One Day We Would Debut A New Marketing Message
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On October 4, 2011, the press conference expected by tens of thousands of "Apple followers" was held as scheduled. However, what disappointed "apple fans" was that the press conference did not take place as expected - launching the new generation iPhone 5 - but only launching the iPhone 4S upgraded from iPhone 4. , and all information about iPho
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One Day We Would Debut A New Marketing Message - Leland Kornegay
One Day We Would Debut A New Marketing Message
One Day We Would Debut A New Marketing Message
Copyright © 2024 by Leland Kornegay
All rights reserved
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1 : TUNING THE ENGINE
CHAPTER 2 : FORMER APPLE BUSINESS DIRECTOR
CHAPTER 3 : CASH CONVERSION CYCLE
CHAPTER 4 : DETERMINED TO KEEP
CHAPTER 5 : THIS IS HOW YOU NEED TO VIEW COMPETITION.
CHAPTER 1 : TUNING THE ENGINE
Once the baseline has been established, the startup can work toward the second learning milestone: tuning the engine. Every product development, marketing, or other initiative that a startup undertakes should be targeted at improving one of the drivers of its growth model. For example, a company might spend time improving the design of its product to make it easier for new customers to use. This presupposes that the activation rate of new customers is a driver of growth and that its baseline is lower than the company would like. To demonstrate validated learning, the design changes must improve the activation rate of new customers. If they do not, the new design should be judged a failure. This is an important rule: a good design is one that changes customer behavior for the better.
Compare two startups. The first company sets out with a clear baseline metric, a hypothesis about what will improve that metric, and a set of experiments designed to test that hypothesis. The second team sits around debating what would improve the product, implements several of those changes at once, and celebrates if there is any positive increase in any of the numbers. Which startup is more likely to be doing effective work and achieving lasting results?
Pivot or Persevere
Over time, a team that is learning its way toward a sustainable business will see the numbers in its model rise from the horrible baseline established by the MVP and converge to something like the ideal one established in the business plan. A startup that fails to do so will see that ideal recede ever farther into the distance. When this is done right, even the most powerful reality distortion field won’t be able to cover up this simple fact: if we’re not moving the drivers of our business model, we’re not making progress. That becomes a sure sign that it’s time to pivot.
INNOVATION ACCOUNTING AT IMVU
Here’s what innovation accounting looked like for us in the early days of IMVU. Our minimum viable product had many defects and, when we first released it, extremely low sales. We naturally assumed that the lack of sales was related to the low quality of the product, so week after week we worked on improving the quality of the product, trusting that our efforts were worthwhile. At the end of each month, we would have a board meeting at which we would present the results. The night before the board meeting, we’d run our standard analytics, measuring conversion rates, customer counts, and revenue to show what a good job we had done. For several meetings in a row, this caused a last-minute panic because the quality improvements were not yielding any change in customer behavior. This led to some frustrating board meetings at which we could show great product progress
but not much in the way of business results. After a while, rather than leave it to the last minute, we began to track our metrics more frequently, tightening the feedback loop with product development. This was even more depressing. Week in, week out, our product changes were having no effect.
Improving a Product on Five Dollars a Day
We tracked the funnel metrics
behaviors that were critical to our engine of growth: customer registration, the download of our application, trial, repeat usage, and purchase. To have enough data to learn, we needed just enough customers using our product to get real numbers for each behavior. We allocated a budget of five dollars per day: enough to buy clicks on the then-new Google AdWords system. In those days, the minimum you could bid for a click was 5 cents, but there was no overall minimum to your spending. Thus, we could afford to open an account and get started even though we had very little money.1
Five dollars bought us a hundred clicks—every day. From a marketing point of view this was not very significant, but for learning it was priceless. Every single day we were able to measure our product’s performance with a brand new set of customers. Also, each time we revised the product, we got a brand new report card on how we were doing the very next day.
For example, one day we would debut a new marketing message aimed at first-time customers. The next day we might change the way new customers were initiated into the product. Other days, we would add new features, fix bugs, roll out a new visual design, or try a new layout for our website. Every time, we told ourselves we were making the product better, but that subjective confidence was put to the acid test of real numbers.
Day in and day out we were performing random trials. Each day was a new experiment. Each day’s customers were independent of those of the day before. Most important, even though our gross numbers were growing, it became clear that our funnel metrics were not changing.
Here is a graph from one of IMVU’s early board meetings:
This graph represents approximately seven months of work. Over that period, we were making constant improvements to the IMVU product, releasing new features on a daily basis. We were conducting a lot of in-person customer interviews, and our product development team was working extremely hard.
Cohort Analysis
To read the graph, you need to understand something called cohort analysis. This is one of the most important tools of startup analytics. Although it sounds complex, it is based on a simple premise. Instead of looking at cumulative totals or gross numbers such as total revenue and total number of customers, one looks at the performance of each group of customers that comes into contact with the product independently. Each group is called a cohort. The graph shows the conversion rates to IMVU of new customers who joined in each indicated month. Each conversion rate shows the percentage of customer who registered in that month who subsequently went on to take the indicated action. Thus, among all the customers who joined IMVU in February 2005, about 60 percent of them logged in to our product at least one time.
Managers with an enterprise sales background will recognize this funnel analysis as the traditional sales funnel that is used to manage prospects on their way to becoming customers. Lean Startups use it in product development, too. This technique is useful in many types of business, because every company depends for its survival on sequences of customer behavior called flows. Customer flows govern the interaction of customers with a company’s products. They allow us to understand a business quantitatively and have much more predictive power than do traditional gross metrics.
If you look closely, you’ll see that the graph shows some clear trends. Some product improvements are helping—a little. The percentage of new customers who go on to use the product at least five times has grown from less than 5 percent to almost 20 percent. Yet despite this fourfold increase, the percentage of new customers who pay money for IMVU is stuck at around 1 percent. Think about that for a moment. After months and months of work, thousands of individual improvements, focus groups, design sessions, and usability tests, the percentage of new customers who subsequently pay money is exactly the same as it was at the onset even though many more customers are getting a chance to try the product.
Thanks to the power of cohort analysis, we could not blame this failure on the legacy of previous customers who were resistant to change, external market conditions, or any other excuse. Each cohort represented an independent report card, and try as we might, we were getting straight C’s. This helped us realize we had a problem.
I was in charge of the product development team, small though it was in those days, and shared with my cofounders the sense that the problem had to be with my team’s efforts. I worked harder, tried to focus on higher- and higher-quality features, and lost a lot of sleep. Our frustration grew. When I could think of nothing else to do, I was finally ready to turn to the last resort: talking to customers. Armed with our failure to make progress tuning our engine of growth, I was ready to ask the right questions.
Before this failure, in the company’s earliest days, it was easy to talk to potential customers and come away convinced we were on the right track. In fact, when we would invite customers into the office for in-person interviews and usability tests, it was easy to dismiss negative feedback. If they didn’t want to use the product, I assumed they were not in our target market. Fire that customer,
I’d say to the person responsible for recruiting for our tests. Find me someone in our target demographic.
If the next customer was more positive, I would take it as confirmation that I was right in my targeting. If not, I’d fire another customer and try again.
By contrast, once I had data in hand, my interactions with customers changed. Suddenly I had urgent questions that needed answering: Why aren’t customers responding to our product improvements
? Why isn’t our hard work paying off? For example, we kept making it easier and easier for customers to use IMVU with their existing friends. Unfortunately, customers didn’t want to engage in that behavior. Making it easier to use was totally beside the point. Once we knew what to look for, genuine understanding came much faster. As was described in Chapter 3, this eventually led to a critically important pivot: away from an IM add-on used with existing friends and toward a stand-alone network one can use to make new friends. Suddenly, our worries about productivity vanished. Once our efforts were aligned with what customers really wanted, our experiments were much more likely to change their behavior for the better.
This pattern would repeat time and again, from the days when we were making less than a thousand dollars in revenue per month all the way up to the time we were making millions. In fact, this is the sign of a successful pivot: the new experiments you run are overall more productive than the experiments you were running before.
This is the pattern: poor quantitative results force us to declare failure and create the motivation, context, and space for more qualitative research. These investigations produce new ideas—new hypotheses—to be tested, leading to a possible pivot. Each pivot unlocks new opportunities for further experimentation, and the cycle repeats. Each time we repeat this simple rhythm: establish the baseline, tune the engine, and make a decision to pivot or persevere.
OPTIMIZATION VERSUS LEARNING
Engineers, designers, and marketers are all skilled at optimization. For example, direct marketers are experienced at split testing value propositions by sending a different offer to two similar groups of customers so that they can measure differences in the response rates of the two groups. Engineers, of course, are skilled at improving a product’s performance, just as designers are talented at making products easier to use. All these activities in a well-run traditional organization offer incremental benefit for incremental effort. As long as we are executing the plan well, hard work yields results.
However, these tools for product improvement do not work the same way for startups. If you are building the wrong thing, optimizing the product or its marketing will not yield significant results. A startup has to measure progress against a high bar: evidence that a sustainable business can be built around its products or services. That’s a standard that can be assessed only if a startup has made clear, tangible predictions ahead of time.
In the absence of those predictions, product and strategy decisions are far more difficult and time-consuming. I often see this in my consulting practice. I’ve been called in many times to help a startup that feels that its engineering team isn’t working hard enough.
When I meet with those teams, there are always improvements to be made and I recommend them, but invariably the real problem is not a lack of development talent, energy, or effort. Cycle after cycle, the team is working hard, but the business is not seeing results. Managers trained in a traditional model draw the logical conclusion: our team is not working hard, not working effectively, or not working efficiently.
Thus the downward cycle begins: the product development team valiantly tries to build a product according to the specifications it is receiving from the creative or business leadership. When good results are not forthcoming, business leaders assume that any discrepancy between what was planned and what was built is the cause and try to specify the next iteration in greater detail. As the specifications get more detailed, the planning process slows down, batch size increases, and feedback is delayed. If a board of directors or CFO is involved as a stakeholder, it doesn’t take long for personnel changes to follow.
A few years ago, a team that sells products to large media companies invited me to help them as a consultant because they were concerned that their engineers were not working hard enough. However, the fault was not in the engineers; it was in the process the whole company was using to make decisions. They had customers but did not know them very well. They were deluged with feature requests from customers, the internal sales team, and the business leadership. Every new insight became an emergency that had to be addressed immediately. As a result, long-term projects were hampered by constant interruptions. Even worse, the team had no clear sense of whether any of the changes they were making mattered to customers. Despite the constant tuning and tweaking, the business results were consistently mediocre.
Learning milestones prevent this negative spiral by emphasizing a more likely possibility: the company is executing—with discipline!—a plan that does not make sense. The innovation accounting framework makes it clear when the company is stuck and needs to change direction.
In the example above, early in the company’s life, the product development team was incredibly productive because the company’s founders had identified a large unmet need in the target market. The initial product, while flawed, was popular with early adopters. Adding the major features that customers asked for seemed to work wonders, as the early adopters spread the word about the innovation far and wide. But unasked and unanswered were other lurking questions: Did the company have a working engine of growth? Was this early success related to the daily work of the product development team? In most cases, the answer was no; success was driven by decisions the team had made in the past. None of its current initiatives were having any impact. But this was obscured because the company’s gross metrics were all up and to the right.
As we’ll see in a moment, this is a common danger. Companies of any size that have a working engine of growth can come to rely on the wrong kind of metrics to guide their actions. This is what tempts managers to resort to the usual bag of success theater tricks: last-minute ad buys, channel stuffing, and whiz-bang demos, in a desperate attempt to make the gross numbers look better. Energy invested in success theater is energy that could have been used to help build a sustainable business. I call the traditional numbers used to judge startups vanity metrics,
and innovation accounting requires us to avoid the temptation to use them.
VANITY METRICS: A WORD OF CAUTION
To see the danger of vanity metrics clearly, let’s return once more to the early days of IMVU. Take a look at the following graph, which is from the same era in IMVU’s history as that shown earlier in this chapter. It covers the same time period as the cohort-style graph on this page; in fact, it is from the same board presentation.
This graph shows the traditional gross metrics for IMVU so far: total registered users and total paying customers (the gross revenue graph looks almost the same). From this viewpoint, things look much more exciting. That’s why I call these vanity metrics: they give the rosiest possible picture. You’ll see a traditional hockey stick graph (the ideal in a rapid-growth company). As long as you focus on the top-line numbers (signing up more customers, an increase in overall revenue), you’ll be forgiven for thinking this product development team is making great progress. The company’s growth engine is working. Each month it is able to acquire customers and has a positive return on investment. The excess revenue from those customers is reinvested the next month in acquiring more. That’s where the growth is coming from.
But think back to the same data presented in a cohort style. IMVU is adding new