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Article

Research on the Green Transition Path of Airport Development under the Mechanism of Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

by
Yangyang Lv
1,
Lili Wan
1,
Naizhong Zhang
1,
Zhan Wang
1,*,
Yong Tian
1 and
Wenjing Ye
2
1
College of Civil Aviation, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 210016, China
2
Zhejiang Scientific Research Institute of Transport, Hangzhou 311305, China
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Sustainability 2024, 16(18), 8074; https://doi.org/10.3390/su16188074 (registering DOI)
Submission received: 10 August 2024 / Revised: 10 September 2024 / Accepted: 13 September 2024 / Published: 15 September 2024
(This article belongs to the Section Sustainable Transportation)

Abstract

Since existing studies primarily explore green development measures from the static perspective of a single airport stakeholder, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model to analyze the strategic choices of three key stakeholders: airport authorities, third-party organizations, and government departments, based on evolutionary game theory. By solving the stable strategy of the tripartite evolution using the Jacobian matrix, the green transition of airport development can be divided into three stages: “initiation”, “development”, and “maturity”, allowing for the exploration of key factors influencing the green transition of airport development. A simulation analysis is conducted based on real Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport data. The results indicate that the tripartite evolutionary game strategy is stable at E4(0,0,1), and the green transition of Baiyun Airport remains in the development stage. By improving the reward and punishment mechanisms of government departments, the evolutionary game strategy can be stabilized at E8(1,1,1), promoting the green transition of airport development toward the mature stage. By adjusting the game parameters, the dynamic process of green transition in airports at different levels of development and under varying regulatory environments can be effectively captured, supporting the precise formulation of corresponding policies.
Keywords: green airport development; transition path; tripartite evolutionary game; stage division; reward and punishment mechanisms green airport development; transition path; tripartite evolutionary game; stage division; reward and punishment mechanisms

Share and Cite

MDPI and ACS Style

Lv, Y.; Wan, L.; Zhang, N.; Wang, Z.; Tian, Y.; Ye, W. Research on the Green Transition Path of Airport Development under the Mechanism of Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model. Sustainability 2024, 16, 8074. https://doi.org/10.3390/su16188074

AMA Style

Lv Y, Wan L, Zhang N, Wang Z, Tian Y, Ye W. Research on the Green Transition Path of Airport Development under the Mechanism of Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model. Sustainability. 2024; 16(18):8074. https://doi.org/10.3390/su16188074

Chicago/Turabian Style

Lv, Yangyang, Lili Wan, Naizhong Zhang, Zhan Wang, Yong Tian, and Wenjing Ye. 2024. "Research on the Green Transition Path of Airport Development under the Mechanism of Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model" Sustainability 16, no. 18: 8074. https://doi.org/10.3390/su16188074

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