Scholastic Philosophy

Nossa proposta é investigar como ocorrem as metamorfoses da noção de substância simples no sistema leibniziano, entre Discurso de metafísica, Sistema novo da natureza e a comunicação das substâncias e Monadologia. Trata-se da mesma substância ou são noções diferentes?
Partimos de aporias de sua época e a polêmica entre os métodos modernos e escolásticos. Apontamos as críticas de Leibniz a ambos, partindo das insuficiências modernas aos excessos escolásticos, passando, assim, do campo da física ao campo lógico, em vista das questões metafísicas. Apoiando-se na exposição lógica, acabamos tentando reconstruir, involuntariamente, todo o sistema a partir do princípio de identidade, para conseguir apontar com mais clareza as inovações de Leibniz que reconciliam os dois partidos em sua síntese original.
Ao final, fazemos breves apontamentos particulares sobre cada um dos três textos e tiramos nossas conclusões, se as diferentes expressões da substância simples, nossa questão motriz.

In this article I investigate the origins and the main stages in the development of the doctrine of self-diffusion of the Good in ancient philosophy, patristics and medieval Scholasticism. The first formulation of the idea of the Good as a universal principle, which is not only the final goal of all things, but also bestows being on all things and renders them
capable of cognition, is given by Plato in the Republic. This doctrine of the Good came to be adopted and further reinterpreted both in the ancient philosophy and Christian theology. Here I propose my own classification of the two main forms (or versions) of the concept
of self-diffusion of the Good, ‘demiurgic’ and ‘emanational’, and identifies their respective attributes when applied in the analysis of the surviving works of the philosophers. I have shown that in Christian patristic and medieval thinking it is the first, or ‘demiurgic’, variant of this doctrine that dominates the discourse, since the goodness of the Creator is commonly regarded as the main reason for creating the world, and his bestowing of goodness on all things is viewed as an act of free will, which presupposes communication of the Good by way of imitation and participation. The ‘emanational’ version of the concept of self-diffusion of the Good, on the other hand, was characteristic of Neoplatonism, and as such was adopted by Christian thinkers only to a limited degree: it was applied almost exclusively to justify the existence of the three consubstantial and coeternal hypostases in one God.

The article focuses on the first three chapters of Isaiah. After recalling the results of modern biblical scholarship on the use of legal and forensic jargon in Isaiah (§ 1) and giving a thumbnail sketch of the traditions of Latin Christian exegesis in the Middle Ages (§ 2), I will examine passages of the commentary on Isaiah written by Dominican theologian Albert the Great in the 13th century (§ 3). The aim is to evaluate to what extent the concerns of the original biblical text, when filtered through the Latin Vulgate and through Christian foresight, are captured by the medieval exegete, to what extent Albert is able to understand the peculiar theme of the self-awareness of the history of Israel in the form of a legal contention between God and His people.

This article offers a new interpretation of Bodin’s stance on the classic issue of action and contemplation -- a vexata quaestio of Bodinian scholarship that takes us to the heart of Bodin's views on ethics, politics, and theology. Taking into account the entire arc of Bodin's production, from the Methodus to the Paradoxon, the article considers Bodin's changing views on the 'best form of life' and argues that towards the end of his life Bodin came to redefine completely the problem by positing a third stage of human experience, which he called "reflection" (actus reflexus in Latin, reflexion in French) and described as the passive enjoyment of God's light reflected in the human soul as in a mirror. The article explores how Bodin's theory of reflection relates to his theology and spirituality, on the one hand, and to his ethical views on the other.  By raising the question of Bodin’s sources for this theory, the article also uncovers his profound debts to late-medieval Scholasticism and Christian mysticism, especially that of Nicholas of Cusa.

The advent of the internet has brought tremendous new possibilities and problems for contemporary society. Specifically, the church has struggled to confront the accessibility of pornography on the web. Because radical technological development has made this unique temptation possible, preexistent theological frameworks are difficult to utilize when making a case for its immorality. This paper focuses on the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, whose theory of the passions exposes the inner workings of lust. I systematically analyze the various faculties of the soul involved in the choice to click a link to pornography by tracing the origin of temptation from the passive potencies (sense powers) to its culmination in the sensitive appetite. I conclude that when reason alone cannot curb appetitive passions, moral virtue must be imbued in the sensitive appetite through the formation of ethical (virtuous) habits that direct one's soul towards the ultimate good of eternal life.

Recht und Moral in der Scholastik der Frühen Neuzeit 1500-1750 (with C. Birr), [Law and Morality in Early Modern Scholasticism (approx. 1500–1750)], (methodica - Einführungen in die rechtshistorische Forschung, 1), De Gruyter/Oldenbourg, Berlin/Boston, 2016, xii-135p.

Studies of early modern scholasticism are experiencing a boom today. Legal scholars, philosopher, theologians, and economists are approaching the texts of the “Spanish late scholastics” and “Catholic natural law theorists” from their own perspectives. Both beginners and experts will find the tools in this volume for conducting independent research on the sources and cross-disciplinary insight regarding the state of research.

I am planning a history of the notion of philosophical nonsense and naturally difficult historical and exegetical questions have come up.  Charles Pigden has argued that the notion goes back at least as far as Hobbes and that Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant (on some interpretations) and pragmatists such as William James, as well as numerous Twentieth-Century philosophers make use of it.  In this ‘paper’ I put forward for general discussion such questions as whether Hobbes was the first 'nonsensicalist', whether Kant was a 'nonsensicalist' at all, which philosophers if any have considered contradictions to be meaningless and whether Wittgenstein thought that his concept of criterion could legitimately be used verificationistically.  I shall continue to add further questions as they occur to me.

A paper delivered at the Drama and Comedy Session, Group 17 (Room 307), Fifth Medieval Forum, Plymouth State College, Plymouth, NH, 13-14 April 1984.

Uses and argues with Bernard Spivack in _Shakespeare and the Allegory of Evil_, holding that Shakespeare's Richard of Gloucester is indeed a Vice figure *and* a morally and psychologically "intelligible" dramatic character, with real-world reference to movement toward becoming "a man in a state of Malice."

En relación con la cuestión del origen del poder político
resulta relevante ante todo señalar que la “teoría de la traslación”
fue la tesis dominante en el seno de la escolástica aristotélica
católica hasta bien entrado el s. XIX. Efectivamente, fuera de
las refutaciones de algunos autores como el conde de Vareilles Sommières y Taparelli, esa tesis recién quedó puesta en tela
de juicio de modo sistemático en el campo de la Escolástica por
Theodor Meyer y Louis Billot, en 1900 y 1907, respectivamente.
Nuestra hipótesis reza como sigue: en Francisco de Vitoria
se constata un alejamiento respecto del modo de entender el
origen inmediato del poder político, que lo distingue tanto frente
al ambiente doctrinal de su época cuanto frente a la escolástica
aristotélica de los siglos subsiguientes.

A study on the notion of wisdom in Albertus Magnus based on his commentaries on Eth. Nic.

«La sabiduría en san Alberto Magno» in: "La sabiduría en Tomás de Aquino. Inspiración y reflexión. Perspectivas filosóficas y teológicas", edited by Liliana B. Irizar, Bogotá: Universidad Sergio Arboleda, 2017, ISBN: 978-958-8987-57-6, pp. 33-53.

In the dictionaries there is a common definition of art as ‘‘the expression or application of human creative skill and imagination, typically in a visual form such as painting or sculpture, producing works to be appreciated primarily for their beauty or emotional power.’’ Even in this very simple definition, it can be seen a necessity for the existence of an artist who is creating the art. When it is again looked at the definition of the artist, it says that the artist is ‘‘a person who practices or performs any of the creative arts.’’ As you can see while the very definition art was signifying the artist, the definition of the artist signifies the art. However, in this paper what it is wanted to do is to show the role and importance of another figure -of course without regretting the role, importance, environment and atmosphere of the art and artist- it is the role of the patrons in the artistic expression. It will be seen how important the impacts of the patrons and their positions in the rest of the paper. While demonstrating their impacts on the artist and naturally on the art, it will also be discussed the political, social, economic and philosophical atmosphere of the artists and patrons. In his book, Şair ve Patron, Halil İnalcık claims that together with the rising merchant class and decentralization in the west, it could be seen different power centers and different artistic expressions growing around those centers but in the east, such a kind of economic and political decentralization did not happen therefore the artistic expression had grown around one center which was depending on the land and agricultural production. His claim helped me to chose a specific period while investigating the role and impact of the patrons; it is apparently the Renaissance period which is witnessing the rise of mercantilism, decline of the church authority and increase of the city states and small principles all around Europe. And lastly, when it is chosen the Renaissance as the period to investigate the role and impacts of the patrons in the artistic expression under, it is appeared as a natural outcome of the period; the Medici Family that is the most effective and powerful patron of the period. While investigating their patronage, I have chosen a chronological methodology which will help us to see the reasons and background of the Renaissance art and Medici patronage.

本稿は、「初期近代における抽象と概念形成」の1章を予定しているものである。本章の目的は、近世を代表する哲学者である、デカルトやロック、ライプニッツにおける抽象と概念形成の問題を論じるに当たり、 その準備作業として、17 世紀西欧における「抽 象」(abstractio, abstraction)の言説を調査し、その一般的使用を分析することから、17 世紀 における抽象概念の一般的理解を見積もることである。本稿が注目したい独自の論点は、「抽象」およびそれに関連する用語に限定した仕方での、17世紀スコラからライプニッツまでの抽象概念の受容と変容である。とりわけ注目したいのは、アルノーとニコルの『ポール・ロワイヤルの論理学』（初版1662; 第2版1664; 第5版1683）およびライプニッツの『人間知性新論』（1703-5）において、真理を導く抽象として積極的に擁護される「精神の抽象」（absraction de l’esprit, abstraction d’esprit）という規定である。この「精神の抽象」に注目する理由は、彼らが精神の抽象を擁護したことだけでなく、抽象観念を否定したバークリやヒュームらと対比する上でも、この概念が重要な指標となると考えるからでもある。そこで本章では、当時のスコラ哲学における「抽象」の定義と用法を確認する。そのためのコーパスとして、当時しばしば参照されたいくつかの哲学辞典を取り上げたい。まず、当時のスコラ哲学の語彙を集成しておりデカルトらも参照したゴクレニウスの『哲学レキシコン』 (1613)を参照する。ライプニッツもまた、自ら館長を務めたハノーファーの図書館に、ゴクレニウスとミクラエリウスの『哲学レキシコン』のコピーを持っていた 。そして、両辞典には、「精神の抽象」という用語が明確に出現している。そこで、次にミクラエリウスの『哲学レキシコン』（1662）も適宜参照し、「精神の抽象」という規定の起源とその精確な意味内容に迫りたい。最後に、ジルソンのINDEX SCOLASTICO-CARTÉSIENの「抽象」の項を参照し、そこで引用されているエウスタキウスの『哲学大全』における抽象の分類の観点からデカルトとスコラ哲学の関係について簡単に触れることで、次章で扱う予定のデカルトおよびデカルト派の哲学における抽象概念にかんする考察につなぎたい。

Pubblicato per la prima volta nel 1931, questo testo è l'opera più importante e rappresentativa di Amato Masnovo: un trattato di metafisica intesa come il cuore stesso della filosofia, che nasce dal problema della vita e a questa deve saper tornare. È l'esigenza di un'interrogazione razionale su di sé e sul mondo, che non può evitare di estendersi alle questioni ultime, di domandarsi cioè se un senso esista oppure no e, se sì, che cosa o magari chi sia; in tale traiettoria la filosofia interseca la religione e si potrà vedere solo poi se tra le due avrà luogo uno scontro o un incontro. In un contesto per molti aspetti lontano dal nostro, ma non meno sofisticato e composito, l'autore ritiene di poter declinare l'abbraccio tra la dimensione della ragione e quella della fede in un volume che oggi può essere considerato un classico, in grado di rappresentare sia icasticamente il proprio tempo sia problemi e soluzioni che lo trascendono. L'edizione che qui si presenta è rivista e integrata nelle note, e include in appendice i quattro articoli richiamati dallo stesso Masnovo nel saggio.

ABSTRACT By offering a historical overview of the problem of universals and by focusing in the contributions of the medieval philosopher John Duns Scotus and the founder of American Pragmatism, Charles Peirce, the article introduces Peirce's insight on the problem. Such insight is tracked by explaining the connections between Aristotle, Duns Scotus, and Peirce. Peirce's account was named by himself 'Scholastic Realism' , and such Realism of universals aims to provide a feasible account for contemporary Scientific Realism. The problem of universals, after such a reading, appears as a continuous and vibrant issue that defines both traditional and contemporary philosophical problems.

Il saggio di Edith Stein intende porre un confronto tra la fenomenologia di E. Husserl e la filosofia di Tommaso d’Aquino. A partire dalla visione stessa della filosofia, E. Stein osserva i punti d’incontro tra due tipologie di pensiero diversi per contesto, riferimento storico e contenuto gnoseologico.
Se appare qualche accordo, tuttavia, a livello filosofico, si deve tenere presente che l’intenzionalità del conoscere non è conciliabile con il realismo tomista, che sostiene l’intelligibilità dell’essere. Un accordo di fondo con un disaccordo di fondo: ci sembra che questa formula, coniata da C. Fabro, riassuma lo studio di E. Stein nel suo confronto fra il maestro che l’aveva formata e che veniva lasciando (Husserl) e il maestro medievale da cui si lasciava ora formare e che veniva accettando (Tommaso).

The essay of E. Stein’s tries to make a comparison between the E. Husserl’s phenomenology and Thomas Aquinas’ philosophy.
Starting from the idea of the philosophy, E. Stein focuses on the link between the two above-mentioned ways of thinking (the phenomenology at one side and the philosophy at the other side), which are different for social and historical background and for the gnoseologic content.
Tough Husserl’s phenomenology and St. Thomas’s philosophy have some common points, the intentionality of knowledge, isn’t compatible with the thomism’s realism, which deals with the being’s intelligibility.
A general agreement in a framework of disagreement: this expression, coined by C. Fabro, could represent the essence of E. Stein’s work, in the comparison between her previous teacher, from whom she was step by step distancing herself (Husserl) and the medieval teacher, who was always more accepted and followed by E. Stein (St. Thomas).

Es ist ein unschätzbar wertvolles Erbe des Mittelalters, Bildung – das „studium“ – als autonome „dritte Gewalt“ neben die Sphäre des Religiösen und des Politischen gestellt zu haben. Wie es zu diesem epochalen Schritt kommen konnte und wie er die Gesellschaft verändert hat, soll im vorliegenden Buch geschildert werden. Als Studienbuch dient es zugleich der Vermittlung historischer Kenntnisse und Fertigkeiten sowie der Einführung in ein Forschungsgebiet, dessen Vielfalt hier natürlich nur angedeutet werden kann.
ISBN (Broschur): 978-3-11-045214-3; ISBN (e-book, PDF): 978-3-11-045222-8; ISBN (e-book, EPUB): 978-3-11-045234-1
Aktuelle Rezensionen:
"Gramsch-Stehfest zeigt sich in der Behandlung seines Themas sehr kompetent. (…) Ausführlich beleuchtet er die Institutionen und Organisationsformen der Bildung (...), durchaus aber auch deren kulturelle Einbettungen: Geschlechtergeschichte des höheren Wissens, Scholastik als gelehrter Modus, Wunderglaube und Entdeckergeist, die Sozialgeschichte der Schul- und Universitätsbesucher, die Karrierewege und die langsame Akademisierung der Gesellschaft während des späten Mittelalters." (Frank Rexroth, in: HZ 310/3 [2020], S. 706f.)
"Robert Gramsch-Stehfest wählte relevante Gesichtspunkte mittelalterlicher Universitätsgeschichte geschickt aus und schuf ein Einführungswerk, das sowohl dem Anspruch der Informationsdichte als auch gefälliger Präsentation und leichter Lesbarkeit genügt. (...) ein gediegenes Studienbuch (...)" (Hanspeter Marti, in: http://informationsmittel-fuer-bibliotheken.de/showfile.php?id=9705)
"Alles in allem hat der Band das Potenzial zum Standardwerk." (Maik Schmerbauch, in: Zs. für Geschichtswissenschaft 67 [2019], S. 865ff.)

The article is a piece of interdisciplinary research: it connects historical-theological studies of medieval Christian thinking and studies in the history of Christian education. It is built around the conviction that the socio-cultural and intellectual context on the one side and the form and content of theology on the other side are always correlated to each other. In other words, the system or type of education that a person goes through influences his mode of thinking and, at last, his theology. The weight and value of this contextual-theological stance are checked and examined within a historical-theological analysis of thirteenth-century university education and the formation of the phenomenon of medieval scholasticism.
The study detects and shows the connections between the educational model that was prevalent at the time and the theology that was formulated. Such a thesis is confirmed and illustrated by the test case of Thomas Aquinas and his Summa theologiae. In the end, the conclusion offers a number of brief notes concerning the educational and intellectual value of study for lay Christians and Christian educators of the present day.

Orthodox gnosiology is not merely an intellectual question,  but is also a phenomenological, existential, ontological, personal and mystical one.  This is how orthodox theology can develop its methodology without reducing itself to a simple philosophical system.

Anselm of Canterbury's Proslogion and its basic theological theses have frequently been viewed as a proof of God’s existence or the ontological argument for it. However there exists another approach, searching for a more religious or mystical reading of the work. A middle way, which combines the two approaches, helps to reconsider this work and its author’s ideas. This third approach views Proslogion as both a narrative and a rational explanation of complex process of gaining the knowledge of God per se. The article aims at offerring such a balanced re-reading, by means of the conceptual exegesis of the introductory and concluding chapters of the Proslogion in dialogue with such scholars as G. R. Evans, R. McMahon, J. Sire, and others.

This essay attempts a sketch of what Neoscholastic thought could be if it were to take seriously both its own past and the challenges of post-modern thought. Arising as a Catholic response to modern rationalism, the Neoscholastic movement embraced the rationalist assumptions of its opponents, practicing what Foucault has termed "reverse discourse." Understood from its historical roots, however, Scholastic thought is open both to a diversity of truths and to the dynamism of history--both crucial aspects of post-modernism. I argue that Joseph Ratzinger's book "The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure" offers the conceptual resources to think the relationship between truth and time in a way that goes beyond traditional Neoscholasticism while remaining perfectly orthodox ("radically orthodox," one might say...).

In his early work, De inventione rhetorica, Cicero casually defines religion as the part of justice “which offers care and ceremony to a certain superior nature, which they call divine" (De inventione rhetorica 2.53).  In Latin medieval philosophy, this Ciceronian definition of the virtue of ‘religion’ (religio) acquired monumental importance.  A few key authors, such as Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, cite this definition as an auctoritas, and get much philosophical and theological mileage out of it. 

Their intention with this auctoritas was to classify religious worship as a natural virtue, as opposed to a theological virtue, that is, as a virtue that naturally inclines man to give to the deity what is due to it on the basis of the natural law, without any dependence on Christian doctrine or revelation.  Despite being conscious that the source of this definition of religion was a pagan (Roman) philosopher, and that his religious background was very different from their own, they sought to ground their view on the nature of religion firmly on the classical understanding of the cardinal virtue of justice.  Thus, Cicero went down in history as the official source for the medieval conception of religious worship. What these medieval thinkers did not know—because they did not have access to Plato’s Euthyphro—is that Cicero’s own source for this doctrine was Plato.  Plato’s Euthyphro truly represents the first Western philosophical text to relate religion to justice, and in fact it is the first instance in the history of philosophy where religious worship is discussed as a thoroughly philosophical issue. The dialogue hinges on the nature of “piety” (eusebeia) or “the holy” (to hosion). After a few unsuccessful attempts at defining piety, Euthyphro, with Socrates’ help, formulates the hypothesis that piety can be defined as “the part of the just that is concerned with the ‘care’ (therapeia) of the gods” (Euthyphro 11e-12e). Although Socrates will question how it is possible for mere mortal men to give “care” or “service” to the gods—for the gods are assumed to be self-sufficient—nevertheless, the claim that piety is a part or species of justice will remain unchallenged throughout the dialogue.  The dialogue, therefore, approaches a definition of piety: it strongly suggests that the genus of piety is justice and, in the second place, that its specific difference has to do with the “care” or “service” of the gods, a definition that almost perfectly resembles that offered by Cicero centuries later. The discussion on piety in the Euthyphro is undoubtedly inconclusive, and this has led most modern interpreters to focus on the aporetic nature of the dialogue, emphasizing its lack of a definitive doctrine on piety.  A few Plato scholars, however, such as McPherran and Vlastos, have proposed what they call a constructivist reading of the Euthyphro, noting that, while the dialogue is inconclusive, this is only partially so: after an aporetic interlude, a somewhat constructive discussion on the nature of piety is offered. 

The aim of this paper is to show through internal evidence, by means of a constructivist reading of the Euthyphro, that with such a reading Cicero was able to draw out and synthesize a positive doctrine on piety, or in Cicero’s language, religio.  The conclusion emerges, then, that Cicero is only the second-hand source of this important medieval idea, and that Cicero himself was heavily influenced by Plato on this issue, probably through the Academy.  Hence, although the text of the Euthyphro was not available to the medieval philosophers, it nevertheless exercised a great deal of indirect influence on them by way of Cicero.  It was really Plato, then, and only secondarily Cicero, whose religious thought the medieval philosophers inherited.

This article focuses on John Wycliffe´s thought and aims at uncovering an inherent revolutionary potential of his philosophy. First, Wycliffe´s metaphysical realism that gave rise to a specific notion of truth based on the divine authority is examined. This notion is then developed into a belief that the Scripture is the absolute authority in the matters of truth. Therefore, Wycliffe considers the Biblical description of the First Church to be a measure for all other ages. However, the Church in Wycliffe´s time was far away from this ideal – thus he concludes that the present day Church needs to be reformed. Since even the Pope, the very head of the Church is corrupt, the reform must come from outside of the Church, namely from the King.

The purpose of this essay is to explore, and clarify, some key features in Aquinas’ account of the virtue of temperance, with an eye to answering some common objections raised against a positive evaluation of temperance. In particular, I consider three features of Aquinas’ understanding of temperance: First, the role of the rational mean in temperance; second, the role of rightly ordered passions in temperance; and third, the ‘despotic’ control of reason over the passions in temperance. Along the way I consider three common objections to Aquinas’ account of temperance: the objection that temperance can be misused for evil, the objection that temperance devalues effort, and the objection that temperance devalues strong passions and thereby implicitly devalues the goodness of sexuality. In responding to these objections on behalf of Aquinas, I take the opportunity to clarify and slightly extend Aquinas’ account of temperance.

""In his « little Treatise in English» on Human nature (1640), and, later, in Leviathan (1647 – 1650), Thomas Hobbes examines and redefines the passions. Basing his argument upon the concept of motion, he conceives them as thoughts: passions are nothing but perceptions, which transit through the brain, and then move towards the heart. There they cause various sensations of pleasure or pain, by helping or hindering « vital motion ».
Anger, Hobbes claims, is a break-through in front of a sudden opposition, not the response to an outrage, as the Ancients had erroneously claimed. « Courage, in a large signification, is the absence of fear in the presence of any evil whatsoever; but in a stricter and more common meaning, it is contempt of wounds and death, when they oppose a man in the way to his end. Anger (or sudden courage) is nothing but the appetite or desire of overcoming present opposition. It hath been commonly defined to be grief proceeding from an opinion of contempt; which is confuted by the often experience we have of being moved to anger by things inanimate and without sense, and consequently incapable of contemning us. » (Leviathan, I, 6, 1-2.  Cf. Human Nature, VII, 1-2).
The definition of 'orge', as the grief for an undeserved slight, joined to the wish to retaliate, comes from Aristotle’s 'Rhetoric', a text Hobbes not only knew, but also translated. Anger was, for Aristotle, the political passion par excellence. It is because we are insulted that we revolt, and that our revolt is justified. It is in anger that we commit tyrannicide. Be it a tumultuous explosion or a long lasting grudge, ire is by definition the reasoned answer of a social actor, who suffers in his body as well as in the social image that he has  created for herself, and on behalf of justice: one does not recognize this person for that which he wishes to be considered. The gender mark is intended, given the heroic context. This criticism might appear to be just a minor detail, confined to Hobbes’ typology of the passions.  But since the new description of anger disconnects the emotion from any justification (thus from justice), refuting Aristotle was crucial for the consistency of Hobbes’ theory of the state. Leviathan must have zero tolerance for any form of social violence, from sedition (his sickness) to civil war (his death). Therefore the celebration of the noble killing of a king (conveniently labeled “tyrant”), has no place in modern politics. Those who come to treat a sovereign as an obstacle in their way understand nothing of the nature of the state, which is artificial and vulnerable, always threatened by a return to the state of nature.
    Furthermore, to object to Aristotle on anger was consistent with Hobbes’ profound weariness with classical political theory. One of the most insidious causes of the dangerous misunderstanding of the state, Hobbes argues, was ideological. People learned to cultivate dissent and glamorize discontent from subversive, poisonous political theories: those of the Ancients. « From the reading, I say, of such books, men have undertaken to kill their Kings, because the Greek and Latin writers, in their books and discourses of Policy, make it lawful and laudable, for any man so to do ; provided, before he do it, he call him tyrant. For they say not regicide, that is, killing a king, but tyrannicide, that is, killing of a tyrant is lawful » ('De Corpore Politico', XXVII,  10).  No learning of a language, Hobbes dryly comments, has ever been paid with so much blood, as that of Greek and Latin (Ibidem, 150).
In the transition from a theory of man as a political animal, naturally inclined to sociability (Aristotle), to a vision of human nature, made up of movement and competition, Hobbes rethought the anthropological underpinnings of politics. This required the simplification of the passions, and the rejection of that interlacing of rights, habits and body, which framed the complexity of the emotions in the classical past. The demystification of anger was critical.
 

""

This article introduces source texts and images that support a new analysis of the iconography of the Theology (‘Disputa’) fresco, and the proposition that it was conceived as the visual and conceptual centerpiece of the Stanza della Segnatura (1508-11). Designed in particular dialogue with the Philosophy (‘School of Athens’) fresco on the Stanza’s opposite wall, Theology embodies the philosophical concord between Plato and Aristotle. Not structured as an unalloyed Platonic hierarchy, Theology presents Christ’s material body as simultaneously present in heaven and on earth, and structures a corresponding interpenetration of the terrestrial and celestial realms. It also uniquely combines all four branches of knowledge—philosophy, theology, poetry, and jurisprudence—depicted in the room. Understood in this way, the private library may be viewed as a fluid discursive space created for a discerning pontiff and suited to its contemplative function. This also permits a clarification of the contributions of the patron (Julius II), intellectual advisor (Giles of Viterbo), and artist (Raphael).  Moreover, it reveals Raphael's intellectual grasp of difficult religious and philosophical ideas, as expressed in his ingenious conjoining of medieval and classical Roman forms, ideas of materiality and immateriality, and body and soul. Such conclusions recast modern understanding of this important monument of the Italian Renaissance as resulting from a collaborative approach to iconographical invention that challenges prior notions of artists working in humanist contexts in the period as ‘passive’ recipients of ‘active’ textual programs.

(from the Introduction:) Choosing imagination as a subject of historical research may appear to be a dangerous initiative. Imagination, dealing with the realm of subjectivity and emotions, is not easy to pinpoint and analyze. But if we approach a medieval text full of metaphors, complex images and mystical visions, the notion of imagination becomes a handy hermeneutical tool. In this paper, I try to shape this tool by defining imagination as a dimension of history and then I use it to analyze a certain aspect of a complex relationship between the texts authored by Magister Mathias of Linköping and by Saint Birgitta of Sweden, namely their methods of using imagined images and their sources.

Em seu volume de estréia, Victor Bruno apresenta um panorama da filosofia ocidental desde a instituição da Escolástica, e guia o leitor rumo a um entendimento mais profundo não apenas dos efeitos da adoção crescente do nominalismo pelas elites pensantes, mas também pelas instituições sociais e políticas, pelas artes e pelo povo

В статье анализируются обстоятельства исчезновения из историографии философии раннего Нового времени исторического феномена схоластической философии и теологии Общества Иисуса, причем показывается, что это исчезновение было параллельным с формированием привычного нам большого нарратива "научной революции" и канона "новой философии" XVII в. в немецкой традиции философской истории философии XVIII-XIX в. Кроме того, демонстрируется значение иезуитов как ведушей образовательной силы Европы XVII в. и описывается тип философии Общества, формирование первых систем - "философских курсов" Общества, а также важность метафизики иезуитов для философского ландшафта всего XVII в.
„The Philosophy of the Jesuits as the lost key element in the scientific landscape of the XVIIth century: On the Insufficiency of traditional image of the history of philosophy and sciences in the Early Modern time”.
The article analyzes the circumstances of disappearance of scholastic philosophy and theology of the Society of Jesus from the historiography of Early Modern philosophy. It shows that this disappearance was parallel with the formation of the familiar narrative of the “scientific revolution” and of the canon of the “new 17th century philosophy” in the German tradition of the philosophical history of philosophy in the XVIII-XIX centuries. In addition, the importance of the Jesuits as the leading educational power of Europe in the 17th century is demonstrated, and the type of philosophy of the Society, the formation of the first systems - the "philosophical courses" of the Society, as well as the importance of the Jesuit metaphysics for the philosophical landscape of the whole XVIIth century is explained.