Powers

Freedom or control of how we act is often understood as a kind of power - a power to determine for ourselves how we act. Is freedom so conceived possible, and what kind of power must it be? The paper argues that power takes many forms, of which ordinary causation is only one; and that if freedom is indeed a kind of power, it cannot be ordinary causation. Scepticism about the reality of freedom as a power can take two forms. One, found in Hume, assumes incompatibilism, and concludes from incompatibilism that freedom cannot exist, as indistinguishable from chance. But another scepticism, found in Hobbes, assumes instead that the only possible form of power is ordinary causation, concluding that freedom cannot for this reason exist as a form of power. This scepticism is more profound - it is in fact presupposed by Hume's scepticism - and far more interesting, just because freedom cannot plausibly be modelled as ordinary causation.

Mario Bunge's Causality and Modern Science is arguably one of the best treatments of the causal realist tradition ever to have been written, one that defends the place of causality as a category in the conceptual framework of modern science. And yet in the current revival of causal realism in contemporary metaphysics, there is very little awareness of Bunge's work. This paper seeks to remedy this, by highlighting one particular criticism Bunge levels at the Aristotelian view of causation and illustrating its relevance for contemporary powers-based accounts. Roughly, the Aristotelian view depicts interactions between objects as involving a unidirectional exertion of influence of one object upon another. This idea of unidirectional action is central to the Aristotelian distinction between active and passive powers, and its corresponding distinction between active and passive objects. As Bunge points out, modern physics does not recognise the existence of any unidirectional actions at all; all influence comes in the form of reciprocal action, or interaction. If this is right, all notions deriving from or influenced by the idea of unidirectional actions-such as the concept of mutual manifestation and reciprocal disposition partners-risk being false by the same measure. Bunge drew the conclusion that the Aristotelian view is ontologically inadequate, but still advocated its use as the most useful approximation available in science. He considered, but ultimately rejected the possibility of a modified view of causation built on reciprocal action, because, in his view, it couldn't account for the productivity of causation. Bunge's critique of this particular aspect of the Aristotelian view cannot be overlooked in contemporary metaphysics, but it is possible to construe a modified view of causation that takes the reciprocity of interactions seriously without loss of productivity.

It is a quirk of philosophy that the study of philosophy belongs to philosophy itself. As philosophers, we can ask not only "What is the fundamental nature of the world?" but also "What is the study of the fundamental nature of the world?" We can ask not only "Are there causal powers in the world?" but also "How should we understand debates about causal powers in the world?" The focus of this essay is an intriguing cycle in early modern ontology-that is, in the early modern study of what exists. René Descartes (1596-1650) helped to usher in a new era in ontology by putting pressure on the causal powers posited by his scholastic forbearers. Nicholas Malebranche (1638-1715) went a step further in flatly denying the existence of created causal powers. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716), however, demurred. Returning full circle, he insisted that any satisfactory account of the created world must appeal to causal powers reminiscent of scholastic...

Este trabalho, depois de discutir o sentido da palavra política, mostra que há quatro possíveis abordagens para a questão das relações entre língua, discurso e política: a) a natureza intrinsecamente política da linguagem e das línguas; b) as relações de poder entre os discursos e sua dimensão política; c) as relações de poder entre as línguas e a dimensão política de seu uso; d) as políticas linguísticas. Este texto desenvolve apenas os dois primeiros itens. A linguagem e as línguas têm uma natureza intrinsecamente política, porque sujeitam os falantes a sua ordem. Os silenciamentos operados pelo discurso manifestam uma relação de poder. A circulação dos discursos no espaço social está também submetida à ordem do poder. Os usos linguísticos podem ser o espaço da pertença, mas também da exclusão, da separação e até da eliminação do outro. Por isso, a língua não é um instrumento neutro de comunicação, mas é atravessada pela política, pelo poder, pelos poderes. A literatura, pelos des...

Se realiza una revisión de los primeros cinco meses del movimiento YoSoy132. Habiendo nacido de la crítica a la falta de democracia de uno de los poderes fácticos más poderoso, el de los grandes medios electrónicos de comunicación, y habiendo hecho un esfuerzo porque las elecciones presidenciales de 2012 propiciaran un voto libre e informado, este movimiento juvenil plural apartidista ha constatado que los procesos electorales han sido secuestrados por los poderes fácticos. El movimiento se ha centrado en su repudio al candidato priista por lo que representa de corrupción y autoritarismo. Ha ido aprendiendo en su contacto con muchos movimientos populares que existe una democracia de los abajo que pudiera propiciar un cambio profundo de la situación de opresión e injusticia que tanto malestar está causando.

This essay focuses on an intriguing cycle in early modern ontology—that is, in the early modern study of what exists. René Descartes helped to usher in a new era in ontology by putting pressure on the causal powers posited by his scholastic forbearers. Nicholas Malebranche went a step further in flatly denying the existence of created causal powers. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, however, demurred, arguing for a return once again of causal powers. Having explored the decline, fall, and rise of causal powers in the ontologies of Descartes, Malebranche, and Leibniz, the essay closes by asking if early modern debates over causal powers might have anything to teach us about the study of ontology itself.

This essay focuses on an intriguing cycle in early modern ontology—that is, in the early modern study of what exists. René Descartes helped to usher in a new era in ontology by putting pressure on the causal powers posited by his scholastic forbearers. Nicholas Malebranche went a step further in flatly denying the existence of created causal powers. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, however, demurred, arguing for a return once again of causal powers. Having explored the decline, fall, and rise of causal powers in the ontologies of Descartes, Malebranche, and Leibniz, the essay closes by asking if early modern debates over causal powers might have anything to teach us about the study of ontology itself.

List of illustrations Acknowledgements Introduction Part I: 1. Bodies: actors and artistic agency on the nineteenth century stage 2. Voices: oratory, expression and the text/performance split 3. Words: copyright and the creation of the performance 'text' Part II: Introduction 4. The 'unconscious autobiography' of Eugene O'Neill 5. Elmer Rice and the cinematic imagination 6. 'I love a parade!' John Howard Lawson's minstrel burlesque of the American dream 7. Sophie Treadwell's 'pretty hands' Epilogue. 'Modern Times' Works cited.

Se realiza una revisión de los primeros cinco meses del movimiento YoSoy132. Habiendo nacido de la crítica a la falta de democracia de uno de los poderes fácticos más poderoso, el de los grandes medios electrónicos de comunicación, y habiendo hecho un esfuerzo porque las elecciones presidenciales de 2012 propiciaran un voto libre e informado, este movimiento juvenil plural apartidista ha constatado que los procesos electorales han sido secuestrados por los poderes fácticos. El movimiento se ha centrado en su repudio al candidato priista por lo que representa de corrupción y autoritarismo. Ha ido aprendiendo en su contacto con muchos movimientos populares que existe una democracia de los abajo que pudiera propiciar un cambio profundo de la situación de opresión e injusticia que tanto malestar está causando.