Search Results (98)

Most literature has extensively discussed reinforcement learning (RL) for controlling rotorcraft drones during flight for traversal tasks. However, most studies lack adequate details regarding the design of reward and punishment mechanisms, and there is a limited exploration of the feasibility of applying reinforcement learning in actual flight control following simulation experiments. Consequently, this study focuses on the exploration of reward and punishment design and state input for RL. The simulation environment is constructed using AirSim and Unreal Engine, with onboard camera footage serving as the state input for reinforcement learning. The research investigates three RL algorithms suitable for discrete action training. The Deep Q Network (DQN), Advantage Actor–Critic (A2C), and Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) were combined with three different reward and punishment design mechanisms for training and testing. The results indicate that employing the PPO algorithm along with a continuous return method as the reward mechanism allows for effective convergence during the training process, achieving a target traversal rate of 71% in the testing environment. Furthermore, this study proposes integrating the YOLOv7-tiny object detection (OD) system to assess the applicability of reinforcement learning in real-world settings. Unifying the state inputs of simulated and OD environments and replacing the original simulated image inputs with a maximum dual-target approach, the experimental simulation achieved a target traversal rate of 52% ultimately. In summary, this research formulates a set of logical frameworks for an RL reward and punishment design deployed with real-time Yolo’s OD implementation synergized as a useful aid for related RL studies. Full article

Cooperative governance of water pollution is an effective initiative to implement the strategy for the protection of the Yangtze River Basin. Based on the stakeholder theory, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of water pollution in the Yangtze River Basin from the perspective of “cost–benefit”. This paper analyzes the stability of possible equilibrium points of the evolutionary game system by scenarios and further explores the influence of key factors on the evolution of the cooperative governance system of water pollution in the Yangtze River Basin using numerical simulation. According to the findings, (1) the watershed system comprises three key stakeholders: local governments, enterprises, and the public. Each stakeholder’s behavioral strategy choice is influenced by its unique factors and the behavioral strategy choices of the other two stakeholders. (2) Equilibrium points represent the potential strategic equilibrium presented by each stakeholder. When the net income of a particular behavioral strategy within the set exceeds zero, stakeholders will be more inclined to choose that behavioral strategy. (3) The key influencing factors in the evolutionary game are regulatory costs, reputation loss, material rewards, and violation fines. Therefore, this paper proposes to construct a cooperative governance mechanism for water pollution in the Yangtze River Basin from three aspects: an efficient regulatory mechanism, a dynamic reward and punishment mechanism, and a multi-faceted incentive mechanism, with a view to promoting a higher-quality development of the ecological environment in the Yangtze River Basin. Full article

In China, new-energy vehicles are viewed as the ultimate goal for the automobile industry, given the current focus on the “dual-carbon” target. Therefore, it is important to promote the sustainable development of this new-energy market and ensure a smooth transition from fuel-driven vehicles to new-energy vehicles. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving vehicle enterprises, consumers, and the government. It improves the tripartite evolutionary game through the mechanisms of dynamic and static rewards and punishments, respectively, using real-world data. The results show the following. (1) A fluctuation is present in the sales of new-energy vehicles by enterprises and the active promotional behavior of the government. This fluctuation leads to instability, and the behavior is difficult to accurately predict, which is not conducive new-energy vehicles’ promotion and sales. (2) A static reward and punishment mechanism can change the fluctuation threshold or peak value. Nevertheless, the stability of the system’s strategy is not the main reason that the government has been actively promoting it for a long time. However, enterprises are still wavering between new-energy and fuel vehicles. (3) The linear dynamic reward and punishment mechanism also has its defects. Although they are considered the stability control strategy of the system, they are still not conducive to stability. (4) The nonlinear dynamic reward and punishment mechanism can help the system to achieve the ideal stabilization strategy. Full article

Since existing studies primarily explore green development measures from the static perspective of a single airport stakeholder, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model to analyze the strategic choices of three key stakeholders: airport authorities, third-party organizations, and government departments, based on evolutionary game theory. By solving the stable strategy of the tripartite evolution using the Jacobian matrix, the green transition of airport development can be divided into three stages: “initiation”, “development”, and “maturity”, allowing for the exploration of key factors influencing the green transition of airport development. A simulation analysis is conducted based on real Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport data. The results indicate that the tripartite evolutionary game strategy is stable at $E_4(0,0,1)$ and the green transition of Baiyun Airport remains in the development stage. By improving the reward and punishment mechanisms of government departments, the evolutionary game strategy can be stabilized at $E_8(1,1,1)$, promoting the green transition of airport development toward the mature stage. By adjusting the game parameters, the dynamic process of green transition in airports at different levels of development and under varying regulatory environments can be effectively captured, supporting the precise formulation of corresponding policies. Full article

Systematic management of corporate safety risks in industrial parks has become a hot topic. And risk prevention and control mutual aid is a brand-new model in the risk and emergency management of the park. In the context of blockchain, how to incentivize enterprises to actively invest in safety risk prevention and control mutual aid has become a series of key issues facing government regulators. This paper innovatively combines Prospect Theory, Mental Accounting, and Evolutionary Game Theory to create a hypothetical model of limited rationality for the behavior of key stakeholders (core enterprises, supporting enterprises, and government regulatory departments) in mutual aid for safety risk prevention and control. Under the static prize punishment mechanism and dynamic punishment mechanism, the evolutionary stabilization strategy of stakeholders was analyzed, and numerical simulation analysis was performed through examples. The results show: (1) Mutual aid for risk prevention and control among park enterprises is influenced by various factors, including external and subjective elements, and evolves through complex evolutionary paths (e.g., reference points, value perception). (2) Government departments are increasingly implementing dynamic reward and punishment measures to address the shortcomings of static mechanisms. Government departments should dynamically adjust reward and punishment strategies, determine clearly the highest standards for rewards and punishments, and the combination of various incentives and penalties can significantly improve the effectiveness of investment decisions in mutual aid for safety risk prevention and control. (3) Continuously optimizing the design of reward and punishment mechanisms, integrating blockchain technology with management strategies to motivate enterprise participation, and leveraging participant feedback are strategies and recommendations that provide new insights for promoting active enterprise investment in mutual aid for safety risk prevention and control. The marginal contribution of this paper is to reveal the evolutionary pattern of mutual safety risk prevention and control behaviors of enterprises in chemical parks in the context of blockchain. Full article

There exist conflicts of interest between upstream and downstream regions in flood control and drainage; how to balance these conflicts and achieve collaborative flood management remains an important scientific problem. To explore a balanced governance strategy, this study took the Demonstration Zone of Green and Integrated Ecological Development of the Yangtze River Delta, which consists of three separate administrative regions, as the research domain. Using evolutionary game theory, the study conducts a comparative analysis of the interests between upstream and downstream areas. It introduces external drivers, such as the intervention of higher-level administrative bodies and incentive-constraining policies, along with internal balancing mechanisms like bidirectional compensation. The goal is to explore collaborative strategies and cooperation mechanisms that can balance the conflicts of interest between upstream and downstream areas. Results indicate that: (1) The final collaborative strategy was closely related to factors such as the cost of conflict, the amount of two-way compensation, additional benefits of flood control and drainage, and the intensity of incentive constraints. (2) Incorporating a reasonable two-way compensation and reward and punishment mechanism into the evolutionary game theory model can promote the model to a stable strategy. (3) The external driving mechanisms aim to coordinate the conflicts between upstream and downstream regions through incentive or constraint policies, which help motivate and encourage proactive collaboration in flood control and drainage management. The internal balancing mechanism is responsible for compensating for economic losses caused by imbalances, thereby creating pressure that fosters regional cooperation in flood control and drainage governance. In a word, the collaborated management mechanism helps provide a more balanced strategy across different administrative regions. Full article

The emerging and promising paradigm of the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) employ vehicle-to-everything communication for facilitating vehicles to not only communicate with one another but also with the supporting roadside infrastructure, vulnerable pedestrians, and the backbone network in a bid to primarily address a number of safety-critical vehicular applications. Nevertheless, owing to the inherent characteristics of IoV networks, in particular, of being (a) highly dynamic in nature and which results in a continual change in the network topology and (b) non-deterministic owing to the intricate nature of its entities and their interrelationships, they are susceptible to a number of malicious attacks. Such kinds of attacks, if and when materialized, jeopardizes the entire IoV network, thereby putting human lives at risk. Whilst the cryptographic-based mechanisms are capable of mitigating the external attacks, the internal attacks are extremely hard to tackle. Trust, therefore, is an indispensable tool since it facilitates in the timely identification and eradication of malicious entities responsible for launching internal attacks in an IoV network. To date, there is no dataset pertinent to trust management in the context of IoV networks and the same has proven to be a bottleneck for conducting an in-depth research in this domain. The manuscript-at-hand, accordingly, presents a first of its kind trust-based IoV dataset encompassing 96,707 interactions amongst 79 vehicles at different time instances. The dataset involves nine salient trust parameters, i.e., packet delivery ratio, similarity, external similarity, internal similarity, familiarity, external familiarity, internal familiarity, reward/punishment, and context, which play a considerable role in ascertaining the trust of a vehicle within an IoV network. Full article

Somatic markers have been evidenced as determinant factors in human behavior. In particular, the concepts of somatic reward and punishment have been related to the decision-making process; both reward and somatic punishment represent bodily states with positive or negative sensations, respectively. In this research work, we have designed a mechanism to generate artificial somatic punishments in an autonomous system. An autonomous system is understood as a system capable of performing autonomous behavior and decision making. We incorporated this mechanism within a decision model oriented to support decision making on stock markets. Our model focuses on using artificial somatic punishments as a tool to guide the decisions of an autonomous system. To validate our proposal, we defined an experimental scenario using official data from Standard & Poor’s 500 and the Dow Jones index, in which we evaluated the decisions made by the autonomous system based on artificial somatic punishments in a general investment process using 10,000 independent iterations. In the investment process, the autonomous system applied an active investment strategy combined with an artificial somatic index. The results show that this autonomous system presented a higher level of investment decision effectiveness, understood as the achievement of greater wealth over time, as measured by profitability, utility, and Sharpe Ratio indicators, relative to an industry benchmark. Full article

It is a challenge for the particle swarm optimization algorithm to effectively control population diversity and select and design efficient learning models. To aid in this process, in this paper, we propose multiple learning strategies and a modified dynamic multiswarm particle swarm optimization with a master slave structure (MLDMS-PSO). First, a dynamic multiswarm strategy with a master–slave structure and a swarm reduction strategy was introduced to dynamically update the subswarm so that the population could maintain better diversity and more exploration abilities in the early stage and achieve better exploitation abilities in the later stage of the evolution. Second, three different particle updating strategies including a modified comprehensive learning (MCL) strategy, a united learning (UL) strategy, and a local dimension learning (LDL) strategy were introduced. The different learning strategies captured different swarm information and the three learning strategies cooperated with each other to obtain more abundant population information to help the particles effectively evolve. Finally, a multiple learning model selection mechanism with reward and punishment factors was designed to manage the three learning strategies so that the particles could select more advantageous evolutionary strategies for different fitness landscapes and improve their evolutionary efficiency. In addition, the results of the comparison between MLDMS-PSO and the other nine excellent PSOs on the CEC2017 test suite showed that MLDMS-PSO achieved an excellent performance on different types of functions, contributing to a higher accuracy and a better performance. Full article

Agricultural insurance is instrumental in consolidating the gains of poverty alleviation and advancing rural revitalization. It significantly aids in the efficient allocation of agricultural production factors, which in turn enhances agricultural output and bolsters the evolution of modern agriculture. Therefore, utilizing data from 583 household surveys and employing endogenous transformation and intermediary effect models, this paper analyzes the production factor allocation effect and specific mechanism of agricultural insurance. It focuses on small-scale farmers and new agricultural operators, exploring how insurance contributes to the advancement of modern agricultural practices. The results show the following: (1) Agriculture insurance can significantly affect the agricultural scale input behavior of farmers such as land input scale and input scale, agricultural machinery application behavior such as the degree of mechanization and water conservancy application, agricultural technology adoption behavior, and planting structure selection behavior, thereby helping to modernize agriculture. (2) There is heterogeneity in the impact of agriculture insurance on the allocation of production factors for small farmers and new agricultural operators. For small farmers, agriculture insurance has a significant promoting effect on their agricultural machinery application behavior, agricultural technology adoption behavior, and planting structure selection behavior. For new agricultural operators, agriculture insurance significantly promotes their agricultural scale input behavior, agricultural machinery application behavior, and agricultural technology adoption behavior. (3) In terms of the mechanism of action, agriculture insurance mainly promotes agricultural scale input behavior through land transfer, facilitates agricultural machinery application behavior by purchasing agricultural machinery equipment and services, encourages agricultural technology adoption behavior by strengthening agricultural technology training, and enhances professional production levels by increasing the scale of insured planting, thereby contributing to the development of modern agriculture. Based on this, several policy suggestions have been proposed. These include enhancing the directionality of agriculture insurance policies, improving the collaborative interaction mechanism between agriculture insurance and agricultural credit financing, and adopting certain reward and punishment measures to curb moral hazard. Full article

Cooperation is essential for the survival of human society. Understanding the nature of cooperation and its underlying mechanisms is crucial for studying human behavior. This paper investigates the impact of leadership on public cooperation by employing repeated sequential public goods games, as well as by examining whether leading by example (through rewards and punishments) can promote cooperation and organizational success. The leaders were assigned randomly and were given the authority to reward or punish. As a result, (1) the leaders showed a strong tendency toward reciprocity by punishing free riders and rewarding cooperators at their own expense, which enhanced the intrinsic motivation for others to follow their example; and (2) both rewards and punishments were effective in promoting cooperation, but punishment was more effective in sustaining a high level of collaboration. Additionally, leaders preferred using rewards and were more reluctant to use punishments. These findings are crucial for creating organizational structures that foster cooperation. Full article

With the increasingly serious problem of global climate change, many countries are positively promoting carbon-emission-reduction actions. In order to deeply explore the interaction between enterprises’ carbon-emission reduction and governments’ regulation, this paper builds evolutionary game models between governments and enterprises under the reward-and-punishment mechanism. The peer-incentive mechanism is introduced to incentivize enterprises to reduce carbon emissions and coordinate governments and enterprises. The evolutionary-stability strategies are obtained by solving the evolutionary game models. The stability of equilibrium points under different situations is theoretically and numerically studied. The results show that the existence of peer incentives makes enterprises more inclined to positively reduce carbon emissions and governments more inclined to positively regulate. A sufficiently large peer fund can always encourage enterprises to choose positive carbon-reduction emission strategies, while governments choose positive regulation strategies. Not only the increasing rewards and fines but also lowering regulatory costs will promote carbon-emission-reduction behaviors of enterprises. Peer incentives are more effective in promoting positive emission reduction of enterprises compared with rewards and punishments. This study can provide important guidance for governments to formulate regulatory strategies and for enterprises to formulate emission-reduction strategies. Full article

In response to the problems of random selection of primary nodes, high communication complexity, and low consensus efficiency in the current consensus mechanism for intellectual property transactions, a Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) consensus algorithm based on the Affinity-Propagation (AP) clustering algorithm, termed AP-PBFT, is proposed. Firstly, the election strategy of the leader node is constructed based on the reputation mechanism; the reward and punishment mechanism is designed to achieve the dynamic adjustment of the reputation value of the nodes in the PBFT consensus process, and the number of votes among the nodes is introduced to determine the node’s reputation value in collaboration with the reward and punishment mechanism to guarantee the precise ordering of the nodes. Secondly, nodes with high reputation values are selected as cluster centers to run the AP clustering algorithm, and clustering groups of knowledge property transaction nodes are constructed based on responsibility and availability. Finally, the three-stage consensus process of the PBFT consensus algorithm is optimized, and the consensus task is decomposed into two layers: the intra-consensus group and the inter-leader node group, reducing the communication complexity of transaction data in the blockchain. Experimental findings indicate a significant performance improvement of the algorithm over the PBFT consensus algorithm in communication complexity, throughput, and consensus efficiency in the simulation environment of multiple types of transactions in intellectual property transactions, including different types of large-scale transaction scenarios, such as purchases, sales, licenses, and transfers. Full article

In response to the shortcomings of the consensus algorithm for intellectual property transactions, such as high communication overhead, random primary node selection, and prolonged consensus time, a Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) improvement algorithm based on Divisive Analysis (DIANA) D-PBFT algorithm is proposed. Firstly, the algorithm adopts the hierarchical clustering mechanism of DIANA to cluster nodes based on similarity, enhancing node partition accuracy and reducing the number of participating consensus nodes. Secondly, it designs a reward and punishment system based on node ranking, to achieve consistency between node status and permissions, timely evaluation, and feedback on node behaviours, thereby enhancing node enthusiasm. Then, the election method of the primary node is improved by constructing proxy and alternate nodes and adopting a majority voting strategy to achieve the selection and reliability of the primary node. Finally, the consistency protocol is optimised to perform consensus once within the cluster and once between all primary nodes, to ensure the accuracy of the consensus results. Experimental results demonstrate that the D-PBFT algorithm shows a better performance, in terms of communication complexity, throughput, and latency. Full article

Large-scale fluctuating and intermittent new energy power generation in a new power system is gradually connected to the grid. In view of the impact of the uncertainty of wind power on the spinning reserve capacity of thermal power units in the new power system’s day-ahead dispatching and reserve auxiliary service market, the original dispatching mode and intensity can no longer meet the system demand. To address this problem, the establishment of a wind power grid-connected new power system’s standby auxiliary service market reward and punishment assessment mechanism is undertaken to fundamentally reduce the demand for auxiliary services of the new power system pressure. In the first part of this paper, a two-stage optimal scheduling strategy is proposed for the first day of the year that takes into account the operational risk and standby economics. First, a data-driven method is used to generate the forecast value of the wind power interval before the day, and a unit start–stop optimization model (the first-stage optimization model) is established by taking into account the CvaR (conditional value at risk) theory to optimize the risk loss of wind abandonment and loss of load and the fuel cost of each unit, and an optimization algorithm is used to carry out the three scenarios and the corresponding four scenarios to optimize the configuration of the start–stop state and power output of each unit. The optimization algorithm is used to optimize the starting and stopping status and output of each unit for three circumstances and four corresponding scenarios. Then, in the second stage, a standby auxiliary service market incentive and penalty assessment model is established to effectively coordinate the sharing of rotating standby capacity and cost among thermal power units through the incentive and penalty mechanism so as to make a reasonable and efficient allocation of wind power output, curtailable load, and synchronized standby capacity. The new power system with improved IEEE30 nodes is simulated and verified, and it is found that the two-stage optimization model obtains a scheduling strategy that takes into account the system operating cost, standby economy, and reliability, and at the same time, through the standby auxiliary service market incentive and penalty assessment mechanism, the extra cost caused by standby cost mismatch can be avoided. This evaluation model provides a reference for the safe, efficient, flexible, and nimble operation of the new power system, improves the economic efficiency and improves the auxiliary service market mechanism. Full article