Pity

Many consider empathy to be the basis of moral action. However, the ability to empathize with others is also a prerequisite for deliberate acts of humiliation and cruelty. In The Dark Sides of Empathy, Fritz Breithaupt contends that people often commit atrocities not out of a failure of empathy but rather as a direct consequence of over-identification and a desire to increase empathy. Even well-meaning compassion can have many unintended consequences, such as intensifying conflicts or exploiting others.

Empathy plays a central part in a variety of highly problematic behaviors. From mere callousness to terrorism, exploitation to sadism, and emotional vampirism to stalking, empathy all too often motivates and promotes malicious acts. After tracing the development of empathy as an idea in German philosophy, Breithaupt looks at a wide-ranging series of case studies—from Stockholm syndrome to Angela Merkel's refugee policy and from novels of the romantic era to helicopter parents and murderous cheerleader moms—to uncover how narcissism, sadism, and dangerous celebrity obsessions alike find their roots in the quality that, arguably, most makes us human.

L’allégorie de la statue de Glaucus est un élément central de la philosophie rousseauiste. Elle permet de comprendre l’essentiel de sa philosophie, depuis l’état de nature jusqu’au contrat social. En effet, la dégénérescence de la nature humaine due à la perfectibilité de l’homme l’oblige à quitter cet état de dégradation qui ne l’honore guère. Ne pouvant plus faire marche arrière, l’homme doit continuer sa dénaturation pour atteindre le statut d’« animal politique » et d’être moral, à travers non pas un contrat de dupes mais un vrai contrat social. Cet article, à travers cette allégorie de la statue de Glaucus, vise in fine à montrer les similitudes de l’homme moderne avec la statue défigurée et monstrueuse de ce dieu marin. Cet article est une critique de notre civilisation qui a besoin d’être repensée pour le plus grand bonheur de l’homme.

In The Age of Empathy, (2010) primatologist, Franz de Waal argues against a Hobbesian view of society and puts in its place evidence of empathy, both within and between species, as the driving force behind evolution.  Scholars as different as Jeremy Rifkin, Steven Pinker and Elaine Scarry have similarly argued that we are becoming an increasingly “empathic civilization,” where influences from literature to the internet have played vital roles in expanding the circle of our moral concern (to use a phrase of Peter Singer), and thereby reduce violence in the world.  In a strikingly different tone, however, Jacques Derrida suggested in his The Animal that Therefore I Am, that we have been engaged in a 200 year old “war on pity,” one, moreover, that has reached unprecedented proportions, especially with regard to non-human animals.  Are these views reconcilable?  This is the question driving this essay, which traces the status of pity or empathy from Rousseau (where Derrida’s interest in the question of pity began) to contemporary affect theory.  Even as we take pains to distinguish pity and empathy today, no clear distinction existed at the origins of Derrida’s war, indeed the word empathy did not exist.  Rather what we find are similar attempts to distinguish instinctive or automatic (sometimes even magnetic) examples of feeling for or with another’s pain (feelings that we are said to share with animals), from those that are dependent on some form of imagination or reflection common only to some “higher animals.”  This is similar to efforts made by de Waal and others to distinguish empathic firing of mirror neurons, and an empathy that depends on a more intentioned and reflective theory of mind.  Derrida reminds us of the necessity to “think this war,” and my examination of the different status and potential effects of these forms of empathy, will be a first step in this direction, especially as I consider whether the differences between our optimistic and pessimistic outlooks may have to do precisely with “what is called thinking,” and the possibilities for reciprocity in the empathic gaze that is said to link the animal within and before us.

This article considers Aquinas’s discussion of Misericordia (Mercy) as a natural virtue, in order to show how he departs radically from the philosophical traditions he engages while discussing it, even as he argues for its character as a natural virtue and seeks to see his discussion in continuity with those philosophical traditions. I will proceed first by introducing briefly the tension between theological and natural virtues in relation to Misericordia. Second, I will look selectively at the Greek and Roman background of Aquinas’s discussion of Misericordia, particularly the sources he replies upon, Aristotle, Seneca, and Cicero, and then finally proceed to Aquinas’s discussion proper to see the ways it presupposes but also critically and significantly departs from the ancient discussion. In giving a practical analogue in the discussion of Misericordia to the speculative truths considered in the first article of the first question, Aquinas enacts what he had argued in article four of that first question, namely that Sacra Doctrina is both a speculative and a practical science.

In this article, I explore how a group of women in a distant Russian province learned to live in the state of grief by creating a space for the traumatic experience in their daily order of things, their personal narratives, and public landscape. Using materials from my fieldwork in Siberia in 2001–03, I demonstrate how the Altai Regional Committee of the Soldiers’ Mothers domesticated and privatized losses of their sons, which were caused by the Russian state’s military politics of the last 20 years.

By devising elaborate memorializing practices, the mothers managed to materialize evidence of their loss and suffering. It is precisely this collective and individual production
of metonymies of death, I suggest, that not only became the main source of the Committee of the Soldiers’ Mothers’ new public identities but also acted as the principal vehicle of their politics of pity.

Grounded in the moral responsibility to help those who seek assistance and refuge, humanitarian aid organizations occupy a central place in our contemporary social life. The question arises as to whether the humanitarian response can provide solutions for those exiled by political persecution. In interdisciplinary work in political philosophy and ethnography, I examine the experiences of politically exiled scholars from Turkey who have received temporary postdoctoral fellowships in European institutions of higher learning through ‘academics at risk’ organizations fashioned on humanitarian principles. Welcomed in their European hostlands as ‘victims’ of and ‘refugees’ from autocratic countries, these academics have become marginalized by an anonymising victim-saviour discourse perfused with the moral sentiments of pity and compassion. Rejecting the emptying out of their political agency and critical academic acumen by such humanitarian gestures, they have turned to strategies of ‘dis-exile’ that seek to reintroduce singularity, collective action, and solidarity into the political realm.

The rhetoric found in Cicero’s works has received extensive attention in modern scholarship with most studies identifying the rhetorical devices in his public speeches. This chapter focuses on emotion as a method that Cicero used in order to persuade Atticus to comply with his requests. It argues against the opinio communis that he was able to be entirely honest and direct with Atticus. It demonstrates through an analysis of his letters to Atticus from his exile that because of Atticus’ refusal to provide, in every occasion, the type of assistance of which Cicero was in need, he resorted to appeal to emotion in his efforts to evoke feelings of pity and guilt; pity for the wretched state in which he was during his banishment and guilt over the role that Atticus played in Cicero’s decision to leave Rome instead of fighting against Clodius’ forces with the help of his supporters and for the fact that he did not try to protect Cicero in his journey to Greece, despite his life being at great danger. The chapter ends by drawing parallels between his requests during his exile and his requests concerning Tullia’s marriage as well as the shrine that he wanted to build in her honour showing that, in all three cases, the use of emotion was a common, but rather ineffective, method in terms of managing to persuade Atticus.

Readers of 'Tis Pity She's a Whore have long agreed that the social milieu of John Ford's tale of sibling incest is one of profound hypocrisy and deceit. The play openly examines brother-sister incest (it is the first English dra ma to do so) within the context of several intricate subplots involving adul tery, revenge, and murder, none of which the city's authorities do anything to ameliorate?indeed, both the ineffectual Friar and "opportunist" Car dinal1 manage to exacerbate Parma's difficulties. As Verna Foster writes, the decorous veneer of Parmesan society masks a propensity toward "illic it sex and the violence of revenge,"2 so that incest can be said to stem from the effort to achieve integrity of purpose in a world in which "it is demon strably impossible to live uncorrupted."3 From this point of view, transgres sion occurs not so much because Giovanni and Annabella are themselves

Abstract Based on a long-term ethnographic study of a group of French boxers, this article retraces the biography of one of its members. Éric was an average boxer who never truly mastered the art of dodging his opponents. He never left the ranks of amateur boxing either, although in fact he never truly hoped he would step into the limelight reserved for the very few champions who make it. His anonymous and relentless commitment to boxing was in fact filled with a different meaning that his ethnobiography brings to light. His commitment to boxing can be better understood in light of the trials he faced in “the poor life”, a life he described as flavorless, mired in unemployment and survival delinquency. Despite his repeated defeats in the ring, for him boxing was the only part of his identity that elevated his status and set him apart from those who only had the streets to hang out on. By revealing the meaning he gave to his pugilism, Éric’s ethnobiography offers a new perspective on the links between boxing, violence, and poverty. It also paves the way for exploring the dark side of a leisure activity and its struggles that extend far beyond the ring itself.

Defense of the ethical interpretation of Aristotle’s katharsis. One of the important genres in theatre and key topics in Aristotle’s Poietike is tragedy. In Aristotle’s point of view , the different varieties of poems are viewed as artifact matters which are the product of human mimesis. Amongst these, the tragic poem has its own superior position, not only regarding face & form , but also regarding its content. This is because it is able to create katharsis by provoking the feeling of pity & fear in its audience. Many different interpretations of katharsis have been developed, including a psychological, epistemological, ethical & medical interpretations ; nevertheless, it is indisputable that ethical end has a higher status than the rest.
This article aims at showing that the genre of tragedy can be viewed as an important factor in adoring the human soul with virtues by creating a moderation in it (the soul). This in turn is the grounds for bringing about prosperity and fortune, which are known as Aristotle’s ultimate end. Trough this interpretation, the firm (trustworthy) connection of art & ethics in Aristotle’s point of view become clear.

This paper interprets the affect of compassion according to Spinoza’s theory of affects (Ethics III and IV). To this end, I distinguish the practical content of benevolence according to the origin, nature and force of affects. Finally, I examine in what sense benevolence deriving from the compassion would be a sadness, whereas the benevolence deriving from the piety would be a joy. Keywords: Compassion. Benevolence. Joy. Sadness. Theory of affects. | O objetivo deste artigo é interpretar o afeto da comiseração segundo a teoria dos afetos de Spinoza (Ética III e IV). Para tal, distingue-se o conteúdo prático da benevolência de acordo com a origem, natureza e força dos afetos. Por fim, examina-se em que sentido a benevolência proveniente da comiseração seria uma tristeza, enquanto a que provém da piedade seria uma alegria. Palavras-chave: Comiseração. Benevolência. Alegria. Tristeza. Teoria dos afetos.

Nietzsche's Therapy examines Nietzsche's middle works in order to challenge those views that dismiss his conception of self-cultivation as a symptom of unadulterated narcissism. It aims to develop a far more balanced and refined conception of his idea of self-cultivation by re-examining the much neglected free-spirit trilogy of Human, All Too Human, Daybreak, and The Gay Science. Contra Nietzsche's critics, it argues that the kind of self-cultivation that draws on the model of Hellenistic and Roman Stoic philosophical therapeia. It suggests that he renovates this therapeutic tradition through his own critical, psychoanalytic insights into narcissism and its transformations. It reconstructs Nietzsche's ethics of self-cultivation in terms of his psychological analysis of the pathological symptoms of narcissism and its healthy or positive transformations. In charting Nietzsche's course from pathological narcissism to mature individualism, Nietzsche's Therapy unpacks the philosophical and psychological basis of his critique of Rousseau and Schopenhauer's ethics of pitié/Mitleid, his use and analysis of comedy and humor in his critical, deflationary treatment of the malady of omnipotence, and his exploration of the idea of friendship as a positive counterpoint to damaged forms of intersubjectivity.