The Two Truths Theory

According to Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophers, everything depends for its existence on something else. But what would a world devoid of fundamentalia look like? In this paper, I argue that the anti-foundationalist “neither-one-nor-many argument” of the Indian Mādhyamika Śrīgupta commits him to a position I call “metaphysical indefinitism.” I demonstrate how this view follows from Śrīgupta’s rejection of mereological simples and ontologically independent being, when understood in light of his account of conventional reality. Contra recent claims in the secondary literature, I clarify how the Madhyamaka metaphysical dependence structure is not a straightforward infinitism since it does not honor strict asymmetry or transitivity. Instead, its dependence relations are irreflexive and extendable, admitting of dependence chains of indefinite (though not actually infinite) length and dependence loops of non-zero length. Yet, the flexible ontology of Śrīgupta's Madhyamaka can accommodate a contextualist account of asymmetry and support a revisable theory of conventional truth, delivering significant payoffs for the view, including the capacity to accommodate developments in scientific explanation.

This monograph includes an analysis of the Commentary on the Introduction to Reality (Tattvāvatāravṛtti) by the Indian Madhyamaka Buddhist philosopher, Śrīgupta (7th/8th century), together with a Tibetan critical edition and annotated translation of this text, which has never before been available in English. In this work, Śrīgupta advances the “neither-one-nor-many argument,” which sets out to prove that all things lack ontological independence, and by implication, that everything depends for its existence on something else. I present a detailed reconstruction and analysis of the argument, showing how Śrīgupta rejects the possibility of ontological independence by way of rejecting the possibility of mereological simples, both material and immaterial. Śrīgupta's other important philosophical contributions are brought to light, including his influential threefold criterion for conventional reality (saṃvṛtisatya) and his argument for the possibility of conceptual enlightened cognition (vikalpajñāna), which is standardly supposed to be non-conceptual.

<<해심밀경(解深密經)>>의 이른바 ‘삼시교판(三時敎判)’은 제2시 <<반야경(般
若經)>>와 제3시 <<해심밀경(解深密經)>>이 똑같이 공(空=무상(無相))을 주제로 하고
있다는 점을 명시하고 있다. <<해심밀경>>의 주석가 원측(圓測, 613-696)은 양자가 어
떤 지평에서 동일하게 무상으로 인식될 수 있는가 하는 물음에 답하기 위해 무상
의 이해를 둘러싸고 전개된 중관(中觀) 사상가 청변(淸辨, Bhāvaviveka, 490-570)과
유식(唯識) 사상가 호법(護法, Dharmapāla, 530-561) 간의 이른바 ‘공유(空有) 논쟁’
에 주목하고 있다. 이 점을 의식하면서 필자는 본 논문에서 그가 제시한 화쟁 논리
를 해명하려 시도하였다.

현장(玄奘, 600(또는 602)-664)에게서 호법 계통의 유식을 공부했던 사상가 원측은
호법의 <<대승광백론석론(大乘廣百論釋論)>> ｢교계제자품(敎誡弟子品)｣을 경증(經證)으로 하여 양자 간의 논쟁을 인식하고 청변을 비판적으로 포용한 호법을 비공비유(非空非有)의 중도(中道)의 사상가로 해석하면서 양자를 화쟁하려 하였다.

그 화쟁의논리는 ‘궁극적 진리의 관점에서’ 유가학도(瑜伽學徒)에 의해 실체적으로 이해된 의타기성(依他起性)(=변계소집성遍計所執性)을 철저히 부정하려는 청변의 공(空=비유非有)의 논리와 ‘세상의 진리의 관점에서’ 수행과 해탈의 기반으로서의 의타기성을끝까지 옹호하려는 호법의 유(有=비공非空)의 언어가 서로 모순되지 않음을 보여주는 이제(二諦)와 중도이다. 원측은 또 청변과 호법 이전으로 소급하여 용맹(龍猛),
제바(提婆) 등의 초기 중관 사상가와 미륵(彌勒), 무착(無著), 세친(世親) 등의 초기
유식 사상가들 간의 사상적 연속성과 동일성의 지평 역시 이제와 중도에서 찾고
있다.


As is well-known, the doctrine of Three Dharma-cakra doctrine in
Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra tells that both Prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra of Second
Dharma-cakra and Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra of Third Dharma-cakra have preached
Emptiness (śūnyatā) as their common theme. On what horizon Buddha declaired
these two sūtras tell the same message, Emptiness or Characterness (無相)? As
annotator on Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra believed to be spoken by Buddha himself,
Woncheuk (圓測 613-696; Ch. Yuance) tried to answer this question, and
looked to so-called Non-Being (śūnya) and Being (bhāva) Controversy between
Bhāvaviveka (490-570) and Dharmapāla (530-561) focused on the meaning of
Characterness. Noticing on this fact, in this paper I tried to illuminate his logic
of reconcile on controversy between Mādhyamika and Yogacāra thinkers.

As a disciple of the Dharmapāla lineage thoughts of the Mind-Only School
of Buddhism as transmitted by Xuanzang (玄奘 600(or 602)-664), he tried to
reconcile these two by positing Dharmapāla conditionally including
Bhāvaviveka's logic of Characterness as a Middle Way thinker 'neither attaching
to Being nor Non-Being' (非空非有) in terms of quoting passages from
Jiaojiedizi pin (敎誡弟子品, Chapter on Instructions and Admonitions to
Disciples) in Dachengguangbailunshi lun (大乘廣百論釋論, Commentary on
Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka) of Dharmapāla as its canonical evidences.

His logic of reconcile is Two Truth (二諦) and Middle Way (中道). 'From the viewpoint of Ultimate Truth' Woncheuk negated paratantra phenemena misconceived as a kind
of substance by the Disciples of Yocacarabhūmi (瑜伽學徒), 'from the viewpoint of Conventional Truth' appreciated the existence of it as the basis of Cultivations and Enlightenment, and finally concluded that negative logic of the former and affirmative language of the latter is not contradictory. In addition, he exposed that logic of Two Truth and Middle Way is also his own hermeutical framework of interpreting the continuoity and identity between such early Mādhyamika thinkers as Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva etc. and such main Yogacāra thinkers as Maitreya, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu etc.

Longchen Rabjampa (1308–64), scholar of the Tibetan Buddhist Nyingma tradition, presents a novel doxographical taxonomy of the so-called Svātantrika branch of Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy, which designates the Indian Mādhyamika Śrīgupta (c. 7th/8th century) as the exemplar of a Svātantrika sub-school according to which appearance and emptiness are metaphysically distinct. This paper compares Longchenpa’s characterization of this “distinct-appearance-and-emptiness” view with Śrīgupta’s own account of the two truths. I expose a significant disconnect between Longchenpa’s Śrīgupta and Śrīgupta himself and argue that the impetus for Longchenpa’s doxographical innovation originates not in Buddhist India, but within his own Tibetan intellectual milieu, tracing back to his twelfth-century Sangpu Monastery predecessors, Gyamarwa and Chapa.