Right to Truth

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This paper attempts to provide a more complete understanding of the so-called right to the truth, deriving from court-made doctrine in the human rights field, and associated with an alternative form of legal proceeding in Argentina that has no equivalent anywhere else in the world: the trial for the truth (juicio por la verdad), a procedure sui generis created in the aftermath of the military dictatorship in response to both the politics of forgetting that prevailed in the 1990s and the continuing obstruction of criminal proceedings down to 2003 due to amnesty laws. Protecting the right to the truth fulfils three functions by turns: first, it makes possible conciliation of amnesty with the right to judicial protection; second, it constitutes the condition for real access to justice; third, it validates the reality of the crime. Each of these functions is associated with one of the three elements, which, together, comprise the struggle against impunity: investigation, sanction, and reparation. Situated between truth commissions and classic criminal proceedings, symbolic reparation and retribution, the Argentinian trials for the truth offer a new way of conceiving both the criminal-law judge’s mission and the relations among law, truth, history, and memory in the context of the rich debates about (post-)transitional justice.
Sévane Garibian

Cet article retrace le contexte et les tribulations de la première reconnaissance judiciaire d’un « droit à la vérité » sur les disparitions forcées, commises sous la dictature des généraux en Argentine entre 1976 et 1983. Quelle(s) fonction(s) l’invocation d’un « droit à la vérité » sur le sort des disparus de la dictature militaire des généraux a-t-elle rempli dans le contexte argentin post-dictatorial, et comment les juges se sont-ils positionnés face à cette revendication inédite d’un droit alors inexistant, de surcroît dans un contexte politique sensible visant à esquiver la question des desaparecidos au profit de la « réconciliation nationale » ? À partir de l’analyse des archives judiciaires et institutionnelles liées aux affaires Mignone et Lapacó et la reconstruction de leur déroulement, cette contribution vise à examiner comment l’invention d’un « droit à la vérité » justiciable a permis à des parents de disparus, soutenus par des ONG de droits de l’homme, de remobiliser une justice pénale évincée par des lois d’amnistie, et d’ainsi relancer le débat politique sur les crimes commis sous la dictature militaire. À cette fin, l’article explore d’abord les ambivalences du recours fondé sur un « droit à la vérité » par rapport aux objectifs politiques qu’il poursuit, et en particulier par rapport à la punition des responsables. L’article montre ensuite comment cette ambivalence du concept de « droit à la vérité », tel qu’il est formulé par les requérants, se reflète non seulement dans la réaction des juges confrontés à cette demande de reconnaissance, mais aussi dans la réaction des militaires et d’une partie du pouvoir judiciaire face aux « procès pour la vérité » (juicios por la verdad) qui consacrent de nouvelles pratiques juridictionnelles sui generis pour assurer la mise en œuvre du « droit à la vérité ».

Este texto pretende contribuir a la recuperación del trabajo que realizan los colectivos de familiares de los desaparecidos en Nuevo León (AMORES y FUNDENL) para encontrar la verdad sobre lo que ocurrió con sus seres queridos y preservar la memoria para que esta tragedia no vuelva a repetirse. Para recuperar la información se revisaron fuentes hemerográficas por internet; blogs, perfiles de facebook y sitios oficiales de estos grupos; documentos e informes de organismos de derechos humanos. Las y los desaparecidos y el quehacer que realizan sus familiares en el espacio púbico son parte de la realidad del México de comienzos del siglo XXI. Sirva este texto como un aporte desde la reflexión ciudadana a la elaboración de eso que Mate (2003) llama el duelo político: “la conciencia de la responsabilidad de los presentes respecto a los ausentes”, y así impedir el olvido y el silencio.

(English version below)

Cet article analyse les enjeux politiques et sociaux posés par l’émergence du concept de « droit à la vérité » et sa reconnaissance par le droit international. Il met en évidence l’ambivalence fondamentale d’une telle ressource pour les mouvements sociaux qui la mobilisent. Examinant le processus de construction de ce droit, il montre comment les victimes des dictatures militaires en Amérique latine ont pu y voir une ressource dans leurs luttes sociales et politiques des années 1970. Il fait voir ensuite comment cette ressource s’est également révélée une contrainte pour ces mobilisé.e.s, en raison de son indétermination et de la diversité des interprétations et réappropriations dont elle fait l’objet. L’article s’interroge enfin sur les nouvelles utopies charriées par l’avènement du droit à la vérité dans le discours du droit international des droits de l’homme.


This article analyses the political and social implications of the emergence of the concept of « the right to truth » and of its recognition by international law. It highlights the fundamental ambivalence of such a resource for social movements. Exploring the construction process of this right, it shows why it could appear as a resource for victims of Latin American dictatorships in their social and political struggles of the 1970s. It then highlights how this resource proved to be also a constraint for these movements, because of its indeterminacy and the diversity of interpretations and reappropriations it allowed. The article finally questions the new utopia revealed by the advent of the « right to truth » in the discourse of international human rights law.

Sumario: I. Introducción. II. El contenido del apartado C del artículo 20 constitucional, reformado por virtud de la reforma de 18 de junio de 2008. III. Para un recuento de la internacionalización del derecho victimal. IV. Los derechos reconocidos en el artículo 20 C constitucional. V. Hacia un derecho victimal integral en México.
Palabras Clave: Derechos de las víctimas; Reparación integral; Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos; Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos; Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos; Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación.

The idea of a "holistic approach" to transitional justice suggests that different strategies for dealing with the past such as truth-telling, criminal accountability, memory work, reparations and institutional reform, interact and complement each other. Their timing, sequencing and interrelation remail contentious though. In the specific case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the deep divisions embedded in the State structure and polity have been hindering dialogue across ethnic and political lines for the past decades. In addition, criminal accountability has been the predominant mechanism for dealing with the past. As a matter of fact, no official truth commission has ever been successfully established; while the panorama of non-official truth-telling initiatives has always been characterized by a certain degree of disarray. The challenge ahead is to find a strategy that matches Bosnia and Herzegovina's specificity and priorities.

This paper explores the shift in the human rights movement regarding the interaction between criminal justice - whether international(ized) or nationalized – and truth commissions. Once regarded as mutually exclusive institutions, focused on contradictory goals, they are now praised by the international community, human rights and transitional justice advocates as being “complementary” in the global fight against impunity. Focusing on the legal development and institutionnalization of the "right to truth", this paper questions this relatively new rhetoric and examines the effects of this consensual discourse on complementarity. In particular, it situates this shift in the broader context of the emergence of a truth and memory “industry” and the rise of new types of knowledge, expertise and technologies of truth-telling and truth-finding practices concerning the factual and legal determinations of mass atrocities.

Introduction

Mukaddes Hanım said that “words have already buried themselves.” She still has no knowledge of the whereabouts of her father, who was arrested twenty years ago. The “state,” which took her father away, did not return him and was
not held accountable, is not the only one that caused the burial of Mukaddes Hanım’s words. Journalists, politicians, academics and other citizens who did not see their suffering, who did not hear them and who did not ask after “Kurdish citizens” whose husbands, children, brothers and fathers were “wiped out,” also preferred the burial of some words. While trying anyway to
keep talking or while we were both waiting in silence, some words came back. But some words lack some meanings. After twenty years we are trying to find buried words and bring them back and to understand what they mean. However, most of the time we feel obliged to admit that words will never be enough to describe the past.
Nevertheless, we try to conduct one of the studies of “coming to terms with the past,” which tries to give ear to the feelings, thoughts, demands of thevictims, who were addressed by crimes against humanity, who were exposed to the violence of states; and to convey these feelings, thoughts and demands
to the states at stake and to those who remained silent when those crimes were committed. We have been trying to achieve that as an institution, namely, Diyarbakır Institute for Political and Social Research. What do I want to achieve personally, as a writer of this study? I can be seen as one of those who remained silent. I was “fortunate” to be a child, adolescent in the West of Turkey; studied “international relations” free of politics and it was only during my PhD studies, when I was “fortunate” to become really aware of the East of Turkey, “the Kurdish issue”. Now, I try to bear testimony to what I became
aware of years ago. Mukaddes Hanım, like others whom we visited for this study, says “Welcome” and shows us courtesy of talking and listening to us. Suffering caused by the loss of her father was turned into pride by her persistence that makes her try to understand and keep asking “why?”
“Why?” is the word we heard most frequently during the fifty six interviews we conducted on our route from Muş, Bitlis, Van, Hakkari, Mardin, Batman, Diyarbakır to Istanbul. There is no meaningful answer to this question. No word has the meaning this question begs for. Nevertheless, there are many words to say, we are never at that point where no words are left; words will never end, because they will never be enough. This study will also be added to all those words that have been said. It will bring together the narratives of Mukaddes Hanım and others who opened their doors to us with the narratives of those who suffer similar pains in other parts of the world as well as
with the political and philosophical narratives produced for similar situations concerning justice, mourning, forgiveness, resentment and political frienship. It will bear testimony to that those who were colonized, impoverished, silenced,
displaced and whose relatives were “wiped out” give a gift – composed of values, words and politics they produced in struggle and persistently keep alive – to those peoples, lives and sciences that did not experience and hear of oppression. A gift to enable the latter to “come to terms with the past.” It is impossible to convey the testimony of oppression, perhaps we can convey  “the narrative of oppression” we bore witness to. We can turn these narratives into a lesson, a politics, since, as Homi K. Bhabha says, “from those who suffered the sentence of history – subjugation, domination, diaspora, displacement
– that we learn our most enduring lessons for living and thinking.”
Before moving to testimonies, in the Chapter I, I try to look closer at the studies on coming to terms with the past, which is the subject matter of these testimonies, and at the goals, tools and addresses of these studies. I touch upon problems and promises of “transitional justice,” which for reasons discussed
in the next chapter, I call “post-conflict justice.” By examining retributive and restorative justice, I discuss notions of “victims, witnesses and survivors” as well as “perpetrators, responsible ones and bystanders.” I also address the meaning of truth for these agents; the characteristics of official truth commissions
and unofficial truth projects. The comparison I have made between retributive justice and restorative justice, which essentially emerged from criticisms of the former, sometimes leads to the relation between these two approaches to appear as an oppositional one. However, as it will be observed in the next chapters of this study and especially in the interviews, the relation between these two approaches can be said to be a complimentary one with regards to justice served in social and legal terms.
In Chapter II, I discuss concepts of “memory,” “mourning,” “forgiveness,” “resentment and vexation” as well as “political friendship” which constitute the subtext of the already mentioned studies and motivate our interviews with witnesses who were exposed to the state violence in Kurdistan in the 90s. In this study I also found valuable to examine the possibility for victims to forgive perpetrators and the responsible ones, the lack of such possibility manifested by feelings of resentment and vexation, and the political equivalent of these feelings. In this respect, I wanted to rethink the relation of “fraternity”
with Kurds which Turks usually define without leaving the throne of the elder brother within the framework of a probable political friendship with Turks, whom Kurds want to be partners in their concerns and struggles. By describing the 1990s, a “state of exception” in Turkey and Kurdistan, in Chapter III, I
aim to provide political framework for the interviews.
The following three chapters are devoted to interviews with witnesses. In the first of those chapters, Chapter IV, I introduce interviewees along with the route and background of our visits. In Chapter V I convey interviewees’ quest for justice reflected in their expectations from the state; their demands for the prosecution and punishment of perpetrators and the responsible ones; their objections to impunity, material reparation and plea-bargain; their views on disclosure and acknowledgment of truths, public apology, and finally
their state of “demandlessness.” Interviewees’ opinions with regard to the possibility of their confrontation with perpetrators and the responsible ones, the possibility for them to forgive and give their blessings, their expectations from Turks in terms of the likelihood of a new contract of fraternity/political friendship and the struggle for dignity they give are presented in Chapter VI. The last chapter is devoted to evaluation and ecommendations.
We tried to conduct interviews within a framework of twenty nine questions organized into three categories: “definition and narrative of victimhood,” “demand for justice” and “confrontation, forgiveness and resentment.” We attempted
to come to know opinions of the interviewees, but knowing that we would certainly not ask these questions one by one, we asked questions in a manner appropriate to the aim, giving priority to flow of the conversation.
That day in the evening, when we had completed our interviews and were talking about what we had heard and seen in those fifteen days, Berivan said “nothing is in its right place” in reference to pain of those who leave baby cribs at the cemetery in Şırnak, as seen in the photo on the cover of this study. Babies are not in their cribs, neither are fathers, spouses, siblings with their loved ones; for twenty years nothing is in its right place. If only this study can explain that, recall the irreplaceable, then it will tell a humble story.
With this study we hope to contribute to the process of “coming to terms with the past” in Turkey. Respect and gratitude we have for those who opened their homes and hearts to us cannot be expressed with words. Xwedê ji we razî be.

This genealogy of the “right to truth” explores the ambivalence of this new concept in international legal discourse. It argues that although various distinct mobilizations have coalesced around the idea of a “right to truth” as a resource to reform international law, the competition around its parameters has
also acted as a constraint for certain truth activists.
Given the diversity of interests at play, the institutionalization process of the “right to truth” before various bodies reveals strategies of alignment and misalignment among truth entrepreneurs that may reinforce or undermine each other’s cause. Although all these visions of the “right to truth” are presently celebrated as “complementary”, the advent of this multifaceted legal category thus conceals a range of conflicts around conceptions of justice and more generally, the social and political priorities given to the treatment of mass atrocities.

This dissertation explores the challenges of proclaiming truth as an international human right and instigating it in the field of transitional justice. The approach draws on a combination of critical legal studies and post-modern deconstructive theories. The discussion examines the legal and historical basis of a ‘right to truth’ and mechanisms for its implementation, observing historical shifts between formal and informal procedures. Critique is focused on questioning the consequences of codifying truth as a ‘right’. It finds that those who define the law have the power to reconstruct transitional societies, determining their relationship with the past and the future. Human rights are revealed not as passive mediators but active agents of change. An analysis of the relationship between truth and power concludes that a right to truth can override competing local narratives. This ‘meta-narrative’ is not controlled by rights victims but by human rights practitioners fluent in their own vocabulary. In this way human rights discourse brings about its own ‘regime of truth’. The discussion is ultimately cautious about formalising a right to truth. Whilst recognising its potential power for weak societies, the right may also diverge from its original aim of empowering victims to seek truth, justice, and redress, on their own terms.

En el marco de lo que se ha llamado "Perpetror Studies", este articulo retoma la muerte del Lazca, reconocido mando militar de los Zetas, para reflexionar en torno a los desafíos que impone la llamada guerra contra las drogas para pensar la figura del verdugo y las consecuencias de su muerte en términos de justicia y expiación de los crímenes cometidos para una sociedad atravesada por la impunidad.

Spanish Abstract: El derecho a la verdad, en tanto concepto jurídico, ha surgido en diferentes ámbitos nacionales, regionales e internacionales de protección de los derechos humanos. Se refiere a la obligación estatal de proporcionar información a las víctimas, a sus familias y a la sociedad en su conjunto sobre las circunstancias en las cuales ocurrieron graves violaciones a los derechos humanos. La verdad es analizada, entonces, como consecuencia de un proceso que involucra la búsqueda de la justicia y el dictado de sentencias que tengan un fin netamente reparador.

No obstante, para los sistemas internacionales de salvaguarda tal derecho no ha sido claramente reconocido, al menos de forma convencional. Su mención en estos es escasa y ambigua. Por estos motivos, el presente trabajo tendrá por objeto observar cómo el Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos ha delimitado el derecho a la verdad, tomando como estudio de caso la masacre de El Mozote, El Salvador, en 1981, la cual todavía hoy se encuentra impune, dejando a la sociedad salvadoreña sin justicia ni reparación pero, fundamentalmente, sin memoria.

English Abstract: The right to truth, as a legal concept, has emerged in different national, regional and international settings of human rights protection. It refers to the state’s obligation to provide information to the victims, their families, and the society as a whole, about the circumstances in which gross human rights violations were committed. The truth is analyzed, therefore, as the consequence of a process involving the search of justice and the issue of rulings that have a merely reparational goal.

However, for the safeguard international systems, this right has not been clearly recognized, at least in a conventional manner. Its mention in these systems is limited and ambiguous. Therefore, this paper aims to study how the Human Rights Inter-American System has defined the right to truth, taking as study case the El Mozote Massacre, which took place in El Salvador in 1981. This event still today remains unpunished, leaving the Salvadorian society without justice or reparation, but fundamentally without memory.

Note: Downloadable document is in Spanish.

The focus of this article is the notion of alethic rights, the rights related to truth. The concept of truth grounds many norms and customary and official rules, but there is no clear and shared idea about its power to generate specific rights. The juridical and political archetype called 'the right to truth' is still subject of controversies, and there are doubts about its being a real 'right', to be protected by positive (new) norms. In the article the problem is explored in truth-theoretical perspective: can philosophy support the idea of truth as a source of rights? Can an updated and well-developed theory of truth be proposed, to help activists and theorists concerned with the need for truth of individuals and communities? I present six alethic rights, corresponding to six different aspects of the human need for truth, then I specifically focus on the truth theory that can justify the hypothesis.
NB - this is a draft version of a published paper - for quotations, please refer to the version in Social Epistemology (https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2021.1919236)

Producto de la violencia armada y de las vulneraciones a los derechos humanos cometidas en las décadas de los ochenta y noventa, el Estado peruano inició un proceso de justicia transicional con la finalidad de resarcir a las víctimas y reconciliar a una sociedad fragmentada. A pesar de ello, aún se mantienen pendientes en esta materia, como la búsqueda de las personas desaparecidas.

El presente artículo ahondará en la importancia de una política de búsqueda de personas desaparecidas a la luz de las obligaciones internacionales en materia de derechos humanos del Estado peruano, y analizará las falencias de sus acciones de judicialización para cumplir esta tarea. Se sustentará la necesidad de un organismo centralizado que se encargue de esta función, y se presentará una propuesta normativa para su implementación en nuestro ordenamiento.

As a product of the armed violence and the human rights violations committed in the decades of the eighties and nineties, the Peruvian government initiated a process of transitional justice in order to compensate the victims and reconcile a fragmented and divided society. However, there are still issues pending in that matter. One of these issues is the search of the missing persons. The present article will delve into the importance of a policy of search of missing persons in the light of the international obligations on human rights matters of the Peruvian state, and will analyze the weaknesses of their judicial actions to accomplish this task. The need of a centralized organism in charge of this function will be sustained, and a normative proposal for its implementation in the Peruvian legal system will be presented.

Hakikat hakkı, henüz onu açıkça düzenleyen bir sözleşme veya uluslararası bir anlaşma bulunmamakla birlikte uluslararası insan hakları hukukunda, ağır insan hakları ihlallerinin kim tarafından, neden, ne zaman, nasıl, ne amaçla gerçekleştirildiğine dair kişilerin ve toplumun bilgi sahibi olma hakkını, kamu makamlarının da aydınlatma yükümlülüğünü öngörmektedir.

Bu çalışmada, bireysel ve toplumsal nitelik taşıyan ve mağdurlar açısında hem bir giderim yolu hem de bir onarım yolu olan hakikat hakkının ortaya çıkışı, gelişimi ve hukuki kaynaklarını ele alınmaktadır.

Çalışmanın temel amacı, bu hakkın politik bir talep olarak ortaya çıktığı tarihi, toplumsal, hukuki koşullar ışığında hukuki metinlerde yer alma sürecine dair kısa bir bakış sunmaktır.

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La politique étatique des disparitions forcées en Argentine (politique planifiée et exécutée durant la dictature militaire de 1976-1983) a encore, au présent, un effet frappant : en l’absence du corps des disparus, les familles cherchent les morts parmi les vivants. Il s’agit pour elles de donner corps, par le droit, aux victimes disparues et mises de ce fait hors la loi. Si « le comble de la disparition, c’est sa propre disparition » (Jean-Louis Déotte), alors résoudre juridiquement l’enigme de la disparition revient à traiter du disparu (en tant que disparu, précisément, non en tant que défunt) à travers le droit dont il est, du point de vue du bourreau, exclu puisque non-existant. C’est dans cette configuration tout à fait singulière d’une violence étatique de masse qui se construit sur l’effacement systématisé des corps de ses victimes (donc des traces et de la preuve matérielle du crime), qu’il est intéressant d’appréhender le corps disparu comme objet d’un triple enjeu : l’établissement des faits, pour la mise en lumière, la (re)construction et la connaissance du récit de ce qui a eut lieu ; la révélation du crime et le jugement des responsables ; la cessation du crime et l’accès au deuil. Il s’agira alors de penser le corps disparu/absent comme générateur de droits individuels et d’obligations étatiques.
Sévane Garibian

The “right to truth” relates to the obligation of the state to provide information about the circumstances surrounding serious violations of human rights. Despite its increasing recognition, the concept raises questions as to its scope and implementation as well as its existence as a free-standing right. Similarly, “memory laws” relate to the way states deal with their past. However, there are certain „memory laws” that, while serving as a guarantee for accessing historical truth, lead to its deformation. As a result, an “alternative” truth, based on the will of the legislators, is being imposed. In this article the authors elaborate on the general nature of the new legal phenomenon of the „right to truth”, as a tool of transitional justice, in particular in the context of both providing and abusing historical truth by the legislators, through the instrument of “memory laws”.

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The juridical treatment of the crimes committed by the Argentine dictatorship can be divided into two stages – the transitional phase proper (from 1983 to the 1990s) and the post-transitional phase (from the 1990s to the present day) – constituting a return trip from punishment to pardon, and back again. Both phases saw a number of abrupt about-turns, each corresponding to a shift in the paradigm through which the abuses committed by the military regime were confronted. The period between these two phases, meanwhile, saw the appearance of the ‘human rights turn’ based on a prescriptive injunction to pursue what was seen as a necessary fight against impunity for perpertrators of the most serious crimes. This development gave rise to new subjective human rights (such as the ‘right to the truth’) which would in turn contribute to developments in criminal law relating to these matters. The criticisms voiced in relation to this ‘criminalisation of human rights’, along with the highly complex and diverse nature of the Argentine experience, illustrate the uncertainties with which we are inevitably confronted when attempting to re-think the very notion of justice during a stage of political (post-)transition in the aftermath of a period of state-committed mass crimes, with the inevitable degree of creative transformation of the law and its functions that this entails.
Sévane GARIBIAN

La « vérité » peut-elle faire l’objet d’un droit ? La question aurait de quoi laisser le lecteur perplexe. Pourtant, en l’espace d’une décennie, l’idée d’un « droit à la vérité » dû aux victimes d’atrocités est parvenue à s’imposer de manière globale : elle occupe aujourd’hui une place centrale dans le paysage des institutions de protection des droits de l’homme et dans les politiques internationales de pacification de sociétés en conflit.
Comment ce concept a-t-il pu être consacré aussi rapidement, alors qu’il ne figurait dans aucun catalogue de droits fondamentaux ? S’agit-il d’un nouveau droit justiciable ou d’un simple recyclage sémantique d’autres droits existants ? Le « droit à la vérité » annonce-t-il une révolution juridique, ou se résume-t-il à une façade rhétorique, voire un fétichisme juridique ?

Cet ouvrage inédit reconstitue la généalogie du « droit à la vérité » en droit international, des luttes sociales concrètes pour sa reconnaissance à ses développements contemporains, afin d’en déterminer les enjeux socio-politiques et juridiques. À ce titre, il présente une cartographie complète des mobilisations du « droit à la vérité » et de leurs effets en droit international. D’une part, l’étude examine dans quelle mesure le « droit à la vérité » est reconnu en droit international et quels sont ses contours normatifs et ses bénéficiaires. D’autre part, elle sonde le rôle des entrepreneurs du « droit à la vérité » dans la construction d’un nouveau droit, afin de comprendre les conditions empiriques de sa diffusion internationale et les enjeux qui la sous-tendent.

En particulier, la thèse montre comment les mobilisations du « droit à la vérité » tentent d’orienter dans un sens particulier certains débats qui demeurent ouverts en droit international et qui sont liés à des enjeux de justice contemporains : les victimes d’atrocités ont-elles un droit à la punition des responsables ? Les amnisties sont-elles licites en droit international ? Peut-on restreindre le secret d’État et contraindre les autorités à communiquer des informations aux victimes de violations des droits de l’homme et à leurs proches ?

En définitive, l’ouvrage révèle l’ambivalence du « droit à la vérité », qui agit tantôt comme ressource, et tantôt comme contrainte pour ses promoteurs, en raison de la diversité de ses représentations et de ses réappropriations successives au fil du temps.

While historians, philosophers and legal scholars have long debated the distinction between historical and judicial truth, it may come as a surprise that a “right to truth” has recently emerged in international law in the context of serious atrocities. After three decades of struggle, victims’ advocates have recently gained momentum with the 2006 United Nations’ unprecedented adoption of a treaty on enforced disappearances that expressly recognizes their “right to know the truth” about what happened. This legal innovation raises the question how victims’ groups came to successfully voice their claims to the world community. However, positivist legal scholarship traditionally overlooks the social dynamics by which norms emerge, thereby failing to account for how moral and political claims migrate from the margins to become express legal norms. Through the case study of the right to truth, this paper traces an itinerary from its local formulation and reception, to its international re...

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ENGLISH VERSION FOLLOWS
"El mecanismo de obstrucción por la amnistía, si bien repetido a lo largo de la Historia tras situaciones de crímenes de masa y de transición política no es sin embargo infalible. Los años 90 vieron la aparición, en América Latina, de una herramienta jurídica nueva que permitió a las víctimas de violaciones graves de los derechos humanos cometidas por su propio Estado, exigir un acceso al juez penal a pesar de las amnistías: el derecho a la verdad, creado por vía pretoriana gracias a una interpretación jurisdiccional creativa del derecho internacional preexistente, y que confronta el Estado a una suerte de “retorno de lo reprimido”. El particular examen de los juicios por la verdad de los años 90 en Argentina permite  comprender mejor el pasaje de lo que en un principio fue una suerte de “imperativo de orden moral”, a lo que se transforma en un nuevo derecho. Pero, sobre todo, este pasaje pone en evidencia otro cambio: hoy ya no es tanto la cuestión de la existencia y de la efectividad de este derecho lo que se encuentra al orden del día, sino aquella, más sutil, de su utilidad –es decir, de su función a la luz de los contextos de su enunciación y de los usos que hacen de él los actores jurídicos"
Sévane Garibian

"The obstruction mechanism for amnesty, even if repeated throughout history, after situations of mass crimes in contexts of political transition, it is not an infallible mechanism. The 90s saw the emergence in Latin America of a new legal tool that allowed the victims of grave violations of human rights committed by their own state to require access to criminal court, despite the amnesties: the right to truth created by Praetorian’s means, thanks to a creative jurisdictional interpretation of the preexisting international law that faces the state with a kind of “return of the repressed”. The particular examination of truth trials in Argentina during the 90’s provides a better understanding of that process of transition from what, at first, was regarded as a sort of “moral imperative” into something that have become a new kind of law. But above all, that transformation reveals another change: today is not so much the matter of the existence and effectiveness of this right which is in the agenda, but something more subtle: its utility, that’s to say, its role on the contexts of its utterance and applications made by the legal actors".
Sévane Garibian

ABSTRACT The focus of this article is the notion of alethic rights, the rights related to truth. The concept of truth grounds many norms and customary and official rules, but there is no clear and shared idea about its power to generate specific rights. The juridical and political archetype called ‘the right to truth’ is still subject of controversies, and there are doubts about its being a real ‘right,’ to be protected by positive (new) norms. In the article the problem is explored in truth-theoretical perspective: can philosophy support the idea of truth as a source of rights? Can an updated and well-developed theory of truth be proposed, to help activists and theorists concerned with the need for truth of individuals and communities? I present six alethic rights, corresponding to six different aspects of the human need for truth, then I specifically focus on the truth theory that can justify the hypothesis.

To download click here : https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:155786

So-called fact-finding or truth-seeking procedures are widely deployed, often, in the form of mechanisms that function either before (in preparation of), in addition to, or else, as an alternative to criminal justice – when the latter is inaccessible. Indeed, reality often requires to fill the blind spots of the so-called "fight against impunity" for the most serious crimes, and to act through non-prosecutorial and extrajudicial means where retributive justice is insufficient, excluded, uncontemplated or unthinkable. These situations lead to the development of other justice mechanisms, such as truth and/or reconciliation commissions. Like the work of judicial authorities, the endeavour of these commissions involves uncovering the traces / remains of crimes and responsibilities, which allows the realization and effective implementation of the right to the truth or the right to know. Nevertheless, these extrajudicial practices are plural and polymorphous, and they use disparate procedures for the establishment of facts. This testifies to a need for new theoretical approaches. This article addresses the importance of a critical perspective when analysing such extrajudicial mechanisms, as well as a series of key questions, in light of the complex plurality that needs to be apprehended.

La « vérité » peut-elle faire l’objet d’un droit ? La question aurait de quoi laisser le lecteur perplexe. Pourtant, en l’espace d’une décennie, l’idée d’un « droit à la vérité » dû aux victimes d’atrocités est parvenue à s’imposer de manière globale : elle occupe aujourd’hui une place centrale dans le paysage des institutions de protection des droits de l’homme et dans les politiques internationales de pacification de sociétés en conflit.
Comment ce concept a-t-il pu être consacré aussi rapidement, alors qu’il ne figurait dans aucun catalogue de droits fondamentaux ? S’agit-il d’un nouveau droit justiciable ou d’un simple recyclage sémantique d’autres droits existants ? Le « droit à la vérité » annonce-t-il une révolution juridique, ou se résume-t-il à une façade rhétorique, voire un fétichisme juridique ?

Cet ouvrage inédit reconstitue la généalogie du « droit à la vérité » en droit international, des luttes sociales concrètes pour sa reconnaissance à ses développements contemporains, afin d’en déterminer les enjeux socio-politiques et juridiques. À ce titre, il présente une cartographie complète des mobilisations du « droit à la vérité » et de leurs effets en droit international. D’une part, l’étude examine dans quelle mesure le « droit à la vérité » est reconnu en droit international et quels sont ses contours normatifs et ses bénéficiaires. D’autre part, elle sonde le rôle des entrepreneurs du « droit à la vérité » dans la construction d’un nouveau droit, afin de comprendre les conditions empiriques de sa diffusion internationale et les enjeux qui la sous-tendent.

En particulier, la thèse montre comment les mobilisations du « droit à la vérité » tentent d’orienter dans un sens particulier certains débats qui demeurent ouverts en droit international et qui sont liés à des enjeux de justice contemporains : les victimes d’atrocités ont-elles un droit à la punition des responsables ? Les amnisties sont-elles licites en droit international ? Peut-on restreindre le secret d’État et contraindre les autorités à communiquer des informations aux victimes de violations des droits de l’homme et à leurs proches ?

En définitive, l’ouvrage révèle l’ambivalence du « droit à la vérité », qui agit tantôt comme ressource, et tantôt comme contrainte pour ses promoteurs, en raison de la diversité de ses représentations et de ses réappropriations successives au fil du temps.

Esta nota ofrece un mapa (que por motivos de espacio ha debido ser mínimo) sobre el tratamiento del tema en la Ley General de Víctimas, bajo el siguiente temario: 1. Contenidos básicos y derechos de acceso a la verdad, incluidos los derechos específicos de víctimas de desapariciones; 2. Extensión y límite del derecho a la verdad; y 3. Generalidades sobre mecanismos de investigación de la verdad.

To download click here : http://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:75211

ENGLISH VERSION FOLLOWS
« El Estado turco ha cometido el delito de genocidio contra el Pueblo Armenio, en el periodo comprendido entre los años 1915 y 1923 ». Esta declaración realizada por un juez federal argentino el primero de abril de 2011 en Buenos Aires, se encuentra en el núcleo de una sentencia definitiva que constituye una primicia mundial y conlleva la consagración jurídica – el (re)conocimiento- de los testigos olvidados de un crimen negado por Turquía. La sentencia se inscribe en un marco singular y único en su género: la práctica judicial sui generis de los juicios por la verdad, auténtica especificidad nacional creada en Argentina en los años noventa para revertir la política del olvido de la época en lo relativo a los crímenes de la dictadura militar. Una práctica cuya existencia misma es el producto directo de una situación inicial de borrado e impunidad, que incita a la creación de mecanismos judiciales alternativos de certificación del hecho criminal y de consagración de sus víctimas/testigos.
Sévane Garibian


“The Turkish state perpetrated the crime of genocide against the Armenian people between 1915 and 1923.” This statement, made in Buenos Aires on 1 April 2011 by an Argentinian Federal Judge, constitutes the core of a court decision that is the first of its kind in the world and that offers a legal consecration – (re)cognition – of the forgotten witnesses of a crime denied by Turkey. The sentence takes its place in an altogether singular framework: the sui generis judicial practice of juicio por la verdad (trial for the truth), a national procedure created in Argentina in the 1990s in response to the politics of forgetting then related to the crimes committed during the military dictatorship. This practice is the direct product of an initial situation of effacement and impunity which calls for the creation of alternative judicial mechanisms of validation of the criminal fact and consecration of its victims / witnesses.
Sévane Garibian

While historians, philosophers and legal scholars have long debated the distinction between historical and judicial truth, it may come as a surprise that a “right to truth” has recently emerged in international law in the context of serious atrocities. After three decades of struggle, victims’ advocates have recently gained momentum with the 2006 United Nations’ unprecedented adoption of a treaty on enforced disappearances that expressly recognizes their “right to know the truth” about what happened. This legal innovation raises the question how victims’ groups came to successfully voice their claims to the world community. However, positivist legal scholarship traditionally overlooks the social dynamics by which norms emerge, thereby failing to account for how moral and political claims migrate from the margins to become express legal norms. Through the case study of the "right to truth", this paper traces an itinerary from its local formulation and reception, to its international recognition, to illustrate how a socio-legal perspective might enrich our understanding of the creation of human rights norms, by uncovering the role of grassroots movements and transnational advocacy strategies, discursive mobilizations and professional trajectories or biographies. It explores the role of non-state actors in formulating novel human rights claims, the importance of moral and cultural resonance in issue-framing, and the ongoing dialogues between the local, regional and international spheres.

El texto analiza las bases internacionales y constitucionales del derecho a la verdad en un régimen de justicia de transición, vinculándolo con el derecho de acceso a la información en poder del Estado. En busca de la efectividad de un régimen de transición, el autor destaca la necesidad de que las autoridades públicas responsables de las comisiones de la verdad u organismos garantes del acceso a la información, sean dotados de facultades para actuar con independencia. El texto también propone, alternativamente, que el legislador, siempre que le sea posible, indique ejemplos de expresiones como “seguridad nacional” e “interés público”, frecuentemente consideradas como obstáculos para el derecho de acceso a la información y el acceso a la verdad, por autoridades administrativas que carecen de independencia, de modo que se sientan más vinculadas a una exégesis literal de las normas, reduciéndoles el margen de actuación (de discrecionalidad y de apreciación) y, finalmente, proporcionando una mayor seguridad jurídica y, en cualquier caso, la credibilidad del sistema en general.

Texto de la conferencia ofrecida en el VI Congreso Internacional de Derecho Constitucional: Constituciones para la Paz, organizado por la Universidad Libre de Colombia, en Bogotá, el 25 de septiembre de 2014.

English Abstract: This text analyses the international and constitutional bases of the right to the truth under a transitional justice system, linking it with the right to access information that is held by the State. In the search for an effective transitional system, the author points out that it is necessary for the public authorities in charge of the truth commissions and organisations guaranteeing information access to be endowed with powers of independent action. The text also proposes, as a solution, that the legislators, whenever possible, should give examples of expressions such as “national security” and “public interest”, which are frequently considered by non-independent public authorities as obstacles to the right to access information and the truth. Such authorities therefore feel bound to interpret the laws strictly by the letter, which reduces their scope of action (margin of discretion and evaluation). In the final analysis, such legislative definitions would create greater legal certainty and improve the general credibility of the legal system.

To download click here : http://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:40582

ENGLISH VERSION FOLLOWS
« L’Etat turc a commis le crime de génocide au détriment du peuple arménien, dans la période entre 1915 et 1923 ». Cette déclaration, faite par un juge fédéral argentin le 1er avril 2011 à Buenos Aires, est au cœur d’une sentence définitive qui constitue une première mondiale, et porte en elle la consécration juridique – la (re)connaissance – de témoins oubliés d’un crime nié par la Turquie. Le jugement s’inscrit dans un cadre singulier et unique en son genre : la pratique judiciaire sui generis des juicios por la verdad (procès pour la vérité), véritable spécificité nationale créée en Argentine dans les années 90 pour contrer la politique de l’oubli de l’époque relativement aux crimes de la dictature militaire. Une pratique dont l’existence même est le produit direct d’une situation initiale d’effacement et d’impunité, qui appelle la création de mécanismes judiciaires alternatifs d’attestation du fait criminel et de consécration de ses victimes/témoins.
Sévane Garibian

“The Turkish state perpetrated the crime of genocide against the Armenian people between 1915 and 1923.” This statement, made in Buenos Aires on 1 April 2011 by an Argentinian Federal Judge, constitutes the core of a court decision that is the first of its kind in the world and that offers a legal consecration – (re)cognition – of the forgotten witnesses of a crime denied by Turkey. The sentence takes its place in an altogether singular framework: the sui generis judicial practice of juicio por la verdad (trial for the truth), a national procedure created in Argentina in the 1990s in response to the politics of forgetting then related to the crimes committed during the military dictatorship. This practice is the direct product of an initial situation of effacement and impunity that calls for the creation of alternative judicial mechanisms of validation of the criminal fact and consecration of its victims / witnesses.
Sévane Garibian

Pursuing truth in the current global political climate is no easy undertaking. Truth seems to be contested on almost every front whether in social media, news outlets and/or the social discourse that surrounds us on a daily basis. The political rhetoric around " fake news " and " fact checking " has now become common lingua amongst everyday folk on the ground. What is the truth about truth? Is truth really so relativized and individualized as to be irrelevant? As we come to the close of 2017 and look forward to 2018, truth seems to be rather illusive.