What’s going on?
I have a new podcast, the Khanversation.
What’s going on?
I have a new podcast, the Khanversation.
The US national election is a week away. It is likely that there are near-zero undecided folks left now, but the race is close, so no one will know for sure until the (inefficient) American electoral system counts the votes. And of course, given his past shenanigans, it is very likely that Trump at least will not easily accept a defeat and this time, the establishment may resist as well. But hopefully there is enough juice left in the system to eventually decide a winner and for that winner to eventually take power on January 20th.
So who should one vote for? and who is likely to win?
Both questions seem to be hard to answer right now. Kamala is clearly the establishment candidate and the deep state is pulling out all the stops to get her elected. But it is still a democracy, so votes do get cast and do get counted, so it is not just up to them. Still, if you approve of how the USA establishment is doing, then you have to vote for Kamala. But what if you have been blackpilled by one of several potential blackpill possibilities in the current environment? for example, my personal pros and cons list would look like this:
Pro-establishment:
Anti-establishment:
But its Trump. And he is frequently an undisciplined clown who either has no idea what it is good to say in a functional democracy and what is beyond the pale, or just does not care. Either way, not a good thing. The system will likely survive him, but it will be endless drama and blatant attempts to use the power of the state against his opponents in ways that would never be admitted by a more disciplined candidate.
Pick your poison.
An increasingly popular argument amongst Out-of-India-Theory (OIT) advocates (Koenraad Elst for example) is that is that the Indo-Aryan etymologies of rivers in the Rig Veda disprove an Aryan migration into India. They claim that native river names would have survived post-migration.
Some of the proffered etymologies for Vedic rivers are rather flimsy, but no matter. There is a much more fundamental issue with this line of argument: the evidence shows that migrants often do not adopt indigenous river names. In fact, Indo-European migrants to Western Europe used names with clear Indo-European etymology for most major rivers.
If OIT advocates believe that Indo-Aryan etymologies for rivers in North India prove the Indo-European languages originated in India, then they must explain why nearly all the major rivers of Europe have such solid Indo-European etymologies:
Thames: Old English Temes, from PIE *tm̥Hes, cognate with Sanskrit támas
Loire: Gaulish *liga, from PIE *legʰ
Seine: Latin Sequana, from PIE *seykʷ, cognate with Sanskrit siñcáti
Rhine: Gaulish Rēnos, from PIE *h₃reyH, cognate with Sanskrit riṇā́ti
Po: Latin Padus, from PIE *bʰudʰmḗn, cognate with Sanskrit budhná
Elbe: Old German *albī, from PIE *h₂elbʰós, cognate with Sanskrit ṛbhú
Danube: Celtic *Dānowyos, from PIE *déh₂nu, cognate with Sanskrit dā́nu
Dnieper: Sarmatian *dānu *apara, from PIE *déh₂nu + *h₂epero, cognate with Sanskrit dā́nu + ápara
Dniester: Sarmatian *dānu *nazdya, from PIE *déh₂nu + *nésdyos, cognate with Sanskrit dā́nu + nédīyas
Don: Sarmatian *dānu, from PIE *déh₂nu, cognate with Sanskrit dā́nu
Vistula: Latin Vistula, from PIE *weys
Though Burmese are a good donor for the Tibeto-Burman in Burmese, it seems pretty clear now that I have Tibetan samples that the Bangladeshi samples are a bit more Tibetan-skewed than these Burmese samples. It may be that the early admixture into Bengal was from a Burmese population that had admixed less with the Austro-Asiatic substrate of Burma.
Note that this confirms the Austro-Asiatic populations have a totally different (more southern) East Asian ancestry source.
Major Amin sent over an extract from his writings about the 1947 attempt to grab Kashmir using tribal lashkars and why it failed. Obviously from a Pakistani POV, but an objective one.. There are formatting issues that I found hard to fix, but you will get the gist.
Continue reading Major Amin on the Failure of the Pakistani invasion in the First Kashmir War
Another Browncast is up. You can listen on Libsyn, Apple, Spotify (and a variety of other platforms). Probably the easiest way to keep up the podcast since we don’t have a regular schedule is to subscribe to one of the links above!
In this episode I talk to Hussein Ibish, a resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Insititute in Washington DC and a longtime commentator on Palestinian affairs as well as the Arab world in general. He described how the crisis looks to a liberal Arab scholar who would prefer to see peace for both Palestinians and Israelis, and what we may expect in the future and ended with a rather pessimistic (or optimistic, depending on your point of view) vision of the near future. We hope to have him back soon to discuss what a saner outcome could look like and how that can be achieved (at least in theory; in practice we are probably in for prolonged violence). This is a complement to our earlier podcast with Dr Edward Luttwak, who presented a more optimistic vision of what Israel is trying to achieve and what it is likely to achieve.
Our friends at scribebuddy.com have prepared a transcript. I am posting it at the end below, unedited. But first, here is a chatgpt summary:
Blog Post: A Deep Dive into the Middle Eastern Crisis with Hossam Ibish on The Brown Pundits Browncast In a recent episode of The Brown Pundits Browncast, Dr. Ali hosts Hossam Ibish, a prominent commentator on Middle Eastern affairs, to discuss the current tumultuous situation in the Middle East, focusing on the complex dynamics between Israel, Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas. Their conversation sheds light on a geopolitical crisis that has long roots in history and contemporary struggles for power, influence, and survival. The Prelude to a Wider Conflict Ibish sets the stage by explaining the origins of the current conflict, particularly after Hamas' attack on southern Israel on October 7. This event was intended to provoke a multi-front war, which Hamas hoped would involve Iran and its network of militias, notably Hezbollah, the Houthis, and pro-Iranian forces in Iraq and Syria. However, despite these hopes, Hamas is not fully trusted by these groups due to its Sunni identity, which clashes with the Shia alignment of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance.†Hamas' attack, while significant, has not succeeded in igniting the widespread regional war it had hoped for. Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, notably went into hiding during the initial escalation, leaving Hamas without the robust military support it had counted on. The Strategic Calculus: Hezbollah, Iran, and Israel Ibish highlights how Hezbollah, despite its vast arsenal of missiles, has refrained from fully engaging Israel. The reason? Hezbollah's primary mission, as dictated by Iran, is not to fight for Hamas or Gaza, but to serve as a deterrent in the event of an Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. This strategic restraint is informed by Hezbollah’s role as a vital asset in Iran’s regional power structure. While Hezbollah attempted to support Hamas through limited military action on the border with Israel, the group has largely avoided provoking an all-out war. This approach preserves Hezbollah’s strength for its primary purpose—defending Iran—and avoids unnecessary depletion of resources in a battle it doesn’t see as its own. Israel, on the other hand, views Hezbollah’s arsenal and its proximity to its borders as a significant threat, which has led to the current Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Israel's Quest for a Recuperative Victory Ibish introduces the idea of Israel’s need for a "recuperative victory." Following the security failures of October 7, Israel seeks to restore its national security image and the confidence of its citizens. For Israel, a clear-cut victory against Hezbollah in Lebanon would serve two purposes: weakening Iran's regional influence by crippling Hezbollah and restoring the sense of security for Israelis in the north. However, Ibish warns that this may lead to only an "illusion of security." Even if Israel manages to weaken Hezbollah and push them back from the border, guerrilla warfare and insurgency tactics will likely persist. This scenario would mirror Israel’s ongoing insurgency struggles in Gaza, where an unending cycle of attacks and counterattacks creates a quagmire that may last decades. Hezbollah’s Calculus: Back to Guerrilla Warfare? One of the most compelling points in Ibish’s analysis is Hezbollah’s potential shift back to its guerrilla roots. The expansion of Hezbollah during the Syrian civil war, where it acted as the main ground force for Assad, has left the group vulnerable to Israeli intelligence and infiltration. A return to a more focused guerrilla war in southern Lebanon could help Hezbollah regain its earlier effectiveness as a lean, resilient fighting force, a possibility that Nasrallah seems to welcome. Iran's Role and the Prospect of a Larger War The conversation then shifts to Iran’s broader role in the conflict. Ibish points out that while Iran has supported Hezbollah and Hamas in the past, its current priority is regime survival and preventing any attack on its nuclear facilities. The Iranian leadership may be feeling domestic political pressure to act, especially as Israel has been striking at its proxies without significant retaliation from Tehran. Ibish predicts that a "war of the cities," reminiscent of the Iran-Iraq War, could be on the horizon. Israel could target Iran’s oil production facilities and nuclear infrastructure, which would be a significant blow to Iran's economy and national security. In response, Iran might hunker down and focus on developing a nuclear weapon as a long-term survival strategy, similar to North Korea's approach. The Grim Reality: Open-Ended Insurgencies As the discussion wraps up, Ibish emphasizes the grim reality that Israel now faces: open-ended insurgencies in the south (Gaza), the north (Lebanon), and possibly soon in the east (West Bank). This strategy of counterinsurgency warfare offers no clear path to resolution, and Israel’s attempts to secure its borders may only deepen the quagmire. Conclusion In this insightful conversation, Hossam Ibish paints a complex and often bleak picture of the Middle East’s current situation. The region’s entrenched conflicts, ideological divides, and strategic imperatives have created a powder keg where no side seems capable of securing a decisive victory. Whether it’s Israel’s quest for security, Hezbollah’s guerrilla warfare tactics, or Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the road ahead is fraught with uncertainty. As the crisis continues to unfold, the stakes for all parties involved remain perilously high. This episode of The Brown Pundits Browncast offers a sobering reminder of the intricate web of alliances and hostilities that define the modern Middle East, and the dangerous potential for further escalation in the coming months.
Continue reading Browncast: Hussein Ibish on the War in the Middle East
Another Browncast is up. You can listen on Libsyn, Apple, Spotify (and a variety of other platforms). Probably the easiest way to keep up the podcast since we don’t have a regular schedule is to subscribe to one of the links above!
In this episode Amey and I talk to famous (and famously pro-zionist) author and strategist Edward Luttwak to discuss the current crisis in the middle east and get the pro-Israel perspective (we also talked to Hussein Ibish to get the liberal Arab viewpoint). I also wanted to ask Dr Luttwak about some other topics (such as the travails of turbo capitalism and the nature and issues of US power etc) but the Iran and Israel clash took up most of our time. Amey did manage to ask Luttwak about the role of innovation in the IDF (a topic on which he has written a book too), but we will have to get him back someday to discuss other interesting topics. For now, here is Edward Luttwak on the Iran vs Israel war and its respective strategies and issues. Transcript below.
Our thanks to our friends at http://Scribebuddy.com (they provide a service that converts audio to text) who have provided the following transcript (not edited, so some errors will be there): Continue reading Browncast: Dr Edward Luttwak on Israel and the Grand Strategy of Iran
Vimal Yoganathan’s debut for Barnsley, highlighted by his two-goal performance, represents more than just a personal victory. His success shines a light on the severe underrepresentation of *South Asians* in English football, where they make up 7% of the UK population but only 0.3% of professional footballers.
There are two important nuances to consider regarding the South Asian population in football. Firstly, a significant portion of this population consists of adult immigrants, who typically do not enter professional sports due to their age upon arrival. Secondly, there has been some positive progress, with a 29% growth in the number of South Asian players in recent years, although this remains a small fraction relative to their overall representation in the UK.
For South Asian players, Yoganathan’s story is an outlier, illustrating the deeply embedded systemic and cultural barriers that continue to block progress in a sport dominated by white coaches and management.
Finally, there is a fourth garden, the Garden of the One.
A seeker went to that door and a voice asked, “Who is there?”
The seeker answered, “I am here, Beloved.”
The voice replied, “Then go away.”
The seeker went away, and continued his search and meditation for many years, until finally he returned and once again the voice met him with the same question as before.
This time, the seeker answered, “You are here.”
Then the seeker entered and there was no seeker and no sought, there was no lover or beloved, there was only the “One” forever and ever.