Paul Rée

What can guilt, the painful sting of the bad conscience, tell us about who we are as human beings? How can it be explained or justified? Being Guilty seeks to answer these questions through an examination of the views of Kant, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Paul Rée, Nietzsche, and Heidegger on guilt, freedom, responsibility, and conscience.

The concept of guilt has not received sufficient attention from scholars working in the history of German philosophy. What's more, even individual thinkers whose conceptions of guilt have been researched have not been studied fully within their historical contexts. Guy Elgat redresses both these scholarly lacunae to show how these philosophers' arguments can be more deeply grasped once read in their historical context, a history that should be read as proceeding dialectically. Thus, in Kant, Schelling, and Schopenhauer, we find variations on the idea that guilt for specific actions we perform is justified because the human agent is guilty in his very being--a guilt for which he is responsible. In contrast, in Rée and Nietzsche, these ideas are rejected and guilt is seen as rarely justified but rather explainable through human psychology. Finally, in Heidegger, we find a near synthesis of the views of the previous philosophers, as he argues we are guilty in our very being yet are not responsible for this guilt. In the process of unfolding the trajectory of these evolving conceptions of guilt, the philosophers' views on these and many other issues are explored in depth, and through them Elgat articulates an entirely new approach to guilt.

(Este artigo carece de revisão e portanto não expressa integralmente as posições atuais de seu autor.)

This paper examines the paths that lead Nietzsche to enunciate his critique of moral values as a new demand. To this end, I consider above all the debate of Nietzsche with Paul Rée and the corresponding moral theory, in order to evaluate, finally, the legacy left by the historical philosophizing to the future generations. Keywords: Genealogy of morals. Critique of morals. Moral valuations. Moral psychology. Grounding of morals. | O objetivo do artigo é analisar os caminhos que levam Nietzsche a enunciar sua crítica dos valores morais como uma nova exigência. Para tanto, considera-se sobretudo o debate de Nietzsche com Paul Rée e a teoria moral correspondente, de modo a avaliar, por fim, o legado deixado pelo filosofar histórico às gerações futuras. Palavras-chave: Genealogia da moral. Crítica da moral. Juízos morais de valor. Psicologia moral. Fundamentação da moral.

There is an eye-catching similarity in structure between Paul Rée's Origin of Moral Sensations and Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals. Accordingly, the Genealogy has been understood as a Riposte to Rée. I will argue in this paper that Nietzsche distances himself from Rée not only by developing alternative genealogies for moral concepts and institutions. Nietzsche's main aim in criticizing Rée is to develop his own genealogical method that aims for historical adequacy, psychological adequacy, distinction of cause and function, acceptance of partial historical opacity and perspectivism.

HAGO COMENTARIOS SOBRE LA PELÍCULA DEL DIRECTOR BÚLGARO PINCHAS PERRY SOBRE LA NOEVLA DEL PSIQUIATRA IRVIN D. YALOM, "EL DÍA QUE NIETZSCHE LLORÓ", UNA HISTORIA FICTICIA SOBRE LOS ORÍGENES DEL PSICOANÁLISIS, QUE INDEPENDIENTE DE LA VERDAD MATERIAL ES DE UNA GRAN BELLEZA EN LOS DIÁLOGOS ENTRE UN NIETZSCHE TERAPEUTA Y UN JOSEPH BREUER ANALIZANTE.

This article focuses on the first treatise of Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals, regarding
the historical origins of the noble and slave morality, and proposes the intrinsic possession
or lack of power as a key notion to understand these origins. Given the significance that
Nietzsche ascribed to the Ancient world, the notion of power will be elucidated through
a comparison with some selected texts by Heraclitus and Plato. The first part deals with
intrinsic power as the primary source of the noble morality, its consequences with regards
to the notion of good and the image human beings have of themselves and their place in
the world. The second part presents powerlessness as the root of all moral resentment, i.e.
of the slave morality, focusing on Plato’s conception of the ἰδέαι, as well as his definition of
being as the power (δύναμις) to perform an action or to be acted upon. The third part synthesizes
the previous sections and shows the relation between the noble and slave morality
regarding both power and cruelty, i.e. their own account of what good and evil are.