Peace
enforcement operations normally include one or more of six subordinate
operations:
• Forcible separation of belligerents.
• Establishment and supervision of protected areas.
• Sanction and exclusion zone enforcement.
• Movement denial and guarantee.
• Restoration and maintenance of order.
• Protection of humanitarian assistance.
D-17. The nature of this type of mission requires that the military force
must be capable of conducting combat operations. Maintaining and
demonstrating combat capability is essential for successful peace
enforcement operations.
Operations in Support of Diplomatic Efforts
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D-18. Forces may conduct operations in support of diplomatic efforts to

establish peace and order before, during, and after a conflict. These
operations include preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace
building. Military support of diplomatic activities improves the chances
for success by lending credibility to diplomatic actions and demonstrating
resolve to achieve viable political settlements.
D-19. Preventive Diplomacy. Preventive diplomacy is diplomatic action
taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence. Army
forces are not normally directly involved in preventive diplomacy but
may support a state department effort by providing transportation and
communications assets. In some cases, military forces may conduct a
preventive deployment or show of force as part of the overall effort to
deter conflict.
D-20. Peacemaking. Peacemaking is the process of diplomacy,
mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that
arranges an end to a dispute and resolves the issue that led to the
conflict. It includes military actions that support the diplomatic process.
Army forces participate in these operations primarily by performing
military-to-military contacts, exercises, peacetime deployments, and
security assistance.
D-21. Peace Building. Peace building consists of post-conflict actions,
predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild
governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse
into conflict. Military actions that support peace building are designed to
identify, restore, and support structures that strengthen and solidify
peace. Typical peace building activities include restoring civil authority,
rebuilding physical infrastructure, providing structures and training for
schools and hospitals, and helping reestablish commerce.
FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE
D-22. Foreign internal defense is participation by civilian and military
agencies of a government in any action programs taken by another
government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness,
and insurgency. The main objective is to promote stability by helping a
HN establish and maintain institutions and facilities responsive to its
people’s needs.
D-23. Army forces in foreign internal defense normally advise and
assist HN forces conducting operations to increase their capabilities.
When conducting foreign internal defense, all Army forces provide
indirect or direct support (not involving combat operations), or conduct
combat operations to support HN efforts.
SECURITY ASSISTANCE
D-24. Security assistance refers to a group of programs by which the US
provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related
services to foreign nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in
furtherance of national policies and objectives.
D-25. Army forces support security assistance efforts through military
training teams, maintenance support personnel and training, and related
activities.
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HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE

D-26. Humanitarian and civic assistance programs consist of assistance
provided in conjunction with military operations and exercises. In
contrast to humanitarian and disaster relief operations, they are planned
activities. Humanitarian and civic actions are limited to the following
categories:
• Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas
of a country.
• Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.
• Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
• Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.
SUPPORT TO INSURGENCIES
D-27. The US may support insurgencies that oppose regimes that
threaten US interests or are a threat to regional stability. This type of
mission is normally carried out by special operation forces. Support
generally includes logistic and training support, but normally not combat
operations.
SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS
D-28. In 1986, the President declared drug trafficking a threat to
national security. This resulted in US forces being employed in a variety
of operations to support other agencies that are responsible for detecting,
disrupting, interdicting, and destroying illicit drugs and the
infrastructure (personnel, material, and distribution systems) of illicit
drug-trafficking entities. Counterdrug activities are always conducted in
conjunction with another government agency. When executed inside of
the US and its territories, counterdrug operations are considered
domestic support operations. Army forces do not engage in direct action
during counterdrug operations. Typical support to counterdrug
operations include the following:
• Detection and monitoring.
• Host nation.
• Command, control, communications, and computers.
• Intelligence.
• Planning.
• Logistics.
• Training.
• Manpower.
• Research, development, and acquisition.
• Reconnaissance.
COMBATING TERRORISM
D-29. In all types of stability operations, counterterrorism and
antiterrorism activities are a continuous requirement in protecting
installations, units, and individuals from the threat of terrorism. These
operations contain elements of both offensive and defensive operations.
Counterterrorism encompasses a full range of offensive measures to
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prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism including strikes and raids. This
is a specified mission for selected special operation forces. Antiterrorism
focuses on defensive measures used to reduce vulnerabilities of
individuals and property to terrorist attacks, to include limited response
and containment by local military forces. Commanders must take the
security measures necessary to accomplish the mission and protect the
force against terrorism. Typical antiterrorism actions include the
following:
• Coordination with local law enforcement.
• Positioning and hardening of facilities.
• Physical security actions designed to prevent unauthorized
access or approach to facilities.
• Crime prevention and physical security actions that prevent
theft of weapons, munitions, identification cards, and other
materials.
• Policies regarding travel, size of convoys, breaking of
routines, HN interaction, and off-duty restrictions.
• Protection from WMD.
NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS
D-30. NEOs are primarily conducted to evacuate US citizens whose
lives are in danger from locations in a foreign nation to a secure area.
They may also include HN civilians and third-country nationals. NEOs
may take place in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment. It can
be conducted as a prelude to combat actions, as part of deterrent actions,
or as part of peace operations. NEOs involve swift insertion and
temporary occupation of an objective, followed by a planned withdrawal.
Leaders use only the amount of force required for self-defense and
protection of evacuees.
ARMS CONTROL
D-31. Arms control operations are normally conducted to support arms
control treaties and enforcement agencies. Army forces may conduct arms
control during combat operations or stability operations to prevent
escalation of the conflict and reduce instability. This could include a
mandated disarming of the belligerents and/or the collection, storing, and
destruction of conventional munitions and weapon systems.
SHOW OF FORCE
D-32. A show of force is an operation designed to demonstrate US
resolve that involves the increased visibility of US deployed forces. The
US conducts show of force for three reasons: to bolster and reassure
allies, to deter potential aggressors, and to gain or increase influence.
The show of force operation usually involves the deployment or build-up
of forces in the AO, an increase in the readiness status and level of
activity of designated forces, or a demonstration of operational
capabilities by forces in the AO. Units assigned this mission must assume
that combat is not only possible but also probable.
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CONSIDERATIONS FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS

D-33. Planning, preparing, executing, and assessing stability
operations is fundamentally identical to the process used for offensive,
defensive, and support operations. However, the following six
considerations help Army forces develop tailored concepts and schemes
for stability operations.
LEVERAGE INTERAGENCY, JOINT, AND MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION
D-34. Unity of effort is fundamental to success in stability operations.
Achieving unity of effort requires constant coordination with all involved
agencies. Commanders must adapt to situations where there may not be
a clear delineation of authority and responsibility. This is especially
important in stability operations since the military is often the
supporting rather than the supported agency.
D-35. Coordinating and integrating civilian and military activities
should take place at every level. A coordination center such as the civil-
military operations center (CMOC) is designed to accomplish this task.
These operations centers should include as many agencies as possible.
Effective civil-military operations can reduce the use of US resources
through coordination with host and third-nation governmental
organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and international
organizations operating in the AO.
ENHANCE THE CAPABILITIES AND LEGITIMACY OF THE HOST NATION
D-36. Army forces must demonstrate the proper respect for the HN
government, police, and military forces to be successful in a stability
operation. The HN military and police forces must be integrated as much
as possible with all aspects of planning, preparing, executing, and
assessing every operation.
D-37. When HN capabilities are inadequate for the task, Army forces
focus on enhancing those capabilities through training, advice, and
assistance. Commanders make maximum use of HN forces and personnel
as lead for all possible activities. These include offensive and defensive
operations, protection of the civilian populace, security of critical
facilities and installations, intelligence and counterintelligence tasks,
new construction and reconstruction, psychological operations (PSYOP),
police duties, and civil affairs (CA).
UNDERSTAND THE POTENTIAL FOR UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF INDIVIDUAL
AND SMALL-UNIT ACTIONS
D-38. Individual and small-unit actions can have consequences
disproportionate to the level of command or amount of force involved. In
some cases, tactical operations and individual actions can have strategic
impact. Recognizing and avoiding these potential problems requires
trained, disciplined, and knowledgeable leaders and soldiers at every
level. Every soldier must be aware of the operational and strategic
context of the mission. Additionally, each soldier must understand the
potential military, political, and legal consequences of the actions they
take or fail to take. Dissemination of this information throughout the
force minimizes any possible confusion regarding desired objectives.
D-8
DISPLAY THE CAPABILITY TO USE FORCE WITHOUT THREATENING

D-39. Army forces conducting stability operations must be capable of
limited combat operations for self-defense. The intent is to demonstrate
strength and resolve without provoking an unintended response. To be
effective, shows of force in stability operations cannot be perceived as
attempts to goad or bully an opponent into an attack.
D-40. Units can display preparedness by routinely conducting
demanding combat training in the AO. Training should include
challenging soldiers to react to situations involving weapons use, levels of
force, and rules of engagement (ROE).
ACT DECISIVELY TO PREVENT ESCALATION
D-41. Army forces must always be prepared to act with speed and
determination when carrying out assigned tasks. Opponents of stability
may perceive hesitation to act decisively as weakness. Units and
individuals must pursue military objectives energetically and apply
military power forcefully. By doing so, Army forces assure friend and foe
alike that they not only can protect themselves and the people and
facilities under their charge but also achieve stability objectives.
APPLY FORCE SELECTIVELY AND DISCRIMINATELY
D-42. Commanders must make sure their units apply force consistent
with and adequate to assigned objectives and employ combat power
selectively in accordance with assigned missions and prescribed legal and
policy limitations. Commanders use the ROE to guide the tactical
application of combat power. When available, nonlethal capabilities can
provide additional tools to augment, but not replace, the traditional
means of deadly force. Nonlethal means are particularly valuable in both
stability operations and support operations as they expand the number of
options that are available to confront situations in which the use of
deadly force is not warranted or ill advised. The commander on the
ground is best qualified to estimate the correct degree of force that must
be used, consistent with the ROE.
SECTION II – SUPPORT OPERATIONS
D-43. Support operations employ Army forces to assist foreign and

domestic civil authorities as they prepare for or respond to crises and
relieve suffering. Support continues until civil control can be
reestablished or support is no longer required. The overall purpose of
support operations is to meet the immediate needs of designated groups,
for a limited time, until civil authorities can accomplish these tasks
without Army assistance.
CHARACTERISTICS OF SUPPORT OPERATIONS

D-44. Support operations involve Army forces providing essential
supplies, capabilities, and services to help civil authorities deal with
situations beyond their control. In most cases, Army forces are focused on
overcoming conditions created by natural or man-made disasters. Army
forces may provide relief or assistance directly. However, Army force
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activities in support operations most often involve setting the conditions

that facilitate civil authorities or NGOs providing required direct support
to the affected population.
THE ARMY’S ROLE IN SUPPORT OPERATIONS

D-45. The Army is not specifically organized, trained, or equipped for
support operations. Instead, Army elements and forces, tailored for
warfighting, are rapidly adapted to dominate a crisis or disaster
situation. In support operations, Army forces apply decisive military
capabilities to set the conditions for the supported civil authorities to
achieve success. Army forces have a functional chain of command,
reliable communications, and well trained and equipped forces that can
operate and sustain themselves in an austere environment with organic
assets. In most situations, Army forces involved in support operations,
both domestic support organizations and foreign humanitarian
assistance, will execute a combination of multiple overlapping activities.
TYPES OF SUPPORT OPERATIONS

D-46. The two types of support operations are domestic support
operations and foreign humanitarian assistance operations. Domestic
support operations are conducted in the US and its territories. Active as
well as reserve component Army forces respond to domestic support
operations. Foreign humanitarian assistance operations are conducted
abroad and under the direction of a combatant commander.
DOMESTIC SUPPORT OPERATIONS
D-47. Domestic support operations are those activities and measures
taken by Department of Defense to foster mutual assistance and support
between DoD and any civil government agency in planning or
preparedness for, or in the application of resources for response to, the
consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including national security
emergencies or major disasters. A Presidential Declaration of an
emergency or disaster area usually precedes a domestic support
operation.
D-48. The US military provides domestic support primarily in
accordance with a DoD directive, military assistance to civil authorities.
The military assistance to civil authorities directive addresses responses
to both natural and man-made disasters and includes military assistance
to civil disturbances, counterdrug activities, combating terrorism, and
law enforcement.
D-49. In accordance with the Constitution, civilian government is
responsible for preserving public order. The Constitution does allow the
use of military forces to protect federal and civilian property and
functions. The Posse Comitatus Act restricts the use of the military in
federal status and prevents it from executing laws and performing
civilian law enforcement functions within the US.
D-50. The operations focus on the condition of all types of natural and
man-made properties, with the goal of helping to protect and/or restore
these properties as requested. Typically, environmental operations are
conducted in response to such events as forest and grassland fires,
hazardous material releases, floods, and earthquakes.
D-10
FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

D-51. Foreign humanitarian assistance operations are conducted to
relieve the negative effects of natural or man-made disasters or other
endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, or hunger. The US
military typically supplements the HN authorities in concert with other
civilian agencies—US, international, governmental, and private.
D-52. Foreign humanitarian assistance operations are limited in scope
and duration, focus on providing relief for the immediate crises, and are
only conducted in a permissive environment. Crises or disasters caused
by hostile individuals or factions attacking its government would
normally be classified as a stability operation. In environments where the
situation is vague or hostile, support activities conducted would be
considered a subset of a larger stability, offensive, or defensive operation.
D-53. The majority of foreign humanitarian assistance operations
closely resemble domestic support operations. The distinction between
the two is the legal restrictions applied to US forces inside the US and its
territories. The Posse Comitatus Act does not apply to US forces
overseas.
FORMS OF SUPPORT OPERATIONS

D-54. Most offensive, defensive, and stability operations will require
some form of support operations before, during, and after execution.
Support operations generally fall into four categories:
• Relief operations.
• Support to incidents involving WMD.
• Support to civil law enforcement.
•Community assistance.
D-55. Support operations may be independent actions, or they may
complement offensive, defensive, and stability operations.
RELIEF OPERATIONS
D-56. In general, the actions performed during relief operations are
identical in both domestic support operations and foreign humanitarian
assistance operations. The actions can be characterized as either disaster
relief, which focuses on recovery of critical infrastructure after a natural
or man-made disaster, or humanitarian relief, which focuses on the well
being of supported populations. Relief operations accomplish one or more
of the following:
• Save lives.
• Reduce suffering.
• Recover essential infrastructure.
• Improve quality of life.
Disaster Relief
D-57. This encompasses the actions taken to restore or recreate the
minimum infrastructure to allow effective humanitarian relief to be
accomplished and set the conditions for longer-term recovery. This
includes establishing and maintaining the minimum safe working
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conditions, minus security measures necessary to protect relief workers

and the affected population from additional harm. Disaster relief may
involve repairing or demolishing damaged structures, restoring or
building bridges, roads and airfields, and removing debris from critical
routes and relief sites.
Humanitarian Relief
D-58. This focuses on life-saving measures to alleviate the immediate
needs of a population in crisis. It often includes the provision of medical
support, food, water, medicines, clothing, blankets, shelter, and
heating/cooking fuel. In some cases, it involves transportation support to
move affected people from a disaster area.
Phases of Relief Operations
D-59. Although each operation is unique, support operations are
generally conducted in three broad phases:
• Response.
• Recovery.
• Restoration.
D-60. Army elements can expect to be most heavily committed during
the response phase. They will be progressively less involved during the
recovery phase, with only very limited activity, if any, during the
restoration phase.
D-61. Response Phase. In the response phase, commanders focus on
life-sustaining functions that are required by those in the disaster area.
These functions describe response operations:
• Search and rescue.
• Emergency flood control.
• Hazard identification.
• Food distribution.
• Water production, purification, and distribution.
• Temporary shelter construction and administration.
• Transportation support.
• Fire fighting.
• Medical support.
• Power generation.
• Communications support.
D-62. Recovery Phase. Recovery phase operations begin the process of
returning the community infrastructure and related services to a status
that meets the immediate needs of the population. Typical recovery
operations include—
• Continuation of response operations as needed.
• Damage assessment.
• Power distribution.
• Water and sanitation services.
D-12
• Debris removal.
D-63. Restoration Phase. Restoration is a long-term process that
returns the community to predisaster normality. Restoration activities do
not generally involve large numbers of military forces. When they are
involved, Army elements generally work with affected communities in
the transfer of responsibility to other agencies as military support forces
redeploy.
SUPPORT TO INCIDENTS INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
D-64. Military operations assist civil authorities in protecting US
territory, population, and infrastructure prior to an attack by supporting
domestic preparedness and critical asset protection programs. If an
attack occurs, military support will respond to the consequences of the
attack.
Domestic Preparedness
D-65. The Army’s role in facilitating domestic preparedness is to
strengthen the existing expertise of civil authorities. This is done in two
primary areas—response and training. Response is the immediate
reaction to an attack and training includes what happens after the
attack.
Protection of Critical Assets
D-66. The purpose of this program is to identify critical assets and to
assure their integrity, availability, survivability, and capability to
support vital DoD missions across the full spectrum of military
operations. Critical assets include telecommunications, electric power,
gas and oil, banking and finance, transportation, water, and emergency
services. An attack on any of these assets may disrupt civilian commerce,
government operations, and the military.
Response to Weapons of Mass Destruction Incidents
D-67. The initial response will be primarily from local assets, but
sustained Army forces participation may be quickly required. The Army’s
capabilities in this environment include the following:
• Detection.
• Decontamination and medical care, including assessment.
• Triage treatment.
• Medical evacuation.
• Hospitalization.
• Follow-up on victims of chemical and biological agents.
SUPPORT TO CIVIL LAW ENFORCEMENT
D-68. Support to domestic civil law enforcement generally involves
activities related to counterterrorism, counterdrug, civil disturbance
operations, or general support. Army support may involve providing
resources, training, or direct support. Federal forces remain under the
control of their military chain of command at all times while providing
the support.
Support to Counterterrorism
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D-69. Military units in support of the lead agency may operate to

eliminate identified threats. Assistance may be provided in the areas of
transportation, equipment, training, and personnel. When terrorists pose
an imminent threat to US territory, its people, and critical assets, the US
military may be used to support operations to counter these threats,
using ground, air, space, special operations, or maritime forces. The
Federal Bureau of Investigation is responsible for crises management in
the US.
Support to Counterdrug Operations
D-70. Army forces support to domestic counterdrug operations is very
limited and will usually be in a support role only.
Civil Disturbance Operations
D-71. The Army assists civil authorities in restoring law and order
when local and state law enforcement agencies are unable to resolve the
civil disturbance. Federal Army forces assist in restoring law and order
when the magnitude of a disturbance exceeds the capabilities of local and
state law enforcement agencies, including the National Guard. Army
participation is to apply the minimum force necessary to restore order to
the point where civilian authorities no longer require military assistance.
General Support
D-72. The Army may also be directed to provide training, share
information, and provide equipment and facilities to federal, state, and
local civilian law enforcement agencies.
COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE
D-73. Community assistance is a broad range of activities designed to
strengthen the relationship between the Army and the American people.
These projects should exercise individual soldier skills, encourage
teamwork, challenge leader planning and coordination skills, and result
in accomplishments that are measurable. Example activities include
Youth Physical Fitness Programs, Medical Readiness Programs, and
Antidrug Programs.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR SUPPORT OPERATIONS

D-74. Planning and executing support operations are fundamentally
similar to planning, preparing, executing, and assessing offensive,
defensive, and stability operations. However, while each support
operation is unique, the following four broad considerations can help
forces develop mission-specific concepts and schemes for executing
support operations.
PROVIDE ESSENTIAL SUPPORT TO THE LARGEST NUMBER OF PEOPLE
D-75. Commanders will be required to allocate finite resources to
achieve the greatest good. Additionally, commanders require an accurate
assessment of what needs to be done to effectively employ military power.
In some cases, warfighting reconnaissance capabilities and techniques
can be executed to accomplish this task. They must determine how and
where to apply limited assets to benefit the most people in the most
efficient way. Initial efforts are usually focused on restoring vital
D-14
services, which include food and water distribution, medical aid, power
generation, search and rescue, and fire fighting.
COORDINATE ACTIONS WITH OTHER AGENCIES
D-76. Domestic support operations are typically joint and interagency,
and foreign humanitarian assistance operations are usually
multinational. Unity of effort between the military and local authorities
requires constant communication to ensure that tasks are being
conducted in the most efficient and effective way and resources are used
wisely.
ESTABLISH MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
D-77. A critical aspect of mission handover is to have objective
standards for measuring progress. These measures of effectiveness
determine the degree to which an operation is accomplishing its
established objectives. For example, a measure of effectiveness might be
the number of deaths caused by starvation. This is an indicator that food
convoys are reaching the designated areas. These measures are
situationally dependent and must be adjusted as the situation changes
and guidance from higher is developed.
HAND OVER OPERATIONS TO CIVILIAN AGENCIES AS SOON AS FEASIBLE
D-78. Support operations planning must always include the follow-on
actions of the civilian agencies and the HN to restore conditions to
normal. The following considerations determine handover feasibility:
• Condition of supported population and governments.
• Competing mission requirements.
• Specified and implied commitment levels—
Time.
Resources.
Forces.
• Maturity of the support effort.
SECTION III – TROOP’S ROLE IN STABILITY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT

OPERATIONS
D-79. The reconnaissance troop has unique capabilities that make it an

important asset to US and combined forces executing missions in
stability and support operations. Whether it is operating organic or task
organized to another light or heavy force, the troop may be called upon to
support a wide range of operations in various political and geographical
environments.
D-80. The reconnaissance troop is used to execute activities that take
maximum advantage of its inherent capabilities of mobility, stealth,
reconnaissance, surveillance, and (HUMINT) collection. The factors of
METT-TC and the operational considerations prevalent in stability and
support operations may modify these capabilities for successful mission
accomplishment. As a result, the reconnaissance troop occasionally may
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be assigned operations that are normally handled by specially trained

and equipped units. For example, the troop may be tasked for crowd and
riot control if a shortage of military police exists. Additionally, troop
leadership may find itself involved with supporting local authorities, or
the lack of, with the basic needs required for maintaining order and life
support. The list below shows some of the unique capabilities the troop
offers:
• Communications (C2).
• Liaison capability (translations).
• Mobility.
• 24-hour operations.
• Own indirect fire asset (mortars).
• Patrolling/surveillance.
• Leadership (squad to troop-level offers over 15 individuals
able to take charge of a situation).
PLANNING AND PREPARATION CONSIDERATIONS

D-81. Disciplined, well-trained, combat-ready leaders and soldiers can
adapt to the specialized demands of stability operations and support
operations. To achieve this degree of readiness, however, the
reconnaissance troop must be thoroughly trained before deployment on
the operational environment, ROE/ ROI, force protection, and individual
soldier responsibilities. The training must be updated continuously
following deployment.
D-82. There are several important considerations that will influence
planning and preparation for stability operations and support operations,
including the following:
• Environment.
• Tempo.
• Intelligence.
• Decentralized operations.
• ROE.
• Graduated response.
• ROI.
D-83. Below are brief discussions of the considerations. Refer to
FM 3-07.3 [FM 100-23] for a detailed discussion of these subjects.
ENVIRONMENT
D-84. Stability operations and support operations can take place in any
part of the world. To deal effectively with the diverse situations they may
face, US forces must undergo orientation training on the complex
conditions and factors at work in a specific region. Each soldier must
understand the political and economic situation, as well as the cultures,
climates, and terrain of the region. He should understand the military
situation, especially the doctrine, tactics, and equipment that are
employed by belligerent, guerrilla, and terrorist forces. Orientation
training should also clarify the following environmental factors as well as
D-16
the planning and operational considerations discussed in the remainder

of this section.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
TEMPO
D-85. Although extreme tension may underlie stability operations and
support operations, the tempo of these operations is generally slow.
Nonetheless, the speed of military action can vary widely, from fast,
violent tactical movement by a reaction force for the purpose of relieving
encircled friendly forces to the occupation of checkpoints to control
vehicular and civilian traffic.
D-86. Throughout stability operations and support operations, the
threat can be expected to execute both overt and covert operations to test
friendly reaction times and security procedures. Units that are
predictable or that lack sound operations security (OPSEC) leave
themselves susceptible to attack. For the troop, the key to a secure
environment is not only to maintain the highest possible level of OPSEC,
but also to vary the techniques by which security procedures are executed
(e.g., changing patrol routes and moving checkpoints).
INTELLIGENCE
D-87. Intelligence is crucial during the execution of stability operations
and support operations. The threats faced by military forces in these
operations are more ambiguous than those in other situations because
combatants, guerrillas, and terrorists can easily blend with the civilian
population. Before forces are committed and while they are conducting
operations, intelligence must be collected, processed, and focused to
support all planning, training, and operational requirements. (NOTE:
See FM 3-07 [FM 100-20] for additional information.)
D-88. In some cases decentralized operations will require the troop to
develop intelligence with limited assistance from higher headquarters.
The form below (Figure D-1, parts one through four) is an example of a
locally devised tool intended for use in urban environments that can be
used by the troop to gather and assess intelligence for both stability
operations and support operations.
D-18
Figure D-1. Example Scout Report that Supports Information Requirements

for Urban Areas (Part One)
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________

for Urban Areas (Part Two)
D-20

for Urban Areas (Part Three)
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________

for Urban Areas (Part Four)
D-22
DECENTRALIZED OPERATIONS
D-89. Although stability operations and support operations are
normally centrally planned, execution often takes the form of small-scale,
decentralized actions conducted over extended distances. In some
situations, junior leaders will have the responsibility for making
immediate and monumental decisions on the ground. Effective command
guidance and a thorough understanding of ROE are critical at each level.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
D-90. ROE are politically imposed restrictions on military operations.
Higher military authorities direct the ROE based on the political and
tactical situations and the level of threat. For example, these restrictions
may require that the forces involved limit their use of firepower to a
certain geographical area or that they limit the duration of their
operations. Refer to Figure D-2 for an example of ROE for one possible
situation.
D-91. ROE must be considered during the planning and execution of all
operations. The unit’s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) will
require adjustment based on each particular situation’s ROE.
Understanding, adjusting for, and properly executing ROE are especially
important to success in stability operations and support operations. The
restrictions change whenever the political and military situations
change; this means ROE must be updated and explained continuously.
D-92. ROE provide the authority for the soldier’s right to self-defense.
Each soldier must understand the ROE and be prepared to execute them
properly in every possible confrontation. In addition, ROE violations can
have operational, strategic, and political consequences that may affect
national security; the threat can be expected to exploit such violations.
GRADUATED RESPONSE
D-93. ROE will be published in any stability operation and support
operation. As the operation continues and the military is forced to deal
with different ROE situations, the threat will quickly determine what US
forces can and can’t do. With the information, the threat will test US
forces and their resolve. For this reason, a graduated response matrix
should be used. This provides leaders and soldiers a framework of how to
deal with ROE situations. They should be rehearsed using vignettes that
actually put the soldiers and leaders in a situation that forces them to
work through the graduated response. Refer to Figure D-3 for an example
of a graduated response.
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
All threat military personnel and vehicles transporting threat personnel or their equipment may be
engaged subject to the following restrictions:
A. When possible, the threat will be warned first and asked to surrender.
B. Armed force is the last resort.
C. Armed civilians will be engaged only in self-defense.
D. Civilian aircraft will not be engaged, except in self-defense, without approval from division level.
E. All civilians should be treated with respect and dignity. Civilians and their property should not be
harmed unless necessary to save US lives. If possible, civilians should be evacuated before any US
attack. Privately owned property may be used only if publicly owned property is unavailable or its use
is inappropriate.
F. If civilians are in the area, artillery, mortars, AC-130s, attack helicopters, and tube-launched or
rocket-launched weapons should not be used against known or suspected targets without the
permission of a ground maneuver commander (lieutenant colonel or higher).
G. If civilians are in the area, all air attacks must be controlled by forward air controller or forward
observer, and close air support, white phosphorous weapons, and incendiary weapons are
prohibited without approval from division.
H. If civilians are in the area, shoot only at known threat locations.
I. Public works, such as power stations, water treatment plants, dams, and other public utilities, may
not be engaged without approval from division level.
J. Hospitals, churches shrines, schools, museums, and other historical or cultural sites will be engaged
only in self-defense against fire from these locations.
K. All indirect fire and air attacks must be observed.
L. Pilots must be briefed for each mission as to the location of civilians and friendly forces.
M. Booby traps are not authorized. Authority to emplace mines is reserved for the division commander.
Riot control agents can be used only with approval from division level.
N. Prisoners should be treated humanely, with respect and dignity.
O. Annex R to the operations plan (OPLAN) provides more detail. In the event this card conflicts with
the OPLAN, the OPLAN should be followed.
DISTRIBUTION: ONE FOR EACH SOLDER DEPLOYED (ALL RANKS)
Figure D-2. Example Rules of Engagement
D-24
SITUATION: Your unit is conducting an operation (i.e., secure a weapons storage facility).
Signs have been posted that no crowds are allowed near the facility. After a period of time, a
crowd of civilians begins to gather. You are given the order to disperse the crowd as quickly
and safely as possible. The following steps should be followed to disperse the crowd. Steps
can be used independently or in conjunction with each other to get the crowd to disperse.
1. Bring in linguists assigned to your unit to talk to the crowd and tell them to disperse.
2. Employ Airborne Speaker Teams to transmit instructions to the crowd to disperse.
3. Employ bullhorns to relay instructions to the crowd to disperse.
4. Use Loud Noise Speaker Teams to disperse the crowd.
5. Honk the horns of unit vehicles to get the crowd to disperse.
6. Employ concertina wire to keep the crowed from gaining access to the area.
7. Start the vehicle you have to show the crowd that you will move on them if necessary.
8. Employ mechanized vehicles (IAVs) as a show of force to the crowd.
9. Take pictures of the instigators of the crowd.
10. Employ military working dogs to disperse the crowd.
11. Fix bayonets.
12. Conduct procedures used in Civil Disturbance Drills.
13. Use pepper spray to disperse the crowd.
14. Show that you have CS canisters.
15. Use the CS canisters.
16. Employ helicopter blades wash to disperse the crowd.
17. Fire rounds in the air.
18. Employ the use of deadly force.
Figure D-3. Example Graduated Response Card
RULES OF INTERACTION
D-94. ROI describe what forms of local civilian contact are allowed and
prohibited. ROI may account for local political, religious, other cultural
sensitivities; or ROI may be designed to protect US personnel by
prohibiting contact with potentially dangerous elements in the local
population. ROI support mission accomplishment by maintaining a
positive image of US personnel with the local population, and by
preventing US forces from being involved in compromising and
dangerous situations. ROI may also be used to define appropriate
courtesy during interactions with local military and civilian authorities
during activities such as compliance inspections conducted during peace
operations.
D-95. The ROI applied by the troop is developed by higher
headquarters with input from CA, staff judge advocate (SJA), chaplain,
counterintelligence, medical, and others. Although the troop commander
cannot make the published ROI less restrictive, he may need to impose
additional rules to account for local considerations. ROI are tools the
individual soldier will need to deal with the nontraditional threats that
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FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
are prevalent in stability operations and support operations, including

political friction, unfamiliar cultures, and conflicting ideologies. In turn,
ROI enhance the soldier’s survivability in such situations. They must be
tailored to the specific regions, cultures, and/or populations affected by
the operation. Like ROE, ROI can be effective only if they are thoroughly
rehearsed and understood by every soldier in the unit.
FORCE PROTECTION
D-96. Because of the influence of local politics and news media in
stability operations and support operations, precautions and operations
required to minimize casualties and collateral damage become
particularly important operational considerations during these
operations. At the same time, however, force protection must be a
constant priority.
D-97. In attempting to limit the level and scope of violence used in
stability operations and support operations, leaders must avoid making
tactically unsound decisions or exposing the force to unnecessary risks.
On the contrary, an overpowering use of force, correctly employed, can
reduce subsequent violence or prevent a response from the threat force.
This must be covered in the ROE and the OPORD from the troop.
D-98. OPSEC, tempered by restrictions in the ROE and ROI, is an
important tool for the commander in accomplishing his force protection
goals. Security procedures should encompass the full range of
antiterrorist activities for every soldier and leader. Examples include
proper communications security; strict noise, light, and litter discipline;
proper wear of the uniform; display of the proper demeanor for the
situation; as well as effective use of cover and concealment, obstacles,
OPs and early warning devices, the protection afforded by armored
vehicles, and safe locations for eating and resting.
D-99. A final consideration in force protection is hygiene. Many
stability operations and support operations take place in underdeveloped
nations. Proper field sanitation and personal hygiene are mandatory if
soldiers are to stay healthy.
TASK ORGANIZATION
D-100. Because of the unique requirements of stability operations and
support operations, the troop may be augmented to operate with a
variety of units. Examples may include infantry, armor, PSYOP, CA,
counterintelligence, and or military police.
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS

D-101. The operational environment (infrastructure) of stability
operations and support operations may be limited, creating special CSS
considerations. These factors include, but are not limited to, the
following:
• Reliance on local procurement of certain items.
• Shortages of various critical items, including repair parts,
Class IV supply materials, and lubricants.
D-26
• Special Class V requirements, such as pepper spray.

• Reliance on bottled water.
MEDIA CONSIDERATIONS
D-102. The presence of the media is a reality that confronts every soldier
involved in stability operations and support operations. All leaders and
soldiers are subject to instantaneous worldwide scrutiny as a result of the
growth of news coverage via international television and radio broadcasts
and the Internet. Opposition to the operation, or anti-US personnel may
interpret or embellish interviews to imply that the operation counters
official US policy and may damage the nation’s interests and
international standing.
D-103. Soldiers must learn how to deal effectively with broadcast and
print reporters and photographers. Training should cover any
information restrictions imposed on the media. Soldiers must also gain
an understanding of which subjects they are authorized to discuss and
which ones they must refer to higher authorities, such as their chain of
command or the public affairs office (PAO). PAO personnel usually issue
daily guidance dealing with these subjects.
OPERATIONS WITH OUTSIDE AGENCIES

D-104. US Army units may conduct certain stability operations and
support operations in coordination with a variety of outside
organizations. These include other US armed services or government
agencies (see Chapter 6) as well as international organizations, including
private voluntary organizations (PVO), such as Doctors Without Borders;
NGOs, such as the Red Cross; and UN military forces or agencies.
LEADER REQUIREMENTS
D-105. Flexibility and situational awareness are paramount
requirements, especially for the troop commander. The troop’s role and/or
objectives in stability operations and support operations will not always
be clear. The commander will sometimes be called upon to make on-the-
spot decisions that could have an immediate, dramatic effect on the
strategic or operational situation. Leadership that disregards the will of
belligerent parties and the lethality of these groups’ weapons compromise
the success of their mission and risk the lives of their soldiers.
SOLDIERS’ RESPONSIBILITIES
D-106. US soldiers may have extensive contact with HN civilians during
stability operations and support operations. As a result, their personal
conduct has a significant impact on the opinions, and thus the support, of
the local population. As noted, soldiers must understand that misconduct
by US forces (even those deployed for only a short time) can damage
rapport that took years to develop. US soldiers must treat local civilians
and military personnel as personal and professional equals, affording
them the appropriate customs and courtesies.
D-107. Every soldier must be updated continuously on changes to
operational considerations (such as environment, ROE/ROI, media, and
force protection). Such changes can have immediate impact on his
freedom to react to a given situation. Keeping the soldier informed of
changes enhances his situational awareness and his ability to adapt to
D-27
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
changing conditions. Leaders must disseminate this information quickly

and accurately.
D-108. The collection of information is a continuous process, and all
information must be reported. Intelligence is provided by many sources,
including friendly forces, threat elements, and the local populace. From
the friendly standpoint, each soldier must be familiar with the
commander’s critical information requirements and other applicable
intelligence requirements. At the same time, threat soldiers will be
continuously seeking intelligence on US actions, often blending easily
into the civilian population. US soldiers must be aware of this and use
OPSEC procedures at all times.
D-109. To emphasize responsibilities, soldiers and leaders conduct
precombat checks (PCC) and precombat inspections (PCI) that focus on
soldier’s knowledge of the environment and application of ROE,
graduated response, and ROI. These checks and inspections should also
identify possible OPSEC violations and deficiencies that could place the
soldier and his equipment at risk. Leaders should stress that terrorists
and thieves may attempt to infiltrate positions or mount vehicles either
to steal equipment and supplies or to cause harm to US forces or
facilities.
D-110. To enhance civilian cooperation and support, the S2 is
responsible for issuing key word and phrase cards (primarily to
commanders) to assist in translation of key English phrases into the
language of the HN. These phrases should apply specifically to the AO.
EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
D-111. The squadron or brigade uses the troop to conduct the various
reconnaissance and security missions and augments it with assets from
the surveillance troop. Because of the resources necessary to deploy,
operate, and sustain forces in stability operations and support
operations, the recce troop is used to execute activities that maximize its
inherent capabilities of stealth, reconnaissance, surveillance, and
HUMINT collection. On the other hand, the factors of METT-TC may
require the squadron to execute tasks other than traditional
reconnaissance and surveillance. For example, the troop may be tasked
with conducting crowd and riot control if a shortage of MPs exists.
SPECIFIC TROOP TASKS

D-112. As part of a force involved in stability operations and support
operations, the reconnaissance troop can expect to perform these tasks:
• Security operations, including the following:
Area security (refer to Chapter 4 of this publication).
Convoy security (refer to Chapter 4 of this publication).
Support platoon checkpoints (refer to FM 3-20.98
[FM 17-98]).
Roadblocks (refer to FM 3-20.98 [FM 17-98]).
• Reconnaissance operations, including the following:
Area reconnaissance with multidimensional aspects (refer
to Chapter 3 of this publication).
D-28
Route reconnaissance (refer to Chapter 3 of this

publication).
Building searches (refer to FM 3-20.98 [FM 17-98] and to
Chapter 7 of this manual).
• Liaison.
• Presence operations.
• Compliance inspections and/or supervise minefield clearance.
• Negotiate.
• Deliver supplies or humanitarian aid.
• React to civil disturbance.
• Plan for and react to a media interview.
NOTE: This is not an all-inclusive list of tasks. The following lists contain information only
on the troop task, purpose, and planning considerations for the tasks specified here.
LIAISON
D-113. When conducting stability operations and support operations, the
higher headquarters may direct the troop to conduct liaison with many
military forces, factional force leaders, government organizations, NGOs,
PVOs, and international agencies. Leaders must be in control,
dominating, and confident. The commander must be aware of all liaison
tasks being conducted in his organization. He should delegate liaison
tasks to subordinate leaders and establish an LNO, when capable, and
assume responsibility of specific liaison requirements that warrant his
level of attention.
D-114. The following is a guide that should be modified to fit individual
METT-TC conditions. The majority of the steps are geared toward a
stability operation, but are easily applied to all types of operations.
• Troop commander determines liaison requirements for
making contact.
Determines the need for interpreter. Plans the type of
interpreter to be used. Ensures that the interpreter to be
used is the right one for the situation. Many times the
interpreter is of the opposite factional affiliation and
could hinder proper dialog or mood of the liaison. May
request interpreter assistance from higher or perhaps
request that the agency/individual conducting liaison
bring his interpreter for heightened clarification.
Identifies military forces, civil authorities, religious
leaders, ethnic groups, local factions, and NGOs operating
in the area of responsibility (AOR).
Conducts IPB of the individuals involved with the liaison.
HUMINT collector compiles information on individuals
from other liaison HUMINT activities with the identified
individuals. Liaison team should know all information
about the individual such as likes, dislikes, family
information, tobacco user, sports interests, factional
D-29
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
affiliation, and combat experience. Anything that will

enhance small talk or knowledge of previous difficulties.
Determines whom to liaison with and contact frequency
for elements in the AOR.
Establishes times and locations for initial liaison contacts
with elements.
Determines who is the best LNO for a particular contact.
Determines the need for a quick reaction force (QRF).
Develops an agenda for liaison meeting(s).
Plans how to maintain continuous contact until dispute is
resolved or tensions are reduced.
• Unit/LNO considerations.
Sets the conditions for a professional and cooperative
relationship.
− Ensures uniforms, equipment, appearance, and
security procedures are appropriate.
− Acquires communication and transportation for
liaison.
− Ensures personnel involved know the current political
and military situation.
− Ensures the LNO team understands the mandate,
ROI, ROE, graduated response, terms of reference
(TOR), and status of forces agreement (SOFA).
Upon request, provides liaison assistance in accordance
with unit constraints.
− Establishes an on-call liaison to respond to crises that
may develop in the unit AOR.
− Updates the situation map for current locations of
liaison contacts.
As required, coordinates with units and/or agencies
operating in the unit AOR.
− Determines what units and or agencies are operating
in the unit AOR.
− Establishes contact at checkpoints, or as specified in
the regional force SOP.
− Exchanges information (military, paramilitary, and
mass civilian movements; minefields and obstacles;
intentions and missions for belligerents; and locations
of key faction force leaders).
Determines how to stabilize an area with existing or
escalating tension.
− Identifies potential “hot spots” of increased tension.
− Determines which factions may be involved and the
regions affected.
− Designates forces to stabilize the area, within
capability, or requests additional support.
D-30
− Coordinates with belligerents to resolve real or

perceived problems.
− Reports developments of any destabilizing situation to
higher headquarters, as required.
− Contacts forces or civilians involved.
− Establishes an upgraded alert status and security
awareness of units in affected area and adjacent
areas, as needed.
− Dispatches liaisons to all elements involved.
• Execution.
Performs necessary greeting functions, salutations, and
exchange of courtesies.
Encourages informal small talk among participants while
offering refreshments and tobacco products.
Discusses the purpose of the meeting, agenda and
potential end state.
Communicates that only major problems are brought to
liaison’s headquarters (BCT/squadron commander)
attention. (This should be only after subordinates have
been unable to resolve the issues; always attempt to
power down and to use rank as a means of escalating the
liaison situation.)
Demonstrates resolve, confidence, commitment, and
concern for local customs and people living in the AOR by
attending major local events.
Implements immediate response to any serious breach of
trust, confidence, or deception that has occurred.
CONDUCT PRESENCE OPERATIONS
D-115. The troop conducts presence operations by manning OPs and
checkpoints, and conducting presence patrols and reconnaissance patrols,
with the intent to be seen. The troop operates on visible routes and
locations. It demonstrates tasks with collective determination with
actions that are meant to deter belligerent actions and defuse tense
situations between belligerents. ROE are strictly adhered to and security
of the force is always planned and demonstrated. Professionalism,
discipline, and the appearance of combat readiness are projected. The
commander ensures the following considerations are followed: backbriefs,
confirmation briefs, or attending the troop commander’s OPORD briefing
or rehearsal are some of the methods available to verify mission
understanding.
D-116. The following are planning considerations for conducting
presence operations:
• The troop designates a QRF in accordance with METT-TC.
• In coordination with higher headquarters, the troop
commander conducts troop-leading procedures.
Directs the troop to evaluate terrain.
Completes military aspects of the terrain assessment.
D-31
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Evaluates and distributes all known information

(location, composition, and disposition) on belligerent
parties and various factions.
Evaluates and distributes information on uniforms,
markings, insignia, vehicles, and equipment.
Plots and keeps current, all known locations of weapons
holding areas, staging areas, or encampments.
Evaluates and distributes known information about
belligerent faction leaders, and headquarters.
Identifies headquarters, police stations, barracks
locations, political party headquarters.
Determines locations for liaison for aggressive HUMINT
collection to defuse any belligerent activity.
• The troop conducts reconnaissance of potential or anticipated
demonstration sites.
Within the troop’s sector, this includes—
− Checkpoints.
− OPs.
− Routes and main supply routes.
− Unit compounds, operation bases, or key facilities.
− Towns or villages in or near zones of separation or
within sector.
− Designated sites by higher headquarters or where
information suggests rising tensions.
Reconnaissance tasks should include—
− Routes available and time factors.
− Potential vehicle and weapon position.
− Adjacent unit coordination (this may be US or
international forces).
− Casualty evacuation routes and treatment locations.
− Limited visibility factors considered.
− Indirect-fire target identification and verification.
• The troop assesses the need for liaison activities and
translators.
• The troop maintains radio contact with adjacent units at
specified intervals.
• The QRF rehearses all aspects of the mission.
Rehearses linkup with all elements that make up
demonstration element.
Checks internal communications and compatibility.
Rehearses movement.
Reviews ROE limitations on use of force.
Rehearses casualty evacuation, rearmament, and
resupply.
D-32
• Troop conducts presence operations by conducting OPs,

checkpoints, patrols, and inspections.
Troop leadership confirms mission plan, ensures
personnel are briefed on and know the following before
commitment:
− ROE and use of force.
− Purpose of operation and desired outcome.
− Inherent risks of the operation.
− Graduated response to provocation.
− Command relationship and controlling headquarters.
− Authentication procedures for order of fire. (Any
unnecessary response may have strategic
implications.)
− Weapon control status and orientation.
The element moves rapidly with lights on, UN or
appropriate markings and colors prominently displayed.
• The platoons may conduct linkup with area or base camp
commanders, other platoon checkpoints/OPs while conducting
presence operations.
Conduct initial recognition by radio (direct to
commander/officer in charge).
Conduct face-to-face coordination on arrival.
Occupy positions as planned or as directed by the local
commander.
• The BCT/squadron receives updates from the troop.
Weapon systems are not aimed directly at belligerents,
but oriented on their direction.
Subordinate leaders are prepared to react proportionally
to escalation.
Leaders conduct negotiations or liaison, as required,
during the presence operation.
Troop is prepared to execute the troop’s QRF, attack, or
defend as necessary within the scope of all applicable
directives.
COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS OPERATIONS
D-117. When intelligence identifies and locates an area to be inspected,
such as arms cache inspection, members of an insurgent infrastructure,
minefield clearance operation, factional barracks inspection, or any other
thing or activity worthy of inspection (usually in accordance with treaty
or peace accord), a compliance inspection is conducted to ensure
conformity. As with presence operations, the squadron commander
normally assigns recce troop(s) this mission.
NOTE: The following planning considerations are the same for squadron and troop level.
D-33
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Task Organization
D-118. Task organization for a compliance inspection requires the unit to
designate a security force to isolate the area to be inspected, a search or
reconnaissance force, and a QRF. Special consideration must be made to
determine the size of security needed and the QRF to overmatch any
possible threat. Augmentation from the brigade can usually provide an
effective QRF.
Conduct of the Operation
D-119. An effective security force is critical to the success of the
reconnaissance/search effort. The security force isolates the search area,
prevents the escape of individuals, and protects the forces conducting the
operation. Checkpoints and roadblocks are established along roads
entering and exiting the area when necessary. This helps isolate the
objective. This may not always be necessary and is dependent on the
compliance inspection mission and the threat or potential noncompliance
activity. The security force will establish OPs, and (when necessary)
security patrols are executed in the surrounding area. Members of the
security force orient mainly on people or vehicles attempting to escape or
evade the compliance inspection in the populated area; however, the
security force can also cut off elements or individuals trying to reinforce
threat forces in the search area. Deployment to the search area is rapid
and is synchronized so it does not provide early warning to the local
population.
D-120. A QRF is located near the compliance inspection. Its specific
mission is to reinforce OPs, patrols, or the search force and to assist the
other elements as required by the mission.
CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS
D-121. When the troop is conducting stability operations and support
operations it will be called on to negotiate. To conduct effective
negotiations, the troop liaison officers of the troop (the troop leadership),
in conjunction with local UN/government organizations and
civilian/military observers, must establish rapport with local leaders of
warring factions and civilians. The troop commander may be directed to
renew efforts to conduct negotiations within the area. The factions within
the troop’s AO may be still engaged in armed conflict. The troop must
have guidance from the BCT/squadron that is developed from the
peacekeeping mandate, the TOR, SOFA, and ROE that define the desired
end state, as well as the limits of concession for the troop.
D-122. The BCT/squadron commander should provide guidance to
subordinates based on the peacekeeping mandate, the TOR, SOFA, and
the ROE that define the desired end state, as well as the limits of
concession.
D-34
D-123. The following are planning considerations for the conduct of

negotiations.
• The unit prepares to conduct negotiations.
BCT/squadron commander ensures unity of effort by
forming a negotiation team. The team consists of—
− Designated team leader (BCT/squadron XO, S3, or
troop commander). May or may not be the chief
negotiator. Supervises the team’s efforts.
− Negotiation/resource coordinator (troop commander or
staff member). Serves as the link to the brigade staff.
Procures and requests information. Ensures
availability of equipment and materiel necessary to
conduct negotiations.
− Recorder. Maintains chronological record of all
conversations between parties and negotiating team.
Compiles information in separate lists or databases
that indicate demands, deadlines, agreements, or
disputes. Maintains a separate listing of all promises
made by the negotiating team.
− Interpreter. An additional interpreter may be
required if the accuracy of the primary interpreter is
questioned.
Negotiating team collects all available information. The
team is included in routine message and report flow from
the TOC.
− Identifies the problem or source of contention.
− Analyzes any previous attempts at resolution and
their outcome.
− Analyzes existing agreements or understandings that
may be part of the problem.
− Knows the constraints and limitations of the
squadron’s negotiation capabilities.
Negotiating team requests or seeks additional
information.
− Makes or issues queries to LNOs.
− Questions local UN/government organizations and
civilian/military observers.
− Queries are included as specific information
requirements (SIR) in reconnaissance and security
tasks.
• Team recommends, negotiates, selects meeting place.
Ensures meeting place is a neutral location or is
acceptable to all parties.
Ensures communications assets are adequate for all
parties, but especially for the negotiating team.
D-35
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Ensures site is surveyed for security requirements.

Security elements tasked and positioned to prevent attack
or sabotage.
Ensures availability and use of same map editions and
scales by all parties or any other supporting documents
that the dispute is concerned with (such as contracts and
mine data sheets).
Coordinates for videotape or other electronic media
recording.
• Team arranges meeting place.
Organizes tables, chairs, maps, cameras, and coffee
(supporting condiments).
Designates an area for guards, support personnel,
parking, and so forth, to wait.
Posts signs or designates locations for various activities.
Establishes communications.
Establishes and designates break areas.
Ensures latrine facilities are adequate.
Makes arrangements for negotiation attendees to rapidly
pass through security checks.
• Team conducts negotiations.
Performs greeting functions, salutations, and exchange of
courtesies.
Makes formal introductions, by name and position, of all
attendees.
Encourages informal small talk among participants while
offering refreshments.
Discusses layout and configuration of site before starting
formal portion of meeting.
Reviews an agreed upon agenda or establishes one.
Allows participants to establish or present their case
without interruption.
− Serves as mediator between multiple parties.
− Corrects inaccurate information or misrepresentation
by the presentation of facts supported by evidence.
− Does not argue to win a point.
− Records all positions, opinions, and issues.
− Avoids making judgments or becoming bogged down
with complaints presented by parties. Recorder makes
notes for investigation and further actions.
Presents the preferred solution (if there is one);
otherwise, works to achieve a solution.
− Isolates what each party desires or what will satisfy
them.
− Identifies a common middle ground.
D-36
− Encourages small concessions to get parties in the

habit of agreement.
− Uses previous agreements or understandings as a
framework for accord (unless those are the basis of
contention).
− Facilitates the process by making commitments
without exceeding the limits imposed by the mandate
or higher headquarters.
Concludes session at agreed time, or when no further
action is possible.
− Recorder summarizes results of session,
acknowledging agreements and concessions made.
Reviews issues requiring investigation and tentative
agenda for follow-up meetings. If possible, provides
written copy of record to participants.
− Requests copies of other parties’ records if they were
taking notes.
− Prepares agreements for signature before parties
depart.
− Ensures clear and positive understanding of any
actions agreed on. Fully defines coordination
measures.
− Makes arrangements for future meetings; coordinates
dates, times, locations, and means of communication.
− Speaks pleasantly to each party during their
departure, regardless of results of the session.
• Team reports results of negotiation to higher headquarters.
Team leader or chief negotiator makes concluding
remarks that point out the positive aspects or results of
the session.
Leader ensures team consolidates all notes and other raw
data.
Leader uses debrief format to prepare report. In
conjunction with recorder, debriefs all team members or
other participants (unit personnel or representatives of
NGOs and PVOs).
Identifies key points or issues that require investigation
or immediate attention.
Posts and updates chronological logs and information
databases.
Prepares formal written report listing circumstances,
issues, and recommendations.
Prepares documents to implement any agreed upon
peacekeeping force actions.
Prepares information summary to brief troop
commanders, brigade commander and staffs, and
UN/government organizations, and civilian/military
D-37
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
observers. Considers inclusion of local or regional NGO

and PVO.
Briefs unit public affairs (if augmented) representative on
results, publicity issues, or necessity to maintain close
hold on results.
• Team begins preparations for subsequent negotiations.
Updates and disseminates new information requirements.
Updates or creates personality profiles of counterpart
negotiating team.
Conducts rehearsals to improve negotiating a position or
resolving a dispute.
REACT TO CIVIL DISTURBANCE
D-124. While the troop participates in stability operations and support
operations, it may be required to assist in the containment of a civil
disturbance by itself or as part of a larger unit. By itself, the disturbance
may threaten nothing, but the potential for destruction of critical
property and the loss of supplies or other assets demands upgraded
security measures. The civilians may be unarmed, but if agitated, may
use sticks, rocks, and bottles as weapons. However, never underestimate
the access to small-arms weapons by noncombatants. Local civil
authority usually is insufficient to contain or restrain the civil
demonstration or disturbance. This is why the troop may be employed to
react to a civil disturbance. Security of the troop is paramount. Soldiers
should be armed and equipped with riot control equipment and loaded
ammunition is carried (in accordance with ROE).
D-125. The following are planning considerations for the reaction to a
civilian disturbance:
• Isolate the area.
Establish a perimeter.
Erect appropriate barriers.
Alert the QRF.
• Establish liaison with local law enforcement authorities.
Request local law enforcement authorities to resolve
disturbance.
Determine the scope and severity of the disturbance.
Advise higher headquarters of possible necessity to
implement arming orders, and request assistance from
other organizations (MPs or UN civil police).
• Key facilities affected by the disturbance identified and
prioritized for protection (such as food distribution point,
checkpoint, government headquarters).
• Forces apportioned as needed to control disturbance and
protect facilities.
D-38
• Fixed security posts augmented, while a QRF remains

centrally located to respond to threats at other likely targets.
Fixed security posts implement rigid entry and exit
controls; only one used.
Facility occupants moved to interior safe room or escorted
out of danger area.
• The unit leader assesses the situation if tasked to exert
control over the civilians.
Intensity level of the disturbance (crowd mood,
composition, activity, perceived intent).
Recent trend in local public opinion.
Unit capabilities and readiness.
Immediate and long-term effects if lethal force is
required.
Weather, terrain, and time of day.
ROE.
• Commander selects or recommends a COA in accordance with
the graduated response.
Monitor.
Contain.
Block.
Disperse.
• Unit leaders select and employ control formations to best
accomplish the task assigned.
• Soldiers respond with strict discipline to orders to help
demonstrate firm resolve.
• Soldiers resist provocation and deliberate attempts to
humiliate them.
• Leaders consider rotation scheme for soldiers in perimeter,
especially those closest to civilians.
• Commander uses all available resources to help reduce
tensions.
PSYOP assets are used for recording unlawful activities,
communicating to crowd, identifying covert direction or
leadership.
CA assets are used to aid in communication and liaison.
PVO and other NGOs identify the real cause of the
disturbance and potential means to end confrontation.
• Soldiers are required to review rules for use of lethal force
before employment in the perimeter.
Brigade or squadron commander may add or delete
restrictions to the ROE.
Soldiers must be able to react immediately to every
threat. (Commander must war-game every considerable
action of the crowd or hostile individuals.)
D-39
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Soldiers rehearse all physical restraint options to be used

in escalating situation before the use of deadly force
before assuming duties on the perimeter. Adhere to the
graduated response.
Leaders ensure that soldiers on the perimeter can hear
orders, and soldiers are kept informed of the situation.
• Apprehension and detention of civilians are consistent with
specific guidance issued for the current operation.
Apprehension and detention limited to serious offenses
involving death or injury, or property theft or destruction.
Personnel searches are conducted to check for weapons or
evidence.
• Leader considers use of patrols and visible mobile checkpoints
after cessation of the disturbance to assist the resumption of
control by the local civil authorities.
• Leader uses video equipment to tape the disturbance and
unit’s actions to document accuracy of activities and preclude
incorrect reporting of force response.
PLAN FOR AND REACT TO A MEDIA INTERVIEW
D-126. The troop will usually be faced with media events within stability
operations and support operations. This will be a leader, individual, or
unit event. The troop must be prepared to face such events and the troop
commander must ensure each soldier is prepared to react in accordance
with unit SOP and ROI. The troop and its soldiers may be approached for
an interview, which may or may not be justified, by media
representatives who appear to be legitimate. The response the troop gives
the media has the potential to cause international effects. Care must be
given in response to the media. All interviews will not materially affect
the unit’s or a soldier’s ability to conduct his assigned tasks. These are a
few guidelines to react to media:
• Interviews are not conducted with non-accredited media
representatives.
• Unit public affairs representative provides guidance to both
interviewer and soldier to be interviewed.
• Soldier interviewed does not speculate, nor does he express
opinions beyond the scope of his experience or duties.
• Operational information is not discussed.
• Troop adheres to the ROE and ROI.
D-127. The following are planning considerations for the reaction to a
media interview.
• Soldier asks to see accreditation certification. (The PAO at
brigade, division, or ARFOR provides authorization
paperwork or escort.)
• Soldier asks where the escort is if reporter appears to be
unescorted.
• If all details are in accordance with instructions received from
briefings, soldier participates in the interview.
D-40
• Unit public affairs representative should remain nearby

during the interview.
• Soldier responds to interviewer’s questions.
Listens to the question and asks for clarification if
needed.
Thinks about answer before responding.
Is honest in replies; says “I don’t know” if answer is
beyond scope.
Explains if he cannot answer a question due to OPSEC.
Does not respond to hypothetical situations used by
correspondent to elicit a response.
Terminates interview if he becomes uncomfortable with
the questions being asked, or if questioning becomes
provocative.
Does not allow himself to be “baited” into a response by a
controversial or so-called “investigative reporter.”
Avoids saying “No comment.”
• If press representative is unescorted, soldier—
Determines if escort is in the area. Asks for a specific
name and unit rather than accepting a general wave
“over there.”
Requests person or team to accompany the reporter to
headquarters element location, or calls for superiors to
come to the location.
Uses tact in dealing with media team.
• Leader attempts to verify identity of media team.
Notifies BCT/squadron’s public affairs representative or
PAO.
Advises media team to depart AO and to make contact
with higher headquarters unit public affairs
representative or PAO. Provides location and
recommends route.
• If media team is in an area under direct US force control (for
example, compound, protected area, buffer zone), soldier
detains them to maintain positive control.
Informs media team that they are in a controlled area.
Informs media team that detention is for security reasons
and will continue until released by higher headquarters.
Uses restraint consistent with authorized methods.
Leader considers that a ploy may be engineered to
portray US force unfavorably.
Keeps higher headquarters informed of all actions taken.
DELIVER SUPPLIES OR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

D-128. The troop may be called upon to escort transportation of
humanitarian supplies to a location that supports a variety of situations.
D-41
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Some of these situations may be food for civilians, medicine for refugee
center/hospital, election materials, and utility equipment, just to name a
few. The troop must measure the importance of the mission, the threat
situation (what may try to interfere with the mission), task organization,
and the consequence of failure (media reaction, loss of life) in
accomplishing the mission. Many times the mission can be delayed until
the situation is less threatening. The amount of supplies and level of
threat will determine if the mission is a troop- or squadron-level mission.
The following are guidelines for achieving success in such a mission:
• Reconnaissance force (quartering party/security force at the
delivery site), security force for the convoy, and QRF.
• Delivery is completed without incident.
• Accountability is maintained and receipt is acknowledged.
• The unit adheres to the ROE.
D-129. The commander confirms the mission and intent from higher for
the humanitarian assistance; does necessary coordination with
government organizations/NGOs that are concerned with the mission;
and establishes a reconnaissance force to reconnoiter the route and the
delivery site (liaison with delivery site officials, evaluates the security of
the site, establishes security of the site). Once complete, the
reconnaissance force may become the overall security force. The
commander establishes the convoy security force to organize the convoy
security mission; and establishes a QRF to respond to chance contact by
the convoy. The following are other planning considerations for the
execution of the delivery of humanitarian assistance/supplies.
• The convoy halts in a covered, concealed site short of the
delivery destination.
• The convoy commander confirms the location for delivery.
• The commander conducts liaison with authorities for drop-off
point.
• The commander organizes the unit to maintain security
during delivery.
Security elements posted at intersections or choke points
en route from the halt site to the delivery site.
Security element posted at delivery site; wire emplaced as
necessary.
Security maintained at halt site.
• Supply vehicles move in manageable numbers (dependent on
off-load timing) to delivery site.
En route security or QRF prevents diversion of vehicles.
Site security prevents infiltration and attempts to loot.
QRF prepared to respond to events at delivery site.
• The commander ensures relief organization or local authority
acknowledges receipt of supplies.
• Security collapses onto and around the delivery site when all
vehicles complete unloading. The unit may set up area
D-42
security with subordinate elements/platoons conducting

screen, reconnaissance, defensive, and QRF missions.
• Security remains on site until local authorities assume
control or distribution is completed.
• The convoy commander reports mission complete to higher
headquarters.
SUPERVISE MINEFIELD CLEARANCE
D-130. While the troop conducts stability operations and support
operations, it may be required to supervise other agencies (NGOs, local
military, contractors) in the clearance of a minefield by itself or as part of
a larger unit. The minefield may threaten ongoing operations by relief
workers and pose a threat to the local populace. In many cases, those
tasked to clear minefields may be open to harassment or assault by local
factions or may be prone to doing an inadequate job of clearing the
minefield. In all cases, clearing of minefields demands upgraded security
measures. Local civil authority usually is insufficient or ill trained to
supervise the minefield clearance. This is why the squadron may be
employed to provide supervision to other agencies clearing minefields.
Security of the units conducting supervision is paramount. Soldiers
should be armed and equipped with riot control equipment and loaded
ammunition is carried (in accordance with ROE). The unit conducting
this operation will be augmented with engineers who are responsible for
the direct supervision of the minefield clearance. Units will assist the
engineers by supervising the overall operation and providing security
around the minefield. Additionally, a medical unit will provide support to
the operation.
D-131. The following are planning considerations for supervision of
minefield clearance:
• Isolate the area.
Establish a perimeter.
Erect appropriate barriers.
Alert the QRF.
• Establish liaison with attached engineers and medical
personnel.
Review the plan for movement to, isolation, and security
of the area.
Review the plan for the minefield clearance.
Develop a sketch or overlay of the area and designate
required control measures.
Develop a detailed sketch of the clearance organization,
who leads, where the engineers will locate, where the
troop elements will locate, etc.
Determine how disarmed mines will be transported out of
the area.
Determine actions to be taken in the case of an accidental
explosion.
D-43
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
• Establish liaison with local law enforcement authorities.

Request local law enforcement authorities to assist with
isolating the area.
Brief them on the plan for the minefield clearance.
• Establish liaison with the agency/unit conducting the
clearance.
Review their plan for the clearing operation with the
attached engineers.
Ensure that they are fully aware of the security plan for
the area and know whom to contact prior to moving
around the area.
• Nearby facilities affected by the minefield location are
identified and occupants are notified of the potential for
damage in the case of an explosion.
• Forces are apportioned, as needed, to isolate the area and
supervise the operation.
• The unit leader assesses the situation and determines if the
operation can proceed.
Is the area isolated adequately?
Does the recent trend in local public opinion and activities
threaten the operation?
Is the clearing agency or unit capable and ready to
conduct the operation?
What are potential immediate and long-term effects if an
accident happens?
Do the weather, terrain, and time of day support the
successful execution of the operation?
Review the ROE as necessary.
• Commander uses all available resources to help reduce the
potential for disruption to the operation.
PSYOP assets are used for recording unlawful activities,
communicating to crowds, identification of covert
direction or leadership.
CA assets are used to aid in communication and liaison.
• Leader uses video equipment to tape the operation and the
unit’s actions to document accuracy of activities and preclude
incorrect reporting of force activities.
D-44
Appendix E
Deployment
The troop must be

CONTENTS
prepared to deploy Unit Movement Officer ................................ E-1
anywhere in the world on Unit Load Teams.......................................... E-2
short notice. Although Hazardous Cargo Certification ................... E-2
higher headquarters is Vehicle Preparation ..................................... E-3
responsible for many
components of deployment planning and coordination, the troop also
requires proficiency in rail, ground, air, and sea deployment
operations. The troop commander must ensure that all personnel are
trained and prepared for deployment. He must also ensure that
certain key individuals or elements in the unit are properly trained to
carry out special deployment tasks. This appendix lists those who
require special training and describes some of the skills that they
must learn.
Key references to support the troop commander’s deployment

preparations are FM 4-01 [FM 55-1], FM 4-01.1 [FM 55-9], and
FM 4-01.15 [FM 55-15]. This appendix also identifies other
deployment-related references and points of contact.
SECTION I – UNIT MOVEMENT OFFICER
E-1. Army policy requires that the troop have a unit movement officer
(UMO), E6 and above, and an alternate appointed on orders. They must
be trained by the troop or a service school and be thoroughly familiar
with the following:
• The contents of this appendix.
• US Air Force/US Army airlift operations.
• The roles and duties of the UMO and unit movement
coordinator (UMC).
• The transportability of the troop's organic equipment.
• The characteristics and capabilities of the types of vessels,
aircraft, or railcars the unit may use to deploy.
• Highway, rail, and port operations.
E-2. Formal training for the troop commander, UMO, and NCO in unit
deployment is available through the Joint Strategic Deployment Training
Center (JSDTC). JSDTC offers resident courses, to include the following:
• Air Deployment Planning Course (Air Mobility Command
[AMC] certified).
• Unit Movement Officer Deployment Planning Course.
E-1
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
• Strategic Deployment Planning Course.

• Transportation Coordinator – Automated Command and
Control Information System (TC-ACCIS).
• Mobilization Deployment Planning Course.
E-3. JSDTC also conducts mobile training team activities on request.
To obtain information on course offerings, mobile training teams, and
related doctrine, contact JSDTC, ATTN: ATSP-TDJ, Fort Eustis, VA
23604-5363 or call DSN 927-2039 or commercial (757) 878-2039.
E-4. The Army Reserve Training Center (DSN 280-7277 or commercial
(608) 388-7277) conducts the Unit Movement Officer Deployment
Planning Course and the Mobilization Deployment Planning Course.
SECTION II – UNIT LOAD TEAMS
E-5. The troop must have an appropriate number of personnel trained

on vehicle preparation and aircraft and rail loading and unloading
techniques. The troop commander should consider designating and
training as unit load teams one squad per platoon. This training will
include the following:
• Preparation of vehicle load plans.
• Preparation of vehicles for shipment by reducing operational
dimensions, protecting fragile components such as
windshields and mirrors, and weighing and marking
procedures for air and rail modes.
• Tie-down procedures for vehicles, aircraft, and railcars.
• Operation of troop vehicles in conditions simulating loading
and unloading techniques for aircraft and rail.
SECTION III – HAZARDOUS CARGO CERTIFICATION
E-6. When the troop is preparing, packing, and marking equipment for
movement and deployment, special certification is required to ensure
personnel follow safety procedures according to AFJM 24-204 or Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR) 49. Improper procedures could cause loss of
life or equipment. Because the troop has air transportable equipment, it
should have at least one school-certified person to certify hazardous
cargo. AR 55-355 gives information on formal certification. Hazardous
cargo certification teams visit most installations annually or
semiannually. (Consult the installation transportation office for
scheduling details.) Regardless of whether or not the troop has anyone
who is school qualified, the UMO/NCO should be familiar with the
contents of AFJM 24-204 and CFR 49. Military Standard (MIL-STD)-
129J and DA Pam 740-1 contain additional packing assistance.
SECTION IV – VEHICLE PREPARATION
E-2
_______________________________________________________________ Appendix E – Deployment
E-7. Efficient equipment preparation for movement is a troop

responsibility. Troop personnel reduce vehicles according to mode of
transportation and the carrier's additional instruction. Transportation
personnel may further reduce vehicles so they will fit into cargo areas
whose particularly low overhead clearance may demand maximum
reduction. This section describes procedures for reduction of unit vehicles.
EFFICIENT CARGO PREPARATION

E-8. Efficiently preparing cargo saves valuable cargo space aboard
vessels and aircraft. Other advantages are greater integrity of unit
equipment, less cargo handling, less chance for troop equipment to
become delayed or lost, and significant cost savings.
E-9. Built-up vehicles will not be transported on vessels or commercial
conveyances without Major Command (MACOM) approval. These types of
vehicles typically have overhead clearance problems along rail lines and
in vessel compartments. When built-up vehicles are permitted, for
example, a temporary substitute for a TOE-authorized shelter, the new
dimensions must be entered on the automated unit equipment list
(AUEL). When mounted on a vehicle, the built-up shelter height must not
exceed the height of the authorized shelter. Authorized shelter heights
are designed to accommodate both the vehicles vertical balance and
overhead clearance on selected transportation modes.
VEHICLE REDUCTION STANDARDS

E-10. Prepare troop cargo (vehicles and equipment) for shipment
according to the mode of transportation and the type of move. If the troop
moves organically, it moves vehicles in an operationally reduced
configuration, such as mirrors mounted and windshields up. Reduce loads
according to Technical Bulletin (TB) 55-46-1 and the movement order.
Further reduction specified by the movement order occurs in the port of
embarkation staging area. Reserve component units that convoy to a
mobilization station before deployment will maximize use of their organic
cargo capacity by reducing loads for the deployment at the mobilization
station. Depending on the strategic lift asset for deployment, full
reduction may or may not be required.
E-11. Make every effort to support the commander's concept of
operations. When preparing vehicles for shipment, unit personnel must
be sure that equipment conforms to clearance and space restrictions.
Personnel must do the following:
• Reduce vehicle length and width by folding in side-mounted
mirrors and removing storage baskets that overhang the
vehicle's fixed dimensions.
• Remove antennas.
• Keep windshields and cab canvas in the up position.
• Leave exhaust stacks in place.
• Reduce height as needed for rail clearance. Check with the
installation transportation office.
• Reduce the length, width, and height of the vehicle only when
specified in the movement order.
E-3
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
PREPARATION OF VEHICLES
E-12. Take the following steps to prepare troop vehicles:
• Thoroughly clean the vehicle.
• Ensure the vehicle is mechanically sound, free of leaks, drips,
and other operational defects.
• Fill fuel tanks only to three-quarters of capacity. Any
additional fuel increases the chance for spillage. Do not put
hazardous labels or placards on vehicles for fuel in the tanks.
• Do not fill trailer-mounted equipment containing combustion
engines, such as generator sets, to more than one-half of their
fuel capacity.
• Ship 5-gallon fuel cans three-quarters full of diesel fuel if they
are shipped in approved vehicle storage racks. Inspect fuel
cans for serviceable lid gaskets, leaks, and other defects
prohibiting their use as fuel containers.
• Do not leave removable crew-served weapons, such as spare
barrels and other sensitive items, mounted or stored in the
vehicle. Instead, consolidate them and place in a secure
container. Seal the container and lock it with an appropriate
locking device.
• Equip all vehicles with serviceable and proper lifting/tie-down
devices or shackles. Remove T-hooks from combat vehicles
and replace them with screw pin shackles.
• Secure ignition keys to the steering wheel with wire. The wire
must be long enough to reach the ignition. Give copies of
container keys to the unit liaison team or supercargoes
accompanying the cargo.
• Do not cover headlights, windshields, or mirrors with tape.
• Ensure fire extinguishers are in the approved mounting
bracket if they are kept with vehicles during shipment.
• Keep driver compartments and steering wheels unlocked.
• To preclude moisture damage to radios, store them in secured
containers. If radios are shipped mounted in the vehicles,
secure them with a padlock and chain; then cover them with
plastic. Treat COMSEC equipment as classified cargo.
E-13. If required for height reduction, lower canvas cab tops. Remove
and box the frames for the cab canvas. Stow them only in the front cab of
their respective vehicles. Keep the canvas threaded through the top
windshield channel. Fold down the windshield with the canvas wrapped
over the windshield and secure with manila rope. The method and degree
of protection are left to the unit commander's discretion.
E-14. If removing exhaust stack extensions, protect the opening from
weather and debris when the vehicle is not in operation. Use a tin can
large enough to fit over the bottom exhaust stack pipe. Attach a wire to
the can and exhaust stack bracket so the can may be removed and not
lost when the vehicle is in operation. Place a shoe tag on the ignition
switch or steering wheel to remind the operator to remove and install the
can as appropriate.
E-4
_______________________________________________________________ Appendix E – Deployment
E-15. When nesting equipment or placing cargo into unit vehicles,

adhere to the following guidelines:
• Maximize use of all vehicles cargo capacity, particularly cargo
vehicles and trailers. If a trailer is nested in the back of a
cargo truck, load cargo under and around the trailer.
• Do not exceed the payload capacity.
• Securely restrain the equipment and cargo in the vehicle body
or chassis.
• Ensure there is no metal-to-metal contact of loaded cargo. For
example, a container loaded in the bed of a 5-ton cargo truck
must have plywood between its bottom and the metal cargo
bed.
• After loading cargo into the cargo bed, cover it with canvas.
Secure the canvas by lashing with manila rope. If steel
strapping must be used, use enough padding to prevent
damage to the canvas.
• Update the AUEL if cargo loaded in a vehicle increases the
dimensions or adds vehicle weight.
• Box on-vehicle equipment (OVE) and remove parts when
practical. Store them aboard the vehicle for easy access at the
port of debarkation. The OVE can be secured best in the
vehicle OVE box. Lock or band the box itself. Store OVE and
parts in the vehicle cab or under seat compartments (as long
as seats can be secured), or place OVE and parts into boxes or
small crates and place the crates in the cargo bed. Mark boxes
or crates with the vehicle's unit identification code (UIC).
• Stow acetylene and oxygen tanks on a separate wooden pallet.
Label tanks according to CFR 49 and clearly mark with the
prime mover UIC.
E-5
Appendix F
Command Post Operations

The troop CP assists the
troop commander in CONTENTS
Command Post Activities ........................... F-1
controlling current
CP Responsibilities ................................. F-1
operations and planning. Continuous Operations ........................... F-3
The troop CP is austere in CP Positioning ......................................... F-4
comparison to higher Enhancing CP Security ........................... F-4
Displacing the CP .................................... F-5
echelon CPs, and it CP Battle Drills ......................................... F-5
cannot integrate combat Communications Architecture ................... F-6
support, plan future Communication Responsibilities ........... F-7
operations, or perform Means of Communication ....................... F-8
Internal Communications........................ F-9
other functions associated Communications Security....................... F-10
with more robust CPs. SOP Considerations.................................... F-11
However, the troop CP FBCB2 Filter Settings .............................. F-11
can assist the commander Threat Reporting ...................................... F-12
Standardized Reports.............................. F-12
by maintaining Charts and Status Boards ....................... F-12
communications with Filing Systems and Naming
higher headquarters, Conventions.......................................... F-16
adjacent units, and Color Standards ....................................... F-17
Graphics and Orders ............................... F-17
subordinate elements. It Integrating Digital and
can also develop and Nondigital Units.................................... F-17
submit routine and Required Supplies ................................... F-18
recurring reports to
higher headquarters. The troop CP can assist the commander during
planning by performing tasks such as analyzing portions of the higher
headquarters order or developing specific parts of the troop plan. The
CP is usually composed of HMMWVs equipped with communications
equipment and FBCB2. It is the net control station (NCS) for the troop
command net and monitors the brigade/squadron command, OI, and
CSS nets. It may also operate on the division HF net. This appendix
provides specific TTPs for operating, securing, and moving the CP.
SECTION I – COMMAND POST ACTIVITIES
COMMAND POST RESPONSIBILITIES

F-1. The reconnaissance troop CP personnel assist the commander in
the coordination and supervision of the execution of plans, operations,
and other activities. One of the primary functions of the troop CP is
collecting combat information from the platoons and reporting significant
threat information gathered during their reconnaissance and surveillance
activities to the higher main CP. The overall CP responsibilities are:
• Assist the commander in command and control.
• Maintain current operations map. Digital units maintain the
following FBCB2 map chart tabs consisting of set map areas,
F-1
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
static (notional) overlays, and CP (dynamic) overlays with

associated CP filters.
OPNS/RECON - track and fight the reconnaissance/
counterreconnaissance battle.
HIGHER OPS - track and fight the current battle.
CLR FIRES - clear artillery fires.
REAR (CSS) - track the activity in the rear area.
• Maintain situational awareness through the following
information:
Unit locations:
− Own platoons.
− Flank units.
− Unit and higher trains.
− Higher headquarters CPs.
Current graphics.
Unit status:
− Maintenance.
− Logistics.
− Personnel.
Artillery targets (list and overlay).
Obstacles (locations and overlay).
Known/templated threat locations.
Commander’s critical information requirements listed by:
− Priority intelligence requirements (PIR).
− Essential elements of friendly information (EEFI).
− Friendly forces information requirements (FFIR).
Current mission statement and intent:
− Own.
− Higher.
• Serve as the troop’s NCS.
• Report information to higher headquarters and adjacent
units.
• Maintain a log of all incoming and outgoing messages on DA
Form 1594.
• Monitor and coordinate CSS for the troop and attached
elements.
• Answer all calls from higher unless directed specifically to the
commander. Respond for the commander when he does not
answer.
• Act as a middleman for any calls directed to a unit or within a
unit.
• Conduct PMCS on all equipment.
• Ensure vehicles are loaded and secured in accordance with
approved load plans.
F-2
__________________________________________________ Appendix F – Command Post Operations
CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS
F-2. The troop CP must be capable of operating on a 24-hour basis.
During continuous operations the troop CP normally operates in shifts;
however, the importance of the XO as the troop second in command must
be accounted for when establishing shifts. The shifts should be
established to provide a depth of experience across all shifts. The CP
operates under the direction of the XO, and is manned by:
• The XO.
• Operations NCO.
• Communications NCO.
• NBC NCO.
• HUMINT NCO (RSTA troops only).
• Two driver/radio-telephone operators (RTO).
F-3. An example of CP shifts is as follows:
• Shift 1:
XO (may need to divide his time between both shifts).
Communications NCO.
HUMINT NCO (if assigned).
RTO.
• Shift 2:
Operations NCO.
NBC NCO.
RTO.
F-4. To ensure continuous, uninterrupted operations, the CP
personnel conduct a shift change briefing to educate the incoming shift on
the current status of the troop, the flank units, and the higher unit. Both
shifts review the significant activities during the previous shift to
familiarize the oncoming shift with upcoming decisions and events. While
the format for the brief is a matter of SOP, it should address the
following:
• Task organization changes (FBCB2 task organization file in
effect).
• Changes to mission (current FRAGO in effect).
• Current CCIR and answers to CCIR received during previous
shift.
• Current threat situation.
• Current platoon and attached element status.
Maintenance.
Logistics.
Personnel.
• Current friendly situation (two levels higher).
• Significant activities (threat and friendly) during previous
shift.
• Activities scheduled during the next shift (timeline).
• Unresolved actions.
• Current communications status.
• CP priorities of work.
F-3
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
• Locations of:
Troop commander.
1SG and trains.
Brigade/squadron commander.
Mortars.
FIST/COLTs.
GSRs.
IREMBASS.
UAVs (flight plans).
HUMINT platoons (operating in troop AO).
COMMAND POST POSITIONING

F-5. When planning an operation, the commander, XO, and operations
NCO develop a plan that addresses the initial and subsequent positioning
of the CP. The movement and positioning of the CP should be integrated
into the troop war gaming and rehearsals. The CP is positioned where it
can best balance the need for security and self-protection with the
requirements to maintain both digital and FM communications. This may
require a centralized position during noncontiguous operations.
Conversely during linear operations, the CP may be positioned well
forward and prepared to move frequently in support of mobile operations.
Regardless, the CP should not be set up along likely threat avenues of
approach and will displace as necessary to ensure survivability and
continuous communications.
F-6. The general guidelines for planning the positioning of the CP are:
• During reconnaissance or offensive operations, the CP should
remain at least one terrain feature behind the troop combat
elements, positioned to maintain communications with the
platoons and the controlling higher CP (TAC CP or main CP).
• During security or defensive operations, the CP should be
positioned in sufficient depth to avoid contact with the threat
while maintaining communications with the forward scout
sections.
F-7. When conducting a reconnaissance for CP locations, consider
towns and built-up areas, reverse slopes of hills, or a position that
provides good communications. The proposed CP location must be away
from crossroads, hilltops, and other prominent terrain features and
have—
• Communications with higher and subordinate units.
• Cover and concealment.
• Firm and level ground with good drainage.
ENHANCING COMMAND POST SECURITY

F-8. CPs must secure themselves against a wide range of threats, to
include conventional attacks by mounted or dismounted forces, artillery
and air attack, electronic attack, terrorist threats, or NBC attacks,
including weapons of mass destruction. The CP relies primarily on
passive measures to avoid detection, but must have SOPs to react to
F-4
contact if located. Consider the following OPSEC/INFOSEC measures

when positioning the CP:
• Do not erect signs advertising the CP’s location.
• Maintain noise and light discipline.
• Limit traffic in and out of CP.
• Use a LP/OP and/or conduct local security patrols.
• Establish fighting positions for CP personnel and maintain a
360-degree perimeter.
• Rehearse execution of the perimeter defense.
• Disseminate near and far recognition signals to all
subordinate elements.
• Designate a rally point and/or an alternate CP location in the
event of artillery or air attack.
• Position vehicles in covered and concealed locations.
• Ensure vehicle and equipment are camouflaged and
generators are muffled.
• In smaller-scale contingencies or stability operations, obtain a
threat vulnerability assessment if the CP is occupying a
permanent location or base camp.
DISPLACING THE COMMAND POST

F-9. While the CP normally controls operations from a static position,
it may be forced to move during an operation. The troop’s SOP should
cover techniques for the handover of control during CP displacement.
These techniques can range from the troop commander conducting C2 to
the XO’s vehicle jumping to the next location and assuming C2 duties
while the CP displaces to join the XO.
F-10. The CP must conduct a battle update with the troop prior to
displacement. All troop C2 elements (commander, XO, 1SG, platoon
leaders) should eavesdrop on the appropriate command nets while the CP
displaces. During movement, messages to the CP should be minimized.
This will require that the CP notify all stations of its planned
displacement. It may require a reconfiguration of FBCB2 auto-send and
auto-forward functions to route messages to the next higher echelon
during displacement.
COMMAND POST BATTLE DRILLS

F-11. The troop CP must be able to react to a variety of situations
during operations. The specific actions taken by the CP should be well
defined in the troop SOP and rehearsed during training. Typical battle
drills are—
• Threat air attack. The CP will not engage threat aircraft
except in self-defense. The shift leader will direct M240 and
M2 fire; the CP personnel not manning weapons will assume
security positions and engage with small arms.
• Threat ground attack. Engage dismounted threat
immediately and then send SPOTREPs to the troop and
higher CP. The shift leader designates a rally point for the
F-5
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
security force to meet and conducts actions to defeat the

threat. AT-4 fires will be directed in volleys against threat
vehicles. M240 and M2 will fire as directed to destroy the
threat. CP personnel not manning weapons will assume
security positions and engage with small arms.
• NBC attack. Personnel don their protective masks and
assume MOPP 4 upon hearing the M8A1 chemical alarm or
other alert determined by the troop SOP. The shift leader
ensures that all personnel have initiated MOPP 4. He then
supervises the execution of M256 kit testing and unmasking
procedures.
• Indirect fire attack. The shift leader directs the CP to displace
to a rally point or alternate location. Control of the battle is
transferred to the troop commander. Vehicles evacuate the
CP as soon as antennas are detached. The 1SG or another
element will return to police up any abandoned equipment.
• Electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM). The CP RTO or
shift leader will determine if one or more radio nets have been
compromised or a target of electronic countermeasures
(ECM). The CP will initiate troubleshooting procedures and
inform the commander, subordinates, and higher CPs. If
troubleshooting procedures fail to correct the communications
problem, the shift leader initiates ECCM procedures:
The shift leader announces the ECCM code word over the
jammed net and all operators switch to the alternate net.
The CP reestablishes communications with all stations.
The CP forwards a meaconing, intrusion, jamming and
interference (MIJI) report to the higher CP.
SECTION II – COMMUNICATIONS ARCHITECTURE
F-12. Fundamental to C2 is the reporting of combat information and

orders. A robust FM voice and digital communications network that can
transmit over extended battlespace is essential for successful operations.
Communications is easily interrupted by obstructions to line of sight
(LOS), other systems operating in the same electromagnetic spectrum,
atmospheric conditions, and threat electronic attack. Planning for
successful communications is increasingly complex and requires detailed
actions, such as:
• Conduct a detailed communications LOS analysis (a
communications MCOO).
• Establish redundant means of communications.
• Ensure subordinates understand the commander’s intent so
they know what to do if communications are lost.
• Plan communications architectures in detail, including the
use of retransmission, digital network linkages, and C2 node
placement.
• Define the initial task organization and expected changes in
order to establish and maintain FBCB2 conductivity.
F-6
• Follow proper signal and communications security

procedures.
• Keep digital orders, overlays, and messages concise to avoid
overloading the FBCB2 system.
• Establish SOPs that define when and what communications
will be transmitted digitally and which will be transmitted by
FM.
• Establish alternate communications procedures.
COMMUNICATION RESPONSIBILITIES
F-13. The traditional responsibilities for establishing communications
(higher to lower, supporting to supported, reinforcing to reinforced, left to
right, etc.) remain valid. With many digital communications systems,
however, all participants have roles that must be executed to establish
and maintain communications. The fundamental rule is that all soldiers
have a responsibility to establish and maintain communications. The
traditional responsibilities are the following:
• Senior to subordinate. A senior unit is responsible for
establishing communications with a subordinate unit. An
attached unit of any size is considered subordinate to the
command to which it is attached.
• Supporting to supported. A supporting unit is responsible for
establishing communications with the supported unit.
• Reinforcing to reinforced. A reinforcing unit is responsible for
establishing communications with the reinforced unit.
• Passing to stationary. This occurs during a forward passage of
lines, with the passing unit responsible for establishing
communications with the stationary unit.
• Stationary to passing. This occurs during a rearward passage
of lines, with the stationary unit responsible for establishing
communications with the passing unit.
• Lateral communications. Responsibility for establishing
communications between adjacent units may be fixed by the
next higher commander or SOP. If responsibility is not fixed
by orders, the commander of the unit on the left is responsible
for establishing communications with the unit on the right.
The commander of a unit positioned behind another unit
establishes communications with the forward unit.
• Restoration. Regardless of the responsibility, all units take
prompt action to restore lost communications.
F-7
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
MEANS OF COMMUNICATION
F-14. Reconnaissance troops use the full spectrum of communications
means. Planning data for communications systems and sensors that
support the troop can be found in Table F-1. The troop has access to the
following means of communications:
• Digital. FBCB2 is the digital system that links the troop to
the brigade/squadron’s Army Battle Command System
(ABCS). The ABCS is a network of computer systems that
allow for advanced reporting, orders and graphic sharing, and
database management.
• Radio FM communications. Operations normally depend on
radio as the primary means of communication for both voice
and digital traffic. Net discipline and SOP minimize needless
traffic. To avoid detection by threat direction-finding
equipment, CP uses all other means of communication to
supplement the radio and minimize emissions. Once in
contact, the primary means of communication will be FM
voice. Radio communications include electromagnetic
communications in FM, AM, UHF, and VHF spectrums.
• Tactical satellite (TACSAT) radio communications.
Reconnaissance operations are often conducted across vast
distances. This necessitates the need for extended ranges.
TACSAT radios have unlimited range so they can fulfill this
requirement.
• Commercial lines. Commercial lines are used when approved
by higher headquarters. Careful consideration must be given
to securing commercial lines and limiting classified material
sent over nonsecured lines. If the unit is forced to withdraw,
existing wire lines, including commercial lines, are cut and
sections removed so the threat cannot use them.
• Sound and visual. Sound and visual signals are in the SOI or
the troop SOP. Signals not included in the SOI may be
established by SOP or in the OPORD. The battlefield will
have many sound and visual cues that become increasingly
important in complex and urban terrain. Commanders and
key leaders carefully determine how sound and visual signals
will be used and authenticated. Sound and visual signals
include pyrotechnics, hand-and-arm, flag, metal-on-metal,
rifle shot, whistles, and bells.
• Messengers and liaison officers. Messengers are used between
the CP, trains, and higher and lower headquarters. Liaisons
are sent to higher headquarters to speed the passage of
information between CPs. The use of LNOs becomes
increasingly important as digitally-equipped units operated
with nondigitally-equipped units.
• Wire. Wire is normally used for internal communications
within the CP, support areas, and assembly areas. It is the
primary means of communication whenever the situation
permits.
F-8
INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS
F-15. The troop operates on its internal nets described below:
• Troop command net. The command net is a secure FM net,
controlled by the troop CP. It is used to command and
control the troop. All organic and attached units and
FIST/COLT operate in this net. The command net is used to
send combat critical information to the commander and to
allow platoon, supporting leaders, and the troop commander
to talk to each other.
• Brigade/squadron command net. The command net is a
secure FM net, controlled by the S3 section at the main
CP. It is used to command and control the
squadron/brigade. All organic and attached units, FSO, ALO,
and supporting units operate in this net. The command net is
used to send combat critical information to the commander or
the S3 and to allow subordinate commanders and the
brigade/squadron commander to talk to each other.
• Brigade/squadron operations and intelligence net. The OI net
is a secure FM net, controlled by the S2 section of the main
CP. All routine tactical reports and other intelligence matters
are sent on this net. This net should be used to free the
command net for command and combat critical traffic. The
troop and subordinate S2s are users of this net.
• Brigade/squadron administrative and logistics net. The A/L
net is a secure FM net, controlled by the S4 section in the rear
CP. This net is used for A/L reports and coordinating logistics
and rear area security operations. The forward support
battalion (FSB), subordinate battalion S1/S4s, and attached
1SGs operate on the A/L net. The troop CP monitors this net.
• Brigade/squadron fire control net. The fire support net is an
FM and digital net controlled by the fire support element
(FSE) in the main CP. It is the primary means of calling for
indirect fires or close air support for the brigade. Battalion
FSEs, troop FIST, the main CP, command group, TAC CP,
and supporting artillery units are users of this net.
F-9
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Table F-1. Communications System Planning Data
Planning Planning Low High Line

Short Freq Freq TAC
Full Name Range Range Data Data of GPS Note
Name Band Range SAT
(Voice) (Data)* Rate Rate Sight
EPLRS Enhanced 3-10 km UHF 420-240 14400 100+ Yes Yes Primary means of
Position MHz bps kbps FBCB2 data
Location transmission
Reporting
System
SINCGARS Single- VHF 30- 1800 Yes Secondary means

Channel 87.975 bps of FBCB2 data
Ground and MHz transmission
Airborne
Radio System
Manpack 5-10 km 1-10 km
Short Range 5-10 km 1-10 km

Vehicular
Long Range 10-40 km 3-35 km

Vehicular
NTDR Near Term 10-20 km UHF 225-450 200 Yes Yes CP to CP data
Digital Radio MHz kpbs transfer
AN/PSC-5 UHF/VF 1-3 km 1-3 km UHF 225-400 16000 Yes Yes Can provide
Manpack (LOS) MHz bps retrans for
LOS and unlimited SINCGARS
DAMA/SATC (TACSAT)
OM terminal
MSE Mobile Area Area UHF 225-400 16000 Yes Signal Company
Subscriber MHz bps maintains MSE
Equipment net
AN/TSQ- TROJAN Unlimited 512 No Yes Primary means of

190(V) Special kbps sending video
Purpose feeds from UAV
Intelligence
Remote
Integrated
Terminal
LRS UAV Launch 50 km VHF Yes

and Recovery
Shelter
GCS UAV Ground 125 km VHF Yes Aerial retrans

Control extends range by
Shelter 75 km
IREMBASS Improved 15 km VHF 138-153 Yes Detection range

Remotely MHz 50m dismounts
Monitored 250m wheel
Battlefield 350m track
Sensor
System
GSR Ground 10 km j-band 16-16.5 Yes Detection range 5

Surveillance GHz km dismounts 10
Radar km vehicles
* Ranges are greatly reduced by using higher transmission rates.
COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY
F-16. The OPSEC program is managed by and the responsibility of the
XO. He analyzes the commander's concept of the operation to determine
the EEFI that must be protected from exploitation by threat intelligence.
The CP develops appropriate security measures based on an assessment
F-10
of threat intelligence collection capabilities and on the friendly indicators

that may compromise the EEFI. These OPSEC measures are primarily
procedural in nature and include:
• Signal security (SIGSEC) to protect operational information
by practicing COMSEC and electronic security techniques.
• Information security to prevent disclosure of operational
information through written, verbal, or graphic
communications.
• Physical security that consists of physical measures that
protect personnel; prevent unauthorized access to equipment,
facilities, materiel, and documents; and guard against
espionage, sabotage, damage, or theft.
F-17. COMSEC involves physical security, crypto security, and
transmission security. COMSEC procedures must be covered in the unit
SOP.
F-18. Physical security protects the crypto system and classified
documents (including plain-language copies of messages and carbons)
from capture or loss. Before an area is vacated, soldiers inspect for
messages, carbons, cipher tapes, and copies of maps or orders. Wire lines
are patrolled to prevent threat tapping. When SOI codes or cryptographic
equipment is lost or captured, the unit reports the facts promptly to the
next higher command. The SOP must contain instructions for destruction
of equipment and classified documents to prevent their capture or use by
the threat. Complete SOIs should not be carried forward of the main CP.
When necessary, the troop’s communication sergeant distributes extracts
for use by forward elements. The SOP establishes priority for issue of
SOIs and extracts.
F-19. Crypto security is maintained by using operations codes,
numerical encryption devices, secure voice devices, and other secure
communications equipment.
F-20. Transmission security limits the threat's ability to listen to radio
signals. Any signal transmitted can be intercepted and jammed by the
threat. All transmissions should be short and treated as if the threat
were listening. Net discipline is the responsibility of all users, but the
NCS is responsible for policing the net. Brevity codes, the terrain index
reference system (TIRS), and coded reports all serve to reduce net traffic.
SECTION III – STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES CONSIDERATIONS
F-21. This portion contains information regarding C2 operations that is

relevant in establishing a troop SOP. The troop must establish a strong
set of guidelines and enforce them on subordinate elements to ensure the
standardization.
FBCB2 FILTER SETTINGS
F-22. All FBCB2 systems in the troop should have standardized filter
settings. This is particularly important for the Red picture so that as
information about icons ages, the system purges them at the same time
throughout the entire unit. Standard filter settings, based on the nature
F-11
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
of the threat’s operation, should be established in unit SOPs and be the

same throughout. (See Chapter 2 for detailed discussion of filter settings.)
THREAT REPORTING
F-23. The general rule is that all contact reports are sent FM (voice).
This is the most rapid method to notify all elements in the troop of threat
contact. Follow-up SPOTREPs may be sent digitally on FBCB2. However,
consideration must be given to transmission queue times. Most units use
the guide of “voice up, digital down” in all reporting. This method is, for
example, platoon reporting via FM and the troop sending FRAGOs to the
platoons via FBCB2.
F-24. To prevent FBCB2 systems from quickly getting bogged down in
duplicate reports and multiple sightings of threat contact, the troop
establishes reporting protocols that limit where SPOTREPs are
forwarded and requires leaders to decide what data is passed to higher
and adjacent echelons. For example, the troop commander may require
the CP to analyze all reports from the platoons before they are fed to
higher and adjacent unit databases, while all reports from the GSR
sections are immediately passed. The troop must balance the need for
real-time combat information with the negative effects of data overload.
STANDARDIZED REPORTS
F-25. The brigade/squadron sets a schedule for submitting routine
standardized reports (commander’s SITREP, LOGSTAT, etc.). The SOP
establishes the message group, transmission medium, and time window
for submission. The SOP should stagger reports to limit the strain on the
tactical internet caused by multiple units reporting simultaneously.
CHARTS AND STATUS BOARDS

F-26. The troop CP maintains charts and status boards with current
information in the main CP at all times. The status boards may be analog
or digital. Regardless, the on-duty shift leader is responsible for updating
the boards. The troop XO has overall responsibility for completeness and
accuracy of all CP visual display boards. See Figures F-1 through F-10 for
examples of troop status boards.
F-12
UNIT LOCATIONS
AS OF __________
1 PLT ____ TRP
2 PLT ____ TRP
3 PLT ____ TRP
CDR ____ EN
1SG HUMINT
CP
SIG
MORTAR RET#1
FIST RET#2
MAINT TOC
MEDIC TAC
CTCP
GSR SEC FTCP
GSR SEC
IREMBASS
Figure F-1. Unit Locations
UNIT TASK ORGANIZATION

AS OF __________
1 PLT ____ TRP
2 PLT ____ TRP
3 PLT ____ TRP
CDR ____ EN
1SG HUMINT
CP
SIG
MORTAR RET#1
FIST RET#2
MAINT TOC
MEDIC TAC
CTCP
GSR SEC FTCP
GSR SEC
IREMBASS
Figure F-2. Unit Task Organization
F-13
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
UNIT STATUS
AS OF __________
UNIT VEHICLES AMMO PERSONNEL POL
TROOP ROLLUP
Figure F-3. Unit Status
HIGHER’S MISSION AND INTENT

___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
Figure F-4. Higher’s Mission and Intent
TROOP MISSION AND INTENT

___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
Figure F-5. Troop Mission and Intent
F-14
PIR
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
Figure F-6. Priority Intelligence Requirements
EEFI
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
Figure F-7. Essential Elements of Friendly Information
FFIR
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
Figure F-8. Friendly Forces Information Requirements
F-15
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
R&S EXECUTION MATRIX
DTG: ______________
R&S EXECUTION MATRIX
MISSION: __________
START
REMARKS
PRIORITY
N
CCIR/
A COORD
INSTR
I
STOP
Figure F-9. Reconnaissance and Surveillance

Execution (Synchronization) Matrix
TROOP TIMELINE AND SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

PLANNED ACTIVITY TIME TIME SIGNIFICANT EVENT
LIGHT DATA
Figure F-10. Troop Timeline
FILING SYSTEMS AND NAMING CONVENTIONS

F-27. To promote interoperability and minimize confusion, the
brigade/squadron SOP should define the naming convention and file
folder system for all reports, orders, overlays, and message traffic. This
F-16
will significantly reduce time and frustration associated with locating

information generated by other CPs or between shifts as operators go on
and off duty.
COLOR STANDARDS
F-28. Digital systems provide an increased number of colors available
for the creation of graphic overlays and informational displays. When the
brigade/squadron deviates from standard color conventions, the unit SOP
should clearly define the use of nonstandard colors, and assign colors for
subordinate unit use.
GRAPHICS AND ORDERS

F-29. The brigade/squadron SOP should define the technical process for
creating, collating, and transmitting orders and overlays. As a minimum,
the troop CP should keep the operations, SITEMP, fire support, and CSS
overlays current in both analog and digital formats. The troop 1SG has
the additional task of maintaining the CSS overlays.
F-30. When creating orders, bear in mind that FBCB2 does not have
unlimited bandwidth. Orders and graphics must be concise to reduce
transmission times. Orders transmitted are limited to the size constraint
of the FBCB2 orders format.
F-31. Graphics and overlays should be constructed with the same
considerations for clarity and size. Situational awareness reduces to some
degree the need for control measures, but key leaders must always
consider the integration of analog units and that SA may not always be
available to all elements. When creating graphics consider the following:
• Use multiple smaller overlays to speed transmission times.
System operators can open only the overlays they need and
display them simultaneously. For example, all routes and
checkpoints could be on one overlay and all boundaries could
be on another. This would allow an operator to “turn off”
overlays to temporarily relieve screen clutter.
• Battlefield operating system (BOS) overlays should use the
operations overlay as the basis of creating their overlays. This
reduces redundancy by eliminating the need to reproduce
boundaries and other common control measures and limits
file size.
• The XO spot-checks all overlays prior to transmission to
ensure accuracy, preventing the need to transmit changes or
corrections.
• Transmit graphics as they are created with warning orders to
avoid a large data dump when the order is completed.
INTEGRATING DIGITAL AND NONDIGITAL UNITS

F-32. It will be many years before the majority of the army is digitally
equipped, and even then the brigade will operate in a joint or coalition
environment with elements that will not have digital equipment. The key
leaders must recognize that integrating an analog unit into the troop
requires the retention of most of the analog control techniques. In
F-17
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
essence, two control systems have to be in operation, with particular

attention paid to keeping the analog unit apprised of all the relevant
information that is flowing digitally. The troop SOP should consider:
• Production and distribution of hard copy orders and graphics.
• Increased graphic control measures. Digital units tend to use
less graphic control measures due to increased situational
awareness.
• Receiving standardized reports over FM or mobile subscriber
equipment (MSE) communications.
• Equipping LNOs with digital systems to give analog units
limited connectivity.
REQUIRED SUPPLIES
F-33. Although not SOP, the following minimum supplies and
equipment should be maintained in the CP to support operations:
• Field Desk with the following equipment:
1 pair of scissors.
1 stapler with a box of staples.
1 box of ballpoint pens.
2 boxes of pencils.
1 box of rubber bands.
1 box of assorted grease pencils.
6 packages of super-fine point alcohol markers.
6 packages of fine point alcohol markers.
3 packages of medium point alcohol markers.
300 sheets of DA Form 1594.
300 sheets of SPOTREPs.
10 pads of white ruled paper.
10 pads of yellow legal pads.
2 rolls of 1-inch masking tape.
3 rolls of clear tape.
2 rolls of double-sided clear tape.
10 envelopes, shotgun.
1 lock set.
1 pencil sharpener.
3 sheets of unit symbols.
3 packages of casualty feeder reports, DA Form 1156.
3 packages of witness statements, DA Form 1155.
3 packages of prisoner of war tags.
• Storage Chest with the following equipment:
1 box of clear document protectors.
1 dictionary.
1 box of 3.5-inch floppy disks.
3 reams of white 8.5 x 11-inch copy paper.
1 box of type I plastic bags.
10 memoranda notebooks.
F-18
1 box each of assorted colored wide-tip permanent

markers.
1 bottle of rubbing alcohol.
3 rolls of acetate overlay material.
1 roll of sticky acetate.
3 rolls of green engineer tape.
5 rolls of assorted colored woven tape.
2 rulers.
5 rolls of toilet paper.
2 rolls of paper towels.
1 graphics template.
2 boxes each color chemlights.
• Field Safe for sensitive items.
NOTE: CP personnel should furnish doctrinal reference manuals (FMs and TMs),
equipment, and supplies that relate to their specific fields.
F-19
Appendix G
Environmental Protection
Protection of
CONTENTS
natural
Environmental Risk Management Process..................G-1
resources is an Identify (Environmental) Hazards..............................G-1
ever-increasing Assess Environment Hazards ...................................G-1
concern. It is the Develop Controls and Make Decisions.....................G-3
responsibility of Implement Controls....................................................G-3
Supervise and Evaluate .............................................G-3
all unit leaders Environmental Risk Assessment Worksheet ..............G-3
to decrease and,
if possible,
eliminate damage to the environment when conducting all types of
operations. This appendix focuses on measures the reconnaissance
troop must understand and implement to accomplish that objective.
Training Circular (TC) 3-34.489 provides a comprehensive listing of
procedures and considerations applicable when operating in
environmentally sensitive areas.
SECTION I – ENVIRONMENTAL RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS
G-1. Environmental risk management is similar to safety risk

management and is based on the same philosophy and principles.
(NOTE: Refer to the discussion of safety risk management in Appendix B
of this manual.) The environmental risk assessment and management
process consists of the five steps outlined in the following paragraphs.
STEP 1 – IDENTIFY (ENVIRONMENTAL) HAZARDS

G-2. The command must identify potential sources of environmental
degradation during his analysis of METT-TC. These environmental
hazards are conditions with the potential for polluting air, soil, or water
and/or destroying cultural or historical structures, sites, or artifacts.
Figure G-1 lists procedures and considerations for identifying possible
sources of environmental risks that the troop may face during a typical
tactical operation. The list is organized according to METT-TC factors.
STEP 2 – ASSESS ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS

G-3. The troop commander and subordinate leaders use the
environmental risk assessment worksheet (Figure G-2) and worksheet
instructions (Figure G-3) to analyze the potential severity of
environmental degradation for each training activity. The worksheet
allows them to quantify the risk to the environment as extremely high,
high, moderate, or low. The risk impact value is an indicator of these
levels of severity.
G-1
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
IDENTIFYING SOURCES OF BATTLEFIELD RISK (BY METT-TC)

MISSION
• Identify and assess known environmental risks during planning.
• Determine environmental impact on mission execution.
• Specify areas of risk and/or concern to minimize the impact on the unit’s scheme of maneuver.
• Select alternate training methods or goals as necessary.
• Develop maps and/or sketches with detailed areas of environmental concern.
• Emphasize the importance of every soldier playing an active role in the identification and timely
reporting of new environmental risk elements.
•
Rapidly and effectively respond to all petroleum, oil, and lubricants, and/or hazardous waste
accidents.
ENEMY (THREAT FORCES)
• Identify probable areas of environmental contamination that could affect friendly force movement.
• Evaluate intelligence reports of how the threat will employ his equipment and/or capabilities to
overcome or take advantage of environmental factors.
• Develop threat target options to minimize environmental effects.
•
Maneuver friendly forces in such a way as to direct threat action away from environmentally
sensitive areas, when feasible.
TERRAIN AND WEATHER
• Provide recommended paths of movement to avoid environmentally sensitive areas.
• Identify well-defined terrain features to assist in navigation accuracy.
•
Obtain and analyze weather data to diminish possible environmental risks, focusing on predominant
and developing weather patterns.
TROOPS AND SUPPORT AVAILABLE
• Brief all soldiers thoroughly on environmental risks, concerns, and/or points of interest.
• Develop a detailed and accurate SOP that identifies guidelines for avoiding risk areas without
inhibiting mission accomplishment.
• Brief troops on how to prevent environmental damage based on anticipated areas of probable risk.
• Employ practice scenarios that test soldier response to changing environmental risks and promote
use of the decision-making process in dealing with risks.
• Require accurate and timely reporting pertaining to all environmental issues (friendly or threat).
TIME AVAILABLE
• Maximize planning time. (NOTE: One key step is to minimize the complexity and length of the
mission briefing as much as possible.)
•
Practice and develop various mission profiles that emphasize adjusting for changing environmental
factors, while maintaining the desired momentum.
CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS
• Identify and emphasize rules of engagement and/or rules of interaction that minimize environmental
damage.
• Expect media coverage and analysis of troop actions that affect the environment.
• Anticipate and limit collateral damage to civil infrastructure (such as agriculture and other food
production, delivery and supply systems, and hazardous chemical storage facilities).
• Identify environmental targets of value that the threat might attack.
Figure G-1. Example Procedures for Identifying Environmental Risks
G-2
___________________________________________________ Appendix G – Environmental Protection
STEP 3 – DEVELOP CONTROLS AND MAKE DECISIONS

G-4. Based on the results of the risk assessment, the troop commander
makes decisions and develops measures to reduce significant
environmental risks. Risk decisions are made at a level of command that
corresponds to the degree of risk. Leaders should brief all responsible
individuals and agencies (to include the installation environmental office, if
applicable) on the proposed operational and training plans and pertinent
high-risk environmental factors.
STEP 4 – IMPLEMENT CONTROLS

G-5. The troop commander and subordinate leaders implement
environmental protection measures at all stages of operational planning,
preparation, and execution. They integrate these measures into plans,
orders, SOPs, training performance standards, and rehearsals.
STEP 5 – SUPERVISE AND EVALUATE

G-6. The troop commander must enforce environmental protection
standards during supervision of all training activities.
SECTION II – ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
G-7. To use the environmental risk assessment worksheet (see Figure G-

4 for a sample, completed worksheet) for a specific operation or training
event, the troop commander and subordinate leaders first conduct an
operational analysis to break down the exercise into events, allowing them
to manage the risks for the various tasks. They also identify particular tasks
for the operation using the troop’s mission training plan (MTP). Leaders
develop the hazard list using their experience, lessons learned, unit SOPs,
applicable references, and guidance from the chain of command. They
identify applicable environmental standards, laws, and ROE that affect the
mission. Leaders annotate each task and associated environmental hazards
in sections E and F on the risk assessment worksheet.
G-8. The commander and subordinates assess each hazard to determine
the risk for potential harm to the environment. Their assessment is based
on how often the environmental hazard occurs during the operation
(probability) and what effect the hazard has on the environment (severity).
They use the probability and severity definitions from FM 3-100.4.
G-9. They develop controls to eliminate or reduce the probability or
severity of each hazard. They identify a mix of educational-, physical-, and
avoidance-type controls and annotate them in section H. Once all risk
control measures are in place, any residual risk is annotated in section I.
G-10. Leaders identify how each control would be implemented and assign
responsibility to unit personnel. The “how to” for each control is annotated
in section J. In the sample worksheet, fueling during resupply operations is
identified as a possible environmental concern. Leaders identified control
measures to include ensuring that operators were properly trained to
dispense fuel, and appropriate spill equipment was available. This process
requires leaders to anticipate environmental requirements and incorporate
them as part of long-range, short-range, and near-term planning.
G-3
G-4
A. Mission or Task: B. Date/Time Group C. Date Prepared:
Begin:
End:
D. Prepared By: (Rank, Last Name, Duty Position)

Page _____ of _____
E. Task: F. Identify Hazards: G. Assess Hazards: H. Develop Controls: I. Determine J. Implement

Residual Risk: Controls
(“How To”):
Figure G-2. Environmental Risk Assessment Worksheet

K. Determine overall mission/task risk level after controls are implemented (circle one):
LOW (L) MODERATE (M) HIGH (H) EXTREMELY HIGH (E)
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________ Appendix G – Environmental Protection
Worksheet Instructions
Block
A–E Self-explanatory.
F Identify Hazards. Identify hazards by reviewing METT-TC factors for the mission or
task. Additional factors include historical lessons learned, experience, judgment,
equipment characteristics and warnings, and environmental considerations.
G Assess Hazards. Assessment includes historical lessons learned, intuitive analyses,
experience, judgment, equipment characteristics and warnings, and environmental
considerations. Determine initial risk for each hazard by applying the risk assessment
matrix (refer to Chapter 2, FM 3-100.4). Enter the risk level for each hazard.
H Develop Controls. Develop one or more controls for each hazard to either eliminate the
hazard or reduce the risk (probability and/or severity) of a hazardous incident. Specify
who, what, where, when, and how for each control. Enter controls.
I Determine Residual Risk. Determine the residual risk for each hazard by applying the
risk assessment matrix (refer to Chapter 2, FM 3-100.4). Enter the residual risk level for
each hazard.
J Implement Controls. Decide how each control will be put into effect or communicated to
the personnel who will make it happen (written or verbal instruction: tactical, safety,
garrison SOPs, rehearsals). Enter controls.
K Determine Overall Mission/Task Risk. Select the highest residual risk level and circle it.
This level becomes the overall mission or task risk level. The commander decides
whether the controls are sufficient to accept the residual risk. If the risk is too great to
continue the mission or task, the commander directs development of additional controls
or modifies, changes, or rejects the COA.
Supervise and Evaluate. This last step is not on the worksheet. Plan how each control
will be monitored for implementation (continuous supervision, spot checks), and
reassess hazards as the situation changes. Determine if the controls worked and if they
can be improved. Communicate lessons learned.
Figure G-3. Instructions for Risk Management Worksheet
G-5
A. Mission or Task: B. Date/Time Group C. Date Prepared:
G-6
Troop STX Begin: 010600 JUN XX 22 MAY XX
End: 020100 JUN XX
D. Prepared By: (Rank, Last Name, Duty Position)

1LT Jones, XO Page 1 of 1.
E. Task: F. Identify Hazards: G. Assess Hazards: H. Develop I. Determine J. Implement

Controls: Residual Risk: Controls
(“How To”):
Conduct resupply Fuel spills during Moderate (M) 1. Train drivers and Low (L) Troop SOP,
refueling fuel handlers on paragraph 8,
proper fuel handling conduct training
procedures prior to STX.
2. Provide spill
equipment.
3. Locate refueling
sites away from
waterways.
Establish a tactical Starting range and Moderate (M) 1. Inform soldiers Low (L) Troop SOP para
assembly area. training area fires. that no open fires 7(a), Range
are allowed. regulations.
2. Brief soldiers on
Figure G-4. Sample Environment Risk Assessment Worksheet

use of pyrotechnics.
K. Determine overall mission/task risk level after controls are implemented (circle one):
LOW (L) MODERATE (M) HIGH (H) EXTREMELY HIGH (E)
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
Glossary
AA assembly area; avenue of approach

AAR after-action review
ABCS Army battle command system
ABF attack by fire
ACA airspace coordination area
ACADA automatic chemical agent alarm
ACE analysis and control element
ACF aviation close fires
ACL aircraft cargo load
ACP air coordination point
ACT analysis and control team; air cavalry troop
ADA air defense artillery
ADAM area denial artillery munitions
AFATDS advanced field artillery tactical data system
AGL above ground level
AGM attack guidance matrix
AGS armored gun system
AGT air-ground team
A/L administrative/logistics
ALO air liaison officer
AM amplitude modulation
AMC Air Mobility Command
AMDCCOORD air and missile defense coordinator
AMDS advanced monitoring display system
ammo ammunition
AMO air movement officer
AMDWS air and missile defense workstation
ANBACIS automated nuclear, biological, and chemical information
system
AO area of operations
AOI area of interest
AOR area of responsibility
Glossary - 1
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
APU auxiliary power unit

ARFOR Army Force
ASAS all-source analysis system
ASAS–RWS all source analysis system–remote workstation
ASR alternate supply route
AT antitank
ATACMS Army tactical missile system
ATCCS Army tactical command and control system
ATGM antitank guided missile
AUEL automated unit equipment list
AV air vehicle
AVO air vehicle operator
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System
AWADS adverse weather aerial delivery system
AXP ambulance exchange point
BCIS battlefield combat identification system
BCT brigade combat team
BDA battle damage assessment
BDAR battle damage assessment and repair
bde brigade
BHL battle handover line
BMNT beginning of morning nautical twilight
bn battalion
BOS battlefield operating system
BP battle position
BRT brigade reconnaissance troop
BSA brigade support area
BSB brigade support battalion
BSC brigade support company
BUA built-up area
BUB battle update briefing
C2 command and control
C3 command, control, and communications
C4I command, control, communications, computers, intelligence
C4ISR command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance
Glossary-2
______________________________________________________________________________Glossary
CA civil affairs
CAB combat aviation brigade
cal caliber
CAM chemical agent monitor
CANA convulsant antidote for nerve agent
CAS close air support
CASEVAC casualty evacuation
CATK counterattack
cav cavalry
cbt combat
CBU cluster bomb unit
CCIR commander’s critical information requirements
CCP casualty collection point
CDR; cdr commander
CDS container delivery system
CFF call for fire
CFL coordinated fire line
CFN call for fire net
CFS call for support
CFZ critical friendly zone
CGS common ground station
cGy/hr centigray(s) per hour
CHAT counterintelligence (CI)/human intelligence (HUMINT)
automated tool (kit)
CHS combat health support
CI counterintelligence
CIP combat identification panel
cm centimeter(s)
cmd command
CMOC civil-military operations center
CNA computer network attack
CNR combat net radio
co company
COA course of action
COC chain of command
COE contemporary operational environment
Glossary-3
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
COLT combat observation lasing team

commo communications
COMSEC communications security
CONUS continental United States
COP common operational picture
CP command post
CRD counterreconnaissance detachment
CRT combat repair team
CS combat support
CSAR combat search and rescue
CSOP combat security outpost
CSS combat service support
CSSCS combat service support control system
CTCP combat trains command post
CW continuous wave
DA Department of the Army
DAP decontamination apparatus
div division
DLIC detachment left in contact
DOCEX document exploitation
DOD Department of Defense
DO/DO drive-on/drive-off
DPICM dual-purpose improved conventional munitions
DRS digital reconnaissance system
drv; dvr driver
DS direct support
DS2 decontaminating solution 2
DSM division support matrix
DSO domestic support operation
DS/R direct support/reinforcing
DST division support template
DTG date time group
DTSS digital topographic support system
DZ drop zone
EA engagement area
EAB echelons above brigade
Glossary-4
______________________________________________________________________________Glossary
EAD echelons above division

EAVO external air vehicle operator
EBC embedded battle command (software)
EC effects coordination
ECCM electronic counter-countermeasures
ECM electronic countermeasures
ECT effects coordination team
EEFI essential elements of friendly information
EENT end of evening nautical twilight
EFST essential fire support task
ELINT electronic intelligence
eng; engr engineer
EO electro-optical
EOM end of mission
EPLRS enhanced position location reporting system
EPLRS–VHSIC enhanced position location reporting system–very high speed
integrated circuit
EPW enemy prisoner of war
ERFS extended range fuel supply
EVENTEMP event template
EW electronic warfare
1SG first sergeant
FA field artillery
FAADC2I forward area air defense command, control, and intelligence
FAADC3I forward area air defense command, control, communications
and intelligence
FARE forward area refueling equipment
FARP forward arming and refueling point
FASCAM family of scatterable mines
FBCB2 Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below (system)
FDC fire direction center
FEBA forward edge of the battle area
FFA free fire area
FFAR folding-fin aerial rocket
FFIR friendly forces information requirements
FHA foreign humanitarian assistance
FIST fire support team
Glossary-5
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
FISTV fire support team vehicle

FL firing line
FLE forward logistics element
FLIR forward looking infrared
FLOT forward line of own troops
FM frequency modulation (radio); field manual
FOS forward observer software
FP fighting patrol
FPF final protective fires
FPL final protective line
FRAGO fragmentary order
FS fire support
FSB forward support battalion
FSC forward support company
FSCL fire support coordination line
FSCM fire support coordination measures
FSCOORD fire support coordination
FSE fire support element
FSO fire support officer
ft foot; feet
fwd forward
gal gallon(s)
GBCS ground-based common sensor
GBS ground-based sensor
GCCS-A global command and control system-Army
GCS ground control station
GCT ground cavalry troop
GIRS grid index reference system
GLD ground laser designator
GO governmental organization
gnr gunner
gpm gallon(s) per minute
GPS global positioning system
GRREG graves registration
GSR ground surveillance radar
G/VLLD ground/vehicle laser locator designator
Glossary-6
______________________________________________________________________________Glossary
HA holding area
HC hexachloroethene (smoke)
HE high explosive
HEDP high explosive duel purpose
HEMTT heavy expanded mobile tactical truck
HF high frequency
HHC headquarters and headquarters company
HHT headquarters and headquarters troop
HMMWV high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle
HN host nation
HPT high-payoff target
HQ headquarters
HUMINT human intelligence
HVA high-value asset
IAV interim armored vehicle
IAW in accordance with
IBCT interim brigade combat team
ICAM improved chemical agent monitor
ICM improved conventional munitions
ID identification
IEDK individual equipment decontamination kit
IEW intelligence and electronic warfare
IMETS integrated meteorological system
IMINT imagery intelligence
INC internet controller
INFOSEC information security
INFOSYS information system
INS inertial navigation system
intel intelligence
IO information operations
IP internet protocol
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IR information requirements; infrared
IREMBASS improved remotely monitored battlefield sensor system
ISMS improved SIGINT (signal intelligence) manpack system
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
Glossary-7
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
JAAT joint air attack team

JDISS joint deployable intelligence support system
JSTARS joint surveillance target attack radar system
JSTCD Joint Strategic Deployment Training Center
JTF joint task force
JTIDS joint tactical information distribution system
JTRS joint tactical radio system
JWICS joint worldwide intelligence communications system
k thousand
KIA killed in action
km kilometers
LAN local area network
LAPES low-altitude parachute extraction system
lb pound(s)
LC line of contact
LCD Limited Conversion Division
LCU lightweight computer unit
LD line of departure
ldr leader
LEN large extension node
LLDR lightweight laser designator/range finder
LNO liaison officer
LOA limit of advance
LOC lines of communication
LOG SITREP logistical situation report
LOGPAC logistics package
LOGSTAT logistical status
LOR limit of responsibility
LOS line of sight
LP listening post
LRAS3 long-range advanced scout surveillance system
LRP logistics release point
LRSD long-range surveillance detachment
LRU line replaceable unit
LST laser spot tracker
LT lieutenant
Glossary-8
______________________________________________________________________________Glossary
LTO logistics task order

LVAD low velocity air drop
LZ landing zone
m meter(s)
MACOM major command
MANPADS man portable air defense system
MASINT measurement and signature intelligence
max maximum
MBA main battle area
MC mobility corridor
MCOO modified combined obstacle overlay
MCS maneuver control system
MDMP military decision-making process
MEDEVAC medical evacuation
MEL maximum engagement line
MELIOS mini eye-safe laser infrared observation set
METL mission essential task list
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available, time available, and civil considerations
MFP mortar firing point
MGS mobile gun system
MHz megahertz
MI military intelligence
MICLIC mine clearing line charge
MIJI meaconing, intrusion, jamming, and interference
min minute(s); minimum
MLRS multiple launch rocket system
mm millimeter(s)
MMS mast-mounted sight
MOD mobile obstacle detachment
MOPMS modular pack mine system
MOPP mission-oriented protection posture
mort mortar
MOS military occupational specialty
MOUT military operations in urbanized terrain
MP military police; monitor-programmer
Glossary-9
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
MPP most probable position

MRB motorized rifle battalion
MRC motorized rifle company
MRE meals ready to eat; mission rehearsal exercise
MRP motorized rifle platoon
MSD mobile support detachment
MSE mobile subscriber equipment
MSG multisensor ground (platoon)
MSR main supply route
MTI moving target indicator
MTOE modified table(s) of organization and equipment
MTP mission training plan
mtr motor
MTS movement tracking system
MTT military training team
MTW major theater of war
NAAK nerve agent antidote kit
NAI named area of interest
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVWAR navigation warfare
NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical
NBCWRS nuclear, biological, chemical warning and reporting system
NCO noncommissioned officer
NCOIC noncommissioned officer in charge
NCS net control station
neg negative
NEO noncombatant evacuation operation
NFA no fire area
NG National Guard
NGF naval gunfire
NGO nongovernmental organization
NLT not later than
NMC nonmission capable
NOD night observation device
NOE nap of the earth
NPL no penetration line
Glossary-10
______________________________________________________________________________Glossary
NSA National Security Agency

NSFS naval surface fire support
NTDR near-term data radio
NVD night vision device
NVG night vision goggles
OB order of battle
obj objective
OCOKA observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment,
obstacles, key terrain, avenues of approach (considerations in
evaluating terrain as part of METT-TC)
OE operational environment
OEG operational exposure guidance
OI operations and intelligence
OIC officer in charge
OMT operations management team
O/O on order
OP observation post
OPCON operational control
OPFOR opposing force
OPLAN operation plan
OPORD operation order
ops operations
OPSEC operations security
OPTEMPO operating tempo
ORP objective rally point
OT observer-target
OVE on-vehicle equipment
PAC personnel and administration center
PAO public affairs office; public affairs officer
PAX personnel (number of)
PC personnel carrier
PCC precombat check
PCI precombat inspection
PDDE power-driven decontamination equipment
PEOC3S program executive officer command, control, and
communications systems
PERSTAT personnel status
Glossary-11
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
PGM precision-guided munitions

PIR priority intelligence requirements
PL phase line
PLGR position locator grid reference
PLL prescribed load list
plt platoon
PMCS preventive maintenance checks and services
PME peacetime military engagement
PMS portable monitoring set
POC point of contact
POE priority of effort
POF priority of fires
POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants
POS priority of support
pos position; positive
POSNAV position navigation
POW prisoner of war
PP passage point
prep preparatory
PSG platoon sergeant
PSYOP psychological operations
PVO private volunteer organization
PW prisoner of war
PZ pickup zone
QRF quick reaction force
R&S reconnaissance and surveillance
RAAMS remote antiarmor mines system
RACO rear area combat operations
RATO rocket assist takeoff
recce reconnaissance
recon reconnaissance; reconnoiter
REDCON readiness condition
regt regiment
RES radiation exposure guidance
res reserve
retrans retransmission
Glossary-12
______________________________________________________________________________Glossary
RFA restrictive fire area

RFI request for information
RFL restrictive fire line
R/GS reinforcing/general support
RHO reconnaissance handover
RHOL reconnaissance handover line
RI relevant information
RMS root mean square
ROE rules of engagement
ROI rules of interaction
ROM refuel on the move
ROZ restricted overflight zone
RP release point
RSOI reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
RSTA reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
RTD return to duty
RTO radiotelephone operator
RTP radiotelephone procedures
RV reconnaissance vehicle (Stryker)
RVT remote video terminal
S1 adjutant (US Army)
S2 intelligence officer (US Army)
S2X intelligence officer (Military Intelligence Company) (US
Army)
S3 operations and training officer (US Army)
S3-Air air operations officer (US Army)
S4 supply officer (US Army)
S5 civil affairs officer (US Army)
S6 signal officer (US Army)
SA situational awareness
SAFFMM sustaining, arming, fixing, fueling, manning, moving
SALUTE size, activity, location, unit, time and equipment
SAW squad automatic weapon
SBCT Stryker brigade combat team
SBF support by fire
sct scout
Glossary-13
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
SD security detachment
SDS sorbent decontamination system
SE security element
SEAD suppression of enemy air defense
sec second(s)
SEN small extension node
SF Special Forces
SFC sergeant first class
SGLI Serviceman's Group Life Insurance
SGT sergeant
SHORD short-range air defense
SIDPERS Standardization Installation/Division Personnel System
SIGINT signal intelligence
SIGSEC signal security
SINCGARS Single-Channel Ground/Airborne Radio System
SINCGARS–SIP Single-Channel Ground/Airborne Radio System–System
Improvement Program
SIP System Improvement Program
SIR specific information requirements
SITEMP situation template
SITREP situation report
SJA Staff Judge Advocate
SKE system keeping equipment
SMS sensor monitoring set
SOF special operations forces
SOFA status of forces agreement
SOI signal operating instructions
SOSR suppress, obscure, secure, reduce
SOSRA suppress, obscure, secure, reduce , assault
SOP standing operating procedure
SP start point
SPC specialist
SPF special purpose force
SPOTREP spot report
SPIRIT special purpose intelligence remote integrated terminal
Spt support; supporting
Glossary-14
______________________________________________________________________________Glossary
sqd squad
sqdn squadron
SSB single side band
SSC smaller-scale contingency
SSG staff sergeant
SU situational understanding
SWO squadron weather officer
SWT scout weapons team
TAA tactical assembly area
TAC CP tactical command post
TAC SOP tactical SOP
TACAIR tactical air (support)
TACP tactical air control party
TACSAT tactical satellite
TAEC tactical air effects controller
TAI target area of interest
TAML Theater Army Medical Laboratory
TC-ACCIS transportation coordinator–automated command and control
system
TEP theater engagement plan
TI tactical Internet
TIM toxic industrial material
TIRS terrain index reference system
TIS thermal imaging system
TLP troop-leading procedures
tm team
TOA transfer of authority
TOC tactical operations center
TOE table of organization and equipment
TOR transfer of responsibility; terms of reference
TOT time on target
TOW tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (missile)
TRP target reference point
trp troop
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
TTT time to target
Glossary-15
FM 3-20.971 ___________________________________________________________________________
TV television
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
UBL unit basic load
UHF ultra high frequency
UIC unit identification code
ULLS-G unit-level logistics system–ground
UMC unit movement coordinator
UMCP unit maintenance collection point
UMO unit movement officer
UMT unit ministry team
UN United Nations
US United States
USAF United States Air Force
USMC United States Marine Corps
USN United States Navy
VHF very high frequency
VHSIC very high speed integrated circuit
VMF variable message format
WAN wide area network
WARNO warning order
WCS weapon control status
WIA wounded in action
WIN-T warfighter information network-terrestrial
WMD weapons of mass destruction
WP white phosphorous
XO executive officer
Glossary-16
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AR 380-19. Information Systems Security. 27 February 1998.
AR 55-355. Transportation and Travel – Traffic Management Regulations.

16 February 1995.
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 49. Transportation. 1 October 2001.
DA Form 1155. Witness Statement on Individual. 1 June 1966.
DA Form 1156. Casualty Feeder Report. 1 June 1966.
DA Form 1594. Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer’s Log. November 1962
DA Form 2404. Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Worksheet. April 1979.
DA Form 5988E. Equipment Maintenance and Inspection Worksheet. March 1991.
DA Pam 740-1. Instruction Guide to Basic Military Preservation and Packing.
29 June 1990.
DD Form 551. Record of Interment. August 1984.
DD Form 1077. Collecting Point Register of Deceased Personnel. July 1984.
FM 1-02 [FM 101-5-1]. Operational Terms and Graphics. 30 September 1997.
FM 2-00.21 [FM 34-2-1]. Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures for Reconnaissance,
Surveillance, and Intelligence Support to Counterreconnaissance. 19 June 1991.
FM 2-22.3 [FM 34-52]. Intelligence Interrogation. 28 September 1992.
FM 2-22.2 [FM 34-5]. Human Intelligence and Related Counterintelligence Operations.
29 July 1994.
FM 3-0 [FM 100-5]. Operations. 14 June 2001.
FM 3-01.8 [FM 44-8]. Combined Arms for Air Defense. 1 June. 1999.
FM 3-04.114 [FM 1-114]. Air Cavalry Squadron/Troop Operations (and Digital Annex).
1 February 2000.
FM 3-06 [FM 90-10]. Urban Operations. 30 May 2001.
FM 3-07 [FM 100-20]. Stability Operations and Support Operations. 5 December 1990.
FM 3-07.3 [FM 100-23]. Peace Operations. 30 December 1994.
FM 3-11 [FM (M) 3-100]. Chemical Operations, Principles and Fundamentals.
8 May 1996.
FM 3-11.3 [FM(M) 3-3]. NBC Contamination Avoidance. 16 November 1992.
Bibliography-1
FM 3-20.971____________________________________________________________________________
FM 3-11.4 [FM(M) 3-4]. NBC Protection (FMFM 11-9). 29 May 1992.

FM 3-11.5 [FM 3-5]. NBC Decontamination. 17 November 1993.
FM 3-18.12 [FM 90-4]. Air Assault Operations. 16 March 1987.
FM 3-20.95 [FM 17-95]. Cavalry Operations. 24 December 1996.
FM 3-20.96. Cavalry Squadron (RSTA). (To be published.)
FM 3-20.97 [FM 17-97]. Cavalry Troop. 3 October 1995.
FM 3-20.98 [FM 17-98]. Reconnaissance Platoon. To be Published.
FM 3-90 [FM 100-40]. Tactics. 4 July 2001. 4 July 2001
FM 3-90.2 [FM 71-2]. The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force.
27 September 1988.
FM 3-90.3 [FM 71-3]. The Mounted Brigade Combat Team. November 2001
FM 3-91 [FM 71-100]. Division Operations. 28 August 1996.
FM 3-100.4 [FM 20-400]. Environmental Considerations in Military Operations.
15 June 2000.
FM 3-100.12. Multiservice TTP for Risk Management. March 2001.

FM 4-0 [FM 100-10]. Combat Service Support. 03 October 1995.
FM 4-01 [FM 55-1]. Army Transportation. 3 October 1995.
FM 4-01.1 [FM 55-9]. Unit Air Movement Planning. 5 May 1993.

FM 4-01.15 [FM 55-15]. Transportation Reference Data. 27 October 1997.
FM 5-0 [FM 101-5]. Army Planning and Orders Preparation. 31 May 1997
FM 5-19 [FM 100-14]. Risk Management. 23 April 1998.

Military Standard (MIL-STD)-129J. Marking for Shipment and Storage. 25 November
1986.
TB 55-46-1. Standard Characteristics for Transportability of Military Vehicles and

Other Outsize/Overweight Equipment. 15 January 1993.
TC 3-34.489. The Soldier and the Environment. 8 May 2001.
Bibliography-2
Index
ISR operations, 1-10 vehicle (UAV) platoon,
A brigade reconnaissance troop multisensor ground platoon,
(BRT), 1-2, 1-11 – 1-12, ground sensor platoon, NBC
actions on contact, 3-15 –
3-1, 3-13, 3-22 – 3-23, 4-36 reconnaissance platoon,
3-21, 3-32, 7-29 – 7-30
engineer operations (BCT),
eight forms of contact, air defense.
3-16 C
command and control (C2),
advanced field artillery tactical cavalry squadron (RSTA), 1-2,
2-6 – 2-12
data system, (AFATDS), 1-3 – 1-8
digital systems, 2-31 –
1-13, 2-31, 6-8, 6-12 CHAT, 2-38
2-38
air defense, 6-60 – 6-62 COLT, 1-8, 1-12, 5-32, 6-12 –
FM radio nets, 2-29 – 2-30
all source analysis system 6-13
troop-leading procedures,
(ASAS), 2-31, 3-29 combat service support, 6-57,
2-12 – 2-28
analysis and control team 7-31
command post, 1-6, 1-11, 2-6,
(ACT), 3-29 combat health support,
2-33
area of responsibility (AOR), 8-26 – 8-28
battle drills, F-5 – F-6
1-22 – 1-23 enemy prisoners of war
(EPW), 8-29 BRT, 1-11 – 1-12
Army aviation, 6-25
evacuation, 8-26 – 8-27 communications, F-6 –
air cavalry, 6-25 – 6-26
F-11
air-ground integration, FBCB2 role, 8-5 – 8-6
continuous operations, F-3
6-26 –6-32, 7-18 – 7-20 for brigade
reconnaissance troop, displacing, F-5
attack helicopter support,
5-32, 6-33 –6-41 8-13 positioning, F-4
assault and cargo for RSTA squadron , 8-10 recce troop, 1-6
helicopter support, graves registration responsibilities, F-1 – F-2
6-42 – 6-44 (GRREG), 8-24 – 8-25 SOP, F-11 – F-19
Army battle command system, maintenance and recovery security, F-4 – F-5
2-31 – 2-32 operations, 8-22 – 8-24
commander’s critical
Army tactical command and personnel and information requirements
control system (ATCCS), administration center (CCIR), 1-2, 3-1
2-31 (PAC), 8-25
commander’s reconnaissance
assembly area, 5-33 – 5-36, resupply operations, guidance, 3-4, 3-11, 4-3
5-41 6-42 – 6-44, 8-16 – 8-22
engagement criteria,
in stability and support 3-12
B operations, D-25
focus, 3-11
battle command methodology, supply operations, 8-14 –
tempo, 3-11 – 3-12
2-2 – 2-5 8-16
common operational picture
battle handover, 5-43, 5-46 tactical functions, 8-2 – 8-4
(COP), 1-1, 2-7
breaching, 5-45 – 5-47, 6-58, troop trains, 8-7 – 8-10
communications, 2-28 – 2-30,
6-60 unit ministry team, 8-28 7-3, 7-6, 7-10, 7-12 – 7-14,
brigade combat team (BCT), combat service support control 7-17, 7-19, 7-24, 7-25, 7-27,
1-9 – 1-12, 3-2 – 3-11, 3-13, system (CSSCS), 2-31, 8-2 7-28
3-15 – 3-17, 3-19, 3-22 –
combat support. See compliance inspection. See
3-23, 3-31, 3-39, 3-45, 3-50,
intelligence, fire support, stability operations and
4-3 – 4-5, 4-9 – 4-11,
target acquisition, army support operations,
4-18 – 4-19, 4-29, 4-31
aviation, unmanned aerial
Index-1
FM 3-20.971_______________________________________________________________________________
reconnaissance troop Force XXI Battle Command multiple lane, 3-31

employment. Brigade and Below single-lane, 3-31
contiguous operations, (FBCB2), 2-4, 2-31, 2-33 –
intelligence, 6-1 – 6-7, 6-57.
1-21 – 1-22, 3-35 2-42, 4-10, 5-7
See also human intelligence.
counterreconnaissance, 2-37, forward area air defense
intelligence preparation of the
3-34, 4-2, 4-5, 4-8, 4-11, command, control,
battlefield (IPB), 1-2, 1-3
4-12, 5-17, 5-20 communications, and
intelligence system intelligence, surveillance, and
control measures. See graphic reconnaissance (ISR), 1-1,
(FAADC3I) 2-31
control measures. 1-3, 1-10, 2-3, 2-5, 2-6,
fratricide, 2-41, 5-22, 5-29,
course of action (COA), 3-17, 2-13, 2-19 – 2-22, 2-28,
B-6 – B-13
3-20, 7-2 2-30, 3-2, 3-3 – 3-4, 3-13,
full spectrum operations, 1-30 7-2, 7-21
D
G J
decontamination. See nuclear,
biological, chemical (NBC). global command and control joint surveillance and target
system–Army (GCCS-A), attack radar system
defensive operations,
2-31 (JSTARS), 3-4, 3-18, 3-23
1-26 – 1-28, 6-11, 6-58,
8-10. See also economy of graphic control measures,
force. 2-35 – 2-37, 4-20, L
5-41 – 5-43
engagement area linear operations, 1-21 – 1-23
development, 5-21 ground sensor platoon, 1-4,
local area network (LAN), 2-31
1-9, 6-48 – 6-50
deployment, E-1 – E-5
ground surveillance radar,
M
3-24, 3-29, 4-8, 6-50 – 6-51
E major theater of war (MTW),
economy of force 5-15 – 5-31 H 1-1, 1-31, 3-8, 3-50
defend an AO, 5-19 maneuver control system
hasty attack, 5-11 – 5-14
defend a troop BP, 5-18 (MCS), 2-31
human intelligence (HUMINT),
engagement area medical evacuation, 6-44 –
1-7, 3-11, 3-36, 6-1 – 6-7,
development, 5-21 – 6-45, 7-19
7-2
5-31 mission, enemy, terrain, troops
collection operations, 6-3 –
engineer operations (BCT), and support available, time
6-4
3-42, 3-48, 3-53, 4-8, available, and civil
document exploitation considerations (METT-TC),
6-56 – 6-60
(DOCEX), 6-4 2-13 – 2-18
environmental risk
tactical questioning, 6-4 – mortar section, 1-8, 4-20, 4-33
management, G-1 – G-6
6-6
exfiltration, 3-33 – 3-34, 7-23 multisensor ground platoon,
1-4, 1-9, 6-51 – 6-54
I
F
improved remotely monitored N
fire control, 5-19 – 5-21 battlefield sensor system
noncontiguous operations,
fire support, 6-8, 7-12, 7-14, (IREMBASS), 1-8, 3-29, 4-8,
1-21 – 1-22, 3-35
7-18 6-49
nonlinear operations, 1-21 –
assets and capabilities, infiltration, 3-28 – 3-33, 4-12,
1-23
6-13 – 6-25 5-42, 7-23
nuclear, biological, chemical
coordination measures, actions on contact, 3-32
(NBC) operations, 3-16,
6-19 – 6-25 aerial insertion, 3-31 3-27, 3-53, 6-54 – 6-56,
fire support coordinator dismounted, 3-30 C-1 – C-14
(FSCOORD), 6-8
employment by section, casualties, C-1, C-2, C-5,
fire support team (FIST), 1-7, 3-30 C-6, C-7 – C-8, C-11
1-17, 5-32, 6-9
employment by unit, 3-30 decontamination, C-1,
mounted, 3-30 C-5 – C-8, C-11 – C-13
Index-2
_____________________________________________________________________________________Index
defense, C-1 – C-3, recce troop, 1-2, 3-1, 3-6, 3-23, area security, 4-30 – 4-34
C-5 – C-6 3-36, 4-36, 4-38 convoy security, 4-34 –
marking, C-8 – C-9, C-14 organization structure and 4-38
personnel responsibilities,
mission-oriented protective drill, 4-26 – 4-30
1-5 – 1-9, 1-15 – 1-19
posture (MOPP), C-1, fundamentals, 4-3 – 4-5
C-3 – C-4, C-6, C-7, reconnaissance, 1-1, 7-24 –
7-31 high-value asset, 4-33
C-12
and security, 3-16. See screen, 1-4, 4-10 – 4-30
protection, C-1, C-2, C-3 – also nuclear, biological,
C-4, C-6, C-7, C-8 situational awareness, 1-6,
and chemical (NBC).
1-11, 1-16, 1-30, 2-5, 2-7,
reconnaissance and and surveillance (R&S), 2-27, 4-4, 4-8, 4-10, 4-18,
security, C-13 – C-14 3-13 – 3-15, 4-22, 4-30, 4-30, 4-34, 5-1, 5-10, 5-15
reconnaissance platoon, 4-36
situational understanding, 1-2,
1-4, 1-9, C-13 – C-14, aerial, 3-26 – 3-27 1-31, 2-3, 2-5, 2-7, 3-5, 3-6,
6-55 – 6-56
area, 1-4, 3-43 – 3-49 3-20, 4-3
reports, C-2, C-10
dismounted, 3-28 smaller-scale contingencies
toxic industrial material (SSC), 1-1, 1-3, 1-30 – 1-31,
(TIM), C-14 engagement criteria, 3-13
3-8, 3-10, 3-50, 6-3, 6-7
unmasking, C-9 – C-10 focus of, 3-1, 3-7, 3-11
stability operations, D-1 – D-9.
fundamentals of, 3-2 – 3-6 See also stability operations
O handover, 3-21 – 3-26, and support operations.
observation and fields of fire, 5-36 arms control, D-7
cover, obstacles, key terrain, missions, 1-13 combating terrorism, D-6 –
and avenues of approach mounted, 3-28 D-7
(OCOKA), 2-15, 3-10, B-9
multidimensional, 3-7, diplomatic effort
obstacles, 3-16, 3-19, 3-32, 7-25 operations, D-4 – D-5
3-33, 3-38, 3-42, 3-44, 3-48,
planning, 3-11 – 3-14, peace enforcement
3-50, 3-51, 3-53, 5-25
A-11 – A-19 operations, D-4
offensive operations, 1-25 –
platoon, 1-7 – 1-8, 1-12 peacekeeping operations,
1-26, 5-9 – 5-14, 6-10, 6-57,
route, 3-49 – 3-54 D-4
8-9
sensor, 3-26 show of force, D-7
operational environment,
1-20 – 1-32, 3-6 – 3-7, D-16, tempo, 3-11 – 3-12 stability operations and support
D-25 operations, D-1
zone, 1-4, 3-38 – 3-43,
orders 2-5, 2-10 – 2-12, 2-35 4-12 compliance inspections,
D-32 – D-33
FRAGO, A-8 – A-9 rehearsals, 2-24 – 2-27, 4-8,
4-30, 5-32, 5-37 environment, D-16
OPORD, 2-22 – 2-23,
2-35, A-1 – A-7, B-10 – relief in place, 5-36 – 5-40 intelligence, D-17
B-13 risk management, B-1 – B-6 media interviews, D-39 –
WARNO, A-9 – A-11 D-40
rules of engagement (ROE),
outposting, 4-37 – 4-38 3-11, 3-18, 3-46, minefield clearance,
D-22 – D-23 D-42 – D-43
P rules of interaction (ROI), D-24 presence operations,
D-30 – D-32
passage of lines, 5-40 – 5-45
PROPHET, 3-29, 5-32, 6-52 –
S reconnaissance troop
employment, D-15
6-54 security drill, 4-26 – 4-30
tempo, D-17
security operations, 1-28 –
R 1-29, 4-1 – 4-5, 4-31 – 4-32, Stryker brigade combat team
8-10, 8-13, 8-21 (SBCT), 1-2, 1-3, 1-4,
readiness condition
3-23 – 3-24, 4-16
(REDCON), 5-35 security missions, 1-4, 1-10,
1-13, 4-2
Index-3
FM 3-20.971_______________________________________________________________________________
support operations, D-9 – target acquisition, 5-27, U

D-15. See also stability 5-32 – 5-33, 6-8 – 6-9 unmanned aerial vehicle,
operations and support (UAV), 1-4, 1-9, 3-2, 3-4,
terrain, 3-3, 3-4, 3-6, 3-7,
operations. 3-14, 3-17, 3-18, 3-22 –
3-10, 3-11, 3-13, 3-14, 3-18,
domestic support, D-10 3-19, 3-27 – 3-30, 3-34, 3-24, 3-27, 3-29, 3-40, 3-42,
foreign humanitarian 3-36, 3-38, 3-39, 3-42 – 3-45, 3-46, 3-48, 3-51,
assistance, D-11 3-46, 3-48 – 3-51, 3-53, 3-53, 4-9, 5-32
relief operations, D-11 5-2 – 5-5, 5-7, 5-9, 5-10, platoon, 6-45 – 6-48
5-17, 5-18, 5-20, 5-21, 5-23, urban operations, 3-7
surveillance troop, 1-8 – 1-9,
5-29, 5-33, 5-35, 5-38, 5-40,
7-22 – 7-23 infrastructure, 3-9, 7-10
5-42, 5-46 – 5-48
patrolling, 7-25 – 7-29
T threat, 1-20, 1-25, 1-28, 3-8,
physical environment,
4-26
tactical internet, 2-31 – 2-32 7-6 – 7-10
tactical movement, 1-29 – troop-leading procedures, society, 3-8, 7-10
1-30, 5-3. See also tactical 2-12 – 2-28, 3-11, 3-13,
terrain, 3-10, 7-5
road march. 3-14, 3-17, 3-39, 3-44, 3-45,
3-51, A-1 threat, 3-8, 7-10 – 7-11
tactical road march, 4-12, 5-4 –
5-9 W
wide area network, 2-31
Index-4
FM 3-20.971
2 DECEMBER 2002
By order of the Secretary of the Army:
ERIC K. SHINSEKI
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
JOEL B. HUDSON
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0307302
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and US Army Reserve: To be distributed in

accordance with the initial distribution number 115890, requirements for FM 3-
20.971.
PIN: 080695-000

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FM 3-20.

PREFACE .................................................................................................................. iii

Chapter 3 RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS ......................................................................3-1

Planning for Urban Reconnaissance......................................................................7-11

The purposes of this chapter are as follows:

• Describe the organization of the two types of reconnaissance

1-1. Reconnaissance troops are optimized to conduct reconnaissance

1-3. As a part of the Army’s transformation process, the recce troop

increased number of tools for executing ISR operations. Unmanned aerial

THE CAVALRY SQUADRON (RSTA)

Figure 1-1. Stryker Brigade Combat Team Organization

1-6. To conduct the SBCT’s ISR operations, the squadron is composed

Figure 1-2. Squadron Organization

THE RECCE TROOP

Figure 1-3. Recce Troop (RSTA) Headquarters Section

TROOP COMMAND POST

headquarters CP (tactical CP [TAC CP] or main CP). During security or

FIRE SUPPORT TEAM

1-17. The platoon can organize into various configurations, but is

Figure 1-4. Recce Platoon Organization

Figure 1-5. Mortar Section Organization

troop provides the squadron commander a mix of specialized capabilities

THE MOUNTED BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

Figure 1-6. Brigade Combat Team Organization

THE BRIGADE RECONNAISSANCE TROOP

Figure 1-7. Brigade Reconnaissance Troop Headquarters Organization

BRIGADE RECONNAISSANCE TROOP COMMAND POST

Figure 1-8. Reconnaissance Platoon Organization

COMBAT OBSERVATION LASING TEAM PLATOON

Figure 1-9. COLT Platoon Organization

SECTION II – MISSIONS, CAPABILITIES, AND LIMITATIONS

Figure 1-10. Troop Missions

SECTION III – RESPONSIBILITIES

• Assist and coordinate with the XO in all critical CSS

• Serve as the commander’s primary advisor on the threat’s

• Supervise the execution of orders; ensure that priority targets

SECTION IV – OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

• Maintaining and preserving viable conventional military

threat forces sanctuary and freedom of action. One possible

Figure 1-11. Example Linear Area of Responsibility

Figure 1-12. Example Nonlinear Area of Responsibility

1-70. In the offense, the disruption zone is that battlespace in which

Figure 1-13. Example Offensive Operation

Figure 1-14. Example Nonlinear Defense

MAIN DEFENSE FORCE

Figure 1-15. Tactical Movement Control Measures and

(PME), and to a lesser extent in MTW. Missions in any environment

antitank guided missiles (ATGM), mortars, mines, explosives, and

Battle command of the reconnaissance troop is typically decentralized

Battle command is a continual and sequential process that begins in

• Define the art of command.

• Describe the communications and digital systems associated

SECTION I – THE ART OF COMMAND

2-1. Command and control are interrelated. Command resides solely

THE ELEMENTS OF COMMAND

BATTLE COMMAND METHODOLOGY

battle command presents unique challenges in the conduct of planning

Figure 2-1. Seeing the Battlefield