Understanding of Action
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Recent papers in Understanding of Action
People can conceptualize the same action (e.g. ‘riding a bike’) at different levels of abstraction (LOA), where higher LOAs specify the abstract motives that explain why the action is performed (e.g. ‘getting exercise’), while lower LOAs... more
People can conceptualize the same action (e.g. ‘riding a bike’) at different levels of abstraction (LOA), where higher LOAs
specify the abstract motives that explain why the action is performed (e.g. ‘getting exercise’), while lower LOAs specify the
concrete steps that indicate how the action is performed (e.g. ‘gripping handlebars’). Prior neuroimaging studies have shown
that why and how questions about actions differentially activate two cortical networks associated with mental-state reasoning
and action representation, respectively; however, it remains unknown whether this is due to the differential demands
of the questions per se or to the shifts in LOA those questions produce. We conducted functional magnetic resonance imaging
while participants judged pairs of action phrases that varied in LOA and that could be framed either as a why question
(Why ride a bike? Get exercise.) or a how question (How to get exercise? Ride a bike.). Question framing (why vs how) had no
effect on activity in regions of the two networks. Instead, these regions uniquely tracked parametric variation in LOA, both
across and within trials. This suggests that the human capacity to understand actions at different LOA is based in the relative
activity of two cortical networks.
specify the abstract motives that explain why the action is performed (e.g. ‘getting exercise’), while lower LOAs specify the
concrete steps that indicate how the action is performed (e.g. ‘gripping handlebars’). Prior neuroimaging studies have shown
that why and how questions about actions differentially activate two cortical networks associated with mental-state reasoning
and action representation, respectively; however, it remains unknown whether this is due to the differential demands
of the questions per se or to the shifts in LOA those questions produce. We conducted functional magnetic resonance imaging
while participants judged pairs of action phrases that varied in LOA and that could be framed either as a why question
(Why ride a bike? Get exercise.) or a how question (How to get exercise? Ride a bike.). Question framing (why vs how) had no
effect on activity in regions of the two networks. Instead, these regions uniquely tracked parametric variation in LOA, both
across and within trials. This suggests that the human capacity to understand actions at different LOA is based in the relative
activity of two cortical networks.
- by Robert P Spunt and +1
- •
- Social Cognition, Semantic Memory, Abstraction, Concepts
The term ‘action understanding’ has been defined in several ways since it was first proposed to describe the psychological process subserved by mirror neurons. Here we outline and critique these definitions of ‘action understanding’ in... more
The term ‘action understanding’ has been defined in several ways since it was first proposed to describe the psychological process subserved by mirror neurons. Here we outline and critique these definitions of ‘action understanding’ in order to evaluate the claim that mirror neurons perform such a process. We delineate three distinct definitions of ‘action understanding’, each involving a distinct psychological process. Action identification comprises using the specific configurations of body parts in observed actions to identify those actions, whereas goal identification and intention identification involve generalising across different observed actions to identify the immediate goal of, or the hidden mental state motivating, the actions. This paper discusses the benefits and drawbacks of using these definitions to describe the process purportedly performed by mirror neurons. We then examine each definition in relation to the mirror neuron literature. We conclude that although there is some evidence consistent with the suggestion that mirror neurons contribute to action identification, there is little evidence to support the claim that they contribute to goal or intention identification.
Intention reading and action understanding have been reported in ever-younger infants. However, the notions of intention attribution and action understanding, as well as their relation to each other, are surrounded by much confusion,... more
Intention reading and action understanding have been reported in ever-younger infants. However, the notions of intention attribution and action understanding, as well as their relation to each other, are surrounded by much confusion, making it difficult to assess the meaning and value of such findings. In this paper we set out to clarify the notions of ‘action understanding’ and ‘intention attribution’, and discuss their relation. We will show that what is commonly referred to as ‘action understanding’ in fact encompasses various heterogeneous association and prediction mechanisms. In general, these forms of action understanding do not result in the attribution of an intention to an observed actor. By disentangling intention attribution from action understanding, and by exposing the latter as an umbrella notion, we provide a framework that allows for better comparison of findings from different experimental paradigms, and a much more fruitful approach to comparative questions.
The discovery of mirror neurons in monkeys, and the finding of motor activity during action observation in humans are generally regarded to support motor theories of action understanding. These theories take motor resonance to be... more
The discovery of mirror neurons in monkeys, and the finding of motor activity during action observation in humans are generally regarded to support motor theories of action understanding. These theories take motor resonance to be essential in the understanding of observed actions and the inference of action goals. However, the notions of “resonance,” “action understanding,” and “action goal” appear to be used ambiguously in the literature. A survey of the literature on mirror neurons and motor resonance yields two different interpretations of the term “resonance,” three different interpretations of action understanding, and again three different interpretations of what the goal of an action is. This entails that, unless it is specified what interpretation is used, the meaning of any statement about the relation between these concepts can differ to a great extent. By discussing an experiment we will show that more precise definitions and use of the concepts will allow for better assessments of motor theories of action understanding and hence a more fruitful scientific debate. Lastly, we will provide an example of how the discussed experimental setup could be adapted to test other interpretations of the concepts.
The discovery of mirror neurons in monkeys, and the finding of motor activity during action observation in humans are generally regarded to support motor theories of action understanding. These theories take motor resonance to be... more
The discovery of mirror neurons in monkeys, and the finding of motor activity during action observation in humans are generally regarded to support motor theories of action understanding. These theories take motor resonance to be essential in the understanding of observed actions and the inference of action goals. However, the notions of “resonance,” “action understanding,” and “action goal” appear to be used ambiguously in the literature. A survey of the literature on mirror neurons and motor resonance yields two different interpretations of the term “resonance,” three different interpretations of action understanding, and again three different interpretations of what the goal of an action is. This entails that, unless it is specified what interpretation is used, the meaning of any statement about the relation between these concepts can differ to a great extent. By discussing an experiment we will show that more precise definitions and use of the concepts will allow for better assessments of motor theories of action understanding and hence a more fruitful scientific debate. Lastly, we will provide an example of how the discussed experimental setup could be adapted to test other interpretations of the concepts.
The discovery of mirror neurons in monkeys, and the finding of motor activity during action observation in humans are generally regarded to support motor theories of action understanding. These theories take motor resonance to be... more
The discovery of mirror neurons in monkeys, and the finding of motor activity during action observation in humans are generally regarded to support motor theories of action understanding. These theories take motor resonance to be essential in the understanding of observed actions and the inference of action goals. However, the notions of “resonance,” “action understanding,” and “action goal” appear to be used ambiguously in the literature. A survey of the literature on mirror neurons and motor resonance yields two different interpretations of the term “resonance,” three different interpretations of action understanding, and again three different interpretations of what the goal of an action is. This entails that, unless it is specified what interpretation is used, the meaning of any statement about the relation between these concepts can differ to a great extent. By discussing an experiment we will show that more precise definitions and use of the concepts will allow for better assessments of motor theories of action understanding and hence a more fruitful scientific debate. Lastly, we will provide an example of how the discussed experimental setup could be adapted to test other interpretations of the concepts.
The human "mirror neuron system" has been proposed to be the neural substrate that underlies understanding and, possibly, imitating actions. However, since the brain activity with mirror properties seems insufficient to provide a good... more
The human "mirror neuron system" has been proposed to be the neural substrate that underlies understanding and, possibly, imitating actions. However, since the brain activity with mirror properties seems insufficient to provide a good description for imitation of actions outside one's own repertoire, the existence of supplementary processes has been proposed. Moreover, it is unclear whether action observation requires the same neural mechanisms as the explicit access to their meaning. The aim of this study was two-fold as we investigated whether action observation requires different processes depending on 1) whether the ultimate goal is to imitate or understand the presented actions and 2) whether the to-be-imitated actions are familiar or unfamiliar to the subject. Participants were presented with both meaningful familiar actions and meaningless unfamiliar actions that they had to either imitate or discriminate later. Event-related Potentials were used as differences in brain activity could have been masked by the use of other techniques with lower temporal resolution. In the imitation task, a sustained left frontal negativity was more pronounced for meaningless actions than for meaningful ones, starting from an early time-window. Conversely, observing unfamiliar versus familiar actions with the intention of discriminating them led to marked differences over right centro-posterior scalp regions, in both middle and latest time-windows. These findings suggest that action imitation and action understanding may be sustained by dissociable mechanisms: while imitation of unfamiliar actions activates left frontal processes, that are likely to be related to learning mechanisms, action understanding involves dedicated operations which probably require right posterior regions, consistent with their involvement in social interactions.
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